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Implementing the AMISOM Mandate amidst Foreign Interventions: Implications for the African Union and United Nations Partnership (2007–2017)

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PhD in Political Science, specialization in International Relations

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Acknowledgements

Abstract

This PhD thesis seeks to contribute towards closing a research gap in the knowledge about the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as an African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) authorised peace enforcement operation. In so doing, the study covers the period 2007-2017 and attempts to fulfil three broad objectives. Firstly, it examines the implementation of AMISOM mandate amidst foreign interventions and their underlying implications for the strategic AU-UN partnership. Secondly, the thesis attempts to examine any significant changes towards the implementation of the mandate by assessing the evolution of AMISOM's decade-long presence in Somalia. The analysis focuses on whether AMISOM has morphed into an exercise in self-interest or still pursuing the shared strategic objectives for which it was established. Thirdly, the study confronts the theoretical idea imposed by Western ideologies to export liberal democracy through peacekeeping operations, especially as it relates to regional peace operations. In a sense, it contrasts between liberalism and realism vis-à-vis peacekeeping operations in order to account for the case of AMISOM given the involvement of frontline states whose realist strategy in Somalia has presented a major dilemma. Given the latitude, the study adopts an interdisciplinary and mixed methodology approach in its analysis of foreign interventions and the pursuit of illicit commercial interests in a conflict economy milieu marked by attempts to counter *al-Shabaab* in Somalia. As a qualitative research, the study relies on primary and secondary data sources including relevant articles and journals, although aspects of quantitative method have also been used where appropriate.

Research Key Words:

AMISOM, Self-Interest, Foreign Intervention, African Union, United Nations, Partnership.

Resumo

Esta tese de doutoramento visa contribuir para o preenchimento de uma lacuna de pesquisa no conhecimento sobre a Missão da União Africana na Somália (AMISOM), como uma operação de imposição da paz autorizada pela União Africana (UA) e endossada pelas Nações Unidas (ONU). O âmbito do estudo abrange o período 2007-2017 e ambiciona cumprir três objetivos principais. Em primeiro lugar, examina a implementação do mandato da AMISOM no meio de intervenções estrangeiras e as suas implicações subjacentes para a parceria estratégica UA-ONU. Em segundo lugar, a tese tenta examinar quaisquer mudanças significativas em relação à implementação do mandato, avaliando a evolução da AMISOM após uma década de presença na Somália. A análise concentra-se em determinar se a AMISOM se transformou num exercício em interesse próprio ou se ainda persegue os objetivos estratégicos comuns para os quais foi estabelecida. Em terceiro lugar, o estudo confronta a ideia teórica imposta pelas ideologias ocidentais para exportar a democracia liberal por meio de operações de manutenção da paz, especialmente no que se refere as operações de paz regionais. Em certo sentido, contrasta entre liberalismo e realismo face às operações de manutenção da paz com vista a contextualizar o caso da AMISOM, dado o envolvimento dos Estados da linha da frente, cuja estratégia realista na Somália apresentou um grande dilema. Dada a latitude, o estudo adopta uma abordagem metodológica interdisciplinar e mista, na análise de intervenções estrangeiras e a prossecução de interesses comerciais ilícitos, num ambiente de economia de guerra marcado por tentativas de conter o *al-Shabaab* na Somália. Tratando-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa, o estudo baseia-se principalmente em fontes primárias e secundárias, incluindo artigos e periódicos relevantes, embora alguns aspectos do método quantitativo tenham sido também aplicados.

Palavras-chave de pesquisa:

AMISOM, Interesse próprio, Intervenção estrangeira, União Africana, Nações Unidas, Parceria.

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List of Abbreviations

AAIA	Aden Abdulle International Airport
ADF	Australian Defense Forces
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AFSOL	African Solutions to African Problems
AIAI	Al-Ittihad Al-Islami
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
APRCT	Alliance for Peace Restoration ad Counter-Terrorism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BNDF	Burundi National Defense Forces
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CCTARC	Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell
CEW	Continental Early Warning System
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
DFS	Department of Field Support
DNDF	Djibouti National Defense Forces
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENDF	Ethiopia National Defense Forces
EPLF	Eritrean Popular Liberation Front
EU	European Union

EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FC	Force Commander
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HOA	Horn of Africa
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
HVTs	High Value Targets
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IGASOM	IGAD Mission in Somalia
IR	International Relations
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
LAS	League of Arab States
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
TFG	Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front

ONUC	United Nations Operation in Congo
QRF	Quick Reaction Forces
RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SALF	Somali Abo Liberation Front
SEMG	Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group
SESG-GL	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes
SNA	Somali National Army
SNM	Somali National Movement
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SPM	Special Political Mission
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSF	Somalia Security Forces
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TCCs	Troop Contributing Countries
TFIs	Transitional Federal Institutions
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TNG	Transitional National Government
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
SRCC	Special Representative of the Commission Chairperson
PCC	Police Contributing Countries
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia

UNSOS	United Nations Support Office in Somalia
UNTAF	United Nations Multilateral Task Force
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Forces
USC	United Somali Congress
US	United States of America
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
VoA	Voice of America
WSLF	Western Somalia Liberation Front
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0. Introduction: Overview of Foreign Interventions in Somalia

> *Whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resemble those of preceding times. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men who ever have been, and ever shall be, animated by the same passions, and thus they necessarily have the same results.*

> *Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527)*

Against the backdrop of war and atrocities, Somalia's past has been marked by numerous foreign interventions since the early 1990s. In her book *Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Somalia Conflicting Missions and Mixed Results*, Elizabeth Schmidt identifies two categories of foreign interventions. The first post–Cold War intervention began in 1992 with a UN mandate to monitor a ceasefire and to provide protection for famine relief operations. The second category of intervention began in 2006 with US central intelligence agency (CIA) support for anti-Islamist warlords and culminated in a US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia the same year. External involvement accelerated the growth of a jihadist movement that quickly dominated the antiforeign insurgency (Schmidt, 2018, p.72). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is an embodiment of the evolving partnership between the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) in confronting peace and security challenges in Africa, represents another round of foreign military interventions and it is the focus of this study. It is important to note from the onset that one way or another, each intervention had its own merits, motivation and undeniably contributed towards shaping the operating context and developments inside Somalia.

In the case of the AU, there is a shared belief among analysts that factors such as the geopolitical dynamics and national interests of the most powerful regional states of the 'Greater Horn of Africa[1]' particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, were central in

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[1] The countries identified in the region include Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Egypt. The Greater Horn of Africa is a region with certain commonalities. To understand the region, one needs to trace the origins and development of the concept in order to analyse contemporary international relations in the Greater Horn of Africa. Historically, the Greater Horn must be examined within the context of the water systems of the River Nile, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Lake Victoria. These

the creation and deployment of AMISOM. This study attempts to demonstrate the extent to which actions and interests by these countries had a noticeable impact on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and consequently undermined the AU-UN partnership. As an example, due to national policy concerns towards its neighbour, Ethiopia, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) had been in Somalia twice between 2006-2011 on different but related military intervention objectives, and in both instances, with the blessings of their United States (US) ally. As can be seen in greater detail in Chapter Four, Ethiopia was first invited by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2006 to contain the establishment of an Islamic State in Somalia, and thereafter in 2011 to support AMISOM and Kenyan troops that were fighting *al-Shabaab* (Ferras, 2013). As a point of interest and for the arguments made in this study, it should be noted that at the time of writing, both Kenya and Ethiopia continued to run military operations inside Somalia with an unknown number of troops outside the AMISOM framework. Pertinent questions surrounding the nature of decision-making, the choice of timing, territory (Kismayo region) and strategy pursued by the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) through the country's security institutions are explored in this study.

To a certain extent, the invitation of a powerful regional neighbour (Ethiopia) echoes the assertion made by Bischoff et. al. (2016) that contemporary Africa finds itself within a particular international order that is characterised by the shift from obtaining support from the superpower of US and Russia to regional support. Whereas the Cold War provided a strange type of stability in the international system in which a superpower is normally invited to assist, the immediate post-Cold War international system was characterized by a different set of threats and civil wars. With the end of the Cold War, support and protection from either the US or its allies, or the Soviet Union and its allies, African countries who were until then dependent on the two superpowers, were left with an international relations arena were a different set of problems emerged. These problems ranged from economic challenges, civil strife and internal armed conflicts to the marginalization of the continent, a situation that changed with the 11 September 2001[2]

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countries lie in the Horn-shaped North-Eastern tip of the African continent. In this geographical context, Uganda sits on the top of the waters of the largest Lake in Africa – Lake Victoria, and the source of the River Nile. This location made Uganda unique and strategically important to the colonial adventurisms. The struggle between the British, Belgians, Germans, Portuguese, Spaniards and the French were centred around the River Nile water systems (Mukwaya, 2004).

[2] On 11 September 2001, *al-Qaeda* terrorist attackers flew planes they had seized into New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington DC. While another hijacked plane was

when Africa's strategic importance for the US and Europe in the 'war on terrorism' increased. This changed dynamic in the global context, put Somalia right back on the agenda of the international community.[3]

In fact, since the operating environment of Somalia continued to evolve from a global perspective, the geopolitical and strategic importance of the Horn of Africa region cannot be overlooked when analysing the AMISOM peace operation in Somalia. Rondos (2016) agrees that the Horn of Africa's resources have been a reason for proxy politics by outsiders. Moreover, Rondos' observation that the West's geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa have in recent years been intensified by the global threat of terrorism, consistent with the US's war on terrorism and European Union's (EU) concerns on migration, piracy and terrorism issues remains indisputable. Again, the US, as the most powerful global actor, has continued to assert its presence not only in Somalia but in the rest of the Horn of Africa region in pursuit of Washington's geopolitical and strategic interests. In this regard, Fedirka (2017) asserts that through US Africa Command (AFRICOM), the US has been training and equipping Somali forces to enable them to effectively deal with the threat of terrorism posed by *al-Shabaab* and other extremist groups. Fedirka points out that there are three main geopolitical goals that inform the US State Department's assistance to Somalia. First, Somalia provides strategic access to the Gulf of Aden and therefore the maritime traffic from the Mediterranean Sea to Indian Ocean for economic purposes. Second, like other western powers keen on military might, the US also considers Somalia's strategic location and therefore can establish a naval base nearby from where it can project its power to the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, to enhance economic and military cooperation with Kenya, a US ally that neighbours Somalia, Washington has considered Kenya's objective of containing *al-Shabaab* its shared obligation (Fedirka, 2017).

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brought down in a field in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3000 people were killed in the 9/11 attacks (BBC, 2019). As it turned out, this date had a major global impact and has since defined the US foreign policy as the date represents the largest terrorist attack on US soil by a foreign adversary (not a country, but a religious militant organization).

[3] In the context of this study, the concept of international community is used to describe all or several actors, such as the United Nations including its Agencies, Funds and Programmes, and international partners, the European Union and donor agencies as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who provide socio-political, security and conflict resolution including financial support including facilitation in the peacebuilding efforts in Somalia.

Likewise, with Moscow's foreign policy pursuit of a multipolar international order, Russia's renewed interest in Africa stretching to the Horn of Africa region also deserves mention (Ogulturk, 2017). In particular, Ogulturk (2017) contends that Moscow continues to pursue political cooperation, arms sales and natural gas markets in Africa with its participation in anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa interpreted as an understanding that 12 percent of world's petroleum passes through the Red Sea. Russia has not only entered into military cooperation ventures with both Eritrea and Sudan, deepening its geopolitical interest in the Horn of Africa, but is distantly wishful that Somalia and Somaliland would be its allies as was the case during the Cold War (Ogulturk, 2017). Certain accounts suggest that, other external actors have also been pursuing geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the region. China, for example, has expanded its presence in the Horn of Africa by establishing its first overseas naval base in Djibouti in August 2017[4] and has opened an Embassy in Mogadishu, most likely as part of its grand strategy not only to be recognised as an influential player at the international arena but more importantly to consolidate its presence in the region. This is in addition to Chinese's long-time involvement in the region, especially in Sudan from the mid-1990s. Daniel Large shares the same view in his article *Sudan's foreign relations with Asia China and the politics of 'looking east'*. He notes that the period of substantive Chinese involvement in Sudan was comparatively short and would deepen progressively over the 1990s until the present moment largely because of oil. However, China's role in Sudan today is different from that during previous phases of relations as it is more far-reaching and involved than at any period in the past (Large, 2008, p.2).

In another study, the same author claims that China is involved increasingly in post-conflict settings around the African continent. In this regard, Sudan has been a key battleground, not least because of its various, linked domestic conflicts but also as a result of domestic, regional African and more geopolitical dimensions of China's role. China's Africa relations feature notable engagement in areas of ongoing conflict and in different contexts of states seeking to establish peace and promote development; China's role appears to be context dependent and ad hoc, blending business entrepreneurialism with government diplomacy (Large, 2011, pp.1-2). These claims also apply to the Somalia

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[4] For details see Blanchard (2017) China formally opens first overseas military base in Djibouti, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E3.

context where China has more and more been enhancing its footprint and influence. On another hand, since 1998 when it adopted its "Opening to Africa Action Plan" and subsequently obtaining observer status at the AU in 2005, while declaring the same year as a "Year of Africa" (Bilgic and Nascimento, 2019), Turkey has been at the forefront in Somalia, based on a foreign policy decisions which were attributed to the problems of emigration and terrorism facing Turkey as well as interest in setting up military base in Somalia to control the Indian Ocean just like other European powers have done in the region (Rondos, 2016). Similarly, the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the recent Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rift[5] that began in June 2017 have also had their toll on the situation in Somalia, with countries such as Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE) trying to exert their sphere of influence and shape developments on the ground.[6] To make the matters worse, the vast body of literature on AMISOM has linked the intervening forces on one hand, with serious violations of human rights, illicit taxation and, charcoal-embargo busting including arms smuggling and theft of resources provided to them by the United Nations through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) while on the other hand, the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) involved have allegedly been following a different script than that provided to them by the mandating authorities (AU and UN). All these issues are the subject of scrutiny in the present study.

1.1. Background of the Study

AMISOM is a legitimate regional peace enforcement operation that, since 2007 has been implementing a peace support mandate in Somalia following authorisation by

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[5] The crisis erupted in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain severed diplomatic relations with neighboring Qatar and imposed an air, land, and sea blockade against it. A few weeks later, they issued a long list of demands for their fellow GCC member to implement in return for defusing the crisis. The three Gulf states were quickly joined by several other Arab and non-Arab countries, including Egypt, which severed or curtailed their diplomatic relations with Doha. The 12 demands circulated by the boycotting parties included stipulations pertaining to Qatar allegedly supporting extremism and terrorism, interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbors, cooperating with Iran, harboring dissidents and opposition figures from other countries, engaging in critical and unfriendly media coverage of its neighbors, and subverting regional security and stability. A 13th demand contained an imprimatur for implementation within 10 days. Doha immediately rejected these demands as unreasonable and impossible to meet and refused to enter any negotiations under conditions it deemed as infringing on Qatar's national security and sovereignty (Jahshan, 2018, p.7).

[6] For more details, see for example the conclusions reached by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in its Africa Report N°260 describing that the bitter rivalries underpinning the crisis among members of the GCC have added a dangerous new twist to Somalia's instability. Competition between the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the one hand, and Qatar and, by extension, Turkey on the other has aggravated longstanding intra-Somali disputes. Available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis.

both the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in an attempt to bring peace and stability in Somalia, a country that is notoriously known and described by many scholars[7] as one of the most dangerous and conflict-ridden countries situated in the Horn of Africa region (See Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Map of the Horn of Africa

Source: https://understandingthehorn.berkeley.edu/1992-physical-relief-map-horn-africa

The UNSC which is discussed in Chapter Three has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.[8] This mandate, which is drawn from the UN Charter, enables the Security Council to establish peace operations[9] with a range of mandates depending on the nuances of a particular conflict. Traditional UN peace operations have generally operated within the framework of a ceasefire and consent of

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[7] See for example, Abbink (2003), Bruton and Williams (2014), Clapham (2013), Ferras (2013), Plaut (2013), Ulrichsen (2011), Wasara (2002), Rondos (2016), Waithaka and Maluki (2016), and Wondemagegnehu and Kebede (2017).

[8] United Nations Charter, Article 24, para. 1

[9] Since many of the UN's contemporary missions cannot be adequately described by the term peacekeeping, the term peace operations will be used interchangeably throughout the study to include peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In this study, AMISOM is understood as peace enforcement operation given that it is involved in active combat.

the host state while adhering to the principles of *neutrality*, *impartiality* and *non-use of force except in self-defence*. These prerequisites have defined the practice of UN peacekeeping operations unless in situations where the host state is for whatever reason unable to maintain security and public order, in which case Chapter VII[10] of the Charter is triggered. As such, the principles have defined the normative framework used by the UN in its peacekeeping operations.

However, the peace enforcement arrangement in Somalia under the AMISOM did not necessarily follow the same pattern. As a matter of fact, AMISOM was established by the AU through its Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007 and endorsed by the UN through Security Council Resolution (UNSCR1744) of 2007. Subsequently, by authorising the funding of a regional force to an active combat operation through another Resolution 1863 of 2009, which created the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA)[11], something that had never been done before in the history of peacekeeping operations, the UN broke the ground with this kind of arrangement. AMISOM is a contemporary phenomenon[12] and a decade has elapsed since it was established. Yet it remains debatable as to whether the Somalia foray has succeeded or failed, and by extension the future of such a model to other AU-UN peace and security efforts. To that end, a strategic review of the 10-years mission by the African Union has both praised AMISOM for its good work done under extremely challenging circumstances and criticised it for not having done enough.[13] Similarly, a number of authors, including

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[10] Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter deals with actions with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. It implies the use of force to prevent an aggravation of the situation and impose peace in accordance with Article 41 and 42. It is under this Chapter the UNSC exercised its authority to authorize the AMISOM peace operation in Somalia.

[11] UNSOA was established with the specific mandate to deliver a logistics capacity support package to AMISOM that was critical in achieving its operational effectiveness and in preparation for a possible UN peacekeeping operation. The logistics package consists of equipment and mission support services normally provided for a United Nations peacekeeping operation of the same size and was aimed to assist AMISOM in its mandate to support the transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Available at: http://point.un.org/UNSOS/SitePages/aboutunsoa.aspx.

[12] AMISOM has been described as a contemporary peace enforcement operation which is unfolding amidst a growing peace and security scholarship. It has evoked and received a wide range of scholastic interest with most works focusing on the evolution of the operation and its impact on the conflict (Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017).

[13] Dessu and Mahmood (2017) London Conference May 2017: 'Somalia needs more action, less lip service', Institute for Security Studies, Available from: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/somalia-needs-more-action-less-lip-service.

Anderson (2014), Albrecht and Haenlein (2016), Wondemagegnehu and Kebede (2017), Williams (2009, 2014 and 2018), Bruton and Williams (2014), Gelot et al. (2012) and Nduwimana (2013) have provided various assessments of AMISOM.

Bruton and Williams (2014) in particular, carried out an extensive research on the lessons learned from the AMISOM counterinsurgency in Somalia from 2007–2013 and came up with two sets of key broad lessons learned, both strategic and operational. The first set of lessons claimed that international indifference to Somalia had costs. These included lack of support and weak AU political leadership that undermined AMISOM as well as AMISOM's effectiveness being hindered by a lack of political neutrality. In the second set of lessons, it was concluded that the AMISOM model[14] had departed from acceptable counterinsurgency tactics; civilian harm attributed to the Ethiopian forces and AMISOM strengthened *al-Shabaab*; *al-Shabaab* had lost the war as much as AMISOM had won it; lack of effective command and control mechanisms caused problems; adequate logistical support was crucial to operational effectiveness and finally, the US direct action on non-Somali high value targets (HVTs) helped to put pressure on *al-Shabaab* (Bruton and Williams, 2014).

In addition, in his book *Fighting for Peace in Somalia* (2018), Professor Paul Williams[15] coincidently provides a history and analysis of the African Union Mission in Somalia covering the same period of this study. He identifies and discusses in-depth what he considered to be the six most important operational challenges that confronted AMISOM between 2007 and 2017, namely, logistics, security sector reform, civilian protection, strategic communications, stabilisation, and developing a successful exit strategy. Whereas Williams rightly acknowledged that all these issues remain central to the broader debates about how to design effective peace operations in Africa and beyond, this study contends that his account falls short of expectations in that, it does not provide

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[14] See Paul Williams (2018, p.4) who argues that the term is used as a shorthand to describe how the mission was organized across three dimensions of political authority, financing, and operations. References to AMISOM as potential model for responding to other crisis started to emerge after late 2011 when the mission forced *al-Shabaab* to withdraw its main forces from Mogadishu and began to be viewed as a relative success.

[15] While Paul Williams's contribution has been remarkable in the analysis made in his publication by detailing some of the most critical issues and challenges experienced by AMISOM, African Union, and United Nations including other partners, this thesis argues that his book falls short of adequately addressing certain important aspects of AMISOM that impacted the implementation of the its mandate between 2007-2017. Therefore, it is the goal of this study to attempt to close that gap and indeed expand further the debate.

similar in-depth details about other and equally relevant challenges in the form of certain realities that took place and had significant impact on mandate implementation in the period under review as argued in this study.

Therefore, in an attempt to fill a niche in the literature about the AMISOM peace enforcement operation and indeed expand the broader debate on regional peace operations and the evolving partnership between the AU-UN, this thesis takes a different starting point and does so by arguing that a third set of equally important lessons learned emerged in the same period. This third set of lessons suggests that the AMISOM mandate was implemented between competing geopolitical and national interests by the state actors and other entities involved, including commercial interests pursued by individual military personnel for self-enrichment. Hence, it is vital to further scrutinise the variables identified in this study and go beyond the lessons learned and challenges put forward by the authors mentioned above including those recommendations contained in the AU's own report on the lessons learned from the ten-years of AMISOM intervention.[16]

1.2. Purpose and Significance of the Study

The significance of this study lies in the researcher's/author's firm belief that the implications of the issues discussed go far beyond AMISOM and the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) involved. Therefore, this PhD thesis seeks to investigate the implementation of AMISOM mandate as authorised by the AU and UN. In so doing, the study attempts to fulfil three broad objectives. First, it examines the implementation of the AMISOM mandate amidst regional and foreign interventions and their underlying implications for the AU-UN partnership as well as towards reduction of conflict in Somalia. The goal here, is to critically analyse the overall impact on the partnership vis-à-vis the geopolitical and national interests pursued by the states involved as well as to explore the impact of illicit commercial activities by AMISOM military personnel.

Secondly, the thesis attempts to examine any significant changes towards the implementation of the mandate by assessing the evolution of AMISOM's decade-long presence in Somalia (2007-2017). The research analyses whether AMISOM has morphed into an exercise in self-interest: whereby, at its best, rich states have been paying African states to have their military presence in Somalia. At its worst, the so-called frontline states

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[16]African Union (2017) Peace Support Operations Division – AUPSOD: AMISOM Lessons Learned Conference, Nairobi, Kenya (9-10 March 2017), Available from: http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ll-eng-1.pdf.

– countries neighbouring Somalia, joined AMISOM as AU authorised regional forces, also known as green helmet, for both legal and illegal geopolitical and national interests as well as commercial interests for self-enrichment, and often, found themselves, at crossroad with mandate implementation. Thirdly, based on the findings, the study attempts to analyse the practical, theoretical and policy implications for the AU-UN partnership. To do so, the study confronts critically the logic of regionalisation of peace operations involving 'frontline states' with the theoretical idea imposed by Western ideologies to export liberal democracy through peacekeeping operations. In a sense, it contrasts between liberalism and realism vis-à-vis peace operations in order to account for the case of AMISOM given the involvement of frontline states.

It is the researcher's expectation that this study will make a major contribution towards the broader debate on contemporary regional peace operations, the much-needed understanding of the dynamics surrounding the AMISOM peace operation and its impact on the AU-UN partnership. Subject to the findings and review of the vast body of literature, an attempt is made to close an existing research gap by delving into the policy implications resulting from the alleged geopolitical, national and commercial interests which the present study considers as critical variables that have ostensibly shaped the implementation of the AMISOM mandate. Furthermore, although several studies have documented the AMISOM peace intervention on many accounts, a survey of literature indicates that most of the existing work on AMISOM has not focused much on the impact of the three variables towards the AU-UN partnership and more importantly, no research has attempted to attribute a cost to the losses suffered by the UN as a result of the corruption and illicit commercial activities involving AMISOM military personnel.[17]

Therefore, an in-depth inquiry on AMISOM is likely to reveal new aspects of operational dynamics, shed light upon the quest for economic opportunity and to the extent possible attempt to quantify the losses in monetary terms resulting from the theft of the logistical package provided by the UN through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). For instance, the analysis may indicate the extent to which most characteristically, the economic opportunity that evolved through AMISOM intervention

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[17] Williams (2018, p. 12) makes a compelling general description of the situation in the following words – corruption included cases of AMISOM personnel engaged in the illicit trade of goods and mission supplies, including rations, fuel, equipment as well as defensive barriers and sandbags, and even ammunitions. He goes on to state that arguably the most damaging set of allegations in this area revolved around claims that Kenyan forces were profiting from the illicit trade in charcoal and other commodities in Southern Somalia.

in the form of indirect foreign investment on the domestic economies of the TCCs involved and the possibility of the complex web of illegitimate commercial activities pursued by military personnel for self-enrichment being extended to their military structures in the countries involved have been entrenched, thereby indirectly contributing for the perpetuation of the conflict in Somalia and possible reputational costs to both the AU and UN from such activities by the troops on the ground.

1.3. Statement of the Research Problem

An analysis of AMISOM cannot be complete without placing it as one of the many foreign interventions in Somalia. Unlike most previous foreign interventions and peace operations, the majority of military forces that make up AMISOM come mostly from countries that have experienced some sort of proxy or inter-state conflict in their history with Somalia and with whom they share porous borders, historical and demographic ties in the Horn of Africa region, namely, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. These countries make up what is known as troop contribution countries and given their immediate proximity to the conflict, they are also considered as frontline states in the jargon of peacekeeping operations and for purposes of this study, Uganda is also considered as a frontline state due to its exhibited national interests and approximation. As a point of interest, it would be relevant to note that in the practice of peacekeeping operations, countries are usually discouraged from deploying troops into a neighbouring country where a military conflict is unfolding. As this study demonstrates, there are valid reasons for this unwritten policy.

In his publication *Regional Interests define the African Union Mission in Somalia*, published by the Danish Institute for International Studies in 2015, Peter Albrecht acknowledged how AMISOM achieved impressive results during 2014 and has at the same time demonstrated the potential to act as one mission rather than a collection of individual TCCs. However, it is also clear that AMISOM's organisation and strategic direction are fragmented, primarily because national interests of some of the TCCs, notably neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia, have been focused more on securing their own borders than on stabilising Somalia. In other words, the conflicting national interests of Ethiopia and Kenya lead to fragmentation of the results that may be achieved through AMISOM (Albrecht, 2015, pp.1-2). Therefore, this research pays particular attention to the actions taken by these two countries and assesses the impact of their interventions on the conflict in Somalia and the underlying implications for the AU-UN partnership.

Given its relevance, this study assumes that the regional frontline states and their powerful western allies (US and Britain) including Turkey, China and certain Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) have deeply vested geopolitical and national interests while playing different roles in Somalia. Thereby they directly shaping the operating environment in which the AMISOM mandate has been implemented. Similarly, the involvement of international organisations such as the UN[18], EU, and the regional intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD)[19] including the African Union itself and other entities supporting AMISOM also adds another layer of interests of some sort while acting as representatives of states. Furthermore, the violations of international human rights and humanitarian law that have been extensively documented by Human Rights Watch[20] coupled with the fact that individual troop commanders and military networks were allegedly enmeshed in illegitimate commercial activities further compounded the situation in Somalia (Uganda Radio Network, 2013; Monitor, 2014; New Vision, 2015; Voice of America (VoA) News; 2016; Daily Nation, 2017; The Citizen, 2016). In this vein, three critical variables are examined in this study. They include – geopolitical and national interests by state and non-state actors involved, either direct or indirectly in supporting the overall peace efforts in Somalia including the commercial interests pursued by the AU forces which adversely impacted on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and the AU-UN partnership.

In so doing, the study queries the implementation of AMISOM mandate as peace enforcement operation amidst foreign interventions and the underlying implications for the AU-UN partnership and towards reduction of conflict in Somalia. For example, apart

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[18]Some observers agree that the UN is often deemed to be driven by powerful states. For example, Ndubuisi Christian Ani observed that the interventions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which is charged with the primacy for the maintenance of international peace and security, represents mainly the views and resolutions that reflect the interests of its five permanent members – the US, Britain, France, China and Russia (Ani, 2016, p. 4).

[19]Just like the UN, the regional intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) is predominantly driven by its most powerful countries, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. As discussed in this study, the geopolitical influence of these countries has been at the forefront of the developments in Somalia.

[20]Since 2007, Human Rights Watch has been documenting serious abuses by troops from the peace support force, known as AMISOM – unlawful killings of civilians, and sexual exploitation and abuse, among others. But there have been no credible and transparent investigations and prosecutions of these crimes. For further details see the Human Rights Watch Report by Laetitia Bader (2016) Dispatches: Protecting Somalis From Their Protectors, Available from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/08/dispatches-protecting-somalis-their-protectors.

from documented evidence by the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), several media outlets[21] and accounts by influential academics reported on the troubling evidence of corruption and illegal commercial activities involving AMISOM military personnel from the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) contingent who were allegedly siphoning large volumes of fuel and pilfering of rations, worth millions of dollars that was part of the logistical support package provided by the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and intended for the sole purpose of AMISOM operations. Allegations of illicit collection of taxes, and the proliferation of the charcoal trade in the strategic port city of Kismayo were made against AMISOM military personnel from the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) contingent troops in a clear violation of the UNSC embargo on the commodity (The Citizen, 7 Nov. 2016).

Apart from Uganda which accounted for a large number of soldiers, the bulk of regional forces that make up AMISOM are from Ethiopia and Kenya, two powerful

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[21]See Reports by several media agencies: A). NDTV (2016) African Union Soldiers From Uganda Convicted For Running Fuel Racket, Available from: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/african-union-soldiers-from-uganda-convicted-for-running-fuel-racket-1445220
 B). Monitor (2014) Former AMISOM commander has case to answer - court martial, Thursday September 18 2014, Available from: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Former-Amisom-commander-has-case-to-answer---court-martial/688334-2456828-1ty3fd/index.html
C). Mohamed Olad Hassan (2016) AU Soldier in Somalia Sentenced for Selling Military Supplies. Available from: https://www.voanews.com/a/au-soldier-somalia-sentences-for-selling-military-supplies/3445530.html
D). Michael Odeng (2015) Former AMISOM commander jailed for swindling fuel,
Lt. Col Eugine Ssebugwawo, the ex-commander of the UPDF under AMISOM has been sentenced to 18 months in prison for diverting fuel, Sunday Vision. Available from: https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1410473/amisom-commander-jailed-swindling-fuel
E). Michael Odeng (2015) Ex-AMISOM commander reprimanded over fraud
Ex- AMISOM commander, Major Louis Bagenda, convicted of fraud was yesterday sentenced to a reprimand by the General Court Martial (GCM), Sunday Vision. Available from:https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1326121/-amisom-commander-reprimanded-fraud
F). Joe Elunya Ssalongo (2013) AMISOM Commander in Trouble over Soldiers' Allowances, Uganda Radio Network. Available from: https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/amisom-commander-in-trouble-over-soldiers-allowances.
G). The Citizen (2016) KDF involved in illicit charcoal exports from Somalia: UN. Available from: http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/KDF-involved-in-illicit-charcoal-exports-from-Somalia--UN/1840360-3443684-g0fanfz/index.html
H). Kelly, Kevin J. (2017) UN urges KDF to stop Somalia charcoal export, Available from: https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/UN-urges-KDF-to-stop-Somalia-charcoal-export/539546-4188766-sllmd4z/index.html
I). Daily Nation (2017) KDF on the spot over Al-Shabaab charcoal exports. Available from:https://www.nation.co.ke/news/KDF-Al-Shabaab-charcoal-trade-in-Somalia-UN-report/1056-4184482-iuv6cg/index.html

countries that have also been running parallel combat operations inside Somalia with support from their external allies but with unclear mandates. According to some analysts, both countries have continued to use Somalia as a buffer zone.[22] Besides other foreign interventions, this particular scenario, where states neighbouring Somalia have both contributed troops to the AU mandated peace operation and deployed parallel forces into the country has undeniably had a significant impact on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate. This scenario is extraordinary and peculiar to the Somalia context in that there are no other known past or contemporary peace operations where something similar has happened. Furthermore, this study argues that the arrangement has provided various actors involved with an arena for international relations that is different from that which traditional UN peacekeeping operations have ordinarily provided, where no one single state takes a prominent individual role even if troops are distributed across various sectors in the country. At the core of the AMISOM mandate implementation amidst such foreign interventions is the evolving partnership between the AU and UN which is subjected to a critical examination in this study.

1.4. Research Questions and Hypotheses

This thesis is guided by the following leading research question: *In what way was the AMISOM mandate implemented in its first decade of existence as a peace enforcement operation amidst foreign interventions and what were the underlying implications for the AU–UN partnership?*

To answer the core and inter-related research questions, the thesis resorts to the theories of international relations, political economy of war and foreign intervention which provide the framework for analysing the variables that have been at play towards the implementation of the AMISOM mandate both at strategic and governance level from the United Nations Secretariat risk universe perspective.[23] In other words, the study attempts to establish the apparent risk factors involved and the extent to which they may

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[22] See for example: Paul Williams (2018, p.128) and Mikael Eriksson (2013, p. 4).

[23] For details see United Nations (2011) Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control Methodology, p.8. In essence, the United Nations Secretariat Risk Catalogue is divided into 5 categories: a) Strategic – relates to high-level goals, aligned with and supporting the Organization's Charter, vision and mandate; b) Governance – relates to organisational decisions or implementation of those decisions; c) Operations – relates to effective and efficient use of the Organization's resources; d) Financial – relates to effective and efficient use of the Organization's financial resources, and reliability of Organization's reporting; lastly, e) Compliance – relates to the Organization's compliance with applicable laws and regulations, prescribed practices or ethical standards.

have contributed in undermining the implementation of a robust peace operation mandate and consequently rendering it ineffective to a certain extent including impacting on the strategic AU-UN partnership. This study considers the implementation of AMISOM mandate as the dependent variable whereas, foreign intervention is considered as the independent variable. Therefore, in line with the main research question, the study raises the following inter-related questions:

a) *How does liberalism and realism account for AMISOM as a peace operation?*
b) *Has AMISOM morphed into an exercise in self-interest by those involved?*
c) *What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for the evolving AU-UN partnership vis-à-vis the implementation of AMISOM mandate?*

Furthermore, in line with the research objectives and in order to enhance the scope of the analysis, the study attempts to address the following two hypothetical research statements (RS):

RS*1:* Without prejudice to the antecedents and broader Somalia context, regional and foreign interventions have significantly impacted on both the overall security situation in Somalia and the implementation of the AMISOM mandate.

RS2. It is likely that the AMISOM intervention in Somalia has resulted in other differences from previous African-led peace support missions and it differs from "hybrid missions." For example, the joint United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As such, the AMISOM model itself may have undermined and significantly impacted on mandate implementation.

1.5. Research Design and Methodology
1.5.1. Introduction
The design of this research is guided by the main research question which is centered on AMISOM as the main unit of analysis and how the peace operation mandate was implemented amidst foreign interventions and their underlying implications for the evolving AU-UN partnership. The AMISOM mission is an unfolding contemporary peace enforcement operation that was still ongoing at the time of writing. Therefore, while it sets the scene by capturing past foreign interventions in order to broadly provide context, the scope of the analysis of this study is limited to the period 2007–2017 that coincides with the 10-year anniversary review of the mission conducted by the AU itself.

An analysis of AMISOM mandate implementation presupposes an engagement with various historical data sources about the mission, the AU-UN partnership and peacekeeping operations including documented lessons-learned, etc. Due to AMISOM's unique nature compared to other peace operations, it is best analysed through case study research design. For Gerring (2004), a case study is an in-depth study of a single unit where the researcher's aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena with an aim to generalise across a larger set of units. As noted by George and Bennett (2005) through a process-tracing which is associated with the case study methodology, the researcher can examine histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to determine whether the causal process a theory hypothesises or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.

Similarly, Sasa Baškarada (2014) provides an excellent example of designing a case study research that deals with the issue of lessons learned in a military setting. Baškarada notes that adaptability and continuous improvement of Australian Defense Forces (ADF) are underpinned by its ability to learn from experience. Such learning requires the ability to capture and analyze observations, and to take adaptive actions that ensure lessons identified become learned and institutionalized. In order to facilitate the collection of relevant observations in the most efficient and effective manner, as well as to assure the validity of the subsequent analysis, it is essential that ADF follows a scientifically rigorous process and employs the most appropriate methods.

This study uses a mix of primary and secondary data sources. Semi-structured interviews are used for primary data collection. Semi-structured interviews provide the researcher with the opportunity to conduct research in a flexible manner. As noted by Saunders et al. (2009, p. 320) in the semi-structured interviews the researcher has a list of themes and questions to be covered, although these may vary from interview to interview which means that some interview questions may be omitted, given a specific organizational context that is encountered in relation to the research topic. Another reason for selecting the semi-structured interview typology is that, due to the ability to broadly define questions while also giving the interviewees the flexibility to delve beyond the scope of the questions thereby enriching the data, the researcher finds semi-structured interviews suitable for the study (Britten, 1999).

In conjunction with semi-structured interviews, this study also makes use of bibliographical revision of relevant materials in order to allow the corroboration of evidence. The researcher reviewed books, articles and journals including official AU and UN documents, records, statements and communiqués. Websites, available statistics and media reports on AMISOM and, broader issues related to the AU-UN partnership and peace operations including periodicals and policy directives have been used. Direct observation has also played its part in the production of the thesis. Moreover, as a qualitative research, the study relies on primary and secondary data sources including interviews with key informants from the countries involved (Table 1.1) refers. Yet, the quantitative method is used where appropriate,[24] especially with regard to the losses suffered by the UN due to corruption involving AMISOM soldiers.

Table 1.1 Fieldwork Countries and Participants

Country	Frequency	Classification
Somalia	11	Interview # 1
Kenya	10	Interview # 2
Uganda	10	Interview # 3
Ethiopia	6	Interview # 4
Burundi	5	Interview # 5
Djibouti	3	Interview # 6
Total	**45**	

As shown in the above table, the study involved a diverse purposive population sample in order to benefit from the respondents' vast experience, knowledge about AMISOM and familiarity with the conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa region. They include senior officials and middle level managers who have either served or still serving different roles within AMISOM, AU, UN and EU including diplomats accredited in the Horn of Africa region, academics and officials from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as independent individuals from the countries concerned. The choice of a diverse population sample is informed by the fact that, in our view, most studies on AMISOM have been based on three tendencies: limited outsider based perspective; they

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[24] For example, an attempt has been made in this study to quantify the losses suffered by the UN in dollar terms because of the theft of large quantities of fuel and rations by AMISOM military personnel. The results of the empirical findings and related details were revealed through interview#1 with two anonymous senior UN officers involved in the daily management of the logistical operations aimed at supporting the AU forces and were corroborated by two Senior AMISOM civilian officials working in Somalia. More details are presented in Chapter Six.

are heavily centred along the lines of AU-UN perspective which does not always lend itself to an introspective outlook, and from that emanates a somewhat opaque view; and implicitly a generalized reading of AMISOM through the prism lenses of national dynamics of TCCs, influence of powerful donors and other actors shapes the overall discourse.

By selecting a wide range of individuals, the intention of the researcher here is to generate different perspectives while also drawing from his direct field experience as an observer-participant with view of breaking the academic confinement resulting from the above-mentioned tendencies and maximise the level of corroboration, validity and support the main findings of the study. In order to facilitate the discussions and analyses of the study findings, a combination of interpretative, risk based and SWOT[25] analysis approach including field-centred qualitative data methodology as postulated by Komey et al. (2014) whereby a field-centred interview technique is used to categorize, summarize and structure the outcome of each individual interview has been useful in the development of the present study. Finally, following the method of structured, focused comparison postulated by George and Bennett (2005), AMISOM is assessed as atypical arrangement compared to other previous peace operations, in particular with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and the joint UN-AU Mission in Sudan (UNAMID) given the nature of intervention and their manifested similarities and differences.

1.5.2. Justification for Case Study Approach

While developments in social sciences show overwhelmingly that most political scientists use comparative politics often in their research, the case study approach is deemed suitable to examine the AMISOM peace operation. As noted by Paul Williams (2018), AMISOM's experiences serves as an important case study for several debates about contemporary peace operations. The first puzzle relates to the long-standing debate

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[25]SWOT is an acronym used to describe the particular Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats that are strategic factors for a specific organisation. The external environment consists of variables (Opportunities and Threats) that are outside the Organisation and not typically within the short-run control of top leadership. In the case of AMISOM, these variables form the context within which the Mission exists. On the other hand, the internal environment consists of variables (Strengths and Weaknesses) that are within the organization itself and are not usually within the short-run control of top leadership. These variables form the context in which work is done (Hunger, J. David and Wheelen, Thomas L., 2000, pp. 9-10). This strategy is used to assess the impact of the variables that unpin this study on the AU-UN partnership.

about why states provide peacekeepers. Specifically, why did only six of the AU's fifty-four members contributed troops to AMISOM: Uganda (2007), Burundi (2007), Djibouti (2011), Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013) and Ethiopia (2014). Another puzzle relates to why all but one of those TCCs maintained its commitment to AMISOM in the face of very high human casualty levels and often with incomplete financial reimbursements.

AMISOM, which is at the core of the AU-UN partnership, is the main unit of analysis in this study. The justification for adopting a case study focus as opposed to comparative approach is derived from the fact that case study design is widely considered as having the ability and comparative advantage to accommodate complex causal relations such as equifinality, complex interactions effects and path dependency. With equifinality, there are several explanatory paths, combinations, or sequences leading to the same outcome, and these paths may or may not have one or more variables in common. Again, the causal process resonates with the scientific realist school of thought which has emphasised that causal mechanisms – independent stable factors that under certain conditions link causes to effects – are central to causal explanations. In other words, it is used as an attempt to trace the links between the possible causes and observed outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005).

By adopting a case study method, the study attempts to provide methodological foundations to analyse how and why the variables identified occurred as well as explore the vast body of documented lessons learned on the AMISOM peace operation. It is also argued in this research that the uniqueness of AMISOM as the first AU-UN authorised active combat intervention involving regional forces and supported by various actors, the case study approach is appropriate for in-depth understanding of such a case. This has surprisingly not been done based on the analysis of the literature about AMISOM to the extent this study intends to do it. The choice of the method is further justified because as noted by Baškarada (2014), case studies allow for confirmation (deductive) as well as explanatory (inductive) findings can be based on single or multiple cases and can include qualitative and/or quantitative data. Moreover, they can be exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory, and they are described as the preferred research method when how and why questions are posed, whereby the investigator has little control over events, and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context.

1.5.3. The Interdisciplinary Perspective

A study of this nature, which is a critical examination of an active combat regional peace enforcement operation requires an empirical assessment and must stem from a conceptual viewpoint that goes far beyond the traditional theories of international relations that have underpinned peace operations for decades. This is because the case study relates not only to the three building blocks (actors, goals, and instruments) which according to Nye, Jr. (2007) are basic to theorising about international politics but also to other disciplines such as political economy of war and foreign intervention theoretical frameworks. Nonetheless, as stated by Innes (2005) these disciplines are not mutually exclusive nor is there lack of porosity between them in the manner in which each attempt to provide explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. Consequently, given the latitude and need to conduct an in-depth examination of certain aspects involving foreign intervention and individual actions in a war context, it seems useful to take a multi-interdisciplinary approach which not only enriches our conceptualization but also provides a better understanding of the case study. For this reason, the study takes a *synthetic interdisciplinary* approach whereby relevant material from different but related disciplines will be brought together as necessary with the disciplinary origins of the material remaining clear (Innes, 2005).

It follows that, while on one hand, liberalism has had a major influence over time in the conceptualisation of humanitarian interventions and exercise of peacekeeping operations it is considered not suitable to theoretically examine and account for the case of AMISOM as a standalone theory, on another hand. Foreign Intervention and Realism, on another hand, are useful in explaining state actors' actions but as explained below they also fall short and inadequate to analyse the individual behaviour of military personnel in a war context. In fact, realism as a theory falls short of addressing individual behaviours that go beyond the scope of the legally mandated tasks which may be pursued directly by either the state agents themselves or indirectly through the non-state actors acting on their behalf. For instance, it may not fully account for the illegitimate commercial activities for self-enrichment through a complex web of interests in which military personnel and their commanders from TCCs —individually or in small sophisticated military networks that might extend to their respective home countries, command structures and influence those who make decisions on troop deployments to the countries where a peace operation is taking place. Neither does it explain the incentive which accounts for the continued

participation in such peace operations by TCCs who may well seize the economic opportunities that sometimes emerge in a conflict zone which can potentially serve as an indirect foreign investment into the domestic economies of the countries involved.

1.5.4. Field Research: Practical, Ethical and Security Constraints

On the practical side, this study has an ethnographic dimension given the observer participant role of its author. Ethnography is rooted firmly in the inductive approach and requires that the researcher gets immersed in the social world being researched as completely as possible over an extended period. The purpose is to describe and explain the social world the research subjects inhabit in the way in which they would describe and explain it. Moreover, ethnography is suitable to gain insights about a particular context and better understand and interpret it from the perspective(s) of those involved (Saunders et. al., 2009, pp.149-150). In that regard, it is useful to note that the author of the present thesis is an international civil servant of the UN whose professional experience spans over 18 years in different geographical settings ranging from Africa, Europe to South East Asia and the Americas. For over 14 years he served continuously with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) performing different functions in complex conflict and post-conflict environments such as, Khartoum and Juba with United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Nairobi with United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), Mogadishu with United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), Díli with United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and finally, in Port-au-Prince with United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). Prior to joining UN peacekeeping missions in the field, he served in the Hague, Netherlands at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former-Yugoslavia (UN-ICTY).

While at UNSOA, he was involved in the provision of operational support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Offices of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (O/SESG-GL) and the United Nations Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Monitoring Group (SEMG), respectively. Nevertheless, as an international civil servant of the UN, the researcher is bound by the Organisation's staff rules and regulations contained in the Secretary-General's bulletin (ST/SGB/2014/1) including ethical policies guiding the conduct of UN employees that among others, prevent the use of material and confidential information for personal gains unless it has been published and therefore located in the public domain. Therefore, these restrictions,

coupled with the academic requirement to conduct research in ethical manner, have been crucial as guiding principles throughout the field research. They have equally been helpful towards addressing any academic concerns on the potential bias effect that may become apparent given the researcher's first-hand experience with the case study as an observer-participant. However, drawing from his vast experience in different peacekeeping missions, the researcher has been able to provide the study with originality, validity and reliability while striking the balance between accessed information and corroboration of data from a vantage point.

Research ethics are an essential component to every step of the research process (Lamont, 2015, p.49). Cognizant of the potential pitfalls and risks associated with field research, this study has been carried out with a clear understanding of the ethical considerations involved. To that end, it has been noted that, in the context of research, ethics refers to the appropriateness of the researcher's behaviour in relation to the rights of those who become the subject of the study or affected by it. Research ethics therefore relates to questions about how we formulate and clarify our research topic, design our research and get access, collect data, process and store our data, analyze data and write up our research findings in a moral and responsible way (Saunders et al., 2009 p. 184).

With regards to security considerations, it should be noted that, at the time the present research took place, the security situation in Somalia remained very fragile and extremely hostile, unpredictable and often dangerous with ongoing combat operations in many parts of the country and *al-Shabaab*'s incessant threat in the period covered in this study. The widening of AMISOM's operational scope to the sectors in accordance with the mission's strategic concept of 5th January 2012 as highlighted in the UNSC resolution 2036 (2012), represented a major security challenge. This meant that given the vast operating area, AMISOM could not effectively control and provide protection throughout the mission which resulted in several security restrictions being put in place. With the exception to the field research conducted in Garowe, Puntland, the security restrictions limited not only access to other regions outside Mogadishu but also the researcher's ability to gather critical data to corroborate some of the study findings. Nonetheless, major effort was made to extrapolate and corroborate data through triangulation which is consistent with the argument put forward by Lamont (2015, p.79) that when gathering qualitative data, it is useful to triangulate data collection techniques in order to cross-reference the findings of a study. Saunders et. al. (2009, p.146) note that triangulation

refers to the use of different methodologies within one study in order to ensure that the data are telling you what you think they are telling you. In a sense, apart from helping to compensate for some of the limitations encountered during the field research and access to sensitive information, triangulation proved to be an effective strategy in assessing the validity of data obtained through interviews.

1.5.5. Field Research: Negotiating Access

This sub-section summarises the empirical work carried by the researcher in the countries of interest to the present study which involved several self-financing field trips despite some challenges. With exception of Burundi and Djibouti where the researcher was unable to visit for a variety of other reasons, most of the field work was carried out in the countries of the Horn of Africa that contribute troops to AMISOM as detailed in Appendix II. As can be seen in the appendix, some respondents were interviewed outside their native countries. However, their participation in the fieldwork has been classified according to their country of origin. With regards to Somalia, the empirical research was carried out mainly in Mogadishu due to the highly volatile and dangerous security situation across the country with severe access restrictions. Overall, the fieldwork included a total of forty-five individual face-to-face semi-structured interviews and, in some cases, due to accessibility and resource constraints, interviews were carried out via telephone, Skype and survey questionnaires distributed by e-mail. The outcome of the fieldwork including the analyses and discussions are dealt with in Chapter Six.

While the researcher was unable to visit both Burundi and Djibouti due to a variety of constraints, as an alternative solution, several interviews were undertaken inside Somalia and outside in Kenya including in other UN field missions with nationals of the two countries and officials who were previously based in Somalia with direct knowledge of AMISOM and familiarity with the issues underpinning this study. It is worthwhile to underline that most of the fieldwork was conducted in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda between 2017 and in the first part of 2020 with one additional follow up round of fieldwork carried out in September of the same year. During this period, the researcher had the opportunity to interact with a wide range of stakeholders and interviewed diplomats, academics, EU, UN, and AU officials as well as AMISOM civilian and military personnel including members of civil society organisations, NGOs and private individuals from the aforementioned countries who are familiar with the political and

security dynamics in the Horn of Africa, Somalia conflict in general and AMISOM intervention in particular.

Given the inherent sensitive nature of the study and professional engagements of some high-ranking respondents, negotiating access and obtaining their availability to participate in the interviews, often proved very difficult throughout the field research to the extent that some contacts prove unsuccessful. Indeed, in his publication *Research Methods in International Relation*s, Christopher Lamont (2015) acknowledges that gaining access to interview subjects is the most difficult part of the research interview process. Particularly, when attempting to get in touch with elites, who themselves have busy schedules and might not see utility in talking to a researcher (Lamont, 2015, p. 85). Nonetheless, aided by his vast network and contacts the researcher was able to negotiate and secured access which facilitated the fieldwork.

Another major challenging aspect that became evident during the field research was the fact that, as an observer participant, the researcher was constantly confronted with the need to navigate the narrow line between the researcher's need to maintain professional standards and his academic obligations. Cognizant of the potential risks associated with research in such context, the researcher was fully aware of the need to consistently make a judgment call and strike a balance between the need to comply with academic rules and maintaining professionalism. During the field trips undertaken, the researcher had the opportunity to engage extensively with a wide range of informants who were either former or currently serving individuals from the organisations and countries involved including academics, diplomats, politicians and those who participated in their private capacity. Finally, the broader issue of security constraints, negotiating access and sensitive nature of the variables discussed was made painfully clear while conducting the field research and writing this study. Again, considering the sensitive nature of the variables discussed in the present study, most respondents have spoken to the researcher in a condition of confidentiality and anonymity except where appropriate identifying their respective organisational affiliation or occupation. However, in order to address any academic concerns regarding the sources and ensure the imperative need to protect the identity of the subjects, it is expected that some sensitive aspects of the field research would be shared separately with the university appointed PhD thesis jury.

1.6. The Structure of the Study

To analyse the outlined issues, the thesis is organised in seven chapters. The first chapter deals with the introduction, objectives and relevance of the study, the statement of the research problem including research questions and hypothetical statements, methodology and outlines the structure of the study. The second chapter is concerned first with the literature review by contrasting between the theory of liberalism versus realism as they apply to AMISOM, the case of interest in this study. Then it discusses the concept of peace in international relations, conflict resolution approaches and touches on political economy of war which is used in this study as a supplementary theory capable of shading light towards the alleged commercial interests pursued by the AU forces in a conflict milieu. The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of the analytical foundations of foreign interventions, defines and operationalises key concepts of the study.

Chapter Three is focused on the institutional context of AMISOM. It proceeds with a general background about the organisational nature of AU and UN as the principal mandating entities that grant legitimacy to the AMISOM intervention. The chapter first, discusses, the AU's role as an agency capable of influencing international norms on peace and security. Then, the concept of "African Solutions to African Problems" (AfSol), the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) including the Capstone Doctrine and the evolving partnership between the AU and UN on peace and security are examined. As a point of interest, the chapter concludes with a discussion on the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) between the AU and the TFG of Somalia, as the legal instrument binding both entities in this peace operation endeavour.

Chapter Four deals with the historical background of the conflict in Somalia, contextualises foreign interventions in general and critically analyses the Ethiopian and Kenyan intervention which is then followed by an assessment of the attempts made by the United Nations and the regional inter-governmental authority on development (IGAD) to find a last peace in Somalia. Then, Chapter Five introduces and discusses the establishment of AMISOM and describes its major characteristics that are relevant to the present study, namely the AMISOM mandate, troops strengths and deployment across Somalia as well as a discussion on the establishment of UNSOA which as explained in this study provided crucial logistical support to the AU forces. The chapter concludes with an analysis of AMISOM funding arrangements and troops payment regime.

In Chapter Six, the first part analyses and discusses the study findings at different level of analysis – systemic, nation-state and individual decision-making levels. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of national interests pursued by the countries involved using the framework developed by Nuechterlein (1976) that helps to map out and explain how things worked in Somalia between 2007-2017. The relevance and consequences of the actions by regional and other foreign state actors involved including the role played by institutions such as the EU, AU, UN and IGAD are all part of the scrutiny and discussion in this chapter. Most importantly, apart from broad geopolitical and national interests pursued by state actors involved, the chapter examines critically the pursuit of illicit commercial activities involving AMISOM commanders, individual troops and their impact not just on the success of the mission and loss in monetary terms but also the extent to which the enterprise has been used to influence foreign policy of the military commanders' countries towards Somalia in order to entrench the enterprise.

Then, the chapter presents the findings on the impact of UNSOA logistical support model before proceeding with a comparative analysis of AMISOM and its fundamental differences with other AU peace operations, in particular with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and the hybrid mission in Sudan – the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in light of the literature review. The chapter concludes with a discussion and analysis of the study findings on external interventions and their overall impact towards stabilisation and peace efforts in Somalia as well as on the evolving AU-UN partnership using AMISOM as a showcase for this strategic relationship. Finally, Chapter Seven provides the summary of the study findings with practical, theoretical and policy implications.

The main practical aspect and policy implications highlighted in this concluding chapter relates to the involvement of frontline states in regional peace operations. On another hand, analytically, the study draws its conclusions by assessing the implications of liberalism and realism chiefly as they account for the AMISOM peace enforcement operation. The chapter draws the key conclusions with the recommendations and suggestions for further research. All in all, the concluding chapter provides critical conclusions as a way of contribution towards the broader debate about AU led-peace operations, AMISOM and peacekeeping operations in general including the AU-UN partnership.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

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2.0. Introduction

This chapter reviews existing literature that examines the conceptual foundations of peace operations which underpin the core and related research questions including the hypothetical propositions of the study. In the meantime, in order to set the scene, it is necessary to briefly discuss the evolution of peacekeeping doctrine and the broader conceptual context in which the AMISOM case study falls under. As noted by Berhe and de Waal (2015), United Nations (UN) peacekeeping was designed in an era of intra-state conflict and civil wars between well-matched belligerents. It was augmented in the 1990s and early 2000s when the UN was the only multilateral institution capable of mounting a complex peacekeeping operation, and when none of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (France, Russia, China, US and United Kingdom) also known as the P5, objected to robust action to halt mass atrocities in small countries. However, in the last decade the situation changed to a variable geometry of mandating authorities, each with different political interests. This has led to diverse forms of military peace missions, ranging from traditional military observer missions to enforcement operations, with various intermediate and hybrid forms.

Conceptually, this study is anchored in the two strands of traditional international relations theories of liberalism and realism[26] in its attempt to analyze the data collected and review of the extant literature related to the topic. It is the researcher's believe that AMISOM is best studied through liberalism and realism as the two theories that, not only have confronted each other in an unprecedented manner vis-à-vis the African Union (AU) led peace operation in Somalia but also because the involvement of frontline states in the fight against the Somali-based militant group *al-Shabaab* has inevitably been linked with the projection of power and military show of force, pursuit of national interests and state

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[26] The choice of these two theories does not suggest in any way that AMISOM cannot be studied by other theories. In fact, the theory of constructivism for example, which is based on the notion that the international system is constituted by prevailing ideas which influence the system, not by material forces and as a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place (Jackson and Sorensen 2010, p.160) could be equally useful to study AMISOM. Proponents of constructivism have the merit of assessing security not only based on military power which they consider to be too narrow but rather they see security as being broader in scope. Constructivism focuses on matters such as cultural identities, environmental relations and cultural institutions including norms that shape state and government policy. However, despite the outlined merits of constructivism, the theory is not in line with the objectives of this research.

survival by Somalia's most powerful regional neighbours (Ethiopia and Kenya). It is for this reason that realism is deemed relevant. Conversely, the theory of liberalism allows for an in-depth analysis of the theoretical foundations that have underpinned the exercise of peacekeeping operations since the UN was created in 1945 and helps situate AMISOM in that context.

2.1. Liberalism

Within liberalism and realism as theoretical perspectives there are differences, trends and nuances in the arguments among different scholars of the same tradition. The theory of liberalism is framed on the belief that individuals are basically good and have fundamental rights that must be protected universally. Classical features of liberalism include individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equality of opportunity. For example, Martin Griffiths (2011) has argued that liberal internationalism is first liberal, and then internationalist because it seeks to replace or reproduce the essential features of the Western liberal democratic state at the international level. At the domestic level, liberal internationalism links the protection of basic human rights with the necessity of constitutional limits to execute power while at the global level, it envisages a world composed of liberal democratic states, at peace with one another, integrated into a global market economy and actively participating in international governance through international organizations (Griffiths, 2011, p.19).

According to Rousseau and Walker (2012, p. 21) liberal scholars predict that stable democracies and economically interdependent states will behave differently in several respects. First and foremost, democratic states are less likely to initiate or escalate conflicts with other states. This principle is also referred to as the 'democratic peace theory'.[27] Secondly, democratic states are more likely to engage in international trade and investment, and the resultant interdependence will contribute to peace. Thirdly and most importantly to this research is that democratic states are more likely to seek cooperative solutions through international institutions. Immanuel Kant and Hedley Bull renowned

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[27] It is the idea that liberal democracies enhance peace because they do not go to war against each other as claimed by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. It has been strongly influenced by the rapid spread of democratization in the world after the end of the Cold War. An influential version of the theory of democratic peace was set by Michael Doyle in 1983 who argued that the theory was based on three pillars: the first is peaceful conflict resolution between democratic states; the second is common values among democratic states – a common moral foundation; the final pillar is economic cooperation among democracies (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010, p.43)

liberal thinkers discuss these principles and their variations at lengths in their various works. For instance, Kant provides three answers on how peace and cooperation are possible. The first, based on reciprocity principle, was that states could develop the organisations and rules to facilitate cooperation, specifically by forming a world federation resembling today's United Nations. Kant's second answer, operating at a lower level of analysis, was that peace depends on the internal character of governments. Kant's third answer, that trade promotes peace, relies on the presumption that trade increases wealth, cooperation, and global well-being – all while making conflict less likely in the long term because governments will not want to disrupt any process that adds to the wealth of their states (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2012, pp. 86–87).

Similarly, theorists such as Hedley Bull and Robert Keohane have postulated an international society in which various actors communicate and recognize common rules, institutions, and interests. For Bull, an international society corresponds to the society of states that exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions which includes forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy and general international organisation, and the customs and conventions of war (Cravinho, 2006, p. 40). On another hand, liberalism can be understood in political and philosophical terms and has generally acquired a broad meaning. For example, in his article, A *Quest for Inspiration in the Liberal Peace Paradigm* Thomas Baum, defines liberalism in its basic, principal form, which is, "the importance of freedom of the individual" (Baum, 2008, p.443). This definition encompasses liberalism in its simplistic form, however in doing so, it reduces liberalism to its minimal definition and accounts only for the *laissez-faire* version. Baum discusses liberalism, by providing some definitions as well as discussing the two strands of liberalism; that is, laissez-faire liberalism and social-welfare liberalism.

For Mearsheimer (2018) key components of liberalism are radical individualism and impossibility of reason to provide us with the key answers about what constitutes a good life. Such conflictual situation of individuals that have different views of life has three remedies: belief that every individual is endowed with certain inalienable rights, tolerance of others' rights to define their own good life and the state that can prevent

conflicts and guard individual rights. Two main currents of liberalism have a dispute over the role of the state in promoting individual rights. "*Modus vivendi liberals*" (John Locke, Friedrich von Hayek, John Gray, Steven Holmes) believe that the state interference violates individual rights, while "progressive liberals" (Ronald Dworkin, Francis Fukuyama, Steven Pinker, John Rawls) believe that the state intervention is necessary to ensure certain individual rights.[28] In general, the mandating and practice of UN peace operations including the AMISOM intervention in Somalia falls within the precepts of progressive liberals and it will be analysed as such.

The theory of liberalism has a close, yet divided affiliation with democracy and the process of democratization. At the heart of democratic doctrine lays the conviction that governments derive their authority from popular election; liberalism, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the scope of governmental activity (Rousseau and Walker, 2012, p. 26). Another view suggests that, despite democracy taking into consideration the opinion of the masses through the voting system it can also generate a tyranny by majority. As such, one may argue that democracy is concerned with the opinion of the majority, while liberalism looks after unpopular minorities. According to contemporary form of liberalism, the chief task of government is to remove any obstacles that may hinder individuals from living a free and just life; a life in which they can realize their own potential. Such obstacles include poverty, diseases, discrimination and ignorance. Poverty, disease and ignorance are the three developmental issues set forth not only in Julius Nyerere's speech on Tanzania development, but it was also extended to the global fight. The disagreement between liberalist scholars on whether the role of government is to promote individual freedom versus merely protecting it, is reflected in various texts and scholarship on the theory (Keohane, 2002, p.50).

Although numerous political science scholars acknowledge that liberalism and democracy are integrally related, other scholars such as Stephen Newman identify the challenges facing liberal democratic societies. The writer strongly argues that liberal values and democratic opportunities are not extended to everyone and yet in certain cases

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[28] Cited by Cvetić, Andrej (2019) Mearsheimer, John J. 2018. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Yale University Press, 328 pp. (Hardcover). Book Review. Journal of Regional Security, Vol. 14, No.1, pp. 45–47.

excessive claims based on liberal values are made on democratic institutions (Newman, 1984, p. 55). On the other hand, Newman in his text *Liberalism at Wits End* believes that democracy in itself poses a threat to liberal values of individual freedom and rights and goes on to undermine the liberal institutions of private property and the market (Newman, 1984, p. 58). This is the stance of most proponents of Libertarianism who strongly believe that the existence of liberal societies prevents the full development of democracy.

In the case of Somalia, understood from the AU and UN perspective, this study advances the argument that the ideological origins of foreign interventions and indeed the AMISOM intervention were initially a product of liberal democracy which sought to establish a western style democracy by supporting the establishment of the Federal Government in the quest to find peace and stability, and end the threat posed by *al-Shabaab* terrorist group. In the years since the peace enforcement operation was launched in 2007, however, as discussed in Chapter Four, a manifestation of realist doctrine has increasingly characterised both the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and the behaviour of state actors involved. Hence, this research contends that while based on the broad goal of democracy promotion, the AMISOM arrangement provided the states and non-state actors with an unprecedented arena to advance their geopolitical and national interests which is consistent with realism as explained in the subsequent section.

To a certain extent, the view of liberalism as a doctrine for liberty of the individual or its emphasis on economic exchange portrays the constraints and opportunities that states face. As an alternative, the emphasis of liberalism on liberty and rights only suggests a general orientation toward the moral evaluation of world politics. For this reason, liberalism can be considered as an approach to the analysis of social reality rather than as a doctrine of liberty. As such, liberalism can be regarded or rather approached from three different angles – 1) starts with the view that individuals are the relevant actors; 2) that aggregations of individuals make collective decisions and how organisations made up of individuals interact; and 3) adopting a world view which emphasizes individual rights and that adopts an ameliorative view of progress in human affairs (Keohane, 2012, p. 56). In a sense, Keohane's second and third angles help to explain the international and regional collective security needs. More specifically, Keohane's angles of analysis help explain how for example, the AU and UN spearheaded the collective decision-making process to address the situation in Somalia. In so doing they were able to galvanising the

international community and mobilizing the required consensus among stakeholders which led to the establishment of AMISOM peace enforcement operation which, among others, was expected to create a conducive liberal democratic environment in which the individual rights of Somalis could be protected while at the same time also promoting human security, building capable institutions and development in the same way it is done in the western world. This is what Mearsheimer (2018, p.1) calls liberal hegemonic ambition in which a state or states aim to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like themselves while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions. In essence, the liberal states seek to spread their own values far and wide because they believe that spreading liberal democracy around the world makes eminently good sense from both a moral and strategic perspective. However, Mearsheimer questions what might happen when a powerful state pursues this strategy at the expense of balance-of- power politics.

Taking an economics perspective from the influential work of Adam Smith[29], liberalism's emphasis that collective results of individual actions lead to the analysis of markets, market failure, and from there institutions to correct such failure. However, in traditional international relations theory it implies attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the reality of strategic interdependence (Keohane, 2012, p. 45). Nonetheless, contemporary IR has sub-divided or rather distinguished classical liberal thought into four major strands; that is, pluralist liberalism, republican liberalism, commercial liberalism and regulatory liberalism (Moravcsik, 1997, p.1). Although these strands are inherently liberal, they are somehow viewed as fragmented hypothesis or separate form of critiquing realism, rather than identifying it as variants of a single yet distinct and coherent liberal theory of IR. While pluralist liberalism argues that the misdistribution of social power or the existence of deep social cleavages create incentive for international conflict; commercial liberalism states that economic interdependence creates incentives for peace and cooperation. On another hand, regulatory liberalism suggests that international law and institutions promote international accommodation and finally republican liberalism

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[29] In his famously known work *The Wealth of Nations",* Adam Smith coined the phrase "invisible hand" to describe the way that free markets adjust supply to demand in meeting human needs. In essence, this doctrine does not need militarism to oversee it, nor does it need any form of force. Adam Smith also argued that the more intertwined and interdependent states relations are, the higher the incentive or motivation for long-term cooperation.

contends that liberal democracies tend to be more pacific or rather peaceful than other forms of government (Moravcsik, 1997, p.1).

In contrast, Robert Keohane contends that a combination of commercial and regulatory liberalism makes a good deal of sense as a framework for interpreting contemporary world politics as well as for evaluating institutions and policies. To Keohane, such a sophisticated liberalism emphasizes the construction of institutions that facilitate both economic exchange and broader international cooperation (Keohane, 2012). By and large, all four strands are applicable to the core research question and the hypotheses to some degree. Yet, Moravcsik views liberalism as a social scientific theory of international relations, which seeks to 'explain what states do, not what they ought to do' (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 3). His main aim is to move beyond utopianism towards a positive liberal theory. This is to say that Moravcsik overcomes the realist reduction of liberalism as a theory of 'idealist, legalist, moralist, reductionist' and to understand a more sophisticated form of structural theory that is ambitious and committed to a better world order. To him, liberalism remains a source of strength, primarily as a guide to normative choice but he notes two major limitations of the two theories – liberalism and realism.

First, Moravcsik (1997) criticizes the artificial contrast between the real (realism) and ideal (liberalism). To him, distinguishing between the two theories is not just a concern for intellectual historians of international relations; but also, social scientists since it impoverishes the definition of each theory into an antidote of the other and vice-versa. In other words, the two theories lack a firm micro-foundation to build a proper distinction between them. The second challenge is that liberalism is founded on 'unrealistic' generalizations about human behaviour. Also, its normative ideals of peace and cooperation reduce the theory to laissez-faire status which in turn becomes more utopian (Moravcsik, 1997, p.5). Keohane concurs to some degree with this line of thought in his book, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*. In the chapter about interdependence and institutions, Keohane lays down some of the critics against the theory of liberalism. He notes that liberalism has been heavily criticized as an allegedly naive doctrine with utopian tendencies, which erroneously ascribes to the conflictual and anarchic international realm properties that only pertain to well-ordered domestic societies (Keohane, 2012, p. 42).

Again, while liberalists believe in the importance of international institutions to regulate the international system and view the world from the perspective of a dynamic of open exchanges of goods and services, on the one hand, and international institutions and rules, on the other, which can promote international peace and cooperation and end to war, the AMISOM intervention which as argued in this study was also based on the liberal principles reveals a whole set of contradictions. First, liberalism makes the positive argument that an open international political economy, with rules and institutions based on state sovereignty, provides incentives for international cooperation and may even affect the internal constitutions of states in ways that promote peace. In the case of Somalia, the reality has been rather opaque whereby the Western ideology of extending democracy through peace operation is being challenged by the powerful regional countries involved in the implementation of the AMISOM mandate. Secondly, the involvement of frontline states and violations of human rights that marked the early years of AMISOM intervention have eroded not only the sacrosanct principles of neutrality and impartiality but have also provided an arena for contestation of global peace and security norms by the regional force. This contestation, in the form of non-adherence to the best-practices in peacekeeping operations which includes amongst others the protection of civilians, selfless and objective implementation of the mandate, does not provide solid grounds for the intended goals of liberalism.

Notwithstanding the fact that liberalism is also based on the assumption that a reliance on economic exchange and international institutions has better effects than the major politically tested alternatives, it has been subject to criticism by even traditional liberalists such as Robert Keohane, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill who consider the normative judgments placed on the theory of liberalism. Keohane (2012) for instance, emphasizes that even sophisticated liberalism is morally questionable. This, he argues, it is because, even though liberals defend international political economy, the 'ideal' theoretical framework still produces inequalities that cannot be defended according to principles of justice. Still, liberal prescriptions for peace and prosperity compare favourably well compared to politically tested alternatives. Likewise, in their book *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall have explored the theory of liberal peace as a mechanism of conflict prevention via common trade, democracy, and the international participation of countries which have integrated in this way (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2016, p. 154).

Keohane however, went on to share other criticisms placed on liberalism by writers such as Carr and Morgenthau. For example, he quotes Carr as arguing that international trade is not prerequisite or rather guarantee for international peace. Simply put, trade can still go on in places where peace has not been achieved. In the case of Somalia and the war against *al-Shabaab* Islamist group, this argument may indeed hold true. Although peace has not been achieved entirely, some parts of the country particularly Mogadishu has seen significant improvements for business and trade which continues to flourish. Morgenthau, on the other hand, places a lot of faith in diplomacy and its correlation to a more liberal world. However, this correlation does not always bear fruit. Keohane makes an outstanding argument that rather than imposing themselves on states, international institutions should respond to the demand by states for cooperative ways to fulfil their own purposes (Keohane, 2012, p.57).

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of First World War, one key element in the diagnosis made was concerned with domestic politics associated with liberalism. A firm liberal belief is that people have a genuine desire for peace and therefore do not like war; war comes because the people are led into it by militarists or autocrats, or because their legitimate aspirations to nationhood are blocked by undemocratic, multinational and imperial systems. Hence, an obvious response would be to promote democratic political systems, that is, liberal-democratic, constitutional regimes, and the principle of national self-determination. The rational here is that if all regimes were to be national and liberal-democratic, there would be no war. Overall, liberalism views international politics as not being based on a '*zero-sum*' game than are international economics and that national interests are always reconcilable. In other words, liberals believe in a natural harmony of interests (Brown, 2005, p. 22).

It is also noted that although it is no longer a major point of debate that continues to separate realists from the liberals, a main point of contention in the previous debate between liberals and realists, around the Second World War, concerned the human nature;[30] whereby liberals generally take a positive view of human nature whereas realists

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[30] For Morgenthau, human nature was at the base of international relations. He argued that humans were self-interested and power-seeking and that could easily result in aggression. Another possible explanation draws on Christian religion. According to the Bible, humans have been endowed with original sin and a temptation for evil ever since Adam and Eve were thrown out of

tend to hold a negative view in that they see human beings as capable of evil (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010, p. 113). Therefore, it is not surprising that liberalism has been heavily criticized by realists such as Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz who considered the theory as an allegedly naive doctrine with utopian tendencies that erroneously ascribes to the conflictual and anarchic international realm. Carr offered the most comprehensive and penetrating critique of liberal idealism by arguing that liberal IR thinkers profoundly misread the facts of history and misunderstood the nature of international relations (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010, p. 36).

Informed by the foregoing assertions, this study advances the argument that while establishing the AMISOM peace operation both the AU and UN erroneously or purposely believed that the underlying interests of the TCCs and other stakeholders involved could be harmonized in support of mandate implementation as understood by both entities with a common unity of purpose. However, in Carr's words, the correct starting point should have been the opposite one: recognizing that given the unique nature of the AMISOM arrangement in a stateless Somalia and the involvement of neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia[31] and Djibouti, despite the initial opposition (by Somalis and also some hesitations within the AU and UN), there was a potential for advancing geopolitical and national interests that were contrary to the spirit of the peace operation by the states and individuals involved as evidenced in this study. In contrast to realism, liberalism is not committed to an ambitious and parsimonious structural theory. Although the theory of liberalism in IR is vaguely stated and seems to yield indeterminate results; liberalism's theoretical weakness, can be a source of strength.

Paradise. The first murder in history is Cain's killing of his brother Abel out of pure envy. Human nature is plain bad; that is the starting point for realist analysis. The second major element in the realist view concerns the nature of international relations. International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim (Morgenthau, 1960, p. 29).

[31] As hinted in Chapter One and argued further in Chapter Four, while sections of Somali society opposed the initial involvement of frontline states when IGASOM was established in 2005 and were later against the US-backed Ethiopian intervention in 2006, it was in fact the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which had invited the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) in the first place to intervene back in December 2006 as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had taken control of Mogadishu and the entire country. Nevertheless, this study goes beyond the 2006 incursion to demonstrate that there is a much deeper history to Ethiopian intervention in Somalia.

As a theory, liberalism to a large extent puts more emphasis on the cumulative effects of human action, particularly institution building, than does either Marxism or Realism. According to liberalists, people really do make their own history (Keohane, 2012, p. 40). For this reason, liberalism may therefore offer some clues about how we can change the economic and political limits to modern international politics. Furthermore, this research argues that overall the theory of liberalism also provides an excuse for powerful states (Western) to intervene in less powerful states in the name of transparency, openness, democracy including the promotion and defense of human rights. It does so, for example, by promoting interventionism through international organizations such as the UN, AU, EU and NATO etc. This is the view shared by Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen who agreed that foreign policy theorists who are concerned with multilateral questions are likely to take a liberal approach, emphasizing international institutions such as, the UN or the World Trade Organization (WTO) as means of reducing international conflict and promoting mutual understanding and common interests. The liberal tradition in IR emphasizes the great potential for human progress in modern civil society and the capitalist economy, both of which can flourish in states which guarantee individual liberty. The modern liberal state invokes a political and economic system that will bring peace and prosperity. Relations between liberal states will be collaborative and cooperative.[32] On the other hand, foreign policy theorists who are concerned with defence or security issues are likely to take a realist approach, emphasizing the inevitable clash of interests between state actors, the outcomes of which are seen to be determined by relative state power (Jackson and Sorensen, 2013, p. 253).

On the other hand, from an ideological standpoint, liberalism is essentially a Western concept serving the interests of the West in the name of globalism and humanitarian interventions. To conclude, this study maintains that similar to other UN mainstream peace operations, the authorisation of AMISOM as a peace enforcement operation was based on liberal democratic principles with the ultimate goal of bringing peace and stability in Somalia. However, as argued earlier, the fact that frontline state actors have been involved, the national interests of such states cannot be ignore considering that their security is intertwined with that of their immediate neighbour,

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[32] See Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen (2013, p. 309) Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches, 5th Edition. Oxford University Press, UK.

Somalia. This dimension is particularly relevant because as pointed out by Mearsheimer (2018) states in the international system are also intensely influenced by concerns about survival, which is why they carefully monitor the balance of power and ultimately seek hegemony. Moreover, Mearsheimer highlights that survival is a defining aspect of liberalism; after all, the theory is predicted on the belief that individuals sometimes disagree so strongly about first principles that they try to kill each other. A crucial purpose of the state is to act as a constable and maximise each person's prospects of survival. While the above assertion may justify state actors' actions when acting independently, this research advances the argument that it goes against the expectation, the spirit and principles of UN mandated peace operations which among others, require participating troop contributing countries to adhere strictly to the principle of neutrality and impartiality.

2.2. Realism

It is widely acknowledged that since the period of renaissance, western thought and politics has been dominated by the tradition of political realism. A few scholars including Nye, Jr. (2004); Griffiths (2011) and Guzzini (2017) have contributed towards the definition of realism. Nye, Jr. (2004) for instance, noted that realism has been the most dominant strand between the main two strands of classical tradition of international relations theory and it is centered on Morgenthau's account which boils down to the notion that states have interests defined in terms of power and that they behave like persons in accordance with their interests (national interest) and not in response to abstract principles (such as collective security) or a desire to act altruistically as suggested by the liberals. Realism has remained the most clearly articulated theoretical approach in the field of international relations due to its longevity, parsimony and appeal to policymakers.

Whereas Guzzini (2017) defined realism as a theoretical language of observation and a practical language of action in which international relations is thought and spoken. He identifies national interest, balance of power, power politics, prudence, self-restraint, a nation's credibility and personality, raison d'État, the primacy of foreign policy, as core concepts associated with the theory of realism. Griffiths (2011) on another hand, affirms that realism is a general approach to international relations, not a single theory. Realism is often portrayed as a tradition of thought that dates back as far as Thucydides, the

chronicler of the ancient Peloponnesian Wars, who wrote – *the strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept.*

Indeed, classical and neoclassical realism are associated with Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Carr and Morgenthau. Neorealism on another hand is closely linked to the work of Kenneth Waltz. As noted earlier, within realism and liberalism as theoretical perspectives there are different trends and nuances in the arguments of authors within the same tradition. For example, Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen identified four main sources of the realist tradition in IR which is based on: (1) a pessimistic view of human nature—humans are self-interested and egoistic; (2) a conviction that international relations are conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war; (3) a high regard for the values of national security and state survival; (4) a basic skepticism that there can be progress in international politics that is comparable to that in the domestic political life. These ideas and assumptions steer the thought of most leading realist IR theorists, both past and present (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010, p.59). The pursuit of geopolitical and national interests by regional states involved in the implementation of the AMISOM mandate comes from the third realist belief and will be analysed as such.

In the context of this study, it is a foregone conclusion that while the AMISOM intervention was a product of liberalism, the way in which its mandate has been implemented between 2007–2017 reveals a more salient picture of realism. To that end, in his work, *Fragmented peacekeeping: Regional Interests Define the African Union Mission in Somalia*, Peter Albrecht (2015) points out one of the key aspects of interest in this research. He noted for instance that, entirely independent of both AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) leadership, and in general contradiction to the international community's agenda, several hundred Somalis were being trained and paid by the Ethiopian forces. In this way, different groups of armed Somalis – which may or may not be presented as SNA members – are supported with one aim in mind: the establishment of border security. It exposes the obvious weakness of the FGS, and by extension the SNA. More importantly, it questions the willingness of the TCCs to support, and thus AMISOM's ability to fulfil, the mandate of the mission. It also shows the limited room to manoeuvre that is available to the broader international community in Somalia. While it holds true that none of the above should detract from the successes that AMISOM has

had over the years, it has become evident that realism, not idealism or liberalism, should be the mantra guiding expectations of the mission (Albrecht, 2015, p. 5).

It is pertinent to note that the picture is one of great complexity considering the divergent national interests pursued by participating TCCs and other state and none-state actors involved which arguably obstructed the implementation of AMISOM's mandate to a certain extent. This calls for a systematic inquiry at different levels of analysis primarily to examine state actors' behaviour but also to explain individual actions. Put differently, this research argues that both state and non-state actors particularly from the TCCs countries were involved in parallel bilateral operations and more importantly in several activities (legal and irregular) through a complex web or networks they created and connections to local actors including state bureaucracies in their countries of origins in a manner which then influenced geopolitical and national policy decisions that these countries made. Previous researches on the AMISOM peace operation have paid little attention to systematically analyse the intervention through the International Relations (IR) level of analysis strategy (Waltz, 1959; Singer, 1961 and Buzan, 1995) and map out the various national interests that have been pursued by state and non-state actors involved which this study attempts to do in order to examine and explain the broader underlying implications of implementing an ideologically liberal democracy mandate with realism based principles which has put to test the strategic AU-UN partnership.

In IR, the concept of levels of analysis is related to the explaining of causes of phenomenon (Buzan, 1995). Accordingly, it is customary in IR to study phenomenon through the level of analysis strategy. However, despite its common use, the concept has been the subject of scholarship debate with the works of Morton A. Kaplan (Kaplan, 1957), J. David Singer (Singer, 1961), Kenneth N. Waltz (Waltz, 1979) and Berry Buzan (Buzan, 1995) being identified as the most cited and early critical references for that debate. More recently, the works of Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen (Jackson and Sorensen, 2013) have also added new contributions to the debate. Despite the enduring debate, three level of analysis are widely employed (Singer, 1961, pp. 78-83; Jackson and Sorensen, 2013, pp.256-263) – system, state and the individual levels:

1. *The systemic level* – which enables to study the patterns of interaction which take place within the system and its environment. In other words, the systemic level of

analysis, and only this level, permits us to examine international relations in the whole, with a comprehensiveness that is of necessity lost when our focus is shifted to a lower, and more partial, level. This level is concerned with the distribution of power among states, their political and economic interdependence;

2. *The nation-state level* – which considers the state as the primary actor in international relations. This sub-system allows significant differentiation among state actors in the international system. Besides dealing with questions such as goals, motivation, and purpose in national policy, this level focuses on the type of government, democratic or authoritarian; relations between the state apparatus and groups in society including the bureaucratic make-up of the state apparatus;

3. *The level of the individual decision-maker* – in this level, focus is put on the decision-making process within the state apparatus. The bureaucratic nature of states suggests that decision making is much more a process in which individuals compete for personal position and power: 'the name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. It is centred on the way of thinking, basic beliefs and personal priorities of those who make decisions on behalf of the government.

In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive picture of AMISOM, this research makes use of the above levels of analysis theoretical framework to examine and explain the findings of how regional and international state and non-state actors including some individuals arguably departed from supporting the implementation of a liberalism-based peace mandate to advancing their own interests (realism) in Somalia. This proclivity for a goal-seeking strategy is in line with the second level of analysis which is centred on the realist notion of power and preservation of national interests which is one of the variables examined in this study. Despite the lack of a widely accepted definition, research suggests that the term national interest has been used by statesmen and scholars since the founding of nation-states to describe the aspirations and goals of sovereign entities in the international arena (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 247).

Although, a comprehensive review of the vast body of literature on national interests is beyond the scope of this study, it is necessary to briefly point out some of the key debates as a background for understanding the underlying implications of the concept with regards to AMISOM intervention and for the AU-UN partnership which is the main

interest of this research. Prominent early scholars including Charles Beard, Hans Morgenthau, Joseph Frankel, Kenneth Waltz and others have significantly contributed to the study of the concept of national interest and how it has been put into practice.[33] In his publication *Theories of National Interest,* Frankel (1970, p. 43) for example, has focused on the fundamental disagreement between those who conceive the concept broadly and hence rather vaguely and those who try to pin it down to a number of concrete single interests, elements, factors, functions or dimensions. All these terms, he argues are used without clear distinction in a partly differentiated but mainly overlapping manner. He claims further that it is impossible in foreign policy to deny altogether the existence of a national interest, however vague and nebulous it may appear to be, at least as an important datum. On the other hand, Waltz (1979, p. 113) also examined the concept of national interest by suggesting that 'each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests'. For classical realists the national interest is the basic guide of responsible foreign policy: it is a moral idea that must be defended and promoted by state leaders.

For Waltz, however, the national interest seems to operate like an automatic signal – commanding state leaders when and where to move. The theoretical difference here is that, while Morgenthau believes that state leaders are duty bound to conduct their foreign policies by reference to the guidelines laid down by the national interest, and they may be condemned for failing to do that; Waltz's neorealist theory hypothesizes that they will always do that more or less automatically. Morgenthau thus sees states as organisations guided by leaders whose foreign policies are successful or unsuccessful, depending on the astuteness and wisdom of their decisions. Waltz sees states as robots that respond to the impersonal constraints and dictates of the international system.[34]

More recently, important contributions have been made by a number of scholars on the concept of national interest.[35] In his publication *The Idea of the National Interest,*

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[33] See Beard, Charles A. (1934) The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy, New York, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp. 506-507; Morgenthau, Hans J. (1951) In the Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy, New York, pp.241-42; Frankel, Joseph (1970) Theories of National Interest, Pall Mall Press Ltd. London; Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill; Reading: Addison-Wesley.
[34] Cited in Jackson, Robert and Sorensen, Georg (2013) *Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches*, p. 81, 5th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
[35] See for example Zakaria, Fareed (1998) *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Nye Jr., Joseph S.

H. W. Brands (1999) points out how for example, in the post-Cold War President Jimmy Carter's effort to release the national interest from the security straightjacket that had encased it since the start of the Cold War, putting more emphasis on democracy, human rights and economic egalitarianism thereby raising the visibility of those subjects in the international forums, was derailed by influential groups within American society. Those individuals had accepted the psychological security of the many people who grew up with the Cold War as the basis of international affairs. Instead, they demanded that security be restored as the touchstone of national interest (Brands, 1999, p. 259). This security oriented national interest was also at the centre of Condoleezza Rice's 2000 campaign speech – *Promoting the National Interest*. She emphasized that American foreign policy in a republican administration was to focus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities, among them to ensure that America's military could deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence failed. Also, to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile power in the believe that America's pursuit of the national interest will create the conditions that promote freedom, markets, and peace (Rice, 2000, pp. 46-47).

As to the above assertions then, it is plausible to argued that the US's unilateral intervention has significantly contributed towards shaping the AMISOM operating environment in Somalia and has continues to be consistent with its pursuit of national interests after the World War II which arguably led to a more prosperous and democratic world. Yet, this study advances the argument that both Ethiopia and Kenya have played the role of client states in support of America's pursuit of national interests particularly in the Horn of Africa region which raises the critical question of whether these countries played the primary role of advancing the AU-UN objectives vis-à-vis the AMISOM mandate or played the secondary role of promoting the broader US policy in Somalia

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(1999) *Redefining the National Interest*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 22-35 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations; H. W. Brands (1999) *The Idea of the National Interest*, Diplomatic History, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 239-261 Published by: Oxford University Press; Rice, Condoleezza (2000) *Promoting the National Interest*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, pp. 45-62 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations; Williams, Michael (2005) *What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory*, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 307–337, SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research; Kaplan, Morton A. (2014) *Values, National Interests, and Other Interests*, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 57-72 Published by: Paragon House.

while individually pursuing their own national interests, thereby undermining the AU-UN partnership and overall peace and stability efforts in Somalia.

Meanwhile, in his article *Values, National Interests, and Other Interests,* Morton A. Kaplan makes important arguments that are worth examining for purposes of this study. The national interest is the interest that a national actor has in implementing the needs of the national system of action. Some of these needs arise inside the national system, and others stem from factors in the environment. More importantly, he notes that when analyzing the interests of a social system, like a state, it is important to take into account the level of governance and the interests of the individuals and subsystems upon which the system depends (Kaplan, 2014, 57). At the core of Kaplan's discussion is the potential of conflict between national needs that can be defined objectively and individual needs of those who are part of the system but with subjective needs (self-interests). This is particularly relevant in the context of this research whereby, the findings demonstrate the fact that while state actors involved in the implementation of the AMISOM mandate pursued their national interests, actions by AMISOM troop commanders and individual soldiers who were allegedly involved in illicit commercial activities had a major impact on the events on the ground. Even more so, the role of powerful elite members in certain TCCs countries of origin exerted significant influence and determined the policy their countries followed in Somalia despite criticisms and the uneasiness such actions have caused at the domestic front, which is in contrast to Michael Williams' assertion that a clear, commonly shared understanding and commitment to the national interest is the sign of a healthy social order domestically and a basis for strong and consistent action internationally. Conversely, the lack of a clear, powerful, mobilizing understanding of the national interest is a sign of societal decadence (Williams, 2005).

In order to examine and explain the national interests pursued by the countries involved, this research makes use of Nuechterlein's (1976, p. 248) proposed framework which advances the argument that the national interest of a particular state may be divided into four basic needs or requirements which account for all of a country's foreign policies. These basic national interests are:

1. *Defence interests*: the protection of the nation-state against the threat of physical violence directed from another state, and/or an externally inspired threat to the political and economic system of government.
2. *Economic interests*: the enhancement of the nation-state's economic well-being in relations with other states.
3. *World order interests*: the maintenance of an international political and economic framework in which the nation-state may feel secure, and in which its citizens and commerce are protected abroad.
4. *Ideological interests*: the furtherance in the external environment of a set of values which the nation-state believes to be universally good.

In the case of AMISOM, in addition to identifying these four basic, underlying interests pursued direct or indirectly by the countries involved, it is also essential to determine as accurately as possible the intensity of such interests in a continuum. In so doing, it is possible to ascertain whether the national interest related to (1) *survival issues*: when the very existence of a nation-state is in jeopardy, as a result of overt military attack on its territory or from the threat of attack if an enemy's demands are rejected. Only defence interests would reach this level of intensity; (2) *vital issues*: where serious harm will very likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military forces, are employed to counter an adverse action by another state, or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation. The terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Somali militant group *al-Shabaab* in Kenya and Uganda fall with this category. A vital issue may, in the long run, be as serious a threat to a country's political and economic well-being as a survival issue. Unlike survival issues, a vital matter may involve not only defense issues but also economic, world order (alliance and national prestige) and in some cases ideological issues; (3) *major issues*: where the political, economic and ideological well-being of the state maybe adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment and thus requires corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats (vital issues). Most issues in IR fall into this category and usually are resolved through diplomatic negotiation. It is when diplomatic efforts fail to resolve such disputes that they become dangerous. Most economic problems between states are major, not vital issues and the same is true of ideological issues, although states sometimes cloak other issues in ideological garb in an effort to mobilize public opinion at home and abroad and (4) *peripheral issues*: where the well-being of the state is not adversely affected by

events or trends abroad, but where the interests of private citizens and companies operating in other countries might be endangered (Nuechterlein (1976, p. 250).

Taken together, Griffiths (2011) points out that most realists focus on geo-strategic and military issues, or issues of high politics, which often seem to dominate global politics, especially in situation of international tension. In addition, realists believe that peace in the world can be maintained only through a balance of power between the most powerful states in the international system, although there is no consensus among them regarding the costs and benefits of particular configurations of that balance in the twenty-first century. The debate is usually in terms of multipolarity, bipolarity or perpetuation of American unipolarity. Again, the realists focus on high politics and military power allegedly derives from the anarchical conditions of international relations that is characterised by the absence of a higher authority which Thomas Hobbes termed as Leviathan, an over-arching power or state capable of controlling the all the units (sovereign states) in the international system. Therefore, realists claim, the domain of international relations is a self-help environment in which states must provide for their own security, either by themselves or in alliance with other states (Griffiths, 2011, p.113).

A similar view suggests that in an anarchical world where there is no authoritative system of decision-making, the state is the key actor in international relations because it regulates international organizations, multinationals, pressure groups, even individuals, who may from time to time, exert influence and act independently of states. The state decides on the terms under which such other bodies can operate. In fact, realists believe that states must look after themselves in a self-help system that characterizes international politics (Brown, 2005, p.30). Besides, as argued by Keohane for the realists, limits on state action result primarily from the power of other states. In other words, world politics lacks common government and is therefore an arena in which states must perpetually defend themselves or face the possibility of extinction by other more powerful states. To a certain extent, one can compare this theory to the survival of the fittest theory. Another study has also argued that the necessity of self-help gives rise to competitiveness among states to tighten their security. This in turn creates a security dilemma;[36] whereby, as one

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[36] Realists acknowledge that the rules of international relations often create a security dilemma, a notion that is associated with John Herz's work in his 1950 publication *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma.* World Politics, Issue No. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 157-180. In essence, the

state seeks to improve the means by which its security increases, it automatically reduces the security level of its opponent states. The power that states wield is derived ultimately not only from population, natural resources and industrial capacity; but more importantly, from organizational coherence, their ability to extract resources from society, military preparedness, diplomatic skill, and national will. These elements are what make a state become "state" from a realist perspective. Whereas for realist, the external limits on modern politics comes from political–military competition and the threat thereof. Given the nature of such competition, it forces states to rely primarily on themselves to develop capacities for self-defence, rather than creating interdependence among states (Keohane, 2012, pp. 42-43).

In that regard, the theory of realism does to some extend devolve from the essence of international relations, which comes down to relations among inter-states and intra-states along with other aspects. In the realist tradition, power is the ultimate causal variable in all relations because the power wielder affects the behaviour, attitudes, beliefs or propensity to act of other actors. Power is sometimes defined widely as the production of any and all effects and thus as nearly as synonymous with causality and it includes military, material capabilities and economic elements (Bischoff et. al. 2016, p. 26). While power remains a key variable, neorealism embraces what is termed structural realism whose main proponent is Kenneth Waltz (1979). According to Brown and Ainley (2009) much of Waltz's work is centred on the notion that the international system is a 'self-help' system where states are obliged to look after themselves, because there is no one else to look after them; they are obliged to be concerned with their security, and at the same time obliged to regard other states as potential threats. A similar argument suggests that realism and neorealism both emphasise states' demands for power and security, and the dangers to states' survival (Keohane and Nye, 2012, p.263).

On another hand, Jackson (2000) offers a contrasting view by stating that power and national interests matter; so do common norms and institutions. States are important, but so are human beings. He further argues that statesmen and stateswomen have a national responsibility to their own nation and its citizens; they have an international

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security dilemma is a situation in which state's actions are taken to ensure their own security such as deployment of more military forces thereby threatening the security of the other states (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2012, p.51).

responsibility to observe and follow international law and respect the rights of other states; and they have a humanitarian responsibility to defend human rights around the world. But, as the crises in Somalia, Sudan, and elsewhere clearly demonstrated, carrying out these responsibilities in a justifiable way is no easy task.

In this vein, this research advances the idea that the canons of realism discussed above typically match the reality of how the implementation of the AMISOM mandate was conducted between 2007-2017. Thus, realism as a theory is relevant in terms of its strengths to examine the implementation of the AMISOM mandate amidst regional and other foreign interventions in that it serves to analyse, first, the state actors behaviour in a conflict context as primarily pursuing national and strategic interests as well as power influence – thereby pursuit of the state's geopolitical interests. Secondly, the regional and international players including the international institutions such as, the UN, AU and EU may be seen as agents of (powerful) principals (states) and therefore incapable of asserting their independence, with their relative effectiveness only as good as is determined by the states involved. While there is considerable debate on the evolving AU-UN partnership in peace and security, it is essential to critically assess how the issues discussed in this study impacted on the overall partnership. In so doing, it attempts to provide an understanding of how international relations theories can help explain the dynamics, attitudes and behaviours exhibited by the states and all those involved, one way or another, in the implementation of the AMISOM mandate as a peace operation.

On another hand, just as echoed by President Nixon on American national interests back in 1970 that the objective of the US was to support its own interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy and the more that policy is based on realist assessment of the US and others' interests, the more effective the American role could be in the world; adding that the US was not involved because it had commitments; it had commitments because it was involved; then concluded by arguing that the US must shape its commitments, rather than the other way around (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010, p.67), the regional states involved in AMISOM particularly Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda including Djibouti have taken a similar approach which has arguably overshadowed the liberal principles of implementing a peacekeeping mandate as they went about enforcing peace in Somalia. It is for this reason that realism is a useful theory in the discussions and analysis made in this study.

It is important to note, however, that there are certain features of realism that are particularly relevant in the context of this study considering the extent to which they have been displayed by the most powerful regional state actors. According to a few scholars (Zakaria, 1998; Lynn-Jones, 1998; Deudney and Ikenberry, 2017) realism is not a single theory but rather a cluster of related – and often conflicting – schools of thought about the basic questions of political order, both domestic and international. Lynn-Jones (1998) for example, distinguishes between offensive realism and defensive realism. He states that offensive realists generally argue that the international system fosters conflict and aggression. Moreover, security is scarce, making international competition and war likely. Defensive realists, on the other hand, argue that the international system does not necessarily generate intense conflict and war, and that defensive strategies are often the best route to security. Similarly, Zakaria (1998) claims that defensive realism predicts that nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive an increase in threats.

To conclude, Deudney and Ikenberry (2017) also have identified three important varieties of realism. First, is the 'equilibrium' or balance of power realism which holds that order and security arise from a distributed or balanced configuration of power and posits that states should and will resist efforts by any state to establish a dominant position. A second major realist school is the 'hegemonic' realism which holds that order requires concentrations of power and provides an agenda for how preponderant states can provide order and sustain their position. A third school is the 'interdependence' realism, which advances the view that high levels of security interdependence (present when mutual vulnerability is very high) makes international anarchy unacceptably perilous, and it suggests that effective government will and should consolidate at successively large scales (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2017, p.10). Therefore, in order to further explain the pursuit of a realist agenda by the regional forces in the sub-region in general and vis-à-vis AMISOM in particular, the above varieties of realism are part of the analysis and implications presented in Chapter Seven of the present study.

2.3. The Concept of Peace in International Relations

Without peace there can be no development and there can be no democracy. Without development, the basis for democracy will be lacking and societies will tend to fall into

conflict. And without democracy, no sustainable development will occur, without such development, peace cannot be maintained.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 6ᵗʰ UN Secretary-General

At the time the discipline of International Relations was founded in 1919,[37] peace was supposed to be one of its key agendas and certainly it was explicitly part of the main institutional frameworks of the modern era (Richmond, 2008, p.8). Ever since, the search for peace has continued to underline the efforts by States either individually or through regional blocks in line with the efforts by the international community to ensure a peaceful coexistence of people across the globe. However, there is a shared consensus that philosophical debate over what peace exactly means, remains persistent. Even those working in the sub-disciplines of peace and conflict studies, for example, an area where there has been a longstanding attempt to develop an understanding of peace, have often turned away from international relations theory or refused to engage with it at all – because it has failed to develop an account of peace, focusing instead on the dynamics of power, war, and assuming the realist inherency of violence in human nature and international relations (Richmond, 2008; Doyle, 1986; Huth and Allee, 2003). Yet the liberals counter this assertion by turning to John Locke's argument that although a state of nature lacked a common sovereign in a self-help system, people could develop ties and make contracts, and therefore anarchy which characterizes international politics was less threatening (Nye, 2007). These divergent views of the state of nature, tend to influence the discourse about peace. For some, peace may be understood as a *state of affairs* in a given territory and for others it is a process of post-conflict intervention, but the boundaries of the peace debate remain (Heathershaw, 2008). What is more important here is that, in the survey of literature conducted there is a general consensus in international politics to view peace from liberal and realist perspectives.

Also, in their survey of the generational development of UN peacekeeping, the theoretical debate in peace operations, and the debate over third-party intervention, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall noted that much of these debates in the

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[37] The symbolic foundation of International Relations as a discipline in 1919 took place in the small Welsh University, Aberystwyth in honour of the American president Woodrow Wilson with Alfred Eckhard Zimmern being its first professor. Zimmern spent little time at Aberystwyth for personal reasons. In his inaugural speech, his successor at Aberystwyth, C. K. Webster, explained clearly that in his view, the acknowledgement of the new discipline represented a new contribution for peace (Cravinho, p.106).

field can be summed up in two ways. First, from one direction came criticism of the ineffectiveness of impartial and non-forcible intervention in war zones. Second, from the other direction came the criticism of the inappropriateness of what were seen to be attempts to impose western interests and western values on non-western countries (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2016, p.181). Therefore, this study argues that the theory of liberalism assures the more powerful Western states with access to markets and resources in places like Africa and elsewhere. According to liberalism, there is no need to use force in pursuit of economic interest because the cost of using that force outweighs any gain. In other words, using the *laissez-faire* ideology, the economic system and resources are already available in competitive terms. By promoting peace, and maintaining good relations among states, such an environment enables economic trade to flourish. If states benefit from each other, especially in terms of huge economic ties, peace is inevitable. However, this does not mean that commerce necessarily leads to peace or reinforcing interdependence among states will automatically stop their geopolitical interests in a country. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that states calculate their cost and benefit analysis prior to disrupting beneficial ties for military prowess.

By and large, liberalism may indeed inhibit the use of force by promoting economic competition, promotion of human rights through individualism, empowering minorities by providing them with a voice to vote free and fairly for their government. In this sense, peacekeepers (military and civilian) are increasingly required to use psychological and communications strategies over the use of military force as they go about supporting the implementation of their assigned mandates. As noted by Tom Woodhouse, although the end goals and objectives of peacekeeping may be defined as military (controlling and ending violence, securing the environment), humanitarian (delivering emergency relief), political (restoring legitimate government), and economic (assisting efforts for development), peacekeeping on the ground is essentially comprised of conflict management and communication activities. The original principles of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, minimum use of force, and legitimate conduct) can only be observed by a closer integration of the communication and problem-solving strategies associated with conflict resolution into the doctrine and practice of peacekeeping (Woodhouse, 2015, p.27).

On another hand, liberalism may also cause the opposite effect. In the post-cold war, the US emerged as the main superpower. The US was a strong contender of liberalism. As such, by exporting liberal moralism the US may have justified the use of force in many developing nations and previous communist regimes. But the fact remains, it is the same liberal values that initiated popular protest at home (United States) against the superpowers military involvement in places like Vietnam and Somalia with the infamous Black Hawk Down episode of 1993. Yet the double standards between liberalism and the concept of peace cannot be ignored. It is within the larger framework of liberalism and the concept of peace that the thesis analysis the theoretical implications in the concluding chapter. On the other hand, it was mentioned earlier that classical realism as developed by Carr (1946) and Morgenthau (1948) depicts nation states as the main actors. The sovereignty of nation states implies the absence of any regulatory authority exceeding the boundaries of the state. Thus, there is anarchy or rather chaos between different countries on a daily basis. Since all states are in a condition of potential war with each other for their own egoistic interests, the concept of peace becomes illusive. Realism in IR perceives the Westphalian system as a universal law that existed in the early stages of history. For the realists, any attempt to create international legal instruments that claim to regulate processes in international relations based on norms and values of an international (supra-national) character is viewed with skepticism. The concept of peace from a realist perspective remains not only illusive but unachievable (Katehon, 2019).

Accordingly, Richmond (2008, p. 9) distinguishes between liberal and realist peace. Whereas, the liberal peace is the foil by which the world is now judged, in its multiple dimensions, and there has been little in terms of the theorization of alternative concepts of peace; realism implies a peace that is found in the state-centric balance of power, perhaps dominated by a hegemon. Indeed, the realists hold the view that, peace is limited if at all possible. Idealism and utopianism claim a future possibility of a universal peace in which states and individuals are free, prosperous and unthreatened. Pluralism, liberalism, internationalism, liberal institutionalism and neo-liberalism see peace as existing in the institutionalization of liberal norms of economic, political and social institutionalization of cooperation, regulation and governance. Nonetheless, much of the peacekeeping literature is associated with the liberal democracy theory which constitutes the basis for multilateral peace operations and as argued in the present study, constituted

the basis for establishing AMISOM. According to liberal thinking, contemporary democracies have reasons to participate in operations with a democratic or humanitarian appeal (Lebovic, 2004). Given their representative structure and popular responsiveness, democracies draw legitimacy, in large part, from the liberal principles (Doyle 1996, 4-5). Compared to nondemocracies, then, democracies more readily accept the view that individuals possess inalienable rights that must be safeguarded and promoted. Worboys (2007) contends that the deployment of soldiers to multilateral peacekeeping operations is a mechanism of facilitating democratic transition.

In line with Lebovic's view, liberalism suggests that the spread of democracy is essential to realize a broader harmony of interest that all people share: "individuals everywhere in the world are best off pursuing self-preservation and material well-being", and freedom is required for these pursuits (Owen 1996, p.118). These liberal views have underpinned the practice of peacekeeping operations which according to Mansson (2008) were deployed primarily as consensual missions to supervise the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes in many parts of the world especially during the Cold War and majority of which authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The post-Cold War global environment, however, allowed for a more assertive and multidimensional operations with mixed Chapter VI and VII mandates, including the authorization of military enforcement measures to both UN and coalition forces to quell and resolve difficult human rights situations. Today, most peace operations are vested with Chapter VII-enforcement powers, including that of authorising the use of military force to protect civilians under immediate threat of violence and with a mandate to protect and promote human rights (Mansson, 2008). This illustrates the fact that the UN departed further from its prior practices in "third-generation" peace enforcement and applying Chapter VIII, the Organization has also conducted peace operations in collaboration with regional bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS).

Anchored in the liberalist theory, traditional UN peacekeeping doctrine is based on three key principles, namely: consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force[38]. It

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[38] First and foremost, UN peacekeeping is consensual; that is, the parties to a conflict agree to the UN assisting them with implementing a ceasefire or peace agreement. Second, the UN peacekeeping strives to be impartial; that is, the parties to the conflict are treated equally. Third, UN peacekeepers are only permitted to use the minimum force necessary to protect themselves, those that they are mandated to protect, and the mission's ability to achieve its mandate (United

is relevant to note that liberal democratic peace has been the underlying ideology of peace operations. This view is supported by Heathershaw (2008) who claimed that the basic discourse of democratic peacebuilding was developed amongst United Nations, major donors and analysts in the immediate post-Cold War period. This illustrates the extent to which it is not just a form of praxis but rather represents peacebuilding as a process of post-conflict democratization which is why most western democracies have been participating in peace operations. In opposition to liberalism, Lebovic (2004) stated that for realists, the democratic character of a country has no bearing on its defined interests and thus on whether and how it participates in peace operations. Typically, realists note that states – democracies included – have chosen to avoid or at least quickly curtail humanitarian interventions (in Rwanda and Somalia in the 1990s), sought to maintain state control over multilateral missions, or participate in them only to the extent that they had an immediate security rationale. States join peace operations, then, to the extent that doing so offers direct benefits or, as some realists argue, exacts only a small price.[39]

2.4. Peace and Conflict Resolution Approaches

Peace and conflict resolution studies challenges fundamental concepts behind both realism and liberalism by rejecting the supposed objectivity of traditional realist and liberal approaches. The development and implementation of peaceful strategies for settling conflicts – using alternatives to violent forms of leverage–are known by the general term *conflict resolution* (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2012). Peace studies and conflict resolution or transformation have been the subject of wide scholarship especially in the Anglo-Saxon academic cycles with the works of Johan Galtung[40] (Galtung, 1996); David Barash and Charles Webel (Barash and Webel, 2016); William Zartman (Zartman, 2007); and Tom Woodhouse (Woodhouse, 2015) among others, appearing as critical

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Nations, 2008). However, in UN peacekeeping impartiality should not be confused with neutrality because while UN peacekeeping missions are impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, they are not neutral in the execution of their mandates (de Coning, 2017).

[39]Unlike their contemporary counterparts, traditional realists are more open to the idea that States pursue humanitarian goals. For instance, Morgenthau defends that foreign policy is guided by "human rights" when he regards them as a subordinate (US) "interest" that can be pursued by States if cost permit (Morgenthau 1985, 276). The realist and liberal views are in contrast but realists stress that immediate security interests are an overwhelming government priority (Lebovic, 2004).

[40]Johan Galtung is considered as one of the founding figures of modern peace studies and has provided the theoretical foundations for peace and conflict. In 1996 he published a book with the title Peace by Peaceful Means in which he discusses peace and conflict theory; development and civilisation theory (Galtung, 1996).

references. For Zartman (2007, p. 3) peacemaking in international conflict concerns conflict both among and within states and nations and therefore deals with power and interests (realism). As a consequence it encompasses conflicts among people, who act in the name of states and nations, and so touches on basic human interactions and reactions including the inevitability of conflicts among sovereign and non-sovereign groups speaking in the name of peoples or nations, but it presents ways in which that conflict can be first managed, moving it from violent to political manifestations, and then resolved, transforming it and removing its causes.

It is to be noted that there are differences in approaches among different scholars in the interpretation of conflicts. Thus, as a first step in an empirical investigation of conflict it is necessary to adopt a clear and workable definition of the phenomenon. To that end, civil war has been defined as an internal conflict with at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year. In order to distinguish wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these fatalities. This definition has become standard following the seminal data collection of Small and Singer (1982) and Singer and Small (1994).[41] It is perhaps important to note that when it comes to dealing with conflicts, despite its alleged failure to address the underlying causes of conflicts, peacekeeping has long been treated not only as an instrument of conflict management particularly by focusing on its capacity for conflict resolution but also by acknowledging that it plays the dual goal of containing violence on the one hand and furthering peacebuilding efforts on the other (Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2004, p. 1).

For Barash and Webel (2016) neither the study nor the pursuit of peace ignores the importance of conflict. Peace and conflict studies, they argue, does not aim to abolish conflict any more than peace practitioners expect to eliminate rivalry or competition in a world of finite resources and imperfect human conduct. They note, however, that where possible peace and conflict studies seeks to develop new avenues for cooperation, as well as to reduce violence: especially organized, state-sanctioned violence and the terrorizing of violence perpetrated by and against non-state actors. It is this violence, by any definition the polar opposite of peace, that for over the past three decades has so endlessly

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[41] Cited in Collier, Paul and Hoefflery, Anke (2004) *Greed and grievance in civil war*, Oxford Economic Papers 56, Oxford University Press, pp. 563–595.

blemished the security situation in Somalia and that – with the advent of the non-state Somali-based militant group *al-Shabaab* which currently threatens stability within and outside the country, makes the assessment of peace and conflict resolution interesting in the context of this research. The threat of violence posed by *al-Shabaab* inside Somalia and across the Horn of Africa region, continues to be a major concern for the AU, UN and the international community.

Meanwhile, Zartman (2007) emphasizes the role of the UN in conflict resolutions by claiming that the Organization's Charter recognizes the existence of three methods for the peaceful management of international conflicts: (1) direct negotiation among conflicting parties; (2) the adoption of various forms of mediation, good offices, and conciliation; and (3) binding methods of third-party intervention (e.g. arbitration and adjudication). On the other hand, other academic sources (Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution, 2000; Coleman, 2011; Oliva and Charbonnier, 2016) have also discussed a variety of conflict trends and provided an analytical framework that contributes towards a better understanding of the concept of peace and conflict resolution. For instance, the Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (2000) developed a model that categorizes three levels of conflict: dispute, underlying and identity-based (or deep-rooted) that can be resolved either through settlement, resolution and reconciliation. While the first level, the dispute, is the most common and noticeable manifestation of conflict, the second level, the underlying conflict, represents a more severe type of conflict, as it is the result of cumulative unresolved disputes. Past actions and decisions by the parties intensify tensions and render their differences more acrimonious as they are heavily influenced by mutual resentment. The longstanding conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia is a good example of this second level; it is a product of several combined incidents that have left a bitter sense of frustration on both sides ever since the two countries fought the war in 1978 over the Ogaden region which has persistently resulted in tension between them (Plaut, 2013). The third level, identity-based conflict, is the most severe and yet sometimes the least visible one. It centers around the values, beliefs, customs and ideals of people, which explains its complexity.

Moreover, prominent scholars including Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall made one of the most considerable contributions to the study of peace and conflict resolution. In their book *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, they examine and provide multiple theoretical perspectives on conflict-resolution theory and practice

with an emphasis on case studies since the end of the Cold War, with Somalia conflict featuring among them. Not only do they present convincingly the theoretical foundations of conflict resolution, including positions, interests and needs, third-party interventions, and symmetric versus asymmetric conflicts but also, they navigate the history of the field by dividing it into four stages of inter-generational development.[42] The authors made a bold statement that conflict-resolution theory is ineffective if it cannot be applied practically to prevent the outbreak of violence, maintain peace, negotiate settlements, and bring about a transformation in the relations between parties in dispute. They find the pursuit of incompatible positions, ideology, economic grievance, and political or group exclusion as practical reasons for conflict. More importantly, they argued that in order to prevent conflict, one must have a strong understanding of its emergence (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2016, pp. 146-150). These issues are particularly relevant in the case of Somalia where for example, one of the most fundamental sources of instability which renders the process of reconciliation between the Federal Government and its Federal Member States (FMS) difficult is intrinsically linked to the perennial problem of competition over resources.

Also, in his study *Peace in International Relations*, Oliver P. Richmond notes that there is greater ethnographic anthropological evidence which demonstrates how peace, prevention, and settlement of conflicts are the greatest impulses of human culture. He goes further to suggest that war is a significant part of Western culture and other parts, but it is not part of every culture. One has only to observe the remarkable memorials of war that are spread in several western countries mainly associated with the First and Second World War, whereby peace is rarely represented in civic spaces except in the context of memorials of sacrifices endured during the two Wars (Richmond, 2008, p. 2).

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[42] The first generation (1918-1945) emerged from the failure of peace, socialist, and liberal internationalist movements to prevent the outbreak of the First World War, leading many intellectuals to pursue what they described at the time as the science of peace (p. 39). The second generation (1945-1965) is marked by further institutional development as a result of the catastrophes of World War II and the start of the Cold War's nuclear-arms race (p. 47). The third generation (1965-1985) combined aspects of the prior generations by focusing on three great projects: avoiding nuclear war, removing glaring inequalities and injustices in the global system, and achieving ecological balance and control (p. 53). The fourth and final generation (1985-2005) took place at the end of the Cold War and provided a more integrative way of dealing with conflict than existed in previous decades. This change came from a context where inter-group conflict had regional and global impacts due to new technologies, mass immigration, and economic interdependence (Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom and Miall, Hugh. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 4th Edition. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016).

However, while peace may not be represented as it should, in the context of international politics, there are treaties, agreements, memorandum of understanding (MoU), and the creation of alliances, organizations and societies in order to foster a peaceful coexistence among nations and their people; the UN, for example, is one of those organizations that have the primacy of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter, specifically through the tasks described under Chapters VI, VII and VIII respectively.

Meanwhile, in his publication *Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution*, Tom Woodhouse made significant theoretical contribution by asserting the relationship between conflict resolution and peacekeeping. He noted that following the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has become central to the international community's response to many complex violent conflicts. It has taken on unfamiliar roles in prevention (UNPREDEP in Macedonia), intervention in active war zones (UNOMIL in Liberia, UNPROFOR in Bosnia and UNOSOM in Somalia), as well as post-settlement peacebuilding (ONUSAL in El Salvador, UNTAC in Cambodia and ONUMOZ in Mozambique). Consequently, it has become more common for Conflict Resolution theorists to refer to peacekeeping as an important instrument of positive conflict transformation (Woodhouse, 2015, p. 27).

Conversely, Branco et al. (2017) have convincingly argued that the conflicts of the XX and XXI centuries have demonstrated a unique capacity to threaten stability and peace at regional and global level. Moreover, they note that in order to effectively deal with conflicts, and with the aim of preventing potential organized aggression by States and non-state actors, or at least to minimize conflicts, both social science academics and decision-makers in matters of international politics have come up with a body of knowledge designated as *Conflict Resolution*. To that end, they have identified and categorized four main concepts as shown in Table 2.1. The categorization of the concepts represents the most used conflict resolution techniques, namely, *dispute settlement, conflict resolution, conflict management, and conflict transformation*. The relevance of their proposed framework is that it serves as an important background that helps the present research in its attempt to contextualise the AMISOM intervention within the broader scope of peace and conflict resolution.

Table 2.1 Conflict Resolution Approaches

1.Dispute Settlement	2.Conflict Resolution	3.Conflict Management	4.Conflict Transformation
1.1. Seeks to resolve disagreements about negotiable interests 1.2. May involve brief negotiation, mediation or arbitration	2.1 Seeks to provide responses to the root causes of the incompatibility of interests 2.2. May be related to issues of identity, human needs or distributive matters in society, thus require complex negotiations	3.1. It is aimed at controlling, not solving a conflict 3.2. In some cases, it seeks to contain conflicts, thus making it less destructive 3.3 May require military intervention to alter the balance of power and impose a different dynamic in the conflict	4.1. Criticizes conflict resolution because conflict is not something avoidable or to be ended 4.2. Acknowledges that human nature in society is conflictual 4.3. Involves transformation of perception about issues, actions and other people or groups including the increase in understanding who "the other" is.

Source: Compiled by author from Branco, Carlos et al. (2017, p.28)

The third and highlighted quadrant of the table is directly linked to peacekeeping operations, a mechanism that as argued earlier, has remained one of the major efforts undertaken by the international community to manage conflicts. The AMISOM peace operation falls within this conflict management paradigm. Peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the UN and other international actors to maintain international peace and security in the world. A point of interest here, is the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement – whereas the former is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile it might be, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in the implementation of a peace agreement reached between the parties to the conflict through the incorporation of a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilians – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace, the latter involves the application, with the authorization of the UNSC, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the UNSC has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. Under peace enforcement, the UNSC may utilize, where appropriate, a regional body and agencies for enforcement action under its authority (United Nations, 2008).

Another important aspect that deserves to be considered in the discussion about conflict resolution techniques is the notion of "timing" in which peace initiatives are conducted. In this connection, the idea of timing in peace initiatives stems from two perspectives – hurting stalemates and ripe moments. In sense, while most studies on peaceful settlement of disputes see the substance of the proposals for a solution as the key to a successful resolution of conflict, there is a growing focus of attention which shows that a second and equally necessary key lies in the timing of efforts for reaching a resolution. Parties resolve their conflicts only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they are more likely to grab on to the proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that appear attractive only now (Zartman, 2007, p. 22). Although this may not necessarily work in every context where there is a conflict and in the case of the conflict in Somalia it is extremely difficult to forge a negotiated settlement with *al-Shabaab* whose complex structure, ideology, political aspirations and ambitions represent a major challenge despite the fact that negotiation remains one of the most viable options for ending the longstanding conflict.

2.5. The Political Economy of War

This research posits that while the phenomenon of war economy is not unique to AMISOM intervention, it nevertheless goes against the purposes of United Nations (UN) mandated peace operations and more importantly it is contrary to the spirit of the status-of-mission agreement (SOMA) signed between the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic and the African Union (AU) on AMISOM, specifically in its Article VI which deals with the conduct of AMISOM personnel. Therefore, it is vital in the context of the present study to examine the underling implications of the phenomenon for the AU-UN partnership. In setting the scene, there is a vast body of literature which shows that the pursuit of commercial interests in a conflict milieu where there is an ongoing combat can arise for several reasons. In the specific case of Somalia, it was noted in the UN Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report for Somalia 1998 that the civil war and state collapse had accelerated the struggle for land, replacing land deeds with semi-automatic weapons as the instrument of choice for appropriating land from weaker groups (UNDP, 1997, p. 32).

The same trend continued pretty much up until the deployment of the AU forces in 2007 but as argued in Chapter Six of the present research, the state of affairs which characterised the operating environment in the first years of AMISOM deployment, took a twist as it was transformed into something rather different and remarkable. From a theoretical point of view, different perspectives in the interpretation of war economy have been put forward by several prominent scholars, including Paul Collier, David Keen, Christopher Cramer; Frances Stewart and Samer Abboud to name but just a few.[43] Paul Collier is considered as one of the most influential scholars whose contribution to the broader debate on the political economy of war has gained widespread popularity. He eloquently contrasts between greed and grievance as the main catalysts for civil wars. While for example, researchers such as Frances Stewart (Stewart, 2008) and David Keen (Keen, 2012) postulate that inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups are a powerful cause of civil wars, and this strongly suggests an alignment with the proponents of grievance thesis (Stewart, 2008, p. 3 and Keen, 2012, p. 758), Paul Collier overwhelmingly points to the importance of economic agendas as opposed to grievance. He makes a bold criticism that grievance-based explanations of civil war are seriously wrong, emphasizing instead on the economic or criminal agendas (greed) of those fighting the war (Collier, 2000, p. 96). Collier's greed-based argument in the sense of economic motivation is consistent with the goals and objectives of this research; therefore, it will be used as such.

In another important study *Incentives and Disincentives for Violence*, David Keen finds that greed-based motivations can come to play a more important role when the conflict drags on for a long time; whereby, economic interests develop for groups that want to take advantage of the conflict (Keen, 2000, p. 27). Accordingly, in order to ascertain whether Keen's assertion conforms to the Somalia experience, this research will explore the observed pattern of illicit economic interests involving AMISOM military personnel either as individual or in sophisticated networks with links to their countries of origin and contributes to the prolongation of the conflict in the country. The relationship

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[43] See for example, Collier, Paul (2000) Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective." Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Ed. Berdal, Mats, Malone, David M. Boulder and London: IDRC/ Lynne Rienner Publishers, UK; Cramer, Christopher (2006) Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries. London: Hurst & Company, UK; Keen, David (2012) *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 757-777 Published by Oxford University Press.

between the level of commercial activities pursued and local conditions leads towards an examination of why war economy takes place as it does in a war context. In his article *Disrupting Conflict Economies*, Samer Abboud of the Carnegie Middle East Center has made important contribution on the link between criminality and conflict. He contends that war economies emerge for a variety of reasons, ranging from opportunists who see the possibility of economic gain during conflict to the need of armed actors to finance their military and political activities. The problem with self-financing is especially acute in situations of protracted conflict where the war economy and its associated activities become increasingly entrenched. A major concern in protracted conflicts is precisely that the continuation of violence, rather than a military or political victory, becomes the goal of armed actors whose wealth and political power are directly tethered to the war economy and its economic profitability. It is for this reason that conflicts can be prolonged because of the economic opportunities they create, not because of the intractability of the political issues that gave rise to the conflicts in the first place (Abboud, 2015, p.1).

Going back to Somalia specifically, in her publication *External Actors in Stateless Somalia: A War Economy and Its Promoters*, Sabrina Grosse-Kettler emphasises the fact that the conflict mechanisms in Somalia differ significantly from other intra-state war economies such as Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Sudan where the exploitation of natural resources has been the main driving factor for conflict in these countries. In addition, she rightly makes the point that a perpetuating war economy became effective after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in the early 1990's, since then the focus of international peace research shifted from the historic causes of conflict to approaches focusing on the mechanisms and motivations that prolong it (Grosse-Kettler, 2004). On another hand, Abboud (2015) also cites a couple of examples which reveal the proliferation of war economy in a conflict milieu. He argues for example that, in Syria, the war economy is characterised by instability and it is largely based on short-term opportunism and mostly predatory behaviour, including taxation, smuggling, kidnapping, looting, and theft or diversion of humanitarian aid; the control of the opium trade by Afghan warlords or the extractive sectors in the Democratic Republic of Congo. These types of conflict financing he argues, provide considerable wealth to combatants and can help explain the continuation of conflicts. For as long as wealth can be generated, the material basis of the conflict remains consistent (Abboud, 2015, p. 3).

Furthermore, it has been argued that recent analyses of war economies have revealed that war can be a sustainable system of economic organization.[44] In a sense, theories about war economies point to the perpetuating mechanisms and the mutual relation between war and economy whereby, war and violence are economically motivated, and individuals or groups use them to maximise profit. From this perspective war becomes a rational economic action which is mainly initiated and perpetuated by personal greed. Hence various identifiable groups – "opportunistic businessmen, criminals, traders, and the rebel organisations themselves" – may lust for violence and thereby establish profitable structures out of war that is then, in turn, self-stabilizing. Accordingly, political or social grievance does not motivate people to take up arms – economic calculation does (Grosse-Kettler, 2004, p. 4).

As hinted in Chapter One, war economy is considered a useful theoretical framework in this study to the extent that it helps explain the commercial interests that have been pursued by AMISOM military personnel either individually or through the complex networks they create and links with their state bureaucracies in a fashion that then influences geopolitical and national policy decisions that these countries make vis-à-vis Somalia. According to one respondent who participated in the field research,[45] the prospect of resources accumulation was a critical motivating factor among individual soldiers vying for their chance to be deployed into Somalia despite the high security risks and dangerous situation that was expecting them on the ground once deployed, especially in the early years of the AMISOM intervention.

The discussion above highlights the fact that political economy of war or simply war economy is a complex research area. Therefore, a comprehensive theoretical analysis on the subject is beyond the scope and objectives of this study. However, the brief arguments presented in this sub-section of the study serve as a background for analysing the pursuit of commercial interests by individual commanders or individual military personnel within AMISOM for resources accumulation and self-enrichment. This is particularly crucial because as argued in this research, there is a vast body of documented evidence which points to the fact that the intervening forces were reportedly immersed in

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[44] For more details see Grosse-Kettler, Sabrina (2004) External Actors in Stateless Somalia: A War Economy and Its Promoters, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Vol. 39.
[45] Details of a semi-structured interview conducted in Nairobi, Kenya on 29 June 2019 with a former Senior Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) official as part of Interview #2.

illicit business dealings, taxation and charcoal-embargo busting including arms smuggling, and notably in the theft of resources that make up the logistical package provided to them by the UN through United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). In this regard, following the assertion made earlier by Grosse-Kettler that the conflict dynamics in Somalia are different from those of other countries, a pertinent question needs to be asked – what is so different about it then? Grosse-Kettler herself provides the answer as follows:

> *"When statelessness emerged in 1991, former influential individuals from the Barre regime successfully created their own authority. When external actors from both the military and economic spheres turned towards Somalia, self-declared authorities competed for attention through violence and alleged co-operation. As a consequence, the role of external actors was determining the Somali war economy from the very beginning".*

Grosse-Kettler's statement impeccably describes and provides insight into the operating environment that AMISOM found itself in when it begun implementing its mandate in 2007. Therefore, it is not surprising that in such a conducive environment it was left up to the intervening forces to adopt a posture consistent with the mandate given to them by both the AU and UN including respecting the obligations under the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) signed between the AU and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). The analysis and findings presented in Chapter Six expand on this discussion and focus on the choices made by AMISOM military personnel and the implications of war economy in a conflict milieu.

2.6. Theoretical Foundation of Foreign Intervention

While this study is not meant to provide a comprehensive analysis of foreign intervention in Somalia, it is briefly discussed as a way of providing a useful basis for understanding the broader context of AMISOM intervention as a case study. The trending literature[46] on foreign intervention in conflict affected countries in general and Africa in

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[46] Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius T. (2005) Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI: Intervention in Solomon Islands, The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 283-308; Eriksson, Mikael (2013) External intervention in Somalia's civil war: security promotion and national Interests?, FOI-R--3718--SE; Tucker, Nichole M. (2014) Humanitarian Intervention: Understanding Ethics within US Foreign Policy Doctrines, UCD Clinton Institute for American Studies; Gegout, Catherine (2017) Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security, Prestige and the Legacy of Colonialism. London: Hurst; Schmidt, Elizabeth (2018) Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Soverignty, Responsibility and the War on Terror. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press; Ingiriis, Mohamed H. (2018) From Al-Itihaad to *al-Shabaab*: how the Ethiopian intervention and the 'War on Terror' exacerbated the conflict in Somalia, Third World Quarterly.

particular, suggests that most of such interventions are conducted for human rights reasons. It is for this reason that Tucker (2014) for example, noted that humanitarian intervention in contemporary debates is considered action for human rights and they are based on doctrines derived for theoretical philosophies. The main debate is centered around whether an intervening country is acting upon human interest from domestic ideals or fighting for universal human rights. Conversely, Mikael Eriksson (2013) examines external intervention in Somalia's civil war by focusing on Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda's military engagement in Somalia. In his view, external interventions in civil war-like situations continue to be practiced by states in the international system. Typically, in such circumstances, a party tends to intervene in another party's armed conflict in order to support one of the belligerents for their own interests. This can be done either directly or indirectly through military support of any kind.

Eriksson went on to state that the intervening state can have several reasons for its decision to intervene, e.g. genuine altruism (benevolence), coercion, as a result of creeping involvement, or for the sake of other vested interests. According to Eriksson's assessment, Somalia's neighbours are gradually entering a tenser political relationship with the government of Somalia. This development is characterised by a tension between Somalia's quest for sovereignty and neighbouring states' visions of a decentralised Somali state-system capable of maintaining security across the country (Eriksson, 2013, p. 4). Likewise, in his article *From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the 'War on Terror' exacerbated the conflict in Somalia*, Ingiriis (2018) has argued that external intervention has frustrated and continues to frustrate peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, adding various adverse layers to an already complicated and complex conflict. The level of forceful military engagement intended for regional domination has profoundly affected negatively the efforts of peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia. On the other hand, Tucker (2014) made valuable contribution on the analytical basis of foreign interventions. To that end, Tucker claims that there are two important aspects to be considered in terms of what interventions are based on human interest (norms in a society) and which are meant to enforce human rights. This can be explained through three theoretical foundations that arguably guide the foreign policy of states. First, *contractarianism* which is a political theory which derives from Hobbes' social contract, a moral theory which questions the rule of the state over the individual. The main idea of contractarianism is that the state's strategy is based on self-interest.

Within this theory, persons are rational and act in rational ways. Thus, humanitarian intervention would be considered a rational reaction to circumstances that are against human interest.

Second, *communitarianism* connects the natural human interest with the interest of the entire community. This theory holds that what is common or socially accepted within the community is legitimate. In addition to something being common, it must also secure basic human rights. An intervention based on this theory, it is debated that factors related to culture can affect all matters of humanitarian intervention because culture and interests are related. Lastly, *the utilitarianism,* which is an ethics theory, holds that the correct course of action increases the benefits and decreases negative factors such as, destruction and human suffering. The philosophy is that the ethical course of action is that what benefits the most people (Tucker, 2014, p.2).

As expected, considerable debates remain on what makes a country to intervene in other countries independently of what theoretical strand is followed and whether foreign interventions contribute in the stabilization or pacification of a country like Somalia. Kabutaulaka (2005) responds that foreign intervention, while useful in the short term, does not offer an easy solution to internal problems. It might create a quasi-functioning state that is able to restore order and serve the interests of the intervening forces, but it often does not address the underlying causes of civil unrest, nor can it build long-term peace. For an intervention to be successful, it is necessary to restore not only a functional state but also relationships between people and it must cultivate a capacity for positive change within a country; otherwise it reinforces a culture of dependency. The role of the intervening force must be one of facilitating positive development rather than dictating it. Following Kabutaulaka's argument, in the case of Somalia, it is crucial that the interests and discourses of foreign interveners do not get privileged over those of the Somali people. This discussion feeds directly into the underlying implications analysed in the present study, particularly the way foreign interventions have ostensibly moulded the dynamics of the conflict both at internal and regional level thereby affecting the implementation of the AMISOM mandate to a certain extent.

Other critical sources of reference on the subject of foreign interventions in Africa have been put forward by at least two prominent scholars including Catherine Gegout and Elizabeth Schmidt who, in the quest for explanations of foreign interventions in the

continent have made significant individual contributions on the topic through their publications.[47] For example, Gegout (2017, p. 101) notes that while the United Nations has become a major security actor since the late 1980s and has successfully deployed several missions in places like Western Sahara, Somalia, Rwanda, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Mali etc, other actors such as states or the European Union have at other times worked alongside it. Gegout highlights further that European actors, China, the United States and others have increasingly been involved in foreign interventions in Africa. As a matter of fact, the African Union has been focusing on the issues of concern to the EU and United States. Similarly, Schmidt (2018) underscores the role of outside powers in the political and economic crises that plague Africa today. Schmidt's work focuses on the investigation of external political and military intervention in Africa during the quarter century following the Cold War (1991–2017) when neighbouring states and sub-regional, regional, and global organisations and networks joined extracontinental powers in support of diverse forces in the war-making and peace-building processes. More importantly, she concludes that the UN, AU, and various sub-regional organisations regularly intervened to broker, monitor, and enforce peace agreements.

2.7. Definition and Operationalisation of the key Concepts

Following the literature review, this sub-section provides a glossary of important terminologies that summarise the study. Taking into consideration the key debates and arguments put forward by several authors as outlined above, the key concepts that will be used in the context of the present study include:

Peace Operations: There is an ongoing doctrinal distinction between the AU and UN whereby, the former prefers the use of peace support operation for its mission while the latter, uses mostly the term peacekeeping operations for missions authorised under Chapter VI and Peace Enforcement Operations for those authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter whose authority is vested in the UNSC. For practical reasons, the term peace operations will be used interchangeably throughout the study to include peace-making or peacebuilding, peace enforcement and peacekeeping. This is because many of the UN's contemporary peace missions cannot be adequately described by the term

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[47] Gegout, Catherine (2017) Why Europe intervenes in Africa: Security, prestige and the legacy of colonialism, New York: Oxford University Press. Schmidt, Elizabeth (2018) Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and the War on Terror, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

peacekeeping, which suggests that there is a peace agreement or ceasefire in place that AMISOM may be helping to monitor and implement. The reality is that AMISOM is in fact an active combat peace enforcement operation (United Nations, 2008).

Frontline States: In the context of peacekeeping operations, the term refers to any country neighbouring a conflict state where a peace operation may be taking place. It is to be noted that there is a longstanding tradition which suggests that ideally in traditional peacekeeping operations, the UN does not allow frontline states to take part or contribute troops as their neutrality may not be assured. In this study, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia including Uganda given its geographical proximity, are considered frontline states (The East African, 2012; Hull and Svensson, 2008) as they are direct neighbours of Somalia.

Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs): In the practice of peacekeeping operations, these are countries that provide military contingents once a mandate or authorisation has been granted by the United Nations Security Council (United Nations, 2008). The concept also applies to AU authorised peace support operations. In the case of Somalia, the countries that have contributed troops for AMISOM are – Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda including Burundi and Sierra Leone.

Foreign Intervention: It is used in this study to describe external interventions by state actors and institutions that not only shaped direct or indirectly, the AMISOM operating environment but also influenced the overall situation in Somalia between 2007 – 2017.

Geopolitics: Geopolitics concerns power struggle over territories for political control over space. It studies the way the international politics can be understood through geographical factors; not only physical landscape, but also weather, demography, cultural regions and access to natural resources. In the practice of politics, geopolitics is an angle of vision that considers the relationship between geography and politics in diverse areas, such as foreign policy, trade policy, economy, military/defence/security policy, etc. (Puheloinen, 1999; Marshall, 2017). The concept is used in this study from two specific angles – the global and regional dimensions. The global dimension includes those state actors and international institutions with vested interests in Somalia and the regional dimension considers the so-called frontline states such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda.

Political Economy of War: It is used in the sense that it is the discipline best suited to help explain the illicit commercial activities that have tainted the ten-year implementation

of AMISOM mandate in Somalia. The choice of this sub-discipline is justified because neither liberalist nor realist theory are sufficiently able to explain the commercial interests that have been pursued for self-enrichment. Several prominent scholars including Collier (2000), Keen (2000 and 2012), Stewart (2008), Cramer (2002), Abboud (2015) and others have made significant contributions and provide incisive analyses of political economy, war economies and illicit business both in a civil war or in a peace operation context. Grosse-Kettler (2004) in particular, has provided an account of war economy specifically focusing on Somalia, the area of interest in this study.

Commercial Interests: Broadly refer to engaging in illegitimate commercial activities for one's personal benefits or profit. For purposes of this study, the term is used to describe the behaviour of AMISOM troops—specifically troop commanders, a small clique of military establishment and other individuals within their countries in which they have taken advantage of the situation in Somalia and the AMISOM arrangement to engage in illicit trade and make profits. The study argues that the pursuit of commercial interests for self-enrichment has in turn influenced decisions TCCs make in Somalia.

National Interests: There are differences in approaches among scholars in the definition of national interests. In order to map out and analyse the various interests pursued by state and non-state actors involved in Somalia, this study adopts Donald E. Nuechterlein's definition and framework which states that in its simplest form, the national interest is the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment.[48] Following his analytical framework, the study will be able to assess the intensity of real but limited national security and geostrategic interests pursued by international actors such as the US, Britain, Turkey, China and certain Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) including the EU. Despite the ever growing influence of international actors in Somalia, this research places a major emphasis on the national interests pursued by the most powerful regional TCCs (Ethiopia, Kenya and to a certain extent Uganda), as the most important state actors of interest in this study due to their impact on the overall mandate implementation and underlying implications for the AU-UN partnership.

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[48] See Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making, British Journal of International Studies, Oct., 1976, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 246-266. Published by: Cambridge University Press.

CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE CASE STUDY
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3.0. Introduction

This chapter provides a background and overview of the institutional and organisational context of the entities that authorised the AMISOM peace enforcement operation in Somalia. The chapter proceeds with an assessment of the African Union's (AU) participation in peace operations and the concept of African Solutions to African problems (AfSol)[49] from an agency perspective, before briefly touching on the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Capstone Doctrine. The penultimate sub-section analyses the evolving partnership between the AU and UN on peace and security issues while the last sub-section briefly summarises relevant aspects of the legally binding instrument, known as the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) signed between the Transitional Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia (TFG) and the African Union on the legal status of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

3.1. The African Union (AU)

The AU is a replacement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was founded in 1963 as a pan-Africanism ideology and a driving force behind Africa's struggle for political independence. Despite its notable achievements in helping defeat colonialism and dismantle the apartheid regime in South Africa, the OAU was institutionally and politically unable and unprepared to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, stop the collapse of Somalia and prevent the Eritrean/Ethiopian wars, and save eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from becoming the worst humanitarian crisis (Komey et al., 2014, p.3). It was against this backdrop that the OAU was transformed into AU in 2002 to make it responsive and enable it to play a more assertive role in peace and security across the continent. As discussed in the following sections,

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[49] It is a largely agreed concept that offers Africa a leading role in defining its problems and providing solutions to the problems facing the continent. Its origins date back to the era of slavery, especially the Middle Passage but it was the diaspora Africa such as the notables Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Dubois that pushed the African solutions, as part of Pan-African Movement, into the limelight. The concept is closely linked in its origin and development to the pan-Africanism, as an ideology and a driving force behind Africa's struggle for political independence, its subsequent formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and its transformation into the African Union (AU) in 2002 (Komey et al., 2014).

unlike its processor, the AU is better structured both institutional and operationally with all critical pillars that are capable of reacting to emerging peace and security challenges.

3.1.1. Contemporary African Union (AU) Participation in Peace Operations

A review of literature suggests that the genesis of Africa's participation in peace operations can be traced as far back as 1960s and it falls within the broader political and historical context of the continent. For instance, Berhe and de Waal (2015) have argued that the strategic environment in which peacekeeping has taken place has evolved. As early as the 1960s, African leaders have taken great care to promote unity and minimise the risk of external powers' intervention. For example, the failure of the ONUC mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) triggered some African leaders to call for an African High Command. Similarly, it has been suggested that Africa started its first ever peace operation under the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the Chadian crisis in 1981-1982 which marked the beginning of a long pan-African walk towards the maintenance of peace and security at continental level (Mays, 2002. p. 105). More recently, in an attempt to play a much more assertive role in the reconfiguration of Africa's security architecture, the AU authorised other peace operations initiatives in between – the deployment of observer missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000, peacekeeping missions to Burundi in 2003, to Sudan in 2004 and culminating with the establishment of AMISOM in 2007 followed by the intervention in Comoros in 2008 (Bischoff et. al. 2016, 98).

While the Chad, Ethiopia and Eritrea experience evolved and influenced the configuration of other peace operations, this study advances the argument that the AMISOM model stemmed from more recent experiences of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003 and earlier ones in West Africa (ECOMOG) where three critical policy influencing lessons were learnt (Gelot, et.al. 2012; Boutellis and Williams, 2013). First, the UN peace operations policy makers realized that some African states would shoulder financial and military costs if their strategic and national interests are at stake. Secondly, what has been christened as "African solutions to African problems" models of peace operations are said to be ineffective due to reliance on foreign funding — which is often late, conditional and insufficient. The vagaries of overreliance on foreign financial support have not spared the AMISOM peace operation either and therefore, critical not only to the present study's interest in assessing the AMISOM

mandate implementation but also motivation of troops staying put amidst the challenges (Gelot, et. al. 2012).

Thirdly, given the political realities that followed in the immediate post-Cold War context, the UNSC members tacitly decided to disengage from the African continent unless there were clear strategic and national strategic involved, the UN simply did not support a direct UN role in African wars (Boutellis and Williams, 2013). Despite the preceding assertions, Ero (2013) has aptly argued that in the last decades, African states, and African statesmen, have played frontline roles in brokering peace agreements and have sought ways, ostensibly African, to end crises. In addition, AU member states have successfully deployed ever more troops to peace operations in Africa and beyond (see Table 3.1). Also, de Coning (2017) highlights AU's participation in peace operations by stating that as of 2017, African countries contributed approximately 48,000 peacekeepers to the UN, which amounts to about 50% of all UN peacekeepers.

Table 3.1 African Union Peace Operations Deployments (2000-2020)

Country	Mission
Comoros	AMISEC & MAES
Burundi	AMIB
Central African Republic (CAR)	MISCA
Mali	AFISMA
Sudan	AMIS I and II
Somalia	AMISOM
Sudan	UNAMID

Source: Compiled by the Author

Given AU's entrepreneurship in successfully deploying various peace operations, the thesis makes an argument that its active participation explains its role as credible agency whose contribution in shaping global peace and security norms is undeniable. By actively participating in peace operations, the AU plays a pivotal role towards the creation and diffusion of global peacekeeping norms. Building on the existing norms scholarship, Coleman and Tieku (2018) explore four key pathways (see Table 3.2) by which African international organizations, states, and non-state actors have shaped contemporary international security norms. They argue that if African actors can participate in and affect the process of norm creation, they can influence and shape the international norm that results from the said process (Coleman and Tieku, 2018, p.3). Such assertions are

consistent with the fact that Africa, as an agency has continuously played a significant role in the past decades working alongside key members of the international community on peace and security related issues including undertaking peacekeeping operations either alone or jointly with the UN.

Table 3.2 Four Pathways of African Influence on International Norms

1. Participation in global norm Creation	2. Development of African-made Norms	3. Creative Implementation	4. Direct Contestation of Global Norms
1.1. Entrepreneurship in peace operations	2.1. Continental or regional interstate negotiations	3.1. Dynamic process of interpretation	4.1. Incongruency of global norms with African conditions may lead to non-application
1.2. The Panel of the Wise and Continental Early Warning System which includes conflict analysis	2.2. Regional initiative for peace and security isssues	3.2. Recognition that international norms emerge in global forums and must be adopted and implemented locally	4.2. Capacity to contest and resist to global norms during negotiations with non-African states
1.3.Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and its associated Court.	2.3. The Pan-African solidarity Norm to counter global norms viewed as contrary to Africa's autonomy and sovereignty	3.4. Potential to subject norms to changes through localization and meaningin-practice	4.3. African public officials may challenge the appropriateness of a particular global norm in their interactions with extra-regional actors
1.4. African Standby Force and its regional brigades including African Union's norm of non-indifference	2.4. Advocacy by agency of local non-state actors (Private Individuals and NGOs)	3.5. Redefining norm content to render them more compatible with local interests and ideas	4.4. African actors may change the framing and content of an international norm to resist global forces or to subordinate the norms to an existing regional norm
1.5. Multilateralism and Unified Position	2.5. Civil society groups	3.6. Local-to-global feedback effects with the potential to transform the "parent"	4.4. Use of domestic tools to contest an international norm
1.6. Peace and Security Council including Regional Economic Commissions.	2.6. Norm diffusion capacity for a bottom-up process.		4.5. African public intellectuals may challenge a particular international norm by pointing out deficiencies through their writings, speeches, and other public

Source: Compiled by author from Coleman and Tieku (2018, p.3)

It follows that the four pathways demonstrate Africa's relationship with global, continental or regionally developed norms in the areas such as international justice system, peace and security including defense issues. The claim by Boutellis and Williams (2013) that the United Nations Security Council endorsed an African-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in June 2012 and the action by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in responding to the crisis in Mali which led to the creation of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in December 2012, stress Africa's participation in the development, implementation and adoption of norms by African actors in a button-up fashion.

Again, Coleman and Tieku (2018) have argued that the four pathways are analytically distinct, but not hermetically sealed from each other or mutually exclusive. Indeed, pathways may shade into each other, or African actors may use multiple pathways sequentially or simultaneously. Global norm creation efforts may present an opportunity for the active or passive diffusion of African norms, but if African perspectives are ignored, they may give rise to localization or contestation efforts. For instance, there was concerted opposition on the interpretations of the global norm of the responsibility to protect by African states who saw it as a justification for regime change in Libya in 2011 and the refusal to cooperated with International Criminal Court (ICC) instead asked the Council to suspend the ICC arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir.

Finally, international relations scholars have developed a plethora of theories to explore international norms creation, development and diffusion. Norms can emerge in multiple ways, including through argumentation, social influence, acculturation, subsidiarity and bargaining. They can be developed either at the global level or through regional processes that may or may not be combined with diffusion dynamics. However, norm creation is never a one-step or linear process. In fact, initially articulated universal norms are not only subject to contestation, but also to resistance and modification, whether at the international or regional levels (Coleman and Tieku, 2018, p.3).

3.1.2. The Concept of African Solutions to African Problems (AfSol)

As noted earlier, the AfSol concept provides Africa a leading role in defining its problems and providing solutions to the problems facing the continent. Ever since the term was coined, there has been a huge proliferation of literature characterised by ongoing debate between the proponents and opponents of the concept. But before analysing the two camps, it is worth revisiting the meaning-in-practice of the concept. According to Komey et al. (2014) through literature review one can learn that African solutions are usually based on either ownership i.e. of being African-led or of being working solutions rooted in African identity manifested in its values, cultures and realities of societies. The question of ownership can again be discussed in the forms of African states, political leadership and institutions, and peoples at the grassroots level.

AfSol as a concept is not a new phenomenon, but rather, dates to the era of slavery, especially the Middle Passage, which massively populated the continent (Komey et al., 2014, p.2). Influenced by the diaspora Africa, the initial effort pushed the Pan-African

movement espoused by the forefathers of the African independence including the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Since the beginning of the African consciousness at the end of WWI advocated by both Africans in the diaspora and in the continent, the concept still lacked clarity both as a coherent concept and practice. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept gained prominence especially in the context of failed Western interventions and "Afro-pessimism". Nonetheless, the concept was again revitalised in the early 21st century as a response to the continent's growing and intractable conflicts, famine and poverty where it has maintained a continuous presence at the bottom of all human development indices in Africa. While African solutions for peace and security have received widespread and strong attention, the underlying meaning of AfSol seems to have been taken for granted rather than critically studied (Komey et al., 2014, p 2-3).

As a conflict prevention and management approach, AfSol has been subject to debates on several fronts. First, its proponents argue about the success of the concept. For example, in his seminal article on *AMISOM and African-Centred Solutions to Peace and Security Challenges*, Rwengabo (2016) has argued favourably about the success of the mission which in his view seems to vindicate emerging scholarly and policy optimism regarding Africa's potential to solve its peace and security problems through Africa-centred responses. Rwengabo advances an Africa-centred solutions perspective that is rooted in Afro-optimist analyses which, basing on Africa's past dealings with foreign actors, suggests that *borrowed fists* cannot solve (most of) Africa's security problems. Evidently, he argues further that unlike non-Africa-centred interventions, AMISOM relied on the AfSol approach whose pillars-genuine commitment, shared Pan-African values, and a sense of ownership-engendered its success by incentivizing states to withstand the Mission's costs and tirelessly mobilise foreign support.

All in all, Rwengabo's assertion from an AfSol perspective is based on the fact that willingness to take a risky operation and suffer large numbers of casualties without withdrawing reveals a sense of ownership, which was absent in previous interventions in Somalia, especially the United Nations Multilateral Task Force (UNTAF) operation, as they were non-African and lacked the innate justification to pay such a high price. Secondly, while to a certain extent Rwengabo makes a valid argument, his optimistic assessment of AMISOM intervention as an AfSol success story is not shared by all. For example, Arman (2014) wrote an interesting article in which he denounced that the

interventions from neighbours have not brought Somalia the promised peace and questioned the African solutions for African problems in the following words:

> *One of the most potent intoxicants in Africa today is the canned phrase 'African solutions for African problems.'*

Thirdly, the Crisis Group Nairobi-based program director for Africa, Comfort Ero also finds problems with African Solutions mantra. According to Ero (2013), Western countries do not want their troops fighting in Africa's wars[50], and would rather not pay for Africans to fight them either; they are perhaps all too ready to endorse the 'African solutions for African problems', a policy embraced by the AU and many of its members to prevent external interference. She argues that this overlooks some fundamental facts. 'African solutions' are often problematic and riddle with hidden agendas as traditional interventions; they are not necessarily the preferred option of all parties, and usually still require significant international assistance. Finally, some conflicts are such an international threat they require an international response.

Besides, while 'African solutions' sound more legitimate, interventions by African states are often no less controversial than more international ones. For example, Ethiopia's and Kenya's interventions in Somalia in 2006 and 2011, respectively, have been deeply problematic and have had less to do with stabilizing that country and more to do with their own national concerns (Ero, 2013). Ero concludes with the argument that the sound principle that neighbouring countries (frontline states) with interests in Somalia should not be part of the AU Mission there was abandoned when the AU and UN agreed to integrate, also known as re-hatting (as part of AMISOM) Kenyan and Ethiopian troops already in the country. In short, despite the criticism that the concept has attracted, there is no doubt that the mantra of African-led solutions to African problems in addressing the challenges faced in many countries and particularly armed conflicts has been widely advocated across the continent since the 1980s. This research makes the argument that the African-led interventions discussed in the preceding section have certainly had an impact on the international peace and security norms and with a more structured AU peace and security architecture (APSA) which is discussed next, the AU and its individual member states will continue to play an ever important role and influence much of the

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[50] Western involvement in troop contributions is very low compared to some other actors such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

contemporary debates on how to conceptualize, design and indeed implement regional peace operations including its ability to shape the international norms will remain relevant as underpinned by its 'African solutions to African problems' paradigm. However, as noted by Engel and Porto (2009, p.92) with serious capacity deficits, the success, indeed APSA's efficacy and resilience, will depend to a very large extent on the AU Commission's leadership.

3.1.3. The African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

Many analysts defend the notion that in the past two decades, contemporary Africa has been characterised by violent conflicts ranging from internal, genocide and ethnic based conflicts to regional, factional and conventional warfare including interstate conflicts. As the trend of armed conflicts and instability hotspots continued to increase dramatically across the continent throughout the early 2000s and the security challenges became more and more insurmountable coupled with the ever growing need to ensure collective security among all member states, it was imperative for the AU to act by asserting its position as agency in international peace and security. In that regard, Arthur (2017) agrees that faced with the new security dynamics on the African continent, the AU was prompted to taken on a prominent role in confronting these security concerns and promoting conflict resolution through various security norms, mechanisms, and structures and architecture. In fact, having a more coherent structure, norms and mechanisms to effectively and capably deal with the underlying causes of conflicts and their non-conventional nature and consequences is what the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) represents.

On another hand, in their book *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solution*s, Ulf Engel and João Porto Gomes have pointed out that contemporary Africa has been experiencing a potentially significant transformation with regard to the norms and institutions governing multilateral relations on the continent. This gradual shift, they argue, has the potential to transform the way the continent addresses the mutually constituted challenges of peace, security and development and is likely to change the nature of bilateral relations within Africa as well as interactions with the international system (Engel and Porto, 2010, p.1). The APSA was established in 2002 by the member states of the AU as a long-term structural response to the peace and security challenges on the African continent. It is a set of institutions, legislation and procedures designed to address conflict prevention and promote peace and

security on the continent. The Constitutive Act of the African Union lays down the legal basis for the APSA. Also, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted by the AU member states in 2002, defines its structure, objectives and principles.[51] All in all, the APSA emerged out of a desire by African Leaders to establish an operational structure that could enable it to execute decisions taken in accordance with the authority conferred by Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (Sessay, 2010). As can be seen subsequently in Figure 3.1, at the heart of the architecture is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which was established as the standing decision-making Organ that is supported by the Commission, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEW), an Africa Standby Force (ASF) and a Special Fund[52] which make up the pillars of the APSA.

Figure 3.1 Components of the APSA at the level of the African Union

Peace and Security Council (PSC)
Standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts within the African Union

African Union Commission (AUC)
-> Support to the PSC and its subsidiary bodies
-> Implementation and follow-up of PSC decisions
-> Together with PSC, coordination of the SROs activities

Panel of the Wise
-> Support the PSC and AUC Chairperson, particularly in the area of conflict prevention
-> Advice, mediation and preventive diplomacy

Continental Early Warning System
-> Facilitation of the anticipation and prevention of conflicts
-> central observation & monitoring centre
-> linked observation and monitoring units of the SROs

African Standby Forces
-> Standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin
-> Participate in Peace support missions decided on by the PSC or intervention authorized by the AU Assembly

African Peace Fund
-> to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security

Source: European Court of Auditors based on the AU Protocol of 2002

In her working paper *Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to the Regional Security*, Healy (2009) stressed the role of the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) since it was launched in May 2004 as the key decision-

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[51] European Union (2018) Court of Auditors: Special Report No. 20 The African Peace and Security Architecture: need to refocus EU support. Available from: https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_20/SR_APSA_EN.pdf.
[52] African Union (2010) Assessment Study Report on APSA. Available from: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20African%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Architecture.pdf.

making body in the new dispensation of peace and security architecture. She notes that its guiding principles include respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, sanctity of boundaries and non-interference; but these exist alongside radically new interventionist principles incorporated in the AU's Constitutive Act. AU member states have authorized the PSC, whose membership is tilted towards Africa's larger and stronger states, to act on their behalf. The fifteen-members Council can authorize the deployment of peace-support missions, recommend intervention on behalf of the AU and approve the modalities for intervention to restore peace and security (African Union 2002: Arts 4h & i). The AMISOM intervention was authorized within this regulatory framework by the PSC in 2007. The role of PSC is to function as the main organ of the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It is a collective security and early warning arrangement intended to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. There are two subsidiary bodies that support the PSC – the military staff committee and the committee of experts. The former advises and assists the PSC in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa (African Union, 2019).

Furthermore, the Protocol that established the council provides for the Committee to comprise of senior military representatives from the fifteen PSC member states, chaired by the military/defence attaché of the member state chairing the PSC in any given month. The Committee can invite any AU Member State to its meetings to assist with its work. The latter assists the PSC to elaborate its draft documents including PSC decisions. The Committee is also composed of fifteen designated experts, each representing a PSC member state, and two PSC Secretariat officers. The Committee is expected to meet prior to each PSC meeting to prepare working documents for decisions.[53] Comparatively, as the main organ that coordinates with the international community and makes decisions on peace and security related matters at the continental level, the PSC is the equivalent of the UNSC that is subsequently discussed.

3.2. The United Nations (UN)
The origins of the present United Nations system (UN) which came into being in 1945 can be traced as far back as 1919 when its predecessor the Society of Nations was founded exactly on 28 June. It has been claimed that at the time of its foundation, all

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[53] For more details see African Union (2019) Peace & Security Council (PSC), Available at: https://au.int/en/psc.

delegates that were present on the date the Society of Nations was created did not appear to be interested to take any decision that could make war disappear from the face of the Earth. None of them was ready to study the root causes of a war, such as the First World War which had caused more than 20 million deaths, or the social, economic and cultural inequalities that followed. All of which were the root causes of another catastrophic war after two decades went by, the Second World War (Frattini, 2006, p.19).

Frattini then went on to emphasise that when it comes to Africa specifically, the UN has had its misfortunes such as its failure to protect and prevent the death of Patrice Lumumba on 12 January 1961 in Congo or prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Frattini, 2006, p.79). In another study by Wibke Hansen, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, it has been suggested that since then, the challenges posed by intra-state war in general, and by the impact of extremely violent conflicts, have variously called into question most of the received assumptions about the process of peacekeeping. Indeed, conflicts in the post-Cold War period have tested the UN's capabilities to the limit, and the failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia have led to widely damning assessments in the academic literature. the genocide in Rwanda, where approximately 800,000 people were killed during April and July of 1994, was described as 'one of the most abhorrent events of the twentieth century.' A year later, in one of the worst war crimes committed in Europe since the end of the Second World War, the Bosnian Muslim town of Srebrenica, which had been designated the world's first-ever civilian safe area under the Security Council Resolution 819 of 16 April 1993, was besieged by Serb militias. During this siege, 8,000 Muslims were killed under the eyes of the UN peacekeeping contingent deployed there (Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2004, p. 6).

Nonetheless, it is undeniable that despite all the setbacks experienced over the years, the UN has continued to assert its role in dealing with a myriad of problems globally some of which directly linked to the aspects highlighted by Frattini (2006) including those related to civil wars during the Cold War period, humanitarian crisis, natural disasters, climate change and migration crisis to name just a few. One of the first authors, who in the early 1990s attempted to theorise about international peacekeeping operations, was Paul F. Diehl. In his quest for explanations of the success of peacekeeping missions in containing conflict, Diehl considered three sets of factors: (i) the characteristic of force itself, including internal characteristics of the operation (force composition, particularly with regard to neutrality), operational characteristics (command and control,

integration of national contingents), and locus of deployment (size and terrain of area, population density); (ii) the characteristics of the mission authorisation (nature of mandate and financing); and (iii) the political and military context, including the nature of the dispute, the behaviour of primary disputants, and actions of the third-party states and subnational actors (Diehl, 1993).[54] To conclude, it is evident that a major task undertaken by the UN is its primary role of maintaining international peace and security in the world which is why the AMISOM intervention was endorsed by the UNSC. However, as argued in the present study, the factors identified by Diehl have presented the AU and UN with an unparalleled challenge in the form of divergent and often conflicting interests exhibited by the state and non-state actors involved in the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and which had a significant impact on the AU-UN partnership between 2007-2017, and will be analysed as such. The next sections provide a brief summary of how the UN goes about fulfilling its role as global leader on all the issues discussed above by revisiting the role of the UN Security Council and the guiding principles of peacekeeping operations.

3.2.1. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs[55] of the United Nations established under the Charter of the Organization. As noted earlier, the Charter gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened. Also, according to the Charter, the United Nations has four main purposes:

- to maintain international peace and security;
- to develop friendly relations among nations;
- to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

Historically, the Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, London in the United Kingdom. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent residence at the United Nations Headquarters in the United States of America city of New York. It also travelled to many cities, holding sessions in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 1972, Panama City, Panama in 1973, Geneva,

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[54] Cited by Bures, Oldrich (2007) in Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping, International Studies Review, Vol. 9, p. 414.
[55] Other organs include: The General Assembly; The Economic and Social Council; The Trusteeship Council; The International Court of Justice and The United Nations Secretariat.

Switzerland, in 1990 and Nairobi, Kenya in 2004. As a matter of principle, all members of the UN agree to accept and implement the decisions of the Council. While other organs of the UN make recommendations to member states, only the Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.[56]

Functionally, the Security Council consists of fifteen members, ten of which are elected by the General Assembly as non-permanent members for a term of two years with each member having one vote. The Republic of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America as the permanent members of the Security Council with veto power. It is important to emphasize that only these five nations also known as 'the big five' have veto power on 'substantial resolutions' — which hasn't been amended since the creation of the UN. Some others can influence but have no official veto. Northern Ireland for example, has no official veto on their own. Moreover, in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. Furthermore, in discharging these duties the Security Council acts in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Organization. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII,[57] respectively. However, it should be noted that the UNSC suffers from a number of shortcomings as an intervening actor in armed conflicts and crises, which is related to its structure, decision-making and efficiency.[58]

This study is concerned with the provisions contained in Chapters VII and VIII which the UNSC used to simultaneously authorise both the AMISOM intervention through Security Council Resolution (UNSCR 1744) of 2007 and the setting up of United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) through Security Council Resolution

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[56] What is the Security Council? Available at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council.

[57] International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Edita Vastra Aros AB, Stockholm, 2010. (ISBN:978-91-633-7823-2).

[58] An extensive literature exists on the shortcomings of the UNSC and its proposed reform. For a more detailed review of this literature and a reform proposal, see e.g. Lättilä and Ylönen (2019). https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592296.2019.1557423.

(UNSCR 1863) of 2009. While UNSCR 1744 allowed a regional force to impose peace in Somalia, UNSCR 1863 cemented the evolving AU and UN partnership in accordance with Article 52 of Chapter VIII which covers regional arrangements for dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security provided that such arrangements are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

3.2.2. The Capstone Doctrine: Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping

Once the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorises a peace operation, it gives a specific mandate to be implemented within a specific timeframe. It is then the responsibility of the mandated entity, which can be the UN itself, a regional organization or international coalition, to carry out the implementation of the said mandate. As noted in Chapter One, the mandates of peace operations are complex and sometimes ambiguous with little guidance on how to define success and/or interpret them. Phiri and Matambo (2017)'s assertion that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led Libya intervention in 2011 that eventually led to regime change instead of only enforcing a no-fly zone as mandated by UNSC Resolution 1973 is a clear vindication of the argument on the challenges of interpreting UNSC mandates.

Nonetheless, efforts to develop a coherent peacekeeping doctrine were in place as early as 2006 and 2007 with the involvement of various partner organizations who facilitated a series of workshops to help develop the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)'s Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations, which became commonly known as the 'Capstone Doctrine', published for the first time in 2008.[59] There are a multitude of tasks, or lines of activity, needed to support a mandate designed to move an immediate post-conflict environment towards one in which there is a prospect of a sustainable peace. The Capstone Doctrine gives guidance at the strategic level (although its principles and guidelines have resonance at all levels). The bridge linking the strategic and the tactical level is the operational level where all the complex lines of activity leading to success need to be knitted together and integrated into one plan.[60]

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[59] United Nations (2019) The Capstone Doctrine. Available from:
http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.
[60] International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Edita Vastra Aros AB, Stockholm, 2010. (ISBN:978-91-633-7823-2).

In order to succeed in the implementation of a peace operation mandate, the three levels of engagement must be careful coordinated in a coherent manner. It is for this reason that in 2008, the DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) published a policy on authority, command and control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. This binding policy which is applicable to all United Nations peacekeeping operations authorized by the UNSC, defines and describes the strategic, operational and tactical levels of authority, command and control in UN peacekeeping operations. The policy defines the authority of the Head of Mission (HoM) and the command and control arrangements within the military and police components. The policy also defines the tasking authorities for both military and civilian logistics units within the integrated logistics system of the UN peacekeeping operations. Clear command and control arrangements support greater cohesiveness amongst all mission elements and allows for efficient and effective implementation of mandates and strengthen the mission's preparedness to handle crisis situations.

Again, while the discipline of military personnel remains the responsibility of the troop-contributing countries the UN may take administrative steps for misconduct, including repatriation of military contingent members and staff officers. Also, troop-contributing countries are expected to be aware of the UN authority, command and control arrangements and ensure that personnel are contributed in accordance with those understandings (United Nations, 2008). Lastly, as a UNSC authorised mission, the policy on command and control applies to AMISOM peace operation in the same manner it would apply to a typical UN-led peacekeeping operation. The only deference is that the overall authority over the activities of the mission is entrusted to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, commonly known as SRCC who acts as the Head of Mission for AMISOM. The challenges of command and control authority within AMISOM are part of the analyses presented in Chapter Six.

3.3. The Evolving African Union and United Nations Partnership

The AU-UN collaboration in peace and security has a long history dating back to at least 1965 when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) signed an agreement with the UN on 15 November 1965, which was updated on 9 October 1990 by the Secretaries-General of the two organisations. Further AU-UN cooperation regarding peacekeeping was called for in a variety of UNSC and General Assembly resolutions, perhaps most notably UNSCR 1197 of 18 September 1998. With the new AU, the trend continued as

evidenced in the UNSCR resolution 1809 of 16 April 2008 and 2033 of 12 January 2012 (Williams and Boutellis, 2014).

More recently, in January 2017, the AU published the report authored by President Paul Kagame on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the AU. In this report, among other important aspects, Kagame underscored the fact that as more and more unprecedented challenges emerge and spread across the globe at a dizzying pace, new vulnerabilities are increasingly laid bare both in rich and poor nations, every country must adapt, but the distinctive feature of recent developments is that even the wealthiest and most technologically advanced nations cannot hope to deal with the changes alone. Even as the dramatic political upheavals unfolding in many states create new uncertainties about the future of multilateral cooperation, it is evident that effectively confronting issues such as climate change, violent extremist ideologies, disease pandemics, or mass migration requires close cooperation with others, mediated in many cases by focused and effective regional organizations (Kagame, 2017, p.2-3). Kagame's report speaks eloquently on the important role of the AU as an agency that is capable of working with other multilateral organisations especially the UN in building international peace and security in the African continent.

**Figure 3.2 AU Commission Chairperson and UN Secretary-General**

Photo Source: Institute for Security Studies (2017)

It is within the above context that the partnership between the AU and UN, the subject of interest at the centre of this study has evolved in recent decades. The handshake in the above picture by the two principals – the AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, on one hand and UN Secretary-General António Guterres, on the other hand, is a demonstration of that enduring and mutually dependent strategic partnership. Nonetheless, as one of the objectives of this study is to understand how this partnership has been put to test in Somalia through the AMISOM mandate implementation, it is important to consider the extent to which the collaboration has evolved and undergone several tests in similar peace and security contexts. To that end, in their assessment of the cooperation between the two entities since 2005, Williams and Dersso (2015) highlight the importance of getting the relationship right to deliver more effective peace operations in a variety of African conflicts, not least because by late 2014 there were record numbers (approximately 130,000) peacekeepers deployed across Africa and, once again, a majority of items on the UN Security Council agenda were related to African affairs. This evolving AU-UN strategic partnership in peace and security is multidimensional and multi-layered in its attempt to address a wide range of issues through a variety of mechanisms.

Similarly, Gelot et. al. (2012) concur that the experiences of UN peace operations in Africa have underscored the centrality of forging good relationship between the AU and Western countries. The AU, as the regional body in a peace operation often complicates the above relationships with multiple capacity building partnerships yet the context of African conflicts is usually already complex. Furthermore, UN peace operations in post-conflict situations in Africa easily get internationalised, tend to happen in countries in transition which are therefore extremely fragile with a high susceptibility to relapse into conflict. This was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone where relapse into conflict occurred while UN peace operations were ongoing. Moreover, Williams (2017) underscores an important feature of the partnership by arguing that the AU-UN collaboration on peace and security is based on mutual recognition of several important facts. First, in the 21st century, the majority of the UNSC's agenda has been occupied by peace and security challenges in Africa. Second, both institutions recognise that the UNSC has the primary – but not exclusive – responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, including in Africa. Third,

both institutions acknowledge that, alone, neither can cope with the multitude of peace and security challenges on the continent.

The relationship between the two entities has not been without challenges. The vast body of literature on AU-UN partnership shows that in recent years there have been instances were major disagreements and tensions arose, and considerable debates remain on the real nature and shape of this relationship from an agency perspective. This was prominent in places such as Somalia, Central African Republic and Mali. Thus, this study subscribes to the notion that the relationship between the AU and UN has tended to be uneven, one that is ostensibly perceived as not a partnership of equals according to the informant who participated in the field work,[61] an argument that is widely discussed in many circles including within the AU itself.

For example, Williams and Dersso (2015) provide details on the troubled transition from the African-led mission (AFISMA) to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013. This mission saw roughly a total of 6,500 African troops rehatted into UN peacekeepers which allegedly lacked proper consultation and the perceived downgrading of African peace-making efforts including matters relating to the transfer of authority from AU to UN (Williams and Dersso, 2015, p.6). All of which led the AU chairperson and the president of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take the unusual step of writing a letter to the UN Secretary-General setting out the amendments they wanted to make to the draft version of the UN Security Council Resolution 2100, which authorized MINUSMA.

Furthermore, Williams and Dersso (2015) identify three main areas of contention that have become apparent in the evolving partnership between the AU and UN. First, debate continues over what type of crisis should trigger the deployment of a peace operation, especially whether missions should deploy in the absence of a viable ceasefire and/or peace agreement. Second, there have been divergent views over when and how peace operations should use force to combat spoiler groups and the extent to which peace operations should become engaged in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activities. A third area of disagreement is how to finance the AU's peace operations, particularly

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[61] Details of a semi-structured interview conducted in March 2020 in Addis Ababa with an anonymous Senior African Union official as part of interview schedule #4.

those authorized by the UNSC. A fourth area of concern has been the transition from AU to UN missions, including the alignment of mandates, timetables, standards, and the appropriate division of labour (Williams and Dersso, 2015, p.2-3).

Yet despite the persistent areas of concern, tension, and disagreements, it is undisputable that the AU-UN relationship has clearly deepened and facilitated the deployment of a record number of peacekeepers in recent years across Africa (Williams and Dersso, 2015). The successful deployments in crisis zones and the issues highlighted above, emphasise the need to continued foresting what should a be win-win relationship between the AU and UN on peace operations which according to Boutellis and Williams (2013) is premised on three realities. First, the fact that security challenges have disproportionately bedevilled Africa. Second, an appreciation that the UNSC has the primary, but not exclusive responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Third, an understanding that none of the two entities can single headedly deal with these security challenges.

Against this background, it appears that the future of UN peace operations in Africa lies in joint operations model between the UNSC and the regional organizations such as the AU (Gelot et. at. 2012). This study contends that the AMISOM model was arguably strengthened by the UNSC resolutions backing the mandate and authorising the setting up of UNSOA which provides the financial and logistical support to AMISOM given the initial challenges encountered at the beginning of the intervention in the highly volatile and conflict-ridden region of the Horn of Africa.

3.4. The Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)
In the context of peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations, African Union or any other entity, there is a need for establishing the legal instrument that regulates the unique relationship that exists between the host government which exercises sovereignty over the area in which a peace operation is deployed (United Nations, 2003, p. 13) and the foreign entity mandated to support the implementation of a peace process or peace agreement thereof. Typically, such legal instruments result into what is known as Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) or Status of Force Agreement (SOFA)[62] that according to Aurel Sari (2008) are bilateral or multilateral treaties that

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[62] Both SOMA and SOFA have three important effects – a) they confirm the principle of immunity; b) they establish the basis to jointly agree on certain limitations to existing privileges where this may be appropriate; and c) they establish rules and procedures for cooperation between

define the legal position of military forces and civilian personnel deployed by one or more states or by an international organization in the territory of another state with the latter's consent. They normally deal with such issues as the entry and departure of foreign personnel, the carrying of arms, taxation, the settlement of claims, and the modalities for the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction over members of the visiting force or mission. Moreover, Willmot et al. (2015) asset that host states need to be equally held to account for their responsibilities and the commitments they make, including under the provisions contained in the SOFA/SOMA.

It follows that, in UN-led peace operations, these instruments set out among others, the privileges, immunities and determines the legal personality including the scope for implementing a peace operation mandate. It is for this reason that a SOMA/SOFA must be signed before the implementation of a peace operation mandate begins. In the case of AMISOM intervention, a SOMA was signed on 6 March 2007 in Addis Ababa between the Transitional Federal Government of the Republic of Somalia (TFG) and the African Union on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). There are two aspects contained in the SOMA that deserve some analysis as they are central to the brother issues discussed in this study. First, in its Article III which stands for the application of the AU Convention, the Agreement provides for privileged status for the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) who shall enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in the Agreement as well as those provided in the provisions of the AU Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities within the context of AMISOM mandate implementation. Secondly, Article VI of the Agreement makes provisions for the Conduct of AMISOM personnel in the following terms:

AMISOM and its members shall refrain from any action or activity incompatible with impartial and international nature of their duties or inconsistent with the spirit of the present Agreement. AMISOM and its members shall respect all local laws and regulations with the Head of Mission, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of

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the sending state and the host state. However, the increasing role of civilian employees and private contractors in support of any peace operation makes it essential to clearly define their status in the host state and regulate their tasks. Some peace operations are entirely civilian in nature which explains the relevance of SOMAs as opposed to SOFAs that are mostly used in peace operations with military components (Dieter Fleck, 2014).

the Commission (SRCC) expected to ensure adherence and the observance of these obligations.

The two observations are susceptible to debate because even though well intended by those who signed the Agreement, for the informed observer they raise a few relevant questions. First, it was unreasonable for the TFG to expect AMISOM and its personnel to respect all local laws and regulations in a country where there were no de facto laws, state institutions and a functioning central government. This particular scenario was described by one Somali informant in the following terms – in the beginning of the AMISOM intervention, because of the lack of a government and lawlessness was the new normal, the situation meant that AMISOM military commanders made up the laws themselves and in fact they became the laws in their own right which is why they were even selling plots of lands for their self-enrichment.[63] This research concurs that this was indeed the prevailing situation in Somalia at least in the early years of the intervention.

Secondly, as AU-UN led endeavour the specific mention and inclusion of the US and EU begs the question, why not Russia, China, Turkey or others? Hence, it comes to no surprise that criticisms have been made because both the EU and US have, essentially been granted a platform to influence the outcomes of AMISOM peace operation and implementation of the mandate. For example, as noted by Mahmood and Ani (2017) the AMISOM financing came into question in January 2016 after the EU placed a cap on the amount it can contribute from its African Peace Facility (APF) for peacekeeping allowances. The new rates a – 20% reduction US$822 from US$1028 per month – had ramifications for troops-contributing countries (TCCs), given that the mission was dependent on the EU for the entirety of the troop allowance contribution. The EU cap on allowance payments led to an outcry from the AU and TCCs (Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda), and set off a whole new debate about external support.

In conclusion, it is evidence that such an arrangement has provided the EU with a unique and privileged opportunity that they can leverage on, as and when they deem fit regardless of the impact on the ground. Put simply, AMISOM troops have effectively been placed at the mercy of one of the AU's main contributors (the EU) whose geopolitical interests may not necessarily converge. In fact, they came into direct conflict

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[63] Face-to-Face Interview with Dr. Omar Alasow, a Somali Academic and Senior Official working with AMISOM, held in Mogadishu on 1 December 2017 as part of Interview#1.

during the 2016 political crisis in Burundi. The European Council's Press Release No. 115/16 (14 March 2016) which announced the suspension of direct financial support to the Burundian Administration, demonstrated clearly how the EU used its influence to exert maximum pressure on the authorities in order to fulfil their wishes. This represented a major challenge for the AU forces fighting a war in an extremely dangerous and volatile environment where no single Western nation is ready and prepared to deploy its troops.

CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA
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4.0. Introduction

While this study concedes that it is beyond its scope to provide a detailed history of the conflict, it is nonetheless imperative to appraise the conflict trends in Somalia as a brief background to the AMISOM intervention. Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to contextualise further the research topic for a better understating of the situation which prevailed in Somalia since the collapse of state institutions in 1991 and the subsequent security vacuum created which lasted for over twenty-years until AMISOM was established in 2007. It does so first, by providing a historical background of the conflict[64] in Somalia and discusses foreign interventions by the most powerful actors and their motivations such as the US, UK, France and EU but also Turkey and certain Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, notably Saudi-Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is to be noted that while these international actors' involvement in Somalia is examined, this study pays particular attention to the unilateral military interventions by two of Somalia's most powerful regional neighbours – Ethiopia and Kenya whose presence on the ground has attracted severe criticisms thereby raising questions on the whole issue of regionalisation of peacekeeping operations involving frontline states. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the role played by both the UN and the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), two key players who kept on trying to resolve the conflict following the withdrawal of the multinational peacekeeping forces from Somalia in 1995.

4.1. Background of the Conflict in Somalia

To begin with, the conflict in Somalia arguably has multiple dimensions that range from local, national, regional to international dynamics. For instance, at local level it is characterised by the complex clan dynamics and lawlessness that prevailed since the collapse of the state in 1991. Nationally, the conflict takes the form of intra-regional

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[64] Given the scholarly debate regarding the use of the term conflict, this study follows the definition used by the World Bank (2005) which states that a conflict arises when two or more societal groups pursue incompatible objectives. It is a dynamic process that leads to both positive and negative changes. The manifestations of conflict vary according to the means employed: A conflict is predominantly violent when the use of violence outweighs the use of political or other means. Furthermore, the World Bank underscores the fact that violent conflicts differ in intensity and scope and range from violence that affects small parts of the population to full war which involves more than 1,000 combat deaths in a year (World Bank, 2005, p.5). The 1000 figure is also a threshold used for example in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

friction as the regions seek to exert control over territory thereby undermining efforts towards building a federal state system. The regional and international dynamics add to an already complex situation. It is therefore not surprising that, there is a myriad of accounts by several scholars, analysts and historians alike that discuss the nature, origins and the dynamics of the conflict in Somalia and the insecurity it creates across the Horn of Africa (HoA) region (e.g. Wasara, 2002; Abbink, 2003; Menkhaus, 2004 and 2008; Mukwaya, 2004; Alasow, 2008; Hull and Svensson, 2008; Menkhaus and Prendergast, 2009; Murithi, 2009;   Hansen, 2013; Rondos, 2016; Maruf and Joseph, 2018).

At the domestic front, it is undeniable that the conflict in Somalia is centred on the clan dynamics. Therefore, it is essential to understand what constitutes a clan and what social intricacies are involved. Maruf and Joseph (2018) made one of the most important contributions in explaining what clans are and how they are manifested socially. Maruf and Joseph in their book *Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally,* provide explanation about the clan phenomenon. They claim that clans are social units whose role in Somali society is so central, so deeply rooted, so part of the air Somalis breathe. The clans, they argue are not based on ethnic, religious, national, class, or political ties; rather the members of each clan are said to descend patrilineally from a common male ancestor who lived in the tenth or eleventh century. With their roots wrapped in legends and their lineages hopelessly intertwined, it is hard to say where one clan ends, and another begins. But is generally agreed that Somalia (including Somaliland) has five major clans: Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq, and Rahanweyn. Each one is divided into ten to twenty sub-clans, which in turn are divided into dozens of sub-sub-clans. It is not surprising therefore that, in a country where virtually everyone shares the same religion, language, and ethnic ancestry, clan affiliation is the main trait that makes one person distinct from another. It is also the main thing that Somalis fight about when it comes to distribution of power.[65]

On the other hand, contemporary conflict in Somalia cannot be explained without considering the broader geopolitical and security context of the HoA region. In that regard, a common view shared by the aforementioned analysts and others is the fact that in the context of the HoA, a number of root-causes of conflicts may be attributed to

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[65] See Maruf and Joseph (2018) *Inside Al-Shabab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally*, Indiana University Press, Indiana, USA, pp.17-18.

several factors which range from cultural identity and ethnicity, porous borders, the effect of proxy wars, and unresolved territorial claims including border demarcations issues in some cases to poor governance, disputes over the Nile River and the Ilemi Triangle, to name just a few. Other factors, such as religious ideology, marginalization, and authoritarian regimes as well as natural disasters in the form of recurrent draughts, famine and the endemic poverty experienced in the countries of the Horn are all part of the problem that at any given time have triggered and sustained conflicts in the region.

Abbink (2003) for example, states that the proxy war phenomenon is visible and affects all countries in the region – though in an extremely complex form – owing to the alliances behind the scenes, the involvement of neigbouring countries such as Sudan, Egypt and Kenya, and the frequent changes of allegiance, a pattern which was followed during the Cold War, a problem that has remained persistent in the post-Cold War period. However, Abbink views proxy wars as being secondary in nature, often of 'low intensity' armed conflicts, pursued in the context of a major geopolitical power struggle or an outright war between states, carried out by subsidiary or co-opted insurgent movements, usually of an ethno-regional nature. Murithi (2009) offers a similar view by claiming that the HoA is beset by chronic insecurity and political tension, which continues to destabilise the region and undermines efforts to consolidate economic development and democratic governance. He goes on to suggest that the region was, and continues to be, plagued, by internal and inter-state tension.

On another hand, Rondos (2016) contemplates a HoA so varied that people pluck what they wish from that variety to generalise. It is that geographical diversity, history, population, politics, and culture that has made the region so prone to conflicts within its societies and between its countries. And it is those differences that have allowed outsiders to play proxy politics with the region. The Horn, he continues is also a region that has been at an historical crossroads in which traders have travelled through from north to south and from west to east. And in which, Empires have grown and subsided. Islam and Christianity embedded themselves in the region from the earliest days of each faith. The river Nile rises in the region and flows through to Egypt, linking all the countries of the Horn in a mortal association for survival. With its territorial connection to the eastern coast, the people of the HoA have been engaged in trade for millennia, linking themselves to the Gulf and beyond.

The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict that erupted in May 1998 which the BBC (2020) described as Africa's deadliest border war[66] also became one of the major sources of instability in the region. As a point of interest, it is pertinent to note that amidst their disputes, both countries sought to undermine each other whenever they could even beyond their immediate territorial boundaries. For example, as noted by Dias (2010), Eritrea provided refuge to the former president of the radical Somali group, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in Asmara with whom the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) had been fighting against inside Somalia. Also, the rise and ascension of the ICU in 2006, resulted from the confrontation between elements of the Alliance for Peace Restoration and Counter-Terrorism (APRCT) which was allegedly supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and *al-Shabaab* (the military wing of the ICU led by Aden Hashi Ayro) for the control of the port of El Ma'na, in the capital, which ended in the defeat of the APRCT. At the time the conflict in Somalia was perceived in simplistic terms as a conflict involving two clans, one Northern clan – the Dorod and the Hawiye which is the predominant clan in the capital Mogadishu.

Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that the rhetoric on pan-Somalia (which envisaged the incorporation of territories from neighbouring states, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, where there is a large number of ethnic Somalis), the inclusion of names of ICU leaders into the US list of terrorists, with the links to *Al-Qaeda* coupled with the aspirations to introduce Shari'a and the pursuit of an exclusive strategy, all contributed to the fostering of alliance between the TFG of Somalia and neighbouring states who saw the ICUs as a threat to their national security (Dias, 2010). What is more, Wasara (2002) claims that in the exploration of conflicts and security situation in the HoA region, there is enough evidence to show that governance is monopolised by ethnic or ideological oligarchies; something which happens at the expense of the majority of ordinary citizens. For instance, the Amharas and Tigreans have dominated Ethiopian politics to control scarce resources at the expense of other ethnic groups in the country. Sudan experiences a similar development, whereby people who describe themselves as Arabs or Muslims depending on appropriate circumstances tend to distort political realities of the country.

[66] Relations begun to be normalised in July 2018 following the signing of a peace deal between the two countries. The town of Zalambesa, divided in two by the border, was one of the main theatres of conflict. Twenty years later, the two countries signed a peace agreement and the Zalambessa border was finally reopened reconnecting communities and bringing dramatic changes. For more details see: BBC (2020) Ethiopia-Eritrea border reopens after 20 years. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45475876

Likewise, the same pattern could be observed in social and political developments in Djibouti and Somalia. The groups involved in this practice are oligarchies with narrow vested interests.

The monopoly of power, scarce resources and denial of rights of others has resulted in civil wars that threaten the very existence of states in the region. The regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre is a relevant example to support this claim. Studies on the disintegration of Somalia showed that Siyad Barre's totalitarian governance was responsible for the civil war that has deprived the country from a recognised political authority. Siyad Barre introduced a clan-based system of governance that dominated economic and political life during his regime. He appointed loyalists into positions of leadership and power. It has been suggested that it was this particular state of affairs that led to the formation and rise of the Somali National Movement in 1981 to resist authoritarianism and brutality against the deprived people. The legacy of the clan-based policy continues to overshadow current politics in Somalia (Wasara, 2002).

In his part, Alasow (2008) provides one of the most detailed analysis on the background and root causes of the conflict in Somalia. Alasow in his book *Violations of the Rules Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts and Their Possible Causes*, begins by asserting that the country has been the scene of devastating internal armed conflicts of varying magnitudes and intensities since 1988 when armed opposition Somali National Movement (SNM)[67] of the north began waging guerrilla war against government forces. Then in January 1991, after 30 years of independence (1960-1990), the Somali State collapsed as the conflict between government forces and clan-based armed opposition groups finally reached Mogadishu, resulting in the downfall of Siad Barre's more than two decades of repressive military rule. The collapse of the Somali state and its subsequent disintegration contrasts sharply with the state's description as one of the most homogeneous societies – ethnically, culturally, and linguistically – in Africa[68].

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[67] Founded in London in 1981, it had an Isaaq core, but also a territorial heritage in the old British Somaliland which linked it to other smaller clans, thus somewhat diluting its exclusive clan identity. Paradoxically, the SNM sought refuse and assistance from the old enemy, Ethiopia and received military assistance from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), both of which were hostile to the now Western-backed regime of Siad Barre (Woodward, 2003, p. 69).

[68] Somalia is often described as a unique country in Africa, being a state founded on one ethnic group, sharing many social and cultural traits, such as language, mode of economic production, and religion. The Somali pastoral nomadic clans estimated to represent more than 80 percent of the population, share a common language and culture, and are believed to descend from a common Somali ancestor. These clans i.e. the Hawiye, Darod, and Dir represented the dominant political

Alasow concluded that the fall of Barre's regime was followed by a political chaos as faction leaders, lacking both the vision and competence to establish a suitable alternative to their predecessor, resorted into manipulation of the clan system (Alasow, 2008, p.1).

Similarly, the United Nations' own account at the time, suggested that the downfall of President Siad Barre in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. The fighting involved two main factions – one supporting the Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, with most of the fighting taking place in Mogadishu but later spreading throughout Somalia, with heavily armed elements belonging to both factions controlling various parts of the country. Some fighters declared alliance with one or the other of the two factions, while others did not. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem. The hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 2019).

Furthermore, according to estimates made by the UN at the time, nearly 4.5 million people in Somalia were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition-related diseases, with the most affected living in the countryside; it also estimated that most probably 300,000 people died since November 1991, and at least 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk while another study cited by the World Bank (2005) suggested that government forces committed atrocities against civilians (an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Somalis died, mostly members of the Isaaq clan, which was the core support for the SNM); aerial bombardments levelled the city of Hargeisa; and 400,000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as refugees, while another 400,000 were internally displaced[69]. Moreover, the UN stated that the political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting including the extent of physical destruction, compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of

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culture since independence in 1960. The Somali agro-pastoral Rahanweyn clans of the inter-riverine areas speak a dialect distinct from that of the pastoral clans. In addition, Somalia has minority communities that do not belong genealogically to the Somali clan families (Alasow 2008, p.1).

[69] See *Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People*, New York: Africa Watch, 1990 cited by the World Bank (2005) in Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics. Available from: https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf.

humanitarian supplies in the country and warned that the conflict threatened stability in the HoA region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area (United Nations, 2019).

Besides, as Somalia descended into a fractious mosaic of independent and unstable clan fiefdoms with the struggle over political power, Somalia fell into the hands of feuding warlords[70] which subsequently led some regions to declare the so-called independent or autonomous states. Notably, the atrocities fuelled Isaaq demands for secession (World Bank, 2005, p.10) and in May 1991 the northwest regions declared the independent Republic of Somaliland but it was never recognised and remains unrecognised by any international body up to date (Alasow 2008, p.1). It was this deteriorating situation in Somalia which led the then United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict.[71]

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[70] A warlord is a military leader who controls a country or, more frequently, an area within a country, especially when the central government is not in control (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020) as was the case in Somalia after the collapse of the Central Government in 1991 when powerful armed militiamen took control of parts of the country; although research suggests that the phenomenon begun much earlier. According to the World Bank (2005) warlords started recruiting among the unemployed and impoverished youth who roamed Somalia's larger cities in the 1980s, and they were later supplemented by pastoral youth who moved to towns to help their clans. Warlords' power base depended on a chronic state of insecurity, so that their clan constituencies needed them for protection. This typically entailed the battling over the political and economic loot, leading the country into a period of crisis and civil war. Warlords in Somalia have been instrumental in invoking loyalty to raise or lower the level of identity from clan to sub-clan and sub-sub-clan and back again depending on what is most convenient. Time and again, these armed warlords have entered into shifting alliances with other clan-based warlords when expedient, only to be on opposing sides soon after. Their militia fight for them and clan kin support them because they perceive state capture by their clan to translate into potential success and benefits. The militarisation of politics has also meant that leaders depend on the use of the gun to achieve their goals, with little regard for basic rules of governance, raising questions of their ability to rule without coercion and armed force (World Bank, 2005, p.20).

[71] These efforts resulted in the passing of two Security Council resolutions, UNSCR 733 of January 1992 and UNSCR 746 of March 1992. The first, urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to increase humanitarian assistance to the affected population and to contact all parties involved in the conflict to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities, to promote a ceasefire and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict. For further details see: United Nations (2019) Somalia – UNOSOM I Background ‹online›. Available from: https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html#one.

Therefore, following intensive negotiations involving the UN, LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as representatives of the two factions, an agreement was reached and on 3 March 1992, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed Farrah Aidid signed an "Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire" which also included the acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. The latter was adopted in support of the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. The Council also requested that the team develop a high-priority plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Following discussions with the team, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed on 27 and 28 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the ceasefire and on arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 2019).

Subsequently, on 24 April 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992), by which it decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Somalia which became known as UNOSOM I. The resolution envisaged the deployment of 50 unarmed United Nations military observers to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu. The Council also asked the Secretary-General, in cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, to pursue consultations with all Somali parties towards convening a conference on national reconciliation and unity (United Nations, 2019). All in all, as noted by Verhoeven (2009) it was the images of starving children and inter-factional massacres that were taking place at the time which triggered a humanitarian intervention to pacify Somalia through the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. Nevertheless, as Hull and Svensson (2008) pointed out, the UN presence was severally opposed by the Aidid faction of the United Somali Congress (USC) and it was quickly realised that UNOSOM I was too small to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. In an attempt to increase security a United Task Force (UNITAF), a multinational force of 37,000 soldiers led by the United States through "Operation Restore Hope", was authorised by the UNSC.

However, Operation Restore Hope quickly turned into a nightmare as UN troops unwittingly became involved in the impossibly complex meanderings of Somali inter-clan politics. Culturally ignorant and oblivious to the hostility of Somalia's clans to central authority, a naive international community blundered as it tried to restructure local power configurations (Verhoeven, 2009, p. 411). Despite all that, in March 1993 a peace

agreement was signed between Aidid and Mahdi, along with other warring parties, where a Transitional National Council was agreed upon. Later, UNITAF was transformed into UNOSOM II. It is noteworthy to mention that the transformation of UNITAF into UNOSOM II did not stop the attacks on the UN. As a matter of fact, a few analysts (Hull and Svensson, 2008; Verhoeven, 2009; Harper, 2012 and Williams, 2018) narrate the events and hostilities which ensued. In June 1993 the UN Pakistani contingent was attacked and 24 troops were killed; two months later, in an attempt to capture Aidid, hundreds of Somalis and 18 American soldiers were also killed and mutilated including pictures of the US soldiers being dragged around Mogadishu were broadcasted over the world (Hull and Svensson, 2008 p.18).

After the slaughter of 18 American marines, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) withdrew from a country that subsequently vanished off Western radar-screens. For the outside world, Somalia became synonymous with roadblocks, gun-toting youngsters and total lawlessness. Warlords carved up the territory, engaged in endless micro-conflicts and seemingly suffocated all commercial activity (Verhoeven, 2009, p. 411). The killing and parading of the bodies of American soldiers subsequently led to a US and UN withdrawal from Somalia in 1995, leaving a limited UN political office for Somalia (UNPOS) which was based in Nairobi, Kenya for security reasons (Hull and Svensson, 2008, p.18). Meanwhile, as the country found itself enmeshed in the middle of the crisis, when the UN peacekeepers withdrew from Somalia in 1995, they left behind a country awash with weapons and riven by factionalism based on a mixture of allegiances to clans, sub-clans, sub-sub-clans, as well as the so called 'warlords' and powerful business elite. In essence, a variety of non-state actors and informal systems of adaptation delivered services in the prolonged absence of a central government. In such uncertain and often violent environment it was difficult for international actors (including most NGOs) to operate in, which effectively led to a period of international neglect (Williams 2018, p.23).

Subsequent to his death in August 1996[72], Gen. Mohammed F. Aidid was replaced by his son Hussein Aidid which opened up a window of opportunity for further

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[72] Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, the Somali faction leader who humiliated the United States in 1993, died of gunshot wounds he had received in battle while undergoing surgery. For details, see McKinley Jr., James C. (1996) *How a U.S. Marine Became Leader of Somalia*, The New York Times, Section A, Page 3. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/12/world/how-a-us-marine-became-leader-of-somalia.html. Also see Stilwell, Blake (2016) *This US Marine went*

negotiations, but unfortunately new fights broke out at the end of that same year. Yet again, in March 1998, the northeast provinces, demanding autonomy within a federal system declared the Puntland State of Somalia, adding to the crisis as this move, once more, reaffirmed the disintegration of the Somali state. In their part, the Hawiye clan took control of the central regions, including Mogadishu, as well as parts of the south and finally in April 2002, a new autonomous southwest Somali State was established in parts of the southern regions (Alasow, 2008, p. 2).

As a result of the continued fighting, no group managed to take control of the country between 1997 and 2000, leaving Somalia without any form of government (Hull and Svensson, 2008, p.18), a situation which according to Hugon (2015) led to the balkanisation of clans and chaos that ensued with an estimate of 300 000 to 500 000 deaths. Without a de facto government, a semblance of normalcy was provided by the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts which as noted by Markus Hoehne was founded as the new umbrella organisation of the *shari'a* courts in Mogadishu and was later replaced by the ICU in 2004. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected as the chairman of the council[73]. The courts pooled their military hardware and established a joint militia force of about 400 men which constituted the strongest force in Mogadishu, and the political weight of the umbrella organization grew. Nonetheless, the organisation was internally quite diverse, and it brought together moderates, who were not interested in pursuing political aims violently, as well as extremists. Only a minority of the ten or eleven courts that joined forces in 2004 were extremist and militant. Following internal divisions, Aadan Hashi Ayro, a young militant close to Sheikh Hassan Daahir Aweys was appointed as commander of the militia of the Ifkahalane court in 2005, without protest from the other courts. Ayro soon became the leader of the courts' 'youth organisation', a group combining a small number of extremely radical and militant elements, which became known as *al-Shabaab* (Hoehne, 2009, p. 6).

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to Somalia and became a warlord. Available from: https://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/us-marine-went-somalia-became-warlord.

[73] He had previously been associated with the group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) and had worked in the judicial system and as an aide to the local faction leader Mohamed Dheere (Hoehne, 2009). He was a moderate figure who had spoken in favor of dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), based in Baidoa, and with the international community. Analysts said that Ahmed exhibited *Qutbism*, an Islamic ideology that supports political or free interpretation of the Holy *Quran* (West, 2006).

Typically, in the context of Somalia, militant groups are usually associated with clans. This is echoed by Hugon (2015) who states that each clan possessed its own militia which also reaffirms the fact that the conflicts are largely clan-based even though, Somalis speak the same language, the Somali. Somalis are Sunni Muslims and they are traditionally pastoralists. The religious dimension is important because it partly helps explain the radical Islamic nature of the conflict which also puts at odds the traditional Islam against the Western World in the form of "Clash of Civilizations" as shown in the rhetoric used by radical groups such as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) who took power through *shura*, against factional leaders in the summer of 2006 with the support from Eritrea. To a certain extent, the ICU were an amalgamation of various groups with tendencies that included radical Islam and were accused by many people of being an African version of Afghanistan's Taliban (Hugon, 2015, p. 162).

Moreover, as the (ICU) continued to spread its influence throughout southern Somalia and was becoming a real threat for security in the Horn of Africa region, the international community and neighbouring countries had reacted with concern since there were accusations that the ICU had ties to international terrorists[74]. Arguably, it was against this background that, given their earlier experiences with Somali Islamism, especially the *al-Ittihad al-Islami*[75] (AIAI, 'Islamic Union'), it was not surprising that, after many of the same extremists emerged in positions of authority in the ICU, neighbouring Ethiopia took a dim view of the establishment of the ICU in Mogadishu. The Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) finally intervened in late 2006 to support Somalia's weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which had been established in October 2004 at a conference in Kenya promoted by the sub-regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Unfortunately, while the intervention ended the rule of the ICU in the desolate former capital, it also provoked an insurgency spearheaded by the even more radical *Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen* or Movement of Warrior Youth, *al-Shabaab* (van Ginkel and van der Putten, 2010, p.39). It is important to note

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[74] See West, Sunguta (2006) Somalia's ICU and its Roots in al-Ittihad al-Islami, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 4, No. 15. Available from: https://jamestown.org/program/somalias-icu-and-its-roots-in-al-ittihad-al-islami/

[75] A radical Islamist organisation that once sought to establish an Islamic state in East Africa and was accused of having ties to *al-Qaeda*. It was formed in a meeting in 1984 in Burao in northern Somalia following the merger of two other organisations: *al-Jamma al-Islamiya* (Islamic Association) led by Sheikh Mohammed Eissa and based in the south, and *Wahdat al-Shabab* al-Islam (Unity of Islamic Youth) led by Sheikh Ali Warsame. The organisation came into prominence in 1991 with the objective of overthrowing Somali President Siad Barre (Ibid).

that a number of analysts (Dias, 2010; Bruton and Williams, 2014; and Hirbe, 2020) share the view that it was Ethiopia's 2006 intervention to oust the ICU and install the TFG in Mogadishu which spurred the establishment of AMISOM. In other words, as Williams (2018) adeptly put it, AMISOM was Ethiopia's way out of Mogadishu as the risk of becoming stuck in a political and military quagmire increased, casualties mounted, and the financial costs grew.

Another critical development of global concern was highlighted by Hugon (2015) who stated that until the end of 2010, the TFG controlled only one part of the capital Mogadishu while the coastal areas of Somalia became a safe haven for piracy.[76] To demonstrate the chronical and longstanding problem, Hugon argued further that an estimated total of 4000 acts of piracy were recorded between 1990 and 2010. He notes further that an estimated total of 20000 of global shipping and 1/3 of warships in the world pass through Somali waters. The situation was compounded by the fact that the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea was also fought inside Somalia. Again, the existing security vacuum supports the argument that Somalia had become a fertile ground for the proliferation of terrorism in the region, one only needs to look at the attacks[77] of 11 July, 24 August or 24 October 2010 in Uganda (Hugon, 2015, p. 162) and other attacks in neighbouring countries, including in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania (Ingiriis, 2018; Zambakari and Rivera, 2019; Campbell, 2020).

As the trend of terrorist attacks continued, the Somali Islamist group *al-Shabaab*'s threat to peace and security in the region became something of a nightmare. Indeed, as explained by Horace Campbell in his article *The War on Terror as a Business: Lessons from Kenya and the Somalia Interventions*, the incidence of attacks on Kenya inside and outside of Somalia had increased after 2012. The high-profile siege of the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi which took place in 2013, leaving 67 people dead had brought

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[76] Piracy attacks on international shipping off the coast of Somalia (South and Central Somalia as well as in the de facto autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland in the North) attracted worldwide media attention from 2008 onwards (van Ginkel and van der Putten, 2010, pp. 1-2).

[77] In July 2010, *al-Shabaab* engaged in its first cross-border operation, setting off coordinated bombs in Kampala, Uganda, that killed seventy-six people in retaliation for Uganda's central role in AMISOM (Schmidt, 2018, 92). The Somali terrorist group *al-Shabaab* carried out two other attacks on Ugandan soil. In the July 2010 attack alone, the militant group carried out multiple suicide bombings in Kampala, during which an estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than 80 injured. For more details see Dagne, Ted (2011) Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda, Congressional Research Service 7-5700. Online, Available from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33701.pdf.

Kenya to the centre of the scene of terror attacks. This was followed by the killing of approximately 68 people in the coastal areas of Mpeketoni, Majembeni and Poromoko in June 2014; the killing of 28 people in a bus in Mandera in November 2014; the killing of 36 people in a Mandera quarry in December 2014; the killing of 147 people on the campus of Garissa University College in April 2015, the Dusit hotel attack of January 2019 and the attack on the at Manda Air Strip 2020 (Campbell, 2020, p. 26).

To conclude, besides all other issues analysed in this sub-section that serve as a relevant background to this study, an argument can be made that just like all other African conflicts, the Somalia conflict can generally be explained based on chronic poverty, social exclusion and generalised frustration among the population. This view is consistent with Ted Robert Gurr's relative deprivation argument which explains political violence as the result of collective discontent arising from a discrepancy between expected and achieved welfare. Gurr's theory may also serve as a possible explanation for what motivates individuals to commit terrorist attacks.[78] However, there are certain particularities that Somalia has and have been contributing towards the perpetuation of the conflict. As explained by a participant during the field work in Mogadishu, 'the Somalia experience indicates that a strife within the same ethnic family can become very bitter and as intense and destructive as a conflict involving different ethnic groups.' On the other hand, it has been claimed that external influence, usually with varying goals both at regional and international level have also been contributing to the perpetuation of the conflict in Somalia.[79] Though, as noted by Maruf and Joseph (2018) it is undeniable that the protracted conflict in Somalia comes down to one thing: power struggles between clans and their sub-divisions.

Hence, this study advances the argument that to a certain extent, it is the interplay of the clan dynamic, pursuit of Islamist agenda and broader external influence that has enabled the militant group *al-Shabaab* to reinvent itself and remain dangerously potent since their expulsion from Mogadishu in 2006 with Ethiopian intervention. Anderson and

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[78] Cited by Richardson, Clare (2011) Relative Deprivation Theory in Terrorism: A Study of Higher Education and Unemployment as Predictors of Terrorism, Senior Honors Thesis, New York University. Available from:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8cde/665bbd27872a4a920b08e9f2774a5cd87d12.pdf.
[79] Details obtained through Face-to-Face interview with Ilham Hassan Ali, a Somali graduate working for the United Nations in Somalia, held in Mogadishu on 29 November 2019 as part of Interview #1.

McKnight (2015) agree that *Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen* has proven itself to be a highly adaptable organisation. Its most recent evolution has seen it transform from an overt, military and governmental force in southern Somalia to a covert, insurgent and anarchic force in Somalia and HoA region. At the time of writing, *al-Shabaab* continues to occupy vast territory in south-central and northern Somalia while carrying out deadly terrorist activities within Somalia but also outside in the region (e.g. Kenya and Ethiopia) including engaging in recruitments that can even break families and mafia-like practices for generating fear and extracting resources.

4.2. Contextualisation of Foreign Interventions in Somalia

> *Just as we have learned that the world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violations of human rights are taking place, so we have also learned that intervention must be based on legitimate and universal principles if it is to enjoy the sustained support of the world's peoples.*

Kofi Annan's Address to the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1999.

At the turn of the century, there was no shortage of foreign interventions across the globe. In fact, when the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan took to the podium to address what he called the last General Assembly of the twentieth century, he was so concerned and wary about interventions which is probably why he chose to tackled two main issues in his speech, namely, the prospects for human security and intervention in the next century in light of the dramatic events of the past year.[80] Broadly speaking, Annan's concern was not limited to the Balkans as there were other interventions taking place elsewhere, including in the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular. Therefore, this chapter revisits and expands on the overview of past foreign interventions that were briefly touched upon in Chapter One. As a way of setting the scene, it is important to note

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[80] Kofi Annan was referring to the Balkan crisis when the war in the former Yugoslavia which was fought between 1991-1999 had reached its peak in 1998 with the breaking-up of the federation of six republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosna-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia) which made up the former Yugoslavia and brought together Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians, Slovenes and others. Thousands were killed in the war and over a million Bosnian Muslims and Croats were driven from their homes in ethnic cleansing. Serbs too suffered. During the crisis, there were concerns raised when five southeastern European countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey) had agreed to set up a multinational rapid intervention force to deal with crises in the Balkans after a three-day meeting in the Turkish capital, Ankara in March 1998. For more details see BBC (1998) Balkan nations agree to form rapid intervention force, Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/67057.stm. and BBC (2016) Balkans war: a brief guide, Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17632399.

that with its longstanding history of violent conflict and instability, Somalia has witnessed several external interventions since the early 1990s. However, a comprehensive analysis of such interventions is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the analyses in this sub-section are meant to provide a general account of key interventions for the purpose of this study and which serve as an important background to AMISOM.

Regarding the term foreign intervention, a few scholars have made significant contribution towards explaining the purpose and interpretation of the concept.[81] For instance, in his article *Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI: Intervention in Solomon Islands,* Kabutaulaka (2005) has made the argument that foreign intervention, while useful in the short term, does not offer an easy solution to internal problems. It might create a quasi-functioning state that is able to restore order and serve the interests of the intervening forces, but it often does not address the underlying causes of civil unrest, nor can it build long-term peace. Finally, for foreign intervention to be successful it must cultivate a capacity for positive change within the country; otherwise it reinforces a culture of dependency and the role of the intervening force must be one of facilitating positive development rather than dictating it.

Similarly, Paquin and Saideman (2008) explain that the international environment is the central determinant explaining third state intervention (e.g. security threat, maximization of power, international norms and regimes). They point out domestic and international factors as motivation for foreign interventions which are essentially based on liberal assumptions of international relations. Moreover, domestic politics greatly matter in the formulation of states' decisions to intervene or not in conflicts elsewhere. These arguments maintain that considerations such as the domestic structure of a third state or the ethnic composition of it are central factors at play. On another hand, Ingiriis (2018, p.2) has argued that foreign intervention whether international or regional must have institutional mechanisms to be legitimate in the eyes of the international community at large. Furthermore, international and regional interventions require universal institutions to legitimise intrusion, while the regional intervention need not legitimisation

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[81] See Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius T. (2005) *Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI: Intervention in Solomon Islands*, The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 17, No. 2, 283-308.; Paquin, Jonathan and Saideman, Stephen M. (2008) *Foreign Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts*, King's University College at the University of Western Ontario and McGill University, Canada; and Ingiriis, Mohamed H. (2018) *From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: how the Ethiopian intervention and the 'War on Terror' exacerbated the conflict in Somalia*, Third World Quarterly.

but continuous support from the outside. Also, external interventions have largely been approached from the perspectives focusing on issues of military and diplomacy, leaving aside the policies of regional governments shaped by the desire for domination.

With Kabutaulaka, Ingiriis, Paquin and Saideman's assertions in mind, it is possible to now discuss the specific case of past interventions in Somalia to enrich and provide the necessary background to this study. To that end, Zambakari and Rivera (2019) have argued that political instability in Somalia had led to several external military and security interventions in the country, notably the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), the United Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States[82] which as explained earlier, transitioned later into UNOSOM II in 1993–1994, Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia (2006–2009), the AMISOM intervention from 2007 to present as well as the unilateral intervention by the United States as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Interestingly, despite the mobilization of such a large-scale multinational force, the American led intervention did not end well. As noted by some scholars, between 1992 and 1994, international military interventions and especially the intervention by the United States (US) to monitor a ceasefire and to provide protection for famine relief operations fell apart in 1993 with the downing of two US helicopters and the deaths of eighteen US soldiers[83] and approximately one thousand Somalis, mostly civilians (Mckinley, 1996; Hugon, 2015; Stilwell, 2016 and Schmidt, 2018). What had started as a mercy mission to feed starving Africans became a humiliating disaster for the US. Therefore, within months of the incident, American troops were withdrawn from Somalia due to the deteriorating security situation and unsustainable high human cost, to be replaced by an equally unsuccessful United Nations force, which itself left the country, leading to years of international neglect (Harper, 2012, p. 6). After the terrorist bombings carried out in August 1998 against the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-

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[82] In addition to the United States, UNITAF included military units from: Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe. The overall mandate of UNITAF was to secure major population centres and ensured that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed without impediment (United Nations, 2019).

[83] The eighteen US servicemen were killed by militias loyal to the warlord Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid in Mogadishu. The incident had a traumatic impact on Americans after they saw on their television screens the naked bodies of US soldiers being dragged through the streets by crowds of jeering Somalis (Harper, 2012).

Salaam, Tanzania, the US officials believed that some of the perpetrators were hiding inside Somalia.[84] The prominence of the US counterterror lens for viewing events in Somalia increased again after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. Thus, in the early 2000s, these US interests as well as those of several regional states, notably Ethiopia and Kenya, prompted a major international effort to resurrect a central government for Somalia (Williams, 2018, p. 23). Ever since, the US has acted and maintained a posture of intervention either unilaterally or bilaterally, out of fear that Somalia's anarchic territories might continue to provide a safe haven for *al-Qaeda* and other terrorist groups.

Indeed, in the post-2001 attacks the anti-Islamism sentiment in the US intensified and it guided foreign policy to the extent that almost any Islamist government taking over anywhere in the world was regarded as dangerous. The ICU taking over in Somalia was seen the same way although violent extremists such as *al-Shabaab* were only one part of the overall equation. The blanket approach made US to push Ethiopia to intervene in 2006 and invited Kenya to join later which led to the deteriorating security environment in Kenya with increased retaliatory terrorist attacks on its soil by the Somali militant group *al-Shabaab*. Meanwhile, Catherine Gegout adeptly summarises the American actions by arguing that the US had been carrying out covert military operations inside Somalia since 2001 and thereafter continued with its bombing campaign in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012. Apart from providing 'technical assistance' to the Kenyan invasion of southern Somalia to fight *al-Shabaab* in 2011, the US used Drones to strike Somali *al-Shabaab* targets in 2013, 2014 and 2015. In 2016, drones and a manned aircraft hit a terrorist training camp, killing 150 people (Gegout, 2017, p.119).

Regardless of the nature of intervention or who intervened, it is important to note that when analysing foreign interventions, one cannot underrate the regional dynamics affecting the Horn of Africa and the fact that the home-grown form of political Islam exhibited by *al-Shabaab* militant group in Somalia had become internationalised. Indeed, according to Maruf and Joseph (2018) the militant organisation recruited hundreds of foreign fighters from North America, Europe, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa

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[84] See International Crisis Group (2002) *Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, ICG Africa Report No. 45, May 2002. Also, Mays, Terry M. (2009) *The African Union's African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why Did It Successfully Deploy Following the Failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IG ASO M)? A Thesis for the Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations*. Peace Operations Training Institute, p. 18.

and established itself as a key regional ally and, later, affiliate of *al-Qaeda*. After the ICU were driven out in 2007 by the US-backed Ethiopian invaders supporting the forces of a weak transitional government, elements of the movement re-emerged as the violent Islamist *al-Shabab* militia which posed a major threat to the outside world as foreign fighters joined the group and in February 2010, *al-Shabaab* for the first time publicly linked itself with *al-Qaeda* (Harper, 2012).

Hansen (2013, p.2) agrees that, while it cannot be understood without grasping Somali clan politics and the local historical background, as an organization, *al-Shabaab* is global, in the sense that it has reached out to the Somali diaspora, a fact that has made Western countries more concerned over its activities. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind the militant group's outreach in attracting the diaspora to its ranks because it is beyond doubt that the global Jihadist philosophies and ideologies have helped to shape local dynamics in Somalia. Jihadism has become increasingly prevalent as the civil war has dragged on. As a result of the severity of the conflict, including the potential for spill over, external actors, most notably Somalia's regional neighbours Ethiopia, Kenya and most recently, Uganda, have become entrenched in the conflict.

On the other hand, Hoehne (2009) has suggested that the development of political and militant Islam in Somalia did not take place in a vacuum. External actors had a strong influence on the course of events and the dynamics in the country. Contacts between international Islamists, *al-Qaeda* specialists, and Somali radicals have existed since the early 1990s including state-sponsored influence by some Gulf countries.[85] For example, on several occasions, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys had travelled to Sudan, where Hassan Al-Turabi, a Sudanese Islamist leader sought to make Sudan the centre of Islamism through the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress which also paved the way for the hosting (between 1992-1996) of Osama Bin Laden and his followers. Also, Mohammed Atef, an Egyptian-born high-ranking *al-Qaeda* official, visited Somalia in 1992, probably in order to forge an Islamist alliance in Somalia and throughout the HoA[86] as part of foreign

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[85] Besides Qatar, historically Saudi Arabia's involvement in Somali politics has been deep. In fact, since the Cold War period until now, the Saudis have provided unlimited petro-dollar support to Somalia in an attempt to promote an Islamic-oriented policy. Both Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been seeking to consolidate Wahhabism in Somalia. In turn, this has been making Ethiopia uncomfortable. Ethiopia's major concern has always been preventing the growing influence of the Islamists in Somalia which it sees as potential threat to its security (Ali, 2011).
[86] Mohammed Atef is alleged to have told a Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir whom he met in 1997 about his role in organising "resistance" against the US presence in Somalia in 1992. This included

intervention by non-state actors. In contrast, the French political scientist Jean-François Bayart (1989) in his acclaimed *L'Etat en Afrique: La politique du ventre*, claimed that the 1990s can be considered as the decade of abandonment of Africa by most Gulf countries. He argued that in 1989 the coming to power in Sudan of a military-Islamist coalition Al-Ingaz with Omar El-Beshir and Hassan Al-Turabi forced Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to divest from this country. On another hand, the seizure of power in 1991 by Isaias Afewerki in Eritrea and the fall of the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in Somalia in the same year, causing a devastating civil war, incited these same Arab countries to abandon the Horn of Africa all together.

Nevertheless, for its part Qatar, with its new leader, the emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani who seized power in 1995, took advantage of the withdrawal of its Arab competitors to establish itself as a neutral mediating power in the various conflicts which were shaking East Africa. Qatar therefore gradually began to widen its sphere of state-sponsored influence to East Africa and Somalia in particular.[87] Despite its mediation efforts, Qatar's very partisan and favourable approach to the "Arab Spring" and especially its diplomatic disdain toward black Africa which lasted until 2008 and had negative consequences on its future relations with many African leaders, finally contributed to the return of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to the region. This time, joined by Turkey which is playing a crucial role in shaping developments in the Horn of Africa, especially in war-torn Somalia.[88] Apart from Turkey and the above identified Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, the new wave of conflict which begun in early 2000s attracted a few other actors, among them, the EU, Britain, US and China who have committed themselves to intervene in Somalia's statehood process in one way or another, while playing the role of both secondary and third-party actors.

When it comes to the EU, in her book *Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security, Prestige and the Legacy of Colonialism,* Catherine Gegout makes one of the most

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the downing of a US helicopter in which 18 American soldiers were killed. Atef was described by US intelligence as the military planner of the Islamist *al-Qaeda* group. US Intelligence also identified him as having masterminded the bombing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (The Guardian, 2001).

[87] See International Crisis Group (2018) The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa, Middle East and North Africa Briefing, No. 65, Available from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa.

[88] See Cannon, B. and Rossiter A. (2017) Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa. Rising powers Quartely, Vol. 2 No. 4, pp.7-29.

considerable contributions for our understanding of contemporary European engagement in Africa. She emphasises that the motives for European intervention since the end of the Cold War can only be fully understood by analysing the global context in which such intervention occurs; nothing that African actors and the UN have both expanded their activity on the continent, while the US and, more recently, China, have set up military bases there. In a sense, the EU as a whole or its individual and powerful member states such as France and UK do not necessarily intervene in Africa for altruist humanitarian reasons but rather to ensure and maintain their competitive advantage in an international environment where political prestige and preservation of economic interests elsewhere matter. Also, the EU finds the AU increasingly to be a credible partner to work with on issues of common interest despite the fact that the regional body is completely dependent on external funding and logistical support, especially from the European block which in itself might lead to convergence in the development of more common policies in the future (Gegout, 2017, p. 89).

In the specific context of Somalia, the EU's intervention can be described as the life blood of the AMISOM peace enforcement operation given its vital role of providing the funding for stipends paid to the AU troops fighting the war against *al-Shabaab* in the most extreme and dangerous circumstances. This issue of EU's financial support is discussed subsequently and forms an integral part of the analysis presented in Chapter Six given the criticality of this support. Yet again, it is necessary to note that, this does not mean that the EU intervention in Somalia is limited to the financing of AMISOM. In fact, the EU as an institution has been spearheading several initiatives such as supporting the Federal Government in its state-building efforts and training the Somalia Security Forces (SSF) through the European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-Somalia)[89] and the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (EUCAP),[90]

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[89] The EUTM-Somalia was launched by the EU in April 2010 as a military training mission in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia. It is mandated to provide training capability with a focus on leadership and specialized courses, the Mission increased its advisory activities aimed at building long-term capability within the Somali Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Somali National Army (SNA) General Staff. For further details see: https://www.eutm-somalia.eu/about-us/.
[90] EUCAP was launched by the EU in July 2012 as a civilian mission which assists host countries develop self-sustaining capacity for enhancement of maritime security. It was initially launched with the mandate to work across the Horn of Africa (HoA) and Western Indian Ocean (WIO) but at the end of 2016, following a strategic review of the Mission, its activities have focused solely on Somalia (including Somaliland). EUCAP Somalia contributes to the establishment and

respectively. Despite the persistent security challenges, both entities were still maintaining their headquarters in Mogadishu at the time of developing this study.

Likewise, several sources have highlighted Turkey's latest intervention in Somalia.[91] According to the Crisis Group, Turkey is the newest country to intervene and despite its relatively small presence on the ground with a dozen governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), it has had major impact in Somalia. Since the country's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Mogadishu in August 2011 at the height of the famine and his decision to open an embassy there, a fresh impetus towards efforts to establish peace was brought. The Crisis Group goes on to explain that while many Somalis place much of the blame for the state's continued crisis on external involvement, Turkey's intervention is seen differently by most Somalis. In fact, despite the intersection of businesses seeking export markets and geopolitical interests, Turkey's humanitarian motives are not questioned and as a relatively developed Muslim state, it is seen as a country to emulate, rather than an external power to be feared (ICG, 2012).

Turkish-Somali relations date back to the sixteen century when the Ottomans came to Somalis' aid fending off Ethiopian and Portuguese expeditionary forces (Lewis, 2002, p. 26), but contemporary Turkey-Somalia relations began with the opening of the Somali Embassy in Ankara in 1979. In May 1993 Lieutenant General Çevik Bir was appointed Force Commander (FC) of the recently established United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Yet, Turkey's reengagement was prompted by the 2011 famine that peaked during Ramadan, galvanising Turkish society, making Somalia a major focus of its aid programs and foreign policy agenda (ICG, 2012). In September 2011 the country's Prime Minister dedicated half of his 66th session of the UN General Assembly speech to Somalia noting that...

> *"No one can speak of peace, justice and civilization in the world if the outcry rising from Somalia is left unheard. We have collected a donation of about $300 million within the last two months. We also organized an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul and the amount of pledges made on this occasion exceeded $350*

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capacity building of maritime civilian law enforcement capability in Somalia, including Somaliland. For further details see: https://www.eucap-som.eu/.

[91] See for example (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2012; Akpınar 2013; Saraiva, 2014; Rondos, 2016; Bilgic and Nascimento, 2019).

million. It is our greatest wish that the leadership demonstrated by Turkey in this direction will set an example for the entire international community."[92]

Erdoğan's passionate speech made it clear that the suffering of the people of Somalia was now more than ever before, a matter of Ankara's priority and how Turkey intended to play a leadership role in resolving the crisis. Turkey has since remained a key player in Somalia affairs, organising and hosting a range of high-profile conferences on Somalia. In this regard, Ozkan and Orakci (2015) have concluded that what initially started as humanitarian response has evolved into a fully-fledged Somalia policy with political and social dimensions. Indeed, as noted by Cannon (2019), genuine humanitarian concerns, at least initially, drove Turkey's engagement in efforts to alleviate a widespread and devastating famine in 2011-2012. However, the prospect of economic gain has played an equally important role in Turkey's developing relationship with Somalia. Within six years (2011-2017), Turkey moved from being an economic footnote in Somalia to its fifth-biggest source of imports. Turkey's initial investments and efforts for influence in Somalia paid off in the form of infrastructure contracts, to include the Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) and its seaport. Therefore, with the control of Somalia's most critical and lucrative infrastructure along with its substantial humanitarian aid necessarily makes Turkey an important political actor in Somalia because of the leverage over, and relationship it has, with the Federal Government.

Meanwhile, as noted in Chapter One, the animosity, diplomatic tensions and political rivalry which erupted in June 2017 within the GCC have had a spill-over effect reaching and significantly influencing the security dynamics and political shifts underway across the HoA region. Also, the impact of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen has added to the complexity and volatility of the region which not only has challenged Somalia's federalism process but further complicated an already intricate situation with the balance of power shifting among the countries involved such as Qatar and UAE. These factors have altered old alliances in the region, eased access to weapons, and more importantly leading to further militarization which adds to the complexity and volatility of the region.[93] Furthermore, the rivalries underpinning the crisis among members of the GCC

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[92] Address by Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey to the general debate of the 66th session of the UN General Assembly", New York, 22 September 2011.

[93] Conclusions contained in a confidential paper by the Horn of Africa Informal Working Group Meeting held on 20 March 2018. The Informal Working Group included: Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United

have further complicated the situation in Somalia. Competition between the UAE, Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Qatar and, by extension, Turkey on the other hand, has aggravated longstanding intra-Somali disputes. Notably, this has been the case between factions in the capital; between Mogadishu and the regions; and between it and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Abu Dhabi's relations with the government of the current President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" have tanked. Farmajo's government accuses the Emiratis of funding its rivals and stoking opposition, particularly in Somalia's federal states. Emirati officials deny meddling and instead accuse Farmajo of falling under Doha's and Ankara's sway (ICG, 2018).

It is true that at the core of the argument, lays the fact that Qatar has long history in Somalia. In this regard, Cannon (2019) explains that even though its foreign policy impetus and objectives in Somalia is something of a black box, Qatar has played a powerful role in Somalia's politics since 2006 despite its small size and population. Before then, Qatar never had local connections or legitimacy but with the rise of the ICU, their short-lived rule and the subsequent atomisation of Islamist movements in Somalia, Qatar began a serious engagement with various Islamist factions and former ICU members, attempting to influence politics through personal and religious networks, and crucially, members of the Somali diaspora. Indeed, influential diaspora members reportedly negotiated the arrival of some of the ICU leadership, to include Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, to Qatar after Ethiopia invaded Somalia and ended the ICU's rule. Cannon also points out to the allegation that the subsequent election of Sheikh Sharif as President in 2009 was possibly funded by Qatar but he later fell out with Doha when it insisted on expanding the government to include violent Islamists such as Hassan Dahir Aweys[94] and his Hisbul Islam (Cannon, 2019, pp.31-32).

Again, while Qatar's attempt to influence the political landscape did not stop with the withdrawal of support for Hassan Sheikh and instead extended its financial support to

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Office of the High for Human Rights (OHCHR), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), World Health Organisation (WHO, Office for Counter Commissioner -Terrorism (OCT), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), UN Office of the Special Advisor for Africa, and UN Office on Genocide Prevention and Responsibility to Protect.

[94]Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys was the former president of the radical Somali group, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) with whom the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) had been fighting against inside Somalia. He was an ally of the Eritrean Regime and was provided refuge in Asmara (Dias 2010).

Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed 'Farmaajo' in the 2017 Somalia's presidential election, the UAE reportedly also tried to influence the outcome of the election but ultimately failed in its bid to locate a suitable candidate (Cannon, 2019, p. 35). Faced with the failure to influence the outcome of the elections, Abu Dhabi has made strategic moves to remain an influential actor in the country including in the breakaway Somaliland where it has expanded its sphere of influence. To do so, it has used two main instruments: control of the ports and the establishment of military bases. The semi-autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland welcomed the Emirati initiative and allowed the UAE military to operate in these regions despite the explicit complaints from the Federal Government that Emirati activities have undermined its national unity (Telci, 2018, pp.3-4).

In its *Crisis Group Africa Report N°260 on Somalia and the Gulf Crisis*, the ICG (2018) pointed out several issues impacting the overall situation in the country. First, Farmajo's government accused the Emiratis of agitating against it. Abu Dhabi rejects that charge and believes it is ostracised due to the new government's proximity to Doha and Ankara. Second, friction between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi, have simmered since the crisis, boiled over on 8 April 2018, when the Somali government confiscated $9.6 million in cash at Mogadishu airport from a UAE plane. Shortly thereafter, the UAE suspended military cooperation with Mogadishu, extracted Emirati trainers and halted aid operations. Third, Farmajo's refusal to publicly pick sides in the Gulf spat was viewed in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi not as neutrality, but as, in effect, siding with their rivals. This triggered a temporary suspension by Riyadh of direct budgetary support of some $30 million per year. The Saudis backtracked shortly thereafter, in part, reportedly, worried by anger on the Somali streets – and elsewhere in Africa – that they were using financial muscle to extract concessions from weaker states. Riyadh resumed budgetary support in October 2017 (ICG, 2018, pp.1-4).

The analyses of foreign interventions made thus far, have epitomised the fact that actions by state and non-state actors have simultaneously produced mixed results and shaped the overall environment in which the AMISOM mandate was implemented. Thus, highlighting the significance of such interventions in the analyses and discussions presented in Chapter Six and their implications as contained in Chapter Seven. In the words of Schmidt (2018), although the initial intervention thwarted some conflict-related starvation, subsequent actions jeopardised civilian lives and increased regional instability. Somalia's post–Cold War experience illuminates the ways in which foreign intervention

can be counterproductive—not only failing to promote peace and security, but even provoking a terrorist insurgency. Rather than strengthening Somalia's internal peacebuilding and nation-building efforts, foreign powers and multilateral agencies often played roles that prolonged or exacerbated local tensions (Schmidt, 2018, p.71). Schmidt's characterisation of past interventions holds true in the case of AMISOM intervention which has equally had a record of mixed results.

One of the major factors that maintained the Somalia conflict and continued to attract foreign interventions remained linked to the availability of caches of weapons and ammunition that were accumulated by a previously militarised state under the Siad Barre's regime (1969-1991). More importantly, despite the UN Security Council embargo on importation of weapons to Somalia and the non-existence of central government capable of buying weapons legally, Somalia continued to receive rounds of deliveries of weapons. This supplies mostly, and initially, originated from two sources: the Arab states of Egypt and Libya and later Ethiopia in clear violation of the UN Security Council embargo (Komey et al., 2014, 29). Finally, the ever-growing influence of certain GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar who, on one hand, have been engaged in the pursuit of an Islamist agenda aimed at promoting *Wahhabism* in Somalia while Egypt, on another hand, sought to promote the Salafi views of the Muslim Brotherhood there[95] has not been a welcomed development by everyone, especially Ethiopia. An argument can be made to suggest that, the expansion of radical Islam in Somalia may explain why more than ever, Ethiopia has continuously felt the need to adopt policies capable of influencing the political and security landscape inside Somalia (Ali, 2011). Whatever the reasons maybe, the next sub-section is dedicated to the analysis of Ethiopia and Kenya's unilateral interventions in Somalia as part of this study's background in its assessment of the AU-UN partnership.

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[95] Shinn (2011, p.204) explains that a small number of Somalis studied the Salafi views of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and Wahhabi teachings in Saudi Arabia beginning even before Somali independence in 1960. As they returned to Somalia, the followers of these schools of Islamic thought had little initial success in propagating their views among Somalis who overwhelmingly followed Sufi Islamic beliefs. In the 1970s, some of the *Wahhabi* believers created The Unity of Islamic Youth (*Wahdat al-Shabaab al-Islamiyya*) and The Islamic Group (*al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*). These two organizations merged in 1982 and changed their names to The Islamic Union (*al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya* or AIAI).

4.2.1. Ethiopia's Intervention in Somalia

When the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agreed and authorised the intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) and African Union (AU) member states to establish a military mission in Somalia to protect the TFG, one key issue of concern was the upholding of IGAD's 2005 decision to exclude troops from neighbouring states and this was explicitly reflected into the text of the UNSC resolution 1725 of 6 December 2006, and prevented Ethiopia from representing its subsequent intervention as a peace support operation. Thus, when Ethiopia moved against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu in late December 2006, it did so unilaterally. However, Ethiopia provided justification for its military intervention on three grounds recognised under international law: the right to self-defence in face of clear and present danger, against terrorist threat and at the invitation of a legitimate government (Yidhego, 2007).

Besides the 2006 intervention, it should be noted that Ethiopia has had a longstanding history of interference in the domestic affairs of its neighbour. Therefore, an assessment of Ethiopia's intermittent interventions in Somalia must be situated within the context of the considerations made in the previous sections. For that reason, an attempt to explore contemporary Ethiopian military intervention must be made by taking a historical perspective in order to appreciate the implications thereof and more importantly, the evolution of the relations between the two states since Somalia gained independence in 1960; during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period until the deployment of AMISOM in 2007. To that end, several analysts have made significant contribution to the assessment of Ethio-Somalia relations and overall security dynamics between the two countries at different stages in their shared history[96]. Accordingly, Menkhaus (2005, p.10) for instance, has argued that the Somali nation was divided among five separate states by colonialism – Ethiopia, Djibouti, British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, and Kenya. He explains that at independence, a central pillar of the Republic of Somalia was irredentism – a rejection of the colonial boundaries and an insistence on the political unity of all the Somali people of the Horn of Africa.

The colonial legacy sowed the seed for future inter-state tensions and conflicts in the region. Yihun (2014) shares the view that Ethiopia and Somalia have endured a complex and difficult relationship since the decolonisation and coming together of British

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[96] (Menkhaus, 2005; Ali, 2011; Eriksson, 2013; Yihun, 2014; Hesse, 2014; Cannon and Ash, 2017; Ingiriis, 2018 and Guluma, 2018).

and Italian somalilands in 1960. Political tension revolved primarily around Somalia's irredentist agenda of seeking to establish a Greater Somalia state and Ethiopia's determination to ward off this threat to its territorial sovereignty. Somalia's irredentist claims would swallow up one-fifth of Ethiopia's territory.[97] Somalia's irredentist agenda first emerged in the late 1950s with the Somali nationalist organisations in the Ogaden, which sought armed rebellion against Ethiopian rule. In 1963, Ethiopian government's attempt to collect taxes led to widespread rebellion in the region, led by clandestine Ogaden organisations (Kefale, 2013, pp. 69-70). The rebellion triggered the first military confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia (Markakis, 1987, pp.175-177). Once again, with the coming to power of General Mohamed Siad Barre in 1969 whose military government had promptly outlined its intention to continue with the unification struggle, the irredentist claims gained a new momentum (Lewis,1989, p. 573).

The chaos and political turmoil in Ethiopia, following the removal of Emperor Haile Selassie by popular revolution of September 1974 and the resultant power vacuum in the country, was taken by the Somali leaders as the right moment to effect their goal of bringing all Somali contested territories under one flag (Gebru, 2000; Clapham, 2013; Kefale, 2013 and Yihun, 2014). Supported by dissident groups such as, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) and Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) who had taken control of large parts of the Eastern Ethiopia, Siad Barre's regime had intensified its attacks on Ethiopia in a bid to exploit the situation there. The government supported and provided safe havens as well as providing moral and material assistance to dissidents to do the groundwork and engaged the Derg militarily in its first months, contributing immensely to domestic instability. In 1977, the inevitable happened and the two countries went into a full-blown war (Lewis, 1989; Gebru, 2000; Wasara, 2002; Plaut, 2013 and Kefale, 2013). Siad Barre's plan was to incorporate Ogaden, Bali, Arsi, and parts of Sidamo into Greater Somalia. This situation

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[97] Somalia's irredentist claims according to I.M. Lewis (1989, p. 573) were centred on the Ogaden, who traditionally live as herdsmen in the region named after them in Eastern Ethiopia, bordering the Somali Republic, and they are part of the wider Darod family of Somali clans. Hence, the irredentist policy was part of a broader strategy to create a 'Greater Somalia' which was intended to incorporate the Ogaden and Haud regions situated in Ethiopia and other regions (French Somaliland and the border District in Northern Kenya) as part of Somali unification. Also, according to Drechsel (2014, p. 5) until now, claims for Greater Somalia (including Djibouti, parts of Ethiopia and parts of Kenya) remain relevant to many Somalis and have been the roots for long-lasting conflicts, especially with Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent with Kenya and Djibouti.

entirely dictated the nature of Ethiopia's policies towards Somalia from then on (Yihun, 2014, p. 677).

In retrospect, the Ethiopian policy towards Somalia was prepared shortly after Somali independence during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie. It was a reactionary policy aimed at weakening the Somali state by creating a terminal disorder for Somalia, thereby curbing its expansionist ambitions. Once more, in maintaining Selassie's policy toward Somalia, the Mengistu regime added a military component to practice the policy by providing support to the northern Somalis in what is now Somaliland against Siad Barre (Abbink, 2003). As it turned out, Ethiopia was able to implement its agenda thanks to the oppressive nature of the Siad Barre's military regime that was determined to pursue an uncompromising policy of a colonial-king strategy of collective punishment against its political opponents.[98]

Besides, in another study by Ingiriis (2018, p. 4) it has been claimed that a whole lot of marginalised Somali clans were forced to seek refuge and sanctuary in Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the Somali political crisis; the Mengistu regime saw the situation as an opportunity and began to materially, morally and militarily back up the armed resistance groups that subsequently made their bases inside Ethiopia to attack the Siad Barre regime from there, particularly after the Ogaden war in 1977. In so doing, according to Ingiriis, the Mengistu regime sought to achieve two goals: (1) to contain Somalia's anti-Ethiopian aggressive policy of supporting the Ethiopian armed opposition groups and (2) to force the Siad Barre regime to allow concessions for the Somali–Ethiopian territorial dispute. The intention of both regimes was to oversee how the armed opposition groups would undermine the other rival.

Likewise, in his article *Why the Haud was ceded*, Léo Silberman points out that at the centre of the uneasy relations between Ethiopia and Somalia lays the fact that in the 19th century, Emperor Menelik II had conquered the Haud, Reserve Area and surrounding areas that are inhabited by Somalis and they were later formally incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire during the so called " Scramble of Africa", on the basis of colonial treaties and agreements signed between Ethiopia and European powers (Britain and

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[98] See for example Alasow, Omar (2008) *Violations of the Rules Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts and Their Possible Causes*, p.22. Also, Ingiriis (2016) *The Suicidal Sate in Somalia, The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991*, p. 4.

Italy).[99] This historically determined *status quo* was rejected by the newly independent Somalia, which since then made it a sacred obligation to struggle for the "decolonisation" of the whole region. In the next four decades (1960-1990) after Somalia's independence, relations between successive Ethiopian governments and Somalia were not smooth and easy as evidenced by the events which led the two countries to war in 1977. In fact, Ethio-Somali relations continued to be anything but full of mistrust and political hostility between the two regimes since the Ogaden war. As a result, every regime was plotting against one another and hosted their respective dissident groups (tit-for-tat) such as the Somalia National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the United Somali Congress (USC) sponsored by Ethiopia; while Somalia sponsored the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Forces/Front (EPLF) as well as Somali nationalist organisations in the Ogaden. In a sense, the major concerns for the two regimes were to weaken and ultimately undermine each other's government respectively (Ali, 2011).

It is worthwhile to note that, there is a vast body of literature which supports the assertion that throughout the 1990s, 2000s and up to present the antagonistic nature of the relations between the two countries has continued to be influenced by the same determinants that marked the immediate post-independence and post-Cold War period including concerns surrounding the influence of Islam in Somalia.[100] This assertion is consistent with the view put forward by Ingiriis (2018) that Ethiopian policymakers rightly realised that the constitution of a unified Somali state based on two critical Islamist and nationalist notions could encourage the pursuit of the 'Greater Somalia' idea and the use of Islam as a political resource in response to the Ethiopian domination. Another viewpoint by Wangari Guluma suggests that Ethiopia has vast interests in Somalia, some of which have led it into direct military confrontation with Somalia (e.g. 1969, 1977 and more recently the intervention in 2006 and 2012). Its long-standing war with Eritrea (1961-1991, 1998-2000) for many years crossed national borders and was waged directly or in proxy conflicts on Somali soil. Also, Ethiopia has remained mistrustful of a unitary Somali state where power is concentrated in Mogadishu. In a sense, Ethiopia's

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[99] For more details see Silberman, Léo (1961) Why the Haud was ceded. In: Cahiers d'études africaines, Vol. 2, N°5, pp.37-83. Available from doi: https://doi.org/10.3406/cea.1961.2962 and https://www.persee.fr/docAsPDF/cea_0008-0055_1961_num_2_5_2962.pdf.
[100] See for example, (Hoehne, 2009; Ingriis, 2018; Guluma, 2018; Hesse, 2014; Eriksson, 2013; Menkhaus, 2014; Anderson and McKnight, 2015).

intervention is aimed at pushing the post-conflict political transition in Somalia towards a federal state (Guluma, 2018).

It has, however to be acknowledged that what really led Ethiopia to militarily invade Somalia in 2006 with support by some internal players and its US ally (Hoehne, 2009) is the threat posed by the ICU whose Islamist agenda was perceived as a direct threat, but as demonstrated in this study, other factors cannot be excluded either. At least this is the argument put forward by Brian Hesse in his comparative analysis of past and contemporary interventions in Somalia *Two Generations, Two Interventions in One of the World's Most-Failed States: The United States, Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia* through which he argues that the unilateral Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, and resulting occupation until 2009, can be largely explained through irredentist and existential concerns. However, it is worth noting that Ethiopia, along with other regional actors, initially sought to reconcile elements of the TFG and ICU through peaceful mediation efforts as demonstrated in the Khartoum-based talks intended to forge a unity government. Unfortunately, when the talks stalled, ICU tried to impose a victor's peace in Somalia. It was this move which put it in a direct confrontation with Ethiopian forces at the time – officially in Somalia as trainers for the nascent TFG national military.

The increased contact between the two forces eventually led to a full Ethiopian military invasion which not only pushed the ICU out of power but also paved the way in January 2007 for the TFG which had invited them to set foot in Mogadishu for the first time since its creation under the tight protection of upwards of 8000 Ethiopian forces (Hesse, 2014). Interestingly, while Ethiopian forces officially "withdrew" from Somalia to give space for the incoming multilateral AU-UN authorised forces – AMISOM, to step in, the reality shows otherwise. As a matter of fact, just like Kenya, at the time of writing, Ethiopia has continued to maintain an undisclosed number of its troops inside Somalia but operating outside the AMISOM framework. This is one of the most critical aspects analysed in this study considering the underlying implications and the manner in which it has broadly impacted, not only on the restoration of peace and security in Somalia, and the implementation of AMISOM mandate but possibly also contributing to the instability in the region, thereby openly impinging on the strategic AU-UN partnership in their peace enforcement efforts in Somalia.

4.2.2. Kenya's Intervention in Somalia

Invoking the provisions of article 51 under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,[101] at the international level, the Kenyan intervention which was codenamed in the local Swahili language as *Operation Linda Nchi* (Protect the Nation) was formally announced in a letter sent to the UNSC by the country's Ambassador to the United Nations, Macharia Kamau in October 2011 in the following terms:

{…} I write to inform you that Kenya, with the concurrence of the TFG of Somalia, has been compelled to take robust, targeted measures to protect and preserve the integrity of Kenya and the efficacy of the national economy and to secure peace and security in the face of the al-Shabaab terrorist militia attacks emanating from Somalia. Kenya has been facing serious challenges emanating from the collapse of the State of Somalia over the past two decades. The situation has worsened of late, following the unprecedented escalation of threats to the country's national security. Kenya has suffered dozens of incursions that were repulsed by its military and police forces. Scores of Kenyans have lost their lives over the past 36 months in border towns and communities owing to terrorist actions and incursions from Al-Shabaab militants. The violent and incessant infringement and violation of Kenya's territory, which has been reported over a long period of time by the international media, can no longer go unchecked. In the light of the foregoing, Kenya, in direct consultations and liaison with the TFG in Mogadishu, has, after the latest direct attacks on Kenyan territory and the accompanying loss of life and kidnappings of Kenyans and foreign nationals by the al-Shabaab terrorists, decided to undertake remedial and pre-emptive action {…} (United Nations Security Council, 2011).

On one hand, domestically, the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) justified the military involvement by citing the fact that Somalia-based militants, al-Shabaab, repeatedly violated Kenya's sovereignty through unprovoked attacks on Kenya's citizens and other interests including several attempted piracy attacks in Kenya's territorial waters and spirited efforts to recruit young Kenyans to join the terror group. Additionally, the militant group kidnapped individuals who were providing humanitarian services. For example, on October 12, 2011, two Spanish aid workers and a driver were abducted from the Dadaab refugee camp. Tourists had also been attacked, directly, thereby affecting directly

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[101] Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 51 of the United Nations Charter).

Kenya's lucrative tourist sector. Again, there were a series of attacks directed at the police and ordinary Kenyans. Such attacks became very frequent in Nairobi, mainly targeting large concentrations of people at places like bus parks. All these activities were undermining, not only the security but also hurting the confidence of Kenyans while at the same time undermining the country's economy (Kihara, 2013).

On another hand, while Kenya played an important role in hosting the legitimate leaders of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia on its soil, the engagement between the two countries have always been characterised by an uneasy relationship due to several factors that are discussed subsequently. Therefore, just like Ethiopia, Kenya's intervention in Somalia must be analysed by taking a historical perspective. This is particularly important in order to further contextualise the AMISOM intervention and appreciate the depth of Kenya-Somalia relations in the period prior and post-October 2011. The pertinence of the analysis is that, it will allow for the arguments put forward later in the context of this study. To that end, a number of scholars have provided several explanations that are worth examining as they will facilitate the analysis that serve as important historical background.[102]

In his article *External Intervention in Somalia's civil war*, Mikael Eriksson (2013) makes crucial observations about Kenya-Somalia relations dating back at least from the 1960s including the *Shifta conflict[103]* that tested relations between the two countries and Kenyan fears for Somali interests in its territory. According to Eriksson, from a long-term perspective, Kenya-Somalia security relations have generally been cooperative despite periods of conflict. He notes that the main bone of contention has been the *Northern Frontier District*, a Somali inhabited province annexed to Kenya at the time of Somalia's independence from Italy and Britain. This resulted in a border war between the two newly independent states in 1963. He also points out that a further major source of tension was the relative marginalisation of ethnic Somali populations in north-eastern Kenya – the most underdeveloped part of the country – during the 1970s and 1980s, when dictatorial regimes ran both countries (Eriksson, 2013, pp. 45-46).

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[102] See for example (Menkhaus, 2005; Eriksson, 2013; Arman, 2014; Anderson and McKnight, 2015; Hesse, 2014; Williams, 2017 and Olsen, 2018).
[103] See for example (Bayart,1989; Mburu, 2005; Whittaker, 2015; and Ingiriis, 2017).

Prominent scholars including Hannah Whittaker, Nene Mburu, Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, Jean-Francois Bayart and others have discussed the *Shifta conflict* and how it has since influenced Kenya-Somalia relations. For example, in her book *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya: A Social History of the Shifta Conflict*, c. 1963–1968, Whittaker (2015) explains how in 1960s the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya which is heavily populated by ethnic Somalis, the individuals that became *Shifta* combined military secessionist with nationalist agenda. The conflict in Northern Kenya which took place between 1963 and 1968 had the double effect of alienating not only the minority ethnic Somali population but it also exacerbated tensions between Kenya and Somalia. Though *Shifta* insurgents carried out limited attacks on government installations, assassinated hostile officials, and conducted acts of sabotage, the conflict was generally characterised by an interweaving of nationalist insurgency activity and local level conflicts over water, land and other resources.

Ingiriis (2017) finds the description of the *Shifta conflict* by both Nene Mburu's 2005 publication with the title *Bandits on the Border: The Last Frontier in the Search for Somali Unity* and Jean-François Bayart (1989)'s description of the *Shifta* 'Somali bandits' in his acclaimed *L'Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre* as problematic and suggests that their work demonstrate misunderstanding over the NFD struggle to secede from Kenya and join the Somali Republic as well as lack of understanding of the context of their struggle. Instead, he argues that for most of the NFD population, the *Shifta* struggle was political because of the widespread desire to join the Somali state. Yet, it was also personal because many families had members fighting on both sides of the war. Likewise, in his Book Review of Whittaker's volume *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Kenya: a social history of the Shifta conflict, c.1963–1968. Leiden: Brill (pb €69 – 978 90 04 28267 4). 2015, x + 176 pp.,* Ingiriis extended his criticism to Whittaker by suggesting that often, her work foregrounds British perspectives and Kenyan government stances on the *Shifta* and accepts the official sides of the story.

Furthermore, by calling the insurgents *Shifta*, the Kenyatta and the post-colonial Kenyan state followed in the footsteps of its predecessor, the British colonial state, which dismissed anti-colonial rebels as *Shifta* or bandits (in Somali, *burcad*). Benefiting from the experiences accumulated with the Mau Mau years, the Kenyan authorities, many of whom former Mau Mau members, adopted tactics of counter-insurgency similar to those they had suffered under colonial rule in order to deal with *Shifta*. This included the

collective punishment of Somali civilian supporters of the *Shifta*, which however, was exacerbated by capital punishment sentences for captured insurgents (Ingiriis, 2017).

As explained subsequently, the NFD is not the only source of contemporary tensions in the Kenya-Somalia relationship. As a matter of fact, Eriksson (2013) points out other sources including for example, the fact that the Somali government suspects Kenya's motives in Jubbaland and its preferred approach to governance issues in southern Somalia, especially in the key port city of Kismayo and Kenya's maritime ambitions and operations that are also a great source of concern to the Somali government. In addition, the influence of powerful Somali-Kenyan government and intelligence officials who have been the key architects in the shaping of Kenya's Somalia policy will continue to be a source of tensions.

However, it must be acknowledged that while Kenya had for a long period of time been affected by the longstanding insecurity inside Somalia, protracted border disputes and the influx of Somali refugees on its territory that allegedly prompted the October 2011 intervention, there is no doubt that just like many other countries including Ethiopia, Kenya was caught up in the middle of the American-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) on behalf of the West in particular and international community in general. Indeed, Olsen (2018) has argued that Kenya's invasion of Somalia falls within the scope of pursuing an image management strategy aimed at pleasing the US in the GWOT. While the GWOT gained momentum since the allegedly *al-Qaeda* orchestrated 11 September 2001 attacks in America, the attacks on the US Embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and on the Paradise Beach Hotel in Mombasa in 1999, both directly linked to Somali terrorists (Mukwaya, 2004; Menkhaus, 2005; Schmidt, 2018), deserve to be mentioned.

In fact, it was alleged that the terror suspects had crossed the Kenya-Somali border and used southern Somalia as both transhipment point and safe haven in those attacks. Fears that the unpoliced border provided foreign or Somali terrorists with easy entrance into Kenya and an easy escape route remained strong and has since been a major preoccupation of Western counter-terrorism partnership with the Kenyan government (Menkhaus, 2005). Elizabeth Schmidt (2018) also shares the view about the GWOT. She wrote that East Africa and the Horn became the first African front in the US war on terror. US concern about the region began before the 2001 attacks but escalated in their aftermath. From 1991 to 1996, *al-Qaeda's* world headquarters were in Sudan. When

Khartoum expelled the organisation in May 1996, as a result of pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the UN Security Council, *al-Qaeda* moved its headquarters to Afghanistan and transferred its East African operations to its Nairobi cell. Also, the US State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program helped establish Kenya's Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in 1998, the same year that *al-Qaeda's* Nairobi cell orchestrated deadly attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Schmidt, 2018, p. 347).

Historically, the chronic instability in Somalia has meant that its immediate neighbours feel unsettled. As an example, Siad Barre's Somali regime had engaged in violent conflict with both Ethiopia and Kenya over their respective irredentist claims. The Barre regime also harboured similar intentions toward the Somali-populated Djibouti (Murithi, 2009). Notwithstanding the insecurity concerns that have characterised Somali society for over two decades since the collapse of the central government in 1991, Mikael Eriksson (2013)'s account suggest that Somalia's neighbours have had a huge interest in how the civil war developed, closely linked to their disputed territorial boundaries, differing ethnicities, ideology, and religious and cultural identity. Kenya in particular, is deeply embroiled in Somalia's politics. Aside from the military engagement in Somalia, there are a number of regular and shadow relations between the two states. This both enables and complicates the relationship between them (i.e. political, economic and social). Kenya shares a long border with Somalia and, unlike other states in the region, Kenya hosts a large number of Somali migrants and refugees. In a sense this convergence has given rise to the "Kenyan factor" in Somalia and equally a "Somalia factor" in Kenya (Eriksson, 2013, p. 34).

Similarly, Anderson and McKnight (2015) provide a set of explanations about Ethiopia's military engagement in Somalia. First, they argued that while the Ethiopian invasion drove *al-Shabaab* out of Mogadishu and into southern Somalia, it gave them the opportunity to establish a strong economic base in the coastal city of Kismayo before extending influence up the Juba valley and into the countryside of Jubbaland and Gosha, often absorbing and co-opting local militias in the process. This gave *al-Shabaab* control over vast swathes of territory across southern Somalia, swelling its coffers through the tithes taken from local communities and rent- seeking on trade and business interests, including charcoal exports and the smuggling of goods across the border into Kenya. Then, some estimates suggested that *al-Shabaab*'s foreign *mujahideen,* at the time, numbered 1,000 at their peak in 2010, and this may have included as many as 500 –700

fighters of Kenyan origins[104]. Kenya followed a similar strategy of recruiting into its army Kenyans of Somali descent to develop what it called a "Third Force" which they planned to insert back into Somalia. Lastly, there was a clear indication that the infamous Kampala "World Cup bombings" in July 2010 by *al-Shabaab* were planned in Kenya (among those finally brought to trial at Kampala's High Court in June 2015), were seven Kenyan Muslims).

It is important to note that despite the official reasons given for launching *Operation Linda Nchi* allegedly based on Kenya's national security, the intervention was not without controversy both within and outside Kenya (Branch, 2011; Drechsel, 2014; Olsen, 2018). As a matter of fact, it has been argued that there was confusion about the real motives and interests involved in the invasion as illustrated in the cables made public by WikiLeaks showing that the US had warned Kenyan authorities against launching an offensive into southern Somalia.[105] However, the same cables show that Kenyan officials were very eager to start the invasion into Somalia and establish a buffer zone in the area known as Jubaland. All this took place unilaterally,[106] without coordinating the invasion plans with its main ally, the US under the Obama Administration. Adding to the confusion, a senior US official   was quoted in the Los Angeles Times as saying that the action caught Pentagon by surprise (Olsen, 2018).

Again, as noted by Williams (2018) in his book *Fighting for Peace in Somalia,* Kenya's intervention also put it at odds and generated tension with Ethiopia's government because it empowered the Ogaden clan, which had powerful connections among Nairobi's political elite.[107] The Ethiopian authorities were worried that the intervention

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[104] See Anderson and McKnight (2015) Understanding al-Shabaab: clan, Islam and insurgency in Kenya, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 9, Issue:3, p. 544.

[105] See Boswell, Alan (2011) "WikiLeaks: U.S. Warned Kenya Against Invading Somalia." Available from: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/11/18/130739/wikileaks-us-warned-kenya-against. Cited by Olsen (2018) The October 2011 Kenyan invasion of Somalia: fighting al-Shabaab or defending institutional interests? Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 36, Issue:1, p.40.

[106] Unlike Ethiopia which was invited by the weak Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to intervene militarily in 2006, Kenya did not have the consent of the Somalia Government. The invasion was controversial to the extent that it was considered by many Somalis and others as a violation of Somalia's sovereignty and its legality also was questionable by international law standards despite the fact that it had allegedly acted under article 51 of the UN Charter in self-defence.

[107] Ethiopia's concerns were in reference to the fact that since he was elected in 2013, President Uhuru Kenyatta appeared to continue with the *status quo* of his predecessor, Mwai Kibaki, whose defence minister, Yusuf Haji is a Somali-Kenyan of Ogaden origin, and his son, who is a senior

would strengthen ex-TFG minister Mohamed Abdi Gandhi who was believed to support the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a long-standing rebel group waging armed conflict against the Ethiopian government. Williams also points out that the Kenyan intervention worried significant swathes of the Somali population who viewed it as an illicit effort to help the Ogaden clan regain its hold on the lucrative port of Kismayo. The centrality of inter-clan conflicts has led some AMISOM officials to nickname Kismayo as the "Jerusalem of Somalia" because of all the fights over who should govern it (Williams, 2018, p.130).

The relevance of the above discussion is that it allows the present study to delve into the issues and the disagreements highlighted to account for any other possible reasons for and explanations behind the October 2011 invasion. It is evident that the analysis made in this sub-section has highlighted a complex interplay surrounding the implementation of the AMISOM peace enforcement mandate with major implications for the AU-UN partnership which is premised on the capstone principles underpinning peacekeeping operations. The broader operating environment in Somalia has been shaped by external actors amongst them, two of Somalia's neighbours considered in military terms as the most powerful in the HoA region (Ethiopia and Kenya). Adding to the complexity is the constant dispute over oilfields along Somalia-Kenya maritime border which poses major risks not only to both sides but also to the entire HoA's security and development. Also, both international and regional powers have had a history of intervention in Somalia affairs in some cases with unclear agendas which has arguably contributed negatively to fostering a conducive environment for finding lasting peace and stability in Somalia. This is critical to the assessment of the AU-UN partnership which to a certain extent has been caught up in the middle of these competing interveners whose goals remain incongruent to the spirit and objectives of the peace enforcement they authorised in the first place.

On the whole, while the AU peace enforcement has put Somalia at a different security level compared to what it was prior to the AMISOM deployment, there is no doubt that the state of affairs described above represents a major challenge because history has shown that foreign interventions have also had a negative impact which has

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intelligence official, were seen as the key architects in the shaping of Kenya's Somalia policy, particularly on issues related to Jubbaland. Haji, who is now a Senator, is currently allied with Kenyatta as a member of the president's National Alliance bloc (Eriksson, 2013, p. 46).

made the overall security and political situation more complicated and has contributed to the prolongation of the conflict thereby, making things worse in Somalia. Therefore, this study argues that in order for there to have been a comparative advantage, all such interventions needed to remain within the AMISOM framework of multilateralism with a common purpose in order to produce an outcome that would be favourable not only to the Somali state but also for its neighbours particularly Kenya and Ethiopia whose cultural, economic and security interests are overwhelmingly intertwined. In other words, there is no doubt that a peaceful and stable Somalia is in everyone's interest and would contribute to the UNSC's main goal of maintaining international peace and security.

4.3. The Role of United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

In the context of this study, it is important to briefly discuss the role played by the East African inter-governmental authority on development (IGAD), the United Nations (UN) and other organisations who remained engaged and tried to resolve the crisis in Somalia. After the withdrawal of the US troops in 1994 and subsequent departure of UN peacekeepers in the following year, Somalia was arguably left unattended. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that both the UN and the East African block kept on trying to fill the security vacuum, spearheading five major and several minor attempts as early as 1991 and 2000 to establish a new central authority in Somalia. It was in this context that, time and again, leaders of various Somali militias and political factions gathered at conferences in Djibouti, Ethiopia, or Egypt. Successive UN coordinators kept on trying to get them to reach an agreement. When an agreement was eventually reached, it would collapse within weeks. It just did not work as the parties to the conflict took a rather win-lose stance (Maruf and Joseph, 2018, p. 26).

Amid all the challenges the country was facing, IGAD members remained committed to the Somalia cause and sought ways of bringing stability in the country. For example, according to Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, in 2000, IGAD co-organised a peace conference along with Djibouti aimed at forming a Somali administration. It was this conference which resulted in a peace agreement[108] that provided for the establishment

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[108] It was the Arta peace process concluded in August 2000 which led to the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) headed by Abdulqasim Salat Hassan. It had support from Islamists and much of the business community in Mogadishu and close ties with the Djibouti government. IGAD, the OAU and the UN recognised the TNG as the government of Somalia. Within Somalia support for the TNG was patchier. Neither the Somaliland authorities in the North

of a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and a Transitional National Government (TNG) mandated for three years even though the new government never managed to extend its authority beyond Mogadishu and faced severe opposition from several warlords and other groups, often backed by Ethiopia, refusing to accept the peace agreement. In 2001, IGAD once more tried to negotiate a solution to the conflict. These negotiations went on until 2004 and resulted in the establishment of new Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) such as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). While the TNG's mandate had expired in 2003, the TFG interim mandate was for five years and it was tasked to prepare Somalia for elections to be held in 2009. However, due to security concerns, the TFG which was led by Abdullahi Yusuf, who had previously ruled the autonomous Somali region of Puntland with military and financial backing from Ethiopia, started its work in exile in Kenya, but later on established itself inside Somalia, firstly in Jawhar and later on in Baidoa in 2006 (Hull and Svensson, 2008, p.18).

At that point, it was increasingly becoming evident according to Mays (2009) that Western states were not eager to return to Somalia. In fact, if a peacekeeping mission was required to support a new national government, it would have to be one mandated and fielded by African countries. It was against this backdrop that planning for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia became more serious in 2004 with the establishment of the TFG of Somalia on Kenyan soil. At the time, planning for a movement of the TFG from Kenya to Somalia included the formation of an African regional peacekeeping mission to support the government. Finally, Mays pointed out that if the TFG was to succeed, it would require an independent military force to provide a sense of security for Somali citizens as the warlords stood down and, hopefully, disarmed (Mays, 2009, p. 4).

Meanwhile, it also became apparent to all those interested in peace and security in the Horn of Africa (HoA) that maintaining the inertia towards Somalia was not an option anymore. This realisation was echoed by Babafemi Badejo, acting representative of the UN Secretary-General at the opening of IGAD's Council of Ministers meeting held in Nairobi on 17 March 2005 to discuss the Somali peace process during which he stated that the need for a peace-support mission for Somalia had been put forward. He went on

West nor Abdulahi Yusuf in Puntland recognised the authority of Abdulqasim. Several of the major Somali warlords were equally disaffected (Healy, 2009, p. 9).

to suggest that the African Union (AU) and IGAD were looking at the best way to meet this perceived need of the Somali authorities (The New Humanitarian, 2005). It was against this backdrop that the AU approached IGAD to assemble the peace operation (Mays, 2009) which it endorsed through its Peace and Security Council (PSC) and mandated the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) through the Communiqué of the 24th Meeting of the PSC held on 7 February[109] though as explained subsequently by several analysts, IGASOM could not deploy into Somalia for many reasons.[110]

Mays (2009) in particular, has attributed the failure to deploy to factors external to Africa, such as the fragmented approach in the form of disagreement that was manifested between the AU and IGAD with the UN; the central issue of funding and none lifting of UN arms embargo on Somalia. As factors internal to Africa, he points out the lack of consent among the belligerents who either disagreed with the inclusion of neighbouring states in the operation and those who refused to accept any peacekeepers altogether; Despite the vocal support of IGAD for the AU mandate, the member states contemplating fielding contingents were not in favour of providing military protection to the TFG in Somalia. With many belligerents in the civil war opposing the introduction of peacekeepers, contingents faced a real possibility of armed conflict and taking casualties. Second, it's difficult to guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process when the belligerents had yet to agree to it. The lack of consensus to have an achievable mandate and more importantly the political will of contingent providers. Without guaranteed funding up front; a mandate that implied the deployed contingents would have to actively defend the TFG; an incomplete peace process; and open opposition of different belligerents for neighbouring countries, IGAD member states were not ready to take the next step and deploy their contingents (Mays, 2009, pp. 16-17).

Besides the cited reasons, it is expected that the analysis made in this study will also contribute towards a better understanding of the challenges that contributed in the failure to deploy. As for now, this study advances the argument that one of the main reasons that became deeply controversial at the time, was the issue of the so-called

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[109] For more details see African Union Peace and Security Council. "Communiqué of the 24th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council", 7 February 2005. Available from: www.aigaforum.com/Documents_on_Somalia.pdf.
[110] See for example (IRIN News, 2005; Mays, 2009; Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017; Williams, 2018)

'frontline states' (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti) that were set to deploy peacekeepers but instead were vehemently opposed by the Somali population and some members of the TFG as they were believed to potentially have ulterior motives in sending in forces into the war-ravaged country (IRIN News, 2005). Indeed, there were reports suggesting that the IGAD decision itself was considered by some Somalis – as a very dangerous move that had the potential of leading to the disintegration of the fragile new government and could re-ignite the civil war in the country.[111]

Like IGAD, despite the withdrawal of its peacekeeping forces in 1995, the UN continued to provide good offices and remained engaged in Somalia as evidenced by the Secretary-General's actions which translated into the establishment of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). UNPOS was established on 15 April 1995 as a special political mission (SPM) to help the Secretary-General advance peace and reconciliation in Somalia through contact with Somali leaders, civic organisations and states including provision of political guidance, as was needed. Since its establishment, UNPOS supported various initiatives aimed at promoting peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. For instance, from 2002 to 2004, it was the driving force behind the efforts that supported the Somali National Reconciliation Conference under the auspices of the IGAD which resulted in the formation of the TFG and after joining ranks with the former Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in late 2008, under the Djibouti Agreement, UNPOS supported the relocation of the TFG from Nairobi into Somalia in February 2009.[112]

UNPOS also organised several high-level Conferences including the Istanbul Conference for Somalia, the International Conference in support of Somali Security Forces and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) held in Brussels, the Joint Security and High-Level Committees. Moreover, UNPOS played a crucial role in facilitating the electoral process which led to the election of a new President on 10 September 2012. This was followed with the adoption by the National Constituent Assembly, on 1 August, of a Provisional Constitution and the subsequent selection of Members of the new Federal Parliament of Somalia. Until its closure on 3 June 2013 as

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[111] The New Humanitarian (2005) Opposition to IGAD's insistence on troop deployment continues. ‹online› Available from: http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/221045.
[112] For further details see United Nations (2019) UNPOS: Background, Available from: https://unpos.unmissions.org/united-nations-political-office-somalia.

a result of the transition into the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) that was established by Security Council resolution 2101 (2013), the UNPOS Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia continued to chair the meetings of the International Contact Group for Somalia (United Nations, 2019).

It is important to note that the UN efforts were not limited to UNPOS. In fact, throughout the crisis period of the early 1990s until the time of writing this thesis, several other UN agencies, funds and programmes have continued to work closely with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the European Union in the provision of humanitarian and security assistance throughout Somalia. In this regard, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2019) noted that a total of six important UN organizations were set up to work in Somalia and coordinate humanitarian efforts and delivery of goods to the civilians caught up in the conflict between 1991–1995. They included, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). These organisations as well as the United Nations Office for Projects (UNOPS), the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) were still operating in Somalia at the time of writing.

Even so, the situation in Somalia did not improve and the country continued to be divided among warlords until mid-2000s during which the radical ICU gained prominence despite all the efforts. As Dias (2010) adeptly pointed out, this scenario of continued instability was one of the factors that put Somalia back in the radar of regional and extra-regional states between June and December 2006 principally because of the alleged connections of the ICU movement to the transnational Salafist militant group *al-Qaeda* and the proliferation of piracy in the coast of Somalia and Gulf of Aden, between 2007 and 2010. Against this background, there was a concerted effort both at regional and international level to find a solution that could help address the economic, political and conflict issues that have marked the Somalia history since the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission in 1995. In the subsequent two decades, lasting peace in Somalia had remained elusive. In fact, Wondemagegnehu and Kebede (2017) noted that since the collapse of the Siyad Barre's government in 1991, Somalia had witnessed both failed interventions and policies of neglect.

To sum up, despite the setbacks in their peace-making efforts in Somalia it is evident that both organisations (IGAD and UN) remained engaged even when a sense of hopelessness was prevalent. Besides other critically important factors that were at play including the Ethiopian intervention in 2006 as discussed earlier, Mays (2009) supports the assertion that the development and mandating of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 must be understood in the context of the continued failure to deploy IGASOM after the March 2006 IGAD meeting. Although IGAD did not abandon IGASOM after the said meeting but continued to explore ways to solve its problems in order to deploy contingents to Somalia. However, the deterioration of the Somali peace process, increased Western backing for a peacekeeping mission and the inability of IGAD to solve IGASOM's problems combined to give birth to AMISOM (Mays, 2009 p.17) which is the focus of the next Chapter.

CHAPTER 5: THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA (AMISOM)
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5.0. Introduction

This Chapter deals with the establishment of AMISOM and discusses its major characteristics that are deemed relevant to the present study. It proceeds with the discussion of key important domestic, regional and international factors that were fundamentally important for the establishment of AMISOM as an African Union-led regional peace support operation. This is followed by an analysis of AMISOM mandate, troops strengths and deployment across Somalia as well as the creation of a stand-alone United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) which as explained in this study, further strengthened the AU-UN partnership and played a vital role towards the implementation of the AMISOM mandate. The Chapter concludes with an overview of AMISOM funding mechanisms, payment regime for its troops and critical issues surrounding the financing of the AU mission in Somalia, especially between 2007 – 2017.

5.1. The Establishment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

As a prelude to the discussion of the factors leading to the establishment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace support operation, it is worthwhile noting that since the early 1990s until mid-2000s, the conflict in Somalia had taken different twists and turns with far reaching domestic, regional and international implications. The brutal and violent conflict which saw the emergence of powerful clan, businessman and radical leaders with Islamist links to the international terrorism networks who had taken advantage of the security vacuum that prevailed since 1995 following the withdrawal of the multilateral and UN peacekeeping forces, prompted grave concern among various stakeholders in the international community. To put it into context, the AMISOM peace support operation did not arise by chance. Somalia is situated in the Horn of Africa (HoA), a region described by many analysts as one of the most volatile and conflict-ridden areas in the African continent.[113]

The persistent menace posed by the lack of law and order in Somalia remained a cause for concern both at continental and international level especially in the new global war on terror (GWOT) context. This concern coupled with other security and geopolitical dynamics in the region, prompted the regional block IGAD, as it had previously done, to

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[113] See for example (Murithi, 2009; Plaut, 2013; Bruton and Williams, 2014; Clapham, 2013; Hirbe, 2020; Rondos, 2016; Waithaka and Maluki, 2016; Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017).

seek ways to bring about the much-desired peace and stability in Somalia. Hence, as noted by Tim Murithi, after successfully forging various peace-making initiatives including facilitating the 2004 elections, IGAD responded positively to the request made by the recently elected head of the TFG – President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed for the deployment of a regional force in Somalia. Coincidentally, the President's request came at a time when the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) was already considering such a military deployment since January 2005. Therefore, in February 2005, the AU authorised IGAD to send a peace support mission to Somalia, and in March 2005 the IGAD agreed to deploy 10,000 peacekeepers that April and they were to be part of IGAD mission to Somalia (IGASOM) whose mandate was to oversee the voluntary disarmament of the militia, protect the TFIs and prepare the ground for an AU force that would replace IGASOM nine months after its deployment (Murithi, 2009, p.147).

Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, IGASOM did not deploy due to factors pointed out by analysts such as Wondemagegnehu and Kebede (2017) who identified some of the reasons that contributed to the failed deployment. First, IGAD lacked the necessary institutional capacity to launch and manage a peace support mission. Second, IGASOM was resisted by some Somali armed groups, that opposed the potential presence of troops from the "front-line states" due to the perception by many Somalis and others that these states would pursue their respective national interests in Somalia. Third, despite getting UNSC authorisation, the deployment of IGASOM also failed to gain the international support that later proved crucial to sustaining the AU's mission, which followed in its wake. Perhaps, less importantly, Eritrea resisted IGASOM's deployment because it would have safeguarded the TFG, which it considered Ethiopia's ally in Somalia. (Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017, pp. 201-202).

Besides other possible reasons, there is no doubt that the decisions by IGAD, AUPSC and UNSC to authorise IGASOM, laid the foundations for the interventions that were to follow (Healy, 2009) particularly, the AMISOM intervention. Against this backdrop, following the failure of IGASOM's deployment, in its communiqué of the 69th meeting held on 19 January 2007, the AUPSC announced that the AU would deploy for a period of six months a mission to Somalia, that became known as AMISOM. The mission was aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilisation phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that it would evolve into a UN peacekeeping operation in support of a long-term stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia. In that

respect, the AUPSC urged the UNSC to consider authorising a UN operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration of its 6 months mandate (African Union, 2007).

Likewise, welcoming the AU's intention to establish a mission in Somalia and underlining the urgency of the deployment to avoid a security vacuum after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and create the conditions for full withdrawal and the lifting of emergency security measures that were in place among others, the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in its resolution 1744 (United Nations, 2007), stressed the need for broad-based and representative institutions reached through an all-inclusive political process in Somalia to consolidate stability, peace and reconciliation in the country and ensure that international assistance was as effective as possible. The Council decided to authorise member States of the AU to establish for a period of six months a mission in Somalia, which was authorised to take all necessary measures as appropriate to carry out a wide range of mandated tasks.

The AMISOM peace support operation represents the first kind of arrangement through which the UN broke the ground by authorising the funding of a regional force engaged in active combat peace operation. The UNSCR 1863 of 2009 created the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and it was mandated to ensure the provision of logistical and financial support to the AU forces fighting the war against the *al-Shabaab* militants and other radical groups in Somalia. Nonetheless, this study seeks to expand the debate in terms of what other factors were at play in the establishment of AMISOM and why after 10-years, the AU mission did not evolve into a full-fletched UN peacekeeping operation as expected. These issues are critically discussed as part of the research findings in Chapter Six. For now, in a hindsight, this study argues that two possible (but not exclusive) international relations considerations may have led to this intervention. First, for the AU, the decision was within the mantra of African-led Solutions to African problems (AfSol) in peace and security in the continent; secondly, Bruton and Williams (2014) highlight that the departure of US forces in 1994 and the subsequent withdrawal of UNOSOM II peacekeeping force from Somalia in 1995 created a political and security vacuum. The withdrawal was followed by the total collapse of state institutions, widespread lawlessness and chaos which made Somalia to become a source of continued insecurity in the region and was considered by the UN as a threat to international peace – therefore, there was a need for action.

Another significant consideration which possibly influenced the international politics to launch the AMISOM intervention can be attributed to the fact that in the post-2001 September 11 attacks referred to earlier, the US increasingly renewed its strategic interests in the Horn of Africa as it feared the threat of terrorism in the region. As noted by Healy (2009, p.14) the prospects and purpose of external intervention changed dramatically in 2006 when the ICU took power in Mogadishu. This introduced new dynamics and sharply raised Western interests in the situation in Somalia, particularly the US which had accused the ICU of harbouring international terrorists associated with the 1998 East African simultaneous embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam. Also, according to Schmidt (2018) the 2002 *al-Qaeda* claim of responsibility for assaults on an Israeli-owned hotel and civilian airliner in Kenya, led the US to believed that the perpetrators had trained in Somalia and used that country as a transit route for weapons and operatives. In effect, Southern Somalia had replaced Nairobi as *al-Qaeda's* regional nerve centre in that same year.

Perhaps it would not be wrong to state that, the US security concerns at the time, coincided with those of the most powerful regional states (Kenya, Ethiopia and to some extent Uganda[114]) in the sub-region. This view is shared by Healy (2009, p.8) who argued that the emergence of Islamism as a political force in Somalia gave the conflict a regional dimension with implications for Ethiopia and Kenya, which both have sizeable Somali communities within their borders. It also excited the interest of the US and other Western powers concerned about the threat of international terrorism. Mukwaya (2004) agrees that international terrorism has created new dynamics in the region; noting that the West, led by the US, has emerged with new policies, which are packaged for the region. At the same time, states in the region have responded by re-designing their domestic and foreign policies in the region and globally to accommodate new developments resulting from the GWOT. On one hand, the West views the collapsing states and fundamentalism as some of the causes of terrorism in the region. On the other hand, states in the region are thrown into a scramble by the US anti-terrorism programme (Mukwaya, 2004, p.43).

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[114] The country has had pronounced political, diplomatic and military interests in the Horn of Africa region. Uganda was extensively involved hand in hand with Djibouti, Kenya and other members in the negotiations on Somalia which took place in Kenya under IGAD in finding lasting solutions to the Somalia problem. Uganda has the lion's share of domestic and regional problems. As a land-locked country bordering the Sudan to the North, Kenya to the East, and Tanzania to the South it is connected to the Greater Horn of Africa with its world system (Mukwaya, 2004).

Again, the growing concern about international terrorists who had sought a safe haven in certain Somalia districts considered to be strongholds of ICU extremists and other anti-government groups was echoed by the UNSC in its resolution 178 of March 2008. More specifically, resolution 178 highlighted a few aspects. First, it noted the significant regional variations with the north being relatively more stable than southern and central Somalia whereby given the limited capacity of the FGS to govern and enforce law, criminal elements were engaged in a range of unlawful activities which ranged from trafficking in human beings, weapons and drugs to unauthorised collection of taxes and levies and abduction, kidnaping and extortion. Secondly, it emphasised that the security situation in Somalia was further complicated by regional and international factors that included, the proliferation of arms, the potential use of Somalia as a stage for a proxy war among neighbours and continuing threat of piracy, which was not only affecting the delivery of humanitarian supplies but also international trade in the HoA region with ramifications across the Arabian Peninsula (United Nations, 2008). Hence, this study argues that, while it aligned itself with AU to forge peace and stability and, support the weak and incapable FGS, for the UN it was a matter of moral obligation to live up to its responsibilities for the maintenance of global peace and security with a renewed commitment in the quest for a lasting peace in Somalia.

The characterisation of state incapacity view is shared by Wondemagegnehu and Kebede (2017) who in their article *AMISOM: charting a new course for African Union peace missions* claimed that the FGS was still new and fragile, and disputes within the Somali politics continued to vex state-building and stabilisation efforts. At the same time, terrorist and insurgent groups including (but not limited to) *al-Shabaab* have proven pernicious, resolute, and adaptable in their effort to undermine any progress toward the FGS's consolidation. The authors made three observations which in their opinion, might have led to the establishment of AMISOM. First, they observed that Somalia's neighbouring states were initially wary of the spill-over effects of the Somalia conflict to their own national security; secondly, the AU saw the creation of AMISOM as a window of opportunity for stabilisation of Somalia given the broad engagement of stakeholders and finally, the UN saw it as a chance to redeem itself from criticism that it had abandoned its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security in the case of Somalia conflict.

Whether encouraged by the above factors or not, it is against the backdrop of an unstable Somalia and the potential threat it posed to regional and international stability that the AU and UN felt the need to act in a country described by Bruton and Williams (2014) as having been steeped in decades of violence since its descent into civil war in 1988 and several attempts by the international community and UN to create a successful peace process or end the conflict, all failed. The battle of Mogadishu fought in 1993 by the US military forces,[115] in support of a UN humanitarian assistance mission, vividly displayed the extent of anarchy and violence which prevailed in Somalia until the deployment of the AMISOM peace support operation in 2007.

Meanwhile, this study reiterates the argument that even though the AMISOM intervention was mandated by the AU-UN, regional geopolitical dynamics and national interests of the countries involved were at play in its making. In this regard, a number of analysts support the notion that the intervention by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) in December 2006 was instrumental in determining the direction of the conflict and forging a change of mind within the AU and beyond towards the prevailing *status quo* in war-torn Somalia.[116] For example, in his book *Fighting for Peace in Somalia*, Paul Williams has argued that AMISOM emerged as the major international response to four important developments in Somalia and the Horn of Africa in the aftermath of *al-Qaeda's* attack on the US on 11 September 2001. He points out the 2004 establishment of the TFG for Somalia in Kenya as the first reason, after more than a dozen failed attempts. Then, the response from the AU and IGAD to the subsequent call by the new President for a peacebuilding mission to help his regime establish itself inside Somalia.

The third development came in June 2006 with the decisive victory of the ICU over the various warlords that had previously run Mogadishu and much of south-central Somalia. Their collusion with elements of *al-Qaeda* and *al-Shabaab* was used in both Washington and Addis Ababa to justify further Ethiopian military engagement. Finally, AMISOM emerged as an exit strategy for Ethiopia's troops after Prime Minister Meles

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[115] "The Battle of Mogadishu", more commonly referred to as "Black Hawk Down" was fought on October 3-4, 1993 in Somalia between the US forces and militias loyal to the warlord General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. It was part of Operation Gothic Serpent, for Task Force Ranger focusing on raids to capture Aidid and his top commanders. It ended up in crisis when Aidid's militiamen downed two US Black Hawk helicopters using rocket propelled grenades. The 15-hour battle that ensued left 18 Americans dead and 73 injured (South, 2018).

[116] See for example (Murithi, 2009; Dias, 2010; Eriksson, 2013; and Williams, 2018).

Zenawi had decided to intervene militarily[117] to topple the Islamic Courts and install the TFG in Mogadishu in December 2006 (Williams, 2018, p. 21). To sum up, it is undeniable that by jointly authorising the AMISOM peace enforcement operation in Somalia, the AU and UN have demonstrated their commitment to further promote the evolving partnership in peace and security efforts in the African continent. However, it is also true that the numerous challenges and variables discussed in this study illustrate the fact that there are blurred lines between peacekeeping principles of neutrality, impartiality and the national interests of the countries involved. Therefore, this study advances the argument that the aforementioned scenario has raised significant concerns among some Somali, regional and international observers and placed at risk the strategic partnership between the two entities in an unprecedented manner. As it turned out, in the first 10-years of AMISOM's existence, it became more and more clear that several other factors, interests and agendas influenced not only the initial decision-making within IGAD members principally by the most powerful states but also the implementation of the AMISOM mandate from 2007 to 2017 as detailed in Chapter Six.

5.2. The AMISOM Mandate (2007–2017)

When AMISOM was authorised in 2007 as a peace support operation by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on one hand, and endorsed subsequently as a peace enforcement operation by the UN Security Council (UNSC), on another hand, the AU forces were provided with a set of tasks to be accomplished within a specific period of time by both mandating entities, including the direction on how to go about implementing them. It is those tasks that made-up the AMISOM mandate which is at the centre of this study. It is worth mentioning that a mandate is not static and as illustrated subsequently, the AMISOM mandate has evolved over time. Before proceeding further, it is perhaps useful to define what a mandate stands for in the context of UN and AU peace operations.

Accordingly, the International Peace Institute (2010, p.6) explains that a mandate is understood as the principal task given to a peacekeeping mission leadership team (MLT) to implement. Typically, a mandate contains many tasks and directions that often are added to or adjusted by the UNSC over time. Devising mandates is an inherently

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[117] Ethiopia intervened in December 2006 following the call by the internationally recognised TFG that was confined to Baidoa, the only town it effectively controlled. The TFG leaders feared the growing influence of the ICU militias who were advancing towards the southern and central Somalia, and preparing themselves to attack the regional administration of Puntland and, if possible, the Somaliland too (Guluma, 2018).

political process based on proposals from diplomats representing member-states usually after consultations with their respective capitals and leaders there lay down rigid margins for negotiating, usually with little flexibility. It is for this reason that, often, mandates reflect political concerns of members states rather than realistic assessments of the practicality of implementing them. Nonetheless, once authorised, there is an expectation that the leaders of a particular peacekeeping mission must operationalise these complex and sometimes ambiguous mandates with little guidance on how to define success. On another hand, it is not unrealistic to expect a good mandate implementation but when it comes to regional peace operations involving frontline states, many significant challenges and nuances may emerge for several reasons as this study demonstrates. With the above considerations in mind, it is now possible to assess the type of mandated activities the AU forces were entrusted with (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 AUPSC Mandate for AMISOM

Main Tasks Mandated
a) to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders,
b) to provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions,
c) to assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia, particularly the effective reestablishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented by some of Somalia's bilateral and multilateral partners,
d) to provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts,
e) to monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation,
f) to facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs, and
g) to protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defense.

Source: PSC/PR/Comm(LXIX), 19 January 2007.

The above Table 5.1 shows the first set of initial tasks that came from the AUPSC which among others, expected AMISOM to also provide the necessary support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian

assistance, and to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia (Murithi, 2009, 148). Also, cognisant of the need to ensure a smooth implementation of the mandate, the AU emphasised the critical role of the countries of the region in the overall efforts aimed at bringing about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia and appealed strongly to all countries involved to demonstrate the necessary cohesion in support of the TFIs and their efforts. Furthermore, for the effective accomplishment of its mandate, the AU urged its member states to provide military and other personnel, equipment and services that would be required and launched an appeal to the LAS, the EU and its member states, the UN, as well as other partners, to urgently provide, in a predictable and coordinated manner, the required financial, technical and logistical support to facilitate the successful deployment of AMISOM. The AU also requested the UN and its Security Council to provide all the support necessary including financial for the speedy deployment of AMISOM, bearing in mind that in deploying a mission in Somalia the AU was acting on behalf of the entire international community (African Union, 2007).

Against this backdrop, in welcoming the AU's intention to establish a mission in Somalia and underlining the urgency of the development; reiterating its support for Somalia's TFI, underlining the importance of maintaining and providing stability and security throughout the country, and underscoring in this regard the importance of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militia and ex-combatants; condemning all acts of violence and extremism inside Somalia and determining that the situation in Somalia continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, the UNSC in its resolution S/RES/1744 (2007) of 21 February 2007 provided the second set of initial tasks (Table 5.2) representing the mandate which came from the UNSC (United Nations, 2007) to be implemented by the AU forces. As a point of interest, it should be noted that both the AU and the UN mandates for AMISOM are similar and complementary in nature. In so doing, the UN laid down its expectations, added a critical and important foundation for the overall legitimacy of the mission and demonstrated its commitment to support the regional efforts towards peace and stability in Somalia.

Table 5.2 UNSC Mandate for AMISOM

Main Tasks Mandated
a) To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in the peace and stabilisation process,
b) To provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions,
c) To assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces,
d) To contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance,
e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.

Source: S/RES/1744, 21 February 2007.

It should be noted that, despite being given what appeared to be a clearly defined mandate, AMISOM faced considerable challenges from the onset. They included operational capability, smaller troop numbers and other critical logistical support challenges but were later mitigated with support from the UN and partners as well as the increase of troop numbers. However, one major challenge related to the issue of exercising a unified chain of command and control as would be ordinarily expected in a traditional peacekeeping operation, persisted.

Also as noted by Williams (2018) the integration into AMISOM of Kenya and Djibouti in 2012 evidenced the problem of lack of impartiality claiming that neither of them joined for the most impartial of reasons. Henceforth, AMISOM's political centre of gravity would coincide with these "frontline states". Since then, the AMISOM mandate was expanded and evolved considerably with several resolutions passed by the UNSC in collaboration with the AU and other international partners as illustrated in Table 5.2.1. below. It is to be noted that such ensuing resolutions were aimed not only at addressing the prevailing security situation in Somalia but also took into consideration the broader operating context in which the AMISOM mandate was being implemented including the ongoing security and conflict dynamics affecting the entire sub-region of the Horn of Africa.

Table 5.2.1 Evolution of AMISOM Mandate

United Nations Security Council Resolution No:	Main Tasks Mandated in Renewed and/or Modified Resolutions
Resolution 1772 adopted by the SC on 20th August 2007.	Extension of AMISOM's mandate by six months. The Council also agreed to take action against parties threatening AMISOM, the TFG and the Somali peace process.
Resolution 1801 adopted by the SC on 29th February 2008.	Extension of AMISOM's mandate by six months. AMISOM authorized to take necessary measures aimed at providing security to key infrastructures.
Resolution 1831 adopted by the SC on 19th August 2008.	Renewal of AMISOM's mandate.
Resolution 1863 adopted by the SC on 16th July 2009.	Renew for up to six months from the date of this resolution the authorization of Member States of the AU to maintain a mission in Somalia and underlines, in particular, that AMISOM is authorized to take all necessary measures to provide security for key infrastructure and to contribute, as may be requested and within its capabilities and existing mandate, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The Council expressed its intent to establish a UN Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision of the Security Council by 1 June 2009.
Resolution 1910 adopted by the SC on 28th January 2010.	Extension of AMISOM's mandate to 31st January 2011.
Resolution 1964 adopted by the SC on 22nd December 2010.	AMISOM's deployment was extended to 30th September 2011, it was further suggested that its strength be increased after it realized its initial authorised force from 8,000 to 12,000 troops thus enhancing its capability.
Resolution 2010 (2011) adopted by the SC on 30th September 2011.	Extension of the deployment of AMISOM troops until 31st October 2012. The Transitional Federal Government was called upon to abide by the roadmap of key tasks and priorities to be delivered over the next one year.
Resolution 2036 (2012) adopted by the SC on 22nd February 2012.	AMISOM's operational scope was widened to four sectors as set out in the Strategic Concept of 5th January 2012. The mission was also called upon to take necessary measures in coordination with TFG forces, so as to neutralize armed groups in the country, and in compliance with international humanitarian law Somalia authorities were to ban export of charcoal in addition to that, member states were to prevent direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia.
Resolution 2073 (2012) adopted by the SC on 7th November 2012	Authorised the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment for four months. AMISOM to take all necessary measures, in compliance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. Expanded on exceptional basis the UN logistical support package for the mission to include funding for an additional 50 AMISOM civilian personnel.
Resolution 2072 (2012) adopted by the SC on 31st October 2012	Adoption of a 7-day technical rollover of AMISOM.
Resolution 2093 (2013), on 6th March 2013	Extended the mandate and authorised AMISOM to take all necessary measures, in full compliance with its obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. To maintain a presence in the four sectors and in coordination with the Security Forces of the FGS, reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia.

Table 5.2.1 Continued

United Nations Security Council Resolution No:	Main Tasks Mandated in Renewed and/or Modified Resolutions
Resolution 2102 (2013) on 2nd May 2013	Adopted by the Security Council at its 6959th meeting.
Resolution 2124 (2013) on 12th November 2013	Extended the AMISOM mandate and stated that conditions in Somalia are not yet appropriate for the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Operation. Expanded the logistical support package for AMISOM, referred to in paragraph 4 of resolution 2093 (2013), for a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 October 2014, ensuring the accountability and transparency of expenditure of the United Nations funds as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1910 (2010), and consistent with the requirements of the Secretary-General's Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). Stressed "the urgent need for AMISOM to establish and use a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell" (CCTARC).
Resolution 2182 (2014) on 24th October 2014	By adopting Resolution 2182 (2014), the Council extended the AMISOM for One Year and Amended the Sanctions Regime during the 7286th Meeting. Expressed concern that AMISOM has not yet established a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response cell (CCTARC), as requested in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2124 (2013) and requests the African Union to conclude the deployment of this cell without any further delay.
Resolution 2232 (2015) on 28th July 2015	Reiterated that conditions would not be appropriate for a UN peacekeeping mission in the country until the end of that year, at the earliest and extended AMISOM and UNSOM mandates.
Resolution 2297 (2016) on 7th July 2016	Reiterated that conditions would not be appropriate for a UN peacekeeping mission in the country. The Council mandated AMISOM to engage with communities in recovered areas and to promote understanding between itself and local populations in order to allow longer-term stabilisation by the UN country team. AMISOM's priority tasks included to secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU.
Resolution 2355 (2017) on 26th May 2017	Authorized the Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 August 2017, in line with the Council's request to the AU for a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel.
Resolution 2372 (2017) on 30th August 2017	Extended its authorization of the AMISOM mandate and approved a reduction of its uniformed personnel to a maximum 21,626 by 31 December 2017 amid a transition of responsibilities to Somali security forces.

As can be seen, the above table illustrates the unwavering support and institutional commitment by the UN which not only enabled the continued presence of AMISOM in Somalia but also exerted influence on the political front while at the same time attempting to curtail the efforts by spoilers of peace and security in the country. Moreover, the table shows that apart from the initial tasks and successive AMISOM specific resolutions, the Council passed other vitally important Somalia related resolutions that arguably helped towards the FGS's efforts in addressing the multitude of problems it faced, such as arms

trafficking, proliferation of piracy and other illicit activities thereby also directly aiding in the implementation of the AMISOM mandate given that the measures contained in such resolutions shaped the security developments on the ground. [118] For instance, UNSCR 1816 authorised willing states and regional bodies to join forces with the TFG to combat piracy and armed robbery incidences off the Somali coast while UNSCR 1838 called upon countries to deploy naval vessels off the Somali coast, and fight piracy by all means necessary in accordance with international law (UNSCR1838/2008). These two resolutions, along with UNSCR 1851 which authorised the use of force to counter piracy off Somalia's coast (UNSCR1851/2008) were of huge importance because, 20,000 global shipping and 1/3 of warships in the world pass through Somali waters.

There is no doubt that the involvement of other actors made it possible for AMISOM to focus on its core mandated tasks, something it was unable to do before as the mission was presented with a myriad of critical security challenges all requiring attention simultaneously. As a point of interest, it should be noted that in the first years of the intervention, AMISOM's capacity was overstretched because besides fighting the war, in order to get the much needed supplies, they had to provide sea escorts of vessels carrying supplies for its forces from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to the Mogadishu port, Somalia (UNSOA, 2012). Another important measure taken was the adoption of UNSCR 1844 which called upon States to prevent individuals threatening Somalia's TFG and AMISOM from entering into or transiting their territories. It urged member states to freeze economic resources or assets controlled by such individuals either directly or indirectly. The Council's sanctions monitoring body – Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) whose mandate was expanded through resolution 1916 of 19 March 2010 to investigate transport routes used in the violation of Eritrea and Somalia arms embargoes, and economic activities generating funds for the violation of the same, played a crucial role (UNSCR1916/2010).

Going back to the AU forces resolutions, the Council was concerned with the issue of unity of command within AMISOM. The need for civilian protection and human rights including violation of sanctions. Thus, in its resolution UNSCR 2182 among others, it

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[118] See for example (Resolution 1766 of 23 July 2007; Resolution 1811 of 29th April 2008; Resolution 1814 of 15th May 2008; Resolution 1816 of 2nd June 2008; Resolution 1838 of 7th October 2008; Resolution 1844 of 20th November 2008; Resolution 1851 of 16th December 2008 and Resolution 2002 of 29th July 2011, etc.).

requested the AU to conclude the deployment of a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC) without any further delay and provided for upgraded marine surveillance and interdiction to counter violations of the charcoal and arms embargoes; and invited prime attention to issues of reported sexual exploitation and abuse by AMISOM military personnel (UNSCR2182/2014). Lastly, the Council called for the strengthening of command and control in AMISOM, cross-sector operations, and the generation/deployment of quick reaction forces (QRF) as well as force enablers and multipliers under the central command of the Force Commander (UNSCR2297/2016).

Amongst the several changes highlighting the evolution of AMISOM mandate from 2007 to 2017 as described earlier in Table 5.2.1., two critical developments deserve attention – the troop strengths and their deployment across the country. First, in its communiqué of 19 January 2007, the AUPSC envisaged the AMISOM deployment to be comprised of 9 infantry battalions of 850 personnel each supported by maritime coastal and air components, as well as an appropriate civilian component and a police training force (African Union, 2007). After AMISOM reached its initial strength of 8,000 troops in November 2010, the number was increase to 17,731 uniformed personnel in February 2012, including two formed police units (FPUs) and a guard force (UNSCR2036/2012).

Once again, following the joint AU-UN review in 2013, in its resolution 2124 the UNSC increased the AMISOM troop strength up to 22,126 uniformed personnel, an increase that was meant for a short period of eighteen to twenty-four months and as part of AMISOM exit strategy (UNSCR2124/2013). The exponential increase of troops strengths put AMISOM in a unique position as it became the largest UN-mandated peace support operation compared to all other existing UN or AU-led peacekeeping operations (UNSOA, 2015). The second development was regarding troop deployments in line with UNSCR 2036 which mandated AMISOM to expand its area of operation outside of Mogadishu and establish presence in four sectors across South-Central Somalia in accordance with the AMISOM strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of 5 January 2012 and 14 February 2012 respectively (UNSCR2036/2012). The Map in Figure 5.1 below illustrates how AMISOM troops were deployed throughout the country. At the same time, the AMISOM expansion to the sectors was linked to another significant development of facilitating and providing adequate security for the deployment of United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) civilian personnel in the regions to carry out the important political, human rights monitoring and civil affairs activities.

Figure 5.1 Map of AMISOM Troops Deployment by Sector

Source: United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), 2017.

It should be pointed out that while well intended by both principals (AU and UN), this study argues that the manner in which the military contingents have been distributed across the country is one of the critical features of AMISOM that further complicated the situation on the ground and impacted the implementation of the mandate. As noted adeptly by Wondemagegnehu and Kebede (2017), the AMISOM troop deployment has followed a country-based sectorisation whereby each TCC is given a specific geographical area to cover. This scenario coupled with the state incapacity of the Somalia government, TCCs have continued to take a bigger role in governing the liberated areas, thereby creating room for the illegitimate commercial activities to take place.

For instance, a 2017 report by the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) faulted the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) contingent of AMISOM as part of the charcoal importing countries and therefore was deliberately failing to implement the charcoal ban imposed by the UNSC resolutions 751 (1992), 1907 (2009) and 2036 (2012) respectively. The same report further narrated a specific instance in which the KDF sector commander deployed in Kismayo and Buur Gaabol failed to cooperate with UN monitors investigating the situation of charcoal trade by KDF troops who are the leading contingent

in Sector 6 and the accusation that the troops had not assisted the Somalia government to enforce the charcoal ban (UNSCR924/2017). Similarly, in their publication *BLACK AND WHITE: Kenya's Criminal Racket in Somalia*, the Kenyan-based *think-tank* Journalists for Justice (JFJ) examined the illegal trade in sugar and charcoal, and found that senior KDF figures have been involved in both. Human rights abuses inside Somalia appear widespread and are carried out with impunity. And the KDF, rather than taking the fight to *al-Shabaab*, are actually in garrison mode, sitting in bases while senior commanders are engaged in corrupt business practices with the Jubbaland administration and providing the militant group *al-Shabaab* with a vital source of revenue. The illicit trade in sugar and charcoal is, according to one diplomat, "shocking" and, "inimical to national security" (Journalists for Justice, 2015, p.1). It is not surprising therefore, that Wondemagegnehu and Kebede (2017) concluded that country sectorisation is often guided by interests of the TCCs.

5.3. The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA)

The importance of the analysis about UNSOA provided here is crucial considering the impact it has had towards the implementation of the AMISOM mandate. When AMISOM was authorised as an AU-led peace support operation, the concept of logistic support for the AU troops was based on self-sustenance by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) as had been the case for an earlier African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), also known as the Burundi model (African Union, 2007). Yet, it was apparent right from the beginning that while the AU member states were ready to provide troops, they lacked adequate resources and equipment to sustain the combat operations in a highly volatile environment against *al-Shabaab* and other terrorist groups. It was this realisation which led to the establishment of a United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) which was hailed by Atul Khare, UN Under-Secretary-General for Field Support (DFS) as being the only field support operation of its kind in the world and that it had significantly enhanced AMISOM's operations in Somalia.

The statement by Atul Khare underscores the fact that unlike the experiences of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that were set-up using particular modalities for technical, logistical and financial support, a different and arguably unique approach has been followed in the AMISOM case. Nevertheless, despite its unique nature, the creation of UNSOA falls within the same dynamics of the evolving collaboration between the AU

and UN with the aim of ensuring that peace operations are conducted more effectively across the continent. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that while UNSCR 1744 authorised member States of the AU to carry out the implementation of the peace enforcement mandate in Somalia, UNSCR 1863 of 16 January 2009 established UNSOA whose mandate was to provide the logistical and financial support to the AU forces fighting the war against al-Shabab and other radical groups in Somalia. In many ways, resolution 1863 was a culmination of several years of discussions between the UN and AU about greater collaboration, particularly in the area of peacekeeping, and the recommendations of the Prodi Report (A/63/666–S/2008/813), issued 31 December 2008.

The Prodi Report was produced following UN Secretary-General's proposal which was endorsed by UNSCR in its resolution 1809 (2008) to establish an AU-UN panel on the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects and concerning the cooperation of the UN with regional organisations. Among other recommendations, it considered the modalities of how to support AU peacekeeping operations established under a UN mandate. The Report emphasised that the UN-AU strategic partnership should be underpinned by the following principles of cooperation, which might also serve as a baseline set of principles for UN engagements with other regional organisations in future: consultative decision-making and common strategy; division of labour based on respective comparative advantage; joint analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation; integrated response to the conflict cycle, including prevention and transparency, accountability and respect for international standards (United Nations, 2008). As a point of interest, in the wake of the 2015 joint AU-UN strategic review, in the fall of 2016 UNSOA was transformed into the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).[119]

A few relevant facts characterise the unique nature of UNSOA operational and logistical support model. First, unlike all other previous peacekeeping arrangements, UNSOA was established as a stand-alone field support operation to deliver vitally

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[119] However, UNSOA will be used throughout the study, as this was the UN office established to specifically support AMISOM, whereas UNSOS was established to support not only AMISOM but also the integrated United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia (UNSOM) and other United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes including the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force on joint operations with AMISOM. For more details see UNSCR S/RES/2245 of 9 November 2015.

important logistical support package to AMISOM. The UN logistical support package provided to AMISOM by UNSOA includes vital life support such as rations (food and water), health and sanitation, fuel; assets management and capacity building, transport, accommodation, communications and information technology, medical and aviation, personnel movement, media and public information and general supplies but not including the transfer of funds (UNSCR2093/2013). Secondly, UNSCR 1863 broke new ground as the UNSC agreed to fund a peacekeeping operation led by a regional organisation from the UN regular assessed budget, something that was never done before, resulting in an unprecedented level of cooperation with the AU (UNSCR1863/2009).

Third, the same resolution also established a mechanism of Trust Fund through which member states could make voluntary contributions aimed at providing additional financial assistance in support of AMISOM mandate implementation until such time, a UN peacekeeping operation would be deployed (UNSCR1863/2009). Finally, as AMISOM grew up from an initial deployment of 1,500 Ugandan troops in 2007, to become the largest AU multidimensional peace support operation with over 22,000 troops and police from seven African countries,[120] and a civilian component that included political, gender, civil and humanitarian affairs units including a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell (CCTARC), UNSOA was since its establishment supporting an active combat operation (UNSOA, 2015).

It is worthwhile noting that unlike other traditional peacekeeping operations whose mandates are implemented in circumstances where a cease-fire exists, supporting an active counterinsurgency combat operation in an extremely dangerous environment was an insurmountable assignment given to UNSOA whose offices where initially based in Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya from 2009 to 2012 owing to the prevailing precarious security situation inside Somalia. The scenario meant that UNSOA's support had to be done remotely as it could not deploy its civilian personnel inside Somalia. Hence, to support the implementation of the AMISOM mandate, Williams (2017) noted that UNSOA employed a range of innovative techniques to provide the field support to the AU forces by pioneering the 'light footprint' concept and outsourcing model. In so doing,

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[120] The countries include Uganda (2007), Burundi (2007), Djibouti (2011), Nigeria (2012); Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013) and Ethiopia (2014).

despite facing numerous challenges that severely inhibited its ability to deliver on all its mandated tasks, UNSOA significantly enhanced AMISOM's capabilities and played a major role in increasing the mission's overall effectiveness (Williams, 2017, p.1).

The remarkable difference made by UNSOA's timely support was widely acknowledged inside Somalia by several senior AMISOM military commanders[121] who applauded its critical role in enabling them to implement the daunting mandate. For example, Lt. General Jonathan Rono, AMISOM Force Commander, noted that

"The important role played by UNSOA in delivering logistical support has enabled AMISOM to implement its mandate to support the Federal Government structures, implement a National Security Plan, train Somalia Security Forces and create a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian aid".

Col. Reverien Ndayambaje, AMISOM Sector V Commander, also praised the UN effort by stating that

"I would like to express my gratitude to UNSOA for the continued support to BNDF Contingent in various areas. As AMISOM Burundian contingent, we have received a lot of support from UNSOA including food supplies, maintenance of our equipment, casualty evacuations (CASEVAC), medical evacuations (MEDEVAC) as well as training to BNDF personnel".

Similarly, Col. Yamane Gabremichael, AMISOM Sector III Commander, expressed his gratitude by stating that

"I thank UNSOA for their invaluable support. It would be difficult to execute our mandate without the support of UNSOA. Logistics is at the heart of any military operation and we are grateful for all the support provided to us".

Also, Col. Abdourahman Abdi Dhembil, AMISOM Sector IV Commander, recognised that

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[121] KDF Lt. Gen Jonathan Rono, AMISOM Force Commander; ENDF Maj. Gen. Mohammedesha Zeyinu, AMISOM Deputy Force Commander; UPDF Maj. Gen. Nakibus Lakara, AMISOM Deputy Force Commander; UPDF Brig. Sam Kavuma, AMISOM Sector I Commander; KDF Brig. Daniel Bartonjo, AMISOM Sector II Commander; ENDF Col. Yamane Gabremichael, AMISOM Sector III Commander; BNF Col. Abdourahman Abdi Dhembil, AMISOM Sector IV Commander; KDF Lt. Colonel Kipya, AMISOM Sector Kismayo Commander and BNDF Col. Reverien Ndayambaje, AMISOM Sector V Commander. See details at: UNSOA, UNSOA, 2015, pp. 11–13. Available from: https://unsoa.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unsoa-booklet.pdf.

"UNSOA is the backbone of AMISOM. Sector IV appreciates UNSOA's support to both the mission and Somali National Army (SNA)".

Finally, Maj Gen. Mohammedesha Zeyinu, AMISOM Deputy Force Commander voiced his appreciation of the efforts and support received in the following words:

"UNSOA is the backbone of AMISOM. It is an organization that supports the mission at the right time and place. Without UNSOA, it would be difficult to conduct and sustain our operations."

Beneath all the praise lays the fact that the nature of AMISOM intervention also meant that UNSOA needed to keep up with the operational tempo dictated by the reality the AU forces were facing on the ground inside Somalia. In this context, just like AMISOM, UNSOA's mandate was modified several times in line with AMISOM operations but also UN specific needs as explained subsequently. The first such change, came through UNSC resolution 1910 of 28 January 2010 which authorised the inclusion of public information support as part of the logistical support package to AMISOM in order to provide the AU with the ability to counter the spreading of *al-Shabaab* propaganda in Somalia (UNSCR1910/2010). Second, UNSC resolution 2010 of 30 September 2011 expanded the UN support package to cover additional 12,000 uniformed personnel, including a Guard Force of an "appropriate size". And, for the first time, the Security Council decided on an exceptional basis and due to the unique character of this mission, to extend logistical support to cover some limited areas of self-sustainment (catering equipment and training, communication equipment, sanitary and cleaning materials, furniture and stationery), and counter-improvised explosive device and explosive ordnance disposal activities (UNSCR2010/2011).

The third change came through UNSCR 2036 of 22 February 2012 which decided "on an exceptional basis and owing to the unique character of the mission" to expand the UN support package to cover the reimbursement of contingent owned equipment (COE) including force enablers and multipliers (up to 12 air assets), as well as support to 20 AMISOM civilian personnel. Another UNSC resolution 2037 of 7 November 2012 extended the logistical support package to cover additional 50 civilian personnel (UNSCR2037/2012). This underlines the fact that the scale of AMISOM operations necessitated a combination of efforts by both military and civilians. As the AMISOM's mandate continued to be repeatedly renewed and/or modified, a fourth change took place in 2013. It was in the first half of 2013 that something remarkable happened when two

very important UNSC resolutions were passed and brought about major transformation of AMISOM and UN posture in Somalia.

First, after the adoption of Secretary-General's report regarding the configuration of the UN presence and engagement in Somalia as a result of the 2012 UN strategic review, UNSCR 2093 was passed on 6 March 2013. Among others, in this resolution, the UNSC voiced its concern on the need to protect the civilians and pressed AMISOM to expedite the establishment of CCTARC and issued explicit instructions for UNSOA support to both AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) to be compliant with Human Rights Due Diligence Policy[122] under the overall responsibility of the SRSG, who is expected to work in close collaboration with the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia ("the AMISOM SRCC") (UNSCR2124/2013). Then in May 2013, UNSCR 2102 was adopted and authorised the establishment of United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) by 3 June 2013 for an initial period of 12 months, replacing UNPOS. Through the same resolution, UNSOA was integrated within the UNSOM framework but with two distinctive reporting lines for its head. The head of UNSOA continued to report to the Under-Secretary-General for the DFS on the delivery of the AMISOM logistical support package, and reporting to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia on logistical support to the newly created UNSOM and on policy or political questions arising from the functions of UNSOA relevant to the UNSOM mandate.

Similarly, resolution 2124 was adopted on 12 November 2013 and mandated UNSOA to support the SNA through the provision of food and water, fuel, transport, tents

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[122] Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) is a United Nations Global Policy on UN support to non-UN security forces. Among others, support is understood here to mean any training, mentoring, advisory services, capacity and institutional building including financial, strategic or tactical logistical support to operations in the field conducted by non-UN security forces. Simply put, the policy requires that support by UN entities to non-UN security forces (for example AMISOM) must be consistent with the UN's purposes and principles as set out in the Charter of the UN and with its obligations under international law to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. Such support should help recipients to attain a stage where compliance with these principles and bodies of law becomes the norm, ensure by the rule of law. Consistent with these obligations, UN support cannot be provided where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures (United Nations, 2015 p.43).

and in theatre medical evacuation when in joint operations with AMISOM. The resolution also requested the FGS to give assurance to the Security Council that its forces being supported by UNSOA will act in compliance with HRDDP and stressed the importance of compliance with the arms embargo – notification to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) of any deliveries of weapons or military equipment or the provision of assistance intended solely for the Somali national forces and charcoal ban. The next set of changes came through UNSC resolution 2182 of 24 October 2014 which among others, requested for improvement in planning and strategic management of AMISOM, and coordination between troop contingents, sectors and joint operations with SNA; noting in particular that military operations should be followed immediately by efforts to reinforce governance structures in recovered areas and the timely delivery of basic services; and encouraged the timely delivery of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) in support of FGS stabilisation efforts (UNSCR2182/2014). Meanwhile, UNSC resolution 2232 of 28 July 2015 called for a strategic assessment of UNSOA and requested the Secretary-General to present the review report to the Council, with options on how to improve the overall support to AMISOM (UNSCR2232/2015).

Figure 5.2 Photo of Somali National Army Troops with Ugandan AMISOM Forces

Photo: Obi Anyadike/IRIN (2016).

The outcome of the review called for under resolution 2232 resulted in another set of substantial changes with the adoption of UNSC resolution 2245 of 9 November 2015 which renamed UNSOA as the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and elevated the

position of its head from Director to Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) with a single and clear mandate of providing logistical support to AMISOM (22,126 uniformed personnel and 70 civilians), UNSOM and 10,900 SNA personnel in joint operations and as part of AMISOM's overall strategic concept. This included provision of food and water, fuel, transport, tents, defence stores and appropriate communication equipment to enable interoperability with AMISOM, and in-theatre medical evacuation. The resolution also required UNSOA to provide a limited support on a cost recovery basis of in-theatre medical evacuations to Somalia National Police (SNP) in joint operations with AMISOM, for casualties sustained where similar support was provided to AMISOM and SNA in compliance with HRDDP (UNSCR2245/2015). Finally, UNSC resolution 2297 of 7 July 2016 extended the AMISOM and UNSOS mandate until 31 May 2017 (UNSR2297/2016) which is in line with the period covered in this study.

All in all, it must be acknowledged that UNSOA was intended to raise AMISOM's operational standards in order to facilitate its eventual transition into a UN peacekeeping operation, but that day never came. Instead, as demonstrated above, UNSOA underwent two reviews, in September 2012 and July-September 2015, in order to make it more effective. However, UNSOA was never going to be able to meet all of AMISOM's war-fighting needs since it was designed on UN procedures, mechanisms, and frameworks that were, not only incompatible but designed for more traditional UN peacekeeping operations in relatively benign environments rather than a war-fighting mission. UNSOA faced several challenges related to logistics support that constrained AMISOM's operational effectiveness. These revolved around the expanding scope of its mandated tasks; the clash between the UN and the AU's organisational cultures; the highly insecure operating environment in Somalia; the problems posed by the size of UNSOA's theatre of operations from 2012, and some of the idiosyncrasies of its principal client, AMISOM.[123] Overall, UNSOA had a mixed record but it produced positive results for AMISOM and demonstrated a new, flexible mechanism for the UN to deliver field support (Williams, 2018, pp. 214-215).

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[123] Despite being untested as an operational, logistical and management support model, UNSOA was also mandated to provide support to the office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region (O/SESG-GL); the UN Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) on Sanctions; the United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS) and later the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to which it was integrated structurally in 2013 while maintaining its operational and managerial independence.

In contrast, the reality also reveals that there were several internal and external factors that contributed adversely, created high risks and arguably undermined the overall implementation of the AMISOM mandate including weakening and compromising UNSOA's ability to sustain the operations. Based on the empirical findings, it is argued in this study that despite its well-intended and transparent delivery of much needed provision of resources to the AU forces fighting the war against *al-Shabaab*, UNSOA's logistical support package inadvertently contributed towards the pursuit of self-interests similar to what happens in other conflict milieus. This assertion yielded significant evidence and was confirmed by several participants during the field work as detailed in the presentation, analysis and discussions in Chapter Six.

5.4. Financing the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

It would be remiss to begin a discussion on the topic of financial support to AMISOM without considering some important aspects. First, the argument put forward by Gelot et. al. (2012) underscores the fact that the context of peace operations in Africa and the experiences of 1990s where relapses into conflict occurred have, understandably so, led to more spotlight on UN peace operations and a desire to model peace operations in such a manner that they would achieve their missions. Owing to the complexities of contemporary African peace operations, the West (US and EU) has shifted from contributing its troops to capacity building support aimed at enabling African countries to manage their conflicts themselves. Secondly, Hull and Svensson (2008) have also highlighted the fact that the membership of the AU tends to be states with limited resources which translates into incapacity to sustain their troops participating in peace operations.

Third, when establishing AMISOM, the African leaders made explicit request to the UN and its Security Council to provide all the support necessary for the speedy deployment of AMISOM. They pleaded for the effective accomplishment of its mandate including the provision of financial support, bearing in mind that in deploying a mission in Somalia the AU was acting on behalf of the entire international community (African Union, 2007, para 13). Moreover, in its resolution 1809 of 16 April 2008, the UNSC welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal to establish an AU-UN panel to consider in-depth the modalities of how to support peacekeeping operations, in particular start-up funding, equipment, logistics, and consider in-depth lessons from past and current AU

peacekeeping efforts (UNSCR1809/2008). The overall effort was aimed at enhancing the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing of UN-mandated peace operations undertaken by the AU. As a result, the panel recommended the establishment of two new financial mechanisms. The first was based on UN-assessed funding and designed to support specific peacekeeping operations. This should be on a case-by-case basis to support UNSC-authorised AU-led peacekeeping operations for a period up to six months. Initially, at least, this support should be provided mainly in kind. The second, a voluntary funded multi-donor trust fund focusing on comprehensive capacity-building for conflict prevention and resolution as well as institution-building. The trust fund was designed to attract new and existing donors, while at the same time fostering African ownership (United Nations, 2008). For AMISOM specifically, Table 5.3 illustrates the various contributions made to the trust fund in support of its operations.

Table 5.3 Example of Contributions to the Trust Fund for AMISOM and the SNA[124]

The above Table is a simplified and an indicative illustration of how money to the Trust Fund for AMISOM and the SNA came from various sources in the form of donations that were managed by UNSOSA. Nevertheless, the utilisation and management of such funding was not a straightforward process as the funds usually came with caveats and several restrictions on what the same could be spent on. The lack of flexibility to disburse the funds from Trust Fund accounts was one of the major challenges faced in supporting the ever demanding and dynamic AMISOM operations. In 2009, for instance,

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[124] Data from Williams, Paul D. (2017) "UN Support to Regional Peace Operations: Lessons from UNSOA" New York: International Peace Institute, February, p.10.

Japan provided funds for outreach activities but UNSOA could not spend the money because of the dire security situation in Somalia. Similarly, the UK's initial contribution of $10 million could not be used to reimburse troop-contributing countries for lethal equipment they owned (Williams, 2017, p. 10).

Apart from the grants received into the Trust Fund, AMISOM was created with a clear understanding that operational costs for running the mission in Somalia were to be dependent on the partnership with the UN and some of the mission's key partners, notably the EU whose financial contributions covering the period of the study will be demonstrated later. This is significant because in the context of the structure of the APSA, the issue of funding represents one of the major challenges for AU-led peace operations. Echoing the same assertion, de Albuquerque (2016) has contended that the greatest impediment to the continued development of APSA is funding; relying so heavily on international donors is inherently risky, an issue of which the AU is very much aware of and has been taking active steps to remedy. For example, despite the EU having supported the endeavour for a long time, and thus having a vested interest in APSA succeeding, unexpected developments such as the refugee crisis may result in the EU having to divert funds away from Africa and APSA.

As matter of fact, in its Special Report *The African Peace and Security Architecture: need to refocus EU support*, the European Union (2018)'s Court of Auditors noted that due to the migration crisis between 2014 – 2016, the EU had decided to transfer the entire IGAD Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) allocation to a Trust Fund for purposes of coherence, among other things. Most of the allocation was directed to activities related to peace and security, resilience and migration. The report stated that using the Trust Fund provided greater coherence – for example, where the actions envisaged under the RIP were more appropriate for or contributed substantially to the emergency migration-related objectives of the Trust Fund.

Scholars including Williams and Boutellis (2014); Hull and Svensson (2008); Williams (2017); Mahmood and Ani (2017) have also supported the argument that funding is a systemic and highly politicised problem confronting the AU, one that the regional body cannot address alone. This situation, according to Williams (2018) is in large part due to the complicated set of arrangements and mechanisms that are required to fund AMISOM. Moreover, the initial financial costs fell directly on the AU's first two

TCCs, Uganda and Burundi who received considerable financial assistance from several external partners, such as the US, the UK, Italy, and the EU as well as assistance from a private firm, Bancroft Global Development.[125] The US, for instance, provided over $1.2 billion worth of bilateral security assistance to support the AMISOM forces fighting *al-Shabaab* between 2006 and mid-2015 (Williams, 2018, p.7).

On another hand, Hull and Svensson (2008) point out that while AU officials still stress the idea of 'African solutions to African problems', dependency on external financing remains a core challenge for the AU. The organisation is heavily dependent on external resources and financing to sustain its peace support operations (PSOs). They note that when outside partners have lent financial support to the AU PSOs, it has often been aimed at strengthening direct operations, thereby leaving the AU institutional capacity undeveloped. Also, some Security Council members, namely France, the UK and Russia, have opposed using UN means to finance AU missions, arguing that the UN's already scarce resources should be used for its own operations and not in support of activities by other organisations (Hull and Svensson, 2008, pp.36-37).

Similarly, Williams (2017) enumerates the multiple sources of funding for AMISOM which include AU member states, the AU Peace Fund, the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, the UN Trust Fund for Somali Transitional Security Institutions, UN assessed peacekeeping contributions, and a range of AU/AMISOM partners, including the EU which has been paying the salaries for AMISOM soldiers. However, he notes that since mid-2015 some of these arrangements have come under pressure to change owing to a variety of factors, including the longevity of the mission, circumstances in the global economy, and other international crisis on the African continent and beyond. The changes had the predictable knock-on effect of causing political tension between the AU, the

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[125] Bancroft Global Development is an American non-profit organisation based in Washington, D.C. that seeks to stabilize a region by using the classic Special Forces approach of working "by, with, and through" local security forces, which in Somalia means advising the African peacekeepers, as well as the Somali national police. Also, there is Bancroft Global Investments, a for-profit company that seeks literally capitalizes on the success by investing in the newly pacified countries and regions. Bancroft's website lists 26 countries in which it has operated, but the firm is best known for its work in Somalia, where it now does about 75 percent of its business and where Bancroft Global Development, its nonprofit wing, earned about $35 million between 2013-2014. Meanwhile, Bancroft Global Investments "has invested about $40 million in Somalia and has generated returns that adequately compensate for the risk factor," as noted by Marc Frey, executive director of Bancroft Global Development. Some observers credit Bancroft with playing a major role in AMISOM's 2011 success in forcing al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu (Naylor, 2015).

AMISOM TCCs, and the EU. At this point, however, the focus is mainly on the UNSOA support package and the financial assistance from the EU. By and large, the significance of the two main funding streams is informed by the fact that besides providing AMISOM with a unique and unmatched support, the analysis and discussions in Chapter Six of the present study demonstrate how issues of accountability emerged and more importantly, how the UNSOA logistical support package and EU financial assistance became highly problematic to the extent that both the AU and UN were exposed, as organisations that mandated AMISOM, to unprecedented reputational risks including significant financial losses which arguably undermined the essence of the AU-UN partnership.

It is against this background that since the early years, the UN begun funding the AMISOM peace operation by establishing UNSOA as part of its commitment towards peace and stability in Somalia. As a matter of fact, its long-time serving Director, Amadu Kamara reiterated the fact that UNSOA was established to provide logistical support to AMISOM; noting that at the time, the AU forces had been in Somalia for about two years in a bid to bring peace to the war-torn country (UNSOA, 2015). Such was the impetus that the implementation of the AMISOM mandate was bolstered significantly given the certainty with which the AU mission now received predictable funding for its operations. Since then, the UN has allocated funding in support of AMISOM operations through UNSOA from its assessed-budget year after year as depicted in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 Evolution of UNSOA Budget by Fiscal Years

Source: United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), 2018.

As can be seen in the above Table, peacekeeping budgets are typically allocated and divided in three main categories – military and police, civilian personnel and operational costs which are also known as group 1, 2 and 3 in the peacekeeping jargon. Even though it was established to support a regional organisation implementing an active combat peace enforcement mandate, UNSOA's budget was no exception which as discussed earlier by default represented several challenges to meet the demands of the AU troops in Somalia. It is also noteworthy and justifiably so, since the first financial year (FY) 2009/2010 until FY 2017/2018, the bulk of UNSOA's funding was earmarked for operational, military and police costs which typically covers the cost of the major resources that made up the UNSOA's logistical package towards supporting the implementation of the AMISOM mandate.

In the context of this study, it is essential to once again refer to some of the most critical food and non-food items that were acquired every year with UN funding and later issued to AMISOM for its operations. They included – rations (food and water), field defence stores, tents, fuel, transport, heavy duty generators, communication and electrical equipment, etc. (UNSCR2245/2015). The listing of the items is by no means a full representation of the overall logistical support package, but rather it is simply intended to facilitate the analysis and discussions of findings in Chapter Six, chiefly concerning the malpractices involving AMISOM military personnel who were allegedly diverting some of the resources put at their disposal and meant to be utilised for the implementation of the mandate.

It was alluded to earlier that one of AMISOM's major source of funding in the period under analysis was the EU and deserves to be put into context. Accordingly, in their publication *Supporting African Peace Operations*, Gelot et al. (2012) quoted Sivuyile Bam, AU's Head of Peace Support Operations Department as saying that the UN is already overstretched, with approximately 120,000 military, police and civilian peacekeepers deployed and a budget of almost US$ 8 billion per year. In addition, its unique form of post-conflict peacekeeping, which requires a cease fire agreement in place and the prior consent of the parties to the conflict., means that it has been unable to respond to some of the most serious conflicts in Africa, such as those in Rwanda, Darfur and Somalia. This, he argued, resulted in a new awareness that the international peace and security system requires a network of actors with a broad set of capabilities, so that regional organisations can undertake peace operations in situations where the UN is

unable to do so (Gelot et al., 2012, p. 8). Whether motivated by altruistic or other reasons, it is against this backdrop that the EU's funding of AMISOM, as shown in Table 5.5 below, should be understood in the context of the present study particularly, focusing on the first ten-years of AMISOM's existence.

Table 5.5 Average EU Commitment to AMISOM per month[126]

Beneath the figures shown in the above Table lays a whole set of issues that are worthy of explanation for a better understanding of the complexity involved in the financing of AMISOM. In this vein, it is pertinent to revisit the context and briefly discuss the broader debate on the EU financial assistance to the AU forces fighting the war on behalf of everyone in Somalia. Overall, EU financial support came through the African Peace Fund (APF) which was created by AU member states to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. The APF was designed to be made up of financial appropriations from the regular AU budget; voluntary contributions from Member States, international partners and other sources, such as the private sector, civil society and individuals; as well as through fund-raising activities (African Union, 2002). It is to be noted that when it comes to AMISOM, several authors including Lorenz and Koigi (2016), Williams (2017), de Waal (2018), Mahmood and Ani (2017) have provided insights on the issue of EU funding for the AU troops in Somalia. It has for instance been noted that, the EU began in 2007 with a budget of €700,000 (about US$824,187) per month for AU peacekeepers

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[126] Data from Mahmood and Ani (2017) Impact of EU funding dynamics on AMISOM, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), East Africa Report No. 16., p. 5.

over six months, pending the envisaged UN takeover in November 2007. However, ten years on, the EU's financial commitment to AMISOM had exponentially expanded in line with increased authorised troop numbers which resulted from the changes and ever evolving mandate as discussed earlier and rising cost of individual peacekeeper allowances. By 2016, the budget hovered around €20 million per month, a steep increase on the initial pledge (Mahmood and Ani, 2017, p. 5).

Similarly, Williams (2017) concedes that the EU pays for all the allowances for the AU troops in Somalia. Paying for AMISOM's monthly allowances became the EU's single largest development project in Africa. It began with an estimated amount of €700,000 in 2007 and by 2016 with changes in the mandate, the cost to the EU was about €20 million per month which was spent mostly on troop allowances, but it was also used for other issues including death and disability compensation for AMISOM peacekeepers killed or wounded in action and indirect support costs such as supporting some AU personnel working on peace support operations in Addis Ababa and AMISOM offices in Nairobi and Mogadishu including training. Also, in his article *Brexidiocy and Somalia*, Alex de Waal (2018) has argued that currently, the EU funds 80 percent of AMISOM costs (it stood at 90 percent in 2017) through APF and so far the EU has provided over 1.6bn euros to AMISOM since it was established and it is only one component of its overall security and development engagement in Somalia which includes three missions – the EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR), the EU military training mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia), and the EU civilian maritime security capacity-building mission, known as EUCAP Nestor (de Waal, 2018, p.1).

To summarise, the issues discussed in this sub-section lead to two important assertions. First, the discussion above espouses the argument that the complexity surrounding the AMISOM funding arrangements exposes the AU to significant institutional risks since it is overly dependent on others to maintain its troops on the ground. This became evident when the EU announced a 20 per cent cut in troop allowances, from US$1,028 to US$822 per soldier, per month starting January 2016, at a critical time when the AU mission was entrenched in a battle with *al-Shabaab* (Lorenz and Koigi, 2016, p.1). As expected, there was a widespread discontentment within AU, AMISOM and TCCs given that the mission was dependent on the EU for the entirety of the troop allowance contribution. Nonetheless, Mahmood and Ani (2017) quoted the EU Ambassador to Somalia Michele Cervone D'urso as arguing that if it had not been for the

EU, the mission would not have been formed. The troop allowance cap thus brought to the fore the key role of the EU in supporting the AU mission in Somalia.

Secondly, this study advances the argument that by supporting the AU mission in Somalia several state actors and institutions have consistently played the primary role of enabling the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and overall peace efforts in Somalia. On another hand, a contention is also made with regards to the underlining implications and the manner in which the various stakeholders leveraged on their position in Somalia, in the case of UNSOA's provision of logistical support, there is no doubt that it became a crucial enabler and catalyst for guaranteeing that AMISOM's logistical and operational demands were met promptly despite the enormous security challenges in the operating environment which remained hostile, unpredictable and often dangerous with ongoing combat operations and *al-Shabaab* laid improvised explosive ordinances (IEDs) in many parts of the country particularly in the period 2007 – 2017.

CHAPTER 6: PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
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6.0. Introduction

This chapter presents the research findings which included direct observation and narrative materials obtained through field interviews. As alluded to earlier in Chapter One, the fieldwork was carried out over an extended period of time which begun as early as October 2017 and continued throughout 2018, 2019 and in the first part of 2020 despite the major challenge caused by the global coronavirus pandemic. Following a rigorous review of literature, as well as numerous documents and relevant data sources about the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somalia conflict in general, the researcher asked the respondents who participated in the fieldwork a series of open-ended questions on which they could elaborate. In line with the aims and objectives of the study, the questionnaire used for data gathering, which allowed the analytical interpretation of responses from the empirical work, was driven by four broad themes:

○ AMISOM as AU-UN Mandated Regional Peace Enforcement Operation;
○ The Actions of the TCCs, AU, UN, IGAD and Other External Actors (US, UK, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE including the EU) that have been involved in peace and stability efforts in Somalia;
○ The Actions of AMISOM Military Personnel;
○ Practical aspects and Policy Implications for the AU-UN Partnership and Peace Operations in general.

To set the scene for the assessment and analyses emanating from the above topics, it is important to highlight that in its first decade of operations (2007–2017), while implementing the peace enforcement mandate in Somalia, AMISOM was operating as an active and full-fletched military combat operation. This meant that the AU mission was confronted with a wide range of security, institutional, operational and logistical as well as related challenges including political tensions amongst various stakeholders both within and outside the country at regional and international level. This scenario has for example, led scholars such as Dawit Y. Wondemagegnehu and Daniel G. Kebede (2017) to advance the argument that AMISOM was operating in a fluid political landscape marked by the absence of stable political agreement amongst the main parties to the conflict. In such an environment, and given the previous failed interventions in the country, the persistent instability and threat posed by the militant group *al-Shabaab*

coupled with the regional and international geopolitical dynamics, the implementation of the AMISOM mandate was inherently challenging. Also, AMISOM was designed and still operates differently from a traditional peacekeeping operation in ways that have created significant challenges for the AU-UN partnership and overall implementation of the peace operation mandate. Firstly, AMISOM has had to become a 'party to the conflict' in order to protect Somalia's Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in a high-threat security environment in which the mission was conducting active counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations. Secondly, troops from Somalia's neighbours constitute the bulk of AMISOM forces with major implications as detailed in the sub-section of this chapter. Finally, AMISOM's logistical support, provided by the UN through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), was designed for traditional peacekeeping operations and therefore has not been a perfect fit for the AU mission's operational needs (Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017, pp. 199-200). All these issues and related findings are analysed subsequently at different levels.

6.1. Analysis of Findings at Different Levels

First and foremost, it is pertinent to note that in any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be analysed and arranged in order to allow for systemic analysis to take place. This happens in the physical and social sciences, whereby the researcher may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system (Singer, 1961, p.77). This study proceeds with a systematic approach in its attempt to analyse the AMISOM intervention by, for example, scrutinising the global and regional dynamics, the mandating principals (AU and UN), the actions by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the US and the EU as powerful external actors, certain GCC countries (Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) including other state actors with great influence in Somalia such as Turkey and to a lesser extent China which in recent years has consolidated its footprint in the region. The analyses made in this sub-section are extensive to the challenges presented by *al-Shabaab* in Somalia and the threat it poses in the sub-region of Horn of Africa coupled with the weakness of the host-country to enforce law and order which has enabled certain actors to take advantage.

Accordingly, as a social science phenomenon, the AMISOM peace enforcement operation has been analysed by following the three levels of analytical framework

discussed with greater detail in Chapter Two, namely – the systemic, the nation-state and the individual decision-making level.

6.1.1. Findings at the Systemic Level: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Interests
The conflict in Somalia and the threat posed by *al-Shabaab* including other security and geostrategic related matters affecting the Horn of Africa region have continued to attract global attention. Therefore, participants in the fieldwork were asked to comment on the actions of the TCCs in general, AU, UN and other powerful external actors (US, UK, France and EU), IGAD and Turkey as well as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE including China that have been involved one way or another in peace and stability efforts in Somalia in the period under scrutiny.

Most of those surveyed were of the opinion that generally speaking, the AMISOM intervention in Somalia provided the state and non-state actors an unprecedented arena to advance their self-interests. The respondents highlighted that beside the proclaimed altruistic goal of contributing towards peace and stability, actions by the actors involved have overwhelmingly demonstrated the manner in which they pursued other interests which then shaped the overall AMISOM operating environment in Somalia in the period under scrutiny. Notably, they identified national interests, geopolitics and geostrategy as the most important variables that characterised actions by several actors in Somalia. Within this context, participants revealed an overwhelming agreement that at the systemic level, external actors — e.g. US, UK and EU as well as Turkey, certain Gulf States (Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia) and China have leveraged on their bilateral assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), AMISOM and UN in general to project their power and influence to lay claim over the geostrategic interests in the Horn of Africa region and Somalia in particular.

As a matter of fact, participants who took part in the field interviews 1, 2, 3 and 4 explained that other interests have certainly been pursued because state actors in the international arena are driven by the pursuit of underlying interests. Almost all interviewees pointed out that the US, UK, and EU including Turkey and China's interests included military and economic control or attempts to influence developments in Somalia for their self-interests. For the Gulf States mentioned, besides exerting a degree of political influence, the main interests have been the deepening of economic partnerships and promotion of a religious sphere of influence with their versions of Islam while at the

same time attempting to wade off the West and other African countries from Somalia. Supporting this argument, Ms. Hamdi Ahmed explained the situation as follows:

> The Gulf States have equally poured tons of financial assistance for political influence even building institutions and property in Somalia as well as providing scholarships for Somali nationals in countries such as Turkey and Egypt. However, they also have their own set of hidden agendas to benefit from. Somalia having the longest sea front among all the African countries has enabled most of the above-mentioned state actors to benefit from the illegal fisheries that is not taxed or even ability to pour waste products from other nations into the coastline areas. Furthermore, the weaponization of finance is showcased in Somalia. The production and exchange of "small arms and light weapons" has been used in the porous borders including Kenya and Somalia or even in Uganda to proliferate the impunity as well as the collaboration between the police, political/elite class of Kenya to support mungiki or even "unorganized crime groups" to scare the population from unrest. These arms have mostly moved around East Africa through the porous borders of Kenya-Somalia.[127]

Another respondent, Mr. Frederick Omondi, focusing on the regional dynamics to describe the prevalent state of affairs in the period between 2007 – 2017, pointed out that the overt interests of countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti were primarily based on the need to stop terrorism from destabilising their respective countries. But geopolitical and economic interests also remained major factors in the calculations these countries made in Somalia. Consequently, it is possible that the AMISOM arrangement may have re-defined these actors' geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the region in a manner that has had a significant bearing on the implementation of the mandate and relative success/failure of the AMISOM peace enforcement operation in the period under scrutiny. However, it is important to acknowledge that the geopolitical dynamics of the regional countries involved intersect with their national security interests in the whole sub-region of Horn of Africa due to the centrality of Somalia.

Nonetheless, some experts questioned the way the AMISOM mandate has been implemented amidst foreign intervention and their underlying implications in the period under investigation. Arguing on the specific question of whether AMISOM remained consistent with its original mandate as entrusted by the AU-UN, one expert interviewed made the following assertions:

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[127] Hamdi Ahmed, Face-to-Face Interview, 16 October 2019, Nairobi, Kenya. Ms. Ahmed is a Somali-Kenyan International Relations Graduate. She works with one of the EU embassies in Nairobi, Kenya. She is knowledgeable about the crisis affecting the Horn of Africa region and closely monitors the situation in Somalia.

To a large extent, I strongly believe that AMISOM has departed from its original mandate. The main actors such as the EU, which was primarily financing the operation, the US, which was largely on training and equipping the AU troops and backing political legitimacy and the UN logistical support and coordination all gradually morphed into the pursuit of self-interests. The US for instance is interested in commercial military supplies beyond AMISOM and has been working to fend off other interested parties e.g., Turkey and China. These countries too have continued to nakedly pursue similar interests while supporting AMISOM. On another hand, as the immediate neighbours, Kenya and Ethiopia have continued to ensure that the outcome of the AMISOM intervention is a situation that they can take control of. Most interestingly, the powerful actors such as the EU and the US have essentially dragged both the AU and UN to act in such a way that is consistent with their own self-interests.[128]

On another hand, an EU diplomat (the participant requested to remain anonymous) provided an eloquent argument to describe the impact of foreign intervention, AU's incapacity and overall lack of control including actions by the TCCs involved. He made his critical assessment as follows:

AMISOM was a brilliant idea, and it achieved some success in the beginning, but it later became hostage of its own success. This is partly because the AU mission failed to provide adequate training to the Somali National Army (SNA) who were supposed to accompany them in theatre especially after more territories outside Mogadishu were liberated from *al-Shabaab*. The failure resulted in a fruit salad of SNA trainers mostly by Ethiopia, US and EU with each having their own self-interest. AMISOM is an operation which has had huge human costs and if it was a UN operation there would have certainly been backlashes but because the West treats the AU soldiers as cheap mercenaries, they are considered expendable. Despite the scale of growth of AMISOM with the troop strengths of up to 22,126 uniformed personnel, the AU has no longer control over Somalia as other actors have come in. In fact, the AU has been slow in appreciating the external influence. With the increased US drone attacks in Somalia and its influence across the Horn of Africa, and growing political, religious and military involvement of some Gulf States and Turkey as well as increased Chinese military presence, the geopolitical context has shifted dramatically. The European Union on the other hand, gives money for development while the Arabs openly buy democracy in Somalia. This is no longer an indigenous containable crisis but a proxy war. AMISOM today is like a sitting duck.[129]

In his comments on the specific actions by the TCCs involved, the EU diplomat expressed his opinion that the AU mission in Somalia has done something else and it acquired a new skin causing nervousness among the countries involved considering that there are essentially five (5) different foreign policies at play. More importantly, there is

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[128] Frederick Omondi, Face-to-Face Interview, 30 March 2019, Nairobi, Kenya.
[129] Face-to-Face Interview with an Anonymous European Union Diplomat, 1 - 2 December 2017, Mogadishu, Somalia.

a reason why traditionally neighbouring countries never got involved in peace operations. In effect, he argued that AMISOM has been driven by two of the most powerful regional neighbours (Ethiopia and Kenya) who use Somalia as a buffer zone. Another respondent supporting the above assertions provided the following argument:

> It has been apparent in Somalia that AMISOM has evolved into an exercise in self-interest with states and non-state actors involved pursuing their own narrow interests, especially with respect to frontline states which even keep their national troops in Somalia at their cost. Indeed, when Kenya crossed over to Somalia in October 2011, it did so under Article 51 of the UN Charter, in self-defense and in defense of its national security. Kenyan troops were later rehatted into AMISOM in February 2012 (ref. UNSCR 2036 of 22 Feb 2012). Ethiopian troops were also in Somalia unilaterally from as early as 2006 as national troops and only became part of AMISOM in 2012. However, even after rehatting, both Kenya and Ethiopia have continued to retain unknown number of bilateral (non-AMISOM) troops inside Somalia at their own cost, to help in pursuing their own national interests in Somalia. This goes for all the other countries with troops in Somalia.[130]

Expanding the argument about the actions of the TCCs, Zainab Abdulkarim also added that Kenya serves as a geopolitical "police guard" for the US and other Western States who have interests in Somalia and the Horn of Africa in general. She emphatically described the situation in the following words:

> The US and other Western nations have refused to send any of their troops to Somalia since the failed intervention in 1993. Kenya in turn benefits both political and financially from this 'big brother status'. Historically, Kenya and Ethiopia have been two important bases for Western geostrategic and security interests.
>
> For example, the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) in business ventures and working alliance with the regional authority of Jubbaland, Somalia and the *al-Shabaab*. The Kenyan cartels use KDF troops as "terror organ" in order to legitimize its access to Somalia's natural resources as well as to provide access to Western counter-terror resources and infrastructures. On the other hand, when the situation heats-up in Kenya, the political elite use *al-Shabaab* terrorist attack stories to deviate the problems on the ground. In short, for the TCCs, Somalia has been used in the international framing of the Global War on Terror (GWOT).[131]

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[130] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Political Affairs Officer working with the United Nations and is closely involved with African Union and knowledgeable about AMISOM issues including security dynamics in the Horn of Africa, 6 April 2019, Nairobi, Kenya.

[131] Zainab Abdulkarim, Face-to-Face Interview, 18 January 2020, Mogadishu, Somalia. Ms. Abdulkarim is a Somali activist with deep knowledge of the Somalia conflict. She campaigns against corruption and advocates for good governance and democracy including promotion of women's rights in Somalia.

Abdulkarim's observation is central to the discussions of the present study. If Western nations, particularly the US and other powerful European countries, were willing to send their troops into Somalia, allowing others to share the same high risk and acceptance of the potential for loss of lives as experienced by the AU forces, there is no doubt the AMISOM intervention would have been transformed into a full-blown UN peacekeeping operation as initially intended by the mandating principals (AU and UN). Such a scenario would have, for example, prevented state actors from ostensibly pursuing their narrow interests and more importantly there would be coherent unit of command and control amongst the various participating military contingents. Therefore, it is not surprising that by maintaining the status quo with the AMISOM intervention, some actors have taken advantage of the business opportunities that have been created in a conflict milieu on the ground. In fact, a few interlocutors expressed concern during the fieldwork noting that the situation in Somalia was out of control and paved the way for some countries to do whatever they liked. For example, one respondent made the following observations while interacting with the researcher in the field interview:

> With regards to pursuing some sort of business venture, Kenya as a geopolitical space for Western countries has been used as a primary base for capital flight from Somalia. Some western and other countries have managed to drain Somalia of its resources and capital using Kenya as a relatively stable country to transfer funds worth billions of dollars abroad. Kenya is not necessarily in Somalia to implement the AMISOM mandate. Arguably, the withdrawal of the KDF from Somalia and demilitarization of security will be a concrete step to break up the cartels that are in the business of terror. In fact, as a Somali and based on my reading both written and documentary, I believe that there is a link between the US intelligence services and the Kenyan cartels in keeping alive the terror threat in Somalia. In other words, for the business in Somalia to be prosperous and influence the desired outcome for the actors involved (AU, UN, EU and TCCs including the USA, China, Turkey and certain Gulf States) there must be destabilization in Somalia.

> Moreover, the weak Somali State and its incapacity to have a grip on the situation in the country has been allowing some IGAD countries, AU and even the UN itself including certain NGOs to form a cartel of their own such that nationals from the superpower nations are able to earn exorbitant salaries and benefits from the "humanitarian aspect of Somalia". The fact of the matter is that despite the millions of dollars poured into the country since the early 1990s, Somalia has never managed to overcome the lawlessness situation or even to eliminate the Islamic militia groups let alone to promote development and sustainable food production.[132]

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[132] Muhyiddin Nor Abdi Face-to-Face Interview, 22 October 2017, Mogadishu, Somalia. Mr. Abdi is a Somali-Kenyan graduate who maintains close links with key figures inside Somalia and follows closely the political dynamics between Kenya and Somalia.

Meanwhile, stressing the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region where global commerce, energy politics, extremism, natural resources, and geopolitical interests intersect, Abukar Artman (2016) provides a contrasting argument and claims that situated across the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa stands as "the new frontier for the world's energy industry" because it is regarded within the oil and gas industry as having huge untapped potential. And Somalia, with its untapped oil, gas, uranium, other minerals resources, and protracted instability, is the microcosm of the region. Therefore, Somalia makes a sound investment by those interested in peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. However, Arman is of the opinion that by default or design, the current stabilization model only perpetuates Somalia's dependency on external actors and makes any attempt to reclaim state sovereignty mere political rhetoric.

The situation is further compounded by the fact that, standing on geopolitical thin ice, the US is desperate to maintain its presence in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. This is especially important now that China, which is also pursuing geo-economic interests (e.g. fishing, oil & gas), has outmanoeuvred the US in Djibouti, and the US is losing its maritime strategic advantage or geopolitical edge, while being leveraged against the massive debt it owes to China. In addition to long-term natural resource contracts, China has completed major infrastructure related to projects in various African countries – multibillion dollar projects of oil pipelines, railway connections, ports and airports to name just a few. China's ever-increasing investment in Africa is over US\$200 billion (Arman, 2016, p.1).

Similarly, the political, economic and religious nexus between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa cannot be underestimated. Some analysts have pointed out that the battle for access and influence in the Horn of Africa region has been intensified in the last decade. The Gulf States, Turkey and China, are all competing for footholds in what is one of the world's most strategic regions. After years of relatively little interest in the countries that make up the Horn of Africa, outside powers are investing billions of dollars in the region and the race for bases and ports in the Horn of Africa is well underway (Jihad, 2010; Cannon and Rossiter, 2017; Novel, 2018). Hodan Elmi, a businesswoman based in Hargeisa, Somaliland accurately described the situation in the field interview as follows:

> The trade cycle in Somalia ports is dominated by networks of prominent Somali businessmen in cahoots with *al-Shabaab* group while operating mainly between

Somalia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, notably Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. It is interesting to note that *al-Shabaab* not only attracts their business by imposing lower rates of taxation in Kismayo than at ports controlled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).[133]

Another respondent in the fieldwork was of the opinion that, it is important to bear in mind that Somalia has been used by external actors as a theatre for fighting proxy wars before, including between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Eritrea was accused of supporting *al-Shabaab* while Ethiopia was supporting the FGS), Kenya and Ethiopia (Ethiopia is supporting the FGS while Kenya is supporting Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam, commonly known as Madobe, the president of Jubbaland and leader of the Ras Kamboni militia group in Jubbaland elections in 2019), and the geopolitics involving the Gulf States of UAE and Qatar where the FGS was perceived to be allied to Qatar and Turkey on one hand, and the UAE reached out to Somalia's Federal Member States in Somalia on the other hand.[134]

Meanwhile, Arman (2016) has been specific in pointing out that many Somalis perceive the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) which micromanages security and political process in Somalia, as representing the interests of Ethiopia rather than Somalia. Under Ethiopia/IGAD de facto trusteeship, *al-Shabaab* expanded in number and became a more potent transnational threat, and Somalia became divided into a number of mini states with half a dozen cardboard presidents who are hostile toward one another and are helplessly exposed to exploitation by external actors. IGAD's role has also been questioned by most participants in the field interviews. In particular, one of the respondents accurately described in interview 4 the fact that to a certain extent, the regional body has been used to serve the interests of some of its most influential member states and provided his comments as follows:

> It has been evident from the very beginning that after IGASOM failed to deploy in 2005 partly, because of objections among sections of Somalis who were against the sending of neighbouring troops into Somalia and the divergent interests of frontline states (Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti) both Kenya and Ethiopia used IGAD to influence the conceptualisation and decision-making process within the AU for the establishment of AMISOM in 2007. So, it is a myth to suggest that IGAD is there to help harmonise the individual interests of these frontline states

[133] Hodan Abbas Elmi, Skype Interview, 24 October 2019.
[134] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Kenyan Political Analyst, 5 April 2019, Nairobi, Kenya.

because regrettably, the reality is that while implementing the AMISOM mandate between 2007–2017, each country has continued to pursue their own interests.[135]

Similarly, majority of those surveyed as part of interview 1, described the ever-increasing influence of the big brother Turkey which has been praised by many Somalis for its infrastructure development projects, capacity-building and bilateral security cooperation with the FGS. On another hand, those surveyed expressed mixed feelings about the EU's powerful position as the entity that has been funding and paying the salaries of the AU forces in Somalia. In other words, most participants in the field interview acknowledged that both Turkey and EU have played a vitally important role towards peace and stability in Somalia. However, participants illustrated that actions by these actors also revealed the same pattern of self-interest. For example, a senior AMISOM civilian (the participant requested to remain anonymous) stated that to my knowledge the EU has been using its position to influence everything that happens in the implementation of the AMISOM mandate in two ways:

> First, the EU has advisors strategically embedded within the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. In doing so, it has been granted a platform to advance its agenda and influence decisions on how the regional body goes about implementing its various peace support operations across Africa. Secondly, it uses its dominant position to push for political changes and to a certain extent when its interests are not aligned with those of the TCCs involved, it adopts blackmail tactics as means to achieve the desired outcome. This became evident in 2016 during the political crisis in Burundi. In Somalia, apart from supporting AMISOM and contributing to the SNA trust fund, the European block has its own agenda which is not necessarily the same as that of the AU and UN because of geopolitical and geostrategic interests but there is no doubt that it leverages on the relative security that AMISOM provides to pursue their own self-interests.[136]

The above comments are consistent with the Latin notion of *beneficium accipere libertatem est vendere*. In other words, the view that "to accept a favour is to sell one's liberty" appears to describe the AU's lack of independence since it depends heavily on external assistance to manage its internal affairs including carrying out its peace support operations in the continent. Yet, paradoxically, the research findings have revealed that without EU funding for example, it would be extremely difficult for the regional body to sustain its troops in Somalia. To illustrate this further, a report by Blair Edmund indicates

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[135] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous African Union Official, 30 March 2020, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
[136] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Senior AMISOM Civilian Official, 17 January 2020, Mogadishu, Somalia.

that Bujumbura's 5,400-strong contingent in Somalia's AMISOM force earns the state roughly $13 million a year and its soldiers a combined $52 million. However, the EU plans to cut back its funding for Burundi's lucrative peacekeeping contingent in Somalia to try to force President Pierre Nkurunziza into talks with opponents and away from the brink of ethnic conflict (Blair, 2016, p.) in 2016 illustrates the pursuit of geopolitical interests. On another hand, Faisa Mohamed, another field interviewee, criticised foreign interventions by noting that all external actors (regional and international) who entered Somalia since 2007 as part of AMISOM, bilateral or unilaterally came in with their own agendas. She painted a disturbing picture about Turkey's actions in particular:

> As a Muslim country, Turkey is welcome in Somalia and for everything that it has done from building one of the best hospitals to rebuilding and securing the Aden Abdulle International Airport (AAIA) in Mogadishu including providing military training to Somali National Army cadets. However, some of the cadets were recently taken to Istanbul allegedly to continue their training there but one of my family friends, received a call from her SNA cadet brother saying that after arriving in Turkey, they had been sent to fight in Libya along with Turkish army and he wanted to run away but didn't know how and where to go.[137]

Moreover, it was alluded to in Chapter Three that there remain significant doctrinal and policy disparities between the AU and UN particularly when it comes to the influence of the UN Security Council permanent members. This suggests that the political positions of these two entities are not necessarily aligned and to a certain extent, each sees the AMISOM foray from conceptually different angle, thereby seeking geopolitical interests of their own. If anything, some of the UNSC member states have consistently leveraged on their position to influence the design and implementation of the AMISOM mandate from the onset. This study concedes that this is not unique to Somalia context as the UNSC has been notoriously divided in the last two decades allegedly due to irreconcilable differences and conflicting interests of its 5 permanent members.

Finally, evidence on the ground point out to serious challenges related to the enforcement of the status of mission agreement (SOMA) signed between the AU and FGS requiring all parties to honour this legal instrument. This has not been the case. In fact, a number of those who participated in the field interview 1 observed that the FGS itself has repeatedly violated the SOMA on critical matters of privileges and immunities including visa exemptions in a clear pursuit of self-interests possibly for some Somali government

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[137] Faisa Zahra Mohamed, Face-to-Face Interview, 18 January 2020, Mogadishu, Somalia.

officials wanting to make money. Conversely, the specific insertion of the US and EU in the SOMA is a clear evidence of how the powerful permanent members of the UNSC leveraged on their privileged position which grants them a unique platform to act in ways that are not always synchronised with AMISOM operations. Such inclusion arguably, weakened and undermined not only the AU's position before these two powerful actors but also presented the US with the opportunity to act at will and carry out its unilateral military operations without coordinating with AMISOM military planners or informing the mandated forces of such actions.

6.1.2. Findings at the Nation-State Level: National Interests

It can be observed from the points raised by respondents in the preceding sub-section that depending on the actor, the pursuit of national or individual interests has been one of the main variables that characterises the present study. Since the AU and UN allowed the so-called frontline states—Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti including Uganda[138] to contribute troops for the peace enforcement operation in Somalia as part of AMISOM, evidence from the field research has revealed that these countries have taken the advantage to pursue their security and national interests. This happened apparently due to security concerns in their shared borders with Somalia coupled with the legacy of the Cold War conflicts. In contrast, Sierra Leone and Burundi are not within the immediate vicinity of Somalia but have taken part in the AMISOM endeavour, with the latter having participated from the very beginning of the intervention alongside Uganda allegedly to deflect from domestic issues.[139] Therefore, it comes to no surprise that evidence from the fieldwork points to the fact that on many occasions the operating orders were received directly from the state capitals of these countries by individual commanders in Somalia, a situation that experts described as unattainable for the AU-UN partnership considering that it had not only continued to weaken command and control within AMISOM but has also undermined the overall implementation of the mandate. The presence of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops operating inside Somalia but outside the AMISOM arrangement provides further evidence of self-interest.

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[138] As alluded to earlier, for the purpose of the present study, Uganda is also considered a frontline state due to its geopolitical interests and regional approximation.

[139] Zambakari, Christopher.D. and Rivera, Richard (2019) Somalia in the age of the War on Terror: An analysis of violent events and international intervention between 2007-2017, The Georgetown Public Policy Review, Washington DC. Also see Williams, Paul D. (2018) Joining AMISOM: why six African states contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 12:1, 172-192, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2018.1418159

This study advances the argument that the regional dimension is probably one of the most complex features that underpins the AMISOM intervention. For this reason, participants were provided with a list of options to comment on the actions by the TCCs in general and particularly Somalia's most powerful regional neighbours (Kenya and Ethiopia) towards the implementation of AMISOM mandate. Among others, the list of options included aspects such as – troops deployment across Somalia; command and control; and assessment of AMISOM whether it morphed into an exercise in self-interest and if so, what kind of interests were involved and reflected on the manner in which the AMISOM mandate was implemented in the period under scrutiny (2007-2017).

As explained in Chapter One, a total of forty-five respondents participated in the fieldwork which represents one hundred percent of the total population sample surveyed. The ratings displayed in Table 6.1 are based on a simplified criterion to qualify an interest according to the overall percentage collated from the responses obtained during the fieldwork. In other words, a score above 40 percent for defence is considered a vital interest and if above 20 percent but less than 40 percent it is considered a major interest while a score of less than 20 percent is considered as peripheral interest. An economic interest with the rating above 20 percent is considered a major interest. Similarly, a rating above 25 percent for world order is considered a vital interest and if above 20 percent but less than 25 percent it is a major interest. The rating above 4 percent for ideological interest is considered a vital interest and if above 2 percent but less than 4 percent it is considered a major interest while a score of less than 2 percent it is considered peripheral.

Table 6.1 Type and Importance of AMISOM TCCs' National Interests in Somalia

	Kenya	Ethiopia	Djibouti	Uganda	Burundi
Defence	44.3	42.7	23.0	38.4	18.9
Economic	23.0	22.0	21.6	35.0	56.3
World order	29.1	31.5	20.4	24.5	23.9
Ideological	3.6	3.8	35.0	2.1	0.9

Moreover, considering the critical nature of regional foreign interventions in Somalia, those surveyed were asked to confirm their awareness of Kenyan and Ethiopian parallel troops inside Somalia but outside the AMISOM framework. Once again, participants were invited to elaborate on what impact if any did their presence have on

the AU-UN partnership and implementation of the mandate in general. To better analyse and illustrate the research findings, the expressed narratives of what participants perceived to be the core national interests of the regional countries involved are categorised in Table 6.2 and rated according to the emphasis placed by participants on the intensity of each interest.

Table 6.2 Rating of AMISOM TCCs' Interests in Somalia

A= Kenya
B= Ethiopia
C= Djibouti
D= Uganda
E= Burundi

Basic Interest Involved	Survival	Intensity of Interest		
		Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defence		A B	C D	E
Economic			A B C D E	
World order		A B	C D E	
Ideological		C	A B D	E

As shown in Table 6.1, majority of participants are of the opinion that defence of the homeland and preservation of a favourable world order (regional balance of power) are clearly vital national security interests for both Kenya and Ethiopia while the same variables are considered major interests for Djibouti and Uganda. As violent and deadly *al-Shabaab'*s actions have been in the region, they do not amount to the survival level of threat capable of destroying or jeopardising the very existence of the states involved. On the other hand, majority of those surveyed rated peripheral the intensity of defence and ideological interests for Burundi considering its modest and less significant military and religious influence. However, they estimated world order to be a major interest for Burundi while playing an active role in peacekeeping operations.

On another hand, the enhancement of the nation's ideology (Muslim values) is considered a vital interest for Djibouti as the only Muslim TCC taking part in the AMISOM endeavour and a major interest for Kenya and Ethiopia with significant Muslim population and, to a certain extent Uganda which also hosts a sizeable Muslim population. It can be observed that most experts surveyed pointed out that the economic well-being of the nation is a major economic interest for all the above mentioned TCCs including the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) despite the fact that the latter was in Somalia for only eighteen months as part of AMISOM. It is not surprising that one of the

participants in the field interview noted that this scenario explains one of the main reasons these countries are in Somalia. He provided the following remarks:

> The financial incentives of their continued participation in the AMISOM peace enforcement operation does not only outweigh the huge loss of lives suffered since the beginning of the intervention in 2007 but also broadly dictates the domestic policy needs and desires of these countries in terms of benefitting from free training provided by the UN and other bilateral partners, free military equipment, and in some cases as part of a grand strategy to keep the soldiers away from causing trouble at home (Burundi is a notable case) and which serves as an indirect foreign investment into their national economies thereby increasing their gross domestic product (GDP), hence their national interests have been entrenched in Somalia. Imagine for example, how much money has gone into the coffers of the Burundian Government since they joined AMISOM in 2007? Millions of dollars going into poor African countries, he concluded.[140]

In support of the above assertions, Table 6.3 provides an illustrative indication of the financial impact on the domestic economies of the countries involved.

Table 6.3 European Union Allowances Paid to AMISOM Soldiers (US$)

Contingent[141]	Authorised Strength	Monthly Allowance	Annual Income	Cumulative Income (2007-2017)
BNDF	5,188	$1,028.00	$63,999,168.00	$639,991,680.00
DNDF	1,894	$1,028.00	$23,364,384.00	$140,186,304.00
ENDF	4,345	$1,028.00	$53,599,920.00	$214,399,680.00
KDF	3,964	$1,028.00	$48,899,904.00	$293,399,424.00
UPDF	6,070	$1,028.00	$74,879,520.00	$748,795,200.00
RSLAF	1,000	$1,028.00	$12,336,000.00	$18,504,000.00
Grand Total			**$277,078,896.00**	**$2,055,276,288.00**

Source: Data Compiled by Author

The above figures are based on the direct monthly payment of US$1,028.00 that the EU has been paying for each AMISOM soldier until January 2016 and later changed to US$822.00. Several analysts (Anyadike, 2016; Blair, 2016; Muvunyi, 2016 and Otieno, 2016) pointed out to the uneasiness caused by the EU's decision to cut the AMISOM funding to 80 percent, an issue that became contentious among the TCCs and contributed to the straining of relations with the AU headquarters. As noted by Obi

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[140] Brian Boucher, Skype Interview, 31 October 2019. Mr. Bucher was a senior AMISOM civilian official who was involved in the daily management of AMISOM logistical and operational planning including strategic coordination with UNSOA between 2013-2017. He is knowledgeable about the core issues and political dynamics of AMISOM, TCCs and African Union.
[141] Burundi National Defense Forces (BNDF), Djibouti National Defense Forces (DNDF), Ethiopia National Defense Forces (ENDF), Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF).

Anyadike (2016) troop-contributing countries reacted with anger to the EU's suggestion that they should make up the shortfall on allowances. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta argued that African troops were paying in blood for what is an international peace and security remit. Both Kenya and Uganda had threatened to withdraw their soldiers (Anyadike, 2016, p. 2). According to a participant in the field interview, the official justification given by the EU for its decision to cut the amounts was based on the fact that there were allegations that funds were being used to pay government ministers in some AMISOM TCCs. He maintained that,

> this official explanation serves as an excuse because we all know how the EU and other donors like to impose their policies and attempt to influence how the AU goes about its governance, management and running its internal affairs. We know this but since we have capacity problems, we always try to find a balance to continue working together on peace and security matters including other areas of common interests.[142]

It can be observed in Table 6.3 that with exception of Uganda and Burundi who were the first countries to intervene in 2007, and therefore obtained significant financial benefits for ten consecutive years, Kenya and Djibouti both gained proportional financial benefits for six years. They joined AMISOM in 2012 while Ethiopia benefited for four years as it joined AMISOM in 2014 and Sierra Leone for eighteen months. Nonetheless, the financial benefits obtained by TCCs through participation in peacekeeping operations is not unique to AMISOM. As a matter of fact, the amount paid by the EU per soldier is close to the amount the UN pays for each uniformed personnel in UN-led peacekeeping operations.

The provisions of UN General Assembly (GA) resolution 281 of 5 August 2014 established a single rate for reimbursement to TCCs' contingent personnel in UN field operations in the amount of US$1,332.00 per person per month as from 1 July 2014, increasing to US$1,365.00 per person per month as from 1 July 2017 (UNGA/RES/68/281). The only difference is that whereas, in traditional UN-led peacekeeping operations the countries are paid by the UN and then pay troops based on their own pay scales,[143] in the case of AMISOM, the EU pays the AU which then pays each TCC. There is, however, a finding which makes the AMISOM experience rather

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[142] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Senior African Union Official, 05 September 2020, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
[143] BBC (2018) Reality Check Team: How Much Does a UN Soldier Cost?, Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43046554.

interesting with regards to the handling of disbursements of troop allowances by individual TCCs. The narrative provided through interview 1 and later corroborated by another participant in interview 4 accurately describes the situation as follows:

> Let's be clear, Kenya and Ethiopia were already in Somalia unilaterally but after realising the huge costs their operations were having, they joined AMISOM for access to UN resources and to regularise their invasions. Djibouti on the other hand, joined AMISOM because of Sector 4 Beledweyne, Somalia's fifth largest city and the capital of the Hiraan region. For them it was a case of coming to deal with 'family issues' and help their Somali brothers. In terms of payments for troops, only the Kenyan government pays the entire allowance amount to its AMISOM soldiers; Burundi and Uganda deduct $200 from each soldier's allowance while Ethiopia and Djibouti deduct $300 from each soldier. It is not clear what these governments do with the money they deduct from their soldiers but in the case of Uganda, we know that the money deducted from each UPDF soldier goes directly to the Ugandan President while the deductions made by the Ethiopian government are allegedly for funding ongoing infrastructure projects in the country.[144]

Other observations on the pursuit of national interests have also been made. For example, in his assessment of why six African states contributed troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia, Professor Paul Williams pointed out the importance of a combination of institutional, political, and economic factors. In other words, the most common official justifications were based on assertions that events in Somalia posed a direct security risk to the TCCs while normative commitments to African solidarity were often less important than other unacknowledged or downplayed factors. Such as, a combination of institutional benefits (related to the armed forces), political advantages (concerning prestige and partnerships with key external actors), and economic support (for individual peacekeepers and the domestic security sector) was generally more important in understanding why these six states became AMISOM TCCs. He concluded that joining AMISOM did help alleviate some regional security concerns but more important were the tangible benefits the decision brought at home to both the troop-contributing governments and their militaries (Williams, 2018, p. 173).

Meanwhile, the role of Djibouti as the only Muslim nation taking part in the AMISOM intervention is explained eloquently by Youssouf (2015) who noted that unlike some neighbouring countries, Djibouti's involvement in the resolution of the Somali

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[144] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Senior AMISOM Civilian Official, 30 November 2019, Mogadishu, Somalia; and Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous AU Official, 07 September 2020, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

conflict which had been exclusively political and non-military for many years assumed a new dimension with the country's decision to contribute troops to the AU Mission in Somalia. Given the UN's reluctance to deploy peacekeeping forces to replace African soldiers and the presence of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops, distrusted by Somalis, the arrival of Djiboutian soldiers was critical to the mission's legitimacy and important symbolically. However, a respondent who took part in the field interview 6 provided his explanation in the following words:

> It is important to note that with exception of Djibouti, most AMISOM troops are from non-Muslim countries which means the presence of Djibouti National Defense Forces (DNDF) adds value to the AMISOM intervention. Also, Djibouti shares border with Somaliland which is not directly affected by the threat of *al-Shabaab* and enjoys a relatively peaceful daily life. The problem is with Ethiopia which is the powerful regional force that Djibouti is fearful of given its comparatively small size. That is why for Djiboutian it is important to have a strong Somali State capable of countering the mighty Ethiopia so that our historical, cultural and religious ties can continue to be maintained.[145]

Majority of those surveyed pointed out that actions by TCCs have not been aligned with the expectations of fostering peace and stability in Somalia as per the AU and UN mandate. When it comes to actions by Ethiopia for example, it is interesting to describe the critical remarks provided by a participant in the field interview 2 who noted that:

> With its heavy-handed policy and ambiguous long-term involvement, Ethiopia has been emerging as a major player seeking to influence much of the political and security developments while tacitly hoping that federalism can work in Somalia but not a heavily managed central government. Ethiopia is also nervous having to deal with the presence of other TCCs inside Somalia and it is very unclear to the international community what exactly the Ethiopians do. Even the AU and AMISOM leadership do not know how to deal with them.[146]

Having examined the politics of interests both at the systemic and nation-state level, it is evident that the state and non-state actors including the TCCs involved have allowed their self-interests to outweigh the coherent implementation of the AMISOM mandate. As matter of fact, the reality on the ground revealed that with troops deployed following a sector-based strategy, there was no unity of command and control within the

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[145] Mohamed Ali Robleh Face-to-Face Interview, 26 January 2020, Nairobi, Kenya. Mr. Robleh is a Colonel of the Djibouti Armed Forces. He has vast experience in UN peacekeeping operations and knowledgeable about the Somalia conflict and the AMISOM intervention including the political and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa region.
[146] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Western Diplomat, 14 June 2019, Mombasa, Kenya.

AU forces which exposed and significantly undermined the implementation of the mandate. It is evident that with troops receiving orders directly from their respective capitals, the national interests of the TCCs were put before the objectives outlined by the AU and UN in the AMISOM mandate. According to a participant in the field interview,

> sectorization was introduced in AMISOM in 2012 when for the first time the UNSC allowed AMISOM to operate outside Mogadishu. Only Kismayo was left to be a multi-national Sector, because of the high politics involving this strategic port city. Sectorization was supposed to ensure each TCC was clear on their areas of responsibility and work hard to flush out *al-Shabaab* in their respective territories. However, over time, this proved counterproductive since TCCs gradually developed "silo mentality". Lack of cross-sector coordination and operational planning has become a bane for AMISOM. Consequently, there have been calls at the UNSC to allow for cross-sector operations though this is yet to be fully implemented within AMISOM.[147]

On the other hand, in their study *Operationalising African-led Solutions in Peace and Security: Case Studies from South Sudan and Somalia*, Komey et al. (2014) described a major incident of a gun battle which exposed the absence of a unified command and control structure in AMISOM following a night-time raid by *al-Shabaab* militants in September 2013. The militants were engaged by Somali troops commanded by the regional administration (partnered closely with AU forces), repelled the attack, and sustained causalities. Unfortunately, the request made by Somali officials for medical evacuation of the wounded soldiers from Baidoa airport was denied by the Burundian troops manning one of the two checkpoints of the airport. The refusal was repeated by the Ugandan check point thereby denying the timely evacuation of wounded Somali soldiers. The row resulted in an avoidable loss of life for soldiers who were fighting *al-Shabab* in support of the implementation of peace enforcement mandate.

The dissection of command between AMISOM contingents is considered a plain indifference and recklessness by the administration and people of Baidoa, who are AMISOM supporters and are expected to support security operations to flush out *al-Shabab* from the region. More worryingly, the regional administration said the fact that Burundian troops take their orders from Bujumbura and the Ugandans from Kampala is clear evidence that raises serious questions on AMISOM's ability to control its

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[147] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous senior United Nations official working with United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). He is closely involved with AMISOM issues and coordinates with AU officials in Addis Ababa, 16 October 2019, Nairobi, Kenya.

contingents, its internal governance and accountability to the mission and the FGS (Komey al., 2014, p. 39).

In summary, this study advances the argument that besides other relevant considerations made in subsequent sections, there is no doubt that the continued presence of Kenyan and Ethiopian troops operating inside Somalia but outside the AMISOM arrangement has arguably compromised the unitary command structure, the evolving AU-UN partnership and the implementation of the peace enforcement mandate thereby highlighting the complexity of regional peacekeeping operations. In so doing, other TCCs have also followed suit and their loyalty to the AMISOM model has suffered as these other states sought to prioritise their national interests within the AMISOM framework.

6.1.3. Findings at the Level of Individual Decision-Making: Self-Enrichment Interests

In the context of this study, perhaps the best way to discuss the level of individual decision-making is to focus on the actions of AMISOM military personnel. Accordingly, in addition to the geopolitical, strategic and national interests pursued by states and non-states actors as explained in the previous sections, majority of respondents shared the view that the pursuit of self-enrichment interests by certain members of TCCs through a web of sophisticated networks with direct links to their governance structures in the countries of origins has been one of the most predominant factors that has negatively impacted the implementation of the AMISOM mandate. It has created major risks and undermined the AU-UN partnership in the period under scrutiny (2007-2017). In order to set the scene, it is useful to revisit how the Kenyan unilateral intervention into Somalia was orchestrated and justified officially as being in self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Nevertheless, a contrast assessment shows that many external observers suggest more compelling explanations that lie with Kenya's desire to be seen as a reliable partner in the US-led 'global war on terrorism', institutional interests within the KDF, and key political elites within the Kenyan government, notably Minister for Internal Security George Saitoti, the Defence Minister Yusuf Haji and several senior security chiefs who advocated for intervention to advance their own economic and political interests (Williams, 2018, p.180). More critically, this also needs to be viewed within the prism of "war economy" where countries and other actors pursue economic interests in a war-torn country like Somalia. Arguably, the circumstances of the Somalia conflict have been

conducive for commercial opportunities and self-enrichment activities to take place. The Somalia state building efforts emanated from a point of absolute state failure, which even with current improvements still is characterised by marked general state incapacity.

On another hand, a number of scholars (Branch, 2011; Throup, 2012; Erikson, 2013; Rosen, 2014 and Olsen, 2018) focusing on how the Kenyan intervention was orchestrated, have described some of the most important considerations at the level of individual decision-making that arguably laid the foundation for what was to happen next with the KDF once they formally integrated into AMISOM on February 22, 2012 following the passing of UNSCR 2036. Gorm R. Olsen, for example, noted that the most active individuals in the decision-making were either of Somali origin or closely related to Somali clan interests, leading one to ask what kind of interests and motives were pursued by these individuals (Olsen, 2018, p. 49). Jon Rosen is of the view that the Kenyan invasion was reportedly driven by a group of influential Somali-Kenyans including the Minister of Defense at the time, Yusuf Haji (Rosen, 2014, p. 9). Rosen's assessment is supported by Mikael Eriksson, who emphasised that Kenyan politicians of Somali extraction opted to actively influence the outcome of internal Somali politics. He went on to state that, they openly took sides and used their connections and leverage within the Kenyan system to support the creation of a Jubaland State in Somalia, in defiance of the wishes of the Somali government (Eriksson, 2013, p. 41). While the assessments by the above scholars focus on the actions of one TCC, the findings of the present study reveal that the same pattern is applicable to other TCCs.

To expand further the analysis and discussion about the individual decision-making dimension, overall, participants were asked to broadly comment on the actions by the military personnel involved in the implementation of the peace enforcement mandate in Somalia. Perhaps one of the most compelling question to consider thus how did some AMISOM soldiers act almost with impunity the way they did in such a highly disciplined military structure and no one in the TCCs military echelons appeared to have been able to stop or prevent such malpractices. One possible reason given by a participant in the field interview suggested that it is a very sensitive and complex matter that cannot be easily described but,

> the fact of the matter is that, more or less all TCCs pursued the same policy in Somalia while serving in AMISOM. In the case of Kenya, control of territory in Sector 6 (Kismayo) was key for amassing resources and collection of taxes. In

most cases, once control was established then politics of perpetuation through a complex web of sophisticated network within the military apparatus of the countries involved kicked in. He added that the problem is not exclusive to the TCCs because maintaining the *status quo* of statelessness and lawlessness in Somalia attracts others to seek business opportunities of all kind.[148]

His argument is consistent with the views expressed by the Journalists for Justice (JFJ) which highlighted that sources from within KDF, parliament and foreign embassies all described to JFJ a situation in which a high ranking military official is at the head of a smuggling network which includes commanders of KDF forces within AMISOM, key figures in the Ministries of Defence, Immigration and State House and that this network enjoys the protection and tacit cooperation of leaders at the highest echelons of the Executive and the National Assembly (Journalists for Justice, 2015, p. 2). Agreeing with the above assertions, another respondent in the field interview remarked that,

> it was demonstrated in a recent documentary how Kenyan troops stationed in Somalia have been benefiting from the lack of effective central government and justice system to embezzle minerals and even charcoal business by cutting down the remaining natural resources. The charcoal business alone has managed to provide Kenyan cartels with huge financial benefits. There have also been reports indicating that senior KDF commanders have established a network which enables them to import second-hand motor vehicles through the port city of Kismayo which are then driven across into Kenya where they are sold at high cost without any customs taxes being paid. Customs taxes in Kenya are very high on motor vehicles, so you can imagine how much money they have been making. This is certainly known and most likely it is extensive to the high echelons of the security institutions in the country.[149]

The empirical evidence reveals that the pursuit of illegitimate business activities involved other AMISOM military contingents. For example, in his article *AU Soldier in Somalia Sentenced for Selling Military Supplies*, Hassan (2016) described that in June 2016, Somali security officers arrested five AMISOM soldiers from Uganda, which has the largest number of troops in the 22,000-strong mission, and ten civilians for selling military supplies and fuel in the black market in Mogadishu. They were found in a garage in Mogadishu with improvised detonators, fuel, sandbags and empty ammunition boxes. For years, soldiers with AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) have made extra

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[148] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous former senior KDF official who served in Somalia with AMISOM, 10 June 2019, Mombasa, Kenya.
[149] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Somali-Kenyan Activist, 25 Janeiro 2020, Nairobi, Kenya.

money by selling military supplies to Mogadishu arms dealers or even their opponents in Islamist militant group *al-Shabaab*.

Moreover, majority of respondents shared the view that institutional and personal interests of some key figures in the TCCs of origin contributed towards the actions and decisions taken by AMISOM commanders to pursue narrow self-interests and emboldened individual decision-making at all levels. With the adoption of sectorization – TCCs were assigned a specific sector, the situation was made worse on the ground as contingents operating under AMISOM opted to report directly to their state capitals in such a manner that operational and individual decision-making among troop contingents within AMISOM were not scrutinized. Unlike in most traditional UN peacekeeping operations, this meant that without adequate central oversight, anarchy was prevalent among military contingents in an unprecedented manner. Pointing to one of the most important findings and disturbing evidence, in its report *African Union soldiers jailed over Somali fuel racket,* the BBC (2016) reported on the jailing of nine Ugandan soldiers serving as peacekeepers in Somalia for running a fuel racket. It quoted Ugandan Brig. Gen. Dick Olum as saying that "the prosecution has proved all the accusations of pursuing personal interest and endangering operational efficiency beyond reasonable doubt."

Figure 6.1 Soldiers from UPDF standing before a court martial held at the AMISOM headquarters in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu

Source: BBC (2016)

In support of the findings, several participants corroborated the allegations made by media, UN reports, and independent audits implicating the AU forces to the illegal business activities while serving under AMISOM. According to one respondent, this practice also involved soldiers from the Burundian and Ethiopian contingents. He made the following remarks:

> It was an open secret among AMISOM TCCs to take advantage of every opportunity that came across in Somalia both for national and self-interest of those who oversaw the decision-making process on troop deployments into the country and for individual soldiers to profit. Everyone knows that armies are well structured institutions with strict discipline. Therefore, troop commanders and senior officials in their countries of origin knew pretty much what was happening on the ground. The opportunity to make money in war-torn Somalia was the main motivating factor among Ethiopian and Burundian soldiers who were vying to get their names listed for deployment despite the danger that was expecting them. In many instances, soldiers had to buy their way in by agreeing to pay a certain amount to their superiors. The same thing happened with Ugandan and Kenyan soldiers especially in the beginning of the intervention.[150]

Yet again, evidence suggests that in some instances, actions by AMISOM soldiers in Somalia had the tacit approval from their countries of origin. For example, in his article published in the Foreign Policy – *Report: Kenyan Military 'in Business' With Al-Shabaab*, Ty McCormick repeated the claim that the smuggling racket of sugar and charcoal through the strategic port city of Kismayo also included key figures in Kenya's ministries of Defense and Immigration and enjoyed the protection and tacit cooperation of leaders at the highest echelons of the Executive and the National Assembly. The proceeds from such illicit business were effectively being split three ways among the KDF, the Somali regional government known as the Interim Juba Administration, and *al-Shabaab* – all of which taxed the charcoal and sugar trades at different points (McCormick, 2015, p. 1). Kismayo is in effect Kenya's second port and the hub of profitable trade – both legal and illicit – that enriches both *al-Shabaab* and Kenyan elites.[151] All in all, the arena provided to military figures, politicians and others to pursue business ventures in the detriment of the implementation of the AMISOM peace enforcement mandate in Somalia, to some extent echoes the skepticism expressed once by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan when he observed that,

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[150] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous former AMISOM Communication Consultant and anti-corruption and human rights activist, 03 April 2019, Nairobi, Kenya.
[151] International Crisis Group (2012) The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, Africa Report, N°184, 15 February 2012, p. 10.

I walked into my peacekeeping work with the conventional wisdom that war is too serious a matter to be left to the generals. I walked away with another insight that declaration of war is too serious a matter to be left to politicians and the diplomats.[152]

Annan's concern is clearly at the heart of why peacekeeping operations should be adequately mandated and managed in an accountable manner at all levels. Therefore, it is worthwhile to note that in traditional peacekeeping operations strategic decisions that underpin the politics and operational management of a mission are ordinarily consensus-based with no privileged space for individual decision-making that can adversely affect the implementation of a mandate. Again, regarding the management of mission resources it is not by chance that they are normally managed by designated UN officials to whom the Organisation entrusts the fiduciary responsibility and stewardship for resources management. These officials are then expected to be personally accountable for their effective management and ensuring internal control systems are in place to execute, monitor transactions and acquire the budgeted equipment and supplies including contracting ancillary services to operationalise and support the implementation of a particular entity's mandate. This also requires defining the inherent risk profile emanating from all support related activities while undertaking operations in the field.

Ultimately, in regard to financial management and execution of large expenditures for the provision of logistical support to a non-UN entity (e.g., AMISOM) and in a non-permissive environment in terms of security, evidence points to the fact that the UN faces numerous operational and financial risks with wide ranging implications.

6.2. Analysis of Findings: The Impact of UNSOA Support Model on Mandate Implementation

There is no doubt that, as an enabling entity, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) significantly enhanced AMISOM's capabilities and played a major role in increasing the mission's overall effectiveness. In other words, UNSOA produced positive results for AMISOM and demonstrated a new, flexible mechanism for the UN to deliver field support (Williams, 2017, p.1). It was also alluded to earlier that UNSOA support and its impact on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate has merited praise among the TCCs involved, as well as other regional and international stakeholders. Deployed in January 2009 for the first time in the history of UN peacekeeping operations, UNSOA marked the new beginning in the AU-UN strategic

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[152] Kofi Annan interview with James Harding, Global Citizen Magazine, November 2012, p. 34.

partnership under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and was applauded by many observers as an improvement over the failed experiment in Darfur, Sudan. In fact, despite the increased demands from its various clients as hinted to in Chapter Five, most of the respondents in the fieldwork shared the opinion that without the invaluable role played by UNSOA in such a highly volatile and extremely dangerous environment, the AU forces would not have been able to successfully carry out the mandate implementation tasks assigned to them by the AUPSC and UNSC.

Nevertheless, the findings in the present study suggest that the UNSOA support had significant unintended consequences with wide-ranging implications for peace and stability in Somalia, the AU-UN partnership and future regional peace operations including for the international community. This resulted mainly from the actions exhibited by AMISOM soldiers through sophisticated webs in pursuit of illegal business ventures for self-enrichment with links to some elites in their countries of origin. Hence, this study advances the argument that actions by individual AMISOM soldiers go beyond the apparent self-preservation of the regional state actors involved and their national security concerns as demonstrated subsequently. For example, in making his remarks on the actions by AMISOM soldiers and the TCCs in general, one respondent provided the following explanation:

> The dedicated multimillion non-lethal logistical package provided by the UN to AMISOM through UNSOA[153] has indeed inadvertently enabled some individual military contingent commanders and their soldiers within AMISOM either as individual or in small, sophisticated military networks to pursue individual economic interests mainly by stealing fuel and rations. This web of relationships that involves not only the military commanders on the ground, other officers and even individual soldiers is likely to also benefit their superiors within the military bras and those deciding about the deployment of troops in their respective home countries. As a result, the UN has lost large quantities of fuel and rations worth millions of dollars every year since the beginning of the AMISOM intervention. He stated further that based on credible estimates, the UN was losing an average of 12 million on fuel and 9 million on rations annually.[154]

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[153] UNSOA's annual budget grew exponentially over the years from an initial US$214 million in 2009/10 fiscal year to approximately US$580 million in 2017/18 fiscal year. For details see P. Williams (2018, p. 215-216) and United Nations Peacekeeping – Financing Peacekeeping. Available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml#gadocs. Also see James Gadin cited in Gelot et al., (2012) whose account suggests that a total of US$729 million from the UN assessed contribution was already disbursed in 2012 through UNSOA to implement the AMISOM logistical support package.
[154] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Senior United Nations Official, 22 October 2017, Mogadishu, Somalia.

Even though AMISOM is not a UN-led peace enforcement operation, the above-described situation clearly highlights the extent to which the Organisation faces a considerable level of risk owing to the complexities of its operations and increased scope of its mandates as acknowledged in the *Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control Policy* (United Nations, 2011, p. 3). Obviously, within the context of UN risk universe categorisation which includes – governance, accountability and operations, the risk exposure is extensive to peace operations the Organisation carries out in partnership with the regional body – the AU. Therefore, it is pertinent to illustrate the extent of losses which resulted directly from the illicit commercial activities perpetrated by AMISOM military personnel who diverted some of the life support commodities, namely fuel and rations issued to them by UNSOA. Starting from the first fiscal budget year 2009/10 when the UN begun providing direct logistical support to AMISOM until 2017/2018, the findings in Table 6.4 reveal that in financial terms, an estimated cumulative amount of US$108,000,000.00 worth of fuel procured by the UN in support of the implementation of the mandate were lost over a period of nine years according to estimates provided by a Senior United Nations Official working in Somalia. This represents almost one third of the total annual amount paid by the EU to all TCCs.

Table 6.4 UN's Fuel Loss (US$)

Source: Data Compiled by Author

According to details provided by a participant involved in the daily management and distribution of fuel and rations on behalf of UNSOA to AMISOM, most of the pilfering was taking place in Mogadishu Sector 1 which is a highly protected area under the general command of the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and Burundi National Defense Forces (BNDF). The official recounted that,

UNSOA was issuing approximately 1 million litres of fuel surplus to requirement every month to UN owned equipment and generators assigned to AMISOM military. The scheme was that, in the middle of the night, groups or individual soldiers from UPDF and BNDF contingent would siphon large quantities of fuel which was then taken and sold to buyers outside the protected area in Mogadishu market giving the impression that the fuel was being consumed. That way the next day the UN fuel contractor would come and replenish the fuel. Besides that, the fuel requirements submitted by AMISOM to the UN were always exaggerated and fuel was even being provided for broken down generators and other equipment. The stealing practice went on year after year since the beginning of AMISOM intervention with several senior and junior military officers enriching themselves without anyone taking notice. It took us almost 10 years to realise that something was not right with the fuel consumption until we deployed the electronic fuel management system and the push quantities in 2017.[155]

On the other hand, the findings in Table 6.5 display a similar pattern in financial terms showing the average amount of stolen rations that were meant for the sole purpose of providing AMISOM with the much-needed sustainability while fighting the insurgency against *al-Shabaab*. Overall, based on the figures obtained during the fieldwork, it is estimated that a cumulative amount of US$81,000,000.00 worth of rations procured by the UN to sustain the AU troops in Somalia were lost over a period of nine years since the beginning of the AMISOM intervention.

Table 6.5 UN's Rations Loss (US$)

Source: Data Compiled by Author

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[155] Skype Interview with an anonymous United Nations Official, 10 May 2018, Mogadishu, Somalia.

Another participant in the field interview explained that part of the problem was the fact that unlike in traditional UN peacekeeping operations whereby the logistical support is provided and managed directly by appointed UN civilian experts responsible for the delivery of service to participating TCCs, the AU troops were being supported remotely from Nairobi and Mombasa due to insecurity in Somalia especially in the first years of the AMISOM intervention during which the security situation was very dangerous. He noted that,

> given the prevailing circumstances, troop commanders were directly responsible for managing the resources provided to them by the UN. However, without UN control on the ground accountability was compromised and illegal business activities involving UN resources flourished with networks to the local market created outside the AMISOM protected areas. The troops have been accused of selling UNSOA-provided supplies like fuel and food to the local market to the extent that even the FGS has complained about this and demanded action since such actions were contributing to the distortion of the market, considering that UN items are tax-free or zero rated. Such actions by AMISOM military personnel have undermined the implementation of the mandate and the very essence of the AU-UN partnership, and it raises a critical policy question on the whole issue of regional peacekeeping operations.[156]

The above assertions and findings as described in Table 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrate the extent to which the provision of the logistical support by UNSOA inadvertently impacted on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate. Nonetheless, this study supports the argument that while it may not be fit for purpose in supporting regional peace operations, as a model and despite the wide implications for the AU-UN partnership and beyond, UNSOA is a great model for operationalising Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and remained a strategic enabler for AMISOM in its fight against *al-Shabaab*. Finally, the significance is not in the actual losses but the fact that the opportunities incentivized troop commanders in such a way that it has had a net negative effect on the pursuit of peace and stability in Somalia.

6.3. Analysis of Findings: Comparative Analysis of AMISOM Intervention

It was discussed in Chapter Three that Africa's participation in peace operations can be traced as far back as the 1960s and 1980s with the Congo and Chadian crisis, respectively. To that end, Terry M. Mays aptly provided some comparable analysis in the Chadian conflict when he wrote,

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[156] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous UN Official, 22 March 2019, Entebbe, Uganda.

"Nigeria's interests in the Chadian civil war stemmed from the general instability in the country and the resulting attraction of external actors to the region; the Chadian turmoil interfered with Nigeria's natural needs for internal security which prompted President Shangari of Nigeria to remark at the 1980 OAU summit that his country had a legitimate interest and concern about the grave situation in Chad" (Mays, 2002, p. 23).

It can be observed in this study that the same rhetoric has been used by Somalia's most powerful regional neighbours who are part of AMISOM. However, it is beyond the scope of the present study to provide a comprehensive comparison between AMISOM and all other past AU-led interventions. As an alternative, for practical reasons the AMISOM intervention has been compared to other previous peace operations undertaken in Africa, notably the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID) in line with the objectives of this research. The choice for these two interventions is informed by a few reasons. First, there are admittedly commonalities in the type of interventions characterised by the necessity to address a protracted conflict endangering regional and international peace and security. Second, the interventions fall within the mantra of *African solutions to African problems (AfSol)* in peace and security sector. Third, the interventions have been based on the regional arrangements under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and, lastly, despite its manifested idiosyncratic nature, the AMISOM intervention shares certain similarities with both interventions.

As matter of fact, among several comparable aspects, many of the participants in the field interviews expressed their opinion that similarities abound between the AMISOM intervention and previous African peace operation initiatives including the hybrid AU-UN mission in Sudan (UNAMID), especially in terms of the actors involved and their roles. This was echoed by a respondent who provided the following explanation:

> The main actors (UN, AU, EU, and the US) have been involved in both, but the UNAMID model presented a more unitary command structure compared to AMISOM where actors pursuing same objectives have tended to have distinct identities and multiple command structures, for example the presence of Ethiopia and Kenya in the mission outside other TCCs framework. The AMISOM model was the first one of its kind where the UN decided to provide logistical support to an AU mission. This was different to the hybrid mission that had been set up in Darfur, which is co-owned by both the AU and UN. Therefore, the AMISOM model provides valuable lessons on how the UN can use regional forces to advance the interest of international peace and security in Africa at a minimal cost

compared to traditional peacekeeping missions. This model has been referred to, by others, as "peacekeeping on the cheap" and supports the UN.[157]

By all accounts, in his article *Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way*, Walter Dorn explains some comparable actions that characterised the Nigerian-led peacekeeping intervention in Liberia (ECOMOG) in the same manner the AMISOM intervention can be viewed. He argued that regional organisations tend to see conflicts in their region through coloured glasses of narrow national or regional self-interests. States in the area usually have close economic, political, military, and sometimes ethnic connections with the conflicting parties. All too often, regional states are part of the problem and not part of the solution. Moreover, regional organisations tend to be dominated by the major power of the region. A good example, Dorn explained is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which is effectively controlled by Nigeria, and created ECOMOG, a bloody peacekeeping "intervention" in Liberia that did not do justice to the term peacekeeping (Dorn, 1998, pp. 1-2).

The above explanation is consistent with the Somalia experience. It is conceivable to argue that in the Horn of Africa, the regional body IGAD which is dominated by Ethiopia and Kenya has been a major driving force behind the establishment of AMISOM in the same way ECOWAS created ECOMOG albeit under different circumstances but arguably providing the intervening forces with an arena to advance their self-interests and pursuit of national agendas. The findings in this study point out to the fact that powerful regional countries in the Horn of Africa have leveraged on their position within IGAD to influence the situation in Somalia and taken advantage of the AMISOM intervention in general. Possibly, one of the distinguishing features between AMISOM and UNAMID is the fact that in Darfur, apart from the mission being hybrid, the management of UN provided resources for the AU military personnel is entrusted to UN appointed officials who have ensured due diligence, stewardship and compliance since the beginning of the intervention in Sudan.

Also, the fact that the implementation of UNAMID mandate is overseen and managed jointly by the AU and UN does not leave space for participating TCCs or individual soldiers to engage in the pursuit of self-interests. In comparative terms, it

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[157] Rashid S. Kisinziggo Face-to-Face Interview, 28 March 2019, Kampala, Uganda. Mr. Kisinziggo is a former Senior AMISOM civilian official. He was based in Mogadishu for over 6 years.

appears that where regional troops operate independently, there is a high risk that malpractices will take place. Evidence suggests that it happened before in Liberia where, according to Dorn (1998, p. 2), after widespread looting and uncontrolled black-market activity by ECOMOG forces, the locals in Liberia put new words to the ECOMOG acronym: "Every Car or Moveable Object Gone!" The same has happened in Somalia with AMISOM forces involved in widespread illicit business activities. For example, the UN Somalia-Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), in its well-researched annual report S/2014/726 of 2014 to the Security Council is quoted as having documented evidence of how top KDF officials within AMISOM were accused of being involved in an illicit business worth between $200 and $400 million per year through export of sugar and charcoal in Kismayo, Somalia, since pushing *al-Shabaab* from the southern port city in 2012.[158] According to the UN SEMG's report, even though the UN had placed an embargo on the charcoal export from Somalia in February 2012[159] in order to cut off one of the main sources of income for *al-Shabaab* (Charbonneau, 2013), in 2013 and 2014 the production pattern of charcoal continued to evolve, with decreases in some areas and increases in others, including those controlled by *al-Shabaab* and the Interim Juba Administration backed by the Ras Kamboni brigade and the KDF contingent of AMISOM (United Nations, 2014, p. 44).

Such outcome also demonstrates how in AMISOM the black-market evolved in an African-led peacekeeping context, involving not only the Kenyan forces but also other contingents such as Burundi and Uganda. Accordingly, the facts described above support the view shared by majority of participants in the fieldwork that there is a great propensity or likelihood for regional peacekeepers to engage in illicit business dealings when not operating as part of a UN peacekeeping operation. Finally, in addition to the national interests pursued by individual countries as explained above, AMISOM differs from

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[158] See McCormick (2015) Report: Kenyan Military 'in Business' With *al-Shabaab*, Foreign Policy Online. Available from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/report-kenyan-military-in-business-with-al-shabab/.

[159] In its resolution S/RES/2036 (2012), the UNSC decided that Somali authorities shall take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia and that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia, whether or not such charcoal originated in Somalia; further decided that all Member States shall report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea ("the Committee") within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken towards effective implementation of this paragraph; and requested the Monitoring Group re-established pursuant to resolution 2002 (2011) to assess the impact of the charcoal ban in its Final Report.

UNAMID in that the former has to be viewed within the prism of "war economy" whereby countries and other actors have ostensibly pursued economic interests in a war-torn country like Somalia as evidenced by the UN SEMG's report and other above-mentioned sources.

6.4. Discussion and Analysis of Findings: External Interventions in Somalia

This section discusses and analyses the findings by examining the two types of external interventions that have allegedly contributed towards shaping the broader context in which the implementation of the AMISOM mandate took place in the period under scrutiny (2007 – 2017) and significantly impacted on the overall peace efforts in Somalia – the regional and international dimension. As a way of setting the scene, in her book *Foreign Intervention in Africa after the Cold War*, Elizabeth Schmidt has argued that external powers intervened, both to provide security for the Somali people and to advance their own interests which were not always in accordance with those of the Somali people (Schmidt, 2018, p.72). In the AMISOM's case, this study argues that there is substantial evidence to support the assertion that the interests and actions of the TCCs were incompatible with the prospect of fostering long-term peace and stability in Somalia, and more importantly, contrary to the AU-UN mandate, thereby vindicating the notion that the countries involved were in pursuit of self-interests. Nonetheless, most of the participants in the fieldwork acknowledged that foreign interventions, whether regional or international, have largely been helpful to Somalia and have sustained AMISOM to-date, anywhere from contributing troops/police to providing military training and humanitarian support.

However, the results of the analysis have shown that the pursuit of war economy by military personnel on the ground coupled with the appetite by some countries to use Somalia as a theatre for advancing their own interests has arguably delayed the fight against *al-Shabaab* in Somalia. The experts surveyed are also of the opinion that with Ethiopian and Kenyan troops inside Somalia but outside the AMISOM framework, the regional dimension represents one of the most critical challenges facing the AU, the UN and the international community in general in this case. The criticality of the situation has been detailed in an article published by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in June 2019 *PSC Report: Reviewing AU peace support operations: what to do when there's no peace to keep?* The report highlights the dilemma in regional peace support operations (PSOs) involving frontline states by noting that the involvement of neighbouring states

in peace operations has always been a contentious issue in international PSOs in general and in AU-led missions in particular.

In the context of the Horn of Africa region, the issue of frontline states was reiterated by UN Security Council Resolution 1725 of December 2006 and was one of the main reasons the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s mission in Somalia (IGASOM) never materialised. Preventing the participation of neighbouring states is primarily aimed at eliminating conflicts of interest where there might be direct stakes in the conflict. In addition, this might prevent existing crises from spilling over into neighbouring states, as witnessed with the Kenya's intervention in Somalia. Despite their contribution to the achievements of AMISOM, it is evident that the presence of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops in Somalia has been counter-productive in some respects. While finding a viable alternative to neighbouring states is a challenge, it remains important in AU-led peace operations to dispassionately discuss the value addition of deploying frontline states in a theatre of operations next door (ISS, 2019, pp. 3- 4). In the case of Ethiopia, while its forces were initially invited by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia in 2006, their presence and subsequent integration into AMISOM is like inviting Israel to implement a peace enforcement mandate in Iran.

Meanwhile, expressing her scepticism about foreign interventions, a respondent in the field interview provided the following remarks:

> Foreign interventions in Somalia have systematically destroyed the chance of any self-determination or freedom for the people of Somalia. I have no idea how we can even think that there is anything positive at all – except for the regional invaders and their Western allies from Europe and America. To put it bluntly, AMISOM is a cover for the Kenyan and Ethiopian-led intervention supported by France, UK, USA etc. It is precisely about commercial interests and access to the untapped resources and the lucrative ports in Somalia. It is an occupation force.[160]

Furthermore, in assessing the regional dimension of foreign intervention, it is worthwhile reiterating the extent of complexity that has characterised the turbulent relations the countries neighbouring Somalia have endured with it since independence and arguably in the aftermath of the post-Cold War period. In the case of Kenya, Mikael Eriksson claims that the persistent conflict between Kenya and Somalia evolves around governance questions in southern Somalia. He notes that the FGS explicitly rejects

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[160] Anab Mohamed Jafari Face-to-Face Interview, 12 June 2019, Mombasa, Kenya.

Kenya's preferred "friends" in southern Somalia and Nairobi's Jubaland initiative has geopolitical consequences. Moreover, if the Mogadishu government wins widespread international support, Kenya will have to decide how to respond and devise an alternative strategy for engaging with Somalia. It is possible for the FGS to ask Kenya to withdraw its troops from AMISOM, possibly citing the original rationale behind the force – that neighbouring states are too partisan to act as peacekeepers (Eriksson, 2013, p.63).

So far, the research analyses have yielded significant evidence that with the geopolitical and national interests of the most powerful states in the Horn of Africa region (Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as Uganda), regional intervention has had a noticeable bearing on the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and has shaped the overall situation in Somalia between 2007 and 2017. As an example, ENDF had been in Somalia twice in between 2006-2011 on different but related military intervention objectives, in both instances with the blessing of its U.S. ally. It was first invited by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia in 2006 to contain the establishment of the Islamic State, then also came in 2011 to support AMISOM and Kenyan troops fighting *al-Shabaab* (Ferras, 2013). Also, Tim Murithi (2009) explains that dating back to the Ogaden crises in 1977, Ethiopia and Kenya have had long-standing geostrategic interests in managing and containing the activities in Somalia. Ethopia's intervention in Somalia in 2006 has compounded the perception that it seeks to manage Somalia's internal affairs (Murithi, 2009, p. 153). With such a historical involvement, no other external actor is as integral to events in Somalia as Ethiopia. Yet, when it occupied Mogadishu in 2006 it had miscalculated and misread the Somali politics, the willingness of other Africans to supply peacekeepers to AMISOM and the ability of its U.S. ally to deliver AU support. This was acknowledged implicitly by the Meles regime when it began a serious disengagement from the battlefield. Ethiopia had suffered significant cost on multiple fronts – financially, diplomatically and in terms of casualties (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 25).

Moreover, Arman (2016) contends that it is from this history that the failures of the Ethiopia foray are traced and even more importantly, claims that Ethiopia's geopolitical interests in Somalia has never changed from a desire for a clan and sub-clan divided Somalia. Therefore, despite being the U.S. ally in the region, Ethiopia's strategic interests in Somalia is on a collision course with that of the U.S. which wants one united Somalia. Nonetheless, according to Ogulturk (2017) by continuing to pursue its national interests in the region, Ethiopia is said to be in constant pursuit of fragile unity in the

region along the coastal belt including Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland, a goal only achievable with Ethiopia-Eritrea cooperation. Likewise, Farah (2017) has noted that a united Somalia is antithetical to Addis Ababa's desire for a clan divided Somalia. This he argues, is understandable as it is in Ethiopia's interest that Somalia stays weak and that a pan-Somalia does not arise again given the past rivalry between the two countries.

The above arguments are consistent with the views expressed by a number of participants in the fieldwork; notably the extent to which regional interventions have been clearly contrary to the idea of having Somalia's stability and security interests as the main priority. Perhaps it is for this reason that Bellamy and Williams (2004) advocate for a new thinking to UN peace operations in two main ways. First, the need to craft peace operations in a manner that strongly emphasises the interests of the victims of conflict above interests and priorities of the intervener. Second, reducing the role of the states and allowing peace operations to encroach into non-mandated tasks. Also, Professor Abraham Kinfe adeptly explained that Ethiopia's motives for engagement in Somalia is mainly one of geopolitical self-interest rather than any deep benevolence towards Somalia. As a key power player in the region, it currently finds itself with the political, military and intelligence capacity to prevent potential threats and contain regional spill-over through offensive engagements in Somalia. However, pursuing national interests itself, cannot be a working formula for a stable Somalia and the whole Horn of Africa region. Particularly, as the geopolitical landscape is reconfigured such unilateral actions risks undermining each other's interests (Kinfe, 2006).

Meanwhile, the findings also revealed an interesting and emerging dynamic in the politics of regional foreign intervention between Kenya and Ethiopia. In a rather exasperated tone, a key senior military official who participated in the field interview provided the following explanation:

> Since we joined AMISOM, one of the major problems we have been facing relates to coordination, command and control because each country tells the contingent commanders what to do in defiance of the AU directives and AMISOM Senior Leadership. The problem has become so acute in recent years and if it doesn't get resolved some TCCs are contemplating the possibility of withdrawing their troops from Somalia. Ethiopia for instance, has repeatedly expressed its frustration because it maintains other troops that are not part of AMISOM but play a crucial role in supporting the implementation of AMISOM mandate. The official stated that his country does not see any interest to continue keeping its troops in Somalia. There is a great possibility in a very near future that we will withdraw our troops and position them in the border areas to defend our national interests. Even KDF

does not maintain all troops that are supposed to be part of AMISOM inside Somalia but keep them in the border areas.[161]

In 2016, Abukar Arman further argued that Somalia is in need of a strategic partner that is willing to pressure the neighbouring tag-team that is holding it in a deadly headlock – Ethiopia and Kenya – to step aside; to weigh in and put economic pressure on key actors in order to engage in genuine, Somali-led reconciliation; and to help rebuild the national army and security apparatus that is capable of keeping *al-Shabaab* at bay (Arman, 2016, p.1). Through these claims, he was certainly expressing concern over the manner in which the AMISOM mandate was being implemented amidst foreign interventions with focus on the regional countries involved and the pursuit of their national interests.

In conclusion, the research findings presented in this Chapter yielded significant evidence that AMISOM has been transformed into an exercise in self-interest. In other words, the discussion and analysis indicated that the pursuit of self-interests at all levels, is the most important variable that had a significant impact on the AMISOM mandate implementation, AU-UN partnership, and the overall efforts towards the restoration of peace and security in Somalia. Moreover, the empirical analysis showed the extent to which actions by AMISOM military personnel and the networks they created for self-enrichment resulted in widespread illicit business and looting of huge quantities of UN fuel and rations. This particular outcome poses significant policy implications for the AU-UN partnership and regional peacekeeping operations. More generally, the fact that state and non-state actors played a dubious role while facilitating the implementation of AMISOM mandate and supporting the peace efforts in Somalia, presents considerable theoretical implications that go far beyond regional security.

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[161] Face-to-Face Interview with an anonymous Senior ENDF Official, 30 September 2019, Mogadishu, Somalia.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS: BETWEEN MANDATE IMPLEMENTATION AND PURSUIT OF SELF-INTEREST

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7.0. Introduction

This concluding chapter summarises the main practical and policy implications and deliberates on the related theoretical implications of the study findings. As can be seen in the preceding chapters, despite being presented with a unique opportunity, the actors involved in the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia have not been able to strike an appropriate balance between supporting the implementation of the AMISOM mandate and pursuing their individual agendas. Furthermore, considering that the conflict in Somalia attracted and continues to attract the attention of many external and regional players, the assessment of the variables underpinning this study has been guided by the main research question about the implementation of AMISOM mandate amidst foreign interventions and their underlying implications for the AU–UN partnership. Overall, focus is put on the regional and international interventions. In so doing, the research attempted to investigate three more specific and inter-related questions including a) the theoretical contrast between liberalism and realism as it applies to the AU-led peace enforcement operation in Somalia; b) whether AMISOM was transformed into an exercise in self-interest by states and non-state actors involved; and c) the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for the AU-UN partnership vis-à-vis the implementation of the mandate. Besides the main research question and inter-related questions, the study also considered an important proposition that "without prejudice to the antecedents and broader Somalia context, foreign interventions are the most significant phenomenon that impacted on the overall security situation in Somalia and the implementation of the AMISOM mandate."

A major goal of this PhD thesis was to contribute towards the broader debate on contemporary peacekeeping and regional peace operations involving 'frontline states' by investigating the implementation of AMISOM mandate amidst foreign interventions. Therefore, having set the scene with this general introduction, this chapter proceeds in three parts. Firstly, the chapter summarises the study's findings. Secondly, it deals with the theoretical implications of the findings by contrasting between liberalism and realism as the two theories that this research found to be relevant in explaining the dynamics surrounding the AMISOM intervention. It then provides key practical and policy implications before putting forward some important recommendations. Finally, the

chapter draws the broad conclusions and suggests some areas for future research as arguably, the findings of the study go far beyond the impact on the regional security in the Horn of Africa and the evolving AU-UN partnership which has been put to the test in Somalia through the AMISOM peace enforcement operation.

7.1. Summary of the Findings

In summarising the study, it is worthwhile to reiterate that the empirical findings have indicated that the AMISOM arrangement in Somalia provided the state and non-state actors with an unprecedented arena to advance their geopolitical and national interests both at the systemic and nation-state level. Collectively, too much emphasis has been put on the military solution against *al-Shabaab* while national grievances and local clan-based conflicts have been ignored. Meanwhile, illicit commercial interests were also being pursued at the level of individual decision-making by military personnel for self-enrichment through a combination of charcoal and sugar trade, illegal taxation and other businesses in places like Kismayo and Gedo, including stealing from the UN logistical support package. Overall, the findings revealed overwhelmingly that although it initially played a positive role in liberating the main cities previously held by *al-Shabaab* and bringing a semblance of normalcy, AMISOM became a serious liability for peace and stabilisation in Somalia with widespread security implications across the Horn of Africa and beyond. This has severely undermined the AU-UN partnership.

The findings have also demonstrated that the AMISOM intervention in Somalia has resulted in other differences compared to ECOMOG in Liberia and it also differs from the hybrid and jointly-led mission in Sudan, the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), in a number of ways, thereby presenting a totally different set of challenges. Theoretically, the findings have highlighted major fault lines in regional peace support operations and revealed how the pursuit of war economy strategy pursued by military personnel in a conflict milieu, and the pursuit of realist-oriented strategies by the TCCs involved have overshadowed the liberal democracy principles of peacekeeping operations. In other words, realism prevailed over liberalism through which AMISOM was established upon. With self-interests being put before principles, the AMISOM experience represents a mutation in peacekeeping operations which poses a high strategic risk to the mandating organisations. By and large, the study considered various factors that have underpinned the interventions in Somalia and has unequivocally confirmed that instead of remaining within the script of the mandate assigned to it by the AUPSC and

UNSC, AMISOM morphed into an exercise in self-interest which has arguably also contributed towards the weakening of command and control structure within AMISOM, in at least three different ways.

First, at its best, Member States of the UN, especially Western countries (e.g., UK, France, Italy, Australia, and U.S.) have contributed funds to sustain AMISOM operations in Somalia while remaining reluctant to contribute troops and instead relying on the country's neighbours and other regional forces to implement the peace enforcement mandate. On the other hand, for the AU, the AMISOM intervention falls within its African solutions to African problems mantra but one that is undoubtedly too complex a problem to be handled by the regional body in its current configuration. A major challenge facing the AU is that it does not appear to have a credible exit strategy. Put bluntly, a decade has elapsed since it deployed the mission in Somalia, but the AU has not fulfilled the most important deliverables with the AMISOM mandate, which is to build a properly trained and robust Somali National Army (SNA) that would be capable of paving the way for the future disengagement of AMISOM troops from the country.

Second, the frontline states –countries neighbouring Somalia that contribute troops to AMISOM under a green helmet– have been involved in the pursuit of illicit geopolitical and national interests which have often put the most powerful regional countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda at crossroad with mandate implementation. This happened even though, in the beginning frontline states were not initially allowed to take part in any peace support operation as clearly highlighted in the UN Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006), to avoid conflict of interest and pursuit of narrow national agendas. The situation has been compounded at the systemic level of analysis with the actors involved, such as US, EU, UK and France, as well as China, Turkey and certain Gulf Cooperation Countries (UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia)[162], pursuing their own interests in a manner that has shaped the broader context in Somalia. Therefore, it can be contended that this factor had the undesired effect of emboldening the AMISOM forces to engage in their own self-interests. Meanwhile, in terms of the

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[162] According to Abdi Aynte, the GCC pursuit of narrow agenda is undermining the state-building efforts and the US appears to be tacitly approving such interventions including actions by the regional neigbours such as Ethiopia and Kenya. Mr. Aynte is a former FGS Minister of Planning and International Cooperation of Somalia (2015-17) and Co-Founder of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS). He was speaking during a Webinar: *Understanding US Policy in Somalia,* hosted by the Chatham House on 15 July 2020 which was attended by the author of this study.

regional dimension of foreign intervention, it is worth reiterating that the two most powerful frontline states, Kenya and Ethiopia, intervened in Somalia initially to defend their own geopolitical and national interests and were later rehatted in theatre to be part of AMISOM. Third, through empirical analysis, the study yielded significant evidence to corroborate what other works had already established about the AMISOM intervention. That is, while enforcing the peace support mandate between 2007 and 2017, members of the AMISOM forces pursued illicit commercial interests for self-enrichment through sophisticated networks or webs with links to their countries of origin.

Finally, as an agency, the AU has been playing an important role in conflict management through active participation in peacekeeping operations in the continent thereby contributing in the development of international norms. However, the AMISOM experience has exposed the fact that the development of African-made norms may face a serious challenge if the norms the AU helps to create as an agency in peace and security are not adhere to by its own peacekeepers. After all, as eloquently noted by Professor Paul Krugman, institutions depend on people obeying the norms.[163]

7.2. Theoretical Implications: Liberalism, Realism and the AMISOM Intervention

As one of the main objectives of this PhD thesis was to provide a contrast between liberalism and realism vis-à-vis the AMISOM peace enforcement operation, it proceeded from the theoretical proposition that as an African Union (AU) mandated mission sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) "the implementation of the AMISOM mandate was to remain within the confines of liberalism which is traditionally associated with peacekeeping operations." However, the findings of this research revealed different results with other theoretical frameworks emerging as equally useful in the assessment of AMISOM, including political economy of war, foreign intervention and realism which proved to be the most useful theoretical framework capable of explaining actions by the TCCs involved and analytically matched the overall manner in which the AMISOM mandate was implemented. This dimension is particularly significant because the outcome of the research confirmed that geopolitical and national security interests of frontline states have superseded the spirit and objectives of the peace

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[163] Paul R. Krugman is a distinguished American economist and Professor of Economics at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He is also a columnist for The New York Times. He was speaking during an interview with CNN's Anderson Cooper on 23 April 2019.

operation mandate in Somalia, thereby highlighting a major theoretical implication for current regional and future peacekeeping operations.

AMISOM exists because of a set of interacting, interdependent components. On one hand, UNSC and AU mandates provide the legal justifications. On the other hand, policymakers and bureaucrats in New York, Addis Ababa and individual countries provide financial, material, logistical and moral support. And with four other African countries with troops in Somalia, the system has, in practical terms, somewhat worked for Kenya and Ethiopia. As but one example of this, AMISOM's commander, as of June 2014, had "dispatched" the bulk of Kenya's and Ethiopia's contingents to the very sectors in which their troops operating outside the AMISOM scope were present and focused before joining AMISOM: most Kenyan forces to Sector 6, Kismayo which is Somalia's third-largest city located in the south, halfway between Mogadishu and Kenyan border (AMISOM, 2014a); and most Ethiopian forces to Sector 3, Baidoa which is a major centre for food and livestock trade, located in south-central Somalia, approximately halfway between Mogadishu and the Ethiopian border (AMISOM, 2014b). The other TCCs are responsible for their own sectors, which means neither Kenya nor Ethiopia do not need to be in such locations. In this regard, working within the AMISOM security system, then, has allowed Kenya and Ethiopia at once to consolidate and broaden efforts against the threat each country has identified as emanating from Somalia (Hesse, 2014, p.586).

In contrast to the general theoretical proposition of liberalism which could for instance, advocate that countries needed to go into Somalia with only one goal of supporting the fight against *al-Shabaab* to create a liberal democratic order (peace), it is clear from Hesse's assessment that Kenya's and Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia possess a healthy degree of self-interest which resonates with the realist and neo-realist schools of thought. In fact, realists would dismiss the proposition outright as wishful thinking since nations only pursue their own self-interests. This raises the question, what does this mean theoretically? When focused on foreign interventions in general and AMISOM intervention in particular, the theory of liberalism offers major insights; some positive, others negative. First and foremost, liberalism as a guiding philosophy, doctrine and policy adopted to guide peacekeeping operations has enabled the AMISOM arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and offered the possibility of improving the security situation in Somalia facilitated by multilateral arrangements. Second, the prominence of international cooperation, institution building, and

humanitarian aid witnessed alongside the implementation of AMISOM mandate are a product of liberal expansionism led by Western nations aimed at promoting democracy in the developing countries, among which, Somalia is just one such example. This, despite the ongoing counterinsurgency and war against *al-Shabaab* with all related security constraints, conflicting geopolitical and national interests of AMISOM TCCs coupled with the protracted clan-based conflict. Third, on the downside, it appears that by now, it is a foregone and perhaps widely accepted conclusion among scholars that, liberalism as a theoretical concept has proved less useful in the understanding of AMISOM intervention. To a certain extent, this reflects the retreat of liberal democracy and liberal forms of capitalism faced with the rising powers and the more authoritarian forms of government and controlled economies.

Initially, AMISOM was deployed in early 2007 as a peacekeeping operation with a self-defence mandate under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. However, the reality on the ground has shown that upon the deployment of the first Ugandan and Burundian troops who suffered massive losses of lives, there was a realisation that the self-defence mandate could not work in such an environment. It was this factor which prompted a change of mind both in Addis Ababa and New York as echoed in the UNSC resolution 1744 (2007) which called for enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is interesting to underscore that this time, the Council specifically authorised AMISOM to *take all measures, as appropriate to implement its mandate*, something that was not spelled out in previous resolutions that paved the way for the deployment of a peace support mission, notably S/PRST/2006/31 of 13 July 2006 and S/PRST/2006/59 of 22 December 2006 which called for the rebuilding of Somali national security forces.

To a certain extent, the AMISOM intervention can be likened analytically to the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 since there is a set of features that are similar between the two interventions. To that end, in their theoretical analysis of the Iraq war, Professors Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry noted that the debate about the ideological origins of the Iraq war is an intramural dispute among realists as much as a clash between realism and liberalism. Furthermore, the academic realists blamed the 2003 invasion on the strain of liberal internationalism that emphasises the promotion and spread of liberal democracy and idealist humanitarianism. Put differently, the Iraq war was part of a more general post-Cold War liberal expansionism and an attempt to realise long-standing Wilsonian liberal agendas for the transformation both of oppressive

regimes and of the international system itself. This picture of the ideological origins of the Iraq war, and its relationship to realism and liberalism (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2017, pp.7-9) resonates with the genesis of AMISOM and the mutation it has undergone in its first decade of existence. Besides, just as the Iraq war was straightforwardly the result of the pursuit of American hegemonic primacy and its origins flawed readily from an ancient and prominent body of realist thought that argues that international order comes from concentrations of power, rather than from shifting balances of power (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2017, p. 8), the AMISOM intervention was also flawed conceptually from the onset. This premise is derived from the fact that while AMISOM was authorised under Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Chapter, hence anchored in the liberal democracy principles, the involvement of frontline states (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) has revealed an important theoretical dilemma. Whereby, with the AMISOM arrangements, the most powerful frontline states have been provided with an arena to pursue realist-oriented policies in Somalia as part of their grand strategy to defend national interests while at the same time, vying for military and hegemonic supremacy in the Horn of Africa. This outcome represents a major theoretical implication for the AU-UN partnership and peacekeeping operations in general.

Moreover, given the regional security stakes and the geopolitical context which has been shaping developments in the Horn of Africa, it appears that the AU, UN, and IGAD have been unable to persuade all those involved to have a common purpose in Somalia. Analytically, this leads to the criticism of regionalisation of peacekeeping operations involving immediate neighbours (frontline states). In fact, the research findings revealed that as the most influential state actors within the regional Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Kenya and Ethiopia leveraged on their positions to influence the decision-making process which led to the establishment of AMISOM. More so, since their integration into AMISOM the two countries have blatantly continued to maintain an unknown number of troops inside Somalia but outside the AMISOM framework. Therefore, this research contends that by allowing these frontline states into AMISOM, major conceptual considerations were put aside either for political convenience or as a *laissez-faire* policy which provided the state and non-state actors with an arena to advance their individual interests in the detriment of the common good, thereby undermining peace and stability efforts in Somalia as well as the AU-UN partnership. On the other hand, gauging the theoretical consequences of establishing

regional peacekeeping operations involving immediate neighbouring countries, as a theory, realism can aptly explain the persistent and problematic issue of command and control breakdown experienced within AMISOM. In a sense, the regional state actors involved have taken it upon themselves to pursue their national interests even though they are part of a multilateral force mobilised under the precepts of peacekeeping operations. This aspect clearly exposes the weaknesses and credibility of liberalism as sound theoretical framework underpinning an active combat peace operation involving not only frontline states but also a myriad of state actors and powerful institutions with their agendas and interests that go against the main objective of fostering peace and stability in Somalia. In other words, the presence of too many stakeholders with diversity of interests led to conflict of interests and sometimes competition.

By distinguishing among the three varieties of realism (equilibrium or balance of power realism, hegemonic realism and interdependence realism) discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, it is possible to make an argument that further explains the actions of the most powerful regional state actors involved in Somalia. For one, focusing on Ethiopia-Kenya relationship there is no such a thing as maintaining an equilibrium or balance of power between the ever mighty Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) with a longstanding military experience and Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) who are novice despite the fact that both countries have been benefiting militarily from huge American support (Branch, 2011; Blanchard, 2013; Hesse, 2014; Arman, 2016). Secondly, the research findings point to the fact that leveraging on the AMISOM arrangement, Ethiopia is asserting its hegemonic realism more and more without significant or real competition. If anything, Ethiopia is consolidating and concentrating its military power in the sub-region. Yet, the third dimension of realism provides that it is inevitable that interdependence realism will continue to keep the Ethiopia-Kenya relations in some sort of "detente" as both nations share the same security vulnerabilities in the Horn of Africa and as such they cannot afford chaos in the region that would translate into perilous anarchy allowing space for opportunistic groups.

Finally, the above described dynamics of policy and theoretical implications capture adequately the complexity of peacekeeping operations that are ordinarily mandated from the deep-rooted tenets of liberalism. However, the outcome of this research has shown that the involvement of frontline states in regional peacekeeping operations ultimately challenged the ideological foundations of AMISOM. This departure

from peacekeeping doctrine is logical when one considers that, for Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda going into Somalia was promoted domestically as a form of defending their countries from terrorist attacks exacerbated by shared porous borders in the case of Kenya and Ethiopia. Realists contend that the national interest of any state is not only to be prepared for war but also protect its borders and people from foreign attacks. Despite this plausible realist justification, the study findings have shown that over time, the pursuit of national interests gradually metamorphosed into economic interests of the countries involved. Once again, realism remains relevant in the analysis of international political economy because power and military capabilities depend on capital accumulation and economic development. This is consistent with the assertion made in Chapter Six that, economic interests were a major factor for the continued participation of the TCCs in the AMISOM peace operation.

7.3. Practical Aspects, Policy Implications and Recommendations

This research contends that a relationship of cause and effect exists between the AMISOM mandate implementation and the AU-UN partnership. Therefore, the study's findings are consequential for the AU-UN partnership in many ways as explained subsequently. More importantly, the AMISOM evidenced self-interests story must go on record for future reference for Africa and the world because it is clear that in the process of implementing the mandate focus was lost on principles and higher values that should have guided the undertaking of the AMISOM intervention in Somalia. Henceforth, in analysing the impact of the identified variables, this research provided several theoretically informed practical aspects and policy implications upon which some important recommendations have been based for the main actors, notably the African Union, IGAD, United Nations and EU including major state actors such as the US, UK and France. Overall, the study has offered insights into critical issues that decision-makers ought to keep in mind when deciding to deploy a similar peace enforcement operation in future. A major practical and policy implication of the study findings points to the fact that there has been an overwhelming acknowledgement among local, regional and international observers that if it had worked as originally envisioned by the mandating principals –the AU and UN including the international partners (donors)–, whereby the actors involved would play their role in a harmonised manner, then the AMISOM intervention and the UNSOA support model would have been considered as perfect examples of a strong and durable partnership in peace and security in Africa. However,

the findings showed that while starting on a sound footing, the relationship has been tested and taken a downward turn in part due to the challenges enumerated in this study and the manner in which the AMISOM mandate has been implemented with a wide range of implications.

First of all, in terms of strengths and opportunities for the AU-UN partnership in peace and security in Africa, AMISOM, as a regional peacekeeping entity mandated by the AU with the endorsement of the UNSC has a unique opportunity to demonstrate the "*African solutions to African problems*" path that has been widely touted both within the continent and beyond. The fact that African countries who understand the terrain and nature of the conflict in Somalia provide troops while the UN, EU and others provide the funding and logistical support, which the AU alone or African TCCs found extremely difficult to mobilise on their own, is amongst the main strengths of partnership peacekeeping. It is this level of coherence and commitment which created traction from AU member states and international partners that granted it serious momentum and made the AMISOM intervention possible. Undeniably, AMISOM has contributed to the strengthening of the AU-UN partnership. Being its largest mission, AU has been keen to work with the UN to ensure the success of the mission, given that the UN provides critical logistical support to AMISOM. This has resulted into closer coordination and cooperation between the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa and UN Secretariat in New York on the support to AMISOM, thereby strengthening the AU-UN partnership at the highest strategic level. Therefore, AMISOM has provided a great opportunity for both the AU and UN to strengthen the partnership between the two entities on the support and financing of regional peacekeeping operations within the continent.

Second, the fact that it is cheaper to mandate and operate a regional peace support operation as compared to a full-blown UN peacekeeping operation may explain why until the time of writing, AMISOM has not been transformed into a full-blown UN-led peacekeeping operation as originally envisioned. It is highly likely that going forward, the UNSC will prefer using the AMISOM model for future peace support operations. In other words, depending on the context of a peace operation, regional peace operations in partnership with regional organisations and economic communities under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter are likely to become the norm. In a sense, the UNSC has contoured to encourage regional interventions due to the comparative advantage emanating from a deep understanding of regional and neighbouring states on the cultural, political and

social sensitivities of the affected nation and hence being better placed to intervene. On the other hand, there is always the persisting argument that neighbouring states have vested interests to exploit and this has also been witnessed in Somalia. Nonetheless, in the context of Somalia, the AU has, to a greater extent, provided the necessary political legitimacy for state actors to engage in peace and stabilisation effort in the country. Yet, the tendency to read vested strategic interests by powerful actors involved has not waned in the case of AMISOM just as the criticism characterised previous similar peacekeeping operations in Africa (e.g., ECOMOG).

Notwithstanding the critique, the model also offers the opportunity for budget sharing among partners. In the specific case of AMISOM, the study highlighted that the UN provides logistical support from its regular budget while the EU pays the stipends and allowances to the AU military personnel. Other partners contribute to the AMISOM and SNA Trust Fund in areas which are not covered by the UN support while the US and UK provide training and technical support. Therefore, it will become more and more acceptable, if structured in such a way that support from actors perceived to be powerful is limited to the background while their interests are carefully balanced. On a balance, the AMISOM model gives the AU control and ownership of the mission, even though this comes with a myriad of challenges, including command and control issues exacerbated by factors such as lack of common strategy and political will by participating TCCs, including the funding mechanism. The outcome of the findings showed that the funding sources played a role in shaping the attitude of military commanders on the ground as they simply refused to put at the disposition of the Force Commander (FC) any equipment received through bilateral arrangements with US or any other donors. This in turn contributed in the continued weakening of the role of the FC to have control over much needed military enablers. This was evident in the case of UPDF, KDF and ENDF.

Third, in terms of policy implications of the research findings that highlight some of the weaknesses and threats, two important points must be made. Firstly, while the AMISOM model has received credit as a credible peace and conflict management approach and probably be recommended for future peace support operations under Chapter VIII, it should not be guided by the "doing more with less" principle for the UN while mandating such missions. This has become evident with the AMISOM intervention. Continuing to do so not only renders the model unsustainable but also creates several operational and strategic risks when it comes to the implementation of

regional peace support operation mandates. Instead, money should follow the functions and the UNSC should authorise all mandated tasks including troop costs to be funded from the UN regular budget which will enable predictability and sustainability in the mission and contribute towards the morale of troops. Moreover, future AU-led peace operations ought to strictly adhere to the principle that immediate neighbouring states cannot contribute troops. The AU must also negotiate for significant, if not full, control over support given to its peacekeeping operations. This will ensure that latent or open pursuit of interests by powerful international actors can be minimised both in reality and perception. As long-term policy objective, the AU must overcome its persistent internal resource management weakness. Secondly, one of AMISOM's weaknesses can be attributed to the discord that multiple actors create when they have distinct but mutually linked roles, yet harbouring latent but antithetical interests which only emerge as the operations unfold. This factor represents a perpetual threat to AMISOM, as the discordance among the key actors will continue to undermine efforts to stabilise Somalia, potentially also discrediting the model.

Four, the empirical findings raise a complex policy implication with regards to the presence of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops in Somalia that operate outside the AMISOM framework. This issue of non-AMISOM troops has been a major threat both for mandate implementation and human rights accountability in line with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) that was discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. This situation necessitated that the UN has continued to engage the AU on the presence of these troops, even though their exact numbers have never been known. Paradoxically, it is interesting to note that previously, the UN and the international community used to condemn the presence of these non-AMISOM troops and even called for their withdrawal. However, as AMISOM continued with the gradual drawdown of its troops from Somalia as mandated by the UNSC, a huge gap was left which could not be filled by the Somali National Army (SNA) as had earlier been envisaged. The results of the fieldwork revealed that currently, this gap has been filled by non-AMISOM Ethiopian and Kenyan troops. As a matter of fact, the AMISOM Military Operations Coordination Committee (MOCC) acknowledged this support in its meeting of 21 April 2020 where TCCs urged the Federal Government of Somalia to expedite the force generation of its troops to take over from the non-AMISOM troops. Also, the evidence gathered indicates that even the shooting down of a Kenyan civilian airplane in Berdale region of Somalia on the 4th of May 2020

was allegedly carried out by non-AMISOM ENDF and raised a lot of questions on HRDDP. This highlights the fact that there is a major HRDDP implication for the ongoing combat operations in Somalia. Therefore, the UN must be prepared to turn off the support to AMISOM in case of serious human rights violations by any of the participating TCCs whether operating within the AMISOM framework or not. Despite this overall dark picture of policy implication, there is no doubt that parallel troops in Somalia are a double-edged sword that must be viewed carefully by the AUPSC and UNSC. While these troops are a clear threat to HRDDP accountability measures and AU-UN partnership, the findings of the research showed that they have also been supporting the implementation of AMISOM mandate, notably by playing a crucial role towards the degradation of the main enemy, *al-Shabaab* and thus arguably contributing in the attainment of the broad strategic objectives in Somalia. It is, therefore, imperative for the AU and the UN to seek commitment from the countries involved to comply with the rules of war whether they are operating only with mandated troops or additional parallel troops.

Fifth, taken together, the regional foreign intervention has not gone down well in the wider Horn of Africa, despite official statements of support. There has been a persistent rift over the regional strategy on how to pacify Somalia and to contain *al-Shabaab*. Unless the rivalry between Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda is tackled and a common stabilisation strategy developed, each may seek to continue undermining the other's efforts, a prospect that would compound Somalia's political and security crisis. In the absence of improved international coordination, Somalia could in effect be carved into spheres of influence. AMISOM, dominated by Uganda, may continue to have influence in Mogadishu and Lower and Middle Shebelle; and Ethiopia in Galgaduud, Hiraan, Bakool and Gedo; while Kenya would want to consolidate its influence in Lower and Middle Juba and parts of Gedo (Crisis Group, 2012, p. 11). The discordant strategy of these powerful regional states explains why command and control structure remained a real and significant problem throughout the AMISOM mandate implementation. This outcome highlights one of the key policy implications of the research findings regarding the objection of frontline states in regional peace operations. As explained in Chapter Four, many Somali parliamentarians vehemently opposed the deployment of IGASOM in 2005, which they considered as cover for Ethiopian military intervention in support of Abdulahi Yusuf. To counter these suspicions IGAD Foreign Ministers agreed that the first phase of IGASOM's proposed intervention would exclude neighbouring states and

involve only troops from Uganda and Sudan (IGAD 2005) but the reality is that Somalia's immediate neighbours became part of AMISOM. The above factors may have alienated sections of the Somalia elite, causing fractionalisation within and thus hampering the AMISOM mandate and the AU-UN partnership.

Last but not least, foreign interventions in general have exacerbated the situation in Somalia. Even though some good efforts were made, the AMISOM arrangement created some sort of anarchy where foreign actors laid or attempted to lay the infrastructure that would allow them to influence lucrative deals in the post-peacebuilding period if Somalia ever emerges from its current stalemate. Sectorisation is one of the key contributing factors which enabled the AU troops to engage in war economy. In other words, the deployment of troops geographically by participating TCCs watered down the principle of central command which is crucial towards the attainment of a common objective. It also created a sense of callousness by troops beyond their sectors in order to discredit other participating TCCs, possibly in line with the directives from their respective state capitals. By weakening the AMISOM central command structure it became ideal for such operations to take place and arguably this could be one of the geneses for the pursuit of self-interests by troop commanders with links to some key elite figures in their countries of origin. Yet, the thesis advances the argument that it is an illusion for Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda including those state and non-state actors that have been attempting to influence developments in Somalia for self-interest to continue considering their efforts as helpful. Instead, all three need to support a political path that will lead to a long-lasting stability, peace and security in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region as a whole. Other partners must also focus more on the rebuilding of the Somali National Army (SNA) which is expected to ultimately guarantee law and order in the country.

7.4. Conclusion

The empirical findings and other evidences have confirmed a new set of lessons learned besides what has been previously put forward by other authors. First, the results of the research proved overwhelmingly that the UNSOA support model had unintended consequences as it inadvertently provided the AMISOM troop commanders and individual soldiers an arena to plunder the UN resources allocated in support of the mandate implementation for their own self-enrichment interests. On the other hand, the AMISOM model itself may have undermined and significantly impacted on mandate

implementation with direct implications for the strategic relationship between the AU and the UN. This outcome raises critical policy and theoretical implications for the AU-UN partnership and regional peacekeeping operations. Secondly, the empirical findings of the thesis have led to a major conclusion that the AMISOM arrangement in Somalia provided the state and non-state actors involved with an unprecedented arena to advance their geopolitical and national interests both at the systemic and nation-state level. Similarly, at the level of individual decision-making, illicit commercial interests have been pursued by individual military personnel and their commanders with links to powerful elite figures in their countries of origin, thereby undermining the overall peace efforts in Somalia and implementation of the AMISOM mandate.

More generally, this study has shown that too much emphasis has been placed on the military while little or no major effort on other key and important aspects such as dialogue, national and political reconciliation which could help in addressing the root causes of the conflict in a clan-divided Somalia. This thesis advances the argument that if the specific characteristics of the Somalia conflict are not addressed, an opportunity remains for *al-Shabaab* and other radical groups to exploit the situation and the efforts of the international community will continue to be overshadowed. To illustrate, the Somalia intervention can once again be compared to the Iraq invasion which was promoted by the U.S. Bush Administration out of the necessity to 'rid the world of evil-doers' and bring the 'blessings of liberty' to oppressed people everywhere. In the eyes of restraint realists the justification constituted a textbook case for American liberal-democratic imperialism, overconfidence in military power and cultural ignorance which is why they stood firm and vocally condemned it as an ill-conceived war and they predicted that the forceful imposition of democracy in the alien culture of Iraq was surely doomed to fail (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2017, pp. 12-13). To a certain extent, the assertion supports the research findings which indicates that many Somalis regarded the imposition of the Federal Transitional Government (FTG) in 2006 as a product of western imperialism rather than a consensus-based and Somali-led initiative. This was also reiterated by Susan Stigant who pertinently pointed out that one of the reasons for the lack of political agreement among Somalis is that the FTG which later evolved into the FGS, was not an outcome of

a Somali-based consensus. It was created in exile and brought into Somalia thereby raising a whole lot of legitimacy and acceptability issues.[164]

Other observations supported in this thesis point to the fact that since the fall of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the subsequent foreign interventions, no serious attempt has been made to rebuild a competent, adequately equipped, and paid national army capable of neutralising *al-Shabaab* and restore law and order in Somalia despite huge financial support from donors. Clan-based, dysfunctional government that talks about genuine reconciliation, but in practical terms does nothing, and an international community that outsourced its mandate to Ethiopia and Kenya who have been engaged in the exploitation of their fiduciary responsibility for zero-sum gain are the main contributing factors (Arman, 2016, p.1). On the other hand, the analysis of the study have acknowledged the multifaceted nature of AMISOM and confirmed that there is a disconnect in the AU-UN partnership since neither one of these two entities has been able to exercise full control of the mission in Somalia. This scenario created unnecessary and ongoing disagreements between AMISOM and UN leadership on the operational and logistical support provided by the UN and bilateral partners. As a result, unless the institutional structures are revised within the scope of this strategic partnership, peace and security in Africa may remain an elusive goal since AMISOM, as a new and widely endorsed form of peacekeeping mission has not proven to be successful so far. Another important challenge that has been confronted by AMISOM is the fragmented interplay mainly due to the multiplicity of actors and their various interests as supported by the findings of this research.

To a large extent, by assessing the AMISOM intervention in Somalia, the study uncovered that the AU-UN partnership and implementation of the mandate have suffered significantly because of the various directions taken by state and non-state actors involved. This has not helped in having a common goal to stabilize the country. For example, on one hand, Kenya and Ethiopia claim to be supporting AMISOM and UN to restore peace and security in Somalia but on the other hand, they have been engaging in destabilisation campaigns by making corrupt deals with certain Somali leaders not only to create buffer-security zones (Kismayo, lower Juba and the region of Gedo) and help

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[164] Susan Stigant is the Director of Africa Programs, United States Institute of Peace (USIP). She was speaking during the proceedings of a Webinar: *Understanding US Policy in Somalia,* hosted by the Chatham House on 15 July 2020 which the author of this study had the privilege to attend.

them achieve their self-interests but also to shape the operating environment for business opportunities. Actions by Kenya and Ethiopia show case of a more nationalist and realist strategy on the ground. Yet, on paper through the AMISOM arrangement and the UN legitimacy they claim to be supporting the building of state institutions with integrity, getting rid of the threat posed by *al-Shabaab* and restoring peace and stability in Somalia.

AMISOM will fail to restore peace and stability in Somalia if state and non-state actors including frontline states continue to advance their grand strategy of pursuing self-interests. The pursuit of geopolitical and national interests as well as the illicit commercial interests pursued by military personnel and those who have been conniving with them remain as the most important factors that characterised the implementation of the mandate between 2007–2017. Yet, the choice between mandate implementation that seeks to promote the common interest and pursuit of self-interests is clear. This leads to the argument that for peacekeeping operations to be successful, they must maintain their original mandates of advancing peace and security without individual nationalistic or geopolitical interests. In so doing, participating frontline states must embrace a liberal regional approach in order to promote securing peace in Somalia as an integral member of the region whose stability remains interwoven with their own.

Finally, this thesis has analysed and discussed a wide range of relevant issues that are expected to contribute towards the broader debate about peacekeeping and the AU-UN partnership using AMISOM as a showcase for strategic cooperation and the implementation of its mandate. Nevertheless, perhaps among some of the most important practical and policy implications that have been made obvious in the study is the fact that there is a need for a better conceptualisation by understanding the problems in-depth and thereby seeking a wholesome approach for future AU-led and AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping operations. Going forward, this is a great opportunity for the progressive forces within the African Union as an agency, and United Nations, to call for a full re-examination of the AMISOM intervention in Somalia. In other words, the opportunity for a better AU-UN partnership lies in the recognition and galvanisation of trust in both institutions as well as making sure that they retain operational control of the peacekeeping missions they mandate. For this to happen, the partnership should advance from being that of bureaucratic entities that make decisions that favour the interests of certain countries and institutions, without adequately considering the wider impact of those

affected, into organs that are result based. After all, the reason the AU and UN were created was to support the people of Africa and the world, respectively.

7.5. Suggestions for Further Research

Based on the variables identified in this research, it would be interesting for future studies to scrutinize the extent to which the tenets of liberal democracy as the theoretical basis upon which AMISOM was mandated have been challenged by the participating TCCs in an unprecedented manner. This study has shown how actions by two frontline states (Kenya and Ethiopia) have not only undermined the AU-UN partnership and eroded the implementation of the AMISOM mandate but also exacerbated the situation and fuelled mistrust among Somalis, thereby hindering the effectiveness of the peace support operation. The dangers of regional and contemporary peacekeeping operations involving immediate neighbours ought to be critically studied bearing in mind the new trends in peace and security. This is particularly important because future research may provide policymakers with a better understanding of conflict dynamics and to identify the inherent vulnerabilities, threats and comparative advantages in carrying out conflict resolution through regional peacekeeping operations.

The wider consequences of the issues considered in this study could be useful for further research by African scholars and others in at least two different ways. Firstly, the empirical and theoretical implications of this research may lead likeminded African researchers and others to critically and introspectively revisit the notion of *African solutions to African problems* in peace and security. Possible areas of interest for future research could be, for example, the African Union's relations with participating TCCs and its capacity for retaining not only strategic but also full operational control of any peace support operation authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council. Besides, there is a need to further analyse the extent to which the AU and UN are totally different organisations with different mandates and cultures. In fact, one organisation may overshadow the other and this has been evident in the case of Sudan where the UN has been overshadowing the AU. On the other hand, future research may draw insightful parallels between the posture exhibited by AMISOM contingents in Somalia and the credibility of AU-led regional peacekeeping operations. Future research could further examine the domestic military operations of some of the participating TCCs whose armies have constantly come under scrutiny with regards to excessive use of force, corruption

and human rights violations. In other words, part of the reason behind the individualised interests pursued in the countries where a peacekeeping mandate is implemented may lay in the fact that there is a great potential for the undisciplined military mentality at home to be exported.

Secondly, previous UN-led peacekeeping operations made up of troops from outside Africa, failed in Somalia. AMISOM with troops drawn from within the African continent with financial and logistical support provided by the UN, EU and other partners has had some success towards the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. More research needs to be done to establish if the AMISOM experience represents an emerging paradigm that will characterise the future of regional peacekeeping operations. To that end, future research may unravel more evidence that could be useful for policymakers within the AU, UN and EU to redefine their collective engagement and commitment for a coherent support of regional peace operations. Lastly, the AU-UN partnership must be studied continuously from an agency's perspective. This is pertinent because initially the idea was to financially support the African Union so that it could manage its own conflicts but the AMISOM intervention has shown that there are limits. As a matter of fact, given the financial constraints experienced in the past decade, this could lead to an interesting case study of an unfolding scenario whereby the UN may no longer be able to finance regional peacekeeping operations.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix I: Semi-Structured Interview Guiding Questions

1. **AMISOM as AU-UN Mandated Regional Peace Enforcement Operation**

   a. Looking at the manner the AMISOM mandate has been implemented between 2007–2017, what are the main strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats for the AU-UN Partnership in Peace and Security in Africa in general and Somalia in particular?

   b. Thinking about the mantra of African Solutions to African Problems (AfSol), how would you compare the AMISOM Model in Somalia to previous AU or jointly AU-UN led Peace Operations in resolving conflicts in Africa, especially compared with the hybrid mission in Darfur? Please state the major differences, if any?

   c. How would you rate the actions by Somalia's most powerful regional neighbours (Kenya and Ethiopia) in support of mandate implementation?

   d. How does the manner in which the AMISOM mandate has been implemented amidst foreign interventions involving frontline states supports the notion that regional peace operation is the way to go?

2. **The Actions of the TCCs, AU, UN, IGAD and Other External Actors (US, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE including the EU) involved in peace and stability efforts in Somalia.**

   a. By virtue of your knowledge and experience in Somalia, how do you qualify each actor's actions as you have seen them displayed during the first 10 years of AMISOM's peace operation (2007–2017)?

   b. It is a well-known fact that both Kenya and Ethiopia have parallel troops in Somalia but outside the AMISOM Framework. In your opinion, what impact did their presence have on the AU-UN partnership and implementation of the mandate in general?

   c. Looking back at the way the mandate was implemented between 2007–2017 and the troops deployment across Somalia, do you agree that AMISOM morphed into an exercise in self-interest? If so, how and what specific interests were pursued by the TCCs involved?

3. **The Actions of AMISOM Military Personnel**

   a. Are you aware of media, NGO and UN reports implicating the AU forces in illegitimate business including court convictions of high-ranking AMISOM officials who were involved in multi-million illegal business dealings by diverting the resources provided to AMISOM as part of UNSOA logistical support package in Somalia between 2007 – 2017?

   b. If so, do you think there was a link or web of interests between the self-enrichment activities by troop commanders, individual soldiers and economic nationalism agenda by those in charge of decisions on troop deployments in the countries of origin?

   c. How do you rate the UNSOA logistical support provided between 2009 – 2017 in support of the implementation of the AMISOM mandate?

   d. By virtue of your position and experience within AMISOM and UN could you make an estimate in dollar terms of the direct financial losses suffered by the UN as a result of above illegal business dealings by AMISOM military personnel?

4. **Practical Aspects and Policy Implications for the AU-UN Partnership and Peace Operations in general**

   a. Looking back at the issues discussed in this study, what are the main implications for the AU-UN partnership and towards future AU-led, hybrid peace operations, and peacekeeping operations in general?

   b. How do you generally rate the impact of foreign interventions in addressing the Somalia conflict? E.g. from 2001-2017.

   c. Describe some of the status of mission agreement (SOMA) between the African Union and Federal Government of Somalia or any other significant challenges that became apparent during AMISOM mandate implementation between 2007 – 2017.

   d. What impact did the way the troops were deployed or distributed across Somalia by country contingents and sector (sectorization) have on the overall mandate implementation including command and control within AMISOM?

Appendix II: Fieldwork Schedule, Interview Dates and Places

Country	Place	Dates	Number and Interview Classification
Somalia	Mogadishu	22 October 2017 1 – 2 December 2017 10 – 12 May 2018 30 September 2019 24 – 31 October 2019 29 – 30 November 2019 17 – 18 January 2020	(3) Interview#1/4 (4) Interview#1/3/5 (2) Interview#1/6 (2) Interview#1/4 (3) Interview#1/3/5 (3) Interview#1/2 (3) Interviews #1/2/6
Kenya	Nairobi Mombasa	30 March – 6 April 2019 12 – 16 October 2019 23 – 26 January 2020 10 – 14 June 2019	(4) Interview#1/2 (2) Interview#2/5 (3) Interview#2/6 (2) Interview#2
Uganda	Entebbe Kampala	8 – 16 June 2018 21 – 24 March 2019 28 – 29 March 2019	(3) Interview#3 (3) Interview#2/3 (2) Interview#3
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	23 March – 22 April 2020 03 – 13 September 2020	(3) Interview# 3/4 (3) Interview # 4/5

Breakdown of Field Interview Participants by Country of Origin

Ethiopia: 2+2+1+1 = 6 Interviewees

Uganda: 1+2+2+3+1+1 = 10 Interviewees

Kenya: 1+1+2+1+3+1+1=10 Interviewees

Somalia: 2+2+1+1+2+1+1+1 = 11 Interviewees

Burundi: 2+1+1+1= 5 Interviewees

Djibouti: 1+1+1= 3 Interviewees