Chapter 7

The Right and Far-Right in the Portuguese Democracy (1974–2022)

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Abstract:

This chapter outlines the development of the Portuguese right and far-right during the democratic regime, from 1974 to 2021, in terms of political movements and parties, ideology and electoral outcomes. The first section contextualizes the Portuguese mainstream right-of-centre parties in the context of the democratic transition and later in their evolution until 1995. The following two sections deal with the Portuguese far-right in the context of the democratic transition from 1972 to 1982, and in the period of consolidated democracy, from the 1980s until the present day, with particular attention paid to the recent populist radical right party Chega, which has achieved parliamentary representation for this political segment in Portugal for the first time. The final section returns to the Portuguese mainstream right-of-centre political space to analyse the period from the mid-1990s until the present day, when the left has become dominant and the right has mostly acted as an opposition force, with some limited exceptions.
Keywords: centre-right; far-right; radical right; nationalism; populism

7.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the development of the Portuguese right and far-right since the 1974 revolution up to 2021, in terms of political movements and parties, ideology, and electoral outcomes.In this chapter, we define the Portuguese centre-right broadly as the political space occupied by the two main parties to the right of Partido Socialista—(PS) [Socialist Party] that have consistently achieved parliamentary representation and have formed or have been part of governments since the 1974 revolution: Partido Social Democrata—(PSD) [Social Democratic Party] and Centro Democrático e Social (CDS) [Social and Democratic Centre]. Both the PSD and the CDS are members of the European People's Party Group (EPP), which validates this assumption from a comparative European political perspective. Also included in the (broadly-defined) right is the more recent party Iniciativa Liberal—(IL) [Liberal Initiative]. Again, its membership of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE) justifies this inclusion. The space to the right of the PSD, CDS, and IL is broadly defined as radical right or far-right, and will be studied in separate sections for reasons that will be explained forthwith. After 1974, the radical and far-right had failed to achieve parliamentary representation until the

2019 legislative elections, when the new radical right party Chega—(CH) [Enough] elected its first member of parliament (MP), later affiliating itself with the European Identity and Democracy Group (ID).

Overall, the chapter focuses primarily on 'ideas' and 'ideology'. The main objective is to map the intellectual history of the right in Portugal since the transition to democracy. The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, we examine the Portuguese mainstream right-of-centre parties in the context of the democratic transition until the mid-1980s, and then in the period of 1985–1995 (shaped by the two absolute majorities achieved by Cavaco Silva both as leader of the PSD and Prime Minister). The following two sections deal with the Portuguese far-right (a very distinct reality from the Portuguese mainstream right-of-centre parties and therefore meriting autonomous treatment) in the context of the democratic transition from 1972 to 1982, and in the period of consolidated democracy, from the 1980s until the present day. With respect to the period of consolidated democracy, particular attention will be paid to the very recent phenomenon of the populist radical right party CH, which has achieved parliamentary representation for this political segment in Portugal for the first time. The analysis of the Portuguese far-right will serve to highlight similarities and differences between the so-called 'old' and 'new' radical right, particularly in terms of political thought and action. This analysis will also explain the reasons for the earlier failure of the far-right under democracy, and the apparent success of the newer populist formula, pinpointing the endogenous and exogenous factors in both experiences. The final section of the chapter returns to the Portuguese mainstream right-of-centre political space to analyse the period from the mid-1990s until 2021, when the left became dominant and the right has mostly acted as an opposition force, with some limited exceptions, particularly in the 2011–2015 government. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the prospects for the Portuguese right in the context of the arrival of new political parties and the crisis in the traditional Portuguese centre-right.

7.2 The Centre-Right: From the Democratic Transition until the Mid-1990s

The Portuguese post-1974 right has been deeply shaped and conditioned both by the conditions experienced during the revolutionary period and by the legacy of the Estado Novo [New State], the conservative authoritarian regime that ruled the country from 1933 to 1974, with António de Oliveira Salazar at its helm (Meneses, 2009). The 1974 revolution and the political turmoil that ensued placed all of the Portuguese right in a defensive stance. Similar processes have occurred and been extensively documented in other countries that experienced democratic transitions of a similar nature. Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) show that the negative evaluation of a prior authoritarian regime by citizens and elites generates a corresponding ideological bias in new

democracies that influences the country's party system development (anti-right or anti-left, depending on the ideological identification of the prior authoritarian regime).1

At the dawn of the Carnation Revolution, prominent figures of the old regime were targeted by the first repressive wave of arrests, exclusions, and exiles (Pinto, 1998), and the label 'right-wing' became synonymous with the recently overthrown authoritarianism (Pinto, 1996). The political space to the right was occupied by secondary figures from the latter decades of the Estado Novo, with backgrounds in neo-fascist revolutionary nationalism, monarchical nationalism, integral Catholicism, as well as the Salazarist military milieu of the African War, who came from an economic and administrative area of the regime that laid beyond the grasp of transitional justice. These were among the first to organize political parties in the weeks following the military coup (Gallagher, 1992). Their political cohesion stemmed from their shared militancy of right-wing opposition to the government of Marcelo Caetano, whom they accused of wanting to liberalize the regime solely in order to dissolve the empire and integrate Portugal into the European Economic Community (EEC).

It is therefore not surprising that the Portuguese democratic regime, especially in its fledgeling years, was openly hostile to any agents or movements perceived to be 'right-wing', a label that during the revolutionary period would often be connotated with adherence to the Estado Novo and equated with being 'fascist'. This had a profound influence not only on the Portuguese radical right, but also on the peculiar way in which the Portuguese mainstream centre-right parties (or, perhaps more accurately, the Portuguese parties to the right of the Socialist Party—(PS) developed. Only by considering this complex and delicate context can we understand why the main post-1974 Portuguese political party on the centre-right named itself as Partido Social Democrata—(PSD) [Social-Democratic Party].2 Under normal circumstances, a social-democratic party in 1970s' Western Europe would, of course, belong to the moderate left, but the political landscape in Portugal in 1974–1975 was anything but normal. Some political actors from the old regime were able to transition successfully to the post-1974 regime. But in the vast majority of cases, this required shedding any association with the 'right', since the new political circumstances were openly hostile to the very existence of overtly right-wing political parties (Alves, 2016a; Bruneau, 1997; Jalali, 2007).3

1 See Grzymala-Busse (2002) for an exploration and analysis of a similar phenomenon in post-democratization party system development within the different context of post-left authoritarian regimes.

2 Even if the PSD's initial designation had been Partido Popular Democrático—(PPD) [Popular Democratic Party]. On the PPD/PSD's role in the democratic transition see Frain (1998).

3 For an analysis of the creation of right-wing political parties in Portugal from a comparative perspective with other Southern European countries, see also Diamandouros and Gunther (2001).

Francisco Sá Carneiro, one of the founders and the first leader of the PPD-PSD, had been the leader of the 'Ala Liberal' ['Liberal Wing'], a group of non-aligned (but tolerated) MPs in the National Assembly pushing for gradual democratic reforms during the final stages of the Estado Novo (Fernandes, 2007). Drawing inspiration from a wide variety of sources—ranging from traditional (non-Marxist) social-democratic authors and Nordic social-democracy, as personified by Olof Palme, to the doctrine of Catholic personalism—the PSD gradually evolved to become essentially a catch-all party appealing mostly to the centre and centre-right segments of the Portuguese electorate. As famously noted by Pinto (1989), the PSD's rank-and-file were positioned to the right of the party's leadership, and the PSD's electoral basis were (largely) positioned to the right of the party's rank-and-file.

At the time of its founding, the PSD assumed an explicitly social-democratic agenda and even attempted (unsuccessfully) to join the Socialist International (Alves, 2016a). Consistently with the party's post-revolutionary rejection of being a right-wing or conservative party, the PSD was initially aligned with the European Liberal Democratic and Reformist Group (ELDR), and only in 1996 did it join the European People's Party Group (EPP), where it remains to this day. One of the peculiar features of the Portuguese party system is that European affiliation is quite probably more indicative of the genuine ideological positioning of Portuguese parties than their names, or even, in some cases, than their party manifestos, particularly on the right side of the political spectrum.

In the case of the other main party on the Portuguese centre-right, CDS, its initial self-exclusion from the right was not as unequivocal as with the PSD, but it is nevertheless relatively clear, at least in it its initial stages, with the centrist designation being a clear signal of the party's intention of avoiding being connotated with the 'right'. Diogo Freitas do Amaral, one of the party's founders and its first leader, reports in his memoirs that the military encouraged him to form a Christian Democratic party in order to avoid leaving a vacuum in the new political spectrum, and also based on the notion that most European party systems included one such party at the time (Amaral, 1995 and 2008).

The CDS's ideological and electoral marketplace positioning was thus conceived to be substantially different from the (aspiring) catch-all nature of the PSD. Although announced as centrist due to post-revolutionary circumstances, the CDS was supposed to bring together moderate conservatives and economic liberals under a broad Christian Democratic framework inspired by other similar European mainstream centre-right parties of the time. It thus came as no surprise that a substantial portion of the Portuguese right-wing elites congregated around the CDS in the post-revolutionary context, even though the party leadership declared itself to be strictly at the centre of the political ideological spectrum.

Despite its self-identification as a centrist party, the CDS was the preferred target for the radical left in its early years. Specifically, until the institutional pushback against the radical left on 25

November 1975, the CDS was a prime target for attacks, both rhetorical (insults, threats and public denunciations), and physically violent (including the looting of party facilities in several locations across the country). During the CDS's first national Congress, held in Porto in January 1975, party militants were held under siege by radical left protesters. All of this contributed towards a perception held both by adherents and adversaries that, notwithstanding its centrist designation, the CDS was, in fact, a right-wing party (Amaral, 2008; Nunes, 2007). The party's vote against the 1976 Portuguese Constitution further reinforced this perception.

Although the context was undoubtedly adverse to the PSD, and to a higher extent the CDS, the survival of both parties in the new democratic regime was helped by the post-revolutionary persecution of their rivals further to the right. Furthermore, international connections were also an important factor in this process of consolidation, providing not just access to European and global networks, but also direct assistance during this crucial period (Robinson, 1996). Both parties' acceptance of the decolonization process contributed further to their gradual acceptance into the mainstream democratic marketplace. At the same time, the nationalizations and aggressive state control of the economy during the revolutionary period created a strong backlash from important segments of Portuguese society to the electoral benefit of both the PSD and the CDS. Notwithstanding these parties' ideological inconsistency, the circumstances and sociological characteristics of the Portuguese electorate in the late 1970s and early 1980s led them to perform a role of resistance to (and later even reversal of) the more radical policies enacted during the revolutionary period (Alves, 2016a).

The electoral victories of the Aliança Democrática—(AD) [Democratic Alliance]—a coalition formed by the PSD, the CDS and the smaller Partido Popular Monárquico—(PPM) [People's Monarchist Party]—in 1979 and 1980 were watershed moments for the Portuguese right-of-centre mainstream parties and for the consolidation of democracy. The AD placed great emphasis on the struggle to stop and reverse the deep statization of the economy pushed by the radical left during the revolutionary period. Its electoral success corresponded to the first sustained pushback against that statization after the 1974 revolution—even if it was only from 1986 onwards, with the process of European Union (EU) integration and its powerful influence in shaping public policy, that Portugal adopted a more 'regular' model of Western market economy (Alves, 2014). Furthermore, it can be argued that the AD's electoral victory was also a key step towards consolidating the Portuguese transition to democracy. Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) argue that a regime effectively becomes a democracy once an alternation in power happens under the same set of electoral rules that brought the incumbent to power. Sá Carneiro's leading of the AD to electoral victory was crucial not just for the Portuguese right (which, during the post-revolutionary period and until that moment, had been far from electorally accessing power), but for Portuguese democracy itself.

The next landmark for Portuguese right-of-centre parties was Aníbal Cavaco Silva's 10-year period serving as prime minister (eight of which backed by absolute majorities in parliament, by the PSD), from 1985 to 1995. Cavaco Silva became leader of the PSD in 1985 and would lead the party to the biggest electoral victories in its history, achieving two single-party parliamentary absolute majorities in 1987 and 1991. Coinciding with Portugal's accession to the EU, Cavaco Silva enacted several important economic liberalization and privatization reforms as prime minister, while also expanding the Portuguese welfare state (Alves, 2011; Tavares and Alves, 2006).

Cavaco Silva was a key transformational figure in the Portuguese political landscape.4 His relatively humble social origins did not make him a prime candidate for achieving such influence, and they probably explain why, despite his extraordinary electoral success, the Portuguese social elites never fully accepted him (Araújo, 2016a). Ideologically, Cavaco Silva did not have a rigid or doctrinaire stance. He was essentially a pragmatist who can probably be best characterized by two elements. The first was his ability to become a vehicle for the economic and social aspirations of the new Portuguese middle classes in the 1980s (Araújo, 2016b; Mónica, 1993). This was key for generating support for Cavaco Silva's agenda of economic liberalization, and also for positioning him in the eyes of a majority of the electorate as the safest bet to manage the early stages of Portugal's European integration. Secondly, Cavaco Silva's ability to adopt a national populist discourse rooted in the benefits of European integration as the road to prosperity (Araújo, 2016b; Pinto, 1989).

'Cavaquismo' became an encompassing, broadly defined mix of economic liberalization, national populism, and pragmatism that appealed to important portions of the growing suburban communities, small business owners, aspiring liberal professionals, and large segments of 'retornados', the Portuguese who had been forced to return to Portugal from the former colonies (often in dire conditions) as a result of the decolonization process.

The impact of the two absolute majorities on the right was profound. Crushed and overwhelmed by Cavaco Silva's electoral success, the Portuguese far-right movements largely gave up any electoral ambitions they might still have and focused on cultural (and, in some cases, fringe counter-cultural) action instead. The CDS went through a very difficult period with the PSD's success, not least because it experienced historically-low levels of support.

Far from being a canonical Christian Democratic party (Kalyvas, 1996), CDS has been marred by internal ideological tensions and heterogeneity. The efforts of the so-called 'Grupo de Ofir', formed in 1984, illustrate the underlying tensions within the CDS. The group, spearheaded by Francisco Lucas Pires, brought together several upcoming figures of the right aiming to form a new combination of liberal and conservative thought adjusted to Portuguese reality. Although it

4 Cavaco Silva also served as President of the Republic from 2006 to 2016.

helped launch several important figures of the future CDS and the broader Portuguese right, the group ultimately fell short in terms of political impact, both due to internal ideological tensions and to the already mentioned steamroller effect of 'cavaquismo' in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Another relevant ideological phenomenon that should be mentioned in this context is the weekly newspaper O Independente. Founded in 1988—with Miguel Esteves Cardoso as its first director, assisted by a then-very young Paulo Portas5—O Independente was highly influential throughout the 1990s in shaping and defining the Portuguese political space to the right of the PSD (Araújo, 2016b). It aimed to form and promote a new, more sophisticated urban right and reflected cultural aspirations on the part of its leading actors, including a marked Anglo-Saxon influence. Over time, O Independente became a leading foe of 'cavaquismo', and contributed substantially to its downfall but, like the Grupo de Ofir, it was not successful in generating a viable leading alternative project on the Portuguese right during its lifetime.

The success of 'cavaquismo' and the cultural and ideological shifts experienced by the right during this period ultimately led the CDS to undergo a soul-searching process that culminated, in 1992, with the party assuming explicitly—and for the first time—that it was, indeed, a right-wing party (Monteiro, 2016). Under Manuel Monteiro's leadership, the party changed its name from the CDS to the Centro Democrático e Social—Partido Popular—(CDS-PP) [Social and Democratic Centre—People's Party], signalling a euro-sceptic stance, opposed to the Maastricht Treaty, a decision that ultimately had the party expelled from the European People's Party in 1992.6

7.3 The Far-Right during the Democratic Transition (1974–1982)

In its first organized form, the radical right in Portuguese democracy has its roots at the end of the authoritarian Salazar regime, with certain particularities of the Estado Novo being passed on as congenital weaknesses: the limited autonomy of its political structures (the single União Nacional Party [National Union], the Legião Portuguesa [Portuguese Legion], and the Mocidade Portuguesa [Portuguese Youth]) compared to the state apparatus, and the demobilization and de-politicization of the masses promoted by the regime (Pinto, 1989). In this context, at the end of the authoritarian regime, the ultra-right was only evident in the mobilization of a small nationalist nuclei during the war in Portugal's African colonies from 1961, and in its opposition to Marcelo Caetano after 1968 (Gallagher, 1983 and 1992; Pinto, 1995; Marchi, 2019).

5 Portas later became leader of CDS in 1998–2005 and 2007–2016, largely shaping the party in his own image. He was also vice-prime minister in 2013–2015. On Portas's defining role and his legacy, see Alves (2016b).

6 CDS was readmitted to the EPP in 2004, under the leadership of Paulo Portas.

The overthrow of the Estado Novo by the military coup of 25 April 1974 further undermined the existing fragility of the radical right as an actor, both throughout the political transition between 1974 and 1980 (Pinto, 1995; Pinto, 1996; Marchi, 2019), and in the armed counter-revolution launched during the revolutionary period in 1974–1975 (Cervelló, 1993; Carvalho, 2017).

From a strategic point of view, the radical right splintered into two tendencies. The minority, composed of hard-core Salazar supporters, rejected the revolution outright, and tried to bring together the reactionaries in organizations such as the Movimento de Acção Portuguesa—(MAP) [The Portuguese Action Movement] and the Partido Nacionalista Português—(PNP) [Nationalist Portuguese Party]. The majority, in contrast, saw the coup as an irreversible fact, and reversing it as an undesirable ambition. This majority aligned with general António de Spínola—president of the Junta de Salvação Nacional—(JSN) [National Salvation Union] and president of the Republic from 15 May 1974—and its federalist solution for 'Portuguese Africa'. In the early months of the transition, the African question remained central to the radical right. The manifesto of the Movimento das Forças Armadas—(MFA) [Armed Forces Movement] still recognized the principle of safeguarding Portugal's Ultramar [overseas territories], which allowed the radical right-wing to defend a referendum in the African Provinces to safeguard multi-continental Portugal in the name of popular self-determination. That milieu created the embryos for future parties. The revolutionary nationalist faction officially announced the foundation of the Movimento Federalista Português—(MFP) [Portuguese Federalist Movement]. The Catholic right-wing created two different parties: the conservative Partido da Democracia Cristã—(PDC) [Christian Democratic Party] and the more traditionalist Movimento Popular Português—(MPP) [Portuguese Popular Movement]. The monarchist-liberal right founded the Partido Liberal—(PL) [Liberal Party]. Of lesser importance, but also part of the front to save the empire, were the Partido Trabalhista Democrático Português—(PTDP) [Portuguese Democratic Labour Party] and the Partido Social Democrata Independente—(PSDI) [Independent Social Democratic Party].The creation of these parties was accompanied by the publication of newspapers, some dating back to the old regime, such as the Jornal Português de Economia e Finanças and Resistência magazines, and others newly established, such as the Tribuna Popular (a branch of the MFP), Tempo Novo (close to the PL), and Bandarra. All of these institutions were situated on the extreme right of the political spectrum, due to their anti-Marxist discourse and their defence of 'Portuguese Africa'.

With a view to the constituent assembly elections to be held in April 1975, in July 1974, the Frente Democrática Unida—(FDU) [United Democratic Front] was formally established: an electoral coalition made up of the PL, the PTDP, and the MFP, by then transformed into the Partido do Progresso—(MFP/PP) [Progress Party]. The FDU reinforced its proximity to general Spínola, to curb the left-wing parties' hegemony over transitional institutions, and to show its support for the president of the republic in his struggle with the Partido Comunista Português—(PCP) [Portuguese Communist Party]. With this in mind, the FDU parties organized a public

demonstration on 28 September for the so-called 'silent majority', in support of Spínola's policies, particularly the African question. The demonstration was boycotted by the PS, the PPD, and the CDS, who were aware of the dangers of a clash between opposing extremist factions. In fact, the PCP and the civilian and military far-left reacted by erecting barricades, attacking the headquarters of the parties and newspapers involved in the demonstration, and arresting dozens of right-wing activists. The failure of 28 September forced president Spínola to resign. Of all the parties to the right of the CDS, only the PDC survived, and over the following months it tried to salvage itself by electing José Sanches Osório, a member of the MFA in the first provisional government, as its leader. In February of 1975, the PDC was admitted to the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) as an observer, and was legalized by the Constitutional Court, with a view to the elections of 25 April 1975.

The PCD's pathway to becoming an institution was abruptly interrupted on 11 March 1975. On this date, an alleged extreme-left operation, known as the 'Easter Slaughter', with supposed plans to liquidate the military right-wing, triggered an impulsive armed reaction by general Spínola, who was defeated once again, and forced into exile in Brazil. The subsequent wave of repression was unyielding; this time, the PDC, with its leader on the run and its headquarters under attack, was suspended by the revolutionary authorities, thus creating a void to the right of the CDS (Pinto, 1995 and 1998).

The debacle of 11 March 1975 put an end to the first attempt to formally create radical right-wing parties. The far-right electorate now split its 'meaningful vote' between the CDS, the PPD, and the PS, considered the safest bulwarks against the PCP (Jalali, 2007: 73). A phase of clandestine and armed resistance began for the radical right, to counter the left-wing radicalization of the Portuguese revolutionary period.

The various factions of the Portuguese radical right sought refuge in neighbouring Spain, still under Franco's dictatorship. In this diverse environment, two clandestine structures were formed: the Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal—(MDLP) [Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal] and the Exército de Libertação de Portugal—(ELP) [Portuguese Liberation Army]. The ELP was made up of Portuguese citizens who had fled to Spain after 28 September, assisted by far-right Italian and the French refugees. Founded in January 1975, the ELP resumed the political manifesto of the MAP: they declared that they did not wish to restore the Estado Novo, but rather to rescue pluricontinental Portugal, and reject Western democracy and the international spread of Marxism.

Between May 1975 and March 1976, the anti-communist armed struggle consisted of hundreds of terrorist acts, mainly concentrated in the period between July and November 1975 and in the North of Portugal. It took advantage of a diffuse anti-communist sentiment among small-scale farmers, artisans and traders, frightened by the collective programmes promoted by the far-left. Here, the radical right played an operational role, integrating the anti-communist uprising

organized by the mainstream parties (PS, PPD, and CDS) and the Church (Cerezales, 2007 and 2017).

The fifth provisional government's inability to control the armed offensive, and the worsening tensions between the revolutionary forces, tipped the country into a new pro-coup phase. On 25 November 1975, the civil and military far-left launched an armed uprising, which was quickly crushed by the anti-communist military. The end of the revolutionary period opened a new window of opportunity for the radical right. Between 1976 and 1980, the far-right once again resumed its party and electoral strategy. The PDC returned to politics to occupy a central position for voters to the right of the CDS. Throughout the second half of the 1970s, the party underwent constant crises of leadership and internal factionalism, with repercussions for the party's structure and cohesion. The Movimento Independente para a Reconstrução Nacional—(MIRN) [The Independent Movement for National Reconstruction]—renamed Partido da Direita Portuguesa—(MIRN/PDP) [Portuguese Party of the Right] in 1979—emerged in January 1977, led by the ultra-rightist general Kaúlza de Arriaga, who had been jailed during the revolutionary period. Lastly, the Front National (FN), an ephemeral abbreviation created for the legislative elections of 1980, was made up of the group behind the far-right weekly publication A Rua.

Among social movements, there was notable growth in right-wing militancy among the young, primarily in the secondary schools of Lisbon and Porto. Among various movements, the Movimento Nacionalista [Nationalist Movement] began its activities in 1976. During this period, the radical right tried unsuccessfully to politicize social organizations made up of citizens who had been affected, in some way, by the revolution and decolonization, such as political prisoners of revolutionary repression, businessmen dispossessed by the nationalizations of the revolutionary period, and returnees from overseas territories. All of these sectors preferred to trust in the parties of the Democratic Alliance, which represented their interests more effectively.

From an electoral point of view, the PDC ran in the elections of 25 April 1976, winning 0.54 per cent of the votes, and in the elections of 2 December 1979, winning 1.2 per cent of the votes. Rejected by the Democratic Alliance, which was victorious in 1979, the PDC, the MIRN/PDP, and the FN formed an alternative coalition, with the aim of electing deputies in the legislative elections of 5 October 1980. The result was disappointing: with only 0.4 per cent of the votes, the radical right lost two thirds of its 1979 voters, and fell short even of its 1976 result. Several factors contributed to this defeat: poor cohesion among the coalition's promoters; an inability to bring the entire far-right bloc together around the project; the increasing attraction of more radical right-wing voters to the AD; the effectiveness of the campaign for a meaningful vote, promoted by right-wing circles, close to the AD; and the unattractiveness of the policy programme proposed by the far-right coalition, compared to the AD. The PDC-MIRN/PDP-FN manifesto only differed markedly from that of the AD in a few, relatively unimportant, points: a criticism of democracy as a synonym for partitocracy; a proposal to form a Portuguese Commonwealth as an alternative

to the European integration; and the illegitimacy of the PCP. By the beginning of the 1980s, these themes held little appeal for the right.

Following its electoral defeat, the radical right abandoned any ambitions to play an institutional role in Portuguese democracy. The PDC and the MIRN/PDP survived on a merely formal basis throughout the 1980s. PDC lost a quarter of its votes in the European elections of 1989 (the last electoral act in which it participated). The two parties were officially extinguished by the Constitutional Court in 1997 and 2004, respectively (Gallagher, 1992; Pinto, 2006; Marchi, 2019).

7.4 The Far-Right in a Consolidated Democracy

In the 1980s, the Portuguese radical right witnessed a significant generational and political shift. A new generation of militants became organized into extremist groups based on an urban skinhead subculture and white Anglo-Saxon supremacy (Marchi and Zúquete, 2016). Among these groups, the Movimento de Acção Nacional—(MAN) [National Action Movement], founded in 1985 by young people from the Lisbon metropolitan area, stood out, with their strategy of recruiting skinheads from the metropolitan suburbs, using an ethnic-nationalist agenda that broke with traditional nationalism. The MAN captured the media's attention, but also experienced judicial repression following crimes committed by skinheads. In particular, in 1990, the MAN was the subject of a Constitutional Court case under legislation against fascist organizations, following the murder, in 1989, of a leader of the Partido Socialista Revolucionário—PSR [Revolutionary Socialist Party] perpetrated by skinheads. The MAN was declared unconstitutional, and only escaped legal dissolution because the movement had already been officially deactivated. Right-wing extremism remained a constant in the Portuguese media of the 1990s, reaching its criminal nadir with the murder of a young Cape Verdean in 1995.

The 1990s also witnessed some feeble attempts at party reorganization. In 1989, the Nova Monarquia [New Monarchy], founded in 1983, inaugurated the short-lived Força Nacional Nova Monarquia—FNNM [New Monarchy National Force], with links to the European radical right, namely the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), the French Front National, and the Spanish Frente Nacional. There were other attempts in 1995, with the Partido Nacionalista Português—(PNP) [Portuguese National Party] and the Aliança Nacional—(AN) [National Alliance]. However, neither of these initiatives managed to gather the 7,500 signatures required by law to legalize them: a fact that was indicative of the diminished organizational capacity of the radical right at the end of the century.

In 1999, the party strategy was finally achieved when right-wing radicals joined the inactive Partido Renovador Democrático—(PRD) [Democratic Renewal Party], a centre party founded in 1985 around the president of the Republic at the time, Ramalho Eanes. In 2000, the radical right changed the PRD's name to Partido Nacional Renovador—(PNR) [National Renewal Party] and

its symbol into a red and blue flame (Zúquete, 2007; Marchi, 2012). In 2005, the new leader, José Pinto Coelho, tried to turn the PNR into the Portuguese equivalent of the rising new European radical right, but also engendered a problematic relationship with its extremist internal component, represented by the skinheads of the Portuguese Hammerskins (PHS), which was the target of an important police operation in 2007. The damage done to the PNR's image remains insurmountable to this day, despite the breakup, more than a decade ago, of its neo-Nazi faction. From an ideological point of view, the PNR laid claim to the legacy of the Estado Novo, defending traditional values and the figure of Salazar as the greatest Portuguese statesman of the twentieth century. The party called for the establishment of a Fourth Republic, with a new constitution. In terms of its values, the PNR defended the traditional family and opposed abortion, gender ideology, and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans (LGBT) agenda, all banners of the so-called 'cultural Marxism'. On the economy, the anti-liberalism of the PNR was embodied in its celebration of the role of the state in defending national production and consumers against globalization. On international politics, the PNR blamed Portugal's accession to the EEC in 1986 for the crisis in key sectors of the national economy, but abandoned its initial anti-European conviction that Portugal should leave the EU. Nowadays, the party expresses an anti-federalist Euroscepticism in favour of a Europe made up of sovereign nations. For the PNR, Europe is Portugal's natural cultural arena, and it no longer incorporates the Euro-African dimension of earlier Portuguese nationalism. The party considers immigration from outside Europe to be an 'invasion' that is damaging to the country's cultural identity.

From an electoral point of view, the PNR has never achieved substantial results, going from 0.09 per cent in 2002 to 0.33 per cent in 2019, with no significant variations in between (0.16 per cent in 2005, 0.20 per cent in 2009, 0.32 per cent in 2011, and 0.5 per cent in 2015). This electoral performance has been confirmed in the European elections (0.25 per cent in 2004, 0.37 per cent in 2009, 0.46 per cent in 2014, and 0.49 per cent in 2019) and in municipal elections. In the Lisbon district—an important indicator for a capital-centric country like Portugal—the PNR went from 0.01 per cent (779 votes) in 2001, to 0.5 per cent in 2017. To this day, the PNR—now called Ergue-te! [Stand-up!]—has been unable to improve its public image, to compete with the anti-globalist discourse of the parliamentary far-left (the PCP and Bloco de Esquerda), to counter hostility from the media, who consistently depict the PNR's anti-immigration and anti-Islamic stances as mere expressions of inherent and/or cultural racism.

7.5 The Mainstream Right from 1995 through to 2021

The ideological and cultural reshaping of the Portuguese right from the late 1990s onwards has been influenced by two main factors. Firstly, greater international exposure (in terms of media access, proportion of people studying abroad, general travelling, and international contacts) of the generation born in the 1970s. The fact that this generation did not directly experience the 1974

revolution also meant that it was more open to external intellectual influences and less conditioned by the revolutionary context and its adversary relationship with the former Estado Novo.

Secondly, the advent of new media—beginning with the blogosphere, followed by social media such as Facebook and Twitter (Araújo, 2016b; Costa, 2021)—was a watershed moment for the mainstream right. These new media outlets have a lot less entry barriers and therefore constituted an ideal platform for the new generation of the Portuguese right to circumvent traditional media circuits—additionally, they quickly became a fast-track way to access positions both in the traditional media and in politics. This 'new blogging right', as pointedly described by Araújo (2006), was more cosmopolitan and more well-informed than its predecessors, but was also highly individualistic, lacking a unified political project.

Blogs such as Coluna Infame, Acidental, Blasfémias, O Insurgente, and 31 da Armada, among others, shaped this 'new blogging right' over the following years and proved influential well beyond the blogosphere (Costa, 2021). It is fair to note, as stressed by Araújo (2006), that this 'new blogging right' presented some relevant elements of continuity with the earlier O Independente, but there were also important differences. This new right was substantially more diverse and much less centred on a close-knit Lisbon-centred social network. As a consequence, it was also more open and genuinely cosmopolitan—contrasting with earlier generations of right-wing intellectuals for whom the opportunity to study abroad had mostly led to a short-sighted dilettante and snobbish vision of the Portuguese reality (Araújo, 2016b). Another noteworthy ideological development for the Portuguese right was the foundation of the monthly magazine Atlântico. The magazine adopted unequivocal right-wing and pro-Atlantic (that is, pro-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and pro-United States (US)) stances, and helped launch a vast host of opinion-makers for many years in this ideological arena.

Another important aspect associated with, and partly resulting from these developments was the emergence of a liberal right in the early 2000s, with a clear (and sometimes radical) free-market agenda, and an openly anti-statist and anti-socialist rhetoric. Initially very loosely formed, the magazine Atlântico and the blogs (particularly the highly successful O Insurgente and Blasfémias) were important focal points for this new Portuguese liberal right. Part of this emerging movement would later be consolidated into a new party, Iniciativa Liberal [Liberal Initiative].

From an electoral perspective, during this more recent period centre-right parties had a brief stint in government, when a coalition government supported by the PSD and the CDS-PP in 2002 was cut short when prime minister José Manuel Barroso left to become President of the European Commission in 2004. After years of internal turmoil, with several failed opposition leaders, Pedro Passos Coelho emerged in 2010 as leader of the PSD with a more liberal electoral stance. The most significant governing period for right-of-centre parties since Cavaco Silva's absolute majorities, Passos Coelho's premiership lasted from 2011 until 2015, leading a coalition government supported by the PSD and the CDS-PP. This government implemented the 'troika'

agreement (with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) that followed the request for emergency financial assistance by the Portuguese government led by the PS in April 2011 (Alves, 2014). After being ousted from government in 2015, the demise of Passos Coelho in 2018 and the ascent of Rui Rio as leader of the PSD marked the party's return to a more centrist position (including the traditional refutation that the PSD is a right-wing party), also evidencing the extent to which the dominating faction shapes the party's position and public discourse. The same new right also played a role in the evolution of the CDS, but in this case the charisma and tight control exercised by Paulo Portas was the dominant factor. Overall, the new Portuguese right's main goal is to counteract the perceived political hegemony of the PS and a more general cultural left and radical left dominance in the political system, the media and academia. Judging by electoral results, its success until 2021 has been clearly limited. From the mid-1990s onwards, the Portuguese political landscape became clearly dominated by the Portuguese PS (from 1995 to 2021, the PS has led the government for 19 out of 26 years). It is also true that, with regards to the Presidency of the Republic—first with Cavaco Silva (2006–2016) and then with another former PSD leader, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa (2016–2021, re-elected for a second term in 2021)—the right will have held the highest political office in the country for two decades. But, in the Portuguese semi-presidential system, the president's power is largely symbolic or, at most, of a moderating nature, exerting indirect influence over the government, which is the institution that truly shapes and implements public policy.

Following the 2019 legislative elections, the Portuguese right may have reached a turning point, after decades of considerable stability within the party system, with the PSD and the CDS as the only significant political forces to the right of the PS (Fernandes and Magalhães, 2020). The poor performance by the PSD and the CDS, combined with dissatisfaction with their party leaders by significant segments of the electorate on the right, and with several salient campaign issues, allowed for the unprecedented successful emergence of new parties on the right. In addition to the radical right-wing party CH, led by André Ventura, the party Iniciativa Liberal(IL) has also achieved parliamentary representation.

The IL presented mostly an economically libertarian platform—with proposals such as a flat income tax, labour market liberalization, and the privatization of inefficient state-owned enterprises—and did well particularly among young and affluent urban voters (traditionally a stronghold of the CDS). Although it should be noted that the IL does not claim to be right-wing, and is aligned at European level with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party(ALDE), within the Portuguese context it is clearly perceived as being right-of-centre in the political spectrum.

7.6 The Populist New Radical Right: The Chega Party

The radical right-wing political panorama changed significantly with the legislative elections of 6 October 2019. For the first time since the 25 April 1974, a deputy associated with the extreme

right of the political spectrum accessed the Portuguese Parliament: André Ventura, leader and only MP from the party CH(; Mendes and Dennison, 2020). In 2019, at 36 years of age, Ventura was a law graduate, with a PhD from Ireland and several career pathways as a university lecturer, a tax inspector, and especially as a football and crime commentator on cable TV channels. His political career began in the PSD, where he found a window of opportunity in the 2017 municipal elections, in Loures, as a frontrunner of the centre-right coalition (PSD-CDS-PPM). In Loures—an important municipal area in greater Lisbon with a socialist and communist tradition—André Ventura's campaign was marked by controversial attacks against the local Roma community, based on cases of petty crime and welfare dependency. The avoidance of the topic by the timid centre-right earned the candidate nationwide media attention. Consequently, André Ventura seized this opportunity to form a political faction, CH, within the PSD, to encourage the party to shift further to the right. Isolated internally, Ventura abandoned the PSD in October 2018, and turned CH into a political party.

In its early stages, the founders of the party were just a handful of aficionados of its charismatic leader, and the legalization process itself at the Constitutional Court suffered repeated irregularities. The party was eventually legalized in April 2019, forcing CH to form a coalition (Basta) with small right-wing parties (PPM, PPV/CDC, and Democracy21) for the 2019 European elections. As head of the list, Ventura based his campaign on controversial topics: life sentences for heinous crimes; chemical castration for paedophiles; and a reduction in the number of deputies. On the subject of Europe, Ventura rejected both anti-Europeanism and European federalism equally, but argued that Portugal should remain in the EU and the euro. The coalition's meagre electoral result—1.49 per cent, with 49,496 votes—was repeated in Madeira's regional elections in September, where CH, no longer in a coalition, received only 0.43 per cent of the votes. Despite these results, CH confirmed its liberal-conservative direction, refining its arguments against the system: calling for a Fourth Republic, with a profound constitutional revision; introducing a purely presidential system; reducing the number of deputies; and combating corruption and cronyism between governing parties and the private sector. The party's most polemical positions continued to be the privatization of health and education, security measures (life sentences and chemical castration), and, importantly, attacks against ethnic minorities based on claims of welfare dependency, and of disrespect for law-enforcement forces and the rule of law.

This agenda, fuelled by the crisis of the centre-right, enabled André Ventura to be elected with only 66,448 votes (1.3 per cent). The unprecedented election of the radical right to parliament made CH the centre of political and media debate, with a significant impact on the party: contacts on social media networks—CH's preferred means of promotion—soared; CH's YouTube channel surpassed every other political party in terms of number of views; party membership increased from 700 to 25,000 between the summer of 2019 and 2020. As an MP, Ventura focused on media

coverage, making the party a member of the far-right European group Identity & Democracy (I&D) in July 2020, and multiplying his bombastic declarations. Throughout 2020, the strategy of radical speech produced an effect: polls showed an increase in intentions to vote for CH from 1.3 per cent to 7 per cent in the legislative elections, and up to 10 per cent in the presidential elections. These predictions were confirmed by the Azores' regional elections in November 2020 and in the presidential elections of January 2021. In the Azores' elections, CH secured 5.06 per cent of the votes, elected two regional deputies and signed a written agreement with the PSD-CDS-PPM to externally support the centre-right government that ended two decades of socialist rule in the archipelago. In the presidential elections, André Ventura secured 11.93 per cent of the vote and ranked third, coming very close to the left-wing candidate Ana Gomes (12.96 per cent). In the municipal elections of September 2021, CH won 4.16 per cent (208,232 votes) and elected a total of 19 city councillors and hundreds of local representatives. This result suggests two contradicting trends. First, the political capital of the leader (almost half a million voters in presidential elections) is still much higher than that of the party. Second, the increasing nationalization of the party with a growing consolidation of the electorate and the capacity for territorial rooting. Importantly, the latter has been confirmed in the 2022 general election, in which CH garnered 7.28 per cent (410,979 votes) and elected 12 legislators.

The party's consolidation reached in just 2 years is further increased by the contextual factors of the new parliament. On the left, the PS conquered the absolute majority of the seats at the expense of the former radical left supporters of its government (the Leftist Bloc and the Portuguese Communist Party). On the right, the historic centre-right party CDS lost its parliamentary representation after almost five decades of uninterrupted presence. These factors make CH the third parliamentary political force and the only one to claim the right-wing identity. By contrast, the Liberal Initiative (from 1,29 per cent to 4,88 per cent) aims to be perceived as a centrist party.7 However, despite its libertarian stance in the Green, Alternative, Liberal (GAL-TAN) competition dimension, its positions are best seen as rightist in the left-right scale, which has arguably dominated Portuguese politics over the past decades.

The first two decades of the twenty-first century thus ended with an absolute first in the history of the radical right in Portuguese democracy: a party on the extreme right of the political spectrum, growing rapidly, represented in parliament, and institutionally recognized by the other actors of the centre-right.

7.7 Conclusion

7 The party leaders often argue that the left-right divide is no longer a useful analytical category. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 2022 parliament, the party made a formal request to sit between the Socialists and the Social Democrats in the legislature.

The Portuguese post-1974 right has been deeply influenced by the historical experience and legacy of the previous authoritarian regime, coupled with the extraordinary conditions of the revolutionary period. These factors had profound consequences both on the centre-right, and on the radical and far-right, and their influence continues to be felt today.

From the revolution until 2019, the Portuguese party system on the right has been characterized by a notable stability in the mainstream centre-right parties, and by repeated failures to achieve representation by forces on the radical right and the far-right. Unlike most of its European counterparts, it was only at the dawn of the third decade of the twenty-first century that the demand for radical right-wing populism seems to have found a viable proposal, which comes from the individual political entrepreneurship of a dissident from the mainstream right wing. This model of charismatic leadership combines the image of a new right, unconnected with the authoritarian past, with an identity that is conservative in its values, and profoundly liberal in terms of the economy, and has managed to seize on an anti-system agenda characterized by law and order, anti-elitism, and identity.

The 2022 general election marked a watershed for Portuguese Right. For one, the declining parliamentary representation of the Social Democrats and the failure to elect a single legislator of the historical Christian Democratic party. Furthermore, in addition to the rise of the IL, the radical right CH emerged as the third most important parliamentary party, sending shock waves throughout the political system. These changes open new medium- and long-term scenarios on the right. The majority government of the PS precludes PSD and IL from making a difficult decision of crossing the Rubicon of negotiating or coalescing with CH.

The new parties IL and CH will prioritize fixing and increasing their own electorate, in addition to professionalizing and structuring their respective party's structure. Furthermore, CH will try to take advantage of the bewildering electoral defeat of PSD to lead the opposition to the socialist government in the parliament and in the streets. The PSD will have to relaunch its position as the dominant party in the non-socialist area. Outside parliament, the CDS will be committed to restructuring its vertices, to counter what many analysts consider the end of the party's historical cycle, although the bet on Christian Democrat conservatism does not seem to offer much potential for this.

The Portuguese centre-right and radical right are in a state of flux and are faced with similar questions as most European democracies (Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020). To what extent will the radical right become dominant in the coming years? Will mainstream right-wing parties change their stances to try to hollow out the electoral success of the radical right? Will the latter join the governmental formula for the future and, if so, what kind of consequences will this have? The jury is still out on these matters. Political developments on the Portuguese right are at a crossroads, and the coming years will help shed light on a new stage.

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