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Nome do candidato(a)
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Doutoramento em Estudos Internacionais

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Abstract

The thesis will reintroduce International Relations (IR) through the lens of constitutive questions and constitutive problems. Introducing IR necessarily leads to an engagement with 'the field as a whole' (Hoffmann 1960:vi). The argument, endorsing the methodological critique (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008), aims to start a debate about the underlying themes that characterise the introduction of IR as a field of research, thus pushing the methodological critique further. More specifically, it identifies three constitutive questions in IR – the why(s), the how(s) and the what(s) – and the constitutive problems that characterise them. This will be done, continuing with the attempt to develop a more consistent argument based on a more solid concern with the research process, in a way that highlights a specific theoretical and methodological framework. Mark Bevir's work will be used to solidify the presentation, and his arguments will be used throughout the whole thesis. In particular, in an initial phase, his more static approach. The goal is to cover how, through a process of theorisation, conceptualisation or the identification of traditions of thought, we can understand different constitutive problems. But there is also a dynamic side to Bevir's argument – an understanding of how ideas change. The thesis's final contribution will focus on the debate about how national contributions to Global IR (Acharya 2014) have been understood and, in particular, on normative arguments for change. The macro reasoning about constitutive questions/problems and the case for change will be linked at this stage in the conclusion, where the argument comes full circle. It will be argued that national communities should become *institutionally* more cosmopolitan, less hierarchical, more communicative, (inter)disciplinary aware of themselves while engaging in debates about how IR can be taught, and, i*ntellectually*, more conscious of their own distinctive history, key identitarian debates, philosophically and theoretically more solid, and be able to explore all the possibilities open in relation to *what* can be studied in IR.

Keywords: International Relations, International Relations Theory, Constructivism, History and International Relations, Mark Bevir, Global IR

Resumo

A tese visa reintroduzir as Relações Internacionais (RI) em termos de questões constitutivas e problemas constitutivos. A introdução das RI conduz necessariamente a um envolvimento com "o campo como um todo" (Hoffmann 1960:vi). O argumento, em linha com a crítica metodológica já desenvolvida (Reus-Smit e Snidal 2008), pretende solidificar este argumento, fornecendo bases mais sólidas para que os participantes iniciem um diálogo sobre os temas que caracterizam a introdução das RI como um campo de investigação. Assim, irá identificar três questões constitutivas nas RI – o(s) porquê(s), o(s) como(s) e o(s) quê(s) – e os problemas constitutivos que as caracterizam. Isto será feito, continuando com a pretensão de desenvolver um argumento mais atento ao processo de investigação, de forma a evidenciar um enquadramento teórico e metodológico específico que será aplicado durante todo o argumento. Mark Bevir será utilizado para solidificar a apresentação teórica. Em particular, e numa primeira fase, a sua abordagem mais estática. O objetivo é abordar como, através de um processo de teorização, conceptualização ou identificação de tradições de pensamento, podemos compreender diferentes problemas constitutivos em RI. Mas há também um lado dinâmico no trabalho de Bevir – uma compreensão de como ideias mudam. O contributo final da tese centrar-se-á no debate sobre a forma como são entendidas as contribuições nacionais para o argumento das RI Globais (Acharya 2014) e, em particular, em argumentos sobre mudança nestas comunidades. A contribuição macro sobre questões/problemas constitutivos e os argumentos normativos de mudança serão integrados na conclusão onde será defendido que comunidades nacionais se devem tornar *institucionalmente* mais cosmopolitas, menos hierárquicas, mais comunicativas, (inter)disciplinarmente conscientes de si mesmas enquanto exploram questões sobre o ensino das RI, e, *intelectualmente*, mais conscientes da sua própria história e de debates identitários, mais sólidas filosófica e teoricamente e capazes de explorar todas as possibilidades abertas em relação *ao que estudar* em RI.

Keywords: Relações Internacionais, Teoria de Relações Internacionais, Construtivismo, História e Relações Internacionais, Mark Bevir, Globalização das Relações Internacionais

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Introduction

This introduction will first clarify what the problem and purpose statements of the project are and its contributions; second, in a step in the literature review process that is not taken in the literature, it will clarify/identify what constitutive questions and problems in International Relations (IR)[1] are, *why* a concern in identifying them matters and *how* to go about doing so; third, it will unpack Mark Bevir's theoretical argument and provide methodological foundations to it and, in the last part, an overview of the chapters to come will be presented.

1.1. Problem/Purpose Statements and Relevancy

This thesis started with a research anxiety: International Relations (IR) scholars have not grasped IR's constitutive questions and problems well.

Constitutive problems are the debates that emerge from an assessment of IR as a research field. Constitutive questions are inductive enquiries that frame these problems. Multiple assessments of the nature of IR as a research field exist. They come in the form of contributions that bring many different issues and topics together under a single argument (Smith 1995, Holsti 1998, Jabri 2000, Devetak 2012) or contributions that emphasize specific dimensions of concern – normally in the form of concern over theory (Burchill and Linklater 2005, Helmann 2020) or substantive matters of IR (Golstein and Pevehouse 2004, Heywood 2011, Lamy, Masket Baylis, Smith, Owens 2008). However, what tends to characterise these contributions is that scholars do not seem to care to engage in comparative analysis of the existing literature that addresses the same topic, nor do they seem to care to ground their research in solid theoretical arguments. If there's a clear sense in other literatures in IR that there's a communication around a topic, no such conversation exists when discussing IR as a research field. In summary, there is a body of work on IR as a research field, but there is no debate among contributors, nor is the debate theoretically grounded in most cases. This thesis aims to overcome these challenges by starting a conversation about how to understand IR as a field of research, theoretically frame such conversations, and, in the process, provide a view of a future for IR.

This work is relevant for four reasons. First, it will allow us to better understand IR's constitutive questions and problems, doing so in two ways. The first is by going over *why the endeavour is relevant*. If at its core we need to become more methodologically self-conscious when developing

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[1] For most of this study – with the exception of chapters 3 and 6 – by IR it is meant "an Anglocentric study of the global that itself emerged out of a broader western tradition" (Ashworth 2014:251).

these contributions, thus creating a sense of conversation among those that are engaging in these presentations, there are also institutional, theoretical and normative reasons for doing so.

The second way in which the thesis will help us better understand IR's constitutive problems is to help understand *how to go about identifying, individualising, and clarifying what constitutive questions and problems are*. If a more complete understanding of literature review is undertaken, our responsibility is not just to theoretically frame the subject matter in a new light, it is also to engage in a conversation with what already exists in a way that makes analytical sense. This thesis aims to do so by extracting constitutive debates from exercises that take IR as an integrated field of study as their object of analysis (Buzan and Little 2001, Reynolds 1975, Scheleider 1954) It will propose moving beyond a presentation of the debates that characterise the field of IR in a way that intermingles different topics and debates together in single contributions and beyond an attitude that doesn't clearly engage in a comparative analysis of different contributions. The goal will be to clarify and compare contributions, so we have a better analytical understanding of the field of IR. It will, more specifically, differentiate three distinctive constitutive questions that run in the literature characterised here as providing answers to three different questions – *why* we should study IR, *how* we should study IR and *what* can be studied in IR. if different answers to the question *how* we should study IR can be derived from a careful analysis of manuals dedicated to the presentation of theories of IR (Rosenau and Durfee 2000, Burchill and Linklater 2005) and if answers to the question *what* can be studied can be derived from the careful analysis of manuals dedicated to stress substantive matters in IR (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2004, Heywood 2011), there is a whole dimension of *why* we should study IR that is (re)emerging as an important focus of reflection (Waever 2013).

Continuing with the literature review – now in its more theoretical side – this thesis's is also important because it will develop a specific theoretical and methodological standpoint to analyse IR's constitutive problems. Some manuals may have analytical cohesion (Hoffmann 1960, Palmer 1970, Puchala 2002), but they rarely develop profound theoretical or methodological viewpoints with which to coherently analyse the debates emphasised in the contributions. We lack theoretical reflection when discussing IR, and this thesis aims to contribute to such discussions (Reus-Smith and Snidal 2008, Weber 2010). In particular, the thesis will advance a Beverian approach to IR's constitutive problems. Bevir has developed what he calls an interpretative approach (Bevir and Rhodes 2016) and has applied it to political science (Bevir and Rhodes 2004, Bevir 2011) and IR (Bevir, Daddow and Hall 2014, Bevir and Hall 2020). Most of these contributions take the historical turn (Hall 2017, Bell 2001) and highlight the importance of the study of traditions of thought. What will be argued here, however, is that beyond his contribution to traditions of thought, Bevir's work does provide insights into debates about concepts, objectivity, traditions, and dilemmas (Bevir 1999). This thesis will unpack the theoretical framework suggested by Bevir in the substantive chapters, highlighting how different dimensions of

Bevir's work can be brought together to theoretically frame the chapters that constitute this thesis. More than just an analysis of traditions of thought, Bevir's view on conceptual analysis, objectivity, historical time or change are particularly relevant to this thesis. This is a thesis that is also methodologically grounded in the analysis of 'high culture' and intellectual debates. it will take seriously Bevir's suggestion that it is in the analysis of web(s) of theoretical conversations that we gain access to a (subjective) yet concrete reality. The analysis of these web(s) of theoretical debates leads to the choice of documentary analysis of academic materials. The selection of the cases under discussion is therefore grounded in this underlying concern to give voice to theoretical debates.

There's a final reason why the thesis is relevant. Once an interpretation is developed of IR's constitutive problems, it will also go over debates about IR's future. Assuming an epistemological take on the assessment of 'the future', the debates, in the past, tended to give primordial space to what Ole Waever and Arlene Tickner describe as epistemological and ontological reflexivity (Waever and Tickner 2009). The emphasis on philosophical and theoretical matters allowed, on the other hand, a more meaningful understanding of IR's substantive matters. The past, present and future of IR were, most of the time, presented in such ways (Bull 1972, Little and Smith 1981, Smith 1995, Halliday 1995). But this is changing, and IR is returning to more traditional problems (Jorgensen 2022, Buzan and Erskine 2016). Of particular concern in these moves is the role that we are giving to understanding national communities of IR in a global context. The thesis agrees with Waever and Tickner's conclusion that we need to move beyond epistemological and ontological reflexivity to sociological reflexivity (Waever and Tickner 2009, Smith 2008, Bueger 2007). The third contribution of the thesis is to (re)focus on the literature of Global IR and address the issue of change in national communities. It will more specifically highlight how dependent change in these communities is on institutional and intellectual reforms, the significance of which will be stressed in the conclusion, where the argument comes full circle.

In summary, if the main purpose is to allow all those dedicated to presenting IR as a field of research to engage in deeper analytical or theoretical conversations among themselves, this requires clarifying why studying these issues is important, how to identify them, how to frame the conversation in theoretical terms and, in line with similar presentations of the topic, outline a normative perspective for the future.

1.2. On International Relations' Constitutive Problems: Why Should We Study Them?

When analysing the literature dedicated to introducing IR as a field of research, Stanley Hoffmann suggests that beyond a discussion over theory or specific problems, his concern is with the "field as a whole" (Hoffmann 1960:vi). This is a study that intends to locate itself precisely at that level and enquire about "the field as a whole" (Hoffmann 1960:vi). Again, agreeing with Hoffmann, that raises the research question of "how should one go about studying world politics?" (Hoffmann 1960:vi). The question becomes, *why* is it an important discussion to have in IR, and *how* to characterise it. This part will answer why we should give credibility to studying IR as a field of research.

1.2.1. Research Methodology and Research Process

If there are some areas of IR research where a productive engagement among academics has ensued and where there are frequent stocktaking exercises that highlight precisely how these conversations have unfolded and how new contributions add to research[2], one of the problems of the manuals that aim to describe and theorise about IR as a field of research is that they do not engage in conversations with one another. There is a clear corpus of connected literature, yet these contributions – both as edited collections (Hoffmann 1960, Farrell and Smith 1967, Little and Smith 2005, Booth and Erskine 2016) and as single reflections (Hellmann 2011, Jorgensen 2022) – speak for themselves. Even though these contributions do provide valuable insights into the state of the IR as a field and sometimes do carry normative weight, clearly promoting certain agendas, there is no attempt to engage with previous and similar literature when introducing the contents. There is no debate among scholars about what describing or theorising about the field necessarily involves, nor is it clear why certain contributions are valuable when compared to others. This, at its core, is a methodological problem.

Awareness of this methodological problem can be found in other contributions. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal conclude the following "[N]ew introductions – more or less advanced – appear each year ... A choice is made by authors and editors about the topics worthy of discussion ..., and chapters are crafted to do these topics justice. Seldom, though, do these volumes have a "voice" of their own, above and beyond that of their individual, constituent chapters" (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008:5). If the problem is acknowledged, the solution seems unsatisfactory. The authors ask "What kind of work is this *Handbook?* Is it a reference book? Is it an introduction? Is it a commentary? Is it a contribution to research? Is it an account of international relations as political practice, or of international relations as a field of study? If the latter, is it a statement of where the field has been or where it should be going?" (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008:3). They conclude that they aspire the volume

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[2] For example in the study of international security (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1997, Krause and Williams 1996, 2018),

to be "an introduction and a reference work" (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008:4) but also "much more than that. We want it to be read as a critical, reflective intervention into debates about international relations as a field of inquiry. It is much more than a commentary, therefore, as our goal is to push debate forward, not merely to recount it" (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008:4). The way they go about creating this reflective intervention is by developing a specific set of questions that they want the contributors of the volume to answer. This, according to the argument, would give cohesion to the volume, hence giving the 'voice' needed that would move beyond works that are mere introductions, commentaries, and reference books. This emphasis on the theoretical/analytical framework as a solution to existing materials comes out in their criticism of the prevailing way used by scholars to introduce IR.

These concerns, coming directly from literature debating IR as a field of research, are pertinent. They identify the prevailing problem with the types of manuals being produced and the goals that underpin such endeavours. Reference books, commentary, and introductions are, therefore, different from contributions. Volumes may have more or less theoretical content. But one can reframe this important reflexive problem in the literature: the issue seems not to be the purpose of the collection or just adding theoretical content to a volume. It is, instead, debating and discussing the purposes of social research itself. The answer, it seems, rests more on debating the problem at the level of research methodology and the research process itself (Kothari 2004, Kumar 2011) and not on the type of manual and the goals of manuals.

Framing the problem as such, we can conclude that the purpose of social research should always be to develop contributions. To do so we need to conduct research which, in itself, can be understood differently by different contributors to the debate. For example, for C.R. Kothari, research "refers to the systematic method consisting of enunciating the problem, formulating a hypothesis, collecting the facts or data, analysing the facts and reaching certain conclusions either in the form of solutions(s) towards the concerned problem or in certain generalisations for some theoretical formulation" (2004:2). In yet another contribution, Uwe Flick assumes research to be "the systematic analysis of research questions by using empirical methods (e.g. of asking, observing, re-using and analyzing data). Its aim is to make empirically grounded statements that can be generalized or to test such statements" (Flick 2020:6). One, however, has to go with the understanding provided by Dong-Wook Song for whom "research (more preciously, academic or scientific research) has to do with (i) linking (that is a 'conversation') what has been done (the past) with what has to be done (the present and/or future) in a way to generate new knowledge and (ii) objectifying what you are doing in a way to contribute to your chosen field (or community)" (Song 2021:408).

Generating new knowledge and contributions lies at the core of all these understandings of what is research, as does the idea that there is a research process that allows us to build such

knowledge and contributions. Again, a debate exists about how to interpret this process (Kothari 2004, Flick 2020), but one has to accept the view that at the core of this process lies the selection of a topic of research, conducting a literature review underpinned by a theory, support such statements with a methodology and methods that will, assist, after the cases are selected, in the collection and analysis of data and the extrapolation of conclusions (Silverman and Marvasti 2008, Merrian and Tisdell 2016). The literature that dedicates itself to presenting IR as a research field, when compared to other literatures, clearly suffers from a more committed engagement with this research process, and it is here – and not in the nature of the publication – that the methodological critique needs to take place.

But there's a more specific critique that can be advanced to Reus-Smith and Snidal's insightful acknowledgement of some of the limitations in this literature. They claim that if only we had a theoretical voice, the problem would be fixed. The issue with this statement is again one of not correctly inserting the conclusion in the research process. The theoretical statement is certainly an important stage in this process, included as it needs to be in the literature review. But there's also an important function of the literature review that is not taken into account by the authors. This is the fact that it needs to (critically) assess what has been done in the past. This is a necessary step prior to advancing any way forward. According to Bryan Greetham, a literature review should:

"1 Formulate the research question or hypothesis that you want to research. 2 Describe the context of your research – to show how the various research studies relate to each other and address issues that have a bearing on your own research project. 3 Present your critical evaluation of the findings of these studies. 4 Outline and justify your choice of the relevant theories, methodology and research tools and instruments that you want to use in your research. 5 Identify new ways in which to interpret previous research or resolve conflicts between previous studies. 6 Identify the gap or the unanswered question that your research will address or a theory against which you want to test a hypothesis" (2021: xi).

Even though a critical analysis of point 7 can be advanced at this stage[3], the centrality given to the idea that one has to critically assess what was done in the past to propose a new theoretical way forward is more succinctly expressed by Greentham when he claims that "In short, whether yours is a stand-alone review or a review that lays the basis for a dissertation or thesis, your aim is to show what is known and highlight what is not known or is uncertain" (2021: xi). It is also present in, for example, when he claims "Besides providing a foundation—a theoretical framework—for the problem to be investigated, the literature review can demonstrate how the present study advances, refines, or revises what is already known" (Merriam and Tisdell 2016:91).

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[3] The generation of a hypothesis is essential in hypothesis-driven research, such as experimental or deductive studies, where researchers test a specific prediction. In qualitative studies, a formal hypothesis may not be necessary. The specific goal of this thesis is to understand theories rather than testing a pre-existing assumption.

The methodological problem of not having a 'voice' is not solved through a discussion of different types of manuals and or by inserting theoretical argumentation in the contribution. It is instead resolved by focusing exclusively on what drives the creation of contributions in social research. At the core of this is an understanding that we need to go through a research process where, among other steps, a literature review stage is of importance. Seeing research as a conversation necessarily involves understanding what has come before and how we can contribute. It also involves identifying theoretical and methodological frameworks that allow for an understanding of data.

Why is it, therefore, important to study IR's constitutive problems? Because, as in other areas, we need to create a sense that we are producing knowledge. Even though there are highly valuable interpretations of these matters, in this more formal sense, this body of work is not systematically contributing to knowledge production.

1.2.2. The Institutionalisation of International Relations

This motivation to provide clarity to chaos is different from the one expressed by Quincy Wright (1955). Also writing in the spirit of a different time, Wright was mainly concerned with giving a voice to IR in an age where it was being proliferated by a number of different disciplines. This motivation is expressed in the preface to the study, where Wright claims that even though a lot of activity is developed on IR, "there is some doubt on this point or, at least, on the sense in which it exists" (1955:vii). These doubts are justified by Wright's personal experience with students teaching at the University of Chicago, where "students complained that while the courses recommended usually had more or less relevance to what might be called international relations, they were not quite sure what the subject was" (Wright 1955:vii). To solve this problem, Wright suggests that two solutions were applied at the University of Chicago: one that still focused on teaching IR through the lens of multidisciplinarity and a second one which aimed to identify the distinctiveness of IR. Quincy Wright was directly engaged in this second endeavour, building the course for it. The book is a reflection of a concern to move beyond a multidisciplinary approach to IR and to focus on the exclusive immersion in the field of IR and its unique essence, being a direct result of the contents of the course.

A good summary of the book comes in the form of a sentence: "Whether viewed as a discipline or as a condition, international relations needs thought and ordering in the atomic age" (Wright 1955:ix). This sentence seems to bring cohesion to the volume as a whole, which is an incursion into how IR was conceived as a field of research at the time of writing. Wight's contribution can be conceived, therefore, as an example of an intellectual exercise that, driven by the anxiety of unsettling/undefined foundations, aims to characterise and digest how to understand IR as a field of

research as a whole. Understanding the scope, theoretical and substantive components of IR is therefore a direct consequence of extracting from the anxiety a broader goal. But there's also a second and more precise reading of the anxiety. If understanding IR as a condition and the substantive matters that mostly characterise the field deserve separate chapters and parts, it seems that the specificity of the multidisciplinary concern of the book leads one to focus on the contribution to the debate of how IR can be classified as a discipline - and how other disciplines contribute to IR's self-identity. The focus on this more specific issue becomes a core concern of not only this book but of a particular interpretation of the history of this period to which the argument now turns.

1.2.2.1- Quincy Wright in His Time: Towards a Revised View of the History of IR

The history of IR has been told and retold in waves of intellectual reflection that have gained new traction since the 1990s (Schmidt 1994, Dunne 1995, Schmidt 2002). The literature can be understood along three levels: theoretical, geographical and the inner driver(s) of the narrative.

Brian Schmidt's theoretical characterisation of research still constitutes an important starting point to theoretically understand the literature. Taking inspiration from Schmidt, the conclusion can be achieved that there are four distinguishable approaches to the study of disciplinary history: the scientific, the historical, the externalist and the internalist. Two approaches characterised by a faith in scientific progression have marked the description of the history of IR: one emphasising 'great debates' (Waever 1996) and the other 'paradigmatic shifts' (Banks 1985) or 'research programmes' (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998).

The second relevant aspect to ask is where these frameworks should be applied. Increasingly, we are coming to recognise that what has traditionally been described as 'IR history' is actually a very limited understanding of history devoted exclusively to telling the story in Western Europe and the US academy. But, also increasingly, there is more history beyond Western Europe and beyond the US academy. In this sense, writing the history of, say France (Breitenbauch 2013), can contribute as much to the development of literature about 'the history of IR' as much as the traditional assumptions that understand this endeavour exclusively as a Anglo-Saxon endeavour (Ashworth 2014, Schmidt 1998).

Grounding the research in a theoretical and geographical perspective is sometimes not enough, however. To these theoretical approaches, we can add the internal dynamic of the narrative told. And these can be distinguished between external, institutional and internal drivers. Studies can incorporate several of these dynamics into their argument. External drivers include 'real world events' as drivers of change. Institutional drivers emphasise the study of processes of institutionalisation that lead to the consolidation of IR as a field of research. Several internal or intellectual drivers also characterise the discussions: first, the reconstruction of the history of IR as the collection of different

traditions of thought or theories in time (Wight 1992). The second is the historical reconstruction of specific views of the subject matter, understood as 'the international' (Ashworth 2014), or sovereignty (Knutsen 1992). The third is a faith in scientific progress where changes are explained in terms of anomalies (Groom, Barrinha and Olson 2019:89) within IR approaches and the incapacity they have to explain reality accurately. The fourth reinforces instead the nature of IR as a discipline (Schmidt 1998).

By approaching the 'history of IR' literature along these three levels, we can provide a clearer view of how external and internal variables are at play. The issue, of course, in order to build a coherent theoretical framework from the beginning to the end in these contributions, is how to reconcile the turn to science that occurs in IR increasingly after the 1930s, where debates become more 'internal' and scientific, with previous views where externalism reigns supreme. This dynamism runs some of the present contributions to the history of IR into trouble if an integral viewpoint running coherently from the beginning to the end of the argument is the goal. For example, in his contribution Lucian Ashworth (2014) has to reconcile a historical framework that moves beyond Quentin Skinner in framing time and space in light of perennial questions (level one) with views of 'the international' that take into account transformations based on external factors – development of the modern state, industrial revolution, problem of world peace, nuclear war and their manifestations in the development of 'subject matters' – while, at the same time he has to frame internal intellectual disputes separately – he brings the work of Peter Gallison to understand how communities of scholars form subcultures of both contact and common language especially after the 'realist turn' that happens after the end of World War II (level 3). An incapacity to firmly ground these transformations more coherently also appears in pure externalist contributions such as the one by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan's contribution (2019). The authors ground their theoretical framework (level 1) in a view of theory open to both explanation and understanding, but that is, at the same time, conditioned by the fact that there is a necessary link for theory to be developed directly from practical concerns. In other words, the history of IR is read from an extract of what goes on in the real world and its many events and how authors and academics think of this world. But this configuration, which is never clearly conditioned by any other theoretical argument, suffers from inconsistency when we see, for example, the emergence of constructivism in the literature. This purely internal development may be clarified when the authors claim that "Constructivism is not so obviously abstracted from Western practice, but is drawn from Western philosophy of knowledge" (Acharya and Buzan 2019:2-3) or when they claim that "IR has been largely built on the assumption that Western history and Western political theory are world history and world political theory" (Acharya and Buzan 2019:3). But the problem is that we are never told what theoretically is feeding 'western political theory' except the declarative argument that it exists and is influencing the substantive presentation of the argument (level 3).

A consistent framework would pick up the context-specific historical approach of Lucian Ashworth (2014) (level 1), grounding it fully in a sociological perspective that would take inspiration in, among others, the contributions of Ole Waever (1998) and in sociology of science/knowledge (level 2), which, itself, gives pride space to a view of IR conceived as a disciplinary field (Schmidt 1998) (level 3).

1.2.2.2.- Beyond Quincy Wright and Back

The integral framework proposed is therefore sensitive to historical contextualism while, at the same time, conceives the 'international' in terms of an analysis rooted in sociology of science/knowledge which, itself, sees IR as a disciplinary field. Impacted by politics, the transition of a disciplinary field is consolidated when it is capable of gaining theoretical, institutional and intellectual autonomy from politics.

Robert Merton can be used as an example of this type of work. In his endeavour to understand how social science can distance itself from politics, his initial work does concede that externalism, politics and culture do have an impact on the way we develop research. The political world and what goes on around us do have an extremely important impact on our concerns as social scientists. However, even though there's externalism, and for Merton, science is devoid of values. Against other sociological attitudes that attribute to values a constant place in the way we conduct ourselves in social research – building Political views of the political (Manheim 1936) – for Merton, such linkage never exists. Relying on earlier versions of positivism allows him to build such a case. Even though we are affected by external politics, we can construct a scientific product. Being more or less Political, the point remains for the argument: autonomy from politics requires an effort to theorize the political in non-Political/Mertonian forms or Political forms.

If this is the first step to acquire autonomy, the second step takes place internally. According to Piots Sztompka "Merton shifts the focus from scientific knowledge alone to the whole of science in operation including the structure and operation of the specific social subsystem" (1986:39). This move from sociology of knowledge to sociology of science further leads him to focus on issues internal to the functioning of science itself such as normative system of science, the behavioural patterns of scientists or the organisation of scientific communities in relation to scientific knowledge. Autonomy from politics and from pure day-to-day discussions, in this second sense, is achieved by creating the internal conditions for a debate among scientists through the institutionalisation of the scientific discourse and the creation of a sense of scientific community among academics. Debating what constitutes a discipline and a scientific community becomes an intrinsic part of this process.

Applying these ideas to the way in which IR scholars have rethought the history of the field, and excluding the important phase where IR was conceived in imperialist and internationalist forms

(Long and Schmidt 2005, Vitalis 2015), the literature has also revised what has conventionally been described as 'the first debate'. In particular, the impact of externalism and politics in the formation of the field has been assessed. On the one hand, we can point to the contribution of Jan Stockmann (2022), for whom the initial stages of IR are characterised by a profound interaction between academia and the real world. Stockmann's theorization of politics and international relations takes the form of a Political view of International Relations. On the other hand, for Schmidt's more internal/insular position – far away from politics –, there was never a debate between realists and idealists, rather what characterised an initial discussion was a dispute between different proponents of juristic theory: some more prone to align with a realist understanding of the world, others keener to put forward a theory of pluralism (Schmidt 1998). This was a debate that, at its core, engaged with the issue of how the "academic field of international relations has attempted to provide authoritative knowledge about the subject matter of international politics" (1998:12). The theorization of international realities can't be seen through the lens of realism/idealism but, instead, through two approaches to juristic theory that were academically/internally characterising the discussions.

If this briefly brings to light the importance of different postures towards the Politicisation of politics in this first phase, Quincy Wright can be approached as emphasising more institutional or scientific themes. These are less interested in the Politicisation or non-Politicisation of research but are characterised by an understanding of the institutionalisation of research. A re-reading of the history of IR inspired by the sociology of science needs to rethink this institutionalisation process in itself in ways that move beyond current understandings. As Jan Stockmann concludes, "Histories of IR have paid little attention to the institutional environment of early IR scholarship and focused instead on re-interpreting the published works of well-known authors" (2022:75). Institutionalisation is considered in the scheme advanced in the previous section, an important driver of contemporary evaluations of the History of IR (level 3). The question becomes how to bring it to the argument. Institutionalisation during this period can be re-thought in two ways: as part of a larger realist movement that became hegemonic in IR from the 1940s (Ashworth 2014, Guilhot 2017, Schmidt 2002) or in itself (Acharya and Buzan 2019).

A re-reading of this historical stage as an institutionalisation period would also help dissect the main revisionist perspective that has been put forward for debating the period when Quincy Wright was writing. Scholars have viewed this historical period as the ascendancy of a discipline debating realist themes. Rather than a 'second great debate' between traditionalists and scientists, revisionists characterise this period as the ascendancy of a disciplinary crisis. In this sense, Brian Schmidt concludes, "One of the consequences of neglecting a careful study of the history of the field has been a failure to recognize adequately the work of the members of the Chicago School of political science. In the 1920s and 1930s, Harold Lasswell, Charles Merriam, and Quincy Wright believed that they were

at the forefront of developing a universal science of politics (2002:19). This argument is further developed later (Schmidt 2012). For Schmidt, what characterizes the literature just before and after World War II is a dispute about the nature of IR as a disciplinary field. According to Schmidt, the disciplinary crisis was characterized by concerns over how the "field has lacked its own unique subject-matter and specific methodology" (Schmidt 2012:99).

Nicolas Guilhot (2017) further contributes to this revisionism when he provides further content to this characterisation. As he concludes "As the demand for IR courses grew … This context triggered a protracted discussion about the study of IR, and the late 1940s saw a proto-disciplinary conversation take shape in journal articles, conferences, and reports of various kinds. The twin issues of relativism and rationalism thus resonated within an ongoing reflection about the nature of international politics" (2017:37). The main dispute that emerges – between a classical and behavioural versions of realism – is thus one where "Scholars opposed to value relativism and to the rationalist view of power sought to move the field away from its interdisciplinary stage, which subjected it to the dominant trends in political science. It gradually became clear that the only way to achieve this was to pursue disciplinary autonomy. The rejection of relativism and rationalism thus provided the common denominator for the forces that converged into the project of building a theory of international relations" (2017:39). At the centre of this dispute are not just methodological and substantive matters, but disciplinary concerns.

Institutionalisation can also be rethought in a second way: in itself. As a driver of understandings of the History of IR it has taken a formal form in the work of Acharya and Buzan (2019) by an assessment of how the "number of places teaching it, the number of journals and think tanks, the number of people doing IR teaching and research, and the setting up of academic IR associations conferences" (Achara and Buzan 2019:142) has increased throughout IR's history. Dates are mentioned and registered. Jan Stockmann takes this further by uncovering "the motives behind these institutions and to contextualise the intellectual output they produced over the following decades" (2022:75). Pushing this agenda beyond formality and intellectual contribution and focusing on issues of institutionalisation of scientific discourse and the creation of a sense of scientific community among academics, we can extract a more significant element in the conversation going on at this stage. An increased awareness to the way courses are designed, the contents of these courses, the ways in which they are to be delivered, what it means to teach, the discussion of different in-class teaching techniques, outlooks for institutional formations of IR departments, issues of recruitment, among others, are highly debated and discussed during this period (Harrison 1936, Zimmern 1937, Manning 1954, Kirk 1947). Quincy Wright's work can also be framed in this manner. His whole contribution, in line with a concern with these types of educational debates, aims to move IR in Chicago away from a general multidisciplinary framework and focus on IR as a unique field of research. Underpinning the whole endeavour is the concern about the question of how to better educate students in this

speciality. The solution, for Wright, required moving away from a multidisciplinarity and focusing on the singularity of IR. If a decade prior to his contribution, a contemporary of Wright, Grayson Kirk was writing that a graduate course should consist of "(1) a general introductory course which stresses the fundamentals of international politics; (2) courses on international organization, international law, international economics, political geography, diplomatic history, social psychology, political theory, and comparative government; (3) a regional course or an advanced topical course; and (4) a senior seminar or coordinating course" (Kirk 1947:51), writing a decade later and in the same spirit of Quincy Wright, Vernon Van Dyke would claim in an article aimed to address ways to improve teaching in IR that, "Along with the problem of developing coherence goes the problem of conceptualization and its clarity" (1957:580). Wright can be seen as participating in this effort to develop a more technical and specific understanding of the contents of an IR course.

In conclusion, in the United States (US), building an IR field required a double move away from ir (international relations): first intellectualising and theorising the (policy-driven) reality via the Politisation or non-Politicisation of the discourse, and, second and crucially for the matters under discussion, understanding the nature of IR as a disciplinary (containing a specific theoretical and international political quality) and institutional field.

The anxiety driving Wright in understanding IR as a field of research can now be translated as deriving from this sense that IR needs to achieve a better sense of (institutional) self. At its core, affected by multidisciplinarity, the solution seemed to be to research the inner problems that affect IR and that provide the field with a distinctive institutional identity. Wright's contribution needs to be contextualised in a historical period in IR that aims to do precisely this. Scientifically, the goal of debating IR as a discipline and as a condition can also be seen as a necessary step to provide autonomy to IR away from politics. No longer conditioned by the theorisation of important policy-driven debates, IR in Wright's age faces the challenge of thinking of itself in deeper institutionalised terms: debating IR's disciplinary/interdisciplinarity is an important part of this process as well as its deeper educational purposes. Through this analysis of Wright's intentions, its deeper sociology of science roots and the rewriting of this historical context by highlighting these roots, we understand why studying constitutive problems is important: moving away from politics, they help us understand better the institutional autonomy of the field.

1.2.3. Theoretical Pluralism and the Technical Turn

Stanley Hoffmann provides a third reason for why studying IR's constitutive problems becomes relevant. According to him the overwhelming production of IR has become "an overcrowded shopping

center" (1960:v), where the only solution to make sense of it all becomes to develop "more systematic work than has been done in the past" (1960:v). how, therefore, to develop more systematic work and bring order to chaos? According to Hoffmann this requires "a plea for theory" (1960:v). Two arguments are advanced: first, following Wright's and the spirit of the age, it necessarily involves debates about what the disciplinary ethos of IR is (Hoffmann 1960:1-12), but beyond this, Hoffmann also links this endeavour with a more specific understanding of theory. Understanding IR's as a research field therefore, in this sense, requires engaging in theoretical reasoning (Hoffmann 1960:171-189, Hoffman 1959). In order to overcome confusion and chaos and to provide guidance we need a particular understanding of theory.

A number of suggestions are put forward by Hoffmann to justify this view of theory. First, the duty of the scholar "is to seek knowledge and understanding for their own sake; and this implies that the main purpose of research should not be "policy scientism" (1959:349). Second, his theory is certainly interdisciplinary but to the extent that "our tools of analysis should be borrowed from other disciplines only insofar as they deal with factors or units relevant to international relation" (1959:366). Third, he criticises two types of theory construction: first is one that aims to produce a 'general system of action' and second, another that uses a closed conceptual playbook. The scientific purposes of the first are "to discover laws, recurrent patterns, regularities, high-level generalizations; to make of predictability a test of science; to achieve as soon as possible the ideal of a deductive science" (1959:357). The second can be divided between one view where "the central concept is supposedly used only as an analytical tool" (1959:362) where "A "static bias"" is imposed on the data" (1959:362). An alternative conceptual view departs from a set of fixed and value free proposals for action and ends up with a "scheme ends with a mere enumeration of factors" (1959:364).

Against these two versions of value-free conceptualism, Hoffmann proposes a new version. One where it is not "possible to squeeze the whole camel of international relations through the eye of one needle" (1959:365). He further develops this proposal for a historical sociology of IR when he claims that it is rooted in pluralism. According to Hoffmann, this pluralism promotes a view where each "one of the approaches I have reviewed has something to contribute; none is the only right way of phrasing the question, or the only right answer. In every social science, and quite obviously here, the facts we can gather are too numerous, too open to conflicting interpretations, too "unstructured," to fit only one scheme of analysis" (1959:365). Furthermore, this is a philosophical position rooted in the idea that understanding 'objective' behaviour is impossible and where "Science which refuses to pronounce on value problems leads to a policy scientism" (1959:366).

We can, therefore, find in Hoffmann's conceptual pluralism another important reason to study IR as a field of research. The initial anxiety expressed by Hoffmann of making sense of a very confusing and expanding field, he answers with an appeal to theory. This is a theory that is more than the voice

of chancelleries - "fighting of crusades, the desire to advise policy-makers, the scholar's dedication to national or international causes can, and perhaps even should be, the occasion, but they should not be the purpose of theoretical research. Political science in this country grew largely out of a similar curative urge and engineering itch, but it outgrew them, too" (1959:349) -, second, this is a theory that is interdisciplinary but recognises that interdisciplinary works by bringing ideas to already existing concepts, finally this is a theory that aims to make sense of IR in all its dimensions: we can't reduce the exercise to strict and scientific assessments of the field as if there are closed and non-normative views of the matter. Rather making sense requires bringing in different worldviews together. Making sense of IR as a field of research requires an endeavour to make sense of the many voices that build IR as a research field.

Brian Schmidt helps us understand this turn to theory that characterises the history of the field after World War II. Even though his justification is never clarified, it implies that IR after its disciplinary crisis debate evolved into a condition in which a number of other deeper theoretical confrontations started to characterise the discussions. Accordingly, "the field has become increasingly pluralistic" (Schmidt 2002:20). What he describes as a 'third debate' became the confrontation between epistemology and methodology which lies at the core of the conversation between 'traditionalists' and behaviouralists. Other technical debates followed: "the inter-paradigm and post-positivism debates, there is the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism (Baldwin, 1993; Kegley, 1995); between rationalists and reflectivists (Keohane, 1988; Walker, 1989); and between rationalists and constructivists ... Yet this listing only begins to scratch the surface, since there are also numerous debates within specific approaches such as constructivism, feminism, realism, and post-structuralism" (Schmidt 2002:20). In other words, Schmidt links together what traditionally are conceived as the second and the third debates and brings them all together under the umbrella of deeper theoretical and plural confrontations.

How does this view of the problem fare in terms of the overall development of IR as a field of scientific research? Returning to Mertons's conception of science, this transition can be understood as a deeper engagement with the debates about/related to sociological epistemology. This is not an area of research that Merton invests a lot of time in, but the broad move is set in place. Raising issues of knowledge necessarily leads scientists to question deeper sources of their own theoretical reasoning and, in itself, is a third important move that can be taken when understanding the sociology of science. Moving from political discourse to the politicization of science and, second, from the politicization of science to the institutionalisation of a scientific discourse, in this third phase science becomes engaged in deeper theoretical and technical discussions.

In his justification for researching IR as a field of research, Hoffman's solution to bringing order to chaos via theoretical pluralism is a clear example of the presence of this technical and theoretical

move in IR which finds roots both in a revised internalist view of the history of this period and in sociology of science. This engagement with deeper theoretical complexity further characterises the next reason given to understand IR's constitutive problems.

1.2.4. Sociological Reflexivity

There's a fourth reason why understanding IR's constitutive problems is important: IR is currently going through a sociological reflexive turn where more attention is being given to the contexts in which IR is born. In a recent introduction to the field, Knud-Erik Jorgensen concludes, "While the numerical expansion is most welcome and presumably reflects an increased demand for specialized scientific knowledge about a globalized yet disorderly world, the widening of scope has left the discipline with an unnecessary identity crisis. What is the discipline? Who are we IR scholars? How do we define the boundaries of the discipline? Should there be any boundaries?" (Jorgensen 2022:2).

One of the challenges, then, when writing about the field these days is to identify it as belonging to a Global IR agenda. According to some more specific assessments, "The discipline has undergone epistemological and ontological reflexivity, and is now increasing its sociological reflexivity (and attention to the geography of the discipline)" (Waever and Tickner 2009:1). To address the turn, Ole Waever and Arlene Tickner suggest more specifically an agenda "the study of any given locale should attempt to ask both about the way the "formal" field of International Relations has been constituted (or not), its origins, boundaries, relation to neighboring fields, its relation to policy making (e.g., as a chain of connected circles from think-tanks to universities, or not), and how it relates to IR at the core (import, dependence, hybridization, resistance). However, we should also ask what other fields have developed in ways that interrogate important elements of International Relations. A part of the solution is to explicitly ask the question: What is locally international? In other words, we should all ask "What is international where I live?", given that those issues, agendas, and concepts representing global issues vary from place to place" (Waever and Tickner 2009:17).

Answering these questions doesn't come easy. It requires an understanding of the disciplinary, philosophical and substantive complexities of IR. In order to better understand and give answers to the sociological reflexive turn, scholars need to have a stronger grasp of IR's constitutive problems. In other words, before engaging in understanding national specifications, scholars must first engage with the question of what IR is in the first place (Rigueira 2012). Answering these questions necessarily requires a better grasp of IR's constitutive problems.

1.3. Identifying Constitutive Questions

As stated before, one of the reasons why we need to engage in the study of IR's constitutive problems is because of methodological deficiencies when discussing these matters. At heart, it was also argued, this is mainly to do with not just developing a theoretical framework with which to analyse a certain problem, but the prior literature review problem of identifying how other scholars have treated the matter. This step will be the focus of this and the next part of the introduction. If some work presenting IR as a field of research does have theoretical concerns (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008, Weber 2010), the prior step of clarifying what others thought about the same matter is completely missing from these contributions.

The first step is to create analytical categories with which to understand these constitutive problems by framing them in constitutive questions. But how? In his review of the field, Fred Sondermann identifies two types of textbooks linking them with two approaches, "One type consists of large collections of data, strung together in a "freight-train pattern"—with a number of topics (boxcars) labeled State, Sovereignty, Nationalism, Imperialism, Power, Collective Security, etc., combined in more or less random fashion … The second type of text attempts a more unified presentation of the subject matter of international relations by organizing its contents around one or more central propositions or assumptions" (1957:102). One can agree with Sondermann but requalify his view and call these two ways of understanding how to frame constitutive questions in IR the implicit and the explicit approaches. Implicit approaches describe in themselves certain problems without referring to anything beyond themselves. Explicit approaches are contributions that aim to extrapolate bigger characterizations, hence integrating the effort in an exercise that aims to bring cohesion to the whole.

When analysing the literature that describes or theorises about IR as a field of research, we see that three distinctive types of contributions can be identified. Sometimes there is the intermingling of different issues in single contributions (Bull 1972, Holsti 1998, Dyvik, Selby and Wilkinson 2017). While this characterises some of the literature, an industry of manuals dedicated to introducing IR theory, on the one hand (Aron 1967, Hellmann 2020), and more substantive matters, on the other (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2014, Bova 2012) has also developed. Constitutive questions can be extrapolated from this literature.

1.3.1. Implicit Treatments

The first can be broadly characterised by attempts to identify trends in research (Dunn 1949, Snyder 1955) where topics and issues are selected in specific parts, sections or chapters but we are never told how the parts are related coherently to a whole.

This type of contribution could be traced back to earlier manuals (Grant, Greenwood, Hughes, Kerr and Urquhart 1916, Gibbons 1922, Bryce 1922, Brown, Hodges and Roucek 1939). In these initial contributions to identify IR as a field of study, we see a concern with issues of history, war and its resolution, foreign policy and diplomacy. Also these manuals debate international economics, international organization and law. Finally, what emerges from this literature is a concern with expansion, imperialism and integration. The analysis of IR's subject matter – and, more specifically, an emphasis on IR's international political dimensions – seemed to characterise these earlier introductions.

In 1930(s) and 1940(s), other concerns emerge (Gurian 1946, Wolfers 1947, Kirk 1947, Steiner 1940), which are consolidated in subsequent decades. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, in the 1950s, stress how important it became to understand 'the science of international politics' (Morgenthau and Thompson 1950). This concern with theory went alongside the 'old' emphasis present in the earlier manuals on dissecting IR's subject matter with an emphasis on issues dealing with the nature of international politics. if one can broadly say that IR's subject matter characterised earlier presentations, the volume by Morgenthau and Thompson broadened this concern to include problems of theory.

Another important collector of previous trends is Norman D. Palmer's volume (1970). This volume is important because it reemphasises the importance of studying theory, but it also adds the dimension of what Palmer describes as 'scope'. He introduces IR in ways that stress IR's disciplinary scope, theory, methods and (substantive) relevance. Problems of discipline are here characterised more broadly as issues of scope, while theory, methods and (substantive) relevancy have separate parts (Palmer 1970).

In the 1980(s), other scope problems started to (re)gain attention – namely the proliferation of the study of IR around the world – while, at the same time, the substantive predominance of a 'classical tradition' was under pressure (Holsti 1985). For Holsti, this substantive challenge also raised another important debate: is theoretical pluralism positive for IR. This was happening while IR was going through turmoil in its theoretical self-identity (Lapid 1989, George 1989). This theoretical and substantive tension continued in the next decades where scholars spend a lot of time reconfiguring mainly these two axes of the debate (Smith 1995, 1996, Booth 1995, Buzan and Little 2001). While, in more recent decades, we have seen an extension and re-emphasis on problems of what has been characterised as IR's scope (Smith 2008, Booth and Erskine 2016, Jorgensen 2021).

What seems clear in this brief overview is that, implicitly, a debate can be identified in these contributions that emphasise issues of scope/discipline, theory/methodology and substances/subject matters. These differentiations can be extracted, however, not from a coherent set-up of these concerns in a way that integrates the parts in a whole. Rather, the parts are read in themselves through an assessment of what, for the lack of better descriptions, seems to be the author's identification of trends in research or a commitment to a certain normative agenda. The parts, chapters or sections define the contribution in itself. There is no concern about aggregating the endeavour in an analytical whole.

1.3.2. Explicit Treatments

More explicit treatments of the same literature exist, however. These contributions aim to provide a coherent assessment not just of parts but of the whole. They categorise the whole ahead of describing the parts and integrate these parts coherently into a whole.

Sometimes these explicit treatments come inside a specific theoretical angle. One example of this is Synne Dyvik, Jan Selby and Rorden Wilkinson's introduction to these matters (Synne Dyvik, Selby and Wilkinson 2017). They ask, using a critical theoretical approach, "1 What is the purpose of IR? 2 What is IR's subject matter? 3 Why bother asking about the point of IR?" and divide the volume by introducing different issues inside each of these questions. Similar goals have Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (2008) when they organise the contributions; through a theoretical approach that aims to integrate theory in both its empirical and normative aspirations, along three questions "What is the nature of the theoretical endeavour in international relations? How have the empirical and the normative aspects of theories interacted to shape individual theories and the debates between them? And finally, has there been progress in the study of international relations, and if so in what sense?" (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008:4).

Other times such explicit treatments are devoid of theoretical predispositions but serve more as analytical guidelines. An example is Hedley Bull's partial assessment of IR's constitutive questions when he organises his essay along three questions: "(i) What is and what should be the subject-matter with which students of International Relations are concerned? (ii) What approaches and methodologies are helpful in studying this subject-matter, and how should the student of International Relations choose among them? (iii) What are some of the guidelines that an academic specialist in International Relations should follow in pursuing his work in the university and in society at large?" (Bull 1972:251)

Even though these volumes do engage in an effort to organise materials in ways that move beyond implicit statements, they nonetheless do not do so in a way that completely satisfies the position promoted here, either because of organisational issues or because they present partial views. Still keeping in mind the analytic predisposition of these explicit statements, grounds for a more aligned conception can be found in the work of Stanley Hoffmann (1960). After distinguishing the volume from the study of specific areas or specific theories, he suggests that "the emphasis is on the field as a whole" (Hoffmann 1960:vi). This necessarily poses an important question: "how should one go about studying world politics?" (Hoffmann 1960:vi). The way this question is answered is divided into three parts: "The first part argues the need for theory in connection with the general problems of scope and purpose of the discipline. The second part presents and discusses the main contemporary approaches to a general theory of international relations. The third part offers some suggestions for less ambitious but perhaps more satisfactory efforts toward theory and includes a tentative program of systematic research in areas I consider crucial for the development of the discipline" (Hoffmann 1960:v).

Another example of this broader and less partial approach is Kaveli Holsti's contribution (Holsti 1998). He divides the presentation of IR's constitutive problems in terms of "W questions: what to study, where to study, study by whom?, why study? How to study, what not to study, and what was left out?" (Holsti 1998: 18). Again in Holsti we see an attempt to understand some of the constitutive problems that seem of concern when introducing IR.

In yet another example, Donald Puchala (2002) asks what "emerges through the successive chapters are a divergent set of assessments of where the study of international relations stands theoretically; an even more divergent set of assessments of where we stand (or ought to stand) epistemologically; and a convergent set of assessments about the state of our substantive knowledge, combined with calls for new research in areas where most agree that such research needs to be done" (Puchala 2002:xiv-xv). Puchala, therefore, highlights and separates the debate along theoretical, epistemological and substantive dimensions. But at the same time, he suggests that in each of these dimensions, each contributor should address three questions: "(1) What ought the student of IR study? (2) How should the study of IR be conducted? (3) Why is it meaningful in contemporary contexts to study international relations within your prescribed paradigms and in the ways you prescribe?" (Puchala 2002:xiii).

1.3.3. On International Relations' Constitutive Questions

Both the implicit and explicit approaches provide clues to identify IR's constitutive problems. Certainly, the implicit focus on issues of scope/discipline, theory/methodology, and substance/subject matters helps clarify some of the problems under debate. This thesis finds inspiration in Puchala's explicit intentions but contests his view that debates about theory, epistemology and substance, as he suggests, necessarily involve within them what, how and why questions. Rather, these questions need to be equated to the problems. In other words, when Puchala asks *why* it is meaningful to study IR, he is, in fact, referring to issues of what he describes as theory (which he links to problems of pluralism), when he asks *how* should the study of IR be conducted, he is actually referring to problems of epistemology, when he asks *what* ought we to study he is actually referring to issues of substance. Equating these categories makes more sense.

If Puchala helps identify constitutive questions and some of the dimensions that characterise IR's constitutive debates, he is not, however, very successful in fully dissecting their potential scope. From an analytical point of view, and as will be described next, seeing *why* problems only through the lens of the debate about pluralism is a very limited thinning of all the constitutive problems that are included in this constitutive question. The next part, rooted in both the explicit and implicit approaches, will engage in a compromised commitment to clarify and expand the dimensions of this and other debates.

1.4. Dissecting the Why(s), How(s) and What(s) of International Relations

This part will continue with the endeavour of better understanding what goes on inside the literature that aims to characterise IR as a field of study prior to developing a theoretical framework. After having analytically segregated the literature into constitutive questions – why(s), how(s) and what(s) distinction – this part will move on to look at what constitutive problems characterise these questions.

1.4.1. The *Why(s)* of International Relations: The Identity of International Relations

In this section, it will be highlighted how IR can be read in terms of its many why(s). Recent contributions to why problems include the introduction of edited volumes (Devetak, Burke and George 2012, Booth and Erskine 2016). In their introduction to an edited book, Devetak, (2012) starts by addressing the issue of what we mean when we discuss the words international relations and the word

international, then addresses debates about the origins and evolution of the discipline and questions whether or not IR is a discipline, before engaging in debates about different theories and subject matters. Booth and Erskine (2016) also ask the reader to question what we mean when we say 'international' before moving on to emphasise epistemological and ontological problems and finalising by addressing substantive changes in current IR. We must separate these debates. The proposed solution presented here is to divide them into three core questions. We will highlight in this part why we should study IR questions.

1.4.1.1. Understanding the Themes of the Debate

With no progressive narrative intended, it can be argued that we saw three moments in the consolidation of *why* problems in IR: a first moment characterised by a thick and thin agenda, a second moment characterised by the thinning of the concerns with the advent of the Third Debate (Lapid 1989) and the recent re-emergence of classical themes that have characterised the first phase of contributions in a third moment.

If there is a contribution where we see the thick and thin agenda of the first moment at play is in Quincy Wright's *The Study of International Relations* (1955). As already suggested, this work emerges in a historical moment in Western/North-American IR when the field was going through a disciplinary crisis and where it was fighting for institutionalisation. How did this manifest itself in terms of why concerns? If one sentence can summarise the contribution that Wright aims to bring forward it appears in the preface: "Whether viewed as a discipline or as a condition, international relations needs thought and ordering in the atomic age" (Wright 1955:ix). We have to distinguish what Wright describes as discipline, condition and atomic age and be particularly concerned with elements that characterise the first. Wright is particularly interested in understanding two questions: first, what is the distinctive nature of the international and, second, how to understand its interaction with other fields of research and what the distinctive features of IR are. But also play an important role in his contribution is the thin agenda of asking whether or not there could be a grand theory in IR. Being a reflection of concerns that may find its inspiration in the 1930s/1940s (Zimmern 1936, Kirk 1947) the debate between the tick and thin agendas will continue up until the 1980s.

The thick agenda found an ally a few years later in the form of Stanley Hoffmann's *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (1960). The core issue raised by Hoffmann is whether IR can be considered a discipline (1960:1-13). In there, in the first part, we find a classical presentation of such concerns in the selection of a contribution by Frederick Dunn (Dunn 1948) entitled *The Scope of International Relations*. Dunn in this contribution, is revisiting a debate about whether or not IR should be considered a discipline and, if the answer is positive, the conditions under which this is a

possibility. Dunn concludes that IR is a separate field to the extent that it was able to create a special body of knowledge around which intellectual energy gravitated. He is particularly concerned with solidifying this intellectual energy around an identifiable subject matter and a set of techniques/methods that support such statements. The argument is that IR gains its distinctiveness by addressing "questions that arise in the relations between autonomous political groups in a world system in which power is not centred at one point" (Dunn 1948:144), where "Its goal is not merely knowledge for its own sake but knowledge for the purpose of moulding practical events in desired directions. In this sense it is a policy science" (Dunn 1948:145). In the study of war and foreign policies, IR scholars find their fundamental objects of study, according to Dunn.

Another classical example of the presentation of IR in terms of thick *why* problems is the edited book published in 1970 by Norman Palmer. Particularly relevant is part I. Entitled *Scope,* it is constituted by three contributions by Chadwick Alger, William Fox and Kenneth Thompson. The fundamental ideas behind these contributions highlight two issues: the importance of tracing the origins of present concerns from the past – and here, the essays of Alger and Fox engage in the uncovering of the history of IR up until that point and the, at the time, core concerns – and, second, how IR relates to other disciplines and fields of research. Creating a historical sense of origin, progression and present state and the relation of IR with other fields are the two issues highlighted by this contribution. Norman Palmer, therefore, expands the sense of scope emphasised by Frederick Dunn (1948) and Quincy Wright (1955) to include not only issues of disciplinarity and debates about what we mean by 'the international' but also a more conscious effort to understand the history of IR.

The thick agenda also incorporates debates about not only what is meant by 'the international', but also what we mean by 'international relations' in the first place. Such debate is particularly relevant in a contribution by Chadwick Alger (1968). Most of it is dedicated to understanding where IR was substantively moving, but the first two sections focus on an analysis of the history of the field and dissect what is meant by international relations. According to Alger there are four possible meanings of the term. The first international relations means "a human activity in which persons from more than one nation, individually and in groups, interact. International relations are carried on by face-to-face contact and through more indirect communications" (1968:61), the second makes a distinction between International Relations as a broad categorisation and its many subcategories (international politics, international economics, international communications, etc). The third equates international relations to the study of foreign governments and the policy-making apparatus. The fourth and final meaning "Includes only those characteristics of nations that have the greatest effect on interaction between nations" (1968:61).

Another important trend in the work during this time that helped solidify the thick agenda of *why we should study IR*, was the move towards a deeper understanding of how IR develops inside

national communities. Most of the work was a reflection on the state of IR in the US (Zimmern 1936, Manning 1954, Hoffmann 1977) but this is a research endeavour that gained a particularly relevant emphasis during this period. The contribution of William Fox (1961, 1968) could be mentioned at this stage to illustrate this concern. In his 1961 collaboration with Annette Fox, he aims to address three questions: "What forces explain its growth and its present shape? How have methods of teaching been affected by the goals of the teacher, by his relation to research, and by the formal organisation of international studies in American colleges and universities? To what extent is the American experience so rooted in uniquely American conditions that it is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere?" (Fox and Fox 1961:339). The focus seems to be on intellectual contributions, institutional development and cultural constraints when developing the study of IR. Intellectually there are two trends conditioning research: the desire to speak to practice and to integrate "the great transformations of twentieth-century world politics" (Fox and Fox 1961:343), and the desire to speak to the "changing fashions in social science and particularly political science, research" (Fox and Fox 1961:343). Institutionally, the goal of these early manuals is to examine general courses, and post-graduate courses and highlight some recommendations for formal university organizations as they relate to the optimum development of study. From the teaching materials for general courses, what transpires is how deeply embedded the teaching is with a "public service motivation and his voluntaristic predispositions" (1961:349). Fox and Fox cite Grayson Kirk's study (1947) to illustrate the core concerns that appear "in almost all the treatises and syllabi: (1) the nature and operation of the state system; (2) basic power factors; (3) the special position and policies of the first-ranking powers; (4) the history of international relations since World War I; and (5) the building of a better world order" (Fox and Fox 1961:351). William Fox and Annette Fox's contribution also goes over how post-graduate studies are organised and discusses the importance of research institutes, time management and effective intellectual communication. Culturally, Fox and Fox highlight how other emerging cultures that are researching IR – namely in the North American-West European-British Commonwealth – are not only engaged in increasingly bigger academic communication networks but should adjust "the subject matter to the great transformations in contemporary world politics" (Fox and Fox 1961:357). A final issue addressed is how the movement of researchers to the US to teaching positions impacted this community. Cultural discrepancies may cause some scepticism, which may be a good thing because, as Fox and Fox conclude, "There is one direction in which the American study of international relations has not moved and for which there does not yet seem to be much call on either side of the Atlantic. This is the comparative study of multiple-sovereignty systems" (Fox and Fox 1961:359). The work of William Fox, therefore, allows for an expansion of the concerns dealing with constitutive research for *why we should study IR.*

The thick agenda consolidated itself up until the 1980s by stressing the importance of understanding the history of IR, engaging in disputes over conceptual clarification of key terms – international or international relations –, disputes over the nature of disciplinarity, and also by digging into debates over how IR is impacted by national contexts. These are debates that characterised the research endeavours of generations of mainly US-based researchers but that were also running alongside a thinner agenda. This agenda is thin because it condemns the study of why problems to other more philosophically relevant (how) disputes. Up until the 1980s we saw both the thick and the thin agenda running alongside each other, a period where the thin agenda also changed configuration. This new configuration became a core concern of manuals dedicated to introducing IR as a field of research during the 1990s (Booth and Smith 1995, Smith 1996, George 1994, Puchala 2002). If in the previous decades, both agendas seemed to be important with the Third Debate (Lapid 1989), not only did the nature of the philosophical dispute change, but it became a core concern of scholars. Let's characterise these two moments then.

The first version of the argument, already present in Quincy Wright's (1955, 1964) contribution, comes in the form of a tendency to discuss the possibilities of a *grand theory* of International Relations. According to Wright, "a general theory of international relations means a comprehensive, comprehensible, coherent, and self-correcting body of knowledge contributing to the understanding, the prediction, the evaluation, and the control of relations among states and of the conditions of the world" (1964:20). But at the same time he claims we need these philosophical foundations to build a grand theory, he also concludes by saying that "A discipline which fulfils all these requirements will be extremely difficult to achieve" (1964:20). Such impossibility becomes clearer later on the argument when Wright argues that rather than one grand theory we can build multiple ones – as long as these conceptualisations are grounded in our capacity to generalize facts. A grand theory, in this sense, not only finds expression in the form of a 'superdiscipline' (1964:27-29), but, and crucially, also in the ability that different conceptions of the world should have to make sense of the "facts of international life" (1964:29). These conceptualisations are approached as mental images that can "be objectified by precise definition, eliminating non-essentials and establishing concepts of abstract, invariable, communicable form capable of logical analysis and development into scholarly disciplines" (1955:485). It is following this principle that Wright concludes that "Historians of science have pointed out that comprehensive pictures or 'conceptual systems' have usually guided particular scientific advances and particular disciplines. A unified discipline of IR implies a generally accepted conception of the human world" (1955:484). He further develops five such conceptualisations capable of bringing a grand theoretical sense to the study of IR: seeing the world as a plan, as equilibrium, as an organisation, as a community, and as a field (1955:485-492). If Wright opens the possibilities of a grand theory to different conceptions, a more limited view of grand theory also emerges that has a stricter

understanding of it. This comes out in the work Richard Brody, for example, who, even though claiming that there is an "absence of a major synthesis", still questions "how can I be sure that convergence is likely or even possible?" (1971:176). This convergence is the alignment of a field "of those for whom international relations are political relations among nations whose leaders are faced with the "problem of foreign policy"" (1971:177) and this convergence is one that "will have to supply laws relating the several levels of the international political system to each other" (1971:177). This was, in fact, a small step to the realisation that only one of these levels actually matters and constitutes the possibility of a grand theory (Waltz 1979).

If a core concern up until the 1980s was a debate about the possibilities of a grand IR theory, during the 1980s we saw the consolidation of a new agenda, however. In his introduction, the already cited work of Donald Puchala (2002) is an example of the second version that probably found its main inspiration in the work of KJ Holsti (1985) and Lapid (1989). According to Puchala discussing the issue of integration/pluralism is a foundational identitarian concern to debate IR due to the tendency scholars have towards "the insularity of scholarship", the "incommensurability of discourses", "the mutual inattentiveness" of specialists, the growing intolerance of intellectual diversity, and even the degeneration of civility in the academy" (2002:xiv). Discussing why we should study IR, in this sense, means engaging in discussions over why integration or pluralism should be promoted. The relevance of this problem leads to the proposal of different epistemological solutions to it. For some, pluralism is negative because it moves IR away from the desired 'unity of method' (Holsti 1985). For others, pluralism is positive because it allows for theoretical diversity (Lapid 1989, Smith 2013).

A more recent exponent of these two drives of the thin agenda – the problem of integration/pluralism and the issue of whether a grand theory is possible – was an important contribution to the literature asking whether we are at the end of IR theory (Dunne, Hansen and Wight 2013). This contribution, which recentred the IR debate in theoretical terms (Levine and McCourt 2018, Kristensen 2018), posed as a fundamental starting point the problem of integration/pluralism and it further consolidated the thin concern by adding a contribution by Chris Brown on the issue of grand theory (Brown 2013).

Even though there was a change during the 1980s, both versions, emphasising different ways of approaching the problem, condemn the study of IR to the study of its epistemologies. In this sense, they condemn us to approach IR through a very epistemologically centred viewpoint as if all debates should be over whether or not insularity is good, or a grand theory is potentially realisable. This configuration of the *why* problem to the *how* has been increasingly contested and a new wave of 'old' debates have rebalanced the dispute.

If one looks back to the history of the discipline, and especially when it first started to become established as a source of institutional and intellectual engagement by scholars – mainly in the United States (US) – one can't avoid acknowledging that they were deeply concerned with other *why* questions. Scholars such as Wright, Fox, Alger, Palmer, and so many others didn't want to condemn IR exclusively to theoretical confrontations or substantive debates. We have, therefore, to resume such concerns and agendas and avoid turning identitarian problems into shortcuts to introduce theoretical concerns and a third wave of literature is doing precisely that (Jorgensen 2022, Booth and Erskine 2016, Devetak and George 2012).

We can find inspiration, for example, in the work of Steve Smith (1987, 2000, 2002, 2013). Also, in Ole Waever (2013), a broader grasp of *why we should study IR* can be found. In particular, Waever's 2013 article is another *tour de force* into some of the elements that animate *why* problems and because it brings these problems together in one contribution (without the intermingling of substantive contents) it needs to be emphasised. His project is, taking inspiration from sociology of science, to better understand the intellectual and social patterns of IR. First, Waever conceives IR as more than just a disciplinary field characterised by a definition or a specific subject matter. Instead, he advances the view that it should be better equipped to look at IR as a discipline that is deeply focused on power and institutions. In particular, and this is his second point, one needs to understand the context under which IR scholars develop their work. US hegemony and the desire and anxieties that are affected by this specific condition drive a worldwide engagement with IR. More specifically, "One should recognize both the significant differences between IR in say Germany, the UK, the USA, and Japan (Wæver 1998; Kinnvall 2005; Inoguchi and Bacon 2001), and simultaneously the omnipresence of US-style IR all over the world. The IR world is best viewed as a mix of a US/global system and national/regional ones with varying degrees of independence" (Waever 2013:314). This broadening of the scope of IR from the hegemonic US and other communities is an agenda that is further solidified by questioning the role that great debates have in the discipline. This necessarily raises issues of the importance of the discussion of IR and its historical condition in terms of great debates. Finally, after opening the disciplinary debate, stressing the importance of the study of a Global IR and of understanding the history of the discipline, the argument ends by clarifying the plural dimension of IR and its current debates.

Waever's contribution does make several important moves to update the conversation about *why* problems. Three moves need to be emphasised. First, it picks up classical themes such as the discussion over whether IR is a discipline or not and the history of IR (seen in light of 'great debates'). Second, it opens these contributions by not focusing exclusively on the national characteristics of the United States. Waever contributes to an agenda of seeing IR beyond this core (Waever 1998), and in this particular article (2013), he further solidifies the importance of this move. Third, and finally, he

incorporates into the argument debates about pluralism in IR, hence integrating also a particular view on the discussion opened up by, among others, KJ Holsti (1985) and Donald Puchala (2002). Waever's take on *why* problems, therefore, integrates old and more philosophically driven concerns.

1.4.1.2. *Why* Study IR: Seven (Possible) Constitutive Problems

There has been an important move in IR to turn why we should study IR problems as just an introductory step to engage with other, more 'important' theoretical concerns. This move focuses on issues of pluralism and whether or not we can have a grand theory in IR. However, we need to recover the agenda that animated much of the debates when IR was first institutionalized in the US, including issues of disciplinary history, issues of what is considered international and international relations in the first place, issues of disciplinary boundaries, and issues that relate to the distinctive characteristics of national contributions to IR. These traditional concerns need to be resurrected and expanded. Contributions such as those by Steve Smith or Ole Waever have done just that. And this needs to continue. As emphasised in this thesis, this not only allows for a better analytical grasp of *why we should study IR*, but also, in the context of a Global IR, it allows us to understand the socio-intellectual and institutional foundations of the study of IR (as emphasised in the conclusion).

1.4.2. The *How(s)* of International Relations: Dimensions of the Theoretical Debate

A second way to introduce IR comes in the form of a focus on *how* we should study it. For example, in the previously examined contributions by Devetak (2012) and Booth and Erskine (2016), some of these issues have already been emphasized. Devetak dissects different perspectivisms[4] in IR. Booth and Erskine focus on the epistemological and ontological dimensions of the debate. But, beyond the intermingling of matters, other introductions seem to focus more precisely on this problem. There are two main ways to bring theory to the introduction of IR.

The first way – also emphasized by Devetak and Booth and Erskine – is to see theory as a marker for other *how to study* problems. A volume by Trevor Taylor (1978) that will be analysed in the next section can also serve as an example. This is an emphasis on distinctive dimensions or ways in which theory can be brought into the study of IR and then develop a particular understanding of other

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[4] By perspectivisms is meant a focus on premises and assumptions (also conventionally described as theories of IR). See Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era'. International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 241-243

dimensions. Writing in 1978, Taylor places a particular emphasis on how theories can perform different functions and then invites the reader to understand different substantive problems along this dimension. Devetak (2012) places emphasis on perspectivisms. Booth and Erskine (2016) in epistemology and ontological disputes. We, therefore, need to make sense of these dimensions in ways that broaden the terms of these discussions. This will be the core of the argument here.

But there is a second way in which theory is also brought into the debate. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal's (2008) edited volume is specifically concerned with introducing IR through theory. The authors are specifically interested in highlighting three issues "What is the nature of the theoretical endeavour in international relations? How have the empirical and the normative aspects of theories interacted to shape individual theories and the debates between them? And finally, has there been progress in the study of international relations, and if so in what sense?" (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008:4) and then, once these debates are highlighted, address other matters of concern such as "debates over the substantive focus of the field, the nature of theoretical progress the relative merits of various 'isms', the appropriateness of particular methods, and the integrity of individual subfields, … the appropriate relationship between the scholar and the policy-maker" (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008:10). The goal, therefore, seems to be to highlight matters of concern in IR as they relate directly to the overall concern of understanding what is theory, stressing the importance of normative theorizing and highlighting the importance of debating progress in IR. Other matters of concern – and the division of the different parts – is directly connect with a concern with theory. A similar attempt is developed by Dyvik, Selby and Wilkinson (2017) but the focus for the authors is more on the inherently political dimension of IR. The foundational assumption of the volume is "that alternative "reflectivist" or "post-positivist" theories and methods (Smith, Booth, and Zalewski 1996) have made it clear that, whatever else it is, IR is not just a science but an endeavour which has been shaped and defined in relationship with history, politics, and power" (Dyvik, Selby and Wilkinson 2017:3). Deriving categories such as the importance of understanding history, politics and power from a theoretical assessment then leads to volume to focus on these areas of substantive concern.

Having established that, beyond the intermingling of these themes with others, there are two approaches that can be said to be focused on *how we should study IR, t*he goal of the next section is to embrace the attempts proposed by the first approach. But, again, we need to better qualify these arguments, engage in a comparative exercise and better understand the different themes that run when we ask the question, *how should we study* IR.

1.4.2.1. Understanding the Themes of the Debate

A marked drive of scholars writing before and after World War II – especially in the United States – was to ground IR on more scientific grounds. The already cited landmark study by Quincy Wright (1955) reflected this intention by developing specific conditions under which theory development can occur. This concern continued with landmark studies during this time. Two such volumes should be mentioned, William Fox's *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations* (1959) and Stanley Hoffmann's *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (1960). At their core, these contributions aimed to start a conversation about the foundations of theoretical work while, at the same time, delivering specific perspectivisms on how these foundations could be consolidated. An important concern, which has recently been converted into a *why* problem, was the possibility of IR having a grand theory. These debates have expanded since this time, and we will address how in this section.

A re-statement of the spirit of Fox's volume is the already cited book by Trevor Taylor published a few years later (1978). Understanding the foundations of theoretical statements lies at the core of part of Taylor's project. For Taylor there are four arguments that we should care about in IR: because IR is concerned with the "same questions of why man acts as he does" (Taylor 1978:2) and that we can develop "varied hypotheses about human behaviour" (Taylor 1978:2). The second reason has to do with IR's ability to understand realities by selecting and stressing "some facts at the expense of others, we pick out what we see as relevant, and this is done using what are usually implicit propositions about a situation" (Taylor 1978:3). This position is more nuanced, therefore, than the previous one. Here the author recognises how realities are read not through some timeless hypotheses but how from this same reality we can extract multiple hypotheses and how "[A]ll views on and analyses of a political situation are based on hypotheses of some sort and International Relations, by concentrating on the explicit formulation of such propositions, can make a significant contribution to policy-making" (Taylor 1978:3). There is a third reason for the usefulness of the study of IR and this relates to a focus on concepts and conceptual discussions. Accordingly, the goal here is the discussion of these concepts per se by themselves, extracted as the research is from realities and foreign policies with a focus on discussing the nature of conceptual IR. There is a final reason why we should study IR and this has to do with IR's ability to cover "moral and practical … issues with which mankind is faced today" (Taylor 1978:4). Writing in 1978, for Taylor, there were four important reasons to approach theory in IR: let's call them the positivist – which claims that we can test in reality several timeless hypotheses -, the neo-positivist – which claims that these realities can be analysed by looking at various hypothesis, the research endeavour is one of identifying the best one – the conceptual – which more than realities is concerned with concepts – and the moral/practical – which aims to understand what can be done with the most relevant issues of the day.

In the conclusion of the volume, CJ Goodwin resurrects the argument but twists it. For him, theories "may have an eirenic purpose intended to help identify the kinds of arrangements which might conduce to a more peaceful international society" (Goodwin 1978:280), they "may be mainly heuristic devices intended to aid our understanding of the nature and texture of international life" (Goodwin 1978:280), and finally "they may be accorded a predictive or prescriptive role aimed at delineating the parameters of choice open to the policy-maker" (Goodwin 1978:280). The importance of this contribution is that it dissects some of the "branches" of theory linked as these branches are with these different purposes.

Accordingly, the eirenic purpose covers both classificatory and explanatory branches. By classificatory the author uses Popper's view of science and stresses how the goal should be to come up with some hypotheses about "patterns of transactions and interactions which can on occasion provide a basis for modest comparative analysis" (Goodwin 1978:282). On the other hand, the explanatory branch is concerned "not merely with ordering the data and identifying the critical variables, but also with explaining possible causal connections between events and suggesting explanatory hypotheses about why certain patterns of transactions and interactions have developed within the international system and why the members of that system, above all the sovereign states, behave as they do" (Goodwin 1978:282). Here research is not just interested in searching the world departing from some preliminary findings but finding in the world different justifications for preliminary findings. The goal is to test several hypotheses from reality and not just try to extract from reality some unique fundamental truth.

Theories can also function as heuristic devices and at this level, they can be either clarificatory or historical. The clarificatory branch aims to dissect the conceptual debate and Gallie (1964) is cited to illustrate how these concepts should be viewed as "essentially contested". The historical branch, on the other hand, aims to "examine the traditions of thought on these questions, to trace the historical antecedents of concepts, assumptions and. explanatory theories, through the memoirs of statesmen and the writings of historians, political theorists and international lawyers" (Goodwin 1978:281).

Finally, theories can have a predictive or prescriptive role. The predictive deals with issues that relate to developing and focusing on the art of forecasting what goes on in real life. It is the art of extrapolating from reality what went on in the past and extrapolating what the future may look like. The prescriptive role, on the other hand, is not so much concerned with what is going on with reality, but, instead, it is interested in suggesting a 'better' world. As Goodwin concludes "[W]hatever the policy orientation, one of the basic concerns is to illuminate means/ends relationships and to ensure that the normative dimensions of policy choices are made quite explicit and subject to careful scrutiny" (Goodwin 1978:284).

What separates Taylor's view from Goodwin's is the latter's focus on four dimensions of theory – the positivist, the neo-positivist, the conceptual and the practical/moral - and the latter's focus on three – its eirenic, heuristic and practical/moral purposes. Goodwin includes in its eirenic dimension both the positivist and neo-positivist views developed by Taylor. And what he also does is to develop six branches of theory: classificatory, explanatory, clarificatory, historical, predictive, or prescriptive. With the contributions of Taylor and Goodwin, we see a reinforcement of the importance of the functions of IR theory.

With the move towards a more self-conscious reflection on philosophical issues that resulted from what Yosef Lapid called the Third Debate (1989), a deeper concern about the philosophical origins of theory and other concerns started to be identified.

Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater provide an enlightened overview of the uses of theories of International Relations that can serve to illustrate some of these changes (Burchill and Linklater 2005). They start by contrasting two types of theory – one linked to rational choice – and "a second category of theory in which the way the observers construct their images of international relations, the methods they use to try to understand this realm and the social and political implications of their knowledge claims, are leading preoccupations" (Burchill and Linklater 2005:2). What seems to be clear from this discussion is that different approaches to IR theory will be differentiated among themselves by broad philosophical assumptions: namely, ontological discussions focused on what we know, epistemological concerns over how we know what we know, methodological discussions going over the acquisition of different types of knowledge and ethical dimensions of knowledge acquisition and what it means to be involved in research. These different philosophical positions are then dissected by stressing the 'contested nature' of theorizing along three dividing lines: divisions over "the very basic question of its subject matter" (Burchill and Linklater 2005:5), "differences about the appropriate methodology" (Burchill and Linklater 2005:5), and "debates about what human beings can and cannot know about the social and political world" (Burchill and Linklater 2005:5).

Following Goodwin's overview but without the clarity provided by this author, a second approach to the same issue is then suggested, starting not by emphasising broad philosophical assumptions but, instead, dissecting the different types of theory that seem to prevail in the literature. The authors start by identifying eight different ways of using theory and six ways in which theories can diverge. Starting with the first, they conclude that theories can be used as laws, they attempt either to explain or to understand, they can be read as traditions of speculation, as empirical data to test hypotheses, or to clarify the use of concepts, they can also be used to criticise forms of domination and to reflect on how the world ought to be organised, and, finally, to reflect on the process of theorising itself. When it comes to the discussion of "some disciplinary preoccupations" (Burchill and

Linklater 2005:12), the authors identify six such preoccupations: discussions over dominant actors, dominant relationships and empirical issues, methodological debates in the philosophy of the social sciences, ethical debates and, finally, discussions over the nature of disciplinary. At this second level of introducing theories of IR, the authors therefore leave the philosophical distinction between explanatory and constitutive theories and focus specifically on different functions that theories may have. Then they elaborate further on what these debates can involve, identifying six areas where debates occur.

What is also particular about Burchill and Linklater's contribution is the last part of their essay where they specifically focus on the importance of conceptualisation to reflections about IR theory. Here they emphasise the methodological and theory/practice dimensions of IR theories. They use a contribution by Fred Halliday (1994) to describe how not only does the research always depart from some precondition when doing the research, but also how there are always different interpretations that need to be taken into account, conditioned by the fact that all research is conducted with moral questions. During this latter part of the essay, the emphasis on methodological debates comes in the form of the view that "[T]heories are needed to conceptualize contemporary events" (Burchill and Linklater 2005:16). They substantiate this analysis by further emphasising how "[C]onceptual analysis – an inherently philosophical activity – is a necessary part of any attempt to explain or understand world politics" (Burchill and Linklater 2005:16). If we are inherently conditioned by our values when doing research, the process of theorising, for Burchill and Linklater, necessarily involves a dispute between different interpretations of what is possible. It is in this sense that we need to take into account not only explanatory theories but also constitutive theories.

The theory/practice dimension, on the other hand, is stressed when the authors conclude that "all forms of social analysis raise important questions about the moral and cultural constitution of the observer. It is important to reflect upon the cognitive interests and normative assumptions which underpin research. The point here is to become acutely aware of hidden assumptions, prejudices and biases about how the social and political world is and what it can be" (Burchill and Linklater 2005:17). If the previous philosophical statement that we can't escape our values is repeated, what is further concluded is that we should have, as researchers, the goal of exploring alternative ways of understanding the world.

After highlighting the value of methodological and the theory/practice problem, the authors go on to dissect areas where theories diverge. They identify four areas of debate: objects of analysis and scopes of inquiry, where the conversation is focused on issues that deal with levels of analysis. The second area of contestation is moral debates, and here the authors highlight how the English School, liberals and critical theorists contest the view that IR should be limited to the preservation of a Waltzian balance of power, where the only purpose is to deter its members from going to war. The third area

of contestation deals with appropriate methodologies to use and here Kaplan and Singer's traditionalism is contrasted by Bull's appeal to the importance of history, law, and philosophy. The final area of debate is disciplinary and deals with debates about whether the discipline should be conceived as a distinct and independent area of research or not.

In summary, after delving into the history of IR, Burchill and Linklater develop a view of IR theory that highlights three main debates: the philosophical, the functional and, within this functional debate, they emphasise the conceptual/theory-practice dimensions. Along these debates, they further identify areas of contestation: subject matter, methodology, normative issues and the nature of disciplinarity. In so doing, the contribution is one of the most relevant ones to synthesise what we are doing when we discuss "IR theory".

In a different but similarly important contribution, Mark Kauppi and Paul Viotti (2020) synthesise how to think about IR theory. This contribution is important because it has a broader understanding of the philosophical debate, because it reframes the theory/practice issue and because it pushes the boundaries of perspectivist debates. Kauppi and Viotti start with a discussion of broad epistemological, methodological and ontological debates before moving into a concrete discussion over what is theory. Here the authors emphasise four separate issues: how theory not only involves explanation but also "a reconstructive positivist strategy" (Kauppi and Viotti 2020:6), they also suggest different ways in which theories can be read through the lenses of different levels of analysis or, and extending this issue, through the agent-structure debate, thirdly, how theories are conceptualised to exist apart from facts and how policymakers should be guided by a theoretical engagement with the issues at hand. Finally, they develop a more precise understanding of images of International Relations vinculated as these images are ways "we see the world" (Kauppi and Viotti 2020:13), allowing us to "make better sense of the world" (Kauppi and Viotti 2020:13). In this latter dimension they further emphasize how "each individual's work will be influenced by a particular doctrine, image of the world, ideology, paradigm, theory, understanding, or perspective" (Kauppi and Viotti 2020:15) in their assessment of how to read the world informed as she/he is by this image. The authors also emphasise an important sub-dimension of this perspectivist debate: the different types of theories that can be conceptualised as images.

It seems that moving away from the discussion over the disciplinary nature of IR, Kauppi and Viotti also understand thinking about IR theory along four dimensions: departing from broad philosophical discussions, they emphasise debates over explanation and understanding, debates over levels of analysis/agency-structure, debates over the relationship between theory and practice and debates over the nature different perspectivisms. Two important innovations can be extracted from this contribution: the broadening of the debate to include debates about levels of analysis/agents and

structures and, on the other hand, the introduction to a deeper conversation about perspectivism and, more specifically, a reading of these dimensions along a view that emphasizes "images of International Relations".

Another important dimension of the debate deals not with the nature and substance of different perspectivisms but in the methodological dimension of studying IR theory. This concern gained particular emphasis during the attempt of IR theorists to understand IR through the lenses of quantitative research. To illustrate this dimension of the debate, we can go back to 1970 and the important volume edited by Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau. In it, the authors advance a classical view of IR – rooted in historical methods – and a scientific one – rooted in a trend towards quantification and scientism. They do so in a way that advances points of conversion and points of disagreement. The hope is to overcome radical dispositions and come up with a compromise (which, inevitably, tends to privilege scientism. The debate has advanced much since and, increasingly, new debates have emerged. The already cited volume by Reus-Smit and Snidal (2008) has five chapters and may be read as one important illustration of the current state of the debate. Methodological individualism and rational choice are contrasted to sociological and psychological approaches. Quantitative approaches are viewed alongside case studies and historical approaches. These contributions illustrate the importance of these debates to an understanding of *how* we should study IR problems and need to be emphasised as another dimension in this debate.

It should be clear by now that debates about "IR Theory" do not involve just discussing the nature of different perspectivisms. Even though in most manuals introducing these issues, most of the contents are dedicated to dissecting different perspectivisms, it is clear that there is more to the discussion than that. We have seen how philosophical, epistemological, ontological, and methodological discussions are also relevant. What is also relevant is understanding the nature of these perspectivisms in themselves – as constellations of ideas and thought. In other words, even when discussing perspectivisms, one needs to take into account that there are different ways in which this reading can be done. Mark Kaupi and Paul Viotti (2020) open the overview here by discussing the issue in terms of 'images', but there are other ways in which to assess these problems. We can find, for example, examples of such alternatives in a discussion raised by Iver Neumann and Ole Waever (1997). In an edited volume, they suggest that instead of addressing perspectivisms as schools or paradigms, they prefer to introduce the reader to figures of international thought. In their own words, "Persons… are points where numerous cross-pressures meet; different academic projects and discourses combine with numerous extra-academic factors" (Waever 1997:2). This contribution highlights precisely the importance of having a standpoint upon which to read different perspectivisms. They, furthermore, in

an analytical move that lacks more solid grounds, conclude that such a reading can be conducted through an emphasis on conceptual discussions, by seeing traditions as contextual historical demonstrations of specific periods, or as timeless traditions. This volume is therefore important because it not only identifies the relevance to theoretical discussions to incorporate in the conversation different perspectivisms, but also, and for the argument developed here more importantly, because it introduces different ways in which these perspectivisms can be read.

A final dimension of the how-to study problem deals not so much with theory but with the context in which theory develops. In other words, we are here interested not in the intellectual dimensions of theory development – and the already cited dimensions – but more in the institutional dimensions. This is sometimes forgotten in manuals presenting IR theory but constitutes an important dimension of the problem and such a concern didn't disappear, for example, from John Garnett's introduction of common sense to the theory of international politics (Garnett 1984). Garnett's contribution helps open up a debate about not only the nature of teaching in a university context but also the contents of the teachings themselves.

On the first front, he delivers a dispassionate and detached view of education – it should not be driven by values or by normative aspirations – say for a better world or radical change – it should serve, instead, the more functional role of providing and delivering an understand of the world as it is, while leaving to the student the capacity to read this same world as well as it can do so. Teaching, therefore, should be detached from moral judgements. But we can't, of course, detach our values from the activity. Teaching, by itself, is an activity deeply impacted by who we are as individuals and the choices we make as such. Garnett also suggests that the role of the teacher shouldn't be to constantly update his teaching materials to follow what is of practical or social relevance. As he claims "At their worst, these courses degenerate into superficial discussions of current affairs" (Garnett 1984:136)

When it comes to the knowledge that should be taught, Garnett is critical of those views which claim that the only value is to deliver a kind of knowledge based on explanation. Giving the example of why discussions of current affairs are so futile in themselves as objects of discussion, he claims that the goal and the contents of teaching need to be based on an understanding of what the essence of daily activity is. As he concludes, "And so it is with international politics. Serious students need to be taught the essence of political activity rather than the current manifestations of it. They need to be taught how to tell the time- not what the time is. What is required, therefore, is a fundamental sort of knowledge, 'a frame of concepts, theories and basic knowledge of enduring value' (H and M Sprout 1962)" (Garnett 1964:137). The necessity to see education as a conceptual effort is further highlighted by the fact that we can't explain realities because international politics is about human behaviour and human behaviour is, because of the necessarily normative content attached to it, not possible to be

grasped. It is also highlighted by the necessity to have a historical perspective of international political realities rather than conduct research based on timeless truths. Tracing back in time conceptual discussions are an element to take into account when teaching.

Garnett, therefore, delivers an assessment of the role of education that highlights its functional and conceptual dimensions. It opens, in doing so, the debate beyond the intellectual dimensions emphasised above and towards the institutional settings in which education is provided. In doing so it needs to be accounted for when the goal is to understand *how we study IR* and it contributed to an area of research that has received more attention lately (Guzzini 2001, Frueh 2020)

1.4.2.2. *How* to Study International Relations: Six (Possible) Constitutive Problems

Some volumes introducing *how to study* IR start by addressing broad epistemological claims about the importance of theory (Reus Smit and Snidal 2008). Others, leaving to one side such broad intentions, aim to dissect different debates that characterise the 'IR theory' debate. Rarely citing each other in ways that make these dimensions clear, this part aimed to bring together arguments and address different dimensions of the *how to study IR* problem. This was also done in ways that move beyond the intermingling of these themes present in other similar presentations. We come to realise that introducing IR theory needs to be more than just a focus on theories of IR. Issues related to *how we should study IR* also involve much more than learning different functions or purposes that theories can serve. Other dimensions of the problem include philosophical, epistemological, ontological, methodological, and institutional/educational debates. And even when discussing different perspectivisms we need to address the deeper problems of how to read them as such.

1.4.3. The *What(s)* of International Relations: International Relations' Subject Matters

Answers to the question of *what can be studied* in IR have been many but no consistent understanding exists among participants about the full scope of the problem. Current proposals, besides the more specific ones that will be highlighted when the web of theoretical debates about this issue is developed, come in three forms: intermingling, myopic, and random. These forms do not mutually exclude one another.

Intermingling occurs when *what to study problems* are introduced along with other constitutive concerns: such as *why we study IR* or *how* we do so. The contributions of Steve Smith (Smith 1995) and Ken Booth (Booth 1995) are examples of this. They start by highlighting how the

subject matter of IR has changed and, subsequently, address other theoretical or scope dimensions. Myopism occurs because these presentations are often devoid of a comparative analysis of other possible routes: a full scope of the problem, therefore, is never identified and other possible alternatives are never compared. The debate becomes one between international politics and global politics only. Examples of such proposals include RJB Walker's suggestion that we are moving from international to world politics (Walker 1989), Ken Booth's suggestion that we need to move from high to deep politics (Booth 1995), Richard Devetak's view that there is a substantive critical turn against a 'great divide' (Devetak 2012). Randomness also characterises some of the literature. In this case, substantive matters are presented in IR without a clear sense of why issues or topics are selected. We are never told what (theoretical) argument leads to the selection of certain topics – and not others (Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons 2002).

We need to have a better sense of the different ways in which to address *what can be studied* in IR. The goal here is to develop a theoretical scheme which can be used to do just that. We need to move beyond broad introductions to these matters, develop a better understanding of the analytical characteristics of these debates, and better engage in more qualified theoretical arguments. We therefore need to move beyond the intermingling, myopic and randomness that has characterised the literature.

1.4.3.1. Understanding the Themes of the Debate

There are, in IR different ways to answer what its subject matter should be. This introduction will highlight four different ways: conceptualizing IR as international politics, as global politics, deriving substances from theory/perspectivisms or theory from substances.

Even though these are the routes identified here, other possible ways may be identifiable. This is an interpretation that, as suggested, is always subjective. On the other hand, what matters for the argument is to clarify the web of theoretical conversations at a macro level and not to engage in the impossible task of detailing the web of theoretical debates that characterise each macro web analysed here.

International Political Subject Matters. The first way in which IR substantive matters are read focuses on IR's international political origins. This is the representation of the substantive matters of IR that connects it more with its historical heritage. It comes in two main forms: an analysis of history and an analysis of the problem of international order (Walsh 1922, Bova 2012, Jackson and Sorensen 2016, Cox 2016).

The first dimension of this debate is the historical analysis of the international system that emphasises three main debates: history itself, actors and issues, and theory. Approached from this historical angle, the argument divides an inner and an outer world and, from this analysis, the argument further assesses actors and issues that help understand contemporary IR and the theories that help solidify the different approaches – more or less conservative – chosen. Reading international political substances conservatively with a historical eye highlights the story of the balance of power, the role of great powers, war and, sometimes, international law internally, and the story of empires and imperialism abroad, while, at the same time, aiming to emphasise the actors and the issues that are important to such an analysis (Mingst 2003).

The inner history is divided into periods that highlight points of major disruption that occur through major war. After an initial effort to sometimes introduce the creation and consolidation of states, what is characteristic of the conservative approach of this literature is an emphasis on at least five such disruptions and six periods: from the Peace of Westphalia to the Peace of Utrecht, from Utrecht to the Vienna Settlement, from Vienna to Versailles and the First World War, from World War I to World War II, the Cold War, and the recent period. During these periods, what is particularly relevant is the balance of power in the system and an understanding of the behaviour of great powers. Also relevant are specific conflicts that may occur during the period, and these are normally minor events or, in the case of a major event, to understand the causes of major war. The non-Western history is addressed differently (Bull and Watson 1984). Here we seem to be living under a capitalist/liberal regime where empires reign (Keene 2002). What matters, since Westphalia, is the globalisation of the state's system to these regions or countries and its principles. Initially, the argument stresses the forces behind such expansion. Subsequently, the argument focuses on the forces of socialisation and two periods that mark this expansion: the first stage takes the form of a colonial movement where states, incrementally, are integrated into a 'standard of civilisation' (Gong 1984) and its constitutive principles. The other stage is the 'revolt against the West' by numerous countries (Bull 1984).

These manuals also stress a concern about the actors and the issues that may solidify such analysis. From the traditionalism of, say, John Young and John Kent (2004) where the goal is to trace international history since 1945 as being characterised mainly by a concern with the institution of great power balancing as well as the traditional concern with war, we also find more liberal-focused analysis that incorporate issues of international political economy (Grieco, Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2017). Other, less traditionalist arguments, propose a more expansive view of the actors and issues that matter. For example, the argument suggested by Mingst (2003), stresses a concern not just with states but with other actors and, to a concern with war and strife, we need to add international political economy, human rights and issues of environment, global health and crime. In their volume, Larres

and Wittlinger suggest an even greater agenda. Global politics seems to be characterised in more recent years by a concern with the global environment, migration, global poverty, failing states, religious fundamentalism, human rights, terrorism, corruption, nuclear proliferation, and soft and hard power (Larres and Wittlinger 2020).

Why are these actors and issues selected in the first place? Theory solidifies the choices – it justifies the inner and outer histories and the choice of the topics under discussion. In the work of Wayne McLean (McLean 2020) we can find the glue needed to understand why theory is important to understand the other debates. According to him, "global politics is a complex combination of political, economic and social factors, and without an organisational framework for analysis, extracting explanations around phenomena is increasingly difficult but necessary" (McLean 2020:71). What is being argued is that realism is particularly relevant to solidify the historical inward argument, conditions such as anarchy and the international system, actors such as states and sovereignty, and issues such as war, geopolitics, diplomacy or foreign policy, liberalism to solidify the historical outward argument, conditions such as interdependence or global governance, actors such as the individual and international institutions and issues such as the international law, international political economy or human rights, and the other approaches such as constructivism, by allowing us to understand social cultures or identities for which other ('social') issues such as the environment, global health, international crime, etc. can be derived.

International political substances can also be read through an analysis of the problem of international order. Definitional debates, discussions about creation and maintenance, or order breakdown are particularly important to address when discussing international order.

In an important contribution to the definitional debate (Lascurettes and Poznansky 2021), order can be seen as regularity – highlighting the idea that there needs to be some pattern – and order as purpose – highlighting the possibility for order to be also connected with some normative aspiration and value system. A strict distinction between regularity and purpose can be established: referencing the work of Ikenberry, he, too, accepts the idea that there are two types of order premised on position – the balance of power and hegemonic order – and one on rules – constitutional orders. Seeing order as purpose, on the other hand, includes seeing it in the form of norms, rulemaking institutions, and international political organisations and other regimes. What Lascurettes and Poznansky further highlight is how international norms can take various forms. He distinguishes between thin and thick orders focusing in particular on the English School debate between pluralists and solidarists. For Lascurettes and Poznansky , we can further distinguish between global and regional orders and between general and issue-specific orders. Another term that is often contrasted with international order is global order. For example, Rosenau (1992) uses it to highlight the arrangements through which world affairs are conducted. These arrangements are parts not so much of a society of states – and the

assumptions the order as pattern and order as satisfaction imply – but, instead, involve the creation of a world beyond sovereignty. What we must conclude, therefore, is that this creates a different type of debate – international vs global order.   Other important debates deal with order creation and maintenance, on the one hand, and breakdown on the other. When it comes to the creation and maintenance, several theoretical angles highlight different mechanisms or understandings of such situations. Within the realist traditions, several proposals emerge. According to some, states are socialised in a hierarchical order automatically and by default (Waltz 1979). For others, however, great powers need to come together and form some kind of concert where they agree on what the main rules of the game are (Kissinger 1957); still, for others, the stability of the system is provided by a hegemon (Gilpin 1981).

These three explanations can be contrasted with liberal conceptions. Liberalism emphasises the fact that in their path to peace, governments need to be republican, it trusts in how economic interdependence between states arising from capitalism and international trade can further incentivise international cooperation, third, and finally, it highlights the importance of institutions and multilateralism as the third pillar to transformation. In the security realm, liberals focus on mechanisms that help prevent wars. For some, these principles and normative values are, therefore, deeply embedded in the formations of orders. Some would emphasise these elements more structurally (Ikenberry 2001), others from an agential point of view (Fukuyama 1991).

For constructivist and critical perspectives, what matters are the principles under which the liberal international order is created and imposes itself. These approaches therefore view the creation and maintenance of international order through the prism of its own ideational construction. Understood in these normative terms, capitalism, liberalism, constitutive norms and other frameworks are used to solidify the argument from different theoretical standpoints (Clark 2005, Latham 1997, Jahn 2013, Cox 1987).

When it comes to the breakdown, this is normally read in light of what was a priori conceived as the reason for the creation. Power and authority models tend to highlight issues of changing configurations of power and nationalism as two driving forces that undermine the equilibrium of the established order (Mearsheimer 2019). Liberal perspectives, on the other hand, tend to unpack challenges to the liberal international order differently. For example, Riccardo Alcaro (2018) highlights how nationalism, and in particular populism, presents an ideological contestation to liberalism. If these contestations play at the level of ideas, the clash of powers with emerging powers such as China, Russia or India presents the second challenge to the liberal order. Other challenges include the fragmentation of state power that derives from the liberal trend towards regionalism. Finally, he focuses on the issue of globalisation and its discontents: the ills of globalisation are read through the eyes of the contestation often seen at national levels towards the hegemonic regimes of economic governance –

especially after periods of financial shock. Critical perspectives also tend to emphasise backlashes against the constitutive values of the liberal order. This backlash can take a variety of theoretical forms, but at its core lies the idea that it is a confrontation of ideals and the values themselves (Jahn 2009) and the social forces that may change the present system (Cox 1990, Gill 2008).

The goal of this section was to present from a macro standpoint the webs of theoretical conversation that can elucidate how IR's international political substances can be read. Historical and debates about the formation, maintenance and breakdown of orders characterise these discussions. In the next section, the focus will be on global political substances.

Global Political Subject Matters. Manuals exist dedicated to introducing IR through the prism of global politics (Lamy et al 2008, Baylis et al 2014, Kegley and Raymond 2007). Looking at these we see that there is a predominance in the discussions over not only the different theoretical frameworks upon which we can understand globalisation but, and crucially, debates about the nature of state sovereignty and its transformation towards some kind of global governance framework. This global governance framework then develops several worldwide substantive policies. The world polity is read, in this case, as an example of this global governance exercise. The substantive dimensions of IR that are emphasised are read in light of these transformations. Issues of war, economy, identity, and environment are picked up to highlight how we are currently being conditioned by a global structure in our day-to-day lives.

In the literature we can find some more or less self-identifiable approaches to this: from the transformationalist proposals put forward by Baylis et al (2014) to the critical approach addressed by McGlinchey (2022). What these books highlight, and this is the argument that is important to make here, is a first reading of the substance of IR in light of this mutational project from international relations to world politics.

What these contributions lack is an introduction to broader discussions of the topic, first, and then potentially introduce a particular standpoint upon which to read these discussions. Continuing with the main goal of elucidating completely the different potential avenues of a discussion before embarking with a particular standpoint, the thesis will reconstruct how IR can be read in light of global political substances through this framework.

Globalisation has several approaches that characterise its study. For the sake of this literature review, they can be described as the definitional, historical, theoretical, global governance, state capacity debates and the identification of substantive issues.

Definitionally some approach globalisation through materialist lenses. For some globalisation as a material process that grows in scale and magnitude through the different processes that allow societies to interact (Held 1995), others push these interactions even deeper and take them to take

part in the formation of authentic global societies built on a common culture (Burton 1972). For still others, more in line with Marxist traditions, there is an underlying economic logic to the process of globalisation that conditioned globalisation to be another word for the exploitative logic of capitalism (Scholte 2005). Others, from a more liberal standpoint, also see an underlying economic logic behind globalisation (Ohmae 1999) but discredit the Marxist judgement. This economic materialism/determinism is, however, criticised by others who assess the limits of globalisation by looking at its political dimension (Hirst, Thompson and Bromley 2009). For still others, globalisation is more than just different types of interaction between societies and constitutes itself more as an ideological project. Some see it in light of the Enlightenment project (Albrow 1996), while others denounce its ideational economic reductionism while opening the view to other dimensions (Gill 1997). For still others, globalisation is more akin to a study of social theory (Waters 1995), while others adopt a pragmatic approach concluding that there is not just one globalisation but many globalisations (Mittleman 1996).

The historical debate is one about whether the contemporary forms of globalisation are to be considered novel or, instead, part of larger dynamics that have existed and can be traced back beyond the contemporary age. The argument unfolds with some positions tying globalisation to forms of interdependence and internationalisation that have always existed (Hirst, Thompson and Bromley 2009, Heilleiner 1994, Scott 1997), and other arguments concluding that there is novelty in contemporary forms of globalisation (Scholte 1997). Still others contradict both versions and view globalisation as a process that needs to be historically read in light of the progression of European and North American history, Globalization, in this sense, is associated with the historical development of Western civilisation (Massey and Jess 1995).

The theoretical/normative debate highlights the epistemology behind the project. At its core, it is a debate about whether globalisation can be considered a force by itself, independent of any other forces, or, instead, whether there are inner normative logics that characterise its advancement. Some claim that globalisation can be analysed objectively. For James Rosenau (Rosenau 1997), for example, the forces that drive globalisation are independent of value judgments and can be assessed by themselves. This is, however, a minority view. Most authors claim that we can't extract value-free values from the meaning of globalisation. Globalisation is deeply connected with what we normatively may think about it. At this stage, a debate emerges between those who do not condemn this ideological project and those who view it as another phase of exploitative capitalism and, therefore, want to give voice to the forces that are currently being, according to the argument, oppressed. For some, therefore, the liberal assumptions – the capacity of globalisation to foster economic efficiency and the societal convergence towards liberal democracy – is a positive impact of this normatively driven phenomenon (Hurrell and Woods 1995). Other arguments highlight how globalisation is driving

the world towards greater inequalities and profound social dislocations. Giving voice to counter-globalisation movements is an intrinsic part of this process (Cox 1992, Gill 2012). Constructivist voices, on the other hand, stress how both of these positions end up being political in some sense (Clark 1999).

The global governance debate can be characterised as a dispute about whether globalisation provides a system of order that overlaps with the current condition of the world formed by sovereign states. Some claim that it does create a distinctive political form. One such view is the one promoted by Martin Shaw: we live under a Western state conglomerate that constitutes an emergent global state (Shaw 1997). Globalisation, for this type of argument, does present itself as an end-state with political form. Other arguments exist, however, that contradict such a view. Some claim that the forces that govern globalisation lack any sense of coherence or purpose. Even though we are more engaged through more connectivity driven by an intensified process of globalisation, these forces are value-free and should be valued by themselves. Reading the argument this way, they do not provide, by themselves, any sense of purpose (Falk 1997). A second point of view against a sense of order is the view that rather than a coherent order, we have the emergence of a new medievalism of overlapping authorities, loyalties and identities (Cerny 2010). The order of the Westphalian system is therefore decomposed, and we live not under a state of international order but, instead, of disorder. A third argument highlights cultural diversity in the contents of this new world. Instead of a single capitalist logic, there are, in fact, multiple logics behind the current state of global governance. Globalisation, for this last argument, needs to be read in light of this cultural turn: the challenge presented by the world market to state authority is not the subversion to an all-encompassing American model of capitalism but the creation of a world of many capitalisms (Albrow 1996).

The state capacity debate involves arguments about whether or not globalisation and its moving parts are considered strong enough and whether or not globalisation and its processes are functionally independent of state action. Some authors claim that globalisation does have an independent force, with its own logic, separate from the willingness of states to accept it (Rosenau 1997). Philip Cerny, for example, writing specifically about financial globalisation, considers it to be irreversible (Cerny 1995). This position contrasts with arguments that see globalisation as existing only to the extent that states accept and embrace it. Globalisation, in its many dimensions, couldn't have existed without the blessing and support of different states (Hirst, Thompson and Bromley 2009).

Finally, substantively, besides the randomness of a selection of issues that may be impacted by globalisation, this selection can take several different forms, depending on the kind of answer given to any of the previous debates. Some assessments tend to restrict globalisation to its economic dimension, while others may take a broader view of globalisation, which necessarily has an impact on the substances that end up being examined. It would be impossible to fully grasp all the possibilities here, but if there is some theoretical logic behind the argument, the issues we tend to understand as

substantive concerns depart from answers given to previous debates. In this overview of the dimensions of the globalisation debate, specific substances are emphasised by different perspectives. The *what to study* substances, therefore, are intrinsic to the arguments being developed. It is not the purpose of this work to highlight all possibilities, just to elucidate that the substantive areas of emphasis in the study of IR find their illustration with an engagement of IR seen as world politics. Different perspectives will focus on different substances, therefore. As an example, we can take the work of David Held.

Held has an extensive collection of work and contributions on the topic of globalisation. What follows is a rather broad overview of the argument whose goal is just to trace its foundational elements. Held develops a self-described transformationalist argument. By transformationalism is meant the idea that he wants to be placed in a middle position between the sceptic (who believes that nothing substantial has changed with contemporary forms of globalisation) and the globalist (who believes that all that existed in the past is fundamentally obsolete) (Held 2004). One could say that Held develops a transformationalism based on historical materialism: he believes that globalisation possesses an internal and almost scientifically driven logic while, at the same time, also being highly normative and ideological. On the epistemological front, he aims to reconcile the materialists with those who believe more in the power of ideas and ideologies (Held and McGrew 2007).

Substantively, he builds a model rooted in materiality and normativity. Materially, he addresses the transformation of the state towards global governance and a global governance structure that developed tools to transform the cultural, economic and political dimensions of the states. Normatively, a globalisation that aims to tackle global inequality through the development of a cosmopolitan social democratic project (Held and McGrew 2007).

To unpack Held's substantive material project, a good place to start is his work on the contemporary reconstruction of democracy (Held 1992, 1995). Specifically, in addressing the cultural, economic and political mutations of contemporary state sovereignty (Held 2000) he succinctly concludes that "It is essential to recognise at least three elements of globalisation: first, the way processes of economic, political, legal and military interconnectedness are changing the nature, scope and capacity of the sovereign state from above, as its 'regulatory' ability is challenged and reduced in some spheres; secondly, how local groups, movements and nationalisms are questioning the nation-state from below as a representative and accountable power system; and thirdly, the way global interconnectedness creates chains of interlocking political decisions and outcomes among states and their citizens, altering the nature and dynamics of national political systems themselves. Democracy must come to terms with all three of these developments and their implications for national and international power centres" (Held 1992:33).

The normative project, on the other hand, appears not only in this initial contribution (Held 1995) but is further unpacked in subsequent ones (Held 2004, Held and Mcgrew 2007). This normative project starts by critiquing globalist perspectives on globalisation of a neoliberal bent that conclude that inequalities are not an intrinsic part of the process. The solution to global inequality is actually to be found in the pursuit of policies of open markets and global competition that bring the global economy closer together and make it more integrated. They stress how global poverty has decreased since the advent of globalisation. Globalisation presents itself as an opportunity to move countries away from the condition of poverty through industrialisation and global integration (Ohmae 1990, 1995; Perlmutter 1991). For realists, it is not globalisation itself that moves countries towards a situation of inequality. Instead, the reasons are to be found nationally as well as globally. On the other hand, global inequality, if it is said to exist globally, is the necessary conclusion of a world order that is not equal but hierarchical. Any attempts to tame global inequality are condemned to be bound by the willingness of great powers to engage in such endeavours (Gilpin 1981; Krasner 1985). Marxists point to the fact that inequality is a pre-eminent condition of the functioning of the world order. There is a division of labour between the industrialised and the non-industrialized world that contributes to it. This, the argument continues, will lead to deepening North-South fractures. The only way to overcome global inequality is through a national revolutionary change in both the metropole and the periphery (Callinicos et aL 1994). Moving beyond neo-liberal, realist and Marxist arguments, Held proposes instead a cosmopolitan social democratic program. This program, succinctly put, starts from the conclusion that globalisation is causing global inequalities. Economic globalisation, in particular, creates a more affluent world for some at the expense of others. There is also, according to Held, not just the growing globalisation of inequality but also of poverty. This is because the globalisation of economic processes is leading to the dislocation of jobs, mainly for the low-skilled and semi-skilled workforce. In the face of this state of increasing inequalities and poverty, the only way forward is the creation of what Held calls a global covenant (Held 2004). Succinctly put "A reconstituted social democratic project requires the coordinated pursuit of national, regional and global programmes to regulate the forces of economic globalization - to ensure, in other words, that global markets begin to serve the world's peoples rather than vice versa. Extending social democracy beyond borders also depends on strengthening solidarities between those social forces, in different regions of the world, that seek to contest or resist the terms of contemporary economic globalization" (Held and McGrew 2000:30).

IR's Subject Matters in Theory: Actors-Processes-Outcomes. The next three sections will highlight how IR theory enters the interpretation of specific problems in IR. Three ways can be identified in such a process: an emphasis on theory first and substantive matters after – in both essentialist and non-

essentialist versions – and an alternative view that starts with substantive matters first and extracts theory after.

The first is the presentation of the substantive problems of IR as they relate directly to a theory and do so in a way that highlights the interaction between the definition of actors, processes, and consequential outcomes. This type of presentation of the subject matter has both an analytical framework and a historical record in the literature and it presents a reading of IR's substances in an essentialist manner.

Writing in 1998, Holsti emphasises precisely this type of analytical engagement. According to him "While these answers to the question of 'what to study?' differed substantially in their level of analysis, the conceptualisation of actors, the degree of abstractness, or the methodologies they employed, they had in common the normative concern with war, conflict, instability and disorder" (Holsti 1998:23). A similar kind of approach can be picked up in a more conceptual form from the contribution of Vivianne Jabri when she concludes that "The boundaries of the discipline are therefore influenced by assumptions relating to significant actors in global politics and the nature of interactions between them. The third area which may come under scrutiny when deciding the boundaries of International Relations and which has been pointed out is the empirical subject matter with which we are concerned" (Jabri 2000:266). Richard Little and Michael Smith (2005) provide a similar approach to the problem. At its core, and following the suggested framework, they aim to understand how different subject matters are built upon underlying theoretical assumptions. As they conclude, "A good way of exploring these problems further here, and of highlighting the distinctive concerns of each perspective, is by comparing their approaches to three questions of substance in world politics. First, what appear to be the significant actors in world politics in each case? Second, what view of the global political process is implied by each perspective? Finally, what kinds of outcomes are emphasised by each approach, and what kind of world do they see as emerging from the actors and processes dealt with?" (Little and Smith 2005:4).

If multiple authors tend to approach the subject matter as a consequence of actors and processes, the historical record of this framework is also extensive but probably found its first representation in the 1950s and 1960s in the form of a discussion about levels of analysis (Singer 1961, Buzan 1995). In the 1970s(s) the conversation moved on and became one of a distinction between power and interdependence or power and globalism (Maghorrori and Ramberg 1983, Keohane and Nye 1977, Puchala and Fagan 1974). In the 1980s, the conversation again changed to one between realism, liberalism and globalism (Holsti 1985), or between realism, liberalism and socialism (Doyle 1986, 1997). In the meantime, Martin Wight introduced and consolidated a new approach to the mix already composed of realism and globalism, namely Grotianism (Wight 1992). This thesis will pick up the conversation as it has been unfolding since the 1990s.

The first overview that can be emphasized here is provided by Little and Smith (2005) where they develop an understanding of different 'perspectives of world politics''. The first is described as the politics of power and security. According to it, and following the analytical framework stressed above, the actors are states, and the main factors and processes that relate to the interaction are their primary concern for power and security in the context of an anarchical environment characterised by the distribution of power. Key institutions here are, besides the centrality on states, the foreign policies and "the existence of a core of practices which produce a minimum of international order: international law, the balance of power, the fear of war itself, the exercise of responsible leadership by hegemonic powers" (Little and Smith 2005:5). As a culmination of this perspective, the outcome emphasised by this perspective is "an international system which operates according to a power hierarchy and in which there is a continuing tension between the concerns and activities of individual states and the demands of the system as a whole. States cannot escape the demands of the system, although it is possible to deflect or balance them in advantageous ways"(Little and Smith 2005:5).

The second perspective, described as the politics of interdependence and globalisation, reflects the impact that globalisation has on world politics. It starts by highlighting how the core actor is not only the state but also other actors. We live in a world where, even though states have power, they become penetrated by other states and other actors. States are not necessarily in pursuit of power and security, and may have different degrees of control and power. At the same time, sub-national, supranational, and transnational actors gain importance. In this context, foreign policy still matters but the state apparatus is one affected not by unitary decision-making but by a complex of political and organisational processes. Along with the disaggregation of the state also comes the disaggregation of its foreign policy apparatus. When it comes to the analysis of the processes that characterise this perspective, Little and Smith conclude that "the international system in these conditions 'explodes'". (Little and Smith 2005:6). The processes and problems that characterise this perspective are therefore intrinsically linked with the analysis of what is "generally described as those of 'globalization', in which intensification of transnational linkages in politics, political economy and various forms of communications and information technologies have produced a transformation not only of institutions but also of ideas and cultural interactions"(Little and Smith 2005:136). The outcome of this new interdependent world is the socialisation of actors in this global governance condition.

The third perspective is what the authors designate as the politics of dominance and resistance. It starts by emphasising how the main actors – states – are constituted by special interests which they serve. The state is merely a player for dominant economic and political interests. These forces of capital use the state as they see fit as well. Having captured the state, they can also discard it when they understand that capital is best served somewhere else. This creates a process where the dominant class or economic interests rule the world. A process necessarily read in light of imperialist

theory: structural relationships are read in light of the centre, periphery, and semi-periphery. At the centre, we have developed capitalist states, and, in the periphery, we have less developed areas. Interactions are established by a conflation of capitalist interests that control the states. This continued dominance by the centre is achieved through the operation of different mechanisms: exploitation, penetration, and fragmentation. The outcome of this is an order where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. The poor are subjected to economic and military interventions that condition the achievement of their own liberation. According to the argument, such an enterprise can be achieved by the contradictions inherent in the system and by the emergence of revolutionary countercultures in the peripheries.

The final perspectives advanced by Little and Smith are not just one but multiple. It is, in fact, in the nature of this (new) perspectivism that it needs to be multiple. At the heart of this multiplicity is a turn towards epistemology and methodology. As Little and Smith conclude, the "study of world politics has become much more self-consciously aware of its philosophical underpinnings. One of the important effects of this development, perhaps not sufficiently acknowledged in the readings, is the huge upsurge of interest in the ethical implications of international relations. A second and related effect … has been to raise significant questions about the nature of the field and how it should be studied and taught"(Little and Smith 2005:364). But while Little and Smith highlight the relevance of epistemological and methodological issues, they also aim to focus on how "the pendulum has swung back again and the central focus is, once again, on ontological debates about the kind of world we are living in and the potential that exists for changing this world" (Little and Smith 2005:364). The readings selected in the section highlight precisely this. They start with contributions by Robert Rothstein, Robert Gilpin and Susan Strange stressing the move towards an increasing concern with the debate about the epistemological nature of theory and how it relates to the real world, to more specific prognosis of this new perspectivism and its new ontologies provided by a contribution on the Gramscianism of Robert Cox and the feminism of Jean Bethke Elshtain and Charlotte Hooper. A 'perspective on perspective' image moves IR from an analysis of concrete substances – linked with power and security, globalisation, and exploitation – to a reading of the multiple possibilities that underlie the study of these same substances.

IR's Subject Matters in Perspectivisms: The English School as an Example. An edifice of substantive concerns for IR can also be built with the help of the contributions being provided by specific perspectivisms. One such case is the evolving debate about the constitutional nature of IR which involves all those interested in norms and normative conduct in IR. With roots in the contributions of the English School (Bull and Watson 1984, Wight 1977, Nardin 1986), constructivists (Kratochwil 1989) and normative theorists (Jackson 2000) have also approached IR through this angle. Also, in Portugal,

in the work of Adriano Moreira, we can find a view of IR that can be traced to not only an interpretative epistemology that finds its substantive conclusion in the view that IR is governed by a form of thin constitutionalism (Moreira 1999). Here we will focus on the contribution of the English School (ES) to this debate, and in the next section, we will focus on normative theory.

Many debates characterise the ES (Navari and Green 2013, Robertson 2001). We have discussions about waves of scholarship, disputes over ES intellectual history, over the notion of what it means to constitute an international society and how it links with other concepts – system and world society, disputes over the historical expansion of this international society and whether there are regional international societies, disputes over what counts as an institution and what the contents of these institutions are, disputes over normative views about the nature of international society – engulfing the ES in the debate between pluralism and solidarism -, disputes over method. Particularly important to understanding how the ES approaches substantive concerns in IR are the debates about ES's institutions and the normative debate. The focus here will be specifically on how Robert Jackson interprets the substantive nature of international society as it relates to the normative dispute and how, by promoting a pluralist understanding of international society, he excludes or limits the validity of other substances more in line with solidarism. Jackson's work will then be contrasted with the efforts developed by Tommy Knudsen to bring solidarist concerns to thinking about international society.

In his presentation of the operation of contemporary international society, Jackson builds an argument that stresses how this society is built on the acceptance of certain rules of engagement that come from the fact that all states need to be recognised as sovereign. Sovereignty and its possession presuppose that all signatures to the club must also embrace several rules of behaviour that allow them to possess such sovereign titles. The constitution of these titles has changed over time, but since the end of the Second World War, they have particular characteristics. Before engaging in what these substantive contents are it is also important to stress that Jackson divides the action of states in the international sphere along two core vocabularies: the vocabulary of international procedure which is part of a larger ethics of principle, and the vocabulary of international prudence which is part of a larger ethics of virtue. These constitute procedural and prudential rules of engagement where "The first vocabulary centres upon the morality of state sovereignty, as disclosed, for example, by international law. The second vocabulary focuses on the ethics of statecraft and the claims of the national interest" (Jackson 2000:16). They, at the same time, highlight the importance attributed to Jackson to international law and foreign policy/diplomacy.

The basic procedural norms of contemporary international society are identified by Jackson to have been created after the end of the Second World War. These are constitutional norms that regulate the substantive operation of international society. Jackson calls them the procedural norms

of a global covenant, and they are more specifically specified in the 'Helsinki Decalogue', which all the signatories to the Helsinki Final Act (1975) have accepted. To be more precise, these substances are constituted by "the six most important norms all pertain to the sanctity and preservation of equal state sovereignty and the regulation of armed force and peaceful settlement of disputes between states. Human rights became prominent in international discourse in the second half of the twentieth century, but they have not achieved the same standing as the procedural norms of state sovereignty. The global covenant also incorporates additional significant norms, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, international aid, and environmentalism, among others" (Jackson 2000:17). For Jackson and his pluralism, the cornerstones of this edifice are the doctrines of state sovereignty and non-intervention. And by affirming this principle, Jackson is also giving voice to a pluralistic understanding of the UN Charter. Besides the Helsinki Final Act, we can also find substantive constitutional grounds for contemporary international society in the principles advocated by the UN Charter. Reinforcing his pluralist approach to the constitution of international society, he reinforces the judgment and functional purpose of the importance of preserving sovereign and independent sovereign rights for all nations and the regulation of armed force, as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes. These normative substances of contemporary international society are, therefore, stressed not only in Article 2 of the UN Charter – which emphasises the foundational principle of non-intervention – but also in Chapter VI – which lays down the articles for the peaceful settlement of disputes – chapter VII – that allows the Security Council authority to employ armed force to defend peace and security – Article 51 – stating that the only way states can employ force is through acts of self-defence. What the Charter also promotes is a view that the great powers should have a particular responsibility in maintaining international order and security. This *pluralist* constitutional framework emphasised by Jackson highlights how norms of intervention and human rights have really limited space in the rightful functioning of international society, and other norms and substantive matters – such as international aid or environmentalism – are read by Jackson as not having "the same standing as the basic procedural norms listed above" (Jackson 2000:17). There is, however, a qualification to the argument: in Western Europe, we have a solidarist constitutional framework in operation. But worldwide, this is not the case.

If these are the procedural norms that govern international society, there are also other important dimensions to it. And these relate to the action of those elements that constitute the state itself. If the procedural norms that constitute and regulate international life are in existence, they are not absolute. The action of state representatives is important to understand the operation of IR. And, according to Jackson, statesmen are governed by an ethic of statecraft that aims to serve the national interest. The fundamental principle which guides the action of statesmen is the principle of prudence. Accordingly, prudence "is a normative concept when it concerns others besides ourselves: it is a political virtue to take care not to harm others. In politics, international politics especially, prudence

arguably is the cardinal virtue because power is so great" (Jackson 2000:20). The national interest, in this sense, and foreign policy decisions are not a kind of impersonal mechanism rooted in power or hypocrisy or any other rationalist view. It's a demonstration of the ethics of statecraft, a moral idea governing the conduct of statespeople. On the other hand, it is *situational* ethics: the context under which decisions are taken needs to be taken into account.

In the end, this constitutional format that Jackson develops takes into account a normative framework which provides a constitutional substance to the issue areas that, according to the author, are important to study. Issues such as sovereignty, security, war, intervention, international trusteeship, human rights or democracy and environmentalism take centre stage for Jackson's pluralistic representation of the world. His main concern is to elucidate how international society needs to be based on the principles of non-intervention, where the rules for intervention are clearly stated. In this world, there is little room for solidarism of different forms. He doesn't discredit the existence of solidarism. It is present in Western Europe by the willingness of states to delegate sovereign rights to post-national sets of institutions. But while this is happening, for the expressed delegation of these rights by sovereign states, the rest of the world is built on other grounds. And this is also because a plural world is one where we can best preserve a sense of respect for others and for differences. Ultimately, this plural world is rooted in a perspective that wants to keep unity in diversity.

Tommy Knudsen develops a different understanding of contemporary international society. For him, we have been, since the end of the Cold War, seeing a move towards a more solidarist international society. The argument is presented by framing it more in line with the ideas put forward by ES writings. For the ES the international society is constituted by fundamental institutions. Both Martin Wight (1977) and Hedley Bull (1977) develop their arguments by sustaining such a view. Deeply rooted in the historical assessment of how interstate relations unfolded, the argument presented by both Wight and Bull recognises that the relations between states were rooted in customs which raised expectations for the unfolding of the interactions. These customs constitute a system of states (Wight 1977) or an anarchical society (Bull 1977) whose foundations lie in fundamental institutions. These are, for Knudsen, the primary institutions that define international society. In line with traditional ES arguments, he sees the mutual recognition of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, great power management and war as the main primary institutions. These are foundational institutions of international society which we can't go without.

What he also aims to understand is how these institutions change and evolve through time. At this level, he argues that one needs to distinguish constitutive principles inherent in primary institutions from the practices by which they are reproduced. He introduces the idea of a broad and narrow approach to institutions. The narrow approach is static and unhistorical. It settles the idea that there are institutions that have always existed and that these are forever in existence. Taking

inspiration from the work of both Holsti (2004) and Buzan (2004), Knudsen argues that, instead, we should take a broader approach to institutional change. According to such an approach, institutions can only be understood in the interaction they have with practices and in the reproduction of institutional functions in these practices. The value of this argument is that it opens the understanding of core institutions to the dynamics of history. We have had different international society configurations over time.

How, more specifically, to conceptualise change? According to Knudsen, institutions are made of the mutual reinforcement between constitutive principles and the practices that sustain them. In this sense a primary institution needs to reproduce itself as the set of principles, the set of practices that sustain them and the mutual constitution of these two elements. Institution continuity presupposes a reinforcement of this dynamic across time, institutional change "can be understood as (a) changes in the practices by which the constitutive principles are reproduced or maintained (= change in a primary institution), or in rare cases, (b) changes in the constitutive principles themselves (= change of a primary institution)" (Knudsen, 2016:12). To sustain such a perspective, that opens international society to a theory of change and a theory of different international societies across time, one can say that different understandings of balance of power are rooted in different practices which, themselves, specifically qualify historically this institution. The broad approach requires or opens up the analysis of this historical transition of international societies.

But the question then arises, have we moved, in our current configuration of international society, beyond the pluralist understandings promoted by Bull, Watson or James towards a different configuration? A plural society, as emphasised by Jackson, requires mutual respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, positive international law, and tolerance of differences. In contrast, solidarism is based on conditional sovereignty, collective security, and collective enforcement of principles (through international organisations and international courts of justice) (Bull 1966). The question, therefore, becomes whether we are seeing signs of the emergence of this solidarist society, and how to conceptualise this change. Knudsen agrees that we are moving towards a more solidarist international society, which is creating new primary institutions. But before this is done, it is important to qualify what he means by solidarism.

Relying on the work of Buzan to draw an internal distinction between different kinds of solidarisms (Buzan 2004, Buzan 2014). There are two types of solidarism: state-centric (of the kind promoted by Buzan) and cosmopolitan solidarism. The difference between the two lies in the fact that for state-centric solidarism, the values of solidarism are promoted by the mutual agreement of states, and for cosmopolitan solidarism, there is a more traditional alignment of solidarism with the project elaborated by Lauterpacht, where humankind and individuals start having rights of their own. At heart the dispute is also about who should be a subject of international law: states or individuals. Knudsen

wants to explore the opportunities for the emergence of this more cosmopolitan version of the argument while not discrediting the existence of other forms of state-centric solidarisms. And it is here that his argument gains the final substantive dimension.

Beyond the importance of studying the indispensable institutions of international society – mutual recognition of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, great power management and war – Knudsen develops the argument that since the end of the Cold War, the international society has gained a solidarist dimension as well. Rejecting the traditional views and debates between pluralism and solidarism which view their relationship as a zero-sum game, he claims that alongside the plural institutions, there are forms of state-centric solidarism – in the form of market interactions and environmentalism – and cosmopolitan solidarism – in the form of machinery for the creation and enforcement of rights and duties of individuals. This machinery is itself, a mixture of pluralism and solidarism.

In particular, Knudsen traces back the emergence of this cosmopolitan solidarism to the laws of war after World War II that made individuals a subject of international law. These were consolidated by the humanitarian laws that derive from the The Hague and Geneva Conventions and the 1948 Genocide Convention. Also, the two 1966 human rights conventions and the move towards international human rights laws constitute important stages in the progression of this type of movement. The adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the realisation of the Court itself in 2002 give robustness to this regime by framing it in a way that allows the international community to act when individuals and groups of individuals are under threat. According to Knudsen, this humanitarian regime creates a dual system of state responsibility and universal responsibility. As Knudsen concludes, it is constituted by "the complementary court system under the Rome Statute, and the dual 'responsibility to protect' of states and international society as represented by the UN and the UN Security Council. States have the primary responsibility to prosecute or protect under the ICC and R2P, but if they fail, states can be overruled by the ICC or the UN Security Council and the rights and duties of individuals or groups of individuals can be enforced against the will of the government that has, or whose citizens have, violated international humanitarian law" (Knudsen 2016:15).

What emerges, for Knudsen, is an international society with new substantive matters to cover. Beyond the traditional institutions, the market and environmentalism gain new importance. Beyond this, humanitarian intervention, international criminal jurisdiction and international trusteeship are seen as objects of reflection and analysis. This is an international society made to preserve the rights of states and of individuals.

IR's Subject Matter as Reality-Theory. The last approach to substantive matters in IR is non-deterministic and open. It is an approach that prioritises reality first. Theory comes after 'the real' is emphasised. Anything that happens internationally can, therefore, become a matter of substantive concern but needs to be framed theoretically.

Chris Brown's *Understanding International Relations* (2001) can be used as an example of this framework. He presents several substances that are of importance to him: the state and foreign policy, power and security, the balance of power and war, global governance, the global economy, globalization, US hegemony and international order. In the conclusion of the first chapter, he highlights the 'theoretical' framework used. According to Brown, "The aim of this chapter has been to discourage the notion that the theory of International Relations can be studied via an initial stipulative definition, the implications of which are then teased out and examined at length. Instead, the process is, or should be, almost exactly the other way around. What is required is that we explore the world of international relations from a number of different perspectives, taking each one seriously while we are examining it, but refusing to allow any one account to structure the whole, denying a privileged position to any one theory or set of theories" (Brown 2001: 16). In other words, against previous approaches which start from theory and read substances in light of these theories, Brown suggests starting from substances and coming up with different perspectives to read these substances. In this sense, the precise definition of these substances is not of concern; we should explore the world of international relations, and only when we find a topic of interest, we come to apply IR theory to it. An understanding of theory is important because it will allow us to understand the lenses which can be used to approach substances. But what matters is to start with specific substantive concerns first, and then highlight how different lenses can read them.

1.4.3.2. *What* to Study: Five (Possible) Debates

What specific substantive matters are IR scholars engaged with? What different answers to the *what to study* problem do they propose? Five ways in which to approach this problem are proposed here. The first is an understanding of these subject matters by framing them as international political problems. The second is through a reading of subject matters in light of a move towards global politics. The third moves to theory and addresses theory in three ways: the first two start with IR theory, and the last one with substantive problems. The first tackles the *what should we study* problem through the aggregation of perspectivisms and the interaction between states-processes-outcomes, and the second moves from theoretical aggregation to theoretical singularity by focusing on specific contributions of perspectivisms. The example given above focused on the contribution of the English School. There is also a final way in which these substances can be approached: one that starts not from

theory but from practical contents. Practices and substances come first, but they are framed by a plural conversation embedded in IR theory. The conclusion to this seems clear: to understand what the substantive contents of IR are, we need to frame them with theoretical conversations derived from IR itself.

1.5. Theory and Method

As suggested, the third contribution of this thesis is to provide a Beverian approach to IR's constitutive problems. We need to frame the analysis of IR as a research field in deeper theoretical reflection, and Bevir's contribution to IR needs to be expanded. Bevir develops an approach to knowledge that he consolidates with a particular view of concepts, objectivity, traditions and dilemmas (Bevir 1999, Bevir and Blakely 2018). Critical in the approach to Bevir's work that is followed here is his view of the role of intellectual ideas and 'high' culture in the framework. To identify the role of 'high' culture and intellectual engagements, the thesis will combine this Beverian proposal with a Gadamerian methodology.

1.5.1. Concepts

The set of meanings we attribute to scientific research are dependent on the contexts of their own employability. This implies an important conclusion: philosophy must be understood as the study of the grammar of our concepts. The study of philosophy, thus understood, is constituted only by the study of what constitutes the concepts with which we make sense of the world. Knowledge is always derived from the study of the grammar of concepts.

Studying the grammar of concepts necessarily leads us to focus on how theorising can be developed: what Bevir designates as justifying form and explanatory form. Theorising of the first kind aims to analyse the characteristics that make up a set of objective and authoritative facts in each discipline. It is the method that allows researchers to reach their conclusions, or the test used to evaluate theories and facts. Theorising of the second kind consists of an "analysis of the thing (or things) that explains the objects of concern to us, together with an analysis of the relationship of this thing (or these things) to these objects. It specifies the way in which scholars can explain the data they uncover" (Bevir 1999:11). In summary, a justifying form presupposes the evaluation of the theory and facts that are behind the scientific work, and the explanatory form requires the analysis of the applicability of what interests us and the relationships established.

Another important issue relates to analysing how this theorising can be achieved. If in the previous section, the importance of facts was discussed in the function it serves in the argument about the importance of comparing theories as the right way to go about our understanding of (scientific) knowledge, here the substantive extraction of the conceptual debates that occur between justificatory and explanatory forms of theorising is achieved through two types of arguments: deductive and inductive procedures. We use them to extract information from our concepts. Deductive procedures extract or define categories within general propositions. They aim to settle the categories that govern concepts. Inductive arguments reinforce the implications of the main propositions or intuitions associated with our concepts. They typically present taxonomic analyses of different theories represented in a discipline.

Finally, following the same methodological approach developed by Bevir (1999), the only way to discuss concepts is through reading the words that constitute such discussions. And here we must go beyond an everyday understanding of language and accept that academic work can interfere with the development of these concepts. This can happen either through the work developed by scientific practice – when there is an effort to define more precisely the concepts with which one works or theoretically extrapolate the words of everyday life – or through philosophy as well – when there is once again an effort to define the words and concepts that makeup reality. When investigating ideas, we must analyse language use involving scientific or philosophical work.

1.5.2. Knowledge and Objectivity

Two approaches to knowledge aim to achieve scientific truths through methodological reasoning – what Bevir describes as logical positivism and logic empiricism. What distinguishes these two versions is how the principle of verifiability is presented in the argument – logical positivism is markedly verificationist, meaning that the goal is to determine whether a given theory is or is not false; logical empiricism adds a logic of refutation, meaning that the goal is to confirm the assumptions of the analysis. Logical positivism places at the heart of their analysis the search for vindication: a theory will be correct if the assumptions of analysis are demonstrably correct. For logical empiricism, the question is not to prove the right but to eliminate the wrong: our ability to construct historical truths lies in our ability to refute another set of theories that are considered wrong by the analysed data.

This centrality in the search for truth based on facts, however, eliminates from the analysis the fact that all known reality is imbued with *a priori* knowledge. Addressing these facts is only possible when some commitment is assumed on the part of the analyst concerning the object of analysis. There is no separation between value and fact, therefore. All theory is inevitably related to the observer. The

interpretation of the fact depends on the adaptability of the analysis to the theoretical context and not the opposite. This analysis, in turn, is dependent on a set of theoretical assumptions that are multiple and open.

On the other hand, one cannot follow what Bevir describes as a logic of discovery. This type of evaluation concludes that it is possible to access a historical context by analysing the linguistic conventions that prevailed when a given work was developed. The aim is to recreate and understand as much as possible about the specific context and the specific languages that were used to truly recreate the meaning of history. This method presupposes the need to develop a theory before developing the work. In this preparatory work, the researcher will have to contextualise himself with the author's work and understand as much as possible of that same historical time: the linguistic conventions, the psychological or psychic composition of the author himself, the political, economic, social framework of the time in which the work was done.

The critique of this argument can be developed at two levels: first, a critique of the logic of discovery itself and second, by the fact that the knowledge that one may have of a specific context is never enough to perceive that same context. The first critique claims that it is impossible to fully understand "what an author meant by a text" (Bevir 1999:123), and no method can do it. It is impossible to divide earlier theories from current theories because we will never know what exactly was meant by the author. A contextual analysis will always be just that: contextual. Dependent on an interpretation and not an exact "method of discovery". On the other hand, this type of epistemology, which, in itself, constitutes a method, presupposes correctly getting to grips with what this context is. As in the epistemological context, this type of approximation is also problematic in methodology. We can always start with the wrong assumptions and come to the right conclusions, we can start with the right assumptions and come to the wrong conclusions, or we can start with the right assumptions and get the prediction right. The act of getting it right is not right and depends on the circumstances. The relevant point of analysis is that the history of ideas must be done, avoiding exact prescriptions of methodology. In the words of Bevir: "We should concentrate on the reasonableness of the histories people write, not the reasons why they write what they do" (Bevir 1999:87). Anything that develops a concrete and exact vision of what it means to read history will, by its very nature, be dubious and insufficient. Imagination, luck, and instinct are always requirements to reach correct conclusions.

Certainly, the search for objectivity in the investigation of historical ideas must be achieved in some way, and Bevir proposes other parameters for doing so. Parameters that, on the one hand, are not closed and, on the other hand, are not exact. They cannot be closed because the logic of justification must be open to comparing different theories. The possibility of comparing different theories and approaches to a single circumstance is inevitable for achieving a more consistent study of the history of ideas. On the other hand, this study can never be closed: the conclusions drawn from

the data analysis, being the result of the always present possibility of comparison, are still imbued with the researcher's own subjectivity. Scientific objectivity will always be, in Bevir's words, a "product of a human practice" (Bevir 1999:97).

But how, more precisely, can theories be compared? This foundation is to be found in what Bevir describes as facts. According to Bevir: "A fact is something the members of a community accept as a fundamental proposition. Facts are observations that embody categories based on the recognition of similarities and differences between particular cases" (Bevir 1999:99). Theories also play a role in the definition of facts: their principal function lies not only in revealing the particular character of a fact - when they make associations between different facts that may be relevant in any approach - but also because they help define what is meant by the fact itself - a theory creates or gives a distinctive quality to a fact.

In summary, for Bevir, the study of the history of ideas is the study of the comparison of different theoretical assumptions about given facts. These facts, themselves, have an independent logic in the sense that they embody categories accepted by all, but, at the same time, they depend on theoretical interpretation.

1.5.3. Traditions

The previous sections emphasised the importance of conceptual analysis and theoretical comparison. But how do these conceptual debates and theories come about? We know that knowledge is acquired either through comparing different theories or through giving voice to explanatory and justificatory forms of enquiry. But how, more specifically, are they formed? To this, we need to turn to the debate over different traditions. It is around traditions that theoretical and conceptual comparisons are formed. Different traditions explain or understand a given concept, and it is to their formation and transformation that we need to turn so we can start comparing different assessments and building our case that to fully understand a particular concept, we need to compare different tradition-specific theoretical frameworks.

First, why do people have the belief system they do? Some positions aim to lock the person into a specific set of rules that define someone's understanding. Historians cannot explain why people have the belief system they have only by assessing the "reality" through the (theoretically oriented) analysis of "pure experiences". It is wrong to say that reality will explain what beliefs people have. On the other hand, it is also wrong to conclude that people are locked into some structurally given set of beliefs and that these cultures limit someone's actions. One position gives pride place to agency, the other to structures. Instead, one needs to understand how tradition and agency interact with each

other. In traditions, there must be the possibility of disruption, and, at the same time, agency decides the development and content of traditions. If people and agents acquire their rationality within the framework of a tradition, that same agent can extend, modify or reject that same tradition. If the argument is credible that structures constrain, it is wrong to conclude that they limit. The historian's objective must be to understand how agents accept, extend, modify or reject different traditions. The agency of the individually held belief possessed by an author is, therefore, always subject to change. It is not locked, even though it is conditioned by an accepted framework to begin with.

Individuals cannot live in a society without some kind of tradition that links them to higher intentions. On the other hand, traditions depend exclusively on individually held beliefs – it is to individuals alone that we need to look to access this process of socialisation. However, one argument concludes that this aggregation is done automatically because the researcher has a set of theories, epistemes, or linguistic predispositions that lead him to be aggregated to that same tradition. What is argued, instead, is that there is no tradition without agency. A tradition is just a starting point, not an arrival point. It is up to the agent to adhere to this set of ideas. In this way, we are socialised in a tradition, but we also want to be socialised. Nothing prevents the agent from exercising the agency and changing his situation.

Second, it is not possible to define and apply a closed definition of a tradition forever. Traditions, in this essentialist sense, live in a permanent zero-sum game where they either exist or are extinct. To this perspective, another must be contrasted: there is not just one tradition but multiple traditions. We can have multiple traditions as long as these traditions can be reasonably justified to a belief network and the criteria for the creation of this belief network. We can hold different traditions as individuals.

One relevant point here is the notion of essentialist core. This essentialist core can be permanent and exist for years. It needs to be established somehow by the researcher in the act of defining a tradition. However, this essentialist core changes over time. If there always needs to be something bringing together different individuals in the connection they have to a tradition, this set of beliefs and cores may change from time to time. Therefore, not only can we have multiple traditions as individuals, but the ones we have as a whole may change over time.

Third, the crucial question, therefore, is through what belief networks are individuals considered to be part of traditions, and what aggregation criteria are there to define something as a tradition? Bevir argues that it is through transmission through time and through the establishment of an internal conceptual connection that this transmission process can be judged. The relevance of this transmission through time is registered when the researcher can detect transmissible themes across the ages. These transmissible themes are the essentialist cores that need to define a tradition. They are not fixed, as already suggested, they allow for transmissibility from teacher to pupil and for the

justification on the part of the research of this process. In other words, the work of the researcher is to trace back these conceptual cores and transmissible themes. When he builds a tradition, these need to be justified as well as how they flow from teacher to pupil. These belief networks, constituted by transmissible themes that are justifiable across teachers and pupils, constitute the design of a tradition.

What this also suggests is that an individual's work can be linked to different traditions. The result of this is that an individual's work may belong to different traditions. As they are not watertight and have a fixed and exact definition, as they are open and fluid, the historian can define the tradition as he wishes. The important thing is that there is some kind of historical heritage that is established in the work. If the desire is to work on the belief system as a whole, the tradition will be defined with that goal in view; if the goal is to work on only one dimension of the tradition, other types of contributions can be built and, potentially, the redefinition of the tradition. What matters is the historian's objective, having as a selection criterion the question of historical (and conceptual) temporality.

This leads to the final point: the creation of a tradition is dependent on the subjectivity of those researchers who created it. Multiple interpretations of an author's work and his inclusion or exclusion from different traditions are possible. The work of the historian of ideas must be, however, to recognise the transmissible themes that cut through generations.

1.5.4. Change

How to understand change? It is important to answer this question by first understanding change of traditions second, change and dilemmas, and third, change in belief.

When it comes to understanding change in traditions, four substantive arguments can be made. First, traditions are made of individuals with agency. We can't separate the idea of tradition from the independence that each one of us has to belong or not to belong in them. Second, traditions, as already stated, don't have fixed meanings. They can change according to the criteria attached to them by individuals. There is authority in tradition, but there is always the exercise of reason. Third, and as a consequence, changes in the composition of individual beliefs are what cause changes in traditions. The object of study should be the belief system of the individual(s) in question. Reasons for change can't be found in structuralisms – pre-determined and fixed – nor in pure individualism – without taking into account a pre-existing condition. Rather, they are both individual and structural. What happens is that change is a direct result of the intellectual exercise of all of us who, simply by thinking about the experiences we have had, reflect on a certain structural teaching to change/modify

it. Changes from a tradition are not material but ideational in this way. That is, they do not result from any external material change per se, but from intellectual work directly and/or are the consequence of these material changes on intellectual work. Fourth, there are two sources of change. The first is real experiences – being an intellectual exercise by excellence, change occurs through the academic reading given to real experiences in the world. Here, the external has an impact on the internal. On the other hand, change in tradition can be brought about equally by an intellectual reconfiguration and by new moral or theoretical challenges. Theoretical or moral reflection can alter a tradition, leading to a revision of the tradition itself.

How do dilemmas operate? First, a dilemma, because it affects our belief system, can happen all the time: it results not only from rare events that can lead to revolutionary changes but also from anomalies that result from our day-to-day and daily lived experiences or intellectual endeavours. What is relevant here is to think that accepting a new reality or knowledge as true motivates us to change our belief system.   Second, they can be rejected or accommodated/accepted. When accommodated, the integration is done through the integration of themes and debates. Themes and debates must have an origin in the pre-existing – it must be logically accommodated with the new. The themes that have been debated and accepted in the past must therefore be reconfigured, but the origin must be those same themes. This accommodation by challenging a pre-existing theme may cause a general revision of other themes. This causes the belief system to be affected in multiple places. A belief system works like a belief network. We modify our beliefs by arranging hooks of understandings that recreate themes that exist in our belief system as it exists.

What is, more specifically, the relation between dilemmas and beliefs? It is in the exercise of thought that dilemmas contest beliefs. If we didn't think, our beliefs would remain unchanged. Beliefs change only because we exercise our thinking and reasoning skills – and not as a result of pure experience. For this reason, it is possible to analyse the critical judgment that leads us to evaluate the experience and the dilemma. Thought enables the aggregation of new beliefs in a process considered internal and always results from the challenge to existing beliefs. The first consequence is that a dilemma always presents a challenge because it is the result of an experience and, when entering our belief system, it will always be theoretical. Second, this requires a way of thinking that can compare beliefs with each other and investigate their validity and strength. If this moment of analysis requires the reformulation of the belief we have about an object, we can again highlight this new belief and compare it with the rest of the network of beliefs we have and continue with the process of rebuilding the network.

To summarise, dilemmas interact with our beliefs because they make us reflect upon pre-conceived intellectual notions we may have. A dilemma is always internal, not external. Externalities matter by challenging our internal intellectual configurations. Furthermore, dilemmas happen all the

time and, when accommodated, they need to depart and reconfigure existing themes. Finally, It is in the theoretical framing of these notions and challenges that we exercise our thought. It is also in further understanding and comparing these beliefs with all the other networks of beliefs linked or associated with it that we engage in the necessary theoretical pluralism.

1.5.5. Document Analysis

Running through this theoretical framework, two important conclusions are important to take: it is interpretative and connected to theoretical disputes. The understanding of web(s) of theoretical disputes characterises Bevir's view on conceptual analysis, objectivity, traditions and dilemmas. It is inevitable that the thesis follows a methodological strategy rooted in an analysis of documents. This study's primary sources will therefore be books, essays, scientific articles, dissertations and papers presented at conferences because these reflect and extract best the meanings intended to be captured by our theoretical approach.

On the other hand, to capture documentary realities, the work of Hans-George Gadamer will be used as a source of inspiration to extract meaning from these documents. Gadamer method involves engaging the research in a hermeneutic circle in which the researcher circulates between the whole and the part and between the part and the whole. Textual interpretation derives precisely from this fluctuation of meanings. Our prejudices or pre-understandings initially enter and force us, socialised as we are in cultural, social or other traditions, to frame the text and the research object with our values. This whole meets the part, however, which, by itself, has a socialising power. The text reveals truths that, possibly, we did not know and, in this sense, transforms what we initially wanted to see or know. This knowledge acquired in practice, in turn, results in the transformation of the vision of the whole and closes, albeit temporarily, the hermeneutic circle. Since our prejudices are infinite, so can the interpretations given to texts. Scientific truth is thus always contextual despite obeying a set of foundations. The hermeneutic cycle is not a vicious circle because it can be escaped every time the researcher makes sense of the perceived reality.

What the documentary hermeneutic approach of Gadamer allows is the possibility for the existence of a permanent interaction between the research and the document under analysis. Initially, the research departs from a number of assumptions and prejudices – these are inevitable and necessary to conduct the research. The text is read, therefore, departing from certain assumptions that are themselves inherited and transmitted across time. However, it is not just the researcher that is relevant in this process. Gadamer develops the idea of the *fusion of horizons* to describe the necessary dialogue that must exist between the reader and the pre-existing assumptions of the text or

document under analysis. Documents have a life of their own, and the researcher needs to understand what this life is. Against more radical positions, however, Gadamer argues that a text doesn't speak for itself, nor is the context under which the text was written all that is to be known. The first position leads to absolute relativism, where each person can interpret a text following whatever position that is determined by the text itself. The second position gives the context under which the text was written and the method under which the text needs to be read, the right methodological attitude to take. Gadamer, not only promoted a view that goes against radicalism but also condemned contextualist arguments that were prevalent in the hermeneutic tradition to which he was contributing. As René Geanellos concludes "Prior to Gadamer, textual interpretation was spoken of as an attempt to reconstruct the original thoughts or meanings of the author. Accordingly, Ast claimed the explanation of a text meant discovering the idea the author originally had in mind. To this Schleiermacher added that interpretation only began after successful identification of the author's original meanings … Gadamer moved beyond this hermeneutic theory of understanding and in the process radically reconceptualised textual interpretation. He asserted that a text is understood not through the author's meaning but through itself" (Geanellos 1998:157). The conclusion is that talking about a *fusion of horizons* means allowing the text to speak for itself while keeping some foundational understandings that are rooted precisely in the pre-understandings from which we depart. The possibility is always open for a text to change our pre-understandings and certainly, it should have the independence to do so, but, according to Gadamer, this needs to occur not disrespecting but complementing our initial views. This is how the researcher and the author find themselves in constant dialogue. Extracting the truth of a text requires engaging in dialogue while keeping an eye on our prejudices.

Gadamer's conception of *pre-understandings* and his own account of the importance of having inherited ideas across time and space, as well as his notion of *fusion of horizons,* resembles much of the thought put forward by Mark Bevir and his approach to traditions and dilemmas.

1.6. Thesis Outline

As emphasised in the second part, there are many reasons *why* we can study IR's constitutive questions and problems. Manuals presenting IR as a field have emerged throughout this subject's history, and these introductions helped solidify methodological, institutional, theoretical or normative critiques. The introduction emphasised the necessity to create a sense of dialogue among scholars, thus endorsing the methodological critique, aiming to push this critique further. In doing so, it established what constitutive questions and constitutive problems are and suggested a theoretical and methodological strategy to approach these issues. The rest of this thesis is designed to give voice to

this methodological objective by using the theoretical argument consistently throughout the thesis, but also because there's no explicit goal behind the selection of the topics under discussion. Since it would be impossible to go over all constitutive problems, the chapters that follow will focus on specific constitutive problems. The thesis will be divided into five parts, each introducing five chapters.

The first part will develop the arguments that drive this thesis's theoretical and methodological framework. The thesis will find refuge in the ideas and work of Mark Bevir. The goal of the chapter is not just to consolidate the necessity to start thinking theoretically about IR's constitutive problems but also to unpack Bevir's work. The idea that Bevir's contribution can only be read through the historical turn will be contested. Instead, Bevir's reflections on conceptual analysis, objectivity, historical time and traditions of thought, as well as the importance of understanding change, will be theoretically dissected. Each of these contributions produces a theoretical framework that will be solidified by a Gadamerian documentary analysis. At its heart, and in all these dimensions, Bevir's framework is interpretative and intellectual. The necessity to build a methodological strategy rooted in the analysis of documentary evidence follows from the argument that we need to give voice to webs of theoretical discussions. Such a theoretical-methodological framework will be highlighted in chapter two.

In the third chapter, the goal will be to dissect a specific discussion framed here as a *why we should study* IR concern. An initial introductory part will review some issues that can arise when debating this matter. After this assessment, the chapter will go over the transition currently underway towards a Global IR. The goal of the argument, departing from Bevir's reflections on knowledge and objectivity, is to develop an overview of this debate, framing it as a debate about a US-Euro core and more recent contributions that expand the discussion towards other regions and countries other than this core – locations traditionally not counted as producers of IR but that have their specificity that needs to be understood. Specifically, the argument will highlight, among other themes, three core debates: the nature of US hegemony, the nature of Western civilisation and the mutation of concepts and theories that necessarily are involved when these same concepts and theories are read in different socio-historical contexts.

The third part will dissect the different *how(s)* of the study of IR. An introduction to this part focuses on the various ways they have been understood. The specific chapter dedicated to discussing such matters using a Beverian approach will develop a revisionist history of the philosophy of science in IR. IR theoretical literature tends not to take fully into account the importance of the philosophy of science in studying IR. Most of the assessments highlight the significance of the study of epistemology, ontology and methodology – where these terms are described without any detailed analysis of their contents. These broad assessments tend to conflate these debates under the banner of 'meta-theory' (Jorgensen 2018, Kauppi and Viotti 2020). Alternatively, when a more substantive analysis of the problem is conducted, the contemporary discussion seems stuck in the positivist-post-positivist

confrontation (Linklater and Burchill 2005). Departing from Bevir's reflections on historical time and traditions of thought, the argument will move beyond presentism and foundationalism and introduce how the history of the interaction between the philosophy of science and IR needs to be rethought.

The fourth part will focus on different *what(s).* Again, an introduction to the part will dissect some of the different ways this issue is being treated in IR. This introductory part will then be consolidated by one substantive chapter. Its main goal is to reconceptualise the problem of globalisation-state sovereignty in contemporary IR by taking a post-internationalist view of the problem. It will be argued that state sovereignty has, in fact, many different conceptualisations, and these differences need to be understood in all their dimensions. Instead of speaking about sovereignty, scholars need to start engaging with these debates more in light of mutations in the concept of state sovereignty. If we unpack this concept, we can see that the impact of globalisation and its forces take place along a number of dimensions. The argument is particularly interested in understanding mutations in contemporary sovereign authority. Reading these mutations through a post-internationalism prism, it will be argued that the global world promotes horizontal and vertical mutations in the way we understand (sovereign) authority.

The conclusion will bring the argument to a close by going over a particular view of the future for IR. An introduction will take the 'sociological reflexive' turn suggested by Ole Waever and Arlene Tickner (2009) as a possible and viable option to understand this future. Beyond epistemological and ontological reflexivity that have characterised much of the 'great debates' in IR, we need more sociological reflexivity. This necessarily entails, among other things (Waever 2018), a concern with how IR evolves distinctively in different national settings. After an introduction to this part sets the stage for this future, the conclusion will start by providing an overview of the argument advanced in this thesis. It will link Bevir's theoretical framework with the substantive arguments promoted. After this is done and highlighting the importance of unpacking the theoretical argument, it will focus on Bevir's reflections about dilemmas and change to build the theoretical framework of this last chapter. This theoretical framework will then be applied to analyse national IR communities. Change is necessarily intellectual and may happen all the time in an argument. We just need to engage in a different intellectual assessment of the problem at hand, motivated either by an external trigger or an internal intellectual dispute. Departing from this theoretical assumption, it will be argued that we need an intellectual disruption in the way we assess national contributions to the Global IR programme. This involves creating stronger theoretical links to a socio-intellectual framework that takes Ole Waever's reflection on sociology of science and its interactions with IR more seriously. Through this stronger link with this theoretical framework we can, first, better analyse these national communities – by more clearly identifying triggers of analysis rooted in socio (cultural and institutional) or intellectual frameworks – or, second, by suggesting different triggers for change in these national communities –

again rooted in socio (cultural and institutional) or intellectual proposals. The conclusion will expand on this second contribution by broadening the way in which these normative proposals for change are being promoted. It will, more specifically, integrate arguments for change with IR's constitutive questions and problems, and bring argument will come full circle. The conclusion of the conclusion will summarise the main arguments of this contribution.

PART I – THEORY AND METHOD

This thesis will use Mark Bevir's work as its main theoretical inspiration (Bevir 1999, Bevir and Blakely 2018). More work can be developed to integrate this innovative philosopher into IR's debates. Two debates come to mind: constructivism and the historical turn in IR. It is important to keep an eye on these ongoing debates, present Bevir's work, and integrate Bevir into these discussions.

Constructivism has been going through an intense confrontation between different philosophical traditions of thought that have been incorporated into its debates. The classical divisions between conventional and critical/ linguistic/postmodern (Checkel 1998, Hopf 1998, Fierke and Jorgensen 2001) have gained more varied disputes by incorporating new philosophical variants. These days, the debate is influenced by the introduction of different forms of middle-range theorising and 'normalisation' within constructivism (Hynek and Teti 2010, McCourt 2022) and their critics (Epstein 2013, Steele, Gould and Kessler 2020). Understanding the facts of these discussions and the web of the theoretical conversations that compose them is essential.

On the other hand, and keeping an eye on other current theoretical disputes, IR is going through a historiographical turn (Bell 2001, Armitage 2004, de Carvalho, Lopez and Leira 2021). An important debate is unfolding on this front as well between those who want to keep the influence of history in IR restricted to the classical contributions of Leopold von Ranke (Elman and Elman 2001, Elman and Elman 2008), those who want to move beyond this and incorporate economic and social history into IR (Wallerstein 2004), those that are more inspired by historical sociology (Hobson & Lawson 2008) and, finally, others that take the linguistic turn more seriously and are more inclined towards cultural history and the history of ideas (Wallenius 2021, Kessler 2021). Even though general overviews have been developed that aim to grasp different dimensions of the intersection of history and IR (Smith 1999, Hobson and Lawson 2008, Yetiv 2011, Glencross 2015), more can be done to understand the many dimensions of this interaction.

Bevir is also relevant in itself, in what it says about interpretative social science and, in particular, in how to understand the history of ideas. Bevir's work in philosophy started with an effort to modify how we understand the *Logic* of the History of Ideas (Bevir 1999). This endeavour found its roots in Skinner's contextual approach but aimed to transform it (Bevir 2001a). It is mainly in this endeavour that this work will find inspiration to develop its theoretical and methodological framework. Since the *Logic* has been presented, other issues – already present in the *Logic* – were expanded and developed more consistently. Bevir's co-authored volume with Jason Blakely (2018) develops an anti-naturalist approach to social science.

Having clarified the importance of Bevir's contribution, the final theoretical exercise would incorporate his framework in ongoing debates about constructivism and the historical turn. On the one hand, Bevir's anti-naturalist philosophy can contribute to the ongoing debate about constructivism—an integration that is yet to be made (to my knowledge). On the other hand, speaking directly to the recent move to incorporate history into constructivism (Reus-Smit 2008, Leira and de Carvalho 2016), Bevir's ideas and framework can also provide grounds for other contributions. Finally, even though such an endeavour has already started (Hall 2017), much more can be said about how Bevir can contribute to the ongoing historical turn in IR. The continuous exercise of integrating Bevir's work in this new wave of research needs to continue.

This thesis does not intend to analyse all these debates here. It is fundamentally an effort to open avenues for further research for its author. The main contribution presented in the next chapter deals with an earlier contribution to studying this history of ideas developed by Bevir (1999). It, therefore, restricts itself to these earlier arguments, not fully incorporating his latest ones (Bevir and Blakely 2018). This was so because it would serve the purpose of not only helping to introduce the author of the thesis to Bevir's ideas but also because it would make sense for the theoretical proposals being developed in this work – whose use will be clarified not only in the substantive chapters but also in the conclusion.

Chapter 2 – Theory and Method: A Beverian Approach to International Relations

2.1. Introduction

The theoretical foundation of this study will be Mark Bevir's contribution to the study of political ideas. Starting from the critique of logical positivism and building his approach to the study of the history of ideas that finds its root in the work of the Cambridge School and in the work of Quentin Skinner, John Dunn and J. G. A. Pocock, among others (Browning 2016), Bevir develops an argument more suited to the work carried out in International Relations.

Contextualism remains interpretive but is broader. Skinner's work (Skninner 2002, Tilly 1988), in particular, opened up horizons for our ability to analyse the study of ideas. By focusing on language-in-use, it was framed in an understanding of texts in their context and circumstance. The framework allows us to debate the authors' intentions as they would have wished, thus rejecting inappropriate associations between different theoretical projects. It rejected the idea of canon, traditions of thought and transhistorical debates, thus rejecting the idea that there are debates that mark disciplines forever. It focused on the meaning of the text and the need to develop an intentional understanding of such texts. It is by perceiving the context in which the author created the text that we can extract his intention: the text was created to respond to debates taken as true at the time they were written and not in the light of what we want, in the present, to make of them. Obviously, given the centrality of language and the meanings of the text, this effort is commendable. But the rejection of our ability to read contributions considering important problems that will mark the intellectual agenda of a discipline forever and, related, the inability to read past reality in light of the present, makes us reticent about Skinner's use in International Relations. Certainly, localised and detailed studies can be developed and have already been developed. But this radical anti-presentism must be avoided. Mark Bevir opens the linguistic approach to a new interpretation, and it is, therefore, to his work that we will resort to develop a theoretical argument and build the theoretical foundations of this study.

Some ideas are important to emphasise from the outset. First is the centrality of interpretivism. As made clear in the introduction, we need to move beyond an assumption that, on the one hand, concludes that everything that can be theorised has already been discovered or that, on the other hand, we are devoid of ideological commitment when doing research. An interpretive analysis must certainly include normative commitments both at the level of what is studied and in the

perception of the study itself. A commitment to the analysis of facts rooted in the comparison of theoretical frameworks is the way forward.

Second, how can we look at the work of the historian of ideas in the construction of this set of understandings: will the objective be to include intentions and desires or merely to read a text only for the more limited view of the concepts and understandings it develops. This debate will lead us to a broader question about what kind of study should be carried out concerning the argument developed by an author in a text. Are the specific historical, social, and political circumstances at the time of writing the text that count, or, rather, is a text a set of arguments that must be taken on their own in helping to understand networks of interpretation? By privileging the second approach, we must open the intellectual space so that there can be narratives about intellectual movements that extract from different authors' arguments that help in the construction of schools or traditions.

Still related, admitting that there is a possibility that these schools or traditions exist, how do they transform themselves through rupture and change? External and internal viewpoints emerge that debate the possibilities for change. A high culture approach will be followed here. One that privileges the importance of change in intellectual ideas and in intellectual debate.

Answers to these questions will bring this chapter to life. First, Bevir's approach to objectivity will be addressed. The second part will move the role of objectivity to an analysis of how knowledge, concepts and beliefs are understood by Bevir. In particular, the part will dissect the importance of conceptual analysis. The third part will address the problem of how to view ideas in time and the issue of traditions of thought. The fourth part of the essay will focus on change and dilemmas. Intellectual ideas change over time, and we need to understand the operation of change. The last part will integrate Bevir's work with a specific methodological strategy rooted in interpretivism, high culture and Gadamerian documentary hermeneutics.

2.2. Concepts

The first argument is to reinforce that all knowledge originates from some belief system. In this way, logical positivism and the idea that it is possible to explain social reality through a separation between analytical knowledge and synthetic knowledge must be rejected. Following the critique of analytic philosophy – which includes the work of Kuhn, Quine or Wittgenstein –the first substantive conclusion is that the meanings we attribute to scientific research depend on the contexts of their employability. The verification of any scientific proposition thus depends on what we, as researchers, accept as true. There is no stability and neutrality in the meanings we attribute to research: they are always context-dependent and also dependent on our own underlying commitments when doing research. If our

knowledge emerges in the context of our beliefs, it is not possible that any scientific rationality can build any truth. There are no pure observations or empirical truths, therefore.

Second, the commitment to the study of ideas followed here argues that the philosophical exercise itself should be analysed as "reasoning about reasoning" (Bevir 1999:7). Thus conceived, the objective is not to ramble on philosophical questions per se, but to understand the philosophical exercise and, in particular, the study of ideas, as "a second-order discipline concerned to investigate the nature of first-order reasoning" (Bevir 1999:7). The commitment, therefore, is not to develop one more philosophical study that has specific rules to debate its conclusions but rather to debate the form that a discussion takes in a discipline. The focus on form rather than fixed conclusions is a distinctive element of the way this study will be developed. In Bevir's words: "Logics analyze the forms of reasoning associated with acceptable conclusions in first-order disciplines. They do not examine the acceptability of particular conclusions in first-order disciplines" (Bevir 1999:7).

We, therefore, need to perceive the reasons that led to certain assumptions – and this allows us to focus on the centrality of the concepts and conceptual debates that gave rise to these assumptions. Following Wittgenstein, philosophy must be understood as the study of the grammar of our concepts – a study which, unlike Wittgenstein, must be a conceptual exercise rather than a linguistic whole. The objective is to deconstruct the categories, theories or facts that are the foundations of our analysis. The study of philosophy, thus understood, is constituted only by the study of what constitutes the concepts that we use to make sense of the world. The type of post-analytic philosophy promoted here thus concludes that knowledge always derives from the study of the grammar of concepts.

This study of concepts leads us to not necessarily have to study different purposes directly internal to the nature of the discipline itself. The objective is to think about the way a discipline is thought and not about the concrete data that will give us concrete conclusions. This exercise itself is normative in the sense that the aim is to portray the conceptual form and content of an ideal model of thought and not to describe for its own sake the historical, social, political or other processes that directly involve the argument. As Bevir concludes: "when we investigate the logic of the history of ideas, our concern must be with the way historians of ideas reason about historical data, not with historical data itself." (Bevir 1999:8).

Disciplines can present two ways of developing knowledge, which Bevir designates as a justifying form and an explanatory form. In the first one, the objective is to analyse the characteristics that make up a set of objective and authoritative facts in each discipline. It is the method that allows researchers to reach the conclusions they reach or the test used for the evaluation of theories and facts. The second consists of an "analysis of the thing (or things) that explains the objects of concern

to us, together with an analysis of the relationship of this thing (or these things) to these objects. It specifies how scholars can explain the data they uncover" (Bevir 1999:11). In summary, a justifying form presupposes the evaluation of the theory and facts that are behind the scientific work, and the explanatory form requires the analysis of the applicability of what interests us and the relationships established. The objective is more practical, therefore, in the sense that it allows us to access research data.

Obviously, in a second moment, it is necessary to clarify that despite the logic of ideas potentially having to make sense of justifying and explanatory arguments, logic by itself can only be understood in the justifying sense. The reason why this happens seems to be rooted in the very idea that we are interpreting facts: the act of interpretation does not allow us to distinguish a scientific argument, by focusing on experience, from an analytical argument, by focusing on theory. All of our experimentation requires some kind of commitment to an analytical view of the world that, in turn, is not just tested and validated as right or wrong. It exists at the beginning of the act of investigation. The nature of the world demands a commitment to understanding, and this commitment, in turn, underpins our argument. More precisely, the commitment to a set of concepts, or the way we analyse these concepts, makes us develop a particular vision about that same set of ideas.

What is equally relevant to point out is the separation that must be made between the study of pure language and what is required in the analysis of the grammar of concepts. To study the grammar of concepts, the study of the language of these same concepts is inevitable. The only way to discuss concepts is through reading the words that constitute such discussions. The confrontation with the study of language is inevitable in this sense: every time a concept is studied, it is impossible to escape the study of its language and grammar. But what is equally important to conclude is that the philosophy promoted here does not reduce the study of concepts to the study of their language. The objective is not, therefore, to investigate the use of words in our language through, for example, some kind of exclusivity to a quantitative or qualitative methodology. This is how the approach taken here to the study of the history of ideas follows the line promoted by Wittgenstein in the sense that the author's objective was to focus on the study of concepts, theories and habits of thought and not on words and their uses.

Here, we must go beyond an everyday understanding of language and accept that academic work can interfere with the development of these concepts. And this can happen either through the work developed by scientific practice – when there is an effort to define more precisely the concepts with which one works or theoretically extrapolate the words of everyday life – or through philosophy as well – when there is once again an effort to define the words and concepts that make up reality. As Bevir concludes, "When philosophers study the nature and implications of a particular understanding

of reality, they usually benefit from identifying it as precisely as possible" (Bevir 1999:16). In conclusion, which set of concepts should be used in the logic of our analysis? When investigating ideas, we must develop an analysis of the everyday use of language. A use that involves scientific or philosophical work and because it is in the use of everyday language that we find the material for the study and investigation of our ideas. It is in this sense that the methodology for extracting meaning must follow a logic of search for meaning or, as Bevir concludes, "Thus, insofar as the relevant parts of ordinary language lack precision, we can legitimately clarify them further before deriving logical conclusions from them" (Bevir 1999:16).

Having identified the foundation of our argument, it is important to understand how it works. Bevir develops a distinction between deductive and inductive procedures. As he concludes: "Deduction typically draws out the implications of our most entrenched beliefs – the categories that govern whole clusters of concepts. In contrast, induction typically highlights the implications of our beliefs about the differences that can appear within clusters of concepts" (Bevir 1999:19).

Deductive arguments make it possible to identify the categories of these same concepts. Our concepts can thus be categorised, and this categorisation gives them a desired meaning. Concepts presuppose categories that define their limits of understanding. They are extracted from the scientific conversation itself. As Bevir concludes, "Philosophers can premise their deductive arguments on the conceptual structure the practitioners of a discipline take to be true without themselves worrying about its truth. When they do so, their arguments will presuppose the truth of the conceptual structure, which might not be true – but then none of our knowledge of the world is certain. When philosophers premise their arguments on the conceptual structure that governs a discipline, their conclusions will follow from the categories that underpin the very possibility of scholars engaging in the discipline" (Bevir 1999:21)

Argumentation also functions inductively. Here, the important thing is to realise that the analysis of concepts presupposes the analysis of the circumstances that characterise them. This can happen when describing the set of circumstances in which we can use a certain concept or the different types of concepts that can be used to characterise a certain circumstance. Bevir concludes that this analysis is dependent on our intuitions as researchers: there is an epistemic quality to our intuitions as they are defined as derived from our pre-philosophical assumptions. This defence of intuition for inductive work allows us to extract its nature: the objective is to make sense of the categories that govern us and extract from them an orientation for our work. The general is achieved by an intuitive analysis of our concepts. We may be wrong in this analysis and have to re-evaluate it, but this should not discount the fact that our exercise to give meaning to concepts must (also) be in intuition. In this way, the whole inductive argument starts from an intuitive analysis that is confirmed or rejected by

the analysis of propositions. Ultimately, intuition and verified propositions work to validate our intent argument. The relevance of theoretical discussion for the validation of propositions appears as an element to consider. In this second substantive argument to characterise the intuitive dimension, what is important to highlight is the similarity that exists in the construction of this argument with the arrangement of examples in theories. As Bevir concludes, "Inductive arguments work by testing philosophical theories in much the same way as experiments test scientific theories, so philosophers should design examples in the light of their inductive arguments in much the same way as scientists design experiments in the light of their hypotheses" (Bevir 1999:24). It is difficult to extract propositions and intuitions based on examples and descriptions of examples: there has to be a work of isolation and understanding of these descriptive examples, highlighting their theoretical nature.

2.3. Knowledge and Objectivity

Mark Bevir develops an approach based on anthropological epistemology to promote our understanding of what it means to acquire knowledge and how we should frame it. This epistemology is critical of both objective and radically subjective positions. We will approach the first ones first and criticise the second after.

Two versions exist of merely objective versions. The first concludes that we can acquire knowledge through concrete analysis of facts. This type of argument is supported by both logical positivism and logical empiricism. What distinguishes these two lines of analysis is the centrality that the principle of verifiability presents in the exposition of the analysis. Logical positivism is markedly verificationist; logical empiricism adds a logic of refutation to a logic of verification. As Bevir concludes: "Logical empiricists argue only that historians can justify their theories using a logic of either vindication or refutation. … a logic of vindication tells us how to determine whether a given theory is or is not true, and a logic of refutation tells us how to determine whether a given theory is or is not false. Logics of vindication and refutation ignore the question of how a historian constructed a given object or theory. They concentrate instead on a given object or whether theory corresponds to pure facts" (Bevir 1999:89). Verificationists place at the heart of their analysis the search for a vindication: a theory will be correct if the assumptions of analysis are demonstrably correct. For refutationists, the question is not to prove the right but to eliminate the wrong: our ability to construct truths lies in our ability to refute another set of theories that are considered wrong by the analysed data.

What unites both verificationists and refutationists is the centrality they place on acquiring knowledge through the analysis of facts. The objective is to verify if a certain theory is vindicated or

refuted by the analysis of facts. These principles start from the idea that it is possible to experience the whole world. Our perceptions of the world identify it as it is. We start from a clean slate, looking for rationalisation. Logical empiricists can add to this concept the search for community intersubjectivities, but regardless of this aspect, what they seek is always to achieve an objective analysis of facts based on theoretical assumptions. The centrality of this world, which is discovered only in the act of investigation, characterises these two logics. The only burden this discovery carries is our previous theorising that demands to be verified or refuted. But priority will always be given to the object: it will determine the coherence of the approach, not the theory we intend to analyse. The categories that we intend to analyse, in this way, always assume a value dependent on the analysis of facts.

The problem with this type of argument is that it forgets that all known reality is imbued with *a priori knowledge.* Addressing these facts is only possible when some commitment is assumed on the part of the analysis in relation to the object of analysis. There is no separation between value and fact, therefore. All theory is inevitably related to the observer. As Bevir concludes: "The important point here is that because experiences embody theoretical assumptions, they cannot be pure, so they cannot provide criteria for conclusively determining either the truth or the falsity of theories. When we look at the facts to see if a theory is true, what we find there will depend in part on us" (Bevir 1999:91).

Logical empiricism also presupposes a semantic theory based on a conformationist analysis that guarantees that it is possible to identify truths in the analysis of propositions. That is, an observation corresponds to one and only one theoretical basis: "The possibility of a logic of vindication or refutation relies on our matching propositions with experiences individually" (Bevir 1999:92). This type of analysis is incapable of understanding the full dimension of theoretical analysis that entails the work of scientific analysis. This is because it presupposes a connection between a theoretical assumption and a factual analysis. What should be promoted, instead, is the inevitability and openness that this factual analysis must have to a set of other theories (and not just to a presupposition). What results from this analysis is openness to a theoretically multifaceted analysis of a fact or experience. It is impossible to associate an experiment only with the test of a theory in this way; the hypotheses that fail the test must be, for that very reason, framed by another set of data that escape the analysis in particular. The interpretation of the fact depends on the adaptability of the analysis to the theoretical context and not the opposite. This analysis, in turn, is dependent on a set of theoretical assumptions that are multiple and open. In short, "[W]henever we use observations to test a hypothesis, the way we interpret the observations and their relation to the hypothesis presupposes the truth of various theories. To test the hypothesis against observations, we must accept the truth of the bundle of theories that acts as background knowledge in the test" (Bevir 1999:92).

The problem with this type of positivism, therefore, is that it does not take our values and theoretical assumptions seriously in the act of investigation. They are, however, inseparable from research. Some of this theoretical knowledge is so central to our reading of reality that it is almost impossible to find any fact or experience that will refute it. We can always find ways to convert what we see into a theoretical interpretation. When something affirms itself as the right reason, we are not, on the other hand, proving a theory right. We are, rather, demonstrating the strength of our subjectivity. The same happens when something goes wrong with the analysis, and we need to revise theoretical assumptions. This review does not end the analysis; on the contrary, what happens is that we can convert this approach into any other assumption that, despite not being hegemonic at the time, it becomes after the revision. This process can lead us to reject our assumptions altogether. But when that happens, it's because the multiple options open no longer make sense. Once again, what happens here, as in the previous question, is that scientific work must be open to an open subjectivity.

But it is not just positivism of different types that intends to lock the analysis in a closed and logical process – where subjectivity and agency are not truly vindicated. A second version of the argument promotes the existence of formal and technical objectivity in the acquisition of knowledge. In doing so, it indicates that theorising exists because of the procedures that lead us to that same theorising. The logic of claim or refutation submits another logic: the logic of discovery.

The work of what Bevir calls conventionalists is characterised by this logic of discovery. This type of evaluation concludes that it is possible to access a historical context through the analysis of the linguistic conventions that prevailed at the time a given work was developed. The aim is to recreate and understand as much as possible about the specific context and the specific languages that were used to truly recreate its meaning. What this type of work intends to develop is the idea, based on the work of Wittgenstein and other authors, that the meaning of a word derives not only from the concrete meaning of that same word but also from the intention that is implicit in it. The historical work essentially involves developing a method to understand the dimension of what is implicit. To understand the meaning of a work, it is necessary to perceive the necessarily temporal conventions that formed the framework of thought that governed the work.

This method presupposes the need to develop a theory prior to the development of the work. In this preparatory work, the researcher will have to contextualise himself with the author's work and understand as much as possible of that same historical time: the linguistic conventions, the psychological or psychic composition of the author himself, the political, economic, social framework of the time in which the work was done. The development of this prior theory ensures that a later theory can be developed, a theory that will always be contextualised and temporally relevant. The final result of this work thus presupposes the development of detailed studies and works that are detached

from contemporary concerns. Only in this way can we avoid costly criticisms of historical work such as presentism.

A critique of this argument can be developed at two levels: first, a critique of the logic of discovery itself and second, problems that come from the assumption that the knowledge that one may have of a specific context is enough. Regarding the first type of criticism, what can be concluded is that the development of a theory prior to the analysis is always subject to the subjectivity of the person who reads it: different people react differently to the analysis of a historical fact, and because we cannot give this guaranteed security in analysis, we cannot equally guarantee the viability of the connection between an earlier theory and a later theory. What is defended, then, is a separation between earlier and later theories. It is impossible to fully understand "what the author meant" (Bevir 1999:…), and no method will be able to do it. The only solution seems to be to divide these earlier predispositions (which will always be particular) from the later result. A contextual analysis will always be just that: a contextual analysis.

A second type of criticism focuses specifically on the method suggested by the conventionalists. This method is technical and closed because it presupposes *a priori knowledge on the* part of the researcher of the context that led an author to the development of his work. The writer knows *a priori* what led to an investigation: the analysis of this context is a founding and fundamental phase of research. Now, this type of epistemology, which, in itself, constitutes a method, presupposes correctly getting to grips with what this context is. It presupposes correctly building the previous theory in order to certainly fix the later theory. As in the epistemological context, this type of approximation is also problematic in methodology. We can always start with the wrong assumptions and come to the right conclusions, we can start with the right assumptions and come to the wrong conclusions, or we can start with the right assumptions and get the prediction right. Be that as it may, the act of getting it right is not right and depends on the circumstance. Defining as fundamental a methodology that establishes as a priority the prior knowledge of the circumstance does not allow reaching correct views without this knowledge.

A second methodological criticism that can be developed lies in the insufficiency of the methodology itself: it is not enough just to focus on the context to extract the meaning of a work. The ability to understand this derives from aspects that go beyond the context since it, by itself, does not give us guarantees of reliability. It is impossible to conclude from the analysis of a context that it allows one to arrive at the author's ultimate intention, and this is because the author is always a foreign element to those who develop a work *a posteriori.* There is life beyond the historical context, and it is necessary to open ourselves to the possibility of this existence to truly perceive this same context.

In short, there cannot be a logic of discovery because it is impossible to find a mechanical procedure that allows for the extraction of meanings: historians cannot justify their work based on this

method. There is creativity and agency in the analysis process that cannot be ruled out. The success of analysis is dependent on "insight, intuition, or good luck" (Bevir 1999:87). What is argued, then, is that there should not be a closed method in approaching the historical object. A method that concludes that it is in the context and in the language used in the context that all historical truth is found. Instead, historical work is necessarily an individual work subject to inspiration, instinct or luck. The relevant point of analysis is that the history of ideas must be done, avoiding exact prescriptions of methodology. In the words of Bevir: "We should concentrate on the reasonableness of the histories people write, not the reasons why they write what they do" (Bevir 1999:87). Anything that develops a concrete and exact vision of what it means to read history will, by its very nature, be dubious and insufficient. Imagination, luck, and instinct will always be requirements to reach correct conclusions. The search for research evidence should not have a closed formula, it should be open.

Certainly, the search for objectivity in the investigation of historical ideas must be achieved in some way, and Bevir proposes other parameters for doing so. Parameters that, on the one hand, are not closed and, on the other hand, are not exact. They cannot be closed because the logic of justification must be open to comparison between different theories. The possibility of comparing different theories and approaches to a single circumstance is an inevitability for achieving a more consistent study of the history of ideas. On the other hand, this study can never be closed: the conclusions drawn from the data analysis, being the result of the always present possibility of comparison, are still embedded with the researcher's own subjectivity. Fusing theory and reality is never neutral, the process is always based on normative research assumptions. Since reality can never be portrayed neutrally, since we will always approach it in the light of any theoretical-normative framework, our knowledge is intrinsically related to us and our personality. It is in this sense that scientific objectivity will always be, in Bevir's words, a "product of human practice" (Bevir 1999:97).

The need to develop comparisons between theories is rooted in the idea of an objective activity that manages to go beyond radical criticism when it concludes with absolute relativism. As Bevir concludes, "[W]hat we need is an anthropocentric epistemology that provides us with rational criteria for accepting or rejecting beliefs" (Bevir 1999:98), and this foundation is found in the possibility of developing objective knowledge based on what Bevir describes as facts. Here, it is convenient to define what Bevir understands by fact: "An agreed fact is a piece of evidence nearly everyone in a given community, especially any of them present as witnesses, would accept as true" (Bevir 1999:98). What Bevir opens the way with this approach is a reading of objectivity and knowledge that sees its foundation in facts and the theoretical comparison of their reading. He further consolidates the importance of facts with subsequent clarifications.: "A fact is something the members of a community

accept as a fundamental proposition. Facts are observations that embody categories based on the recognition of similarities and differences between particular cases" (Bevir 1999:99).

The principal function of a theory lies not only in revealing the particular character of a fact - when it makes associations between different facts that may be relevant in any approach - but also because it helps to define what is meant by the fact itself - a theory creates or gives a distinctive quality to a fact. The work of theory is thus to link different facts and give them theoretical meaning. Obviously, in this second sense, theory does not reveal facts that exist *a priori*: theory gives normative content to analysis and creates a distinctive quality in the approach to the fact. Theoretical debate happens when different theories frame these facts differently.

Objectivity as understood here thus derives from our ability as researchers to compare rival theories in terms of these facts that are taken for granted by all. The possibility of comparison exists because we are able to read sets of themes that are portrayed multiple times and that, as such, are accepted as relevant. There is an overlap of approaches to a given fact, and it is this overlap that allows for theorisation and comparison. It is the facts that provide the basis for comparing theories and interpretations that may be substantially different.

Bevir also bases this objectivity on a set of rules of intellectual honesty and behaviour that guarantee its permanence: the first concludes that objective behaviour must be open to criticism, and the second rule of behaviour implies a preference for standards of truth and reason and for challenges. To these same standards that are based on consistent criteria of proof and reason, finally, the third rule concludes that objective behaviour "implies a preference for positive speculative theories which suggest exciting new predictions rather than negative ones which merely block criticisms of existing theories" (Bevir 1999:101).

Two criteria are also developed not to consolidate objectivity but rather to guarantee the feasibility of continuing to compare theories effectively. The first concerns the synchronic features of theory: we should prefer theories that are consistent, comprehensive, and make sense. The second criterion for being able to compare rival theories is focused on their diachronic characteristics: in the sense that our behaviour must be open to criticism, we must also integrate theories that are progressive and open in our analysis.

Although the highlighted criteria are relevant to carry out a more coherent comparative approach to theories, ultimately, as Bevir concludes, "the web of theories we select will be the one that meets our criteria, not the one that constitutes the truth" (Bevir 1999:103), or that is, Bevir assumes that our choice is affected by our own discretion. On the other hand, the refutation of this choice can also be difficult to counter: as is concluded, "dogmatism has a positive role in our quest for knowledge" (Bevir 1999:103). As a theory begins to have more adherents, it is also very likely that

more sceptical ideas will emerge: it is up to the researcher to contradict or criticise these critical attitudes.

But what are the criteria that establish an internal debate between different theories? According to Bevir, "Historians should justify their theories by comparing them with their rivals by reference to criteria of accuracy, comprehensiveness, consistency, progressiveness, fruitfulness, and openness" (Bevir 1999:104). These same criteria that serve as the basis for an individual choice can also serve as a basis for the debate between different theories: criticism or comparison between theories thus obeys the same criterion. What is meant by this second exposition is that a given theory can be criticised or compared with another one, basing the analysis on, for example, its consistency. Another criterion can be used to realise this intention. Bevir aims to elucidate the fields in which a potential critical or comparative debate between theories can take place.

The logic of researching ideas does not result from our ability to conclude that we are developing an objective theory – this objectivity being extracted by a concrete research method, either because we believe that we are extracting from reality an assumption of a pure fact, or because it justifies our preconceptions. On the contrary, the way to justify a reality theoretically is through comparisons that can be developed between different theories. The justification of the theory is made by comparing rivals and is based merely on the acceptance of facts. A set of criteria that makes comparison possible and a set of criteria that justify the individual choice solidify this approach. An approach that is necessarily based on a set of objective assumptions. This criterion of objectivity is radically criticised by some other positions. These criticisms assume two dimensions that will now be addressed.

The criticism rests on a precise foundation: even if we manage to identify and aggregate facts on which it is possible to compare theoretical propositions, establishing criteria for comparison and selection, this will not allow us to assimilate the world as it is. This is because, despite having defined objective criteria, they are not true: the search for truth must be, for critics, the ultimate goal of analysis, not the problem of objective criteria. Such a critical basis underlies both the work of criticisms that emphasise elements of irrationality and incommensurability.

The argument from irrationality concludes that even if we can agree on aggregating facts and criteria for comparing theories, we cannot truly make sense of the world as it is. This is because if the facts depend, as pointed out, on human practices and our criterion of judgment in the final analysis, we cannot truly assimilate and reach a truth. To achieve this true knowledge, we have to realise that all knowledge is irrational and can only be assimilated in the form of what Foucault calls "discursive formations". This criticism is based, then, on a position that there is a dimension of irrationality in the acquisition of knowledge or the acquisition of truth: knowledge is nothing more than a struggle for power and for the (irrational) definition of the power of truth taken as true. Methodologically, this

perception of power can only be assimilated in the composition of the discursive formation that detects where it resides.

Concerning this critique promoted by the irrational argument, Bevir develops an argument based on what he calls anthropological epistemology. What is suggested, then, is that all human beings develop possible perceptions of the way they behave in the world, and these perceptions are reasonably accurate. Our behaviour then obeys a certain rationality that guides us. If these perceptions and this behaviour were not valid and assumed as possible, this would lead us to behaviours that would not be viable, or, in the author's words: "If our perceptions were completely unreliable, they would lead us to a radically false understanding of the world, and a radically false understanding of the world would prove unsustainable because it would lead us to act in ways we could not do for long" (Bevir 1999:108). There is, then, a reality and an objective and true knowledge of that same reality in the very limitations to which we are subject as individuals by our actions. It is in this sense that "We can report objective knowledge to truth because our ability to find our way around the world vouchers for the broad content of our perceptions" (Bevir 1999:109). The approach that Bevir favours places emphasis on the very rational reasonableness of human behaviour. This reasonableness is a guarantee that we are debating true criteria and not radically subjective formulations as advocated by irrational positions. It is in the selection criteria that we can get closer to the truth. Without these criteria, such truth is not possible. The reasonableness of justification results from the very nature of us as human beings: if our perceptions were completely irresponsible, we would not be able to give and make sense of the world. We would be lost and without a sense of existence. This nature and ability of ours to manage to find our way in a way that makes sense and is justified in theoretical positions that are selected and debated by concrete criteria guarantees the truth of our propositions. Once again Bevir: "an anthropological epistemology provides a normative analysis of justified knowledge. It says that people should justify their claims to knowledge in terms of our criteria of comparison because our theories suggest that these criteria provide a means of approaching the truth. It does not say either that people actually do justify their beliefs in this way, or that knowledge is true by virtue of meeting our criteria. All I have argued is that after people justify their claims to knowledge using our comparison of comparison, they can fend off the charge of irrationalism by referring to the nature of our being in the world" (Bevir 1999:110).

The problem with the irrationalist thesis, at its core, is a different interpretation of the concept of truth: for irrationalists, truth requires a unitary link between theoretical knowledge and reality, for the position defended here, truth exists in human action itself and in its ability to do things. These actions can be multiple, but they are always instinctive. Based on our ability to make sense, they create different truths. It is in this subjectivity that is part of the nature of our existence that we find different

truths. By creating criteria for comparison, we reconfirm the existence of this truth. Although criteria are formally important, our existence guarantees the creation of truth(s) in its own right.

The second radical critique of the impossibility of objective acquisition of knowledge is developed by what the author calls the argument of incommensurability. This argument is based on the principle that criteria that make sense to us may not make sense to other people, cultures or times. If something has criteria for us, these criteria may not exist for other people and, as such, our conceptual conventions are not universally transferable. Our theories will thus only be accepted by those who accept certain criteria as true. They are, therefore, always seen as parcels without the ability to become universal. As Bevir succinctly emphasises, incommensurability arguments "argue that because both the meaning of a proposition and the content of a belief depends on the contexts in which we locate them, no belief can retain its content if we move it from one conceptual scheme to another, so we cannot possibly compare beliefs from rival conceptual schemes" (Bevir 1999:111).

In Thomas Kuhn, we find an example of this argument from incommensurability. The idea is that different theories develop their own internal dialogue and that this dialogue constitutes a different and separate world. Conversion to external dialogue must, therefore, be a total conversion. Different conceptual assumptions only truly make sense within a specific and closed framework of relationships. Moving concepts between different fields is an impossibility. The same incommensurability argument, though different, appears in postmodern critiques.

Postmodern critics conclude that it is not possible to assume a fixed and specific meaning and, as such, any text must always be fluid and subject to multiple interpretations. All meaning is unstable because any of us can develop a personal interpretation of any given text. Any attempt to assign meaning to a text itself requires the attribution of meaning and, as such, makes the idea of textual meaning unfeasible in the study of ideas. Any theorisation suffers from this problem of eternal return to the infinity of meanings that can be given to a text. The Kunhian argument is reinforced once again by this criticism: the impossibility of, through human behaviour reinforced by the existence of criteria, being able to objectively compare the reality that surrounds us. If Kuhn emphasised paradigms, postmoderns emphasise infinities of interpretations.

Phenomenological critics approach this inability to separate belief from historical time through the lens of the necessity for a fusion of horizons. They conclude that historians, in their inability to understand the past without some form of presentism, need to acknowledge that the past must speak for itself. The past must be objectively assessed on its own, not through some present lens.

If, with Kuhn, the basis of the argument is based on the response to the first criticism, meaning, there is a possibility for the existence of a factual conversation of different theories if we identify that

a factual reality out there exists and is identifiable. Theory comparison, in this sense, is possible. Scholars do live in separate worlds, but these worlds are commensurable.

The postmodern argument can be refuted in the conclusion that it is based on confusion between point of view and language. Although we can use multiple combinations of words to describe a particular point of view, that point of view is always the same. That is, the variation of the argument is always made in relation to the same fact and not in relation to multiple facts: it is from this argument that our argument is based on the strength of the theory and the need to compare different theories. There is a fixed object, in short, the target of analysis, fully characterised as an object of analysis.

The phenomenological critics need to acknowledge, finally, that we cannot escape our prejudices when analysing the past. The past can be accessed in itself and objectively. Rather, it is always interpreted. As Bevir concludes, "Whereas Gadamer appears to think that prejudice plays a positive role in all knowledge, his followers seem to regard it as a barrier to knowledge of past intentions.60 Some phenomenological sceptics define our presuppositions in terms of individual prejudices, others define them in terms of social traditions, but they all make the same point. They argue that accounts of the past are necessarily corrupted by the subjective biases of those who tell them" (Bevir 1999:123). To a position that concludes that because we are condemned to assess the past only through the subjective lens of the present and, hence, we rather develop ways to understand this past in itself, Bevir contrasts a position that accepts the inevitability of subjectivity of this analysis rescued by a reading of the past in itself but in all its dimensions. Comparing theoretical premises from the past is the necessary drive for this newfound subjective objectivity.

In conclusion, moving beyond the incommensurability criticism requires not only the necessity to reinforce the principles of anthropological epistemology but also to understand that historical time does not speak for itself.

2.4. Traditions

If the argument so far presented the function of knowledge as being one dependent both on the comparison of multiple theoretical frameworks and on the study of the 'grammar of our concepts', this part will bring a historical dimension to this debate. This is done by an analysis of traditions. The role of tradition can be read in a double sense: its formation and its reconfiguration or challenge. That is, it can be read in the light of its construction or rupture and anomaly. We will address the first in this part and the second in the next part.

Bevir begins by asking himself how a historian can gain access to the *web of belief* of his object of study. In doing so, he develops a division between individualists and structuralists. Here, the debate is located at the social or asocial root of our rationality: is it in the social structure or the agency in which its foundation resides? Individualists conclude that we are capable of rationality regardless of our social context: we have an objective and pure reason that allows us to individually apprehend what surrounds us. For structuralists, the exercise of our rationality is entirely dependent on the social context in which we are inserted. We do not exist apart from what we are or where we are: our existence does not allow us to be freed from our circumstances. There is an irrationality inherent in the process of acquiring rationality from which we cannot free ourselves.

This concept of rationality results, on the one hand, in a posture in relation to the object of study and places the researcher in a position either as containing in himself some universal formula capable of assessing the historical field or, on the contrary, completely dependent on the social circumstances that condition their action. That is, researchers reconstruct individual beliefs either using their own concept of rationality or using the entire concept of rationality of the person being investigated. This concept of rationality, on the other hand, leads to a posture in relation to the object of study: for the first position redefined as logical positivism, we have access to the object of study through a set of theoretical predispositions on which we intend to draw conclusions, to structuralist positions redefined as idealists, research proceeds based on a set of pre-defined categories that allow us to access and reconstruct what we study. In both cases, the reconstruction of rationality and the object of study is done *a priori*: either by a rational process or by the reconstruction of a field that is previously categorised. For Bevir, these two positions must be reconciled, and for that, he develops a position closer to what he describes as "semantic holism" (Bevir 1999:92).

Concerning the first dimension of this question, it may be further assumed that rationality is either all of the researcher or all of the object of study. In this way, both positions create an incompatibility of conciliation between our rationality and the rationality of the object studied. What this type of approach promotes is, therefore, the existence of two types of rationalities that are incompatible: the researcher and the object of investigation. Because of their incompatibility, we can never extract a universal rationality from the past. What are we condemned to do instead? It is at this stage that Bevir introduces the idea of consistency: "Thus, because people share a limited concept of rationality as consistency, the main aim of historians of ideas must be to reveal the consistency of the webs of the beliefs recover" (Bevir 1999:109). How do we solidify this concept of consistency? Here, Bevir will appeal to the conscious, rational and sincere nature that underlies all our beliefs. Thus, "the conceptual priority of the conscious, rational beliefs reinforce the foregoing account of the historian's relationship to various concepts of rationality. It implies that historians should begin by approaching webs of belief as though they are internally consistent: it implies that historians should approach

beliefs as though they are held for reasons that make sense to the believer" (Bevir 1999:190). The objective of the historian of ideas must be, in this way, to be able to show what other people understand to be true. Unlike individualists who assume the subject of investigation as a foreign element or idealists who see in the subject the reason for the existence of the investigation, Bevir's "semantic holism" intends to extract rationality in contact with the subject through a rational process based on the idea of consistency. The historian of ideas must make tangible the way other people see and analyse the world, and do so because we all have a limited concept of rationality defined as consistency.

Regarding the second dimension of the question, Bevir develops the idea of a puzzle where "the objectivity of a belief depends on its relationship to various other beliefs. There cannot be any self-supporting beliefs. No belief can be rational either by reference to an experience or a priori. Certainly, some beliefs refer to reality; it is just that they are not pure but rather embody theoretical assumptions" (Bevir 1999:192).

Thus, contrary to logical positivism, which claims to reveal the consistency of the belief system as being founded on pure experiences, this attitude assumes that our theoretical predispositions guide our analysis. Unlike idealists, historians cannot portray the belief system based on experience or predefined basic categories alone. What is promoted is the re-creation of these belief systems in the belief system itself and through the theoretical commitment of the researcher, on the one hand, and in the extraction of belief networks that do not bind the researcher to a conceptually closed orientation. The extraction of meaning is done at that moment and through an approach open to multiple possibilities, necessarily opened by the investigation process and by the object of study in particular. If the entire object of study is theoretical/normative, it is not enclosed in a set of rules or methodologies. Bevir concludes: "Thus historians who want to produce a rational reconstruction of a web of beliefs resemble puzzlers who want to piece together a spherical jigsaw. Each piece of the jigsaw, each belief, belongs where it does by virtue of the pieces around it. The puzzler completes the jigsaw by joining all the pieces together to form a single picture which then makes sense of each individual piece. Nonetheless, the jigsaw has no obvious starting point since each piece stands in an essentially similar relationship to those around it" (Bevir 1999:191).

A second question is still posed: how can the historian explain historical context? Here again, Bevir opens up two positions: empiricists conclude that we possess a set of beliefs as a result of pure experience; experience will tell us why people hold certain beliefs. The historian must be able to perceive the circumstances in which people find themselves and not how these same circumstances are constructed or interpreted by the objects of study. For idealists, we have our ideals because, structurally, they exist for us to understand. We inherit a set of predispositions that condition us. The

historian must, therefore, only understand this structuring framework and not how individuals respond to these circumstances. The social context is structurally important.

Regarding the first, if it is true that it is in the experience of each one that a large part of the understanding to perceive the system of beliefs resides (in the process of investigating these experiences), the truth is that pure experience does not allow us to understand the reason for the belief. In other words, Bevir concludes that we cannot perceive reality without having a set of beliefs that define that same reality: "Experiences can generate beliefs only where there is already a web of beliefs in terms of which to make sense of the experiences" (Bevir 1999:193). So empiricism cannot explain why we are able to reach a belief based on the experience we have acquired alone. This experience presupposes a set of ideas and access to these traditions. Bevir further develops the argument by integrating a set of arguments that will become clearer later in this chapter. For the author, it is not just the fact that the historian's objective is to study an object of study that has a system of beliefs: that same object derives its belief system from an inheritance that precedes it. There is a transmissibility of belief systems between generations and people, and the object of the investigation is to frame this transmissibility in the act of study – or at least to be aware of it.

The idealist position, on the other hand, concludes that a person has a set of beliefs only by reference to some tradition to which he belongs. There is a structural determinism associated with its action. The argument promoted here certainly agrees with the idea that there is a framework of tradition to which we are linked and which cannot be avoided. The problem is the radicalism of this idea, which does not give space to the agency. Although there is a constraint, this constraint is dependent on the individual adhering to the idea. No individual adheres to an idea structurally and by itself. Traditions should not be conceptualised as self-sufficient but as "emerging entities" (Bevir 1999:…). They emerge based on each one's subjectivity and adherence to this tradition. The investigator's aim should be to identify this act of adherence and not to assume that it exists *a priori.*

There is a third important argument, already mentioned in the course of the argument, but which requires development: the process of socialisation in the tradition. A tradition corresponds to the intellectual context in which individuals exercise their rationality, their defence being acquired during a process of socialisation with the matter in question. How can we better understand this social dimension of assimilation? Two ideas should be promoted by the "procedural individualism" promoted by Bevir: first, "traditions arise only out of the beliefs of specific individuals", and second, "the defence of agency implies that traditions do not determine the beliefs of their exponents" (Bevir 1999:203).

The first important idea is that no one can escape a tradition. Individuals cannot live in society without having within them a set of beliefs that are the result of initiation into a tradition. The same happens with academic work: it cannot exist without being associated with some set of principles that

guide and guide it. Traditions operate in this way always. It is not possible to overcome them by concluding that, for example, there are neutral and pure phenomena, nor can we avoid them entirely or conclude that traditions only exist because we want them to exist. A tradition, as defended here, although it does not determine behaviour, cannot be avoided, however. An individual always has to start from a tradition, but in the process, his agency is relevant: the tradition can be expanded, modified or rejected. It is up to the individual and the individual's beliefs to contribute to the development of the tradition. This second assumption needs to be reinforced and developed.

It has already been developed here that a tradition requires a process of individual assimilation by each element in this framework of subjectivity. Despite corresponding to a set of beliefs that have consistency in themselves, it is equally dependent in its entirety on individuality. An individual does not have a tradition forever when he is part of any process of socialisation of matter. Traditions always depend on an acceptance process. Ultimately, they are dependent on this process. It is in this sense that Bevir concludes that a tradition is "a starting point, not as something that determines, or even limits, later performances" (Bevir 1999:201). We must be cautious in concluding that a tradition has an unavoidable presence. More substantively, the idea of absolute agency independence separates Bevir's conception of tradition from other understandings. A radically interpretive argument defends a structuralist perspective. For this type of argument, a tradition functions as a structure that socialises and constrains us. The paradigm or episteme governs our actions, our beliefs and our desires. A process of automatic socialisation to this subjectivity happens without space for freedom of choice. The nature of tradition is subject, for this argument, to paradigmatic communities or language games that condition the way we read reality and have nothing to do but accept it. What is being promoted here is the idea that there is no tradition without this aggregation decision. Traditions are products of a choice that exists at a given moment and that socialises but that is also socialised. Despite the existence of *a priori*, individuals can interpret it differently to confront or modify it. In this activity of reflection and the possibility of acceptance or contestation lies the freedom of change. Change can, therefore, happen even when agents think they are fully integrating with any tradition. A tradition, therefore, must be understood as a starting point but not a final destination. Despite starting from it, we can always accept the set of assumptions it defends (by extending or modifying it), or we can reject it entirely. The individual is responsible for this decision of aggregation, modification, extension or alteration.

The version of tradition defended here, along the lines of Bevir, is equally contrary to arguments that see traditions as constituted by eternal and fixed notions. This type of interpretation leaves no room for agency. Here we are specifically debating a second important dimension in this issue, to be revisited: "the defense of agency implies that traditions do not determine the beliefs of their exponents" (Bevir 1999:203). For those who see tradition as being composed of an immutable,

primary and persistent notion, the objective will always be to treat this concept in a set of contexts without looking at variables that can change it. A concept and presupposition, in the form of a unit of analysis or tradition, is thus assumed to be constant. The socialisation process exists and is permanent and unchanging. The agency is forgotten in this way. The work of analysis matches authors and specific texts with these same definitions. A tradition is thus understood as a clear set of assumptions that assumes an eternal and unchanging definition. Its static categories function as *ideal types* of characterisation of that same tradition. Contrary to this essentialist version, what is argued here is that there is not one tradition, but several traditions. We can certainly argue that a tradition can remain unchanged over a long period, but this cannot be due to the original interpretive work that makes them devoid of agency elements.

And here, an important notion appears in the theoretical context: the idea that traditions may have a set of defining aspects or not have this set of defining aspects: the debate on what Bevir calls the "essentialist core". There are occasions when this centre of analysis exists, and this focus is maintained for years and characterises a tradition. But sometimes that common space may not exist forever. The common space is divided into parts and segmented: some parts are defended and accepted, others modified, and others still rejected completely. A tradition can never be defined in terms of a specific research core that will characterise it forever. This is the main conclusion of the discussion. There are traditions in which it is possible to trace this transition, but there are others without this body of union from beginning to end. The important thing is that it is the researcher who makes sense of the tradition in the act of description. Certainly, if this defining body does not exist, the analysis of a tradition will always deconstruct parts of its characterisation.

After having argued that traditions require individuality and agency to exist, it is still important to conclude that this socialisation process is only concluded with other relevant elements: the question of temporality and internal conceptual connection.

An intellectual tradition is the sum of the beliefs of its exponents, where socialising intersubjectivity is the result of consented belonging on the part of individuals. What emerges from this characterisation is the idea that different individuals are socialised by desire or will in the process: the offspring of knowledge transfer is an important factor in the process. As Bevir concludes: "Individuals hold webs of belief, and traditions are composed of the webs of belief of various individuals who are related to one another as teachers and pupils" (Bevir 1999:204). Traditions must, therefore, embody a set of temporal relationships to serve the entry point highlighted earlier. To serve as an entry point, there had to be someone who, in the past, reflected on the same path and developed a set of assumptions about that same path. There is no property of automatic process and automatic assimilation in this socialisation. It is important to highlight this aspect: socialisation never frees itself

from individuality. What happens is that it is transmitted by initial will, and that will allow the hook with the teaching of the past.

An important point to defend is that this temporal continuity is established around what Bevir calls "transmitted themes" (Bevir 1999:204). Some themes may attract more adherents of a tradition than others. A member of a tradition does not have to defend everything that his teaching has defended. The important thing is to remain faithful to part of this teaching and, starting from it, defend it, expand it, change it or reject it completely. The solidity of justification promotes an altered or rejected version of tradition. As long as there is some coherence of transmissibility, it can be said that the tradition has been maintained. The concept of formative influence on development gains prominence in this way.

If this formative influence is relevant, what becomes equally important is the existence of internal conceptual coherence and conceptual connections to speak of a tradition. A tradition cannot be composed of unconnected beliefs. It cannot be made up of beliefs that are opposites and that originate in disconnected mind maps. There has to be a minimum conceptual coherence for us to conclude that we are developing or being socialised in a tradition. Conceptual coherence does not mean, however, an absolute acceptance of founding principles. It means that there must be a coherence of beliefs that gravitate towards a number of elements that characterise and distinguish that same tradition.

How to find a contributor to a tradition? We cannot do it through the specific definition of a set of criteria that characterise a tradition and, starting from them, assimilate any author within this scheme. This is presented as an approach to the problem of an essentialist nature. Since traditions are not fixed entities to which we automatically associate authors, the only way to understand a contribution to a tradition is to temporally trace the author's connection to the tradition.

On the other hand, we cannot add to a tradition a contribution just because it seems to respect the presuppositions of that tradition, as if we add a particular belief system to another general belief system, both of which correspond to the same set of ideas. Instead, what is promoted is the idea that the belief system is volatile and can change over time. As long as there is temporal and conceptual consistency, change must be accepted and integrated. It is in this sense that Bevir concludes: "No particular web of beliefs or set of experiences has a privileged, automatic, or natural role in defining any tradition" (Bevir 1999:208). Even if we had a closed definition of a tradition from what can be considered its greatest contributor (imagine Marx), this does not mean that it cannot subsequently be changed. There is no authentic tradition.

In the same vein, another conclusion follows: "no particular set of logical relationships has a privileged, automatic, or natural role in defining any tradition" (Bevir 1999:208). The study of ideas

aims to define a tradition having as a criterion not any logical relationship between different beliefs. This would lead us to conclude that this system is closed. The only way to trace the belonging and development of a tradition is through the analysis of temporal connections. In short: "Traditions are not hypostatized entities. They do not consist of either a privileged web of beliefs or an authentic set of philosophically significant relationships. Historians must define traditions by reference to historical facts about webs of belief and the links between them" (Bevir 1999:208).

The need for temporal and conceptual comparison with what precedes is fundamental as a defining criterion of belonging to a tradition. That is, even if an author wants to belong to a tradition just because he identifies a set of common logical beliefs, this criterion is not sufficient. The idea is that there must be a concrete defence of ideas that must be analysed for their communion historically, references to historical work and the temporal connection must exist – as well as a conceptual communion. Bevir further reinforces the idea of temporal connection and the sense of inheritance.

The result of this is that an individual's work may belong to different traditions. As they are not watertight and have a fixed and exact definition, as they are open and fluid, the historian can define the tradition as he wishes. The important thing is that there is some kind of historical heritage that is established in the work. If the desire is to work on the belief system as a whole, the tradition will be defined with that goal in view, if the goal is to work on only one dimension of the tradition, other types of contributions can be built and, potentially, the redefinition of the tradition. What matters is the historian's objective, having as a selection criterion the question of historical (and conceptual) temporality.

This leads to the final point that is important to emphasise here: the creation of traditions is dependent on the subjectivity of those who create them. The historian will define a tradition in order to build a specific contribution that follows his own criteria. Another historian may approach the same subject and construct it differently. The foundation, once again, for the selection of a tradition passes through the connections and temporal and conceptual references that must be established in the work.

What this type of elaboration also achieves is to avoid talking about "the contribution" of a given individual as if that contribution were the only possible one to have. For contextualists and conventionalists, this is an important dimension of their work: faithfully tracing through a pre-defined method the "truth" of a given author's work.

And this also includes another methodological rejection: the idea that there are "epistemes" that characterise an epoch as a whole. Traditions do not structure the belief system because they must be seen as being constructed by agency and the contribution of agents. Reifying historical epochs only allows one reading and locks historical time into a single belief system. Historical work must, however, create a multifaceted reading of historical times. On the other hand, the wider the dimension of the

tradition, the less significant it will be. This is because the richness of tradition lies in extracting individual meanings from communities and giving them meaning. This inheritance of beliefs is individual and must represent that individuality. Concentrating everything on a certain "episteme", for example, undoes the individual basis of the construction of tradition. It is in this sense that an era must be represented by multiple traditions.

2.5. Dilemmas and Change

In the previous part, it was determined that traditions are rooted in historical time yet not fixed by historical time, how they are fluid, how they gain consistency by the transmission across time of ideas that have thematic coherence, and the selection of whose traditions matter is always subjective.

The question that arises now is, how can we understand the transformation of these traditions? For this, Bevir introduces the idea of dilemma. The fixed and structured value of traditions determined in the previous section changes by the response agents give to dilemmas. This section will address more specifically this dimension of rupture and challenge to a tradition.

The first important point in the discussion has to do with how we perceive change within a tradition. Remaining faithful to the principles of agency that characterise the theoretical framework taken, the conclusion can only be that although a tradition is, in itself, an important factor of socialisation (as developed in the previous part), the reconstruction of this same tradition is not done internally. In other words, despite being a strong structure that guides, educates and conditions us, we can always, as individual carriers of agency, accept and endorse or challenge and change.

Tradition does not fix meanings, nor are they opposed to the exercise of reason, in this way. They do not have a fixed and established meaning forever. There is authority, but there is freedom of contestation and transformation as well. A tradition can never fix a set of meanings; the free exercise of reason is not conditioned by this important socialising structure.

An important conclusion of this assumption is that changes in the composition of individual beliefs, in the exercise of reason, are what cause changes in tradition. Here, the object of study is always the belief system of the individual in question: the way in which this individual reconceptualised a set of ideas that changed the way in which he previously thought of tradition.

The study is no longer synchronous (the effect of traditions on the individual) and becomes diachronic (the study of the individual in traditions).

Change in tradition, understood this way, does not result, as developed by structuralists, in any process of (external) conceptual development that does not evoke agency and give rise to agency.

Nor does it result from any intellectually intended purpose for its alteration. What happens is that it results from the intellectual exercise of all of us who, simply by thinking about the experiences we have had, reflect on a certain structural teaching to change it. Changes from a tradition are not material but ideational in this way. That is, they do not result from any external material change per se but from intellectual work and/or the consequence these material changes have on intellectual work. They result from the experiences lived and thought by each of us. Change occurs in the interaction of the new set of beliefs with the old set of beliefs. Sometimes, this interaction results from a new experience that will change the perspective under the theories with which we have been socialised. Sometimes, it results not from experience but from intellectual work and how a new theory or an interesting supplement has resulted in a new interpretation of past experiences, thus reconfiguring the theory itself.

So, two sources can serve to alter a tradition or two sources that create dilemmas. The first are real experiences that result from academic reading, given to real experiences in the world. The dilemma, in this sense, appears through the reading that is given to something with real impact. It is necessary to perceive the intersubjectivity of this new reality to understand how a change in tradition can be perceived from this intersubjectivity. Here, the external has an impact on the internal. This external is, in this case, acquired by the analysis of fieldwork – in the investigation that can be carried out with agents in the field and how these agents interpreted a certain dilemma to modify a certain tradition. The important thing to emphasise for this first form of rupture and contestation is that it results not from an external impact per se but from the impact that this acquired perception of this external represents for a tradition. The dilemma, in this case, has its origin in the concrete and lived experience and in the impact that this lived and thought experience has on the tradition with which we have been socialised.

On the other hand, change in tradition can be brought about equally by an intellectual reconfiguration of the tradition and by new moral or theoretical challenges. Theoretical or moral reflection can alter a tradition, leading to a revision of the tradition itself. Here, the impact could be said to be entirely internal. It leads to new reflections or debates that, when introduced into the tradition with which we were socialised, result in a change or reconfiguration of it.

What is a dilemma, and what is the relationship between dilemma and belief? This discussion of change leads us to introduce the idea of a dilemma: a change is always the result of a dilemma, and dilemmas appear in the theoretical context developed here as demonstrations of change. In Bevir's words: "A dilemma is a new belief which merely by virtue of the fact that one accepts it as true poses a question of one's existing beliefs" (Bevir 1999:228). They can be real or intellectual. That is, they do not necessarily have to be the result of new practical experimental data or of a particular human

behaviour, as some positivist versions would accept. A dilemma can have a different nature, therefore, whether it is real or not. The important aspect to emphasise is that they pose a challenge to our socialisation in the tradition. They result from or contest some type of teaching transmitted temporally that seemed correct and correct to us. They, therefore, demand that we change the composition of our belief system if we assume it is correct. Again, what is relevant here is that the person assumes it to be true. A dilemma is, in this way, and in itself, a subjective element that interacts with the subject's intersubjectivity and with his system of beliefs. The fact that we accept it as true reveals its existence and power.

Another important aspect to note is that they are always happening. Contrary to the Kunhian paradigm shift in which a dilemma is presented as a rupture in relation to a set of data assumed to be true, the change in our dilemmas is not revolutionary. A dilemma, because it affects our belief system, can happen all the time: it results not only from rare events that can lead to revolutionary changes but also from anomalies that result from our day-to-day and daily lived experiences. Once again, what is relevant here is to think that accepting a new reality or knowledge as true motivates us to change our belief system.

Changes in the belief system are always individual because they are agency-dependent and internal because they are ultimately dependent on the outcome they ultimately have in that same belief system. As Bevir concludes: "[C]hanges of belief come about as a result of an inner, Socratic dialogue of question and answer" (Bevir 1999:230). A dilemma, in this sense, must have the authority to present a challenge and, in addition to the authority assigned, must also present a challenge. The challenge stems from the fact that it has to be considered true and *outside* or contrary to the belief system we have been socialised with.

A dilemma may merely extend our knowledge or change it. The extension of a belief arises when our system is only changed and the new challenging belief is compatible with what already existed (albeit *external*). Changing our belief system requires a reconfiguration of it – while remaining faithful to a set of temporal and conceptual connections that give it the integrity required to not be rejected in its entirety.

From all this, it follows that it is in our ability to understand and assimilate the dilemma that it produces impact. Contrary to Popperian logical positivism, which designates scientific problems as being external to our subjectivity, our dilemmas always result from it. Interpreting scientific problems as a neutral element presupposes a distance between the investigation process and reality. If, in reality, there are problems, they result from a theorisation that, itself, is external to the problem. Theorising is assumed to be true and made up of facts that, when faced with a problem, must be reviewed. The dilemma, in this type of perception, is always understood as external and always results from an external factor. What is promoted here is that it is intrinsically internal and works in the

challenge of our subjectivity. This subjectivity can affect more than a group of people, such as technical knowledge on any given issue. A dilemma can be comprehensive or personal, depending on how abstract the challenge is. For example, dilemmas that are based on any experience can be experienced by multiple people, whereas dilemmas that are more intellectual in nature certainly affect only people who know the academic and intellectual debate in particular. Be that as it may, the relevant methodological result of this conclusion is that "Historians can identify dilemmas only through a study of the beliefs of particular individuals" (Bevir 1999:233). It is in the analysis of the internal world of each of us that we can analyse and study dilemmas.

In short, dilemmas arise as a result of challenges that we take for granted. It is an analysis that takes us away from the positivist analysis of problems or anomalies. A dilemma includes any challenge presented to our belief system. This challenge can be practical or intellectual, it can extend or modify our belief system, and it must be authoritative and present a challenge. Above all, reading the dilemma is done by challenging individual belief systems. Its dimension can be larger or smaller depending on the more or less technical composition of the dilemma. But it is in the internal and subjective result that dilemmas impose that the historian of ideas must conduct his work.

How does change of beliefs operate? When faced with a dilemma, a person may reject or accommodate the belief. If rejected, the system will remain unchanged; when there's an accommodation, the new belief will fit into the current system.

When accommodated, the process requires that the new belief be anchored in the current system. This requires that connections be made between the old belief regime and the new one. These connections will have to be ordered in the sense that they somehow respect what already exists. There has to be an acceptance, in this way, of some of the past belief systems. This integration is done through the integration of themes and debates. Themes and debates must have an origin in the pre-existing, which must be logically accommodated with the new. The themes that have been debated and accepted in the past must, therefore, be reconfigured, but the origin must be those same themes. Themes remain a focus of debate despite being altered by the dilemma.

This accommodation, by challenging a pre-existing theme, may cause a general revision of other themes. This causes the belief system to be affected in multiple places. Again, as highlighted before, a belief system works like a belief network. This belief network can be affected by a dilemma. These adjustments, in turn, are consequential results, that is, they result from a change caused in one part of the network, which, by its diverse nature, requires that other parts be potentially changed as well.

What is demonstrated by this process is that it is conceptual and rational and assumes that a belief system is open. No belief system structures our behaviour: when faced with dilemmas, we can

change it. Therefore, the plasticity of the network exists not only internally but also in the composition of the system. A belief system only works as a guideline. This structure can always change depending on the challenges we face and the consequences that these challenges present us with. When faced with a dilemma, the belief system will guide us: there, we will find answers to potentially resolve the dilemma that confronts us. But although there is a guide, this guide cannot constrain. The only way this solution will be satisfactory lies in our non-acceptance of the challenge. If the challenge is accepted, the belief system can be challenged.

We modify our beliefs by arranging hooks of understanding that recreate themes that exist in our belief system as it exists. If our belief system contains in itself solutions to the dilemma, and by its open nature, the conceptual and rational challenge will always be fully challenging, disruptive and indeterminate. And this naturally follows from the open nature of the belief system. But what consequence for our historical work?

The aim of the work should be to analyse the impact of the dilemma on the belief system that was affected in particular. The exercise requires that certain themes be portrayed in light of the dilemma. There must be coherence with the system as a whole, but the reading will be done under the influence of the dilemma in specific themes. If these themes then expand to encompass other areas of the system, those areas will be portrayed equally. The work will be one of mapping the new belief in the existing system.

What is the interaction between experience/dilemma and belief system and of experience and dilemma? The relationship between experience, dilemma, belief system and tradition can be mutually exclusive: that is, experience will potentially create a dilemma that will affect belief and belief system. Experiences may also reinforce existing belief systems. What happens is that both experiences and dilemmas can affect beliefs, but beliefs can, in turn, affect experiences as well.

How to more specifically understand the relationship between experience and dilemma? Here, three types of questions are important to understand. The first concerns the exact influence of two elements: causality or mere influence. A second issue concerns the priority to be given to the type of experience: the social, political context or knowledge as a source of new beliefs. The final question is the relationship between these two elements: is this causality or influence reciprocal, or is it only to be read from experience to belief?

The first conclusion is that there is no causality of any kind between dilemmas and experiences. This would lead us to conclude that only one type of experience is relevant to understanding or explaining some kind of dilemma. This view is wrong. We cannot see changes in beliefs just from an economic reductionist angle, for example. All kinds of experiences serve as a basis for potentially creating new dilemmas and new beliefs, we cannot reduce the impact of experiences to just a limited

set of them. The influence is manifold. The argument presented is based on the reasonableness of our perceptions: all our experiences, because we manage to make sense of them, can serve as a source of dilemmas that will potentially create or modify pre-existing beliefs. Dilemmas arise in all areas of our lives because our ability to make sense of life leads us to assume our experiences as authoritative elements. It is in this way that it is not possible to restrict the set of beliefs that we hold to specific areas.

On the other hand, no area of our lives is more authoritative than any other. It is not possible to categorise experiences by type, for example. What happens is that experiences, dilemmas and belief systems are constituted as a network of interaction. That is, different experiences may affect different areas in our perception of belief. A religious experience, for example, can always create a dilemma that affects not only what could be designated as a religious belief but also another belief that could be of a social or political nature. In this sense, there is no closed circle of influence. In turn, once acquired or in the act of reflection, the new or rethought belief may lead us to develop new experiences in more than one area, leading, at the same time, to a reconfiguration of our perception of that (reconceptualised) area.

Finally, it is in the exercise of thought that dilemmas contest beliefs. If we didn't think, our beliefs would remain unchanged. Beliefs change only because we exercise our thinking and reasoning skills – and not as a result of pure experience. For this reason, it is possible to analyse the critical judgment that leads us to evaluate the experience and the dilemma. Thought enables the aggregation of new beliefs in a process considered *internal* and always results from the challenge in relation to existing beliefs. This internal dialogue and reasoning process privileges not what is desired or what already exists outside of that same thought, but rather how the thought processes what already exists and has been experienced. For Bevir, this process of internal reasoning is presented as having two parts: one requires us to take a notion of the object in the framework of our reflections on it, the theories that give it meaning as a result of our past experiences. As he concludes: "Our grasp of an object always incorporates a theoretical component" (Bevir 1999:248). A dilemma always presents a challenge because it is the result of an experience, and when entering our belief system, it will always be theoretical. Again, in Bevir's words: "[T]he belief which an experience prompts always depends in part on the theories by which one makes sense of the experience" (Bevir 1999:243). In other words, the process that links the dilemma to the belief system and, globally, to tradition always requires a theoretical exercise. The second component of reasoning concerns the "perspective from which we reflect on an object" (Bevir 1999:248). This requires a way of thinking that can compare beliefs with each other and investigate their validity and strength. If this moment of analysis requires the reformulation of the belief we have about an object, we can again highlight this new belief and compare it with the rest of the network of beliefs we have and continue with the process of rebuilding

the network. The nature of the dilemma is thus exposed: by questioning past beliefs, it comes to life in our internal reasoning process.

2.6. Methodology and Documents

Three ideas are important to retain from the theoretical approach developed above: first, its interpretive essence, second, the rejection of closed assumptions based on narrative or discourse analysis that themselves constrain the need for agency in the process of creating our belief system, third and finally, the notion of the intellectual foundation of the analysis which, in the case of our research purpose, leads to an interest in debates whose essence is intrinsically academic. This third assumption necessarily leads to a methodological foundation of the study not so much in the general perceptions about a topic existing in multiple media, such as newspapers, memoirs, etc, but a focus mainly on academic dialogue and on "high culture" themes. These three foundational ideas serve as contextualisation to justify general methodological themes, as well as the choice of the method used (documents) that will be discussed in this section. Before this is done, it is important to emphasise the type of investigation carried out here first.

2.6.1. Types of Investigation

One of the research areas in methodological issues concerns the nature of the research process (Kothari 2004, Kumar 2011). Several topics are dealt with in this literature, but it is important to emphasise here what is most interesting for the study: the difference established between different types of investigation. Contrary to a strictly positivist argument for which the purpose of any inquiry is to construct inquiry questions that are "important in the real world" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), there is a wider concession to types of inquiry that do not present this inductive character. Research can thus assume different types. In this regard, Kumar develops a scheme of different types of research, disaggregating it into three perspectives: application, in terms of objectives and in terms of the way of inquiry (Kumar 2011). Perhaps a more interesting proposal for the study that will be developed is the one advanced by C.R. Kothari (2004).

The first contrast proposed by Kothari is between *descriptive investigation* and *analytical investigation*. A descriptive investigation merely intends to assimilate data extracted from reality and works, for example, very well for database searches. The objective is merely the description of this analysis done without a broader framework. On the other hand, analytical research requires the

researcher to use information already available and to exert an effort to aggregate and give critical meaning to the information collected.

The second contrast highlighted by Kothari is between *applicable research* and *fundamental research*. Applicable research requires finding a solution to a problem that a society may face. The investigation thus results directly from a real-world problem to which the researcher gives meaning. On the other hand, fundamental research is concerned with generalisations and developing an understanding of those generalisations. This type of research aims to "gather knowledge for knowledge's sake" (Kothari 2004:3) and is also called "pure or 'basic' research" (Kothari 2004:3). What differentiates applicable from fundamental research is the research objective: the applicable one intends to answer some practical problem, the fundamental one a theoretical problem in which the objective is to consolidate a certain perspective or analysis "finding information that has a broad base of applications and thus, adds to the already existing organised body of scientific knowledge" (Kothari 2004:3).

A third distinction can be drawn between *empirical* and *conceptual research*. Empirical research "relies on experience or observation alone, often without due regard for system and theory" (Kothari 2004:4), the conceptual research "is related to some abstract ideas or theory" (Kothari 2004:4).

Finally, Kothari distinguishes between *quantitative* and *qualitative* research. The quantitative is based on a metric analysis of quantities. The objective is a quantitative analysis following a formal and more or less rigid analysis. Qualitative research has no metrics but involves qualities or attributes, it involves the subjective assumption of attitudes, opinions or behaviour. Its subjective quality therefore requires a greater involvement of the researcher in the research process.

Considering what was just discussed, what can be concluded is that saying that all research is only relevant when it intends to solve a real problem is, in itself, an approach to doing research that follows a positivist or quasi-positivist research option. This thesis escapes from developing this type of investigation: following the distinctions suggested by Kothari, it will be **analytical**, **fundamental** and **conceptual** with other **qualitative commitments** that will be also developed in this section.

2.6.2. Documents

Given what was exposed by the theoretical analysis previously advanced, document analysis will be the preferred method used in this work. The use of interviews was considered, but, after a more careful analysis, it was found unnecessary to carry them out. But what are documents? The importance of documents attributed by this thesis presupposes a methodological conduct typical of a

historiographical study (Tosh 2002) and, on the other hand, an incursion into the hermeneutic analysis of this same documentary base (Gadamer 1975). These two variables, by themselves, reveal an interesting debate that underlies different definitions of what a document is. These different definitions, in turn, open research projects that can be read as separate, although inevitably complementary.

For some research positions, approaching the documentary base necessarily requires a debate about the types of documents that exist. It is in this sense that Stephan Wolff concludes, "Documents are standardized artefacts, in so far as they typically occur in particular formats - as notes, case reports, contracts, drafts, death certificates, remarks, diaries, statistics, annual reports, certificates, judgments, letters or expert opinions" (Wolf 2004:284). The emphasis given to the format that documents can assume opens a dynamic debate about the nature of these formats, what gives rise to them, and the conditions for their existence. These issues will be addressed in a separate section and relate directly to an important area of research that aims to address the different types of documents that exist. However, other definitions stress different dimensions of what a document is.

For Lindsay Prior, a document must be more than just its format. For the author: "If we are to get to grips with the nature of documents, then we have to move away from the consideration of them as stable, static and pre-defined artefacts. Instead, we must consider them in terms of fields, frames and networks of action. In fact, the status of things as "documents" depends precisely on the ways in which such objects are integrated into fields of action, and documents can only be defined in terms of such fields". (Prior 2003:2). What this second definition proposes, therefore, is an emphasis not on what documents are but what they represent. It's not so much interested in the format but in the contents of the format itself.

This dual perspective on documents will be addressed in the sections that follow. In the next section, the question of what documents are will be addressed, debating different types of documents, their contextualization and how their relevance can be perceived. The objective is, therefore, to first identify the types of documents that will be used in the research conducted in this thesis. In a second section, the specific method of approaching these documentary sources will be discussed.

2.6.2.1. Types of Documents

As mentioned before, and although it is not the only view of what can be done with the Beverian approach to the history of ideas, our object of investigation is focused on the analysis of intellectual and academic debates. This limitation and the analytical, fundamental, and conceptual nature of the project substantially reduce the scope of research sources that will be used. The focus of the investigation is to understand how different academics were concerned with developing the theories,

concepts, and traditions that concern us. In this sense, the resort to sources such as diaries, letters, autobiographies, newspaper articles or official documents derived from institutions, sources considered primary in other contexts, makes no sense for this study. It aims to understand how ideas were debated academically and the theoretical debates that these discussions produced. This leads to an analysis of what will, in this study, be the true primary sources: books, essays, scientific articles, dissertations and *papers* presented at conferences.

I will not go over the set of characteristics that can mark each of these documents that will be used in this study. Other manuals exist that do this in detail (Brundage 2018, Mcculloch 2004). The purpose here is more to accept the suggestions of J. Scott (1990) when he concludes that the choice of this documentation will follow criteria of authenticity, credibility and representativeness. Many of these categories were presented and developed to address the difficulties encountered with the traditional definition of primary documentation, and these do not arise most of the time when dealing with the type of documents that will be the subject of research for this thesis. Even though the issues of authenticity, credibility and representativeness are relevant, a fourth important element pointed out by Scott is more important for our concerns here: the dimension of meaning. Stressing the importance of *meaning* further reinforces and links back to the second definition given above by Lindsay Prior (2003). It is to this second dimension of the study of documents that we now turn to.

2.6.2.2. The Meaning and Functions of Documents

A second, less formal definition highlighted earlier emphasises an approach to documents where the centrality of documents as "fields, frames and networks of action" prevails (Prior 2003:2). This means that there is something in document analysis that highlights its substantive and "hidden" dimension. All documents have meanings and functions that go beyond the mere description of reality. But what does this mean specifically to deserve a distinctive section?

When we analyse documents, we can think that they, by themselves, present a concrete and fixed result, established and given as neutral. The function of the document, in this sense, is to reveal something, thus representing a reality. In this version, the document itself neutrally describes the reality that it is portraying and that can be accessed through the reading of the document. This view of documents has some limitations. Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey (2004) reveal what they are: documents are not neutral and represent, in themselves, a reality. This is so for three reasons: first, because more than documents, what exist are *texts* in which the extraction of this described *reality* must be done by looking at the context in which it was written, second, in understanding that there is a relationship of inter-textuality between texts and that they are not just here and now but have a history that needs to be traced and understood and, third, in understanding the relationship between

the author and the reader in the development of this same documentary/textual base. In raising these three substantive problems of document analysis, the authors emphasise the need to firmly understand the meanings and functions that documents assume.

Atkinson and Coffey stress how documents have an ontology of their own, they are not neutral but have what the authors describe as a documentary reality. As they conclude, "we have not tried to provide a comprehensive account of how to analyze documents and other kinds of textual materials. Rather we have tried to indicate just some of the ways in which documentary reality construction can be" (Atkinson and Coffey 2004:73). Documents have content that is not independent of a number of the conditions for their own existence – and they need to be investigated. What this type of analysis does not, however, is open up concrete lines of how to approach the three dimensions stressed above. It provides, in a sense, an ontological view of documents that lacks epistemological commitment. How do we know what we know using documents? We, therefore, need a specific epistemological commitment to substantiate the ontological claim.

Documentary Methods. Attention to extracting meanings from documents can be represented by a set of distinct and different methods: narrative analysis, content analysis, thematic analysis, or even discursive analysis (Tight 2019). Narrative analysis is typical of historical works, but due to its limiting implications, it will not be used here. Thematic and content analysis, due to their linkages to other types of documents not emphasised in this thesis, also do not seem to guarantee a good fit for the general objectives of the study and its interpretative nature. Thematic analysis allows the creation of coding criteria that could be used as a framework upon which to read our documentary realities. The establishment of themes derived from research questions allows, in this way, to understand our research object in ways that could be interesting to pursue. But the problem lies precisely in its low interpretative density. Unlike the approach followed here – hermeneutics – thematic analysis has epistemological and ontological foundations that make it a direct and contextual result of qualitative content analysis. This limitation associates thematic analysis as a method with the purpose of aggregating vast compilations of informative data on which contextual purposes are developed. However, these contexts are limiting and serve limited interpretive intentions. What we need is a method that can grasp these interpretive assumptions more fundamentally. An option could, of course, be discourse analysis. However, using discourse analysis goes against the harmony needed between the theoretical framework and the method to be used. Closed discursive proposals restrain the contextual efforts we intend to pursue: texts have meanings beyond strict language rules since they are grounded most fundamentally on human agency. We are not socialised into a discursive framework that constrains us and restricts our actions; rather, our individuality allows us to construct our own traditions and change them accordingly. It is, therefore, in hermeneutics that this thesis will

find refuge in consolidating its methodological argument. More specifically, it is in the work of Hans George Gadamer (1975) that we will ground the specific method used in the thesis. The author's interpretative foundation is an important element for the selection.

Documentary Hermeneutics. Gadamer bases his work precisely on the critique of what he describes as Method. A method that Descartes intended to develop in philosophy inspired by Newton's similar proposal for the natural sciences. However, for Gadamer, as well as for all those who aimed to criticise these versions of strong positivism, knowledge is not objective: it lives in language and is made of traditions.

Gadamer thus develops a critique of the scientific method. According to this method, it is possible to have unbiased access to the object of analysis and discover its scientific truth. Extracting this natural reality that surrounds us and building scientific truth about it is, therefore, founded on a correspondence between the extracted reality and the result of the analysis: there is a direct correspondence between what we perceive to exist and what exists. Our mind is thus a blank slate where new knowledge is acquired through theories of correspondence. All these theories of correspondence presuppose the existence of mental validations that need confirmation or rejection. These theories of correspondence thus reject the pre-existence of values when conducting social research, nor do they give credit to the power of the context in which the investigation takes place. Truth is natural and unbiased. What the Gadamerian project intends to do is precisely to deconstruct the idea that there is a correspondence between method and truth by identifying reasons to justify scientific "truths" in lived and experienced practice.

For Gadamer, therefore, no investigation process can start with a scientific assumption or theoretical basis that will be validated or rejected in practice. What Gadamer proposes, instead, is that it is in this same practice that truths are identified. Scientific truth must always be shared or found, never given *a priori.* The search for scientific truth lives in a hermeneutic coexistence between those who seek to achieve it and the object of the search itself. Both have independence and are constituted by values and content: truth is born from this encounter with the context and with experience. For Gadamer, truth is that which is discovered, what results from and is brought about by direct contact with reality. It does not exist through validation but through discovery and participation.

But even if practice and experience are relevant, they are not all that exists. All our understandings are imbued by what Gadamer describes, departing from Heidegger, as "pre-understandings". No understanding, therefore, escapes the existence of a set of presuppositions that we all have and carry with us when conducting research. Document analysis requires, therefore, this set of analytical assumptions on which these same documents will be analysed. We cannot exist

without being shaped by presuppositions, and all knowledge has an origin in these same presuppositions.

The centrality given to "pre-understandings" is directly linked to the idea that no present is understood without a perception of the past. Gadamer, like Bevir, puts forward the idea that our capacity for knowledge resides in tradition. It is impossible to apprehend the present without understanding the context upon which it is based. Everything is founded on the past: it culturally grounds us and projects us into the future. It is in this sense that it is also argued that all interpretations are individual since each of us builds the present with presuppositions and "pre-understandings" that may differ. Our role as documentary researchers, then, is to reinvent the present starting from a set of assumptions that, themselves, are rooted in traditions and interpretations that are particular and distinctive. Knowledge is nothing more than the accumulation of these different interpretations. If this idea matches Bevir's account of the history of ideas, what Gadamer develops is a methodological grounding to the argument: documents or what he calls texts need to be read based on our pre-understanding, which is grounded in specific traditions. Because each of us has our own pre-understandings, the research endeavour is always individual: scientific research means accumulating knowledge based on this individual experience.

But framing the research of documentary realities just in terms of pre-understandings and contexts doesn't allow for a treatment of what happens in the analysis itself: the relation between the reader and the author or the research and the text itself. And here Gadamer proposes what he describes as a "fusion of horizons". In the act of interpretation, the researcher must frame his initial argument to the new research realities and, in doing so, adapt his present knowledge to the dialogue that the new reality presents him with. That is, it is by being closed to a set of assumptions but, at the same time, adapting these sets of assumptions to the new reality whenever required, that the researcher gives meaning to that same reality. The new reality is thus not assumed to contain truth in and of itself in the sense that it's all about context. Nor do we just carry truth from the start that will never change where this truth needs to be proven or not proven. For Gadamer, we enter into a dialogue with the reality we are analysing, and truth is the direct result of this mutual constitutive process. We must extract from this reality, without departing from our founding purpose, its true perception. The creation of the possibility for this co-constitution between reader and author or between the researcher and the text under analysis is one of Gadamer's main contributions to document/text analysis. As René Geanellos concludes, "Prior to Gadamer, textual interpretation was spoken of as an attempt to reconstruct the original thoughts or meanings of the author. Accordingly, Ast claimed the explanation of a text meant discovering the idea the author originally had in mind. To this Schleiermacher added that interpretation only began after successful identification of the author's original meanings … Gadamer moved beyond this hermeneutic theory of understanding and in the

process radically reconceptualized textual interpretation. He asserted that a text is understood not through the author's meaning but through itself" (Geanellos 1998:157).

Thus, the Gadamerian "fusion of horizons" is based on the idea that the document must speak for itself. And this idea, along the lines of Bevir, distances Gadamer and our method from two other presuppositions: the contextual and the discursive. The first argues that the document must be thought of in its historical time and space: the researcher's job is to extract the arguments that led to the perception of that historical time. The inevitable conclusion of this assumption is that there is no idea of temporal transposition of thought: what exists is a historical truth and a historical context that must be apprehended following contextual rules. A version that is equally rejected by our methodological assumption is the idea that the text is valid by itself, and the reader is responsible for the final reading of that same text. That is the radical argument that promotes a complete separation between interpreter and reader and gives the reader primacy in the analysis. Gadamer, following general hermeneutical assumptions, confirms that the initial interpretation resides in the reader, but that this, at the same time, must be shaped by the text itself. By stressing the importance of the reader over the author, it moves beyond pure contextualism; by stressing the importance of the reader but also of the author's intended meanings, it rejects the idea that all interpretations of a text are possible.

The documental method of Gadamerian hermeneutics thus requires a permanent effort to integrate the part into the whole. In doing so, the textual analysis functions in a hermeneutic circle in which the researcher circulates between the whole and the part and between the part and the whole. Textual interpretation derives precisely from this fluctuation of meanings. Our prejudices or *pre-understandings* initially enter and force us, socialised as we are in cultural, social or other traditions, to frame the text and the research object with our own values. This whole meets the part, however, which, by itself, has a socialising power. The text reveals truths that, possibly, we did not know and, in this sense, transforms what we initially wanted to see or know. This knowledge acquired in practice, in turn, results in the transformation of the vision of the whole and closes, albeit temporarily, the hermeneutic circle. Since our prejudices are infinite, so can the interpretations given to texts. Scientific truth is thus always contextual despite obeying a set of foundations. And the hermeneutic cycle is not a vicious circle because it can be escaped every time the researcher makes sense of the perceived reality.

2.7. Conclusion

The theoretical argument was built on four main arguments and a methodological strategy designed to solidify them.

The first foundational aspect of the theoretical model can be found in the importance of the study of concepts. This proposal starts by emphasising how social reality can't be assessed through a separation between analytical knowledge and synthetic knowledge. Our knowledge emerges in the context of our beliefs, it is not possible that a scientific rationality can build any truth. Following Wittgenstein, philosophy must be understood as the study of the grammar of our concepts. This is a study that must be a conceptual exercise rather than a linguistic whole. The study of philosophy, thus understood, is constituted only by the study of what constitutes the concepts that we use to make sense of the world. To provide consistency to such an exercise, we need to elucidate both justifying and explanatory forms. The explanatory form requires the analysis of the applicability of what interests us and the relationships established. The objective is more practical, therefore, in the sense that it allows us to access research data. This, in itself, needs to be understood as a justificatory exercise. This is also an exercise that needs to move beyond language alone. It is necessarily framed by how academic work can interfere with the development of these concepts: it is rooted in scientific practice. Finally, it works by highlighting deductive and inductive processes: Deductive arguments make it possible to identify the categories of these same concepts. Induction demands the analysis of the circumstances that characterise them.

Second, it argued that justification does not come from different logics that can develop different methods to achieve truth. Rather, it must be open and subjective. Its roots lie in our ability to compare different theories: justification is, therefore, intrinsically linked to the comparison of theoretical arguments. This posture, on the other hand, is foundationalist. An anthropological epistemology was proposed that allows us to justify our knowledge. At its core, this epistemological posture is rooted in the idea that we need criteria for accepting and rejecting beliefs. There's a reality out there that can be perceived even though it is, at its core, subjective. The foundation of this epistemology is the idea that we can agree on certain facts. Facts allow us to convey a debate and a reality out there. The principal function of a theory lies not only in revealing the particular character of a fact - when it makes associations between different facts that may be relevant in any approach - but also because it helps to define what is meant by the fact itself - a theory creates or gives a distinctive quality to a fact. The work of theory is thus to link different facts and give them theoretical meaning. Objectivity, as understood here, thus derives from our ability as researchers to compare rival theories in terms of these facts that are taken for granted by all. The possibility of comparison exists because we can read sets of themes that are portrayed multiple times and that, as such, are accepted as relevant. Objectivity also follows rules of intellectual conduct. In the selection process, we must choose theories that are consistent, comprehensive, and make sense. They should be open to criticism and progressive. Be it as it may, despite these criteria, we are not looking for truth. The selection of the theories that we compare is always dependent on the subjective analysis of the interpreter. The

approach also suggested criteria under which the theoretical comparison of theories can take place: criteria of accuracy, comprehensiveness, consistency, progressiveness, fruitfulness, and openness.

Traditions also play a role in our theoretical argument. Against the view that historical research is found in two concepts of fixed rationality – one that places the researcher as a universal element in the research process and another that sees context as completely dependent on social circumstances –, we need to aspire instead to a view of the historical process that conditions the analysis to subjectivity. This necessary intersubjective analysis does not, however, discredit grounds for its own consistency. Time is neither transcendental nor exclusively local, therefore. If we can extract consistency in the historical argument – in the conscious, rational and sincere nature that underlies all our beliefs – what is promoted is the re-creation of the belief system(s) of historical time itself through the extraction of belief networks that do not bind the researcher to a conceptually closed orientation while, at the same time, framed in a context that always shows the theoretical commitment of the researcher. The extraction of historical meaning is, in this sense, completed through an approach open to multiple possibilities necessarily triggered by the investigation process and by the object of study in particular. A claim against presentism is, at the same time, a claim against fatalism. Traditions do not have eternal and fixed notions: there are always multiple traditions inside a tradition. There is also no essentialist core – there are occasions where this centre holds, but others where participants in the debate only accept certain assumptions of it. That does not make them any less participant in the debate. What matters for a tradition to be considered as such is that there needs to be temporal transmissibility – a sense that there is a link across time in the sharing of certain ideas – and conceptual coherence – the sharing of themes. First, there must be a concrete commonality of ideas that can be analysed across the authors through references to historical work and/or direct temporal connections between authors. It comes in the form of a sense of inheritance or the form of a temporal connection and the sense of inheritance. Second, a tradition cannot be composed of unconnected beliefs. It cannot be made up of beliefs that are opposites and that originate in disconnected mind maps. There has to be a minimum conceptual coherence for us to conclude that we are developing or being socialised in a tradition. A member of a tradition does not have to promote everything that his teaching has promoted. The important aspect is to remain faithful to part of this teaching and, starting from it, defend it, expand it, change it or reject it completely. Finally, the process of selecting which traditions matter and how is dependent on the researcher.

Change operates at the level of traditions: no structural or purely individual/random forces drive change. Change in the composition of individually held beliefs is what causes change in traditions. Change is a consequence of the intellectual exercise of all of us who, simply by thinking about the experiences we have had, reflect on a certain structural teaching to change it. On the other hand, changes in tradition are not material but ideational. That is, they do not result from any external

material change per se but from intellectual work and/or the consequence these material changes have on intellectual work. There are two sources of change: the first is real experiences – being an intellectual exercise by excellence, change occurs through the academic reading given to real experiences in the world. It is necessary to perceive the intersubjectivity of this new reality to understand how a change in tradition can be perceived from this intersubjectivity. Here, the external has an impact on the internal. On the other hand, change in tradition can be brought about equally by an intellectual reconfiguration of the tradition and by new moral or theoretical challenges. Theoretical or moral reflection can alter a tradition, leading to a revision of the tradition itself.

Change also operates at the level of belief systems: It is in the exercise of thought that once again change operates. If we didn't think, our beliefs would remain unchanged. Beliefs change only because we exercise our thinking and reasoning skills – and not as a result of pure experience. The first consequence is that a dilemma always presents a challenge because it is the result of an experience, and when entering our belief system, it will always be theoretical. Second, this requires a way of thinking that can compare beliefs with each other and investigate their validity and strength. If this moment of analysis requires the reformulation of the belief we have about an object, we can again highlight this new belief and compare it with the rest of the network of beliefs we have and continue with the process of rebuilding the network.

What are the consequences of dilemmas? A dilemma may merely extend our knowledge or "change" it. The extension of a belief arises when our system is only changed, and the new challenging belief is compatible with what already existed (albeit external). Changing our belief system requires a reconfiguration of it – while remaining faithful to a set of temporal and conceptual connections that give it the integrity required to not be rejected in its entirety. Second, they can be rejected or accommodated/accepted. When accommodated, the integration is done through the integration of themes and debates. Themes and debates must have an origin in the pre-existing, which must be logically accommodated with the new. The themes that have been debated and accepted in the past must, therefore, be reconfigured, but the origin must be those same themes. This accommodation, by challenging a pre-existing theme, may cause a general revision of other themes. And this causes the belief system to be affected in multiple places. A belief system works like a belief network. We modify our beliefs by arranging hooks of understandings that recreate themes that exist in our belief system as it exists.

Three ideas are important to retain from the theoretical approach developed above: first, its interpretive essence, second, the rejection of closed assumptions based on narrative or discourse analysis that themselves constrain the need for agency in the process of creating our belief system, third and finally, the notion of the intellectual foundation of the analysis which, in the case of our research purpose, leads to an interest in debates whose essence is intrinsically academic and

theoretical: we are looking for webs of theoretical conversations. Our object of investigation is therefore focused on the analysis of intellectual and academic debates. Conducting interviews was a method considered, but it was decided that relying solely on documents would be enough. The question becomes how to understand documents. It was proposed that there are formal and philosophical ways to approach such matters. Formally, In this sense, the resort to sources such as diaries, letters, autobiographies, newspaper articles or official documents derived from institutions, sources considered primary in other contexts, makes no sense for this study. What it aims to understand is how ideas were debated academically and the theoretical debates that these discussions produced. This leads to an analysis of what will be, in this study, its main primary sources: books, essays, scientific articles, dissertations and papers presented at conferences. But we also need to move beyond format and assess documents as if they give us the truth of a particular matter. Rather, the analysis of documents is necessarily an activity embedded in the analysis of their meaning. Atkinson and Coffey (2004) stress how documents have an ontology of their own, they are not neutral but have what the authors describe as a "documentary reality". The epistemological foundations of the analysis of these realities brought the argument closer to a Gadamerian documentary hermeneutics.

PART II –THE *WHY(S)* OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In literature characterised by contributions that never cite similar and past works, the main way of presenting *why we should study IR* problems has been by intermingling them with others (Hoffmann 1960, Holsti 1998, Booth and Erskine 2016). This thesis aims to be clearer in identifying these issues and in identifying them as constitutive problems in IR. It necessarily requires reviewing these contributions beyond the intermingling. Implicitly, this will translate into recovering an agenda that marked much of what was going on in (mainly) North American universities when the study of IR first emerged with intellectual and institutional strength.

The first step is to review much of what has been written on the discipline about this initial debate stage. IR has conventionally been told through an angle emphasising so-called 'great debates'. According to this story, scholars' initial writings are treated as representing a debate between idealism and realism, followed by a discussion between scientism and traditionalism. We need to reengage with the literature reviewing this conventional way of writing the history of IR by highlighting other foundational debates that took place during this time, drove the concerns of academics, and got lost in the 'great debates' translation. History must be read entirely in its contexts and without social scientific presentisms and essentialisms.

After the historical revisionism, one needs to engage with other aspects of *why we should study IR*. Inspiration can be acquired from the initial writings of IR scholars in North America. Specifically, Quincy Wright's *The Study of International Relations,* published in 1955, highlights core concerns that drove academics to understand why one should study IR in the first place. This book presents itself as an important contribution to the spirit of the time and, compared to other similar books such as Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, for example, had significantly less impact in subsequent literature. Indeed, the latter aged much better in terms of influence than the previous. Nonetheless, we need to resurrect themes that were emphasised by Wright and others.

The first of these foundational concerns was a debate about what concepts such as 'the international' or 'international relations' mean. This is a debate that has increasingly regained the attention of scholars, especially in the writing of new introductions to the field (Devetak and George 2012).

Another debate – also emphasised by Quincy Wright and so many others (Dunn 1948, Kaplan 1961) – was the question of understanding IR as a disciplinary field. Wright's book (1955) is centrally concerned about this problem, which, in itself, was a reply to the anxieties of students who question themselves, in light of so many interdisciplinary links IR can establish, what could IR's distinctiveness be? For some, this debate is a 'great debate' (Finnegan 1972, Rogowski 1968).

Another essential agenda during this time was the study of IR in the United States (Fox and Fox 1961, Hoffmann 1977). This was driven by an interest in understanding how specific national communities develop their perception and contribution to IR. Most initial research was conducted in the Anglo-Saxon world (Smith 1985), but the agenda was expanded (Holsti 1985). This research has also been picked up by, among others, Ole Waever (1998), who has contributed significantly to grounding these endeavours on more open and solid grounds.

Only at the end of this journey the issues of pluralism or whether or not we can achieve a grand theory in IR (Waever 2013, Dunne, Hansen and Wight 2013). Conditioning why problems to these two issues (Puchala 2012, Lapid 1989, Dunne et al. 2013), is to have a very limited view of what these problems are. IR needs an agenda to return to more foundational *why* concerns, especially because it is facing its own globalisation.

The next chapter will contribute to this changing configuration. It would be impossible to treat all the problems this revision requires in this thesis. This thesis, among other goals, aims to open the possibilities of these problems by engaging with the 'methodological' critique of *why* we should study IR. The next chapter will start this process by debating different theoretical proposals for understanding Global IR.

Chapter 3. A Western-Centric IR and Beyond: On Global IR Proposals

3.1. Introduction

International Relations is witnessing a change towards greater sociological reflexivity. There is more to IR than just its North American heritage. (Smith 2000, Waever and Tickner 2009, Acharya 2016). This chapter aims to understand this debate and highlight how it currently unfolds.

A structural division is occurring in the discussions about this topic that is relevant to the argument developed here. This is the division between those initial concerns that aimed to understand whether there was an American hegemony or dominance of the discipline (Hoffman 1977), a second stage that moved beyond American and focused on the US-Euro (Jörgensen and Knudsen 2006), to the more recent transition to discussions that aim to understand IR in the whole world (Tickner and Waever 2009). Writing in 2008, however, Pinar Bilgin argues that rather than three stages in the debate, there are, in fact, two axes. The first is constituted by American IR versus the rest, where the main driving force of the discussion was whether IR was still an American social science. These studies focused on "the extent and nature of US dominance" (Bilgin 2010:818). The second axis, for Bilgin, involves discussions over Western IR versus the rest. This axis of the debate contrasts the debate over dominance that mainly focused on analysing European and American disciplinary patterns with a new one whose core concern is to contrast the discipline's 'Western' character and what goes on in other parts of the world.

Bilgin's proposed divide is a strict one, however. What lies at the core of the divide is not 'Western' versus 'Non-Western', but rather the view of a world based on different conceptions of hegemony (Jörgensen 2003). There are post-hegemonical approaches that do not criticise the fact that there is a US Hegemony but, at the same time, try to uncover what lies beyond this hegemony and understand distinctive national traditions while accepting Western dominance. In other words, they do not condemn US hegemony as necessarily a negative aspect of the current study of IR. To understand the new divide, one has to move beyond Bilgin's suggestion, therefore. At stake is not hegemony versus post-colonialism; it is, instead, the condition of hegemony that needs to be contrasted to different post-hegemonical conditions – including the post-colonial.

Considering what was just said, Weblke Vogelaar (2020) provides an important contribution to this debate. According to him, there are different strands of conversation going on when discussing global IR: "first, a pre-debate on IR as an "American social science"; second, a conceptual-normative

strand raising awareness for IR's Western-centric character; and third, an empirical strand with case studies on IR knowledge practices in different countries and regions beyond the West" (2020:19). The initial debate was characterised by Stanley Hoffman's important contribution (1977). In it, it was claimed that IR was essentially an American social science because America had the intellectual predispositions for the emergence of discipline. An important aspect of this debate is the fact that the argument revolves around the intellectual and institutional predispositions that need to be in place for IR to emerge. The second strand of the conversation moves beyond Hoffman and beyond Europe to focus on IR beyond the West. As Vogelaar concludes "this literature suggests alternative conceptualisations that are more sensitive to social and political realities in the global South/East" (2020:21). The third strand is the empirical vindication of these claims by presenting "specific IR practices to illuminate what geo-epistemological diversity looks like in action" (2020:22). Vogelaar, therefore, points to an important dynamic inside the broad US-Euro core versus rest of the world. It is that we moved from a focus on issues of intellectual and institutional requirements to letting the rest speak for itself. What seems to emerge from this assessment is that there seem to be three approaches to understanding global IR: one that focuses mainly on the contribution of Western IR to the creation of global thought, a second which aims to reconcile Western and non-Western and a third which aims to move away from Western and give priority to the voice of the non-Western exclusively.

A more detailed assessment of the post-hegemony world is provided by other authors for whom what matters is the contestation of Eurocentrism and the West. These contributions tend, therefore, to forget all the history that led to what came to be designated as Global IR (Acharya 2016). In the assessment, the works of Holsti, Smith, Jörgensen, and Schmidt, among others, somehow get lost in the process (Vasilaki 2012, Anderl and Witt 2020, Qin 2020). Rosa Vasilaki (2012), for example, focusing exclusively on the voices of a post-western IR, anti-Eurocentric IR, identifies three other alternatives: pluralism, particularism and postcolonialism. By pluralism, she refers "to the trend most notably represented by Acharya and Buzan and Buzan and Little. The theoretical pluralism of these works seeks to democratise IR by opening up a space where parallel stories can be told without being thought as mutually exclusive and without making absolute normative or ethical claims, but by simply sharing the terrain of IR and looking at 'what kind of configuration the combination of all of them produces' (Buzan and Little 2001:38)" (Vasilaki 2012:6). By particularism, Vasilaki means contributions that aim to prioritise "local or cultural standpoints and systems of thought" (Vasilaki 2012:6). The goal is to provide national cultures with their voice separate from Western influence. In so doing, the contributions highlight the uniqueness of regions, nations, or cultures and aim to universalise their potential reach. Finally, postcolonialism, according to Vasilaki, "pioneered in linking the critique of reason and progress with the anticolonial struggles – and, more broadly, with the question of the 'non-West' – on the one hand, and poststructuralist insights which exposed the inextricable relationship between

knowledge/science and hegemony/power on the other" (Vasilaki 2012:8) in so doing, it moves beyond pluralism because it aims to dissect the effect of hegemony and its knowledge/power complex by focusing on what lies beyond it and in the voices of the dispossessed. Only by uncovering the power structures can we understand what is left behind. The West is viewed as an oppressive force. It can't be considered alongside the non-West, as pluralists would claim. It also wants to move beyond particularism because it does not think we can extrapolate local particularism to universalism as the project aims.

Departing from Bevir's attempt to highlight the importance of an intersubjective construction of knowledge that moves beyond the affirmation that we can find, through the establishment of different logics of verification, refutation or historical, an accurate and scientific or methodological analysis of facts, it is going to be argued that we need, instead, to ground our analysis of goes on in the 'real world' through a theoretical comparison of facts and themes. Theoretical comparison is an inevitability that derives from our central place as researchers in creating knowledge: we can't escape an understanding of reality without understanding the different theoretical models that explain or understand it. Our effort needs to grasp this theoretical reality – an endeavour that is always subjective. This endeavour relies on analysing different facts upon which the theoretical comparison occurs. Facts or themes that allow the researcher to identify an objective logic in the debate. Certainly, there is a reality out there that can be perceived and understood. It resides in our ability to read sets of themes that are portrayed multiple times and that, as such, are accepted as relevant. The chapter will, therefore, be in four parts: the first will focus on culture-blank approaches (Valbjorn 2006), meaning approaches that accept a Western-centric view of global IR. Subsequent parts will highlight viewpoints that criticise this Eurocentrism in pluralistic, postcolonial/post-modern and non-western forms. In the process, it will identify the themes that characterise this discussion, thus providing an (intersubjective) objectivity to the debate.

3.2. A Western-Centric Global IR

As suggested, the literature dedicated to bringing more national self-awareness to IR studies focused on North American hegemony and, later, European contributions. This was challenged by the increasing broadening of the debate to other geographies with a felt need to consolidate a more solid view of what IR looks like beyond the West. This part will trace this transition and put forward an initial approach to global IR which attributes to the West its foundation. An important article by Jörgensen (2003) will allow us to understand the nature of these discussions. Subsequent parts will unpack what will be described as the hegemonic model and the socio-intellectual models. The latter will be divided

into an initial focus on the US-Euro core and the move beyond this core to incorporate other parts of the world (while keeping the theoretical model consistent).

3.2.1 Towards a Western-Centric Global IR

An essay by Knud Erik Jörgensen, written in 2003, highlights how the conversation between scholars was unfolding at the time. The argument will be adjusted here to better highlight the purpose of the factual/thematic map that makes more sense for this chapter.

Jörgensen starts with the idea of power. He refers to the work of Steve Smith as an example of an engagement of this type. He points out how IR is directly linked with the interest of political powers and gives the example of how "during the time of Pax Britannia British liberals began pleading for university chairs and specialised institutes, the contours of a discipline emerged. After World War II, and parallel to the rise of US hegemony, IR began to flourish in the US" (Jörgensen 2003:331). The second view stresses what Jörgensen describes as self-images. Again mentioning an important argument by Steve Smith (1995), he suggests how Smith's self-images can characterise the discipline's origins. Specifically, Jörgensen describes what he means by self-images: a discipline characterised by a disciplinary history that focuses on 'great debates'. He points to two limits to such a view, the first being the fact that there is knowledge that is not exclusively theoretical in IR; hence, privileging theoretical knowledge discredits other forms of knowledge claims, the second being that the self-images that Smith promotes have been cultivated in the Anglo-Saxon world only.

Moving towards the third image of the debate, Jörgensen stresses ideas of hegemony. Citing emblematic works of Holsti (1987), Smith (1985; 2000; 2003), Waever (1998), and Crawford and Jarvis (2001), he concludes that this discussion confirms the view that "the discipline lives under American hegemony and this is likely to endure. It should be noted, though, that Waever predicts that contemporary American obsessions with rational choice are likely to change the current state of affairs and, inadvertently, contribute to a multipolar global IR community. This qualification notwithstanding, the scenario is that we should expect is "that tomorrow will look like yesterday" (2003:332).

He moves on to the fourth way of characterising the debate at the time, what he calls social science. Hoffman's work is cited here, and the focus shifts to how "Worldwide, relations between IR and its disciplinary environment show considerable variation" (Jörgensen 2003:332).

Finally, Jörgensen proposes the alternative image that he describes as after hegemony. After clarifying how different nationalities understand IR differently, he describes how there are now developing communities in Europe, Latin America and Japan, that see IR very differently when compared to the US. He stresses how in Latin America "When it comes to research, US influence has

been minimal" (Jörgensen 2003:334), whereas in Japan "US influence has also been weak" (Jörgensen 2003:334),. He concludes that there are positive aspects to this new phase, residing mainly in the resilience of the American IR community and its strong cosmopolitan dimension along institutional and academic lines: institutionally because ISA can function as a quasi-global organisation, and academically because "very strong belief in academic cosmopolitanism characterises the US discipline" (Jörgensen 2003:335). The main negative consequence of this move towards an after-hegemonical stage is that cultures close themselves from the outside world. Citing an argument developed by Valbjörn (2004), this creates a global IR that has been culture-blind but risks becoming culture-blinded. Culture blind because it doesn't allow nationalities to have their voice, yet blinded because this may result in nationalities taking over completely.

3.2.2 The Hegemonic Model

The first model approaches Global IR as a hegemony. Analytically, what unites what is described here as the hegemonic model is a concern for debate on different dimensions of what Helen Turton describes as dominance. According to her, dominance is the ability to "1 Set the intellectual agenda / subject matter, 2 Dominate the discipline theoretically, 3 Produce a set of preponderant epistemological and methodological assumptions that guide and underpin the majority of IR research and scholarship, 4 Command a dominant and overtly significant presence in the institutional structure, 5 Gate-keep the discipline's borders, thereby managing the process of inclusion and exclusion into the international disciplinary realm" (Turton 2016:9). So scholars debate the substantive agenda of IR, its theoretical and philosophical foundations, its institutional structure and, related, the geographical nature of IR. However, the chapter will not use the word dominance because it brings with it an oppressive connotation. And this relates to an important second point.

The proposals reviewed here aim to understand the dynamics between an anglophone centre and the rest of the world. Three such proposals will be offered in this part: Kal Holsti's initial work, Steve Smith's disciplinary approach and Jörg Friedrich normative proposals. The argument will be made that these views are, at heart, Eurocentric and reinforce the view that IR depends upon what goes on in the Anglo-Saxon core. Also these three approaches illustrate how the current hegemonic debate unfolds: those concentrated in answering the questions about whether the US is a hegemony, those that accept such proposals but want to think of counter-hegemonically and still others which not only think in counter-hegemonic terms but move beyond the categories of hegemony to propose normative futures.

3.2.2.1. Kal Holsti's Methodological Hegemony

Kal Holsti is one of the first authors to consistently reflect upon the nature of IR as a global discipline. Building on previous studies (Haijar 1977, Inoguchi 1982, Kent and Nicholson 1980, La Bar and Singer 1976, Pfotenhauer 1972, Gareau 1981), he develops a model grounded in a methodology. This methodology changes from chapter five to chapter six, but its foundations are the same: Holsti selects a pre-established sample of textbooks prevalent in each country and then analyses reference and citation patterns in these pre-established textbooks to understand patterns of consumption of IR across the world.

The first major argument is presented in chapter five of the study. The methodology for this argument aims to "note (1) the nationality of the author and (2) the paradigm used in that author's work, for each book or article listed in the textbook's bibliography, "suggested reading," or reference section" (Holsti 1985:84/85). The goal, in this case, is to dig deep into the intellectual substance of IR, assessing, specifically, what theories dominate and are being taught not only in the US but also around the world. His study is geographically very limited – he sticks to Anglo-Saxon countries to which he adds India, Korea and Japan. Despite this limitation, it allows the reader to understand the intellectual role and dominance that certain theories and their substances have in IR at the time of writing.

Holsti (1985) concludes that the classical tradition – which he contrasts to theories of global society and Neo-Marxist challengers – prevails in most communities of the world (including India and Japan). Japan, he shows, is the main contender to this assessment. But even there, the presence of alternative voices is restricted to 16%. The remaining 84% of the citations and recommended readings show the prevalence of the classical tradition (aligned with Realism). This not only shows the prevailing hegemony of a substantive concern across the world with issues of war and peace (while issues of interdependence and dependence take a less prevalent role) but also the dominance of Western-made IR. Both arguments go hand in hand for Holsti – the substantive and the theoretical.

What is also important to stress in the study is that, even though not a great detail is placed on third world countries, Holsti does conclude that "Dependencia theory, in particular, seems to inform textbook discussions of Third World states in international relations, and many others deal in one way or another with ideas emphasizing the notion of a global community, the interests of which are conceptually distinct from those of nation states" (Holsti 1985:100/101). This, of course, has led later scholars to dig deeper into such assumptions and prove the importance of this literature in these countries (Dunn and Shaw 2001, Turton 2016).

Be that as it may, the argument suggests that the classical tradition, both in its substantive and theoretical assumptions, has a hegemonic presence in the concerns of scholars not just in the US but in the world analysed by Holsti. This is the case even in India, Korea, and Japan.

The second important contribution is to assess how far we live as a community of scholarly research actively contributing to the pursuit of common goals – instead of insulating itself in clusters of nationally defined dialogues. In other words, the main goal is to assess if there is "(1) professional communication between researchers residing in different and separate political jurisdictions; and (2) a reasonably symmetrical pattern of "production" and "consumption" of theories, ideas, concepts, methods, and data between members of the community" (Holsti 1985:102). If this doesn't happen, what tends to occur is the prevalence of insularity, where each community is speaking to itself but where we still can detect a hegemonic and hierarchical presence of some communities. The model, therefore, requires analysing citation patterns to identify the predominance of American and British dominium in different national communities, signs of national parochialism and signs of international diversity (where beyond the Anglo-American world, scholars cite other countries).

The methodology used in this case aims to locate references to paradigms and then identify the nationality of authors cited in "bibliographies, "suggested reading" sections, reference pages, and, where necessary, footnotes. We defined nationality in terms of the author's normal place of employment, not temporary residence, actual citizenship, or other criterion" (Hosti 1985:104).

The conclusion is that, in the Anglo-American world, there is a clear hegemonic presence of American authors and where – in the UK example – national parochialism is also prevalent. What is not prevalent in these core countries – mainly America – is the citation of works beyond this core. Peripherical studies are not sources of major citations. This creates a pattern of both the hegemonic presence of US literature and national parochialism. In the case of the US, both go hand in hand; in the case of the UK, it solidifies the hegemony of US literature.

In the other countries, a similar pattern to that of the UK emerges in the hegemonic presence of Anglo-American literature in IR (mainly American), but also where scholars, nationally, tend to cite themselves quite extensively. International reference in these countries beyond the hegemonic core doesn't exist or is irrelevant.

The view that emerges from these studies is one not of internal dialogue where there is an internal lively multicultural participation by scholars in a global debate, but instead, one where national parochialism is equal or more when compared to patterns of the core hegemonical presence of the main centres of intellectual contribution: the United States and the UK. What emerges is an IR that is not only characterised by dominium but also by national parochialism. This contribution leads to the final relevant conclusion of the study.

A third important, related contribution of the study departs from the assumptions that there is, in fact, a hegemonic presence of US literature across the world – that is both substantive and theoretically predominant. At the same time, Holsti also understands there is more in these communities than just the US. The question becomes understanding why there have not been a lot of contributions to the centre in the periphery. In essence, Holsti, departing from the assumption that there is an intellectual core in the West, introduces the question of why parochialism exists and what to do about it. As he makes clear, the statement "does not suggest that research and writing in the field occur only in two countries; rather, it is only that the work of scholars in these two countries becomes disseminated regularly throughout the community, while the works of scholars in other countries are acknowledged primarily in the writer's own country or geographical region. It is not so much asymmetry of production as of consumption" (Holsti 1985:103).

Some comments about this discrepancy are already visible before a more systematic treatment of the issue, when Holsti claims that scholarly opportunities differ in different countries. Comparing anglophone to the rest of the world, he claims, "They have available to them research funds, low teaching loads, sabbaticals, research assistance, travel funds to attend conferences, and libraries stocked with a vast array of books and journals. By contrast, scholars in many developing countries work under conditions that militate against quality research. Some hold two or three jobs. If they write, it is often for the mass audience at home, where they can earn a little extra money from newspaper or magazine articles (or sometimes for advancement in politics). Sabbaticals do not exist; neither do funds for research, travel, or library acquisition. In other words, the findings reported below imply nothing about human academic potential. They do say something, however, about the sociology of our profession" (Holsti 1985:84). This is further solidified later on in the argument.

At the time of writing, and after pointing out that 'language' is an important issue, Holsti identifies two other reasons for the periphery's parochialism. First, the issues emphasised in the hegemony do not relate to peripheries. Second, the patterns of publication in most countries remain parochial because "authors in some countries "dominate" the field, or because certain clubs exclude those with improper credentials, … because the scholars themselves do not regularly seek to have their ideas enter the network of scholarly communication" (Holsti 1985:84). Language, substantive and institutional dissonances are therefore the main reasons for why we have a hierarchical pattern in IR where the centre is replicated around the world, while, nationally, there are auto-imposed barriers to enter the centre.

3.2.2.2. Steve Smith's Disciplinary Power

Steve Smith builds an argument that picks up important contributions to this discussion to build a view of IR as being dominated by the agenda and methodological commitments of the United States. His contribution to these discussions highlights how, through his control of IR, the US-based academia also controls what is considered good and bad theory/meta-theory and what is good and bad theoretical substance.

Smith relies on the work of K.J. Holsti (1985), Alker and Biersteker (1984) and Waever (1998) to build his case. Holsti is mentioned because his contribution allows us to understand how there is a theoretical dominance of the field of IR that resides in two communities – the US and the UK – but mainly in the US. Through the analysis of textbooks, Holsti confirms that it is in US manuals that most of the world relies on to teach and learn about IR.

The argument of Alker and Biersteker is brought in to understand the substance of what goes on inside this academia. This is a critical move in Smith's argument because it allows him to identify the core of this intellectual/theoretical dominance. According to Alker and Biersteker, in their assessment of the presence of traditional, behavioural and dialectical approaches inside US academia, they conclude that 70% of US academia relies on some form of behavioural approach, 20% was traditional and only 10% dialectical. This not only gives content to the theoretical dominance outlined by Holsti but also highlights the parochialism of US academia: most of the literature is produced by Americans for Americans. The hegemony of a single methodology and ontology is therefore emphasised by Smith as the core conclusion of Alker and Biersteker's study.

Smith does concede that two other factors besides intellectual and theoretical dominance impact on US hegemonic role: "first, the sheer size of the US IR community compared to those in the rest of the world and, secondly, the role of the main (US-based) academic journals in both setting the theoretical agenda and in prestige terms" (Smith 2002:80). But for the argument, the main focal point is precisely the idea that there is a theoretical dominance which has epistemological and ontological consequences for how we view what counts as IR.

Ole Waever's work has been brought in to confirm this view further. Waever (1998) is used to update Alker and Biersteker's conclusion about the dominance not of behaviouralism but, instead, of rational choice theory. On the other hand, it provides the reasons, nationally, why the US emerged as the dominant country. In his analysis of Germany, France, Britain and the US, Waever concludes that the US has an academy centred on theoretical journals where scholars must compete to access them. This institutional and academic infrastructure is different from the countries analysed in Europe, "where power historically rested either in sub-fields or in local universities, not in a disciplinary elite. American IR alone generates an apex that therefore comes to serve as the global core of the discipline" (Smith 2000:395). This institutional infrastructure feeds into the intellectual dominance of rational choice theory. In light of a better assessment of national conditions that Waever's essay allows, the

confrontation of US and other countries also leads Smith to conclude that the rational choice theory that is so hegemonical in the US and, as a consequence, in the discipline, will not travel well to countries such as France, Germany or the UK, "these three IR communities are developing more in the way of national identities and also combining more to form a European IR community" (Smith 2000:395).

Smith also dedicates intellectual energy to understanding IR in the United Kingdom (Smith 1985). Even though he points out that language, theoretical concerns, general political/economic circumstances, and similarities in the study of fundamental substances of the field create synergies between the two countries, there are also important differences. Smith points out how the historical trajectory of IR is different in both countries, how more detailed and divergent political and economic circumstances paths create different pressures – the UK losing its empire, US emerging as one among others –, how different institutional frameworks can also be distinguished – qualitative, more time dedicated to thought, less contact between politics and academia in the UK when compared to the US – and, finally, he stresses different intellectual climates – less responsive to social science methodology in the UK.

Two other consequences flow from these conclusions: first, the appeal for the existence of a more plural discipline in terms of the approaches available to theorise, and second, the elucidation of the substantive consequences of the centrality of rational choice theory and positivism for the discipline.

On the first point, Smith stresses that the epistemological dominance of positivism and rational choice is leading the way to a shrinking of theoretical possibilities in the study of IR. Smith is eager to promote a view that there should be theoretical diversity and pluralism (Smith 2013, Smith 1995).

Second, the epistemological and methodological centrality of positivism and rational choice also affect the questions asked in IR. As Smith concludes, "Put simply, and possibly too crudely, the mainstream of the US discipline sees political and military inequalities, but it does not deem other forms of inequality as relevant to the discipline" (2002:82). Smith mentions how questions of gender, migration, the environment, and human rights "are seen as falling outside the core of the discipline or are features to be studied according to the canon of the social science enterprise, which thereby reconstitutes them as atomistic and external" (2002:82). On the other hand, issues of economic inequality are treated as domestic politics or as issues of development.

Steve Smith thinks there is a hegemonic country and a hegemonic discipline (Smith 2002). Besides the fact that to build a counter-history of IR, it always needs to take into account 'the great (North-American) debates, this hegemony is, for Smith, rooted in the theoretical and meta-theoretical dominance of the US. It is further consolidated by the institutional dominance of US academia (its sheer size and the role its journals play in setting the agenda). Even though this is the case, Smith also

opens the door for a counter-hegemonic IR. Across the world, this hegemonic discipline doesn't travel well. In particular, in the UK, even though there are similarities in terms of a shared language, a concern with theory and political circumstances, IR is also driven by diverging political and economic specificities, institutional divergences and, most importantly, intellectual divergences. Smith is also particularly vocal about the need to move towards a more pluralistic IR – in terms of theory and meta-theory. Finally, on rethinking core substances that seem to constitute IR's subject matter.

3.2.2.3. Jörg Friedrich's National and European Identities

The argument provided by Jörg Friedrichs (2004) comes in a long tradition of reflections that aim to understand first whether there is a US Hegemony in the field and whether this hegemony is good or bad, and then provide grounds for thinking the world beyond hegemony – by indicating avenues of research for local communities that can potentially balance this hegemony. Friedrich's study is also groundbreaking, not just because it highlights how to move beyond US hegemony and contributes to thinking about national communities distinctively, but also by moving the debate towards discussions over the nature of how to bring about a European IR identity.

The first argument put forward by Friedrichs is the idea that there is a US intellectual hegemony placing the United States as the core country for the production of IR. He refers to the study of Holsti (1985) to emphasise this point but also wants to move beyond Holsti. That work is mentioned to confirm that this hegemony is based on citation patterns of work that derive from the United States, mainly. According to the argument, and looking at textbooks mentioned in different syllabi across the world, what emerges is a picture of a discipline where a center-periphery relationship between the American and, to a lesser extent, the British IR community and the rest of the world. This translated into an American core, a British semi-periphery, and all other dependent peripheries. This built an image of IR where everything was floating around the North American academy, with the British also submissive to this core (by the number of citations collected when compared to those collected of Britain in the United States). It's a world where the US rules supreme in a parochial sense: everything flows from there to the rest of the world, and little comes from the rest of the world to the United States. Writing in 2004, Friedrichs is also of the opinion that, even though European national communities had increased their ability to internally produce more IR and to develop a national conversation, there was still a dominant relation occurring in these communities towards the American (and to a lesser extent British) core. He uses the work of Johan Galtung to refine his view of core-periphery relationships.

But Friedrichs also criticises this approach. He aims to ground his view of hegemony and dominance in a methodology that moves beyond citation patterns. Looking at just citation patterns

has limits because "mainstream literature is over-represented due to the introductory character of textbooks" (Friedrichs 2004:7) and because "the analysis of citation patterns in textbooks tells a lot about patterns in the consumption, but little about patterns in the production of scholarship" (Friedrichs 2004:7). After discrediting Stanley Hoffman's socio-institutional approach (Hoffman 1977), he suggests that US intellectual hegemony is prevalent because of what he describes as the two stabilisers, "the use of English as a lingua franca, the process of editorial selection, and the sheer size of the American IR community (Friedrichs 2004:8), on the one hand, and the social construction of this hegemony, on the other. The social construction of hegemony exists because of the way IR scholars tend to characterise the development of the discipline – the narrative of the 'great debates' serving here as a way to legitimise the presence of the US-UK core. This development, therefore, doesn't do justice to what was going on elsewhere and invites scholars to repeat a view of disciplinary developments that discredits any other possible alternatives. In the end, Friedrich's view of hegemony is succinctly summarized by him "the International Relations discipline is characterized by an asymmetrical pattern of professional communication, with the American community of scholars at the core. There are three important stabilizers to uphold this pattern: the use of English as a lingua franca, the process of editorial selection, and the sheer size of American IR. Another important factor for the reproduction of American intellectual hegemony is the standard account of disciplinary history" (Friedrichs 2004:11).

Friedrichs does a good job of summarising some of the arguments that have prevailed in the literature since the publication of Holsti's ground-breaking work (Holsti 1985) and expanding on it. But he also wants to give credit to an emerging national and European identity. As he suggests, he has two main goals with his contribution, "first, to provide the building blocks for a new narrative about disciplinary history which shall do more justice to the evolution of the field in western Europe; and, second, to suggest viable strategies for the piecemeal development of a more vibrant 'Eurodiscipline' of International Relations" (Friedrichs 2004:18). How is this done?

On the first front, Friedrichs aims to explore the distinctive way in which national communities have developed their version of IR. Friedrich argues that IR can take different forms around the world. Friedrich uses three case studies – France, Italy and Nordic scholars – to construct models of behaviour towards US hegemony – academic self-reliance, resigned acceptance and the pooling of intellectual resources, respectively. At its heart, the framework aims to develop a strategy that challenges the intellectual/institutional hegemony of the American centre, achieving, in so doing, the desired aim to write disciplinary history differently.

The question becomes how to do so. In an argument that lacks deeper theoretical ground, this is done through an assessment that aims to identify both institutional success/failure and intellectual success/failure at the level of the European periphery. In the chapter on the Nordic countries, this framework comes to light as Friedrich concludes, "1. In so far as individual scholars and scientific communities in the academic periphery have a strong interest in joining the discussions going on in the centre, the success of an academic community can be measured by its ability to gain access to the discipline via the centre. 2. Since it would be naive to assume that successful scholarship is necessarily also good scholarship, the excellence of an academic community must be measured by its capacity to provide original contributions to ongoing debates and to set qualitatively innovative issues on the research agenda. Only if both of these criteria are fulfilled, can the 'Nordic network' be considered a model to be emulated by other European IR peripheries" (Friedrichs 2004:65). This very raw and highly unspecified theoretical framework is then used to analyse not only Nordic countries but also France and Italy.

In the case of the Nordic countries, Friedrich developed the most incisive assessment of their institutional development, and there is a clear separation between institutional and intellectual contributions. Institutionally, success seems to be measured, specifically, by the fact that "Nordic IR scholars dispose of a variety of attractive outlets for their academic production. Many Nordics have gained access to the academic world market by getting their books and articles published by English and American editors (Goldmann 1995). At the same time, a generation of mostly younger Scandinavians is networking with scholars from other European countries to create an integrated European community of IR scholars (Jönsson 1993a: 160)" (Friedrichs 2004:67). The creation of publications internally, the capacity to enter the international conversation and the academic world market and institutional interactions with colleagues in the region and beyond the region, three key elements for good institutional foundations. Friedrich traces this institutional progression from the 1950s onwards. His goal is to focus on the formation of a multi-level research cooperation among Nordic scholars that justifies using this region as a success case and a good strategy for intellectual emancipation. The second important contribution is to move from institutions to intellectual contributions. The driving force behind such an assessment is again never made clear, but what transpires from the literature is a desire to understand contributions that, by interacting with prevailing Western literature, have made an impact and significant contribution to this literature. Friedrichs sees two core and important structural contributions on this front: agreeing with Jönsson (1993) he also regards a significant characteristic of Nordic IR as its ability to bridge building and to help create and solidify middle-range theorising – he calls this position moderate scientific revisionism due to his behavioralist and positivist origins. This view, however, is limited. He further gives examples of relevant contributions that aimed to engage more fully with the post-positivist turn. Here, he

separates a more radical scientific revolutionism from the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. It is also important to stress the interaction between the institutional and the intellectual. According to Friedrich, the foundations for success are institutional. This can be read from the statement, "The placement of the Nordic IR communities at the center of a complex network of multi-level research cooperation has certainly left its imprint on the theoretical and methodological orientation of the authors concerned. Indeed, the networking of Nordic authors in the field of IR research has been accompanied by a clear diversification of their theoretical and methodological orientations" (Friedrichs 2004:72). This is the nature of a successful research community: to institutionally root itself in a multi-level research cooperation strategy that will allow the creation of strong intellectual outcomes. This strategy is better when compared to the other two: self-reliance and resigned acceptance.

An example of self-reliance is provided by the chapter on French IR. The idea of self-reliance comes from Friedrichs view of institutional deficiencies that come out of France and do not allow for IR to fully and more professionally institutionalise itself. Self-reliance needs to be understood in this context: "The French tendency towards academic self-encapsulation has its roots in the national history of IR as an academic discipline. Until the end of the Second World War, there was no autonomous field of IR studies in France, although international organization was part of the legal training of the public service, and diplomatic history was considered an aspect of political history. Only after the end of the War was IR constituted as an independent area of academic studies. … Formally, French IR was established as a subdiscipline of Political Science during the academic reforms of the 1960s (Wæver 1998a). Nevertheless, only a few French IR scholars opted for Political Science to guide their scholarly production. The large majority continued to borrow their theoretical wisdom from the established academic backgrounds of International Law and Diplomatic History. At least partially, this has remained so. Many French IR scholars continue to employ the methods and accepted norms of the discipline in which they have developed. Due to the continuing preponderance of the legal tradition and diplomatic history, the bulk of French IR has always been surprisingly atheoretical and largely state-centric" (Friedrichs 2004:30). So, according to Friedrich, the main reason for self-reliance is the incapacity of IR to institutionalise itself fully in France – not only via the creation of its own distinctive identity but also through the reinforcement of a concern with theory. This leads Friedrichs, and moving his needle from the institutional analysis to the intellectual one, to further characterise distinctive generations of French IR theory: the first, which is still predominant, finds itself rooted in the study of two academic traditions: International Law and Diplomatic History. The second emerged in the 1960s on the back of the work of Raymond Aron, but which is not limited to this work. During this generation, scholars intended to contribute more to "social (and to a minor extent socialist) theory" (Friedrichs 2004:33). The third generation has a concern with social identity translated in the works of Bertrand Badie, Marie-Claude Smouts and Zaki Laïdi. These generations are described respectively as a-

theoretical scholarship, social theory, and post-theory. The contributions are read to the extent that they interact with or change existing IR theoretical assumptions (although there is never a full analysis of what counts as theory).

An example of resigned acceptance of the US dominance is the chapter on Italy. But whereas in the cases of Nordic countries and France, the attribution of such descriptions comes from the institutional argument, in the Italian case it seems a combination of the geographical positioning of the country alongside institutional reasons. Starting with the first, and according to Friedrich, "The present research report broadly concurs with this view, while trying to find out the reasons why Italian IR appears to be so strongly marginal. The basic idea is that Italian IR may be duly understood as a marginal periphery vis-à-vis the American intellectual core. There will be more evidence for this assertion submitted in the course of the examination, but it is certainly emblematic that there is now an excellent manual in Italian, co-authored by five Italian and five American scholars (Ikenberry and Parsi 2001a, 2001b). Imagine how unlikely it would be the other way around: to have a textbook for American university students co-authored by American and Italian scholars.1 Moreover, it is revealing that no other European scholars, not even from Great Britain, were called in to participate in the endeavour" (Friedrichs 2004:47). So, as suggested by the argument developed by Holsti (1985), there is an acceptance in Italy that the importation of anglophone theory is the way to go. This exists alongside a parochial regime where scholars tend to cite national sources at a similar rate as they cite anglophone ones. Neglectable references exist to authors outside these two poles. The title of the chapter seems to allude precisely to this geographical dynamic: "International Relations theory in Italy: between academic parochialism and intellectual adjustment" (Friedrichs 2004:47). If this seems to be the foundation of the argument, institutionally, Friedrichs has the most sophisticated presentation of IR in Italy when compared to the other two cases. He presents cultural, institutional and intellectual/theoretical reasons for this lack of institutionalisation. Culturally, the lack of internationalist culture and interest in 'things international' is the first factor presented; another cultural factor is the contrasting interests between a political regime and Italy's Atlantic turn in 1947. Institutionally, Friedrichs points out that language and funding (due to the discrepancies between academic research and policy relevance) may be important factors. Finally, intellectually and in an academic environment similar to the French one, IR never gained full independence from International Law or Diplomatic History. Moving to the intellectual contributions of the Italian IR community, they are built based on a categorisation that emphasises different 'paradigms' or perspectives: realists, Grotian liberals, dissenters and an assessment of how IR is being discussed in the public realm. The methodology used for this selection takes into account the following assumptions: "first, I do not identify every single author with one and only one 'paradigm'; instead, I consider the possibility of one author moving back and forth from one school of thought to another. Second, my survey is not

confined to ordinary professors; any author from any Italian IR department is admitted since his scholarship offers a substantial contribution to IR theory.6 Third, I would propose some terminological modifications: the expression 'paradigm' is generally avoided, the 'transnational paradigm' is renamed 'liberalism', and a residual box of 'dissenters' is introduced" (Friedrichs 2004:52).

Friedrich's goal is also to think about the possibility of a regional Euro-discipline. There are two related issues here. The first deals with the question of what relationship exists between the US hegemonic centre and this emerging Euro-discipline. This is because of an increasingly robust institutional infrastructure and the potential to move beyond the social construction of the US hegemonic centre through intellectual emancipation. According to Friedrich, the Euro-discipline shouldn't try to overcome American parochialism by creating a form of counter-parochialism. Instead, according to him, "the 'Eurodiscipline' should become a confederation of national and regional communities of scholars maintaining their links with colleagues in other parts of the world" (Friedrichs 2004:76).

The second question becomes, how to create such a community. Departing from his analysis of US dominance – and the core of it – and from his case studies, Friedrich develops the four ideas that need to be taken by the Euro-discipline to, in his opinion, solidify itself. The starting point is communities of scholars that are deeply rooted in their national traditions. These academic and cultural environments, as the author describes them, should condition how a potential Euro-discipline can solidify itself. But he concludes that the first step to do so is to contest US-Anglo dominance of disciplinary historiography. Since this is, for him, the core aspect of the intellectual dominance of the core, it is inevitable for Europeans to revise this story and start telling it differently. Departing from the analysis of his case studies, he then proposes measures dealing with academic sociology, politics and the elaboration of theoretical tools that will help solidify a Euro-discipline.

Concerning academic sociology, he suggests that following the Nordic model of multi-level research cooperation against both the Italian and the French more hierarchical models is the way forward. By this, he means that it is important to enhance the number of networking activities at the European level that bring communities of researchers together. This model aims to overcome national postures where these communications are conditioned by gatekeepers that restrain or monitor the exchange of theoretical achievements. It seems, for Friedrichs, that the solution here is the creation of connectivity between research communities.

Concerning academic politics, he suggests a strategy of developing theoretical third ways as the way forward for a Euro-discipline. Here, he concludes that the strategy of equidistance followed by the English School is superior to the strategy of rapprochement followed by the constructivist option. Friedrichs dedicates two chapters of his contribution precisely to these two strategies. As he describes these strategies deal with "epistemic strategies of issue-related 'schools' and approaches" (Friedrich

2004:125). At the core, therefore, the discussion revolves around which epistemological strategies to pursue while developing research. One that follows the constructivist example of bringing everything together under one unifying (positivist) epistemology. And another of conceding to all sides some part of a more overarching explanation or understanding of an action. This epistemological discussion does find correspondence in those chapters where the discussion seems to be between an attempt to overcome the binary and opposition sense in which theory is built in the centre. The English School, with the strategy of integrating different approaches, overcomes this binary construction completely. The epistemological argument of this strategy of rapprochement will find more solid epistemological grounds later on in Friedrichs contribution to the debate (Friedrich 2009, Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).

Finally, there is an argument about the importance of elaborating theoretical tools. Here, Friedrichs points out the opportunities of what he calls a strategy of theoretical reconstruction. Here again, the strategy is not well specified or precise enough to elucidate how this can be translated into an actionable or theoretical plan. Friedrichs gives the example of neo-medievalism in one of the chapters of the book (Friedrichs 2004) and discusses why it is relevant to develop this strategy of theoretical reconstruction. According to him, he aims to develop "a whole new genre of IR scholarship, which I would call 'theoretical reconstruction'. Nothing should prevent IR scholars from posing whatever theoretical puzzle interests them and from trying to find innovative solutions by arranging a fictitious conversation among theoretical voices" (2004:125). He furthermore, elucidates that the goal is to elucidate how "All these different theoretical approaches will be brought into a fictitious dialogue with one another and with American approaches" (2004:124). One has to conclude that the goal of this innovative research deals with questions of the value and importance of conceptual formulation in the understanding of IR. It is precisely this that can be extracted from a more precise introduction to the topic of theoretical tools and the purpose of theoretical reconstructions when it's concluded that "The argument is directed towards the purpose of intellectual innovation and suggests that conceptual exploration should be a top priority in the present situation of theoretical disarray" (Friedrichs 2004:147)

3.2.3- The Socio-Intellectual Model: The US-Euro Core

If the previous models reinforce Eurocentrism by a view of Global IR that, through many different approaches, that tends to reinforce the presence of a substantive, theoretical, philosophical, institutional and geographical predominance of certain regions of the world against others – or contest

such assumptions (Turton 2016), a different view of the matter is possible. Jörgensen, in his 2003 article, suggests a social science approach, and it is precisely to this model that we now turn.

Ever since the publication of Stanley Hoffman's article (1977) on the sociological nature of IR academies, the study of these matters has changed from an analysis of an imperial or hegemonic condition to one where greater emphasis is placed on the internal determinants for the formation of IR communities. Rather than having the US/UK as a reference, the model looked at cultural, institutional and intellectual characteristics that allow for the formation of IR communities. This part will focus on contributions to such formulations not only by revisiting this historical contribution but also by suggesting a macro-sociological approach developed by Ole Waever (1998) that takes inspiration from but roots the contribution more consistently in the sociology of science/knowledge.

3.2.3.1. Stanley Hoffmann's American Social Science

One of the first contributions to what is here designated as the socio-intellectual model was Stanley Hoffmann's article (1977). Hoffman is mainly interested in understanding the emergence of IR in the United States, and he attributes three reasons for such an emergence: political, institutional and intellectual.

The political pre-eminence of the United States is one of the reasons pointed out by Hoffman for the emergence of IR in this country and is considered, in fact, the most important factor. On the one hand, scholars were interested in understanding important and relevant issues that helped address this condition of supremacy, they were subjectively committing science to the pursuit of the understanding of the US's place in the world and the functioning of this world. On the other hand, this subjective commitment by scholars was also what politicians wanted. Research outputs and the need for a political understanding of what was happening to the US and the world after World War II came hand-in-hand.

Institutionally, Hoffmann emphasises the relevance of the institutions in feeding both the political and intellectual dimensions. Accordingly, it was important for the government and the scholars to be nearby; also important was the network of foundations that helped finance research, and finally, the nature of universities themselves. On this last point, Hoffmann stresses how "They were flexible; because of their variety, which ensured both competition and specialization, and also because of the almost complete absence of the strait jackets of public regulations, quasi-feudal traditions, financial dependence, and intellectual routine which have so often paralyzed the universities of post-war Europe" (1977:50)

Finally, Hoffman points out three important intellectual reasons for the emergence of IR in the US. The explosion of social sciences in the country walks hand-in-hand with the profound belief in the

sophistication of 'exact sciences' and how they can help explain the social world as well. There was, therefore, an intellectual predisposition in the US to believe in Enlightened progress and how sciences could find their way to better explain the social world. The third reason has to do with the nature of this theorisation. The community of researchers, mostly from Europe, changed the reconfiguration of what it meant to do research. In Hoffman's words, "these were scholars whose philosophical training and personal experience moved them to ask far bigger questions than those much of American social science had asked so far, questions about ends, not just about means; about choices, not just about techniques; about social wholes, not just about small towns or units of government. So they often served as conceptualizers, and blended their analytic skills with the research talents of the "natives." (Hoffmann 1977:47).

According to Hoffmann, therefore, what helped the emergence of IR in the US was the effort of conceptualisation brought in mainly by European emigres, supported by scholars who were in close ties with the government, grounded in institutions that helped solidify this endeavour.

3.2.3.2. Ole Waever's Sociology of Science

In his important contribution to this debate (Waever 1998), Ole Waever starts by developing a theoretical model based on the sociology of science that would contribute to moving IR beyond the state of neglect towards theory. According to him, the history of the discipline is being written with no serious theoretical foundation. In his words, authors "write about the past as part of one of the debates about who is right and who is wrong, what mistakes were made in the past, and why everyone should follow me now" (Waever 1998:691). To fix this, Waever introduces a distinction that was emerging at the time between external and internal explanations that explain changes in the discipline. External accounts introduce various political, economic, social, and intellectual causes that propel change in IR. These are real-world developments that have consequences for the discipline. Internal explanations, on the other hand, were inherently conceived by past reflections as having a linear trajectory, a progressivism that leads scholars to see disciplinary transitions as natural confrontations derived from the analysis of academic discourse itself. Waever is not convinced by the state of un-theoretical reflection in IR, so he suggests an approach grounded in the sociology of science. The work of Stanley Hoffman (1977) serves as inspiration.

At its core, this approach has three dimensions – a socio-cultural dimension, a scientific dimension, and an intellectual dimension. The first layer deals with the influence of the state in the development of social sciences. It has four dimensions: cultural-linguistic/intellectual – dealing with intellectual styles that characterise nations – and three others that relate directly to how social sciences are affected by the roles that they are supposed to fulfil in the broader context of the form of

state. Three dimensions are stressed here political ideology – which Waever only characterises as "national traditions of thought about state and society" (Waever 1998:695) – state-society relations and a country's foreign policy situation. The institutional layer, on the other hand, is "partly about the emergence of ''social science'' as such (2a) and partly about the division into disciplines (2b) that emerged at different times and in different ways in different countries. To become an accepted science depended both on the links that a discipline could make to societal interests (discourse coalitions) and on the formulation of an organizing concept and from that a scientific language" (Waever 1998:695). Finally, the intellectual layer deals with the internal development of the discipline itself: its social and intellectual structure. Waever, grounded in the sociology of science, develops a model that can incorporate in it both external and internal factors. What is also important to note is that he is mainly applying it to the analysis of national constellations, where he uses the second layer supported by the first one, but only by reference to the importance of national ideological and philosophical traditions (ideology) and foreign policy traditions. The third layer will be used in the analysis of the development of national academic fields and the traditions of intellectual thought upon which these fields rely.

Side-tracking itself from this model, however, Waever's initial concern is to understand the condition of US hegemony specifically along two dimensions: its institutional and meta-theoretical orientation. Maintaining the spirit of the division between cultural, institutional and intellectual parts in the model, this could be the 'cultural' dimension of the argument. According to the argument and against views that focus on textbooks or curricula, the goal is to compare the distribution of the author's country of residence in the leading journals in both America and Europe. This analysis concludes that, on the one hand, US journals are not becoming more global – the dominance of US scholars in US journals is overwhelming. On the other hand, the presence of American authors in European journals is increasing, which could be "a sign of increased dominance regarding the production of theory, or it might reflect a shift in the European journals toward more theory" (Waever 1998:700). On the other hand, the content and meta-theoretical orientation of the publications are also analysed. Here, the conclusion is that Americans are more prone to give priority to rational choice, whereas Europeans tend to privilege constructivism and postmodernism. The conclusion is given by Waever, "There is one IR discipline, not several. Lots of interaction and transatlantic publishing take place—especially in one direction. Theories are mainly produced in the United States. Metatheoretical orientations differ on the two sides of the Atlantic, with much more U.S. interest in (more or less formalized) rational choice approaches versus more European interest in constructivism and postmodernism" (Waever 1998:703).

Leaving the analysis of the institutional and meta-theoretical dimensions of hegemony to the side, the theoretical framework rooted in the sociology of science/knowledge comes to life in the analysis of

national communities. Waever contributes to a new wave of research that aims to bring sociology of science into the study of national communities. His goal is to look at four national communities – Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States – using the approach suggested above.

The German case illustrates how the emergence of social science and its divide is a direct consequence of the ideological predispositions of the country and its foreign policy interests. The first affects the structure of the discipline; the second affects its substances. Institutionally, the influence of the interference of the state led to a weak political science – influenced by many other disciplines, especially by law – and hierarchical structures within departments. It is from this that an IR discipline emerges. As Waever concludes, "In this place and time this set of ideas was seen as the core of history, so it did not trigger attempts to construct a separate discipline of IR. Historicism or the ''power school'' in German history was constructed from the idealist, strong concept of the state a general and strict power theory with states as units" (Waever 1998:705). The influence of this institutional and intellectual condition changed after 1945 in a way that is counter-cycle to the United States. During the 1960s until the 1980s, there were influences in the German academy of Galtung's inspired peace research, and during the 1970s, the move was towards integration, transnationalism and interdependence. In the 1990s, according to Waever, German IR seemed to be moving towards the development of "more independent theory and, to a lesser extent, oriented these theories toward an international audience" (Waever 1998:705). The creation of a journal in 1994, the debates on Habermas, Luhmann and the regime-inspired Tubingen school are given as examples of this new dynamism. The conclusion seems to be that "the conditions are probably better here than anywhere else for an independent dynamism, drawing on national traditions while fully keeping up with American developments" (Waever 1998:706).

The French example provides another illustration of how the ideology of state structures interferes directly with scientific developments. The tripartite structure of French social science that dates back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – itself subject to transformations of the French state – is presented as the reason behind contemporary institutional formations. A faculty of social sciences is not the normal format in France. The institutional defragmentation is, therefore, something that institutionally characterises the study of political science and IR in France. As Waever concludes, "Today political science can be found in all three parts of the academic system: research within Centre National de la Recherche Scientific que (CNRS), in the case of IR mainly in Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI); elite training in the Grandes Ecoles; and mass teaching in the universities, where a few have politics departments and the others position politics as the junior partner of law" (Waever 1998:707). The consequence of this defragmentation is that many themes that relate to political science can be found under the designation of political economy or sociology. This institutional composition is also characterised by a concern with practice. When political science

got an institutional home in 1871, it was intended to form civil servants. This trend continues, to which Waever adds three others: because of the relevance of sociology, when political science turns theoretical, it borrows from sociology; second, practical IR lacks theoretical foundations; and three, intellectuals writing about IR come from a wide range of fields. Because of these institutional orientations and their intellectual implications, no great debates ever had an impact in France. Nationally the work of Raymond Aron, the historical school of the Annales, and the radical transformationalism of writers such as Merle, Badie and Smouts are given as examples of innovative French writing. In all of these, we find the influence of an institutional structure which is decentralised, characterised by the influence of multiple other fields of research – mainly sociology, history and law – and that finds its intellectual vitality in the work of Aron and the literature on the transformation of the Westphalian system. Beyond these original contributions, what exists is the influence of the practical, with scholars giving a weak status to theory. The conclusion on this second front is that "Most French IR scholars do empirical or policy work without the obligation felt by American scholars to locate themselves theoretically or to justify an essay by referring to theory implications. Consequently, many write in the old, state-centric tradition, more or less influenced by Aron" (Waever 1998:709).

The case of the United Kingdom is also explored by Ole Waever. IR was institutionally born from the conflation of many different disciplines and with some level of independence when compared to its direct relation to political science. It was never closed to other disciplines and could, therefore, benefit from the links with history, law, political philosophy and sociology. It is, therefore, less defined as political science when compared to the US. Intellectually, according to Waever, Britain's place in the world and its foreign policy concerns also played a role in the development of theory in Britain. He gives the example of the work of Arnold Wolfers and his concern with the Anglo-American tradition in foreign affairs, as well as the work of other authors during the post-Versailles period who were mainly interested in the League of Nations. Also, the English School is read in light of this concern. Picking up an argument put forward by Tim Dunne (1998), the work of Edward Carr is used as an example of how the English School was initially created by reformist realists wanting to explore the societal elements of international relations. The Idealist-Realist debate is therefore seen essentially as emerging from the need to theorise about the debate between the liberal world of idealists and the power-based world of the realists. In England, they aimed to explore the societal dimensions of this confrontation by revising realism. According to Waever, the English School is also a reflection of British history – mainly through its inspiration on the Eurocentric diplomatic system that played an important role during the rule of Britain. Also, the attachment to the 'classical approach' (Bull 1972) is a reflection of an academia that has strong relations with history and philosophy. The direct link between institutional development and intellectual development plays out at this level. Finally, the United Kingdom is analysed as being the main challenger to US dominance, and they lead the attempt to create a

European IR organisation that counterpoints US dominance. But whereas French and German IR are more inward-looking, the British are more outward-looking. Their goal is not so much to create a distinctive national community but to interact in several overlapping transnational systems. In particular, Britons play a role in the US academia and the then-emerging European community.

If the second layer, dealing with national communities, is described as being concerned with the institutional part of IR, the third layer of the sociology of social sciences – the intellectual layer –, consists, on the other hand, of two dimensions "the discipline as social and intellectual structure and, second, its main intellectual traditions" (Waever 1998:715). With the spirit of hindsight, we can conclude that the first dimension deals with the optimal institutional conditions for the development of an academy. Whereas the second with how historico-political contexts are important in theory development. Let's start with the first.

Waever emphasises how a scientific field works. Departing from the work of Richard Whitley (2000), there is, on the one hand, the idea that scientific fields control the production of intellectual novelty through competition for reputation. This is a system where only new knowledge is published but where, at the same time, this knowledge needs to conform with collective standards and priorities. The second variable at play is the degree of mutual dependence, which is defined as how scholars depend on other groups of colleagues to make what can be described as significant contributions to the literature. This, at the same time, means that groups of scholars are dependent on those that dominate reputational institutions and what counts as valid. Once this is established, Waever then compares different countries, starting with the United States. In the US, "although a hierarchy exists among universities, the way up is through publications, so the leading journals are the most important bottleneck" (Waever 1998:717). On the other hand, scholars' dependence on each other is geared towards publication in these journals. The mutual reliance on each other is a reliance on the demands for essay publication. And here, "the journals are mainly defined, structured, and to a certain extent controlled by theorists. You only become a star by doing theory" (Waever 1998:718). After analysing the United States, Waever deals with other nationalities. In France, we have a hierarchical academic world that is not that concerned with being guided by publication patterns. On the other hand, as suggested before, theory doesn't play a relevant role. In Germany, power is vested in professors, with a peer-reviewed journal that emerged in the 1990s. According to Waever, "One's career depends more on one's relationship to the local professor (or local faculty for acceptance of the Habilitationsschrift) than on some national competition" (Waever 1998:719). British IR, finally, is varied. There is an important role for journals, but they are not as well organised and structured as the ones in the American context. Debates, in this sense, were not as central to this community as they are in the US. With internationalisation, British IR is still the main competitor to US hegemony.

Moving to the analysis of the historico-political field, Waever emphasises the confrontation between an American and European tradition of thought. According to him, American IR is characterised by historicist realism in two forms: "continental, historicist, and British liberal roots" (Waever 1998:720). He continues, "To the former, states exist because they do—due to history and to their own will. They are their justification, and they clash and struggle for numerous more or less rational reasons. To the latter, states exist because they fulfil functions for individuals(contract theory for security plus collective goods), and their relationship to other states is anarchical, which complicates cooperation" (Waever 1998:720). On the other hand, there is a liberal ontological influence in the thinking that derives from the US. This ontological sense of liberalism deals with the idea of the prevalence of a contract theory of the state, individualism, and rational calculations when thinking about the micro-foundations of politics. In epistemological terms, this leads to an easier characterisation of American political science when compared to the European one. In IR, the basic unit of analysis becomes the individual and ontologies that are assumed a priori. Turning his analysis towards Europe, Waever describes it as more sociological than the American one. Besides this general reflection, Waever also concludes that selling American ideas to Europe is difficult. No general reflection on European political science is extensively carried out besides these two generalistic ideas.

Bringing the hegemonical and sociology of science arguments together, Waever concludes with an aspiration: Europeans need to be less institutionally hierarchical and more intellectually theoretical, and Americans less parochial and more open to other approaches. The example of European Studies in the mid-1990s serves to illustrate this desired change: if Andrew Moravcsik's International Organization essay in 1991 served to break the ice of European literature stuck as it was with the hegemony of non-theoretical reflection, examples of ideas such as multi-level governance illustrate how Europe can break free from American theoretical dominance. This is also contrasted with the advent of the counterpoint to this literature, which is mainly derived from the culture-specific American research academia: rational choice approaches to European integration.

Waever's work demonstrates a wave of research that emerged in the 1990s that aimed to not only develop new theoretical proposals but also to ground the research in a more solid understanding of (US-Euro) communities. In doing so he grounded his view on an approach to the sociology of science that allowed him to address issues of hegemony, national contributions, institutional and intellectual frameworks, and desired outcomes.

3.2.4. The Socio-Intellectual Model Beyond the US-Euro Core

Increasingly, the challenge of thinking IR beyond its US-Euro core became a concern for IR scholars (Chang, Mandaville and Bleiker 2001, Jones 2006). This had an impact on how the literature moved beyond a concern with US hegemony and its many debates and how distinctive national communities evolve through an angle that emphasises what Jörgensen (2003) describes as a social science method. Instead, we are entering a stage of a world beyond the US-Euro core and its hegemony towards a post-hegemonical state. Here, the goal will be to show that even though this transition is taking place, the centrality of Western thought and its importance is not questioned.

3.2.4.1 Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever's Non-Western Worlds

Arlene Ticker has contributed enormously to the literature on Global IR with contributions that range from applying hegemonic models (Tickner 2003,2013) to those that aim to draw post-colonial conclusions (Blaney and Tickner 2017). Because these dispositions find room in other contributions of the chapter, the purpose here is to focus on the work she developed with Ole Waever, launching an important collection that aimed to give voice to contributions in this field of research (Tickner and Waever 2009).

In an edited volume, Ole Waever and Arlene Ticker (2009) aim to dissect what is happening to IR beyond the US-European core. The goal of the project, as a whole, is to bring together two dynamics of research identified by the authors at the time of writing: on the one hand, an analysis of IR in national contexts through an evaluation of distinctive national and regional contributions, on the other an analysis of how these national contexts also end up changing prevailing assumptions about IR's core concepts through a contextualised view of these same concepts. The trend identified by Waever and Tickner required, therefore, a deeper look at how IR is being produced distinctively by national/regional contributions and how these nationalities themselves rebel against its concepts. Even though this is the initial intention of the volume, it delivers more on the first front than on the second.

The volume is theoretically organised to bring together contributions from both postcolonialism and sociology of science. It started by suggesting a theoretical scope broad enough to encompass such intentions. Post-colonialism is brought in to elucidate the importance of understanding how the global is built not through the prism of a modern project but, instead, in the interaction this modern project has with the other. A proper understanding of the world needs to rely on the interaction between the modern and the local. Realities are built from this confluence of experiences. Also, local voices and the

voices of the subaltern play a key role in understanding how this interaction occurs is transgressed and potentially changed. Notions of hybridity are therefore important to retain when understanding Global IR. Factors that cannot be represented in the dominant dichotomies of the modern project present an anxiety that will eventually break these dominant structures. It is in this sense that the word 'wordling' comes into play. As Waever and Tickner conclude, "when we talk about "worlding" in our book series, this is to emphasize that these intersecting practices of colonizing, resisting, and reshaping mean that we are all engaged in imagining and creating worlds" (Waever and Tickner 2009:9). Global IR for the authors is not about universalising nor given exclusive voice to the local. Instead, these intersecting academic practices allow for it to be thought of not as universal, not as local, but in the spaces in between.

The second theoretical source inspiring the study (and the most important one) is the sociology of social science. Sociology of science helps us understand "how different kinds of knowledge are produced at various times and places, why disciplines are more or less integrated (both conceptually and socially), and why activities in distinct disciplines are organised around various types of institution (journals, foundations, top professors, or associations)" (Waever and Tickner 2009:11). These three objectives are then dissected by the different contributions provided by different modes of thinking about sociology of science: from Merton's technical black box to other approaches that aim to incorporate external and internal influences on science.

The first to be mentioned is Merton and his idea of autonomy: whether research institutions are independent of political and economic systems. Merton developed a theory of the sociology of science that can blackbox the conditions for science to emerge. In doing so it allowed a more precise study of the institutions of science (journals, scientific societies, research training, hiring patterns). This black box had consequences, however. As Waever and Tickner claim, "this strand of the sociology of science remains important because it enables us to see the peculiar dynamics of a social system regulated not mainly by direct political orders, or by economic competition for profit, but through the institution of peer recognition for the production of scientific originality" (Waever and Tickner 2009:12).

After pausing on the disruptive influence that Thomas Kuhn had on both reifying Merton and allowing for further expansion, the authors then analyse the contribution of social constructivists to the sociology of science. Social constructivist work allows for science to be analysed through its social dimensions – macro and micro – thus emphasising a view of science towards extra-scientific factors. Social constructivists explain science from a political, ideological or economic sense or derive justification in the 'laboratory' itself. These factors are external to intellectual practices as such – those factors that matter the most for Merton.

Once the purely internal and the extreme external approaches are presented, the work of Richard Whitley, Randall Collins and Peter Wagner / Björn Wittrock are analysed. The first two as examples of views that aim to bridge the gap between externalism and internalism. The main difference between Whitley and Collins is how they start from different perspectives. Whitley aims to give a greater role to the social aspects in the construction of scientific work, whereas Collins starts with intellectual contributions and provides reasons for how external factors impact these. Wagner and Wittrock's work is brought in to elucidate how aspects of the debate can be further emphasised. Specifically, the authors develop a political sociology of the social sciences by identifying links between political cultures and how they interact with theoretical production. Finally, and continuing with the intention to highlight how specific dimensions of the model can be the subject of more precise attention, the ideas that emerge from the so-called 'new production of knowledge' emphasise how research is conditioned by and intensified by economic industries that favour certain types of research when compared to others.

A final comment is due at this stage. The overall layout of the chapters and contributions is pluralistic in the sense that bringing regional/national contributions incorporates examples of work that privilege a non-Western view of IR theory. But this is not the overall intention of the project – as a whole, the project is intentionally biased towards the continued reliance and importance of Western IR theory. Hence, the inclusion in this section. As the authors claim, "The aim of bringing such legitimate variation to light is not to move towards a world of national perspectives – "the Chinese School", "Indian theories" – and thus lowered international communication and a kind of internal monopoly of criticism and assessment (Callahan 2001; Xinning 2001). Standpoint arguments should not lead to the conclusion that criteria of validity are somehow relative to the geographical origins of a work. But communication can only begin if voices emerge from around the globe, and not only echoes of one voice (Holsti 1985)" (Ticker and Waever 2009:339)

From this theoretical/analytical assessment, Tickner and Waever move on to more specific concerns of the case studies. And here the goal becomes one of 'bringing to earth' the theoretical framework just discussed. There are two important contributions at this level.

One is to consolidate the inspiration of the project in the sociology of knowledge. It starts by identifying a more precise theoretical framework that departs from the sociology of science and applies it to IR (Waever 1998). It has both a cultural and institutional focus – the social dimension – and an intellectual dimension. The social dimension needs to take into account "(1) policy needs/foreign policy; (2) institutional structure, financial constraints; (3) social sciences: what other disciplines are strong; maybe linked (i.e., colouring IR) or maybe covering the ground in its terms (sociology? law? administration? humanities?); (4) the nature of the state; and   (5) strong

cosmologies, distinct religious-philosophical traditions" (Waever and Tickner 2009:20). Scholars need to take into how different cosmologies or distinctive national cultures, the nature of the state, how disciplines are built, financial constraints and foreign policy interests condition how IR develops in certain geographies. On the other hand, intellectually, the focus is three aspects: first, problematise the relationship between politics and the university; second, understand patterns of participation in international academic events; and third, understand how theorising takes place nationally – on this front, the authors offer three models: "(1) pure importation: scholars are socialized abroad and teach "at home" whatever was fashionable when they studied in the United States or elsewhere;   (2) tool-box: they pick a combination of whatever seems to work; (3) uniqueness: they do local analysis, given the unique quality of their particular settings; and possibly in consequence (4) they derive theories from their own worlds" (Waever and Tickner 2009:19).

The other related contribution is that it allows the framework to provide an agenda for reform or research. As they conclude, "the study of any given locale should attempt to ask both about the way the "formal" field of International Relations has been constituted (or not), its origins, boundaries, relation to neighbouring fields, its relation to policy making (e.g., as a chain of connected circles from think-tanks to universities, or not), and how it relates to IR at the core (import, dependence, hybridization, resistance). However, we should also ask what other fields have developed in ways that interrogate important elements of International Relations. A part of the solution is to explicitly ask the question: What is locally international? In other words, we should all ask "What is international where I live?", given that those issues, agendas, and concepts representing global issues vary from place to place" (Waever and Tickner 2009:17). This agenda for reform is further solidified or augmented by comments on strategies for specific institutional and intellectual transition. Institutionally, they refer to the work of Jörg Friedrichs and the strategies that academies have for developing themselves – the negative strategies of self-reliance and resignation and the positive strategy of multi-level research cooperation (Friedrich 2004). Intellectually, in questions that are important to be quoted at length, the authors ask, "is the way forward to give greater priority to "facts on the ground," or will this induce problematic ontologies of "civil war," "poverty," "development," and "democracy," as long as local theoretical work is missing? The easy answer, of course, is that both theoretical and empirical work is needed, but the challenge then is how to connect the two in practice. If theory takes place in isolation from local practical challenges, it reproduces Western categories. If local empirical work is conducted without theory, it also reproduces these categories because they have not been challenged and reconfigured. "Progress" is most likely to occur when scholars discuss theory locally in a setting where they feel responsible and committed in relation to empirical and policy concerns." (Waever and Tickner 2009:22).

In the conclusion, reviewing the contributions of the edited volume, the authors summarise the discussion mainly along two dimensions: the professionalisation of IR and the kinds of IR that are made around the world. This, in a way, corresponds to the socio-institutional and intellectual dimensions highlighted above. This also needs to consider that to speak of national contributions to IR, one needs to take into account how the national and the global can't be discussed separately. In other words, we can only understand national contributions in the context of US dominance and hegemony. Whatever goes on inside is a direct consequence of the fact that we are deeply influenced by a US intellectual hegemony.

Institutionally, the concern is whether IR communities have achieved autonomy from political and economic powers so that they can create their own independent and internal principles of self-regulation so that the debate about what is good and bad research becomes the central point of the discussion – instead of debates conditioned by other conditionalities. The discussion happens along three main directions: the influence of culture, the influence of intellectual drives, and the influence of academic and research fields themselves. Culturally, the authors conclude that even though there were many political cultures involved in the research, the IR discipline doesn't seem to be characterised by direct interference by political authorities. Universities and academic practices are therefore developed freely from political pressure. The example of African IR is suggested as a possible deviation from this general overview. It is claimed that the more the teaching of IR is officially sponsored by diplomatic schools, the more direct engagement there is by political authorities in the destiny of academic freedom. Still, on this social front, and turning to the dimension of the influence of economic resources that may potentially condition academic freedom, it is concluded that direct routes from the economy to research are rare in the countries analysed. There are two ways in which financial resources can condition research, however. One directly: research policy does regulate research not by explicitly saying what needs to be taught but, instead, through the control of the format. In other words, through the establishment of the rules that regulate universities. There is also an indirect way in which financial resources are important, though: this is the role that think tanks and other such institutions play in society. As the authors conclude, "by captivating monies and researchers, the think-tank industry also saps universities' capacity to engage in their own preferred practices" (Tickner and Waever 2009:331).

If there are limited and conditional influences by these two dimensions of the social, intellectually how is institutional research characterised? The political agenda doesn't translate directly into academia, but academies are mostly institutionally characterised by an interest in politics. As the authors conclude: "The criterion of success is to develop scholarship that makes sense out of the challenges faced by "x" country and, in some instances, that offers concrete policy recommendations for overcoming them" (Tickner and Waever 2009:331). This is even more intensified

in countries where IR is conditioned by the identity of the country itself. And here politics enters academia not directly but as a statement of the general concern of the state itself. This general concern is then reflected generally in all academic research. So, IR gets intellectually impacted by the identity of the state itself.

There is still a last important dimension in this socio-institutional framework: the idea of recognition and the drivers of recognition in academia. It is acknowledged that publication in international journals has become an important guarantee of local scholarly power but that, however, internally the academic structures differ from this scheme. If in the United States and the Anglo core (England, Canada and Australia), the selection of academic personnel is done almost exclusively by academic record, in the rest of the world – including in Europe – "international publications are not the route to influence" (Tickner and Waever 2009:332/333). The authors point out how national associations and individual leaders of the national discipline, on the one hand, and the local university itself and its criteria of selection, are what prevail.

If this is the socio-institutional characteristic of IR, as described by the authors, how does IR fare around the world intellectually? IR around the world seems to be characterised by what is described as state-centric ontology. This ontology manifests itself in a tendency for a greater role given to realism and concerns with concepts such as power, security and the national interest. What is also stressed is how this concern with the state, its security and power, tends to highlight a certain content to the international – a content that tends to be ahistorical and Westerner.

There is a second element by which the authors characterise the literature. According to them, "In addition to its robust state-centrism, the lack of theoretical production in IR and scholarly interest in this enterprise is striking in most of the cases studied, especially in the non-core" (Tickner and Waever 2009:335). What seems to emerge in academic discussions is, therefore, a confrontation between those who want to do theory and those who want to keep things as they are. For the traditionalists, the theory's low standing comes from the fact that it was developed by someone foreigner and that it tells the story, not from the inside. Others feel that because of the urgency of their political situations and the 'real-world' problems that are in great need of being addressed, theory is something that they can't afford to do. The tendency towards leaving theory behind is also reinforced by the general tendency stressed above of the intellectual discussion to be about the concerns over the state and its foreign policy agenda.

When it comes to the analyses of US hegemony, the volume is adamant that it has limited impact in the study of IR. If hegemony is meant the framing of questions, theoretical dominance and meta-theoretical dominance, the case studies show that it is only at the theoretical level that such phenomena exist. Substantively, each community is guided by distinct research interests based on the

country's foreign relations. In terms of theories/meta-theories, IR outside the core is characterised by the influence of realism, neorealism and security studies, some interdependence theory but no place exists for rationalism and quantitative analysis. Theories are also adapted to local circumstances and to fit local needs. Waever and Tickner also distinguish between two postures here: Western Europeans argue that US hegemony cannot be ignored and find ways of coping with it by incorporating it more fully. Non-Western countries, however, show more reluctance to incorporate Western assumptions. What is also emphasised by Waever and Tickner, and especially through the contribution of Thomas Biersteker to the volume, is how US academia is highly institutionally parochial. IR scholarship lives in this country far from what happens in other parts of the world.

Even though this is the general intellectual state of IR beyond the Anglo-American world, the volume does recognise that some communities want to move towards what can be described as national schools. China, Russia and Japan are examples of such communities that, moving beyond the hegemonic concern over state-centrism, have been developing efforts to create distinctive theories. What seems clear from all this is that even though there is an intellectual hegemony of Western theories, they do not travel well. National communities are also characterised by their own empirical concerns. It is in this context that the authors also ask where to go after the presentation of their socio-intellectual model.

Confronting Western IR can take two forms: particularism and post-colonialism. Condemning their own pluralism, they do not see the turn towards particularism as a move that needs to be taken. Instead, they reinforce the value of the post-colonial agenda. Here, we move back to the theoretical argument and an attempt to reframe the substantive contributions. The inquiry into the agency of the non-West needs to take the agenda of confronting and historicising "some of the central Western categories and presuppositions that inform scholarly activity in the non-core more actively and directly, most importantly state-centrism and national security. If the local role of IR in the periphery is to change, which is most likely the key to a distinct dynamic in its development, redefining what IR is and thereby what types of knowledge constitute legitimate contributions to it is indispensable" (Tickner and Waever 2009:338).

Waever and Tickner's volume's main contribution, even though it started by emphasising the importance of analysing concepts from a local perspective, is not on this front. It is on the opportunities it opens to analyse distinctive regional and national contributions to IR. To do so, it develops a model that, even though it incorporates post-colonial reflections, is mainly rooted in the sociology of science and Waever's previous work (Waever 1998). The volume is intended to be pluralistic by the incorporation of a national view that moves beyond a Western-centric view of internal developments.

It is, however, biased towards Western IR and an example of the expansion of the socio-cultural model from Europe to the rest of the world. In the next parts, we will see how this model was contested by other frameworks.

3.3. Pluralisms: Towards a Global IR

Pluralists aim to integrate the non-Western with the Western world in a way that still privileges the influence that the latter needs to have in the formation of a Global IR discourse. These approaches support the view that IR has been too Eurocentric and, therefore, needs to move beyond these foundations. But they do so in a way that is highly favourable to the historical role that Westernisation needs to play in the construction of this new Globality.

In this part, we will address approaches that do just this. Topics under discussion include debates about what theory is, what Western hegemony is, where theories come from, and the issue of whether there is a prevalence or not of Western IR over other forms of theoretical reasoning. Also under discussion will be the debate about how to think of IR beyond its Eurocentric origin in more substantive matters: what role did Eurocentrism play in the formation of the discipline, what international order or civilisation was created as a result, what forms of regionalism are emerging, how to think of global IR locally when it comes to the substantive content of the field. Finally, what pathways are there in the creation of this Global IR? And here, we need to understand what impact this new framework has on US hegemony, for the theoretical and methodological reconstruction of the field, the forms of dialogue that need to be in place and the risks and opportunities involved in the creation of this pluriverse of views.

3.3.1. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan's Global IR

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan have been building the case for a move towards global IR. This is done in three steps: one, by contesting the presence of Western IR theoretical dominance – the only way to overcome this dominance is by incentivising the creation of non-Western theories – second, by promoting a different reading of the disciplinary origins and cultural groundings of IR has described by conventional wisdom to open its boundaries, third by thinking about different pathways this global IR can take.

The first endeavour asks 'why is there no non-western IR theory' (Acharya and Buzan 2007).

The authors depart from a very broad definition of IR theory: one that includes not only explanatory but interpretative branches, and in a way that aims to incorporate plural views of it that aims to be as broad as possible. What aligns both explanatory and understanding views of theory is the idea that both have the goal to abstract from the day-to-day events, aiming to aggregate aspects of reality into sets of things. According to them, "Theory is therefore about simplifying reality. It starts from the supposition that in some quite fundamental sense, each event is not unique, but can be clustered together with others that share some important similarities" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:4). But this argument comes attached to a separate one: desires for universality also need to take into account that interests are involved. In other words, claims of universality need to be contested by their sub-systemic intents. The authors question whether attempts at universality may be seen necessarily as resulting from interests that need to be taken into account. In such a world, theory formation is nothing but a demonstration of sub-systemic interests – not achieving the desired universality it aspires to.

After these two epistemological clarifications, the authors clarify what counts as a theory. Here, again, they develop a broad understanding of the matter. They claim that "it be substantially acknowledged by others in the IR academic community as being theory; that it be self-identified by its creators as being IRT even if this is not widely acknowledged within the mainstream academic IR community; that regardless of what acknowledgement it receives, its construction identifies it as a systematic attempt to generalise about the subject matter or IR" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:6). They also account for elements of 'pre-theory' which include not only the work of academics but also practitioners – as long as they are incorporated in the three sets of possibilities identified above.

But how to understand Western hegemony and move beyond it? According to the authors, this is achieved by introducing "non-Western IR traditions to a Western IR audience, and to challenge non-Western IR thinkers to challenge the dominance of Western theory" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:14). These are two independent topics and discussions here therefore: on the one hand, the issue of dominance of Western theory, on the other the necessity to introduce Westerners to non-Western traditions. Even though the argument is presented the other way around (Acharya 2016), it will be dealt with here using this same logic: dealing first with US dominance and then with national contributions.

On the first front, Acharya and Buzan put forward the claim that existing IR theories are deeply rooted in Western assumptions of social reality. A move towards a world of non-Western IR theories needs to start from the assumption that how IR has been built is deeply embedded in Western philosophy and understanding of social life. Classical realism, neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism, Marxism, the English School, Constructivism and postmodernism, and strategic studies are all

presented as examples of theoretical constructions that are generated to highlight how their foundations lie in (European) social and political thought and how they end up replicating ideas about the world that are deeply rooted in Western political and social practice. This conditions the way they are presented and deeply embeds their view of the world in the experiences of European history. This will be a point that will be highlighted more consistently when the projects aim to reconstruct national communities. But for now, this also translated into Acharya's and Buzan's understanding of Western intellectual dominance over IR.

This theoretical dominance and the Western heritage upon which it builds also leads to a further consequence: the hegemonic role of the United States as the epicentre of intellectual reflection. According to Acharya, "American dominance happens because of its dominance in theory, especially realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and in methodology" (Acharya 2016:6), and the argument is particularly interested in understanding the suppression towards any other theories that may be developed elsewhere. To move towards Global IR, a move towards other perceptions of theory needs to be taken. The question becomes, how to assess these contributions internally? In other words, where does non-western theory come from?

To assess internal contributions and to bring home the idea of new non-Western IR theories, the argument is solidified by the development of an overarching analytical model. According to Acharya and Buzan, we can look for a broad notion of non-Western IR theory by searching four main types of literature. The first is to focus on key figures who build non-Western thought and understand what they have to say about IR. This is a route that aims to explore classical traditions and thinking of religious, military, and political issues that are relevant to IR. The second aims to understand and extract the thinking and foreign policy approaches of Asian leaders. As they suggest, "Although a good deal of their thinking may be sourced to training in the West or training in Western texts at home (although some, like Sukarno, were educated locally), they also came up with ideas and approaches independent of Western intellectual traditions that were a response to prevailing and changing local and global circumstances" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:11). The third aims to identify different uses of Western theory in local contexts. Of course, this raises a problem of not developing theories from a purely non-western source but mainly deriving from the West an understanding or explanation about a certain event in the region or a country. Acharya and Buzan leave this difficulty open. The fourth and final way to extract non-western influences in IR theory is the use of Asia or a specific country as a case study. As they conclude: "Such work studies Asian events and experiences and develops concepts that can be used as tools of analysis of more general patterns in international relations and for locating Asia within the larger international system and comparing it with other parts of the world" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:14). These four sources of non-Western IR theory are laid out in the introductions. But

because they originate or are inspired by Western IR concepts, the latter two potential sources of non-Western IR theory will be discredited in the conclusion. And a new argument will be opened – the idea that is linked with theory comes from history and culture.

In the conclusion of the volume, the authors identify the possibilities of non-Western thinking from the contributions presented. In Japan, the work of Nishida and its goal to problematise and construct a Japanese identity, the work of Hirano and his effort to work with Japanese interpretations of regional integration or the work of the Kyoto's School about 'post-white power' are taken as examples of this thinking beyond Western IR. In China, Qin's work on the Confucian Tianxia worldview is also mentioned as an example of another contribution. Similar contributions to non-Western IRT can be found in the volume in India where the uses of Kautilya's notion of mandala or the particular approach to Indian nationalism by leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee and Sri Aurobindo Ghosh is dissected.

If the dissection just done of Indigenous voices is an important goal of the volume, the pluralism of Acharya and Buzan's works also aims to bring together not just an exercise that focuses on Indigenous voices for their own sake but that takes on board the sociocultural frameworks that had already made important contributions to this literature. This seems clear when the authors argue that "Our explanations for the absence of a non-Western international theory focuses not on the total lack of good life in the non-West, but on ideational and perceptual forces, which fuel, in varying mixtures, both Gramscian hegemonies and ethnocentrism and the politics of exclusion. Some of these explanations are located within the West, some within the non-West and some in the interaction between the two. These explanations have much to do with what Wæver (1998) has called the 'sociology' of the discipline, which reinforces material variables such as disparities in power and wealth" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:2). While this is happening, another theoretical argument is presented dealing with the advent of non-western nationalised theoretical formations. This is introduced in the form of Robert Cox's idea that 'Theory is always for someone and for some purpose' (Cox 1986: 207). Acharya and Buzan seem to attribute the interest in the formation of Indigenous forms of IR theory to states' interests. They claim, "Neither China nor Japan fits comfortably into realism or liberalism. China is trying to avoid being treated as a threat to the status quo as its power rises, and the moves to develop a Chinese school of IR are focused on this problem. Japan is seeking to avoid being a 'normal' great power, and its status as a 'trading state' or 'civilian power' is a direct contradiction of realist expectations. ASEAN defies the realist, liberal and English School logic that order is provided by the local great powers. South Korea and India perhaps fit more closely with realist models, yet neither seems certain about what sort of place it wants for itself in international society. To the extent that IR theory is constitutive of the reality that it addresses, Asian states have a major

interest in being part of the game. If we are to improve IRT as a whole, then Western theory needs to be challenged not just from within, but also from outside" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:3).

Departing from this understanding of hegemony, the study develops several different hypotheses about the reasons behind the neglect of non-Western theory. In their edited volume (2007), Acharya and Buzan raise several hypotheses for the hegemonic role of Western theory. The first hypothesis is that Western IR has this hegemonic role because there is nothing else besides it – Western IR theory has discovered the right way to understand the world. For this scientific reason, the authors add a second explanation: it is dominant because of Western power. As they conclude, "Here one would need to take into account the intellectual impact of Western imperialism and the success of the powerful in imprinting their own understandings onto the minds and practices of the non-Western world" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:17). It is dominant because the West became dominant in non-Western areas. Two other hypotheses are advanced by the authors: the third relates to the entry barriers that can exist when scholars aim to enter the core. In this case, non-Western contributions remain hidden because leading journals at the core develop strategies to keep non-Western concerns away from them. In a different essay, Acharya develops this point further. Acharya identifies language, intellectual and substantive gatekeeping as some of the main obstacles to entry (Acharya 2016). While they justify in this third hypothesis that gatekeeping and language barriers as obstacles, they also raise another question: there are hidden theoretical frameworks in the non-Western world that need to be explored. There is also a fourth hypothesis that Acharya and Buzan also develop in their edited volume and that is less about hegemony and more about the role of national communities themselves. This is the hypothesis that there are, in fact, local conditions that militate against the production of IR theory. The authors point to historical, cultural, political and institutional diverges between the West and non-Western societies for this to occur. Historically, there is the role of war and historical trauma that lies at the core of the creation of Western IR theory – maybe this didn't affect other countries. Second, there are potential cultural differences, and by this, they mean that doing theory is typically a Western thing, whereas other parts of the world are more interested in empirical approaches related to local affairs rather than generating global theories. The authors also point to political factors that may be different between Western and non-Western societies: IR theory has flourished mainly in democracies and far away from the interests of governments. As a rule, as Acharya and Buzan suggest, living in non-democratic countries and/or countries where there is not a direct link between country interference and intellectual engagement with IR would involve more theoretical work. There is, finally, a fourth institutional element that may play a role and by institutional, they mean "things to do with the resourcing, workloads, career structures and intellectual ethos of those, mainly academics, who might be expected to do IRT" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:21). The authors finally develop a fifth hypothesis for the centrality of US hegemony: what we are seeing is a catch-up period where, increasingly, non-

westerners are building the intellectual and institutional infrastructure internally to participate in the global dialogue. This would entail seeing the process of development in the non-Western world as happening in the same way as the one in the West. What is, therefore, innovative in this work is the way the authors bring in aspects that are internal to the countries themselves as a way to justify their desire not to participate in the US hegemonic core of intellectual activity.

In the conclusion of the study, Acharya and Buzan assess the prevalence of Western IRT in non-Western worlds. Out of the five hypotheses, the first one is rejected by the studies. The idea that there is only one way of doing theory and that it was found in the West is rejected mainly because of the perception by local academies that Western IRT doesn't capture what goes on in their national conditions. Second, there is, in fact, the sense that when IRT is mentioned in the countries analysed, it is hegemonically by reference to what goes on in the West. This is the typical Holstinian (1985) proposal that, due to the power and prevalence of IR theory, the manuals of the West are the ones that we mention when we teach IR nationally. The third hypothesis, that there are exclusionary strategies at play, is also confirmed – language functions as the main obstacle to entry. On the other hand, it is not confirmed that there are undiscovered hordes of IR theory in Asia. The fourth hypothesis is also confirmed: local conditions militate against the existence of IR theory. As the authors conclude: "The paucity of institutions, journals, research cultures, career incentives, research resources and training facilities is especially acute in Southeast Asia (other than Singapore), and is also a major problem in India" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:224). Finally, the idea that the West has a head start and that it is a question of time and resources for other countries to catch up is also confirmed, especially by the Chinese case study.

But what is also important to stress is that from these hypotheses, Acharya and Buzan also seem to suggest a model for the potential development of IR theory in the periphery. The logic is that the more a society tends to internationalise itself, the more it will rely on Western theories. This conclusion seems to derive from their own words. As they conclude: "The real distinction seems to be the degree of interest in theoretical work per se or the distinction between theoretical and atheoretical work. It is reasonable to assume that a great deal of work on international relations in Asia falls into the latter category, although this is changing as economic and institutional conditions in Asian countries develop. This, however, does not automatically translate into great appeal and room for non-Western IRT; indeed, the reverse may be the case. Scholars are more likely to turn to Western" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:222).

But a turn to non-Western thought also demands moving the critical agenda further. It is not just the exploration of national traditions of IR theoretical thought that is sufficient. We need to rethink how we understand IR and its historical heritage.

At this level, Acharya separates epistemological contributions from substantive ones (Acharya 2016). As he puts it there, if IR "is to overcome Western dominance, then it must offer concepts and theories that are derived from other societies and cultures" (Acharya 2016:…). On the other hand, he more clearly clarifies what is meant by thinking of IR beyond Western culture and history. In his words, "Global IR knowledge need not only be sourced from epistemological concepts, such as zhongyong dialectics but also practices and interactions in the non-Western world" (Acharya 2016:3). This involves a research agenda that highlights the constitutive elements of Western sovereignty and its core principles and how they become universalised through a different understanding of rules and laws – leading to a revisionist account of European expansion and its contents. Second, a revised understanding of world order and international order with a deeper role played here by the idea of civilisations and the rise of multiple modernities (Acharya 2014). Third, the study of regions and the regional world is another important element of the research agenda for a Global IR research program. Fourth, Acharya is particularly incisive about the necessity of building bridges between IR studies and area studies. In the end, having a more historically sensitive IR necessarily leads us to understand not only ideas in context but also to critically assess IR's history and the story of the Western system and civilisation, bringing in regionalism while, at the same time, question how IR has distance itself from area studies (and think about ways to bring these two fields together).

A last set of contributions can be identified in the work of Acharya and Buzan, which aims to answer the question, is non-Western IR possible?

This relates, initially, to the debate of how to overcome US hegemony. According to Acharya (2016), this necessarily leads to measures that aim to include more scholars from the Global South in the editorial boards of ISA journals, to understand how the dominance of the English language is a challenge for readers outside the core and how this needs to be overcome, also there are suggestions insisting on the development of new textbooks that highlight plural dimensions of IR.

The second relevant aspect is an understanding that knowledge matters – and how we need to revaluate established conventions of knowledge production in IR. According to Acharya (2011), the core seems to be fixated on King, Keohane and Verba's type of generating theory. Instead, we need broader conceptions of what theory is. He cites the work of Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2011) and the injection of pluralism that it brings to IR.

The third reflection on the topic relates to the view of the new world, which, instead of being one where a core dominates, is increasingly becoming nationalised. The fragmentation of global IR will come from the nationalisation of approaches to IR, rooted as they are mostly in national traditions and speeches. In this sense, IR is more likely to develop a fragmented sense of self as these national contributions emerge. This suggests that Asia and other developing countries should move beyond

what Acharya and Buzan describe as hypothesis five. As the path of progress takes place – where national IR start discovering their national sources of inspiration – the less likely it is that these communities are playing 'catch up' with the West. They are not likely to repeat the same development trajectory of the West but, instead, have their own national trajectories inspired by national stories while, at the same time, influenced by Western ideas. As they conclude, "But in our view, this does not mean that Asian or developing countries are simply in a 'catch-up' mode. We allow for the possibility, as raised in all of the case study papers that the latter could move in entirely different trajectories towards outcomes that are constitutively distinct from the West, or at least could 'localize' the pattern of international relations established in the West in ways that inject substantially distinctive local elements which would require a significant broadening of IRT, if it is to become a truly universal discipline" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:231).

The fourth and related idea reflects on the context of the possible dialogue between Western and non-Western theory. As they claim, "This suggests that the development of non-Western IRT need not be a matter of projecting pure indigenous ideas, nor should it be a matter of wholesale adoption/ borrowing of foreign ones, but that it can proceed through mutual adaptations and localizations between the two that leave the local component dominant, at least in the initial stages" (Acharya and Buzan 2007:233).

The fifth idea refers to the consequences of thinking about IR in these terms: this is a moral debate about the risks and benefits of the emergence of this world. As Acharya succinctly puts it, "The risks include introducing new linguistic and cultural divisions in the discipline, thereby undermining its globalization, and serving the national interests of governments and being manipulated by them. But there are benefits as well, which include challenging Western dominance, generating enthusiasm and support for alternatives (as well as popularizing IR in general as a subject of study), developing alternative and new concepts and approaches to solve problems, and supporting new publications" (Acharya 2016:10).

The argument promoted by Acharya and Buzan departs from the assumption that there is a Western dominance of IR and that such a dominance is not necessarily bad. We need to accept it while, at the same time, overcoming it both theoretically and historically. They develop different ways in which to think about IR nationally to further allow us to understand a world beyond Western-centric IR. Theoretically, and in the end, the conclusion is that we should most likely end up in a world of global IR that assesses the cultural, institutional, and theoretical development of IR nationally while also promoting different national trajectories of development. If we have overcome the idea that there is only one way of doing IR, we are also not in a world where all there is to IR is the creation of national schools. Actually, in their joint volume, if there's a trajectory in national communities, it is one where

both Western IR dominance is likely to be present. A more plural Global IR, nonetheless, thinks itself beyond Western hegemony – both institutionally, epistemologically and methodologically –, that uses an epistemologically plural stance (biased towards post-colonialism in the case of Acharya) while keeping in mind the necessity of an open dialogue between the global and the local. This new world of highly unpredictable outcomes has advantages and risks.

3.4. Post-Colonialisms: Towards a Post-Western IR

Post-colonialisms are here described as an approach that includes not only post-colonial voices but also post-modern ones. What brings together these two versions is the contestation of how IR is founded upon Western thought and the Eurocentric programme. This unites post-colonials with both pluralists and particularisms. What separates them is the theoretical foundations upon which post-colonials ground their research and the main criticism that is the target of their work: the process of Westernization itself (and not so much the formation of distinctive national identities).

Both versions of post-colonialism depart from distinctive epistemological, ontological and methodological foundations which aim to overcome existing stories about IR theory. This alternative theoretical turn is then supplemented by the critique of how existing international systems and concepts can be rethought in the context of a globalised and contextualised IR. Increasingly, questions of what happens to IR in a post-colonial world, the risks or pitfalls to such a proposal, and the issue of how to understand and overcome Western hegemony are also coming into play in the literature.

The essential feature of these post-colonial positions is the intention to highlight how we can't think of IR beyond the West, to expose its abuses while proposing new solutions. The world was not built by the West. But it was built as an abuse of existing realities, which also need to be taken into account. Exposing the underlying hegemonic logic of order while suggesting and reinforcing other Indigenous foundations is the overall framework of the postcolonial proposal. This part will provide an overview of this second approach and its intention of thinking about a post-Western IR.

3.4.1. Post-Colonialism

Post-colonial thought thinking about the possibilities of a Global IR will be highlighted in this section. The goal is to illustrate how, through various theoretical frameworks and other analytical frameworks, the purpose of complementing a view from the West with the perspective from the non-West came to characterise a substantive part of what came to be developed in Global IR. The section will highlight two contributions to this approach: Robbie Shilliam's important edited volume on non-Western

thought and a recent update of the argument that includes more up-to-date concerns, which is the contribution of Arlene Tickner and Karen Smith.

3.4.1.1. Robbie Shilliam's Non-Western Thought

An important volume towards furthering non-Western thought was the exercise presented by Robbie Shilliam under Non-Western International Thought (2011). Writing in one contribution and comparing the volume with existing approaches, Mustapha Pacha concludes that the main value added to the volume resides in its capacity to move beyond the mutual constitution of the West in the non-West. Directly addressing existing contributions to similar problems, he claims that "The untimely nature of these reflections is also intensified by the awareness that, in globalizing times, it seems quite unfashionable to speak about the 'non-West', unless, of course, the term is used literally to designate geographical regions within an established cartography of Western IR (Acharya and Buzan 2007; Tickner and Waever 2009). Nonetheless, the compulsions of fashion or normalization must be resisted" (Pacha 2011:220). This compulsion to normalization is further substantiated by "an apparently unconventional strategy" where "the addition of other sites and cultural zones would provide a more comprehensive, more representative, portrait of IR in a globalizing setting (Tickner and Waever 2009)" or, instead by "A larger cultural sample of an IR conditioned by its Western patrimony" where "the 'pre-theoretical' (Acharya and Buzan 2007, p. 427) can be given greater audibility" (Pacha 2011:219). For Pacha both the strategies of adding cultural zones or the alternative of considering these cultural zones as 'pre-theory' are limited. The non-Western is the mere instrument of Westernization in both proposals. Therefore, existing attempts to incorporate the non-Western function more as representations where the task is addictive. What the volume proposes is an approach that aims to reconstruct and not just add.

Theoretically, Shilliam's contribution is important to understand the roots of the project in post-colonialism. The first main idea is that non-Western thought must be approached as part of a relation of a process of domination. Dominance is the sense that when the Western academy approaches the non-Western, it does so in a way that tends to highlight some aspect of its own assumptions. It is in this sense that the non-Western archive is affected by the assumptions of Westernization. This leads to a conclusion "even having recognized the co-constitution of the archives of Western and non-Western thought through (the threat of) relations of colonial domination, and even after having problematized the authenticity, essentialist nature and pristine character of the non-Western archive itself, it is crucial that we do not ignore non-Western thought as a collection of situated outlooks on the modern condition. For it is upon this uneven non-Western geointellectual terrain – by no means

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an alien world, yet neither a global commons – that many of the deepest engagements and problematizations of modernity have been produced" (Shilliam 2011:18).

Second is the assumption that interpreters of such knowledge are not independent of their own production. "Therefore, when engaging with non-Western thought we must not only recognize the concrete relations of domination through which such thought has been both created and received, we must also recognize the creative agency that has been deployed in order to construct understandings of an imperially and colonially induced modernity" (Shilliam 2011:19).. It is in this sense that Shilliam recommends three sensitivities that must be in place in order to construct non-Western knowledge. "First, we must recognize the determining history of colonial/quasi-colonial cultural and political impingement/domination in modern thought. That is to say, quite simply, that if knowledge is always produced within particular contexts, then (the threat of) colonialism is a meta-context in which knowledge of modernity has been produced" (Shilliam 2011:21). Second, "we must nevertheless be sensitive to the differentiated nature of experiences of imperialism and colonialism. That is to say, that non-Western thought has been situated within an array of geo-politically and geo-culturally variegated experiences" (Shilliam 2011:21). And third, "we must remember that this difference has never been unbounded such that all that is required is to list a set of open-ended cultural particulars. We cannot incorporate the archive of non-Western thought into our Academy through a liberal embrace. Rather, we should remember that the variegated contexts within which non-Western thought has produced knowledge of modernity have always been bound to constellations of power that have foisted a global imperial and colonial order. Therefore, in the historical-geographical imaginary, the West and non-West operate as positionalities already produced by various intellectual attempts to map and chart a passage through the variegated global experience of colonial modernity. Hence, non-Western thought is constitutive of global thought on modernity" (Shilliam 2011:21). To summarise the idea, what Shilliam reinforces is the need to first understand the mutual implication of the interpreter with what is being interpreted, second, that in this process one needs to take into account the experiences of those that were subjected to imperialism and colonialism and third, that, while doing so, we need to view this as an experience of colonial modernity and not in itself – non-Western thought is a process embedded in modernity and its project.

The question becomes how to engage the West with the non-Western, therefore. As a solution, Shilliam proposes moving beyond Gadamer and Levinas because both authors are not able to understand 'the other' in itself but rather incorporate it in a pre-established Western viewpoint. Accordingly, "Eurocentrism is most evident in the unspoken assumption that we do not need to attempt to travel to intellectual terrains outside of the ideal West, and that all that is required to problematize the modern condition can be found within the Western archive. The solution is not to add non-Western thought into the expanding archive of the Western Academy, for that is a

continuation in the intellectual sphere of imperial expansion and colonial rule. Rather, the purpose is to undermine the security of an epistemological cartography that quarantines legitimate knowledge production of modernity to one (idealized) geo-cultural site" (Shilliam 2011:24).

The first important argument is an attempt to demystify the role that colonialism plays in International Relations. This is done by critiquing the exclusion of concerns about this term in IR. Giving voice to the history of colonialism and imperialism requires reading stories from within by exploring traditions of thought and specific thinkers that had to engage with the "the content, meaning, and emergence/divergence of modernity from within a colonial – or more accurately speaking colonized – context" (Shilliam 2011:5).. The keyword here is the notion of western modernity and the colonial/imperial project attached to it, and how this modern project is being contested or interpreted differently by specific authors. This idea is analysed in three chapters.

The first chapter, by Gerard Aching, engages with the ideas of the standard of civilisation promoted by the English School. According to the argument, this standard admitted that sovereignty was linked with two requisites: one material – a technologically advanced economy – and another one political – the idea of individual rights to persons and property. These two constitutive principles legitimise the attainment of civilisation, which Cuban leaders were subjected to. The argument addresses how, both technically and politically, Cuba became a Spanish dominium and how local leaders' adherence to the ideas and norms of the standard undermined the attainment of sovereign independence. This is a story written from the inside and looks at how insiders adhered to the normative framework.

In the second chapter on this topic, Branwen Gruffydd focuses on the cosmopolitan values being promoted by international institutions and, specifically, in the context of decolonisation. The goal is to show how Lusophone African anti-colonial movements, led by Agostinho Neto, Samora Machel, Amilcar Cabral and Eduardo Mondlane, cultivated a different version of internationalism that moved beyond conventional and international logics of colonial logic. These political leaders worked on a view of the international that emphasised a post-racialized humanity which needed to be accounted for and intellectually very different from the prevailing cosmopolitan worldview.

The second goal is to understand and give voice to different cultures. This picks up the debate about the importance of understanding the particularities of place and the conditions of its happening. According to some, this cultural turn is positive since it allows for better sociological, historical and anthropological sensitivities. According to others, this leads to an abandonment of the study of what matters – global power struggles – and the exercise also ends up in the hegemony of the local.

Be it as it may, this cultural turn leads to research of different cultural contexts and the "various ways in which culture has been deployed by intellectuals outside Europe and the United States as a resource with which to assimilate, co-opt, resist or transform social–scientific concepts and categories historically associated with Western imperial expansion" (Schilliam 2011:7). The keyword here is concepts and categories. The goal here is to understand how different concepts associated with the West are contested and interpreted differently by different nationalities.

The first chapter on this theme is about how democracy is read in Islam, particularly by picking up the work of Sayyid Qutb. In another chapter, Kamran Matin also highlights how Islam has been conventionally assessed by the West and how these readings are incomplete. More specifically, he aims to disrupt the idea that Islam can be modern. The third contribution looks at how Japanese thinkers thought about Christianity in light of Confucianism, Daoism and Samurai ethics. This reading thought to reconcile universalism and cultural diversity. Key to the writings was also the promotion of a decentralised association of sovereign states and the defence of autonomy as a form of internationally recognised rule. This led scholars to criticise imperialism as well since it would disturb not only the philosophy of and the practice of autonomy. The fourth contribution, by Arif Dirlik, looks at the Chinese academy in the IR discipline and how the cultural turn is helping it find its foundations. An IR with 'Chinese characteristics' not only has to take into account revolutionary and imperial historical sources but also discuss how to balance these traditions in the incorporation into the global capitalist system.

The last part deals with the issue of thinking about the national in post-national conditions. This state of post-nationalism is contested when one looks at what non-Westerners are writing about the phenomena. The goal is to "explore non-Western imaginaries and articulations of a post-national constellation arising out of substantive engagements not with a post-Westphalian world but with the post-colonial condition" (Shilliam 2011:8). In non-Western worlds, the national and the post-national were never conceived different; instead "both constellations have existed at the same time as potentiality and actuality if we take the global context of modernity to be defined by colonial and imperial practices" (Shilliam 2011:9).

In a summary of the theoretical and substantive aspirations of the volume, the contribution by Mustapha Pacha (2011) should also be emphasised. At the beginning of this section, the chapter already uncovered his view on existing approaches and how non-Western thought needs to be placed in relation to these. In essence, it needs to move beyond a position of the mutual constitution of the West in the non-West, and it should, instead, attempt to reconstruct such a relationship (and not just add).

Theoretically, such a move departs from the assumption of dominance. Dominance when it comes to the prevailing US hegemony over the intellectual hegemony of the field. Acceptability in the centre presupposes conformity to epistemological and methodological forms of gatekeeping that do not allow to place ontological and historical questions in the forefront.

Dominance in the sense that what prevails is a story of disciplinary origin that accepts the founding role that the *mission civilisatrice* had in the formation of IR, seeing it as a journey of the triumph of Westernization with a subliminal refusal to acknowledge the existence of cultural distinctiveness.

A theoretical dominance that presupposes or understands the non-West as a source of justification for Western scientific canon that leads to a circumstance where "the non-West is not permitted to generate narratives of universality; its primary function is reduced to confirming or falsifying speculations in Western theory, as a limitless reservoir of data production to illuminate the validity of Western thought or as a living mirror of the (pre-modern) past" (Pacha 2011:218). This is while, at the same time, such assumptions are "a wholesale product of hubris nor conceit nor neglect; it is embedded in the imbrications of theory in the world. It is also made opaque by the uneven character of a global cultural economy premised on established modalities of valorization, institutional power, and habitus. As a particular form of cultural (and political) practice, IR theory helps shape the world but is also shaped by it. Similarly, the horizon of alternatives is also conditioned" (Pacha 2011:218). To move beyond such a state of affairs, Pacha suggests the use throughout the volume of strategies that aim to reconstruct modernity through "'strategic essentialism' (Spivak 1993) ... a self-conscious strategy to recognize the ambivalence, but also a political dimension, attached to this label" (Pacha 2011:219).

Moving beyond dominance also has specific substantive concerns. At the centre of Pacha's framework is the notion of modernity. As he claims, "non-Western IR is attentive to context produced by imperial and colonial relationality. In essence, the ontology of non-Western IR is neither the nation-state nor the Westphalian system, but the experience of coloniality and the formation of global modernity" (Pacha 2011:222). Such a move to thinking about different modernities inside global modernity has further implications.

It relates directly to a second enactment that aims to develop a more ample view of subjecthood. Accordingly, we need to overcome the ideal type of modern subjectivity rooted as it is in impersonalised, desacralised, and individualised subjects. Instead, we need to account for the struggles that move beyond this ideal. As Pacha concludes, "struggles to resist the advance of the ideal-typical modern subject infuse the processes of the formation of emancipatory projects in the colonial world. Subjectivities that emerge in these struggles are not anti- or pre-modern, but modern, ensconced within global, not Western, modernity" (Pacha 2011:224).

The third important enactment for a new non-western IR is "the recognition of violence and the brutal mobilization of military and political power throughout the colonial encounter, which is also the formative process of global modernity" (Pacha 2011:224). At the heart of the non-Western thought, for Pacha, lies a reconfiguration of what the meaning of sovereignty entails and the meaning of the present world order. The spatial construction of this modern world demanded or created a specific view of global modernity implicated as this version is in specific notions of what it means to become a member. These conceptions of modern subjecthood need, however, to be questioned. As Pacha concludes, "The appreciation of multiple modern forms of sovereignty can ill-afford circumventing recognition of heterodox notions of sovereignty antecedent to the colonial encounter, but drastically shaped by it. Alternative notions of government, rule of law or democracy continue to provide inspiration for seeking post-Westphalian settlement either through the medium of religiously-textured 'national projects' or post-national constellations" (Pacha 2011:225).

3.4.1.2. Arlene Tickner's and Karen Smith's Global South

Arlene Tickner and Karen Smith are the co-editors of an important volume, International Relations in the Global South (2020), which consolidated a change towards increasing awareness of non-Western thought. This goal is achieved on two levels: first, by questioning the hegemonic and Western-centric foundations of IR, and second, by highlighting how different concepts are understood by non-Western societies. This exercise is done, on the one hand, by opening the intellectual space and the conventional way in which IR is presented in textbooks to students. This is normally done through a Western perspective. Because textbooks are not neutral and they do play a role in constructing the field, the volume aims to bring to light a textbook grounded in the perspectives of the global South. As the editors conclude, "Its chapters are authored mainly by scholars who are either from and/or based in the global South, and whose primary goal is to provide an alternative or complementary reading of IR derived from the experiences of the non-core" (Smith and Tickner 2020:3).

The project finds itself in other foundations as well. First, it aims to move beyond conventional or mainstream IR. By this they mean "scholarship that centres on specific research topics … that defends a positivist idea of science … and whose adherents share ontological assumptions about what the "international" is and epistemological ones about how to build knowledge about it" (Smith and Tickner 2020:5). Departing from the work of O'Hagan (2002) they also think about the West in multiple dimensions: as an actor, an institutional model and an intellectual foundation but they tend to emphasise the importance of the intellectual foundation of the project of Western IR. On the other hand, by global South, the authors mean extracting contributions from all those areas of the world that have been largely absent from making contributions to IR. This is, therefore, a broad

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understanding of global South that has more to do with not a geographical location but more as a "distinctive political positionality and an ethical subjectivity" (Smith and Tickner 2020:6). The project is grounded in an understanding of Eurocentrism that is understood as "the limitations engendered by theorizing from a particular narrative on "European" experiences to study the rest of the world" (Smith and Tickner 2020:7) and is, furthermore, rooted in two more ideas that derive from the contribution of post-colonial thought to IR: the notions of epistemic violence –the idea that colonialism was not only about political domination but also cultural domination dealing, therefore, with knowledge systems – and the notions of decentring and counterpoint – as a method to counter epistemic violence based on the idea that it is necessary to decentre IR by challenging its politics, concepts and practices in a way that allowed for an understanding of overlapping trajectories between the colonizer and the colonized.

Having established the necessity to theoretically decentre IR, the debate moves on to other issues. It starts by readdressing the issue of US hegemony and dominance. If this dominance has been contested on substantive, meta-theoretical and other fronts, some arguments do argue that it is on the theoretical front that US dominance is most preponderant. This is to be contested, and the contribution of Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al. aims to do just that. The broad goal is to identify IR as essentially a knowledge production structure where teaching plays a crucial role in the dissemination of these ideas. They analyse textbooks used, IR syllabi, and scholars' answers to derive the conclusion that non-Western thought is not present in Western curricula. On the other hand, in most countries, US materials play an important role. They also analyse the justifications for this – Westerners use the non-West as a case for a theory development most of the time. Non-Western thought is descriptive, not theoretical power. It is not taken in itself as relevant for research just used to prove or disprove certain assumptions. This constitutes a form of epistemic violence. The awareness of such conditions, on the other hand, allows scholars to become aware of their own position in the context of knowledge reception, distribution and production. Postcolonial thought is particularly important in their exercise of delinking from the prevailing epistemic violence, as Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al conclude "As a concrete strategy, many postcolonial scholars call for the epistemic delinking from, or "unlearning of," Western concepts and theories and the revalidation of different local and heterogeneous epistemologies (derived from mythology, oral traditions, embodied experience, etc.), thereby bringing the experience of the subaltern to the centre of knowledge production (Mignolo 2007)" (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al 2020:26). Two strategies are used to achieve such goals "While some emphasize the singularity and heterogeneity of subaltern experiences (Bhabha 1994) or imply the appropriation of essentializing concepts (Spivak 1996), others go as far as to envision a "universal project" of connecting the diverse experiences of colonial subjects (Mignolo 2011)" (Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al 2020:26). These two dimensions – the theoretical, conceptual and historical – will be subsequently either

indirectly or directly assessed in the volume. On the other hand, and going back on strategies to overcome the embedded nature of epistemic violence that underpins Westerners theoretical dominance, In the context of the classroom, they are particularly interested not in a radical transposition to non-Westerner thought but, instead, in the questioning of Western assumptions while, at the same time, introducing non-Western thought.

Beyond the issue of US hegemony, other more substantive matters are addressed: the history of IR and issues of international order. In their argument, Vale and Thakur ground the substantive foundation of IR not just in the concern over questions of order and war, anarchy and state sovereignty, but also, and profoundly, in questions of colonial administration and race. In so doing, they also changed the institutional birth of IR from Aberystwyth to South Africa, where the British Empire found it necessary to reflect on its actions in South Africa. On the other hand, Blaney, in his contribution, highlights how the expansion of Eurocentrism, the invasion of North America and even the Chinese One Belt, One Road Initiative, as examples of narratives of expansion and civilisation, should be seen as being consolidated not as a narrative of success but, instead, as a narrative of mutual confluence and interconnection. The emphasis here is on counterpoints and situations in which multi-layered and overlapping histories coexist.

The more substantive part of the volume, however, moves beyond these themes and focuses specifically on how the national context generates different views about specific concepts. Grounding this contribution in their counterpoint framework, they are interested in uncovering how concepts have been traditionally understood, how they "travel and whether they have multiple origins and can therefore be considered Western at all" (Smith and Tickner (Smith and Tickner 2020:8) and "how concepts have and can be rearticulated in diverse contexts" (Smith and Tickner 2020:8). The goal, therefore, is not to question completely western interpretations of specific concepts in IR, it is, instead, to highlight how these interpretations can be compared and contrasted to non-Western ones.

3.4.2. Post-Modernism

Stephen Chan's work, in a language that is encrypted and sometimes difficult to coherently assess, brings the work of postmodern thinkers into the debates about Global IR.

Chan starts with a critique of contemporary IR theory founded, as it is, in four principles: the first is the existence of a view that focuses on the prevalence of a system which is viewed as being generalisable. This is so even for approaches that stress different country approaches to IR, contest the view of IR paradigms and acknowledge the existence of several sub-fields in IR: all these frameworks, for Chan, end up reifying the view of a generalisable system. Second, this view reinforced

by paradigm and more, is further solidified by a philosophical and epistemological principle of validity. Third, the mechanisms of this system are viewed as being universal, operating through differing processes of socialisation. Finally, the discipline is hegemonic enough to keep the gate closed to critical voices. Even though these are the conditions of IR, postmodernism offers an opening for Chan. He acknowledges the emergence of critical voices that contest the view of IR as a paradigmatic fight. These perspectives lead to a more dedicated care for the idea that cultures matter in IR.

Once a general critique of IR theory is developed, Chan then proposes his theoretical framework upon which to read this new IR rooted in or taking inspiration from postmodern writers. He takes from Rorty the idea that we need to recognise not only one but many languages and interpretations of a world. Language and words "can be a minefield for assumed correlations of meaning" (Chan 1993:37), and this has two main implications. First, there can't be knowledge without acculturation; second, such acculturation should be understood in anthropological terms. More specifically, this second dimension asks "where, in different communities, power is socially situated, and how it is differently perceived by those at different social levels" (Chan 1993:37). IR, therefore, and from this perspective, becomes the ability to master different languages in their anthropological sense. The embeddedness of language and culture is, therefore, an intrinsic part of understanding IR.

At heart, understanding this mutuality of language and culture leads to an emphasis on the process of nationalism. And in nationalism, we provide the answer to the question, where do theories come from. This, according to Chan, "can be not only idealistic but chauvinistic. It can be structured from existing traditions, or create entirely new ones" (Chan 1993:38). Writing nationally means engaging with those that are on the fringes of dominant discourse means understanding and giving voice to cultural struggles and forms of resistance. Only there can the idealistic and chauvinistic forms of tradition can be found. He further suggests a methodology based on four principles: drawing on any local culture; second, understanding national philosophies and the articulations they make of meaning; third, understanding that methodologically there may be challenges because these traditions may be available only in oral form, fourth, be careful on the nature of the sources – be aware that culture may be written from the outside and not from within.

This is then applied to a reconfiguration of our understanding of international systems. This reconfiguration starts by criticising universalist assumptions about such a system: those present in the work of Linklater or Beitz. For Linklater, there is a progressive universalisation of norms in the system; for Beitz, these norms derive from an adjustment to national principles. The national is transposed to the international and this international gains in morality, therefore. These arguments are contested. The configuration proposed departs from a model suggested by Aron, where "the heterogeneous society seeks to challenge the homogeneous system" (Chan 1993:41). This heterogenous society is therefore constituted by multiple nationalism – there was an Islamic world system, a Chinese world

system – not only in the minds of theoreticians but also in the minds of policymakers. Also, in Africa, there was "a regional diplomatic system of representations, exchanges and protocols not unlike the Vienna system" (Chan 1993:41).

3.5. Particularisms: Towards a Non-Western IR

Particularisms aim to highlight the importance of homegrown theorising. They criticise existing IR theories as Western and Eurocentric. The goal is to look exclusively at the ideas that emerge from different nations, cultures, and authors and assess the intellectual contributions they may have to think about IR from a local and original perspective. Such assessments, therefore, aim not only to criticise existing IR theorising but to extract theory from non-Western origins by identifying several ways in which such an endeavour can be undertaken. Such endeavour tends to pose questions such as

What is theory

Where does theory come from / How to develop local theories

How to engage with Western literature / What form of dialogue

Examples of such theories – international system, regionalisms, concepts, national authors, national schools

The risk of parochialism

How to move beyond US Hegemony

Answering these answers can take different forms and in this part, the chapter will dissect three important projects that aimed to better structure this type of particularism. The first has roots in postmodernism and its critical assessment of IR. The others are more driven towards providing distinct local communities with a sense of theoretical identity.

3.5.1. Yaping Quin's Global IR

In his contribution to these discussions, Yaping Quin's edited volume Globalizing IR Theory, is an effort in such direction (Quin 2020). He starts by pointing out that there are two approaches to the effort of understanding global IR: the inclusive approach – referring to the work of Acharya and Buzan – and the critical approach – referring to the work of Tickner and Blaney.

The inclusive approach "is a reformist project, not meant to disavow and displace the existing IR but to construct an inclusive edifice that various and different theories exist and develop" (2020:5). A project initiated in 2007 which gained more substantive contours in the presentation by Acharya of its programme. According to Quin such move towards a Global IR theory is illustrated by the following

concerns "is based on pluralistic universalism, grounded in world history rather than Western history, subsumes rather than supplants existing IR theories, integrates regionalism and area studies, eschews exceptionalism and recognizes multiple forms of agency" (2020:6). In this sense, the inclusive approach doesn't want to overcome Western IR theory, instead it wants to supplant it with Non-Western IR theory. The idea is that the hegemony needs to be complemented by work that derives from the non-Western world. It can't be overcome. Hegemony by the West is not recommendable in an era where IR theory is increasingly becoming global. But it is unavoidable, providing the foundation for a plural understanding of IR. It sees Western IR as the most important part of a global IR.

The critical approach, on the other hand, wants to expose how there is a core-periphery relationship and how this relationship superimposes itself upon the development of a Global IR. In the face of this, the periphery is "allowed to consume, but they can never produce, for they merely provide raw materials and apply theories made in the core. As a result, a production chain has been established where a superior and subjective self in the core orders and an inferior and objective other in the periphery follows" (Quin 2020:3). Setting the theoretical stage like this leads the critical approach to promote a different IR. This necessarily requires cutting down ties with the centre because the centre is an oppressive core. The only role of the periphery in this scheme is the reinforcement of the centre. To overcome such a scheme, non-Western IRs are not complementary with anyone. "To resist against the IR establishment, the critical approach proposes that IR theory in the periphery should be found and encouraged in order to enable non-Western or peripheral IR communities to become knowledge producers and theory builders or, in short, to be subjects rather than mere objects" (Quin 2020:3). This critical approach, therefore, aims to overcome such a core-periphery relationship by dissecting how it reproduces itself, the contestations that result from such an attempt, the efforts to bring different views together and ways to think about future alternatives.

Quin, however, identifies limitations with both approaches. Even though the inclusive approach does highlight the importance of thinking locally about IR, its main problem is the fact that it sees Western IR as the centre point of a plural world. This conditions the project, in Quin's opinion. As he claims, "its emphasis on universalism, though modified by the adjective 'pluralistic', may actualize an effect of socializing non-Western IR theories into the Western mainstream" (Quin 2020:9). We need, instead, to galvanise the construction of local IR theories for their own sake. This is the most relevant aspect of a program that aims to move towards a truly Global IR. On the other hand, the critical approach even though it focuses on the efforts being developed by non-Westerners, it does so in a way that gives too much credit to Western IR. As he concludes, "the variation cannot be significant enough to make a real difference at all. Without serious and innovative theorizing on the concepts or re-conceptualization and generation of new concepts, we still face the problem of 'difference makes little difference' (Quin 2020:4). Later on, and still describing the critical approach, "it lays more

emphasis on destruction than construction. It has told us that non-Western IR theoretical activities exist in many places and need to be encouraged. But it tells little in specific terms about how to develop non-Western IR theories that are able to compete on an equal footing with Western IR theory" (Quin 2020:9). One can conclude that Quin's effort is to move beyond the centrality in the Western world given by the inclusive approach, while, at the same time, and against the critical version, by digging deeper into the micro-foundations of what is involved in thinking about non-Western theory on its own. Such an endeavour necessarily leads Quin to focus on foundational questions such as what is theory and where does theory come from.

What, then, is non-Western theory? In his effort to provide more solid foundations to answer the question of how to develop non-Western IR theory, Quin concludes that there are three prerequisites: theory as a system of ideas, it involves conceptualisation, generalisation and abstraction, and it should be about theorising the international rather than any other subject. Quin's goal is to develop a broad understanding of theory so that it can include both explanatory and interpretative versions of theory.

The second main element of his notion of non-Western theory is the fact that it is based on geocultural communities that are outside the West. This geographical criterion aims to exclude from reflection Western thought. This gains more consistency when Quin reflects upon the epistemological foundations of his proposal.

He develops a theoretical framework that understands theory as a practice of geocultural communities that exist outside the West. He departs from the literature that sees theory as a practice to conclude that knowledge is always rooted in a background or a system of meaning. This necessarily gives a prime place for knowledge formation in our cultural background, which functions as a hidden hand behind our assumptions. On the other hand, this knowledge comes from a community of practice. According to Quin, "It is the practice of such a community that has over time produced its background knowledge, which in turn shapes its collective practice" (Quin 2020:11). Human action is therefore dependent on background knowledge of a community of practice. Knowledge production is shaped by the background knowledge or the system of meaning of the community of practice that shapes and makes representational knowledge. This more micro approach to what a geocultural community is also finds refuge in a more consistent understanding of substances.

According to Quin, knowledge is necessarily linked to a culture or a civilisational background. Western thought was founded upon the ideas of nation-states, sovereignty, and security. This developed a community of practice in such a geocultural community that inspired scholars to think and write about such matters. But other civilisational practices have crystallised in different cultures, which need to inspire scholars in a different direction. As Quin claims, "Recognizing that there are multiple civilizations and therefore multiple civilization-based geocultural communities provides an

inspiring condition for non-Western knowledge production to be legitimately possible and practically achievable" (Quin 2020:12).

In conclusion, for Quin, non-western theory is "a system of ideas that abstracts and generalises about the subject matter of international relations by employing significant elements of the background knowledges embedded in geocultural communities outside the West" (Quin 2020:12). What is absent from this definition – due to the nature of the edited volume but which appears in other works (Quin 2016) is the substantive cultural foundation of such geocultural communities which Quin attributes to the idea of civilisation and its content. Such a ground-breaking definition aims to highlight the importance of the quality of theoretical work – pre-theories or quasi-theories are to be rejected – and, on the other hand, the value of Indigenous and non-Western local theorising.

But where does theory come from? The way forward for the creation of a non-Western IR theory necessarily implies taking inspiration from local sources of knowledge production. By this, Quin means that one should dig deep into one's history and political theory as sources of inspiration. Alternatively, culture and civilisation can be used as sources of intellectual inspiration.

But what form of dialogue is it possible to have between non-Western and Western theory when engaging in theory construction? Quin highlights the 'instrumentalist approach' developed by Yong-Soo Eun, who advocates a "Weberian dialogue that is a collective reasoning with all perspectives engaged in the dialogue having equal scientific validity" (Quin 2020:19), the main goal of which is to accept "that non-Western experiences and historical memories are useful sources for testing mainstream Western IR theory, using Korean foreign policy as an example to illustrate a dialogue between Western international theory (constructivism) and Korean experiences" (Quin 2020:19). Xuetong Yan proposal, on the other hand, is driven more towards the development of an interactive dialogue at the level of idea development and not so much at the level of empirical assessment. Departing from local intellectual experiences and Western forms of realism, he develops what he calls moral realism. This incorporates Chinese thinking into realism. Other viewpoints do understand the contributions put forward by these endeavours as being constantly adding to Western thought. Giving the example of the contribution by Acharya, for whom recent contributions add to already existing Western thought, Quin argues that this engagement is "both a process of learning and of critical reflections. Learning helps scholars to move beyond activities of developing pre-theory and critical reflections to be creative and innovative" (Quin 2020:20).

Substantively, Quin's work tends to privilege the development of comparative studies that mainly focus on the development of international systems and the value of developing work on regionalism and inter-regionalism.

Quin is also particularly incisive about the potential for a non-Western IR. The first idea is that a truly Global IR is only Global when we move beyond the hegemonic predominance of Western thought. We need indigenous theories to grow so that they become legitimised and engaged in an equal dialogue. Encouraging indigenous production will lead the way towards this world. Second, all non-Western community is local. It is informed by the background knowledge of the geocultural community whose practice is, by definition, local. This necessarily affirms the Global IR project in its attempt to give voice to global histories. Histories that are local and based on local historical practices. This also means accepting that all theoretical judgements are bound to be non-universal. According to Quin, "Any theory that claims universality is itself not only nonscientific but also nonhuman" (Quin 2020:14). The third element is that it needs to be inclusive. It can't set epistemological or any boundaries of acceptability and non-acceptability. Quin gives the example of how Wendtian constructivism was accepted because of its credentials, while theories of dependency were rejected because they were seen as moving beyond the mainstream. Against a North American academy that sets boundaries, non-Western IR needs to be inclusive. Non-Western IR is not rooted, therefore, in a boundary-drawing practice. This raises the fourth issue, which relates to the interaction between Western and Non-Western IR. According to Quin, such a dialogue happens not in a logic of mutual exclusion but in a form of dialogue that leads to a better world. Accordingly, "Western and non-Western IR theories are not conflictual poles whose interaction leads to elimination or assimilation by one of the other. Rather, their interaction facilitates the growth of both" (Quin 2020:16). More substantively, this means that their interaction is seen in the form of assimilation/elimination, where "History progresses and humankind advances mainly because the contradiction between major social forces works as engines. A dichotomous binary is thus a state of contradictory and conflictual forces in interaction. Its characteristic feature is conflict, and its effect is very much a homogenising synthesis. We may see evolution and progress, but they are at the cost of destruction and annihilation of the otherness. If we use West IR theory and non-West IR theory in such a sense, it is indeed a dichotomous binary" (Quin 2020:16).

There are, however, some pitfalls to the Global IR project, as it is understood by Quin. First is the recognition that diversity needs to incorporate a plurality of theoretical frameworks. Peter Katzenstein's contribution (2020) illustrates one point of view, which is the necessity that the author places on bringing together common and tacit forms of knowledge. This approach "recognizes the plural realities of world cultures and histories that can produce different meaning systems" (Quin 2020:21). Also important, for Quin, seems to be the practical applicability of these theoretical endeavours. The contribution of Eun in the volume illustrates the point further "He believes that theory should be scientifically judged by its ability in terms of application and good theory is universally applicable" (Quin 2020:22). Second, creating a dichotomy of 'west vs non-west' is likely to lead to

another caveat: it will likely reinforce the Western hegemony. Instead, "it is important for non-Western academic institutions and scholars to strengthen their own capacity to develop new theoretical approaches and publish in leading IR journals in the West and to expose Western scholars to different histories, realities and local conditions so that they may realize that the world is diverse and the paths to theory development vary" (Quin 2020:22). A dubious claim is made about the issue of cultural exceptionalism, however. Even though it is recognised that exceptionalism may reappear during the course of developing non-Western theories and that alongside Chinese work, other centres of IR theoretical power need to emerge in the non-Western world, it also highlighted the dangers of politicising theorisation. The example of the Kyoto school approach as supportive of the imperial regime of Japan is criticised for being too political and, in this sense, not scientific enough.

Quin's proposal is for a new form of Global IR. A Global IR that is conceptualised beyond the plural and the critical approaches by the emphasis it places on providing credibility to forms of theory that do not inevitably continue to give priority to Westernism and, on the other hand, that are deep enough to think about what is involved in developing such theoretical frameworks that move beyond established postcolonial assumptions. A truly Global IR only emerges in such circumstances – by providing legitimate theoretical sources for the non-West to gain strength by itself and gain a more equal and balanced condition when assessing global contributions to IR. Such is done by relying on geo-cultural specific and practice theory able to identify and uncover geo-specific background knowledges. Intellectual sources of inspiration can be philosophy, history and political thought, as well as pre-established ideas about culture and civilisation. The way forward is to engage in different forms of dialogue that bring together Western and non-Western thought: interactive, ideational, and complementary. This is a Global IR where "diversity is legitimate and complementarity important for theoretical development" (Quin 2020:21).

3.5.2. Ersel Aydinli's and Oca Biltekin's Homegrown Theorizing

In an important volume that aimed to bridge the gap between Westerner and non-Westener IR theory, Ersel Aydinli and Oca Biltekin developed a conceptual scheme to understand what they describe as homegrown theorising.

The starting point for such a project is, on the one hand, the idea that Western theories have failed to capture important changes and implications of IR and this is mainly because the authors feel theories are not reflexive enough. This lack of self-reflexivity would require understanding theoretical contexts

much better: when applied to the real world, Western theories are therefore premade packages of concepts and inferences that are alien to social and historical conditions. Contexts matter greatly and greatly affect how we can understand or misunderstand IR. According to Aydinli and Biltekin, transforming meta-theoretical assumptions or applying more rigorous methods of analysis is not enough to correctly assess non-Western realities. The only way to do so and to become more theoretically relevant is by taking the voice of the non-Western as important. As the authors conclude, "The main obstacle for IRT, then, is arguably the exclusion of the periphery from original theory production" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:2).

They identify two approaches to the issue of developing non-Western IR theories: the first aims to tackle the lack of reflection about non-Western by trying to modify Western theories with non-Western concepts. The goal of the periphery is to tackle primary questions that are prevalent in contemporary Western IR and embed them with non-Western thought. They describe this approach in two ways: one as "more positivist leaning scholars, since they see no fundamental difference between theorizing in the core and in the periphery, except in the social and material conditions of scholarship" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:2). A second way in which it is conceptualised is in the attempt to create a 'post-western theory'. This version of the argument relies on Western views but wants to complete them with non-Western thought. In a way, it aims to move beyond the closure IR would become if exclusive non-Western voices reigned. Rather than having multiple nationalistic poles, IR is better off by claiming complementarity. Relying on Western thought but unpacking its normative intentions and moving beyond them, the way forward.

Against this criticism, the second approach is inherently non-Western. They give the example of the work of Acharya and Buzan (2010), Tickner and Blaney (2013) and Chan and Moore (2009) as examples of such endeavours. According to Aydinli and Biltekin, "These works argue that a genuine attempt to widen the world of IRT requires periphery voices acquiring their theorizing agency first, and this can only be done if their experience can serve as a source for unique new theorizing efforts and perspectives. They look for knowledge and practice in non-Western settings and assess their potential in offering alternative general frameworks of IR" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:2). Departing from these assumptions, it is important to clarify what their proposed approach: it comes in the name of homegrown theorising.

But what is homegrown theorising? The value-added and importance of this approach comes to light in their effort to identify what is meant by this term. As they characterise it, "What distinguishes homegrown theories from mainstream theories is their origination from a geo-cultural standpoint, whether this be at the stage of concept formation or at the stage of inference … Theorists either build on a local philosophical standpoint in their production of novel concepts and/or particularly draw their

data from the part of the world they experience to invent new concepts or alter existing ones" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:18). It is therefore important for the emergence of what is described as homegrown theorising that the scholar is working from intellectual contributions that have their source in distinctive geo-cultural environments. The innovation comes from working on or about these contexts and bring specifically conceptual or empirical innovations to research that depart from the assumptions rooted in these contexts. Even though this is not sufficiently emphasised in the introduction to the volume, another important element to add to the mix is the idea that it is peripheric. In the conclusion, Aydinli and Biltekin highlight the importance of establishing a binary difference between core/periphery and West/non-West. It is "intended to point out the differences so that we can start redressing inequalities rather than denying similarities and establishing hierarchies" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:227). This leads the authors to the conclusion that they more consistently assign the notion of 'homegrown theorising' to what they describe as 'theorising the periphery'. Therefore, it doesn't make sense to locate the periphery in a specific geographical area because Westerners may also theorise about such matters. The distinctive characteristic of this homegrown theorising about the periphery is the sense that scholars participate in grounding their intellectual and empirical reflection on the work and ideas that find their place in these non-core and non-Western areas. This leads to the second important question addressed by particularisms: where does homegrown theorising come from?

Two moments in the identification of homegrown theorising are relevant: either the innovation is brought in via a conceptual re-evaluation of what indigenous scholars have to say about the international – which may or may not have inferential consequences – or the innovation is brought in via the inferential part – when local conditions are used to justify the transformation of a Western concept or when local conditions are used to empirically transform what were preconceived ideas. The authors attribute different names to these different types of transformations.

The first type of homegrown theory is described as alterative. By this, the authors mean the following "they are built by restructuring mainstream theories based on evidence from indigenous experiences. It can be done in two ways: either different definitions for mainstream concepts are suggested or they are applied in a different level of analysis" (2018:22). This type of theory, therefore, picks up a Western model and changes it based on local circumstances. The change can be conceptual and referential.

The second is what they describe as referential homegrown theory building, which means the attempt to pick up a specific homegrown thinker's idea or any concept from a specific culture and use it to draw conclusions about observed phenomena. In this sense, a non-western standpoint is used

both for concept formation and inference. The important and distinguishing feature of this type of theory is the fact that it relies on local thinkers, writers or scholars.

The third type of homegrown theory is described as authentic. According to the authors, "Authentic homegrown theory building begins with putting forward empirical puzzles and coming up with original concepts to explicate these puzzles. Authentic concepts are coined with little or no reference to either homegrown ideas or mainstream theories … Since authentic homegrown concepts are not redefined or refined forms of indigenous conceptualizations, what makes them homegrown is the origin of the data used while making inferences. In other words, authentic homegrown theory is not conceptually, but inferentially homegrown" (2018:25). By starting with real data it develops geo-cultural specific concepts based on specific local experiences. These appear to be more in line with a typical empiricist approach to social scientific research, where conceptual extrapolations are taken from data.

If we link the description of the approaches to non-western thinking proposed by the authors – emphasising a distinction between two approaches that accept Western theory but aim to modify it with non-western thought and, second, approaches that want to abandon Western contributions completely and just focus on non-western contributions – the solution proposed by Aydinli and Biltekin accepts partially contributions coming from the first approach and all the contributions coming from the second. Homegrown theorising of the periphery presupposes, therefore, abandoning those approaches that are "more positivist leaning … since they see no fundamental difference between theorizing in the core and in the periphery, except in the social and material conditions of scholarship" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:2) and to focus on the remaining ones.

Having established the framework, and even though the interpretative lines are blurred and are never made clear by the editors, the volume goes ahead and emphasises in the substantive chapters these three types of homegrown theorizing.

The volume also highlights the pitfalls and risks of embarking on different forms of homegrown theorising in the periphery. The first has to do with the originality of the approaches: even though claiming to be new, they may end up being repetitions of available critical voices that have their origin in Western thought. The second has to do with the risk of fragmentation of the field from a theoretical standpoint. The authors are, however, of the opinion that theoretical fragmentation is not bad for the discipline, it is good and that we need to go through a period of "chaotic theory production at the global level" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:231). Finally, there is the risk of politicisation, where academic knowledge is highjacked by political purposes. In an answer devoid again of any philosophical deeper

meaning, the authors conclude that such risks are not necessarily bad and shouldn't prevent scholars from engaging in theoretical work.

When it comes to practical recommendations, it suggests a necessity to reflect on theoretical matters by "starting with the basics, such as "how do you ask questions? What is a research question? How do you make arguments and hypotheses?" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:232). Also, the volume highlights the importance of looking into teaching practices. This necessarily needs to lead to a reinforced emphasis on non-Western thought and the creation of textbooks designed from a non-Western point of view. It also involves institutionalising intellectual efforts in an academic journal. The authors give the example of how young German IR scholars were able to revolutionise the IR discipline in their country by the institutionalisation of a German IR journal, *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*. The final recommendations deal with the need for organisation because without "organization among periphery IR theorists, there will be limited chance of materializing into a collective enterprise" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:232).

3.5.3. Vineet Thakur's Theoretical Peace … and Beyond

Vineet Thakur has contributed to this discussion by further developing a model for understanding IR from a non-Western perspective. As with the previous contribution, his goal is to focus on the debate about the nature of theory and the possibilities of its decomposition, contributing to the formation of a new, more informed way of developing theory in a non-western context. He proposes to achieve a move beyond the self-proclaimed end of IR theory (Dunne et al. 2013) to instead say that theoretical peace is never achievable. Not until the Non-Western, and in particular African voices, are heard (Thakur 2015). This necessarily means understanding that there is an epistemic order of IR, based on the power of Western IR theories, that dictates the silencing of other forms of theorising. These are conceived as descriptions and unscientific by Westerners, according to Thakur. While he concedes the hegemonic status of the production of knowledge in the West, he also acknowledges the emergence of more qualified forms of theorising in other parts of the world. His hope is that these versions will create multiple narratives about IR and, in particular, about Africa. He suggests that the best way to do this is both theoretical and the capacity to overcome challenges.

Theoretically, and drawing on the work of Karen Smith (2009), he claims that all theories are forms of storytelling. Elements of fiction that allow us to extrapolate what goes on in reality. We are travellers in these forms of liminal zones between fiction and reality. Some theories, however, move beyond fiction and are perceived as representations of IR. According to Bleiker (2001), American and British theories aim to achieve such a status. The only way to move back to storytelling and fiction is

not only to claim the inherent storytelling status of such aspirations but also to rethink how we do theory and reinvent the place of storytelling in IR. Thakur aims to achieve this by developing an understanding of IR theory in African contexts. He suggests that we need to see these new interpretations through three dimensions: language, plots, and characters.

When it comes to languages, Thakur recognises two types of languages, one that is close to post-colonial thought, claiming that the "assumed "difference" between Western concepts and Eastern concepts is unsustainable. There are non-Western elements in Western concepts (Bilgin 2008)" (Thakur 2015:218). The second one is close to the "enunciation rights for an alternative language. African concepts such as ubuntu, ujaama, pan-Africanism, African personhood, and negritude provide alternative lenses through which the world is understood, experienced, and categorized" (Thakur 2015:218). This second type of language, therefore, aims not to reconcile the Western with the non-Western but focus on difference itself as a distinctive feature of epistemological standing.

He also develops four different plots that can be employed. The first aims to understand the non-western with Western concepts. As he claims, "Consequently, when Africa writes about the international, it is not necessarily about writing from an expressively African standpoint; it is to reclaim these concepts and widen the range of their applicability by claiming alternate ways in which, say, realism operates between states" (Thakur 2015:223). The second aims to use the West to test data and hypotheses derived from Africa. This reverses previous attempts that see the relationship the other way around. The third plot aims to understand concepts that derive exclusively from the African context and universalise their understanding and use. In this case, concepts are homegrown, as he claims giving the example of ubuntu "The point being labored here is that ubuntu does not remain merely an African concept to be studied and applied in Africa. It is a concept that can be theorized and applied across the world" (Thakur 2015:224). The final plot requires extracting a new understanding from the African context altogether. As he claims, "True theoretical emancipation requires a completely new imagination of historical processes. The ongoing process of historical change now provides a fitting opportunity to write truly alternative theories. The regions of the South, they argue, are the first sites to experience the full range of variations of modernity" (Thakur 2015:225).

When it comes to understanding who the characters are, Thakur suggests two views of the matter. The first "is to argue that the standard IR issue areas—war, peace, international economy, nationalism— need to be understood in their African context". The second way requires expanding the agenda of IR to include other issues that are of real concern to African thinking. As Thakur dissects, in this case, "Africa informs IR discourse is broadening the ambit of issue areas that are deemed properly "international." Dunn (2001a) argues that "Africa exists in the privileged centre of global discourses on the environment, migration flows, biodiversity, ecology, gender, human security, land

mines, development, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions (IFIs), and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)." To these, one may add issue areas such as crime, global diseases like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and, most recently, Ebola, intellectual property right regimes, the security of women and children, sustainable development, aid, indigenous movements, and peoples' movements against oppressive regimes" (Thakur 2015:219).

After this is clarified, it becomes easier to understand the eight changing configurations that Thakur suggests as contributing to the re-creation of storytelling along these suggested lines. The combination "same plot, same language, same characters" becomes a play with the importance of historicizing same characters or re-evaluating substantive contents of Africa inside traditional views of the subject matter – "Why, for instance, has Africa not seen the emergence of a genuinely hegemonic system, or even a multipolar regional system in the traditional sense of the term? (Thakur 2015:220). The combination "same plot, same language, different characters" becomes a play in the reinvention of the substantive content of IR to move from traditionalism to new issues that are of special concern to Africans. The combination "same plot, different language, same characters" plays with the philosophical predisposition of the study applied to traditional subject matters. Accordingly, the idea is to understand how a specific (traditional) concept is achieved through a conflation of Western and non-Western. As an example of such disposition, Thakur concludes, "in order to understand war and peace in Africa, one needs to ask whether the reasons for war could be extrapolated from concerns about security or through more domestically oriented explanations that embed a nation's security in the security of the regime. Steven's (1987) concept of omnibalancing is a more useful analytical tool to understand such conflicts" (Thakur 2015:222). The fourth combination, "same plot, different language, different characters" plays with the same philosophical disposition but in thinking beyond traditional subject matters. Finally, the four combinations attributed to plot are actually different understandings of how to produce IR theory with distinctive non-western characteristics. As highlighted above, this becomes a play with generating African theory via understanding the non-western with Western concepts, using the West as a data experience for non-western generate theory, identifying distinctive concepts or intellectual thought in these indigenous places or, finally, extracting from these spaces new theories from the ground-up.

Alongside this theoretical expansion of IR beyond theoretical peace, challenges loom on the horizon for these increasingly more relevant communities. The first is to move IR communities beyond seeing universities as typical centres of diplomatic training and move teaching to theory. This may potentially have the consequence of reifying the centre, but Thakur is confident that it may not. The second challenge is recognition, which aims to make distinctive substantive African problems the concerns of the discipline. The third challenge is to engage in epistemological writing for self-recognition that "eschew both the extremes of romanticism and radicalism" (Thakur 2015:227).

Overcoming these three challenges and intensifying the theoretical effort would make IR more open to the thought of non-Western, or, more specifically in Thakur's case, to African voices. This would end the end of IR discourse, the end of the end of IR as a theoretical peaceful place, by incorporating in it the voices of the Indigenous others in a way that is linguistically inclusive, attentive to the many plots that lie in its formation and with a focus on substances other than the traditional ones.

3.6. Conclusion

Departing from a Beverian understanding that advocates that to fully grasp knowledge we need to depart from the assumptions that it is never rooted in the analysis of facts on the ground through the creation of different verificationist or refutationist logics nor through the creation of *a prioristic* methods of analysis, it was argued that the only way to grasp an understanding of what surrounds us is through the theoretical comparison of this reality. This comparison is rooted in what Bevir describes as an anthropological epistemology. At its core, this epistemological posture is rooted in the idea that we need criteria for accepting and rejecting beliefs. The work of theory thus links different facts and gives them theoretical meaning. Objectivity, as understood by Bevir, thus derives from our ability as researchers to compare rival theories in terms of these facts that are taken for granted by all. The possibility of comparison exists because we can read sets of themes that are portrayed multiple times and that, as such, are accepted as relevant. The chapter was an exercise in identifying and comparing different theoretical postures – western, pluralist, post-colonial/post-modern and non-western – and identifying the core themes that run in the theoretical conversation.

At heart, these frameworks aimed to understand the interaction between US dominance on the one hand and the development of socio-specific and historical-specific contexts of theorisation on the other. These proposals discuss issues such as the nature of US hegemony, what theory is, and, specifically, what is Western IR theory, they question where theories come from. Some of these views are particularly concerned with the specificity of understanding contexts of theorisation: the dynamics of regional/national communities of IR, of international order, civilisations and regionalism, of concepts used – and contested – in IR. They are also concerned with providing suggestions about the importance of philosophy and epistemology in IR, the dialogical challenges that emerge when trying to integrate – or not – the West with the non-Western, and the risks and opportunities of building an IR grounded in nationalistic particularities.

In particular, the chapter aimed to dissect different models that emphasise different facets of these debates. To do so, it categorised the debate in a way that contrasted those models that attempt

to promote the view of a discipline that needs to rotate around a US or, implicitly, a US-Euro core and how this has increasingly moved towards a greater concern with the world beyond this US-Euro core. Five models illustrate this transition.

The first model reads global IR as a reflection of a hegemonic project. The fundamental aspect of this model is the grounding of the argument in the substantive, intellectual, institutional and geographical location of centres of power and how these centres of power project themselves around the world in the production of what is viewed as IR and how the process itself can potentially change over time. Different methodological approaches are used to justify the claim. The chapter focused on Holsti's ground-breaking study. Three main arguments were identified in this study: first, how the US literature is dominant from a substantive standpoint, which also translates itself as a justification for a predominance of its core concerns – everyone around the world seems to be researching the 'classical tradition' –, second, Holsti's looks at patterns of geographical concentration in the study of IR. He views a discipline that is hegemonic, by the centrality that scholars from the centre have in citation patterns, while at the same time being also highly parochial, by the relevance that national authors also have in these citation patterns. What also characterises IR is the irrelevance of a constructive dialogue that incorporates multiple nationalities. So, beyond reference to the core (normally in the form of US academics) and reference to national authors, nothing else is represented. This leads Holsti to the last set of conclusions, which is to find justifications for the low presence of these multiple centres of research in the centre. He attributes to language, lack of enough substantive awareness of what goes on in this world, and, most importantly, internal institutional insufficiencies to be the main drivers of this absence. The second argument presented in the chapter was the one developed by Steve Smith. Departing from a different theoretical framework, Smith also accepts that we live under a hegemonic discipline (2002). This hegemony is mainly established by the way in which the history of IR is told, by theoretical and meta-theoretical dominance. It is further consolidated by the institutional prominence of US academia (its sheer size and the role that its journals play in setting IR's agenda). But Smith also gives birth to a counter-hegemony argument which finds inspiration in later literature (Alejandro 2019, Smith 2008). This counter-hegemony is read in light of the necessity to bring plurality to the theoretical study of IR and by the analysis that he promotes on the shrinking of the subject matter that positivism conditions IR to (therefore shrinking its normative aspirations). But also by his analysis of the UK (Smith 1985). Using the hegemonic framework, he builds a distinction between the UK and the US where he points out how the historical trajectory of IR is different in both countries, how more detailed and divergent political and economic circumstances paths create different pressures – the UK losing its empire, US emerging as one among others –, how different institutional frameworks can also be distinguished – qualitative, more time dedicated to thought, less contact between politics and academia in the UK when compared to the US – and, finally, he stresses different intellectual climates

– less responsive to social science methodology in the UK. The last work to be analysed under the hegemony framework was the contribution by Jörg Friedrichs (2004). This work is important not just because it is clearly framed with the hegemony framework in mind – Friedrichs concedes that there is an institutional and intellectual hegemony by the US but his questions becomes normative: how to relate to it. He suggests two internal and normative strategies to cope with this hegemony: institutional reform that creates nationally a community of scholars open to internationalisation, on the one hand, and intellectually capable of thinking theoretically about IR. On this second front, Friedrichs suggests two epistemological strategies: one rooted in conceptualism and another in middle-range theorising.

The second model moves beyond this focus on a debate about hegemony. Instead, its core principle is that rather than looking at universal patterns, we need to look at specific characteristics of national communities. Departing from a ground-breaking study developed by Stanley Hoffmann (1977), these authors look at culture-specific arguments that allow for the formation of national/regional IR communities. There are two stages to this process: one that is founded on Eurocentrism and that aims to mainly focus on what is going on not only in the US but also in Europe, and a second stage that aims to move beyond this Eurocentrism to other parts of the world. Both moves, however, and contrary to other models that will be emphasised in the next paragraphs, do not want to overcome the contributions of the West to IR. National communities are read through an acceptance of Western contributions and dominance. This does not mean, however, that these perspectives accept US hegemonic dominance. They want to move beyond this dominance. The main focus of these contributions, on the other hand, is on developing an understanding of what regional/national IR communities have to bring to IR. Three authors were analysed that help understand the core message of this framework. The first was the important contribution by Stanley Hoffman (1977). If the work of KJ Holsti (1985) can be identified as an important step in the consolidation of the hegemonic model as emphasised above, the work of Hoffmann was an important milestone in the consolidation of the socio-intellectual model. The emphasis on socio-intellectual derives mainly because it aims to incorporate these earlier contributions (Manning 1954, Kirk 1947, Wark 1938, Zimmern 1939, Fox 1949). All of them aspire to understand the institutional and intellectual foundations of IR communities. Hoffmann is particular incisive about the importance of geo-political factors, institutional strategies that privilege merit and intellectual communities concentrated on conceptualising their surrounding realities. These cultural, institutional and intellectual dimensions subsequently gained other theoretical building blocks by grounding these debates in the sociology of science. This change is visible in the work of Ole Waever. Theoretically, he grounds his framework in sociology of science, inviting the reader to think about the socio-intellectual dimensions of IR along cultural, institutional and intellectual dimensions. Waever, more specifically,

develops a macro-theoretical approach that aims to reconcile the contribution of hegemonical studies with his sociology of science viewpoint. The model starts with the work of Peter Wagner (1991), which is used to build three dimensions of research: culture, institution and intellectual. It seems, then, that even though Wagner is the main theoretical inspiration to analyse national communities, Waever seems to apply this analysis to the institutional part of the model. To the cultural part, he links hegemonic debates about institutional and meta-theoretical hegemony. This becomes clear when Waever highlights his intellectual dimension of the macro-structure. According to him, "The third layer of a sociology of social sciences is the intellectual layer. It consists of two dimensions: first, the discipline as social and intellectual structure and, second, its main intellectual traditions" (Waever 1998:715). In this intellectual dimension, he takes inspiration not from the work of Peter Wagner but from the work of Richard Whitley (2000) and Robert Merton (1970) to understand the institutional and intellectual dimensions of national and the European communities. In 2009, in collaboration with Arlene Tickner, he applied this framework around the world. This volume is important because it marks a shift from the centrality of the US-European core to the analysis of other nationalities and regions. But, it keeps a Western bias. Even though the intellectual field is open when national communities are analysed beyond the Western core, this expansion is done by emphasising Western intellectual traditions. The separation between sociology of science and post-colonial approach indicates this move. In Hoffmann and Waever, we find the main source of inspiration to understand the social science approach, but rooting the intellectual contribution of IR exclusively in Westernism is, however, contested by the next viewpoints.

A third approach, put forward by Acharya and Buzan (2007), does highlight how non-Western thought is relevant. But what the scholars also emphasise is how the main trajectory of national communities is not exclusively one of moving beyond the West. In other words, even though non-Western thought is stressed and its contributions highlighted, these contributions need to be read in the context of a Gramscian hegemony that serves as a guide and inspiration while, at the same time, rejecting and contesting in the name of national interests. In their framework, Global IR is both an attempt to identify hegemony, socio-intellectual differences and nationalistic tendencies. It's a plural approach that certainly doesn't want to focus on Western IR but aims to dissect internally the different routes taken. The socio-intellectual dimension is never fully theoretically assessed to the extent that it should. Priority is given to dissecting 'where we can find non-Western thought'. But in the conclusion of the study, Acharya and Buzan are clear: if there is a Western hegemony putting pressure on IR communities, these communities have their own nationalistic trajectories. Some trajectories tend to accept and be influenced by Western tendencies, incorporating in themselves such tendencies – translated, however, by different histories and priorities. Some other trajectories are grounding themselves more fully in non-Western voices. If, with the spirit of hindsight, a more precise and

balanced presentation of the theoretical argument is needed, the conclusion seems clear: the critical side of the Gramscian hegemony incorporates both socio-intellectual as well as non-Western voices (Acharya 2014, Buzan 2018).

The fourth approach, called post-colonial, is a combination of post-colonial contributions and post-modern contributions. It criticises previous views because they concede too much to Westernism. Rather than incorporating the non-Western with the Westerner or seeing both side by side, post-colonial and post-modern approaches want to give an exclusive voice to the non-Western. But they do this by still being rooted in Western traditions of thought. The non-Western has a voice in the framework of the Western. It is observed as the explored, the indigenous, that which is left behind. The voice is given from this sense of disaffection and dealignment. The voices of the Indigenous are also observed as a direct consequence of an oppressive Westernisation process. This history of hegemonic influence needs to be told not from the standpoint of the hegemon but as a dependent relationship with what already existed and was left out. The critique of this fourth approach is, at heart, a critique of modernity and the Westernization of the world, both theoretical and substantive. Modernity and Westernization were built not from the eyes of the winner but through the interaction on the ground of these different processes. Colonialism, sovereignty, and power operated not devoid of local cultures and local interactions. The history of the colonial condition needs to be read differently by giving credibility to what was already there. On the other hand, indignity had worldviews that constructed self and others in ways that moved beyond the Western canon. This framework also has a lot to contribute to a better and more open understanding of IR. Finally, It is in this context that many contributions call for the epistemic delinking from, or unlearning of, Western concepts and theories and the revalidation of different local and heterogeneous epistemologies (derived from mythology, oral traditions, embodied experience, etc.). This process necessarily implies the construction of alternative intellectual canons that move beyond the prevailing intellectual hegemony of the West. To the theoretical and intellectual hegemony of the West, we need to add the indigenous experiences. In them, we will find alternative theoretical voices at the same time.

A final theoretical framework wants to move beyond Western contributions altogether. This is one where IR theories of the non-Westerner are emphasised in themselves and by what they can provide to IR research. The conceptual frameworks elaborated by Quin (2020) and Aydinli and Biltekin (2018) provide clear examples of such endeavours. If Quin is particularly incisive in the distinction this approach has towards the type of work developed by Acharya and Buzan (2007), on the one hand, that is characterised as inclusive because it aims to aggregate in itself still with Western assumptions, Aydinli and Biltekin (2018) is particularly critical of the type of what developed by socio-institutional approaches viewed as more positivist leaning viewpoints – "since they see no fundamental difference between theorising in the core and the periphery, except in the social and material conditions of

scholarship" (Aydinli and Biltekin 2018:…). Both Quin and Aydinli and Biltekin aim to focus more precisely on developing schemes that can focus exclusively on non-Western theory. Particularly relevant seems to be the distinction between contributions that derive from theoretical or referential standpoints, or a combination of both. The focus is always on what non-peripheral countries or regions can bring to IR. In Thakur, we see a different, yet similar, unpacking of the problem. His framework is different because it is more theoretically predisposed towards certain assumptions – namely post-colonial and postmodern. But his plots are basic decompositions of the multiple ways in which local IR can develop. With Thakur, we understand, therefore, that particularism can also be read in light of the post-colonial.

PART III – THE HOW(S) OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Deriving different dimensions of the problem of *how we should study IR* means focusing on debates about 'IR theory' and extracting the many levels of engagement with this topic. In a literature characterised by contributions that rarely cite previous contributions to justify the interpretation taken – some would say, where no literature review is ever conducted – we can identify seven levels of discussion that allow us to think theory thoroughly (Rosenau and Durfee 1995).

The first deals with views of IR theory that stress philosophical discussions. These interventions incorporate philosophy of science debate in IR. The way to introduce these issues illustrates how epistemological, ontological and methodological issues matter to an understanding of IR (Smith 1995). A different approach to the problem emphasises a historical assessment of how these debates have evolved and conditioned the literature (Wight and Kurki 2013). This literature, even though it has always been a concern of theoretical reflection (Wight 1955, Fox 1959), has gained deeper roots in IR after the post-positivist turn (Lapid 1989, George 1994).

The second level of the broadly speaking theoretical debate has traditionally been introduced as a problem of assessing different functions or purposes of theory (Morgenthau 1970). Contributions to this level of discussion aim to place at the centre of the debate different ways that we can interpret IR theory and the functions it can assume. These are, by their very nature, epistemological problems. Emphasising the epistemological origins of these conversations is in dire need of becoming a more solid endeavour in IR (Wight 2007b).

The third important discussion moves from epistemology to ontology. Traditionally introduced as the 'levels of analysis' problem, it has recently gained a new dimension: the debate about agents and structures (Buzan 1995, Wight 2006). In the introduction, we saw how Kauppi and Viotti (2020) make this a central point in their introduction to theories of IR. The suggestion is to look at the constitutive elements of theory – the actors, processes, dynamics – that characterise theory construction.

The fourth level of debate moves from philosophy, epistemology and ontology to methodology. It aims to dissect how, methodologically speaking, we can read IR. This is another important debate that is sometimes forgotten when we introduce *how to study problems* in IR. It could be traced to the debate between historical traditionalism and scientism (Knorr and Rosenau 1969). However, more recent methodological discussions have entered the field. From methodological individualism and rational choice to the debates about historical methods, we have deepened our understanding of the methodological foundations of IR studies (Reus-Smit and Sindal 2008).

The fifth level of discussion deals with what Smith describes as debates over how we can understand IR theories as coming and originating in "different intellectual traditions" (Smith 1995:11-13). This is a debate about perspectivisms (Lapid 1989) and has entered the debate more intensively ever since the designation of IR theories as paradigms (Banks 1985). Why should we see IR theory as a paradigm? What does this involve? Waever (1995) makes an important statement about this topic and the necessity to rethink how we see perspectivisms in IR. He suggests looking at the ideas of individual contributors as an alternative to paradigms or schools. Others suggest understanding this issue as 'traditions of thought' (Wight 1991, Dunne 1994). Historians have recently revived these conversations, taking the debate in new directions (Wallenius 2021). It is, therefore, important to question how we present perspectives of IR before introducing them.

The sixth level is, of course, the introduction of IR theories themselves. When introducing IR theory, an almost intuitive way of seeing it would be through this angle, almost exclusively. Realism, liberalism, different types of constructivism, and non-Western theories enter the conversation at this stage by characterising their inner debates.

The seventh level of discussion moves beyond theory development as an intellectual exercise and focuses on the institutional setting in which theory is being built. Dealing with questions of how the educational and institutional elements impact the development of IR has increasingly become an important topic to discuss *how* we do what we do (Guzzini 2001, Frueh 2020). We saw how John Garnett (1984) introduced these themes in his common-sense approach to international politics. He highlighted the limited role that values should have in educational settings and how abstracted from reality and committed to the conceptual study of it, the teaching of IR should be. These debates certainly deserve to be more fully understood and have been so, especially in the context of the sociological reflexive turn (Waever and Tickner 2009). An endeavour that needs to continue.

This thesis will not deal with all these debates. It would be impossible to treat all the problems this revision requires in this thesis. This thesis, among other goals, aims to open the possibilities to debate these problems. Specifically, the contribution in the next chapter will focus on the philosophical dimensions of these debates by developing a revisionist history of philosophy of science in IR.

Chapter 4. Philosophy of Science and International Relations: Towards a Revisionist History

4.1. Introduction

Philosophy of science is not conveniently treated in introductory manuals of theories of international relations. Normally, the questions that interest philosophers are examined under broad headings where scholars dissect how epistemological, ontological, and methodological issues impact IR. Manuals go on to provide brief descriptions of such words. Such words, we are told, are meant to help us understand how to comprehend the world (Kauppi and Viotti 2000), they are constitutive elements of meta-theoretical discussions (Jorgensen 2018), and they allow us to understand what makes theories diverge from one another (Burchill and Linklater 1996). Certainly, epistemological, ontological, and methodological issues do have a role to play in IR, but we need better and more detailed introductions to such matters. Efforts have been made in the form of edited volumes that elucidate the importance of starting to dissect such matters (Dunne et al 2013, Carlsnaes et al. 2013). They imply that beneath these generalist accounts on how to understand philosophy and IR lie more robust arguments. This chapter will focus on these arguments and introduce how the philosophy of science can historically be understood in IR.

To move beyond presentism/fatalism, refuge will be found in the essay in Bevir's understanding of concepts and traditions. A study of explanatory and justificatory disputes will be highlighted in the first two parts. More substantively, the argument presented by Bevir on how to interpret traditions will be fundamental to understanding the core of this chapter's contribution. This latter argument necessarily starts by highlighting how the history of ideas can't be told with a view that aims to translate a present objective into a distant past through the extraction of coherent sets of ideas along the way. Time is not an eternal present nor a methodological contextualisation of the specificity of the local. Instead, time and historical context should be read by themselves, considering the re-creation of all the belief networks at play during these specific periods. Different historical contexts do not have just one but multiple belief networks. Time does not serve as a narrative of an eternal present nor a relativist local. It is found in itself and all its dimensions. It's the capturing of the multiplicity of these beliefs that the theoretical enterprise needs to be engaged with. On the other hand, it is not fatalistic, meaning that traditions do not have eternal and fixed notions. There is no essentialist core – there are occasions where this centre holds, but others where participants in the debate only accept certain assumptions of it. That does not make them any less participants in the

debate. What matters for a tradition to be considered as such is that there needs to be temporal transmissibility – a sense that there is a link across time in the sharing of certain ideas – and conceptual coherence – the sharing of central themes.

Seeing the history of IR in a presentist/fatalist manner leads to a construction of IR as evolving through several 'great debates': realism v idealism, science v. tradition, inter-paradigmatic debates, positivism v. post-positivism. This evolutionary perspective, in turn, led to a very limited understanding of the role of science in IR: ideas vs matter, historical scientism vs behaviouralism (and the corresponding 'methodological' disputes), the victory of positivism in the so-called 'inter-paradigmatic debate' and, finally, positivism vs post-positivism (treated as a confrontation between explaining v. understanding, rationalists v. reflexivists, positivism v post-positivist). We need to break this 'history' through a contextual framework that can bring to light all the webs of beliefs present during specific historical periods. When this is done, each period will bring to light a permanent attempt by IR scholars to bring various debates that were going on in the philosophy of science to IR. Each historical period needs, therefore, to be read in this new light.

In the creation of a revisionist history of philosophy of science in IR, the chapter will participate in bringing together a theoretical argument with the current debate that is unfolding about this matter. The first two parts are foundational - they discuss themes that will animate subsequent contributions – by providing a brief overview of philosophy of science and by arguing for the necessity and importance of meta-theoretical conversations in IR. Once the necessity of meta-theory is asserted, a revisionist history of the role of science in IR will begin.

4.2. On Philosophy of Science

There are extensive discussions about how to characterise debates in the philosophy of science. It is not the goal of this section to go over these disputes in detail. The goal of this part is to broadly settle what will be looked at when describing positivist and post-positivist / interpretative approaches. In so doing, it will characterise a general debate that distinctively separates disputes over a philosophy of science from debates about epistemology, ontology or methodology. These fields of research have their own dynamics, and the goal of this part is to differentiate the study of philosophy of science from these other aspects. It is important to differentiate, therefore, debates about philosophy of science from these other debates. This will be done by characterising positivist and interpretative disputes that are all characterised by being theoretically reflexive.

When evaluating what could be described as positivist approaches to International Relations, three broad debates emerge that are relevant to dissect. The first is the debate about the definition of

theory and the assessment of the extent to which specific research has developed or produced a theoretical statement. Disputes at this level aim to go over a specific definition of theory, how we know it and how we see it in the research developed. The debate is over whether or not a specific research project has produced the lines in which it has produced a theoretical statement. A second distinctive discussion concerns the evaluation of theory. How can we assess whether a theory is right or wrong? Is there criteria or a logic of justification? Here, philosophers of science engage in discussions about specific attributes of theory, like empirical fit, parsimony, deductive power, scope, falsifiability, and plausibility. It is important, when we consider whether something is to be considered a theory, these evaluation criteria. The third and final aspect that needs to be stressed here engages with the appropriate strategy for science. How should we, as scholars, go about producing theory? How is the research designed and conducted? Deductive and inductive logic tend to characterise this debate.

Interpretivists want to move beyond positivism. The work of Mark Neufeld (1995) will be used here to identify three distinctive characteristics of this theoretical reflexivity. The first is that interpretivists are "aware of the underlying premises of one's theorizing" (Neufeld 1995:41). In other words, theoretical edifices are built upon some underlying assumptions, and these assumptions need to be acknowledged. This first assumption is complemented by two others. The second is the inevitable role that values play in the assessment of reality. We can't have an uncompromised understanding of empirical facts. There is no such thing as a method that can assess what goes on in the real world devoid of normative judgements and prejudices. The idea that there is a separation between who is observing and what is being observed is an aspiration to an ideal of objectivity that doesn't exist. Instead, all interpretivists recognise that all the assumptions that we construct have politico-normative content. We, therefore, need to incorporate the role that these normative disputes have in the construction of knowledge claims. Researchers influence the production and validation of knowledge. And these debates need to be acknowledged. There is no such thing as a separation between a reality out there and a factual interpretation. This leads us to the third assumption of interpretative work. This is the idea that there is no such thing as a conception of knowledge that is ahistorical and extra-social. Instead, all knowledge claims need to be associated with the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, "which, in contrast to episteme, is oriented to the exercise of reasoned judgment not in the context of the timeless and unchanging, but of the variable and contingent" (Neufeld 1995:43).

Having clarified, in broad and synthetic form, what to look for when debating the philosophy of science, the next parts will trace the role that it had in IR. This endeavour will start by justifying the importance of philosophy of science in IR before a historical assessment of its role in IR is conducted.

4.3. Away from Meta-Theory and Back

Engaging in philosophical discussions in International Relations is sometimes seen with suspicion by some authors. This needs to be criticised both specifically and with a broader argument.

William Wallace (1996) advances a first critique against the importance of bringing philosophical discussions to IR because doing so invites an exercise of what he describes as scholasticism. It is important to start with his understanding of the role that meta-theory plays – and why we need to avoid it. According to Wallace, scholasticism leads scholars to "take refuge in increasing abstractions, theories and meta-theories" (1996:311). It occurs, specifically, when "practitioners shift from attempts to address common questions from different perspectives to competition among different 'schools'; in which each multiplies definitions and explanations, develops its own deliberately obscure terminology, and concentrates much of its efforts on attacking the methods and terminology of competing groups" (1996:311). We should instead do what he describes as scholarship, which "involves conceptualization, categorization, and explanation, and assumes transmission of the knowledge gained to others". And here a second argument against scholasticism is presented. According to Wallace, scholarship "hardens into ideology or dogma when the contingent basis for explanation— the necessary doubt which should accompany all intellectual discovery—is forgotten" (1996:311). Therefore, meta-theory should be avoided because we should conceptualise without ideology, conceptualise to explain, and do so in a way that is useful for policymaking.

One important structural criticism was put forward in Steve Smith's reply to this contribution. According to Smith (1997), meta-theory is an inevitability of scholarship. Against Wallace, he concludes that we cannot avoid ideology when exercising scholarship. In our effort to understand what surrounds us, therefore, "theories are not separate from the empirical world they seem to report on for Wallace: they constitute that world" (1997:515). In other words, it's impossible to somehow have a theory that is not itself committed to a certain perspective and view of the world. Thinking that we can escape meta-theory in the sense of ideology and scholasticism, as Wallace sees it, is impossible, according to Smith.

A second criticism is put forward by Theda Stockpol. This came in the form of a review article entitled *The Dead End of Metatheory.* The argument gained popularity more by the assumptions it implies than by a direct engagement with the literature Stockpol intends to interact with. It is important, therefore, to start from what the author describes as meta-theory. According to Stockpol "To its good fortune, political sociology has always been relatively free of metatheoretical urges – that is, urges to classify

the grounds of other people's arguments rather than pursue substantive problems" (1987:10) and she continues later on "Metatheoretical exercises risk creating artificial ideal-typical categorizations that obscure rather than illuminate the more fruitful tendencies in substantive theory and research … This schematization obscures the fact that the best work in political sociology has for many years focused on interrelations between social and political processes, and has examined both collective actors and institutional or organizational structures" (1987:10).

Stockpol revitalises Wallace's critique at the level of a confrontation between the classification of arguments and the intention to pursue practical problems. Stockpol shows disdain for classificatory purposes – these would, in her view, move the researcher away from the study of 'practicalities' and the political sociologies that underpin these realities. This is a criticism that focuses not on the nature of objectivity, the role of theory in aiding policy-making, but on the nature of theory – and whether or not the effort to conceptualise and schematise a problem is considered meta-theory. For Stockpol, knowledge is a reflection of universal forces, and it's constructed by the actor's embeddedness in a particular social and historical period, hence their policy relevance. These contexts are universal illustrations of material forces. Classificatory purposes beyond these are a waste of scientific time. We need to understand that there are material forces that have always managed to understand how the world works. Time is eternal, social forces are contingent. It should be the work of the scientist to illuminate these universal laws and focus on these social struggles.

A critique of this approach would emphasise that instead of actors, we can focus on communities of academics and that by doing so, we are not directly involved in practical discussions. For example, all conversations about what order we should pursue after the war in Ukraine don't necessarily require an engagement with the political and sociological forces on the ground. Instead, the historical grounding of the argument can be done in the confrontation between different perspectives, emphasised by different authors regardless of their worldview or conception of order.

Qualifications can be further placed on how this work is done. For example, Steve Smith classifies his contribution by the unravelling it produces of "how the current 'politics' gets defined and what (political) interests benefit from that disarming division between the political and the non-political." (Smith 1997:509). The unravelling of the 'community of scholars' has a clear normative intention for this type of approach.

Finally, there is a third critique put forward by Fred Halliday (1994), which tackles the same criticism put forward by Stockpol with a nuance. According to Halliday, and in a critique that targets the 'Third Debaters', the author claims that those who engaged in the critique of the 'positivist' establishment tend to fall into two traps: "On one side, invocation of history as a cult of facts served to deny historicity, i.e. political and intellectual change or context; on the other 'Meta-theory', solemnly

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announced, i.e. debates on how to write theory, became detached from substantive analysis" (Halliday 1994:23). He further consolidates his meta-theory critique when he says that, first, "Abstraction may be necessary, but as a route to explanation. The alternative to bad theory is not empiricism, but good theory, in both its conceptual and explanatory dimensions" (Halliday 1994:24), and second, "IR needs to be methodologically aware and explicit, IR itself is not methodologically specific in the sense of raising issues of theory or method distinct from other social sciences" (Halliday 1994:23).

Stockpol wanted an empiricist theory devoid of conceptual and historical specificity, which analyses social forces at play in this consistent momentum. Halliday wants historicity with theoretically predetermined content. Even though their approach to history and context is different, both of them advance the view that meta-theory is useless because it doesn't allow us to understand the empirically and methodologically verifiable political forces at play.

We have, therefore, to move beyond the criticism that sees meta-theoretical reflections as mere reflections of unnecessary ideology, as a quick precursor of empirical research, and as merely a distraction from the real issues of politics that should concern us. We can't escape the fact that all science is ideological (in the sense that we can't escape our own belief systems), and we can't escape the idea that to understand social realities, we need to deal with a multitude of options that explain or understand this social reality, that instead of political forces we better understand what communities of scholars say about a certain event.

Beyond these specific criticisms, a broader point remains. It is important to accept that all theoretical positions are not empty and that they are all dependent upon certain assumptions about ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Based on these assumptions, we, as researchers, see the world differently. By trying to move away from researching these commitments, we are running away from understanding IR. As Kurki and Wight put it, it "is impossible for research to proceed in any subject domain in the social sciences in the absence of a set of commitments embedded within positions on the philosophy of social science. … Meta-theoretical positions have deep, if often unrecognized, consequences for social analysis. Being aware of the issues at stake in the meta-theoretical debate and of their significance in terms of concrete research serves as an important starting point for understanding IR theory and facilitates a deeper awareness of one's own meta-theoretical orientation" (Kurki and Wight 2013:14/15).

Putting the critics to one side, it's time to understand how the philosophy of science has been assessed in IR. This will be done initially by a historical overview of the literature, and, second, by focusing on the contemporary debate about IR's philosophical foundations.

4.4. Towards a Revisionist History of Philosophy of Science in International Relations

What influence has science had in the investigations and research of international relations scholars? The question of science and how we can do science was something that was not always particularly relevant to academic writing in International Relations. A clear reflection on what the meta-theoretical foundations of a study are, even today, is sometimes omitted from the research being conducted. Alongside advancements in the study of philosophy, the professionalisation of academic degrees has helped and today's research, as will be outlined below, is much better at addressing meta-theoretical debates when compared to previous periods of the discipline.

In this part, the chapter will focus on the transitions that occurred in IR on the science question. From an initial stage where science was more or less omitted from reflections – with no clear outline of what the specific grounds for the research being conducted were – to a situation where science and reflections over meta-theoretical substances became highly relevant, the importance of and the question of science in IR has gained increasing attention. This part will be in three sections: first, we will address questions of theory and engage Mark Bevir in the conversation. Four subsequent sections will go over four phases in the discussion of science in IR: an initial one that contrasted historicism with positivism, a second one that contrasted behaviouralism and historicism, a third one that aimed to bring Thomas Kuhn and to IR, and a fourth one that contrasts positivism and post-positivism.

4.4.1. A Word on Theory

The chapter will participate in the current conversation about a revisionist history of IR (Schmidt 1994, 1998) and, in particular, it will start contributing to a revisionist view of the role of philosophy of science in IR. This part will highlight these theoretical moves.

4.4.1.1. Beyond Traditional Disciplinary History

Ever since the reflexive attempt to tell the history of (North American) IR differently (Schmidt 1998) scholars have been engaged in a conversation about how disciplinary history has been told in IR. In the work of Brian Schmidt, we find refuge in understanding how this current trend to revise the traditional ways of approaching the history of IR unfolds.

Schmidt develops a critique of the traditional approaches that are used to tell the history of IR. This historiographical sensitivity is itself the consequence of intellectual discussions that not only promoted the revision of the history of political science (Gunnell 1995, Farr, Dryzek and Leonard 1995) but were further galvanised by the post-positivist turn that characterised IR (Lapid 1989, George 1989). This post-positivist critique made us aware of the subjective and contextual nature of knowledge and, in doing so, criticised accounts of science that see it as an evolving progression towards cumulation. Telling the history of IR implied incorporating such unilinear and progressive accounts. Schmidt distinguishes four ways in which this happens (1998). The first is through an approach that emphasises paradigmatic changes. This account sees IR as evolving through several progressive stages characterised by ruptures provoked by internal or, most of the time, external causes that have led to advancements in the way we understand the field. These transformations are read, with varying degrees of theoretical consistency, in light of 'paradigmatic shifts', the result being that during a certain phase, a hegemonic debate takes place, which leads to the victory of one side, which then confronts another challenger which eventually can surpass confronting the next challenger. John Vazquez (1983) provides such an example of this account in the way he sees the progression of IR in terms of the victory of Realism in its various forms. Besides this view that emphasises paradigm shifts, others focus on disciplinary 'great debates'. These approaches, again not characterised by deeply rooted theoretical foundations, have a less progressive understanding of IR, but such progressivism comes in the form of what is excluded. IR is seen in the light of several confrontations that occur throughout time, again provoked by external or internal events, which subsequently led to another stage of conversation or 'great debate'. Ole Waever (1995, 2013) presents IR in precisely these terms, arguing not only for the usefulness of understanding disciplinary history in such terms but also that contemporary IR is going through a debate that has positivist and post-positivist foundations. This fourth debate is the best characterisation of the inter-paradigm debate, the tradition versus science and the idealist versus realist debate that were its antecedents. The third way in which disciplinary history is presented is through the view of grandiose traditions of thought. Again, these traditions are thought to be timeless and unilinear transpositions of what some classical writer told about a certain topic which is then used to understand contemporary ideas. In a useful and important distinction, Schmidt highlights how there are two ways in which to write the history of IR in terms of traditions. The first way, which he sees characterising the work of KJ Holsti (1985) or Ian Clark (1996), is a description of a tradition "in terms of chronologically ordered luminaries cumulatively contributing to a conventional pattern of thought" (Schmidt 1998:27). The second way in which the history of IR is traced in terms of traditions is by defining what a tradition means first, and then trace this 'scientificity' to the past. Both of these approaches to the writing of IR continue with the previous attempts to provide some kind of progressive understanding of the nature of the field. They view IR as an evolving condition of paradigm

shifts, debates or traditions implicitly or explicitly accepting that there is an underlying progression of the debate. But there is also a fourth approach to such progressivism. This is what Schmidt characterises as the contextual approach. For contextualists, the evolving nature of IR is justified by external events exclusively. The internal debates are just an inevitable consequence of what goes on in the real world. So IR is seen as evolving through a number of debates in light of precisely these changes. The work of Steve Smith (1985, 2000) can be cited as a prime example of such contextualism. It is not, like in the other approaches, that external events trigger prior intellectually defined assumptions; they play a hegemonic role in controlling what goes on inside IR's debates. Nothing besides these externally driven interests matters as demonstrations of what hegemonically matters.

Against these four approaches, Schmidt proposes what he describes as an internalist approach to the study of disciplinary history that he calls, inspired by the work of John Gunnell, as critical internal discursive history. A Beverian approach certainly accepts not only the criticism put forward by Schmidt towards the prevailing understandings of the history of the discipline but also some assumptions of his approach. A summary will be provided here. A Beverian approach accepts the idea that to avoid unilinear and progressive approaches, we need, as Schmidt concludes, to focus on traditions of thought and that these traditions are "far from monolithic, they tend to refer less to actual historical traditions, that is, self-constituted patterns of conventional practice through which ideas are conveyed within a recognisably established discursive framework, than to an analytical retrospective construction that largely is defined by present criteria and concerns" (2013:9). However, what Schmidt doesn't account for is the possibility of these traditions of thought being the consolidation of prior and transferable conditions. In other words, Schmidt's internal discursive history is focused on the contextual but discounts the possibility of this context becoming a reflection of prior traditions that, as long as solidified in the conversation of the interpreter, can be traced back in time. Also, when it comes to conceptual change, Schmidt's approach disregards the value of externalities to galvanise internal discussions and, therefore, is a pure intellectualist approach to change. But, as emphasised by Bevir, change can happen driven by external events which have an impact on how we perceive intellectual ideas. Of course, both agree that externalism, per se, is not sufficient to understand what goes on inside a particular tradition. However, whereas the approach proposed by Schmidt suggests that such influence is impossible to happen, Beverians would conclude that they do occur due to the impact they have in promoting ongoing intellectual debates. These two key differences are animating contemporary debates about the nature of the study of ideas in IR, but fundamentally, one has to agree with the critique put forward by Schmidt towards conventional ways in which we approach the subject. To better understand it, we need to become more context-dependent and aware of the particularities of historical time. We need to trace the intellectual debates much better rather than have this approach that we somehow have evolved through a number of paradigmatic shifts, great

debates, glorious traditions or driven by political interests. This leads us to the second important contribution that, not only Schmidt's contributions have achieved, but is driving contemporary assessments of the history of IR: the specific critique of how the history of IR has been told.

In Peter Wilson's work (1998), we find inspiration for re-writing the history of IR. In an attempt to conclude how the first debate was a myth, he develops a never-explicit analytical framework to better understand the nature of this debate. According to Wilson, the First Debate was highly misunderstood and mischaracterised, and to fully understand it, we need to trace back more precisely the contributions of the so-called liberals. The way in which their work was read, mainly by EH Carr, doesn't fully represent what they meant. Also, if there was a debate at all between realists and liberals, this didn't correspond to the debate as it was depicted mainly by the work of EH Carr. Analytically, what Wilson did was, therefore, first to better understand what the liberals meant and, second, to better understand the nature of the interaction between realists and liberals (mainly through the review of replies by different liberals to Carr's work and through a reassessment of what Carr's work provoked in the generation of a realist-realist and a utopian-utopian debate). Wilson's contribution is a landmark study in revisionist history and served as an inspiration for subsequent exercises. In an important contribution to this literature, Brian Schmidt (2012) brought together scholars who took Wilson's endeavour to heart while reframing it. In that edited volume, Osiander's contribution continues in the analytical tradition that Wilson has put forward. Keeping with Wilson's traditionalism, Osiander (2012) departs from the assumption that there was a mischaracterisation of what we mean by liberalism and therefore, his effort is to reconstruct this tradition/paradigm in time and understand how it translated and was consolidated after World War I. According to Osiander, "My contention is that the Idealist writers discussed in this chapter ground their interpretations of international politics on a shared paradigm that has hitherto gone largely unrecognized. Indeed, from E. H. Carr onward it has been dramatically misconstrued. Following a critique of certain widely held views on Idealist IR, the chapter will draw attention to a number of themes in this body of writing in an attempt to establish the underlying paradigm" (2012:33). This leads him to build some categories upon which liberalism manifests itself and understand how this period of history helped solidify these categories. One could say, therefore, that both Wilson and Osiander, even though they do acknowledge that there is a mischaracterization of liberalism in the first debate and the whole nature of the liberal-realist debate, the goal is a conservative one of establishing pre-determined assumptions and fit a paradigm or a tradition in it while criticising how the debate itself unfolded. This, continuing with Schmidt's suggestion, is a limited revisionism.

For a more complete attempt to revise the history of IR, more in line with Beverian or Schmidtian revisionism, would claim that the whole idealist/realist debate is a creation that serves certain presentist purposes. It needs to trace the history of this debate to its own creators and dissect

what lies behind it. This brings the historical context into play and allows scholars to have better sensitivity to this history at the same time. We have, therefore, to conclude that the first great debate was a creation elaborated by subsequent efforts (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005, Thies 2002, Schmidt 2012a, Ghuihot 2011). After this contextual principle is defined, the second step is to understand what is going on. And here, scholars have taken two routes. Some claim that there was, in fact, a debate between liberals and realists, but this debate was very specific to a particular context and time. It certainly doesn't exhaust everything that was happening during this period, but it was a debate that characterised some of the discussions that were happening (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005). Keeping with this conservativism, others claim that there was never a debate and that what happened was a reconstruction by a tentative hegemonic theory that not only construes the historical epoch as one where its core values are constructed against other core values – which they eventually beat – but, and in the process, completely misrepresents what the other opponent meant to say to serve its identitarian interests. The exercise is one of showing not only the presentism that lies at the creation of the great debate but also questioning the way the debate itself is built (Thies 2002, 2012). Other approaches, however, are more radical in their critique. They argue that there was never a debate in the first place and that the nature of the discussions of IR during this period was completely different (Ashworth 2012, Schmidt 2012). The exercise, in these cases, is not only to question the presentism but to conclude that there was something completely different going on while, if there was something resembling an idealist-realism going on, it needs to be revised (Schmidt 2012) or to reinterpret the traditions of so-called liberalism and so-called realism altogether (Ashworth 2012).

The purpose of exposing contemporary theoretical and analytical dispositions of historical revisionism in IR is to continue with such endeavours in this chapter. A Beverian approach accepts the presentist critique put forward by the revisionists, but the one specifically adopted here will take the side of the traditionalist or conservative route. While putting forward a revised view of philosophy of science in the history of IR, it is inclined to promote a revisionism of existing conceptions – not a radical reconstruction of the debate.

4.4.1.2. Revising the History of Philosophy of Science: Beyond Presentism and Fatalism

Not a lot of research has been conducted on how we tell the history of philosophy of science in IR. Traditional accounts tend to describe this evolution in the form of a direct correspondence of these debates to IR self-described 'great debates' (Kurki and Wight 2012) or to understand this influence in terms of the advancement of positivism towards a post-positivist era (Smith 1995, George 1994). Both of these perspectives, however, need to be criticised because they are both presentism – they read events, debates, and concepts into the past as if they have a historical unity, not taking into account

the historical specificity of these issues – and finalism – debates are presented as a linear and progressive expansion of core and concise thoughts and ideas. An effort to understand contexts and to provide more solid content on how ideas are transmitted through time is required.

A conversation about this issue has been started in the literature by Scott Hamilton (2016). His goal is to bring a genealogical approach to how meta-theory has been brought into IR. Hamilton aims to understand the emergence of forms of rationality rooted in theoretical practices. Knowledge is grounded in theoretical practices, that are constituted by forms of (theoretical) rationality that need to be assessed in their historical specificity. For Hamilton, thought about meta-theory in IR had fundamentally three (historically specific) phases: an initial one where scholars were concerned with creating a grand theory of IR through the psychological assessment of different 'images' while avoiding discussing meta-theory. The work of Frederick Dunn (1949), Inis Claude (1960), David Singer (1969) or Quincy Wright (1955) is used to discuss this theoretical practice. A second phase emerged with the questioning of the possibility of a grand theory. The first demonstration of this new theoretical practice came with the contribution of Robert Jervis (1970). For Jervis, we have a 'real world' out there that needs to be understood in terms of self-contained images. This idea was further solidified by a conversion of the image view of IR into a conversation about paradigms. This second phase, therefore, saw the disappearance of an aspiration for a 'grand theory' but kept the view of IR as an interaction of different images that aim to understand the real world – therefore keeping a distance from meta-theory. The third phase, however, embraces meta-theory while continuing to question the possibility of theoretical unity. It is demonstrated by the development of a perspective of perspectives. Discussing IR in terms of images or paradigms is therefore seen as discrediting the most relevant conversation to have, which is that, to cite Onuf, "We construct worlds we know in a world we do not" (1989: 37- 38).

Although this contribution is important because it highlights the importance of discussing the method used to discuss meta-theory, its philosophy of science foundations is weak. Hamilton is not concerned with assessments of the history of philosophy of science in IR, per se, but assessments of treatments of meta-theory/ontology in IR. He develops, therefore, not a history of the philosophy of science in IR but a history of treatments of ontology in IR. However, because he develops a ground-breaking conversation about the methods used to describe the history of philosophical matters in IR, his arguments need to be addressed.

Continuing with the effort to bring theoretical and methodological rigour to this discussion, the goal here will be to trace how different traditions of thought have influenced the work of IR theorists when they integrated reflections of philosophy of science in their studies. This will develop a Beverian approach to understanding the question of science in IR. As already emphasised, Bevir highlights how one needs to look at historical contexts in their specificity while not forgetting that ideas can also be transmitted across time. This is done by a concentrated effort to reinterpret core

concepts and ideas from previous eras and reinvent them for our use. What is also emphasised by Bevir is how an author can have different traditions of thought. There is no such thing as consistency and uniformity in the study of ideas. Different authors can become part of different traditions of thought.

It will be claimed that we can understand the importance of the philosophy of science in IR by digging into how this problem was interpreted by academics in three stages: one period characterised by a dispute between scientists and historians, another by understanding how Kuhn came to have an impact in the way IR scholars thought about the world, finally, after Kuhn, philosophy of science characterised different configurations of the debate between positivists and post-positivists. The first can be traced back to the work of Hobbes up until the 'behavioural' v. traditionalist debate of the 1960s/1970s. The second characterised much of the conversation during the 1970(s) and 1980(s). The third characterised the literature after this period.

4.4.2. From History to Science? Readdressing the 'First Great Debate'

This part will address the initial stages of a discussion about philosophy of science in IR. It will go back to a brief discussion of the issue assumed in Hobbes's work before moving on to the debates that often characterise what came to be known as 'the first great debate' (between Idealists and Realists). This phase is characterised by an initial engagement with concerns over the philosophy of science. The interpretation of this engagement, however, serves a very specific function: to legitimise a presentist and fatalist approach. The work of Carr and Morgenthau is often used as symbolic of this desired transformation (Vasquez 1983, Guzzini 1998). We have to dig deeper and move beyond presentism by contextualising the discussions that were actually taking place at the time.

4.4.2.1. Traditional Accounts

The traditional account of what is described as 'the first great debate' is normally assumed to be a debate between Idealists and Realists. It is important to understand how this distinction first came about and the consequences of it. The story of the first great debate has been told either through the analytical application of paradigmatic shifts, grand traditions, and contextualisms or through an approach that emphasises a series of debates.

The main contributor to such a distinction is EH Carr. In his work, EH Carr also develops an understanding of the birth and development of the initial study of IR. According to Carr, there was an

initial confrontation in the discipline between the voices of idealism and the voices of realism. This understanding of IR's emergence and theoretical development plays out later on in other contributions. For example, Grayson Kirk (1947) concluded that, following World War II, international politics was replacing international cooperation as the core element of the modern study of IR. William T. Fox (1949) also claimed that the new research was moving away from international government and the commitment to reforming the world towards research that focused on the international politics of the contemporary state system. Frederick Dunn (1949) concurred, concluding that there was "a movement from reform to realism" (Dunn 1949: 80). In Dwight Waldo's contribution (1954), we find the first reference to an academic debate in the field between so-called idealists and realists (Schmidt 2012). This is reinforced by another William T.R. Fox article that highlighted how "one development in the post-war study of international relations which has occupied the foreground of the attention of the casual observer has been the so-called 'Great Debate' between the realists and idealists" (Fox 1961: 19). What Quirk and Vigneswaran rightly conclude about this literature is that 'the first debate' was a creation of writers who had the goal to create a specific view of IR: an IR concerned with science and with international political substances. This was the guiding light and the goal of those writing about IR in the 1950s. The creation of the first debate needs to be contextualised, therefore, by the writings of those engaged in the behavioural revolution in IR. In other words, as will be concluded next, we can't understand the second debate without the formation of the first.

This view was subsequently replicated. For example, for Hedley Bull, IR went through three successive stages: the 'idealist', where progressivism characterised the contributions of the authors and that marked the 1920s and 1930s; the 'realist' during the 1930s and 1940s, where conservative theories emerged as a reaction against progressivists, and the 'social scientific' theories of the 1950s and 1960s (Bull 1995). Bull uses in this essay a specific theoretical framework grounded in a scientific assessment of history and historical transitions. For him, the role of history is to serve as a "laboratory of the social sciences" (Bull 1995:183). The work of the theoretician is to explore the potentialities of history to justify a scientific proposition. This emphasis on history leads him to reject the view that we can rely on or construct general propositions to develop science. This was the whole point of a previous contribution to this matter (Bull 1966), but while he rejects this project, he confirms the utility of history as an auxiliary tool to these intentions. The role of the historian is to deal with singular events through the understanding that every "political situation is located in time and to understand it, we must know its place in a temporal sequence of events: what the antecedent situations were out of which it grew, what the elements of continuity are that link it with what has gone on before, and what the elements of change are that mark it out as different. The language of theory is a timeless language of definitions and axioms, logical deductions and extrapolations, assertions of causal connections, and ascertainments of general law. The exposition or explanation of a historical sequence depends at

every point upon an appeal to theory, acknowledged or unacknowledged, but it is not itself the elaboration of a theory" (Bull 1995:183). This theoretical framework is then used to justify the transitions that occur in the disciplinary study of IR. As suggested, the first phase was the idealist phase, and it came about because IR scholars needed to provide answers to the disasters of World War I. The realist literature emerged in the late 1930s, and this was due to the emergence of America as a world power. Realism "At a time when the American discussion of international relations was heavily ideological, it appeared to provide a sharp instrument of criticism; when America looked for guidance as to how to conduct herself, it provided a sense of direction; for an American audience in need of a crash course in statecraft, it seemed to offer a convenient crib of European diplomatic wisdom, the more convincing on campus because it was ex- pounded, as often as not, in a thick German accent" (Bull 1995:190). There is, finally, a third stage, characterized by the "search for a scientific theory that would facilitate prediction and control of international politics" (1995:200). This, according to Bull "had its origins in a peculiarly American combination of optimism about the solubility of political problems and faith in research as a problem-solving technique" (1995:200). Bull doesn't disregard that there are critics and other voices out there, and also how the real world is presenting challenges that are leading to the criticism of this hegemonic role played by scientific research, but, what comes out of such a presentation, is an implicit acceptance that what rules IR at the time of writing is science, and, in particular, debates about different causes of war. Bull, therefore, never fully develops a theory of historical change except by saying that "an historical sequence depends at every point upon an appeal to theory" (1995:183), but what characterised his assessment of historical transition is the view that the triggers are external events in the case of the emergence and consolidation of idealism and realism and internal debates about the necessity for a science of international politics for the emergence of social scientific theories of the 1950s and 1960s. What is important is that nothing besides these debates characterises these periods and that, even though Bull mentions traditionalism as an example of a criticism of the last stage, he never fully credits it as being highly relevant. Instead, what emerges is a sequence of the evolutionary condition of IR from Idealism to Realism (because of the necessity of scholars to answer externalities) and of scientism (as a reply of the American hegemonic academy).

Others characterise this period in light of paradigmatic shifts. John Vasquez's (1998) account of this transition is particularly incisive. According to Vasquez's account, idealists help institutionalise the discipline and instil it with purpose, but the anomaly provoked by World War II led to a substitution of this hegemonic paradigm by realism. Realism substantively won the debate against Idealism and, after World War II, consolidated itself, at the same time, by its scientific intentions. This view of the history of IR assumes it as a sequence of 'paradigm shifts', in this case, from the logic of ideas to the logic of scientifically based power realities. This is a view of the academic journey of the discipline beyond the utopian ideas of so-called Idealists towards more practical political realities and scientific

direction that are joined together. For Arend Liphart (1974), this transition is even more specific. The second debate was not just about method (the victory of scientific realism), but it was also about substance. The victory of systemic scientific realism.

Still others use contextualism and external events to justify the debate. Steve Smith (1987) sees the evolution of IR in terms of debates about what goes on in the real world and the interests of US Foreign Policy. Both of these elements need to be combined to understand both the emergence and consolidation of liberals and its later substitution by realism in various versions – initially traditional and then in its scientific mode. This theoretical arrangement, with roots in post-structuralism, sees changes as emerging directly from external events and interests of foreign policy decision-making. Academic communities are mere reflections of political power. It also concludes that we see the victory of certain assumptions, driven by foreign policy orientations, every time a change occurs. If the First World War led certain liberal assumptions to reign supreme, the Cold War led to others. In the process, two varieties of realism emerged – traditional and scientific. But, for Smith, following Liphart (1974), scientific realism reigns supreme.

What these understandings lead to is a view of IR as an implicit or explicit evolutionary confrontation that allows for the victory of one theory or paradigm against another while, at the same time, seriously misreading the nature of the debates. During this specific time, the description of successive stages led to the victory of realism against liberalism, a victory of science over history, and, in the strong version of the argument, of a certain version of realism (devoted to science) over tradition. IR is seen in the light of an epic journey that either better responds to the demands of the real world, to the intellectual demands for more disciplinary focus, or to more accurate international political science, which is able to respond better to the demands of the real world.

The presentation of the discipline in these terms had three important consequences. "First, many assume that there is a clear link between World War I and the genesis of IR. Second, many also assume that the scholars writing and teaching after the formation of the League of Nations were all idealists or utopians. And third is the notion that Carr and his fellow realists, through their critique of the interwar scholarship, launched the great debate and were instrumental in eventually replacing idealism with realism" (Schmidt 2012:5). In other words, the writing about the emergence of IR became fixated in the causal impact and importance World War I had – nothing before this period mattered – second, nothing besides the debate between idealism and realists existed in IR during the inter-war years, third, there was a real debate going on which led the way to the transformation of IR from international government to international politics and from tradition to science.

A revisionism, therefore, aims to trace back the history of IR before this period; second, it questions the construction of this evolutionary view of IR, third and finally, it aims to better

contextualise the conversations historically in two ways: by putting forward a revisionist agenda of prevailing assumptions that expands on the debates while conceding to the traditional view (Kahler 1997, Wilson 1998, Osiander 1998) or through a radical reconstruction of historical debates (Schmidt 1998a, 1998b; Ashworth 2002; Thies 2002).

We need to consolidate this revisionism by engaging with the specific role that philosophy of science has in this reading. In particular, this chapter will show how there was more philosophy of science reflection about IR before the 'idealist' period and how, in, our understanding of it in this specific debate, we need to move beyond the view that these debates helped solidify the victory of a theory/paradigm/tradition/context that validated science. More specifically, on this second front, it will show how there is no such thing as a unified view of science in Hans Morgenthau's understanding of international politics. Instead, in the work of these authors, we do not see an inevitable march from tradition to science, as claimed by some of the presentist and fatalist agendas.

4.4.2.2. From History to Science? Philosophy of Science in the 'First Debate'

As suggested, philosophy of science became a systematic concern of research among philosophers, mainly during and after the twentieth century. It is no surprise that we do not find solid discussions about this topic in most literature that dealt with IR issues before the surge of interest in the topic, both in philosophy and, as a consequence, in IR. This section will elucidate how IR scholars dealt incipiently with the idea of philosophy of science in a way that is both anti-presentist and anti-fatalist.

It can be said that, in a way, the prevailing understanding of science during the initial stages of relevant writings about 'things international' was characterised by an approach that highlights the influence of historical methods. We can find such an example in Thomas Hobbes. His historical-philosophical method requires the study of political prudence, the practical wisdom acquired by the close examination of historical examples. This is a form of (political) science that aims at a form of knowledge acquisition based on the experience of the past in itself and what these contexts tell us about social reality. For science, in Hobbes, needs to be hypothetical yet with a generalistic aspiration. A rudimentary concern for the study of meta-theory does start appearing in this literature.

After these initial reflections, it is also true that the liberal literature in IR, which characterised the transition to the twentieth century, was also not fertile in reflections on its own philosophical and meta-theoretical foundations. Some assumptions can be made, however, about these studies.

What fundamentally characterises liberal writings is a belief in progress and the notion of reason (George 1994:74-77). This implies that liberals would be interested in an approach to international relations that would privilege an engagement with the ideas fertile to the Enlightenment project and the desire to bring more scientific rigour to our knowledge claims. Even though this, in

principle, would characterise these studies, it is also fair to say that it is difficult to find in these contributions a clear statement of a meta-theoretical position. We would struggle to find them extensively debated among the liberal authors, and even inside their contributions, references to philosophical debates are scarce. The exception could potentially be found in Norman Angell. He has implied that we need science to understand the role of education in the liberal worldview. According to Angell, in education resides the future of progress towards a more self-aware international. As he claims, the lack of education was an obstacle to the "impartial search for truth, the true interpretation of all the facts" (Angell, 1947: 17); without this value system, we can't operationalise "the only method by which we can hope to make steady progress: the correction of social theory and doctrine in the light of fact and experience; the scientific method applied to society" (Angell, 1947: 23). This example serves to illustrate how science appears in these studies not as a central concern but somehow inserted ad hoc. If these writings are indeed inspired by the Enlightenment desire for scientific progress, the foundations of this desire are scarcely mentioned. Be it as it may, if, in the work of Thomas Hobbes, we can find rudimentary efforts to develop a historicist approach to political studies, with the liberal literature, we find the first initial effort to bring positivism to IR.

With what came to be known as the realist literature we can start to find a more serious engagement with the science question. E.H. Carr, in particular, does start to engage a bit more consciously with this literature. He starts his critique by claiming that Idealism was not scientific enough, and that is a reason for why the "science of international politics is in its infancy" (Carr, 1946:14). According to this view, which will be shared by other authors, idealism is associated with the forces of 'reason', whereas realism is linked with the forces of empiricism and 'facts'. Understanding the 'facts' of international politics and their causes and consequences would be the way forward. But the fact is, even though there are these claims of scientific credibility, Carr's claims to move IR more scientifically and empirically do involve a discussion of what Carr means by science. It is precisely this lack of clarity on what science means that has opened a conversation about what science may mean for Carr.

A similar discussion can be conducted on the work of Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau himself seems to rely on an assumption that "For the liberal, science is a prophecy confirmed by reason; for the conservative, it is the revelation of the past confirmed by experience" (Morgenthau 1946, 32), hence he seems to accept Carr's differentiation between reason and experience. Even though this is claimed, Morgenthau's work has led to disputes over what he means by science. In his work, we can find different understandings of what science might imply, but there is no clear article or opinion to clarify these different positions. In IR literature, we can find two different positions on how to read his work.

On one side of the argument, Morgenthau is read as an author who leads realism towards 'a long road to science'. And by science, these authors mean positivism (Guzzini 1998, George 1994, Tellis 1996). Taking the work of Jim George as an example, he affirms that Morgenthau is "'both classical hermeneutiscist and hard-nosed positivist" (George 1994:92), but, as will be seen, his hermeneutic is grounded in the pragmatics of day-to-day policy decisions which, even though are always contextually and historically situated, need to take into account broad positivist norms. George promotes the view that Morgenthau's Realism relies on the separation of subject and object. Accordingly, it accepts the premise that we can distance ourselves from realities out there and objectively assess what they contain. Second, it establishes that we can extract permanent and generalisable truths from such realities, which are not subject to the contingency of the historical event. This is done by affirming the accurate correspondence between the facts out there and the theoretical argument. The facts need to be consistent with the interpretation of the theory. The practical application of these ideas comes from George's view of the potential hermeneutical element in Morgenthau's thought. Here he emphasises that this hermeneutic appears when the statesmen are confronted by certain problems of foreign policy and, in this mode, the statesmen are actually engaged with the contingency of history. However, when deciding, statesmen take into consideration the inevitable and rational decisions. This controversial view of Morgenthau's work, therefore, places a lot of attention on his later work and, especially, on his six principles (1946).

On the other side of the argument, we have an assessment of Morgenthau's contribution. For these authors, Morgenthau has a more nuanced view of science, which is anti-positivist. According to William Bain, "Morgenthau rejects the notion of value-free science; that he argues that the essential purpose of science is to judge the value of knowledge; and his belief that the ultimate questions which confront the scientific enterprise are moral in nature, casts doubt upon George's claim that Morgenthau is a detached observer of an objectified and external world 'out there'" (Bain 2000:454). According to Bain, "The scientific enterprise, as Morgenthau understands it, is one way of realizing human purpose. It is a normative activity: it is a tool of judgment that, when properly practised, may be used to discern what is significant, useful, and which improves the human condition. Therefore, the scientific enterprise is concerned with judging contending moral claims—claims that are expressed in terms of values, norms, and rules which cannot be external to human experience" (Bain 2000:456).

Who is right, and who is wrong? Both are right and both are wrong. If we need to move beyond the idea that Morgenthau was a scientist in disguise by elucidating how other interpretations of his thought are possible, at the same time we can't box his work inside one tradition of thought. A nuanced view is anti-presentist while, at the same time, non-fatalist. It elucidates how Morgenthau's work can function in many different viewpoints depending on the way a specific tradition of thought is

constructed by the author. One has to move beyond presentism, but one can't be stuck with one interpretation.

This section engaged with the historical revisionist argument by elucidating how the idea of science impacting (international) political studies can be found before World War I. It can also be found in the work of liberal internationalists and in the work of what came to be called Realists. What can be said about these initial reflections is that they do not elucidate what the philosophical foundations of IR are. In other words, the authors do not clearly state their assumptions in a way that is followed up during the study that is being developed. What we find in E.H. Carr and Morgenthau, however, are initial attempts to start a conversation about science. In E.H. Carr, we find 'idealists' who are in love with 'reason' and realists who are in love with facts and experience. The grounds for this separation are weakly defined, however, as well as the implications. In Morgenthau, we find an author who is also not clear about his philosophical assumptions but who, nonetheless, engages with philosophical debates and concerns.

Be it as it may, the section showed how, especially through an open interpretation of Morgenthau's work, we need to move beyond presentism and fatalism. In rejecting presentism, we reject the view that Morgenthau was a hermeneutic positivist. But in rejecting fatalism, we reject the view that he was either this or a normativist. Instead, Morgenhau's work is open for interpretation. It is legitimate to use and describe Morgenthau's work through different traditions of thought.

4.4.3. From History and Science to Science and History: Readdressing the 'Second Great Debate'

This part of the chapter will start by readdressing how the 'second great debate' has been described in IR. The first section will go over these traditionalist assessments, leading the way to a second section where a more historically sensitive analysis will highlight how, rather than being a thing of subsequent decades, the authors and philosophies of science that will inspire subsequent authors can already be found during this stage of intellectual reflection.

4.4.3.1. Traditional Accounts

A view of this debate sees it as an inevitable story of a discipline that finds its unilinear existence in the form of the study of international political substances through scientific methods. This is told and replicated in several ways.

Arend Lijphart (1974) offers a thin presentation of this period. For him, a paradigm shift occurred during this time, which led to the confirmation of a revised paradigm. He sees the discipline moving from a traditional approach to realism to a scientific one. The elements of tradition first emerged in the works of Thucydides, Hobbes, and Rousseau. This paradigm gave the initial support to the study of IR. The behaviouralist agenda, however, reconfigured it, creating a paradigm shift. Substantively, it mainly focused on the creation of a view of IR that gave priority to systemic reflection. It also moved from tradition to science. The end goal of this paradigmatic shift was the formation of the study of IR, which was mainly interested in the kind of study that Kenneth Waltz (1979) became a representative of. This approach is not only limited by the thin substantive configuration it presents of the 'evolution' of the field, while again giving priority to behaviouralism and discrediting everything else.

The work of K.J. Holsti (1985) can also be used as another example of a traditional yet thin account of this period. According to him, IR is an evolving condition of authors mainly concerned with what he describes as the classical tradition. This classical tradition is substantively concerned with matters of war and peace, stressing nation-states as the most important actors and how these sovereign actors exist in a milieu characterised by anarchy. In a more detailed article about this period, Holsti (1971) concludes that there was a general attempt to build a 'general theory' of international politics – which at this time had been disaggregated between those that were concerned with national variables and the emergent concern over the international system –, but never digs deep into what the roots of the methodological dispute were. In his words, changes in this period are analysed through a broad claim that "there were few attempts to create theory in terms of defining the central questions of the field and making causal statements and generalisations, verified by empirical, rather than anecdotal, means" (Holsti 1971:166). For Holsti, therefore, there is nothing more to IR during this period than a dispute between levels of analysis and a debate about the causes of war/peace on the one hand and, on the other, a methodological dispute led by scientists. This, again, presents a very thin view of the dispute while, at the same time, the reader is left to wonder what the philosophical foundations of these methodologies were. For Holsti, this second debate was fundamentally about solidifying a classical tradition and the consolidation of a debate about methods; nothing besides the consolidation of this debate exists and what specific methodological disputes we do not know.

In a famous volume edited by Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (1969), the authors characterise this debate as essentially one between different scientific understandings of IR and a strong historicist approach represented by the work of Hedley Bull (1966). This dispute is, therefore, not characterised as substantive. An agreement exists, according to the authors, about the substance matters of concern when debating international politics. This is fundamentally a concern about methodologies. The volume, as a whole, is an attempt to bring together tradition and science. However, the volume also

excludes certain versions of tradition to highlight a very specific view of it. For example, the work of Raymond Aron is not presented in itself but by the critique developed by Oran Young (1969). At the same time, the already mentioned essay by Bull and especially the essay by Galtung (1969) highlight how history and science work together. Science provides general or specific scientific generalisations, which then can be acknowledged or not by historically sensitive work. This is a complementarity that would also emerge years after the publication of this work (Elman and Elman 1998).

What these views of the second debate serve to reinforce is the view that there was a consensus during this time that the substantive matters of concern to IR scholars were issues of high politics which led to the emergence of a particular understanding of IR – a more open or less open version of realism – and an IR deeply committed to positivist science or to a complementarity between science and strong historicism.

Moving beyond contributions that aim to broadly tell the history of IR as a discipline, a treatment of the question is put forward by articles dedicated to tracing the history of the philosophy of science in IR. For example, Monteiro and Ruby conclude that this period in IR saw the emergence of an attempt to provide philosophical foundations to the discipline. This behaviouralist phase meant the importation of the "methods and standards from the natural sciences. In making their case, they turned to Logical Positivism, the dominant PoS (philosophy of science) at the time, which defined science as the search for natural laws through rigorous empirical observation and systematic data collection, while placing little value on theory and explanation (Monteiro and Ruby 2009:20).

In this account, there was never a debate with 'traditionalists', and one wonders what the deeper foundations of the debate between these behaviouralists and empiricists were. In a different assessment of this period, Wight and Kurki (2013) do confront behaviouralists with a traditional approach, but they seem to forget that besides the hope on the part of behaviouralists that through "the relentless accumulation of data, knowledge would progress and control would follow" (2013:18) there were other perspectives that prevailed during this time to characterise what could be called the scientific camp. Also, the historicist side of the equation is analysed through the broad claim that "For these theorists, systematic inquiry was one thing, the obsession with data collection and manipulation on positivist lines was another. Study of IR for Bull and Morgenthau involved significant conceptual and interpretative judgements, something that the behaviourist theorists in their focus on systematic data collection and scientific inference seemed not to adequately recognize" (Wight and Kurki 2013:18). In another contribution to this debate, Wight (2002) discusses with more detail the role that the turn towards logical positivism had. Excluding the substantive importance of traditionalism in the debates – besides emphasising that it constitutes an obstacle to this hegemonic posture – Wight addresses the commitment that logical positivists had to operationalism – the importance of defining

concepts precisely – and instrumentalism – concerning the status of non-observables. What seems to characterise Wight's recollection of this period for these authors is the emergence of behaviouralism as a hegemonic philosophy of science in IR.

More nuanced and detailed treatments of the history of philosophy of science during this period include, for example, Steve Smith's account. Smith (1995) highlights the debate between the strong version of positivism represented by Morton Kaplan and the strong version of historicism represented by Bull (1966). To this, he adds the debate between inductivists (Russett 1969) and deductivists (Young 1969) and the contribution by Charles Reynolds (1973). Debating the initial confrontation between Kaplan and Bull, Smith concludes that this debate "ignored both epistemology and ontology; it was instead a very narrow dispute about what methods were appropriate for the study of international relations" (1995:33). In a more methodologically self-conscious approach, John Gunnell concludes the following: "Social scientists, however, often viewed the philosophy of science as not only a description of scientific practice but as the basis of methods and precepts involving, what was often referred to as, 'theory-construction'. Few social scientists had either an adequate grasp of the nature and origins of the philosophies to which they subscribed or more than a tertiary acquaintance with the primary literature … These images functioned largely as the basis of a methodological ethic demanding, for example, that explanation be couched in terms of law-like generalisations which could be tested by factual observation" (Gunnell 2011:1450).

From the assessment of the literature, what emerges are, therefore, two perspectives: one that views IR as evolving in an unilinear direction without regard for anything that goes beyond this. Another more nuanced view that approaches this debate has fundamentally a reflection of a 'behaviouralist turn' which ended up in the consolidation of logical positivism against a strong historicist position represented by Bull or similar treatments that describe this period as mainly concerned about methodological matters.

We need to continue with our revisionist efforts not only by questioning the unilinear views of historical evolution but also by more clearly contextualising the nature of the debates that are actually unfolding. It seems clear that both in broad statements about the intellectual history of the field and in those that aim to trace the history of the influence of philosophy of science in IR, there is room to dig deeper into the nature of these disputes and the different traditions of thought at play. This debate can't be characterised as the ascendency of positivism in the combination of a concern with systems and science or as a confrontation between a strong positivist assumption rooted in the work of Morton Kaplan or Kenneth Waltz against a weak historicist claim that can be extracted from the work and contribution of Hedley Bull to which we add a few other comments along the way (Smith 1995). We

need to better understand the historical context, also to justify the presence of traditions of thought that find their place in reflections about IR over and over again.

To better understand the nuances of this historical context and its traditions of thought, a good place to start would be the edited volume by Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (1969). The authors identify at least three different types of scientific research, "For some, science means abstract theory, for others it connotes testable hypotheses, for still others it is synonymous with the collection of quantified data" (Knorr and Rosenau 1969:13). Traditionalists, for Knorr and Rosenau, can be divided in two camps "disagreement over whether the fault with science is that its standards of verification are too limiting or that its model-building aspirations are too grandiose" (Knorr and Rosenau 1969:13). The volume unfortunately and however, is not organised in a way that elucidates the reader about the central role that philosophy of science is playing in the conversation. We lose track of these claims, and the main conversation becomes one of the centrality of the debate between Bull and Kaplan – and replies to this confrontation. Nonetheless, we find in the sentences quoted above the roots of a deeper debate. Positivisms (in both deductive and inductive form), the initial engagement with the work of Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn is central to the conversation that is going on at this time. Central to the conversation is also the emergence of a more solid debate about historical sociology and the role that theoretical framework extracted from History and other fields can play in IR. It is to this more detailed approach to this debate that we need to turn.

4.4.3.2. Science and History in the Second Debate: Beyond Traditionalism

Saying and synthesising the discussion over philosophy of science matters to an exclusive debate between traditionalists and scientists is not digging into the literature that was being written during this period. One needs only to take the volume edited by Norman Palmer (1970) to understand that even during this time, scholars were calling this debate "alienated or bored" (McCelland 1970:72). We saw the emergence of a debate among positivists and interpretitivists already during this time. This section will briefly go over it.

In the work of Morton Kaplan (1957), James Caporaso (1976), Oran Young (1969), and Kenneth Waltz (1979) among others, we find examples of logical positivism in operation. It is not the goal of this section and of this chapter to dissect in greater detail the different assessments these authors have of what constitutes logical positivism.

James Caporaso builds directly on the logical positivist approach in the philosophy of science, identifying five criteria for the evaluation of theory: fit, or empirical adequacy, parsimony, deductive power, scope and falsifiability. By fit he means the theory accounts for the facts, and he discusses measures of improbability, strength, and the form of relationships between variables. By parsimony,

he means simplicity: a theory should be a concise abstraction of reality. By deductive power, he means the possibility of making systematic derivations of theorems (propositions, hypotheses) from axioms. By scope, he means the range of application, or domain, of the theory. By falsifiability, he means the capability of a theory to be refuted. He accepts the Karl Popper notion that a theory is falsifiable to the extent that its predictions are risky or improbable. For Caporaso, the greater the fit, parsimony, deductive power, scope and falsifiability, the better the theory.

The construction of a pure deductive model of theoretical abstraction was also the academic life endeavour of Morton Kaplan (1969). If a more ample understanding of this historical phase existed in IR, certainly Kaplan's work would be more widely cited. Kaplan attempted to execute a similar research project as the one advanced and promoted by Kenneth Waltz (1979). His goal was to synthesise in deductive form different types of international systems – with a central preoccupation in addressing different balance of power configurations. He is certainly highly aware of the philosophy and methodological foundations of his study and highly aware of the necessity to ground IR in more solid - in this case deductive – foundations. Waltz (1979) would continue the trend 10 years later with the book that came to be known as a landmark study for decades to come. But whose philosophical and substantive foundations can already be found in all those concerned not only with deductivism but also with the study of the international system that preceded Waltz (Knorr and Verba 1961).

Beyond an emphasis on abstract model formation and theory construction, we can extract other, more empirically driven contributions from this period. Besides these logical positivist contributions, empiricists also had an important influence on the debate during this time. It played out in different forms, however. Following the general distinction proposed by Knorr and Rosenau (1969), two will be highlighted here: those efforts that aim to empirically verify testable hypotheses and those efforts that focus more on the collection of data.

An example of the first type of approach is the work of Robert North, Ole Holsti, Nazli Choucri, Dina Zinnes and other contributors to what came to be known as The Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration. This group, led by the work of Robert North, aimed to research the reasons for major international conflict, and the research endeavour had two main phases: first, an analysis of the internal variables that may contribute to it and, in a second stage, the study of the broader determinants of international expansion, conflict and violence. These two phases can broadly be characterised as an analysis of the psychological, political and organisational pressures involved in decision-making under stressful conditions on the one hand, and the structural dynamics that lead to a major war, on the other. A more detailed analysis of the project would see it as an effort to understand "the laws that translate national characteristics into international behavior in the form of lateral pressure … how this pressure interacts with other variables in that system in such a way that

many traditional forms of international rivalry such as arms races, alliances, compensations, and divide and rule strategies are produced and how these forms of rivalry and competition lead to violence. Finally, the authors are seeking to understand how the dynamics of interstate rivalry served as background factors or as parameters of the crisis behavior in 1914" (Caporaso 1976:379). Even though these were the two/three stages of the development of the project, there was never deep engagement with issues of philosophy of science in the contributions. The reader comes with a sense that if there is a logic to be detected in the literature, it is the attempt to define pre-theory before empirical investigation. The research project is an endless attempt to detect several possible variables that can be proven by empirical research. Empiricism plays out in this research project in its more deductive front. The initial stages require an examination of potential causes that need to be verified by case studies. As Robert North concludes, "The intent from the start was to develop partial theories, or proto-theory, and test them as 'scientifically' as possible. By this we meant that the investigations should advance from explicit assumptions, observe recognised canons of inquiry, and yield finding that could be accepted or rejected according to some rational criteria and that would tend to be cumulative" (1976:349). The development of these 'proto-theories' is, therefore, a confrontation with more static logical positivist assumptions. For logical positivists, the idea that there needs to be a perfect fit between the theory and empirical research for a statement to be considered true is something that this version of empiricism doesn't accept. Instead, the project aims to regard theory as a tool that needs to be tested and revised in its own application. The foundation of this form of empiricism resides, for Robert North, in the possibilities of the existence of auxiliary hypotheses. Whenever discrepancies exist between a theoretical statement and the data extracted from the case studies, they can be compensated by the formation of auxiliary hypotheses. These hypotheses can be used to harmonise factual propositions that are deemed to be, as a whole, inconsistent.

This loose approach to empiricism needs to find coherence in the methodological tools used to close the argument. In particular, over the years, the proponents of this project have put forward innovative ways to analyse their proto-theoretical claims. If the initial work relied on content analysis and interaction analysis, later work would become more formal using causal modelling involving a system of equations, simulation and forecasting. The button line behind these strong methodological tools to close the loose philosophical argument was that "we believe that modern techniques can settle once and for all some of the more traditional strictures on research evaluation" (North, Holsti and Choicri 1976:436).

If in the research connected to The Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration, we can find an example of an empiricist approach that relies on pre-theory to assess empirical realities in the quest for science through methodological strategies, other empiricisms emerge during this period. For example, the Correlates of War project (COW), led by J. David Singer, is a project where a

different approach to empiricism can be identified. For Singer, it is difficult to generate theory in IR as being composed of "integrative propositions, all of which are logically consistent with one another, most of which are falsifiable, and many of which have been empirically supported" (1976:40), instead what he proposes is to start with evidence and facts from these extract an intellectual scheme constructed to explain what is being observed. He builds this proposal with three types of knowledge: existential, correlational and explanatory. Existential knowledge is the foundation of all other knowledge and is composed of propositions that describe the regularities of the data that are generated by observation and collection. Correlational knowledge produces the link between empirical description and explanation, it is knowledge of the similarity or covariation of two or more sets of observations. Explanatory knowledge provides the glue and the 'causal' sequence of propositions that have been extracted and tested/confirmed. As Job and Ostrom emphasise, this leads the COW project to "pursued a sequence of analyses consisting of the following ordered steps: (1) collection and recording of all relevant facts, (2) development of a set of bivariate hypotheses, (3) discovery by inductive inference of a set of confirmed bivariate hypotheses, (4) development of a set of multivariate hypotheses, (5) discovery by inductive inference of a set of confirmed multivariate hypotheses, and (6) construction of a dynamic causal model" (Job and Olstrom 1976:45). In the Correlates of War project we can therefore identify an inductivist conception of scientific inquiry. J. David Singer, even though more concerned with the process of data collection and analysis, is certainly aware of the philosophical dimensions of such discussions and grounds his approach in these discussions.

But during this time, other important traditions of thought came to light. The work of Imre Lakatos, for example, starts finding its philosophical grounds in IR. The philosophical foundations of the already cited work developed by The Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration can be used as an example of a transition from the use of hypothesis to test a theory towards a more Lakatosian formulation of the approach. Faced with discrepancies in the previous foundations, Robert North (1976b) concurs that the need to add 'auxiliary hypotheses' to his existing philosophical structure constitutes a problem. This problem is inherent in the way he conceptualises the philosophical foundations of his approach in the first place. To overcome it and to accept the necessary progressive contingency of his theory, he moves towards the ideas of Imre Lakatos. Specifically, he adopts Lakatos's idea of a 'progressive problem shift' as a justification for the adjustment. According to North, Lakatos promotes the idea that every theory is constituted by 'the hard core' and 'auxiliary hypotheses which perform a protective shield around this hardcore. They are conditionalities placed upon a certain theory that better justifies it when faced with irregularities. A research programme is successful if the discrepancies can be adjusted through the use of these auxiliary views. All this leads to a progressive problem-shift. Unsuccessful research problems can't cope with the new contingencies,

and therefore, changes in these conditions cause degeneration. Imre Lakatos's work was, therefore, also understood and applied in IR during this period. Academics were drawing on advancements in the philosophy of science and importing the ideas into IR. Presentism leads us to believe that Lakatos just emerged in IR after the post-positivist turn. This view is wrong.

Also, different interpretivisms started to gain traction during this time. Even though the most often cited article to illustrate Bull's position during this period is his case for a classical approach (1966), in a later argument, we find Bull's more substantive philosophical statement about the importance of interpretivism in IR (Bull 1995). In that article Bull describes the importance of a historical method because "there are international political situations which have to be seen not merely as cases or illustrations of one or another general proposition but as singular events" (Bull 1995:182), because "any international political situation is located in time, and to understand it we must know its place in a temporal sequence of events" (Bull 1972:182), and finally, "because history is the laboratory of the social sciences, the source of the material by which general propositions may be verified or falsified, but also because theory itself has a history, and theorists themselves elaborate their ideas with the preoccupations and within the confines or a particular historical situation" (Bull 1972:183). It is also important to stress how, for Bull, theory needs to be both critical and constructive in the sense that, on the one hand, the role is in "identifying, formulating, refining, and questioning the general assumptions on which the everyday discussion of international politics proceeds" (Bull 1995:183) and, on the other hand, in "establishing that certain assumptions are true while others are false, certain arguments valid while others are invalid, and so proceeding to erect a firm structure of knowledge" (Bull 1995:183/184). This is an interpretivism that aims to bring together an acceptance that history serves as the justification to prove whether certain assumptions are right or wrong. It is a theory that doesn't accept universality but is prone to accept conditional truths. As long as the assumptions are localised in time and space and accepted to be true, then we have achieved our contingent truth. It is also a theory that is critical in that it accepts the value of identifying general assumptions while, at the same time, being constructive and, therefore, rejecting that everything goes. With these assumptions, Bull opens the door for a debate about the role that concepts and historical analysis play in the analysis of IR. A debate that certainly didn't emerge just with the post-positivist turn of the 1990s.

Another important contributor to the debates that were emerging at the time was the historical sociology inspired work of Raymond Aron or Stanley Hoffmann. Both of these academics made significant contributions during this time that are, most of the times, neglected by those who write the story of IR as the triumph of discipline, science and/or "high politics". Revisionist efforts to rewrite the 'second great debate' and to extract historical sociology contributions that started to emerge during the 1950s and 1960s are being made (Curtis and Koivisto 2010), and this chapter wants

to further contribute to this reassessment. It is of vital importance to revisit these endeavours with a historical sociology of IR that avoids one extreme, "the authors nearest the tradition of diplomatic history find authenticity only in the surface of the event itself, its singularity and uniqueness. At the limit, the event is what will never occur twice" (Aron 1970:64) and also avoids at the other extreme "the modernists, who are the most inclined to construct models of conjuncture (with the greatest possible number of variables), the model being compared with historic situations in the framework of a given moment or in a period of evolution" (Aron 1970:64). Aron, in particular, wanted to develop a historical sociology of IR of Weberian inspiration "that would retain the typical traits of the conjunctures to be compared, and would use ideal types in order to bring out what is the same and what is different in two conjunctures-for example, the bipolarity of the Greek city system at the time of the Peloponnesian War and the Russo-American bipolarity of 1945-1963" (Aron 1970:64).

A revisionist would also need to emphasise Charles Reynolds's (1973) brilliant exposition of philosophy of science problems as they relate to IR. Volume after volume published in the 1990s and after seemed to introduce questions of philosophy of science as having emerged mainly during this period. Picking up Reynolds's contribution, one can already see that during the 1960s, there was a concern about these matters. Reynolds confronts what he describes as scientific, middle-range, and historical approaches to science and, in particular, to explanation. His goal is to debunk deductivist and middle-range theories, in which arguments are presented in a very clear and lucid manner. The work of systems theory and deductivism is criticised as well as other versions more concerned with the theoretical procedures. And Reynolds includes in the latter versions of the argument where the "Scientific method is taken by some scholars to mean techniques of enquiry which are formally systematic, organising and categorising data on a quantitative or categorical basis. For others, it means the creation of what are termed 'conceptual' or 'analytic' schemes, which serve as a general framework of explanation that confers meaning on empirical data. Another approach is concerned with 'middle-range' theories, which offer only partial explanations but serve as a guide for enquiry and can be linked together to create more general theories. Finally, it is argued by some writers that theoretical approaches should not be judged by criteria which properly belong to scientific argument, but should be considered as a form of explanation which is sui generis" (Reynolds 1973:51). Historical methods are also introduced as reactions against both these views of science and explanation. Reynolds provides an extensive discussion of historical explanation from the more generalistic version in which past and present are fused in a theory of history to the critique that we can't have history with empirical verification, and the most relevant critique that we can't have history without the historical reconstruction of the past in itself. And on this latter point, Reynolds alludes to the conversation between those who claim that an understanding of the total past is possible against those who claim that this totality of the past can't be known "Since the totality of the past cannot be known and thus

used as a criterion of 'objectivity", any attempt at reconstructing part of it is both selective and dependent upon theorising, conceptual or organising criteria. Such criteria may be implicit in the narrative or defined and made explicit, but even if they are not so systematised, they exist nonetheless" (Reynolds 1973:106). This study shows how the conversations during this period intensified when it came to discussing the philosophical foundations of the studies.

In conclusion, the assessment put forward by Gunnell (2011) that deep discussions about philosophy of science seem not to be a major concern of the participants in IR conversations during this time is, to some extent, right. Also, the view developed by Smith (1995), that, at the end of the day, this neglect allowed for a more focused concern not so much with philosophical matters but with issues of methodology seems to be accurate. The focus, especially for the deductive and empiricist literatures, seemed to be more on data collection and data analysis and the centrality of the methodological discussions that ground these problems. But both Gunnell's and Smith's contributions, which rightly move beyond rush assessments of this historical period that seem to give priority to a triumphant logical positivist position or a weak debate between traditionalists and scientists, do not take into account the emerging debates about philosophy of science that were actually unfolding. If this is done and unpacked as was done here, we will come to realise that modern discussions about philosophy of science in IR find their routes in this period. The contribution of Charles Reynolds (1973) to this debate is therefore crucial to understanding how scholars were deeply engaged in converting their different theoretical assumptions into the language of philosophy of science. If one looks at those engaged in scientific discussions, it may be correct to say that they were mainly concerned with generating data and assessing data – and the methodological discussions that this involves – but if one looks at the interpretiivist critique, we find reasons to believe that there were others more inclined to meta-theoretical concerns that were deeply engaged in debating philosophy of science matters. The same pattern can be found during the so-called 'fourth debate' – the interpretivists brought questions of philosophy of science to the table while the scientists were not intensively concerned with meta-theory.

This part of the chapter, traced back in a simplified format, provides examples of work developed that need to be considered if the goal is to develop a better assessment of the history of science in IR during this period. It did so by digging into the philosophy of science foundations of the 'scientists' and by highlighting interpretivist contributions in greater detail. This exercise needs to continue…

4.4.4. Paradigms and Beyond

Another important debate that is normally discussed by scientific assessments of the evolution of IR is the so-called inter-paradigm debate (Banks 1985a). This was a debate that placed philosophy of science at the centre of the characterisation of the phase in itself, and that also has several underlying assumptions about the nature of philosophy of science in the substantive dimensions of the debate itself. In the first section, the chapter will address how the foundations of a traditional understanding of this debate are grounded both in the literature of disciplinary history in IR and in those specific accounts of this history aimed at addressing the philosophy of science. In the second section, through historical revisionism, the chapter will show the presentism and fatalism of both presentations.

4.4.4.1. Traditional Accounts

What, specifically, characterises the inter-paradigm debate? It is important to start with this question to organise distinctive features of the discussion. Ole Waever helps bring clarity to the debate when he identifies its three distinctive features: "1) its area for locating the differences: 'ontologically' as different conceptions of the nature, units and content of international relations; 2) its 'participants': the three schools; and 3) its self-conception as 'incommensurable paradigms'." (Waever 1997:14). Even though these can be characterised as the three distinctive characteristics of this debate, Waever, is mainly focused on highlighting how the central debate was one about different ontological possibilities. If this is Waever's assessment, we can nevertheless have a broader view of the debate and emphasise its two distinctive features instead: the first saw the emergence of the idea that IR was governed by three Kuhnian paradigms that came to dominate how we perceive IR, the second feature was the substantive debate among these paradigms. This section will address the emergence of this view of inter-paradigmatic disputes and how it consolidated itself in a continuation of the linear and presentist view of IR.

A succinct example of the traditional approach to this period is the edited volume by Margot Light and AJR Groom (1985). In this volume, the editors depict the image of IR at the height of the inter-paradigm debate. It is divided into two parts: one where the inter-paradigm debate is portrayed through the conceptual exercise developed by Michael Banks (1985b), concluding with more philosophy of science inspired contributions by Michael Nicholson (1985) and A.V.S. de Reuck (1985) and a second part where the traditional issues of 'high politics' "power, conflict, strategy, foreign policy analysis, integration and disintegration, the relevance of anthropology and psychology are all examined" (Light and Groom 1985:3). What prevails from such a conception is not only the study of IR rooted in a debate between three paradigms – world society, development and dependency and neo-realism – with greater sensitivity for the historical origins of IR in normative theory, on the one hand; and, on the other, a study that finds it's philosophical grounds in different versions of positivism. It is

also a subject that is substantively concerned with issues related to security. This picture can be further dissected by more detailed assessments of its presumptions, to which we now turn.

The affirmation of an inter-paradigmatic debate can be traced back to the work of Michael Banks (1985). The idea that Realism was unable to fully grasp changes during the 1970s was evident by the consolidation of liberal thought during this time (Keohane and Nye 1972, 1977). This move towards the consolidation of a liberal front that better depicts this era of increasing interdependence moved against a worldview that emphasised the study of the causes of war as the main leitmotif of academic endeavours. At the same time, Marxism was also increasingly seen as a theoretical argument about IR that made sense to explore and be engaged with. The routes of this concern probably lie with the advent of the Cold War and the necessity to explore the kind of arguments promoted and defended by this ideology. IR during the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, moved beyond the previous centrality on issues of 'high politics'. Banks (1985) promoted the idea that these images constitute different paradigms, importing the work of Thomas Kuhn to illustrate this new configuration. At the same time, Kuhn's work was imported to consolidate a view that the debate in IR was stuck in an incommensurability of arguments. These different paradigms developed different views of the world, which couldn't complement each other. They created different academic communities focused on stressing distinctive and separate features of international reality. This, according to Ole Waever's assessment, was a great debate that was mainly driven by an affirmation of distinctive ontological and substantive statements. What the argument seems to forget, however, is that it is grounded on a compromise to a specific philosophical view of the functioning of IR, so rather than just being and following Waever's semantic use of the words about different ontologies, it is also a debate about methodology. The affirmation of an incommensurable Kuhnian inter-paradigmatic debate is a methodological statement.

The affirmation of these methodological and ontological statements can be seen if we move from the 'great debates' discussion to those proponents who frame the history of IR in terms of paradigms. In the work of Michael Banks (1985a, 1984b), we find such an endeavour. To understand it, we can divide it into attempting to address three issues: tracing the disciplinary history of IR, grounding the debates in substantive assumptions and thinking about possible future. His view of disciplinary history aims to separate two main periods: before and after World War I. Before, we need to focus on what Banks describes as the classical heritage (1985a), which can also be described as normative theory. This is the theory that departs from the study of what classical writers had to say about IR. The description of this part of disciplinary history is not, however, being traced as paradigmatic shifts but, instead, as grand traditions (Banks 1984b). After the First World War, Banks describes three phases: the traditional, the behavioural and the post-behavioural. Crucially, Banks sees these debates as functioning around confrontations of general theory. The first debate was

characterised by the dispute between realism and idealism. If the First World War allowed for idealism to become the main paradigm, realism dethroned idealism through the critique produced by Carr and the events that led to World War II. In the 1950s, this first debate was pushed to the side, and behaviourists took over. This led to the advent of empiricism and other scientific procedures challenging traditionalists. Banks sees this confrontation as it is seen by Knorr and Rosenau (1969), a debate between tradition and science where realists and idealists are all brought together under the designation of tradition. The emergence of this new debate was driven by a concern over methodology and not ideas, according to Banks. The focus was on finding methodological grounds for a new discipline, or, as Banks concludes, "The purpose was to create an objective science of world politics in which theories would be explicit and findings would be cumulative" (1984b:10). The hegemonic concern of the time was therefore converted into this one, an endeavour which, by late 1960s came into question. The anxieties of not achieving the desired results increased, and scholars began to question the attempts of the behaviouralists. According to Banks, "By the late 1960s the dilemma had become profound, because the criticisms were undermining the previous paradigm without providing any promising alternative. The discipline seemed to be in the unique position, historically, of having no general theory at all. One scholar nicely captured the mood of the period in a short article: "Where Have All the Theories Gone?" (Phillips, 1974)" (1984b:12). It is also at this stage that Banks introduces another structural differentiation alluding that there is a different way to understand paradigm change. Banks accepts John Vasquez's (1983) argument that realism and behaviouralism were promoting exactly the same principles in IR, so at the same time that previously he acknowledges three paradigmatic changes, he now seems to accept the idea that there were only two: idealism to realism, and realism/behaviouralism to new inter-paradigmatic debate. The appearance of Thomas Kuhn's intellectual contribution at this stage (Kuhn 1962) helped clarify what was going on in IR. The discussion became one of identifying anomalies in existing paradigms as signals for paradigm change and disruption. Such anomalies were clearly identifiable in the existing hegemonic paradigm, which was described as a conflation of realism and behaviouralism. These anomalies, therefore, led to the inter-paradigmatic debate that characterised the literature at the time of Banks's writing. This debate leads to the second main contribution of Banks work: dissecting the nature of the inter-paradigm debate. it is important here to start with Banks general philosophical assumption. For him, it is important to continue with the empirical endeavour of understanding facts, but in light of the moves towards Kuhn, he also acknowledges that all theory is ideological. This combination of empiricism and ideology is perfectly elucidated in the sentence, "The 'real world' of global politics is not a naturally given state of affairs like the physical environment. Its extreme complexity does require elaborate empirical work to describe its condition at any one time. But the task of explaining it is not a matter of hunting down immutable laws" (Banks 1984b:4). In light of the new inter-paradigmatic condition, the quest for a

general theory of IR, philosophically speaking, should therefore be to divide the world human race into sections and the disputes among these paradigms would involve methodological – "How should we set about observing things, defining them, measuring them and comparing them?" (1985a:8) – theoretical – differing views on the substance of IR – and also the acknowledgement that all theorist is an ideologue and that it is impossible to separate theory from the values of the researcher. The theoretical disputes are then dissected a bit further when Banks concludes that "The contradictions are most distinctive in relation to the major theoretical categories of actors, dynamics and dependent variables. On actors, realists see only states; pluralists see states in combination with a great variety of others; and structuralists see classes. On dynamics, realists see force as primary; pluralists see complex social movements; structuralists see economics. On dependent variables, realists see the task of IR as simply to explain what states do; pluralists see it more grandly as an effort to explain all major world events; and structuralists see its function as showing why the world contains such appalling contrasts between rich and poor" (1985a:13). From these foundational disputes, Banks also stresses how other disputes emerge: namely over the scope of the study of IR and over the distinctive concepts that are unique to some contributions. It becomes clear that Banks omits how, from a philosophy of science perspective, differences emerge among these different paradigms. This leads to the third main contribution by Banks: his view of the future. For Banks, in light of the emergence of this paradigmatic fight, there are two solutions (1979, 1984b e 1985b): the one proposed by John Vasquez (1983) which aims to bring different paradigms together to better answer empirical questions, and the one proposed by Banks himself which basically, and still in light of Kuhn's work, sees this fight among paradigms as a way to bring about a new hegemonic paradigm. In his work, Banks proposes the world society paradigm as such a solution (1978, 1984a).

But how to read statements that focus on the specific philosophy of science contributions to these debates? Moving beyond Banks's effort to bring Kuhn's paradigms to tell the macro-story, the neglect to dig deeper into how the philosophy of science is treated inside each paradigm leads to the inevitable conclusion that there is a hegemonic role given to positivism. This comes in strong and weak versions. As an example of the first, we can take the work of Jim George (1993). Even though George condemns how the history of the discipline has been told, he further contributes to creating a new myth about this historical period. In his important contribution, he confirms the consolidation of a version of realism during this time – a specific version that is a synthesis of For George, this period saw the consolidation of a realist perspective that, at the philosophical level, creates a "dichotomized ontological logic that assumes into reality a distinction between a realm of empiricist "fact" and a realm of "theorized" knowledge, derived in one way or another (i.e., either inductively or deductively) from it" (George 1993:18) and that substantively the reductionist terms associated with the transplanted methodological individualism of structuralist state-centric anarchy" (George 1993:15). For George,

therefore, the third debate was really about the emergence of neo-realism as a crude version of the continuous and linear hegemonic victory of realism in both it's philosophical and substantive dimensions in the discipline. In such a way that, for George, the discipline becomes realism characterised as it is in this really thin manner by George.

Another example of work that aimed to trace back the history of philosophy of science in IR that is not so hegemonic but still attests that this was a period where everything was about positivism is the contribution of Kurki and Smith (2013).To summarise their opinion at both the macro level and the micro one of debating philosophy of science at the level of theoretical discussion, they conclude that "Kuhn's model of scientific development was enthusiastically embraced by the discipline" (Kurki and Smith 2013:19) and "to a large extent a consensus had emerged around a commitment to positivism" (Kurki and Smith 2013:19). This eventually leads them to conclude that "although the interparadigm debate did not directly involve disputes over the nature of science it was the period of disciplinary development in which the philosophy of science began to play a substantial and explicit role" (Kurki and Smith 2013:19).

Continuing with our initiative to revise these traditional accounts of disciplinary history, with a specific focus on issues that relate to the philosophy of science, these traditional viewpoints need to be revised. In the next section, we will continue with the exercise of revisiting the traditional while opening it for new discredited possibilities, rather than reinventing the disciplinary historical wheel.

4.4.4.2. Beyond the Traditional View

Considering the theoretical argument advanced, a historical revisionist approach advanced here needs to contest the traditional view of the debate while, at the same time, condemning these views for their presentism and fatalism. In particular, and having in mind that this revised historical account is directed towards accounts of the philosophy of science, revising this inter-paradigm debate needs to do two things: the first is to highlight how the view that there was a Kuhnian inter-paradigm debate in the first place can be contested. The second is to question the unilinear narrative depicting this period by the hegemonic role played by three perspectives and, in particular, that all of them are converted to scientism. This second critique is not so much directed towards the idea of paradigms but the role that the philosophy of science played in the definition of the substantive contours of the debate.

This analytical exercise can already be found in one of the main critiques of the inter-paradigm debate (Ferguson and Mansbach 1988). In their contribution to the ongoing debate – and before the re-articulation of their arguments to take into account the positivist-post-positivist phase (Ferguson and Mansbach 1991), Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach developed a view of international theory

that is critical of the depiction of IR as an evolving debate that aims to put forward the idea of endless progress from one debate to the next, they are also critical of the view that empiricism should rule how we philosophically approach the discipline. These two critiques constitute the corpus of revisionism as it is characterised here. For Ferguson and Mansbach, the latest endeavour to turn to Kuhn is part of the academic attempt since World War II to make IR a scientific disciplinary field. This was initially aspired by the behaviouralists, who assumed that the social world could be understood in the same manner as the natural world through the analysis of data and the use of methods and tools. This endeavour continued with the adoption of Kuhn to characterise the newly formed great debate. This philosophising of the nature of the 'great debate' in itself, is seen as a continuation of the attempt to make IR read in light of continuous scientific progress. For Kuhn, sciences have evolved from the 'normal science' stage through 'anomalies' to new conditions of 'normal science'. The inter-paradigm debate served this broad intention of seeing IR as a child of natural sciences. Ferguson and Mansbach, therefore, criticise this attempt to make IR and their debates sons of these evolutionary conditions. They, more specifically, criticise the applicability of Kuhn in the first place in IR. According to them, IR academics can't identify common problems, they are not able to come up with consensual definitions of those problems, and they are deeply embedded in what Ferguson and Mansbach designate as idiosyncratic research – where theorists are concerned with their own research assumptions, in creating their own research groups, closed as these endeavours are of the recognition that there is something common and grand to discuss – and incapable on making any significant cumulation when it comes to theory consolidation. In conclusion, if the emergence of the idea of inter-paradigm debate is deeply rooted in the continuous desire to make IR as close to natural scientific progress as possible, the idea that we even have paradigmatic discussions in IR is not possible and real.

If this constitutes the first major revisionism that can be taken from Ferguson and Mansbach, the second one is more specifically a philosophy of science one. In this contribution, the authors advance a way of approaching IR that moves it beyond the so-called hegemony of positivism. The first important contribution is the idea we, as researchers, have inherent values that do not allow us to conduct neutral research. This is a key finding that could already be taken from Kuhn himself, but which is taken further through an interpretative critique. This critique is consolidated by the conviction that our subjective values are taken from the view we take of the society that surrounds us. Or, in Ferguson and Mansbach's words, "because of the pervasive influence of society upon him and his perceptions" (Ferguson and Mansbach 1988:34). The second important statement is that IR needs to be seen as being engulfed in conceptual disputes. We can't escape the subjectivity of our assessments. Understanding social reality is understanding those discussions. As Ferguson and Mansbach develop, "What is striking about these debates and what distinguishes them from debates in the natural sciences is that essentially the same arguments and emphases tend to recur over and over again

through time despite superficial changes in concepts and language. And, as we shall suggest, such debates recur because they revolve around enduring normative themes" (1988:35). Finally, this political dialogue needs to be assessed as a reflection of the normative predisposition of the era. Research needs, in this sense, to be sensitive to context. More specifically, shifts in normativity are characterised as changes in value hierarchies. Accordingly, "value hierarchies periodically change in response to contextual and situational factors that heighten perceptions of deprivation of some values and reduce anxieties about others. Such shifts may be slow and imperceptible, resulting from evolutionary or secular environmental changes (e.g., technological development and ecological change), or they may be sharp and clear as a consequence of cataclysmic events (e.g., wars, plagues, and famines)" (Ferguson and Mansbach 1988:37).

4.4.5. Beyond Positivism and Post-Positivism: Readdressing the 'Fourth Debate'

To continue with the Beverian revisionism of the history of IR – and to conveniently place the history of science in it – this last part will focus on the place that philosophy of science occupies. It will first highlight how the history of philosophy is told by a presentist/finalist approach – which sees IR as a great battle between positivism and post-positivism. These views are represented by various presentations that will be highlighted below. We need, however, to move beyond the presentation of philosophy of science in such simplistic terms. This requires not only an exercise of historical specification but also an exercise of bringing to light the disputes among different traditions of thought about this matter that move beyond presentism and finalism.

4.4.5.1. Traditional Accounts

During the 80s and in a movement that would consolidate itself in the 90s, IR saw the emergence of what came to be described as "The Third Debate" (Lapid 1989) or of the post-positivist era. In its origins this intellectual movement, besides the goal of opening up IR to new forms of intellectual discussion that would lead to a form of theoretical pluralism that, in the words of Mark Hoffman leads to the conclusion that "there is no longer any clear sense of what the discipline is about, what its core concepts are, what its methodology should be, what central issues and questions it should be addressing" (Hoffman 1987:231), this Third Debate also aimed to question the positivist assumptions of IR and its substantive conclusions. Especially the move towards giving voice to new post-positivism approaches lies at the core of most of the interventions during the period (Lapid 1989, George 1993, Ashley and Walker 1989). The centrality of the post-positivist critique and the necessity to reconsider

theoretical options in light of new post-positivist alternatives leads, more specifically, to four major themes. The first "emphasizes the inadequacy of the positivist/ empiricist approach to the study of human society and politics" (George 1989:272). The second, "the process by which knowledge is constituted," which "stresses social, historical, and cultural themes rather than those reliant on 'cognito' rationalism, notions of autonomous individualism, or variants on the 'sense data' or 'correspondence rule' formats" (George 1989:272). The third aims to reject of "the foundationalist search for an objective knowledge external to history and social practice" (George 1989:272), while the fourth and final "emphasizes the linguistic construction of reality" (George 1989:272). Alongside this broader philosophical goal, more substantive attempts were made to redefine what is considered to be IR. Most of these contributions, of course, came in the form of different demonstrations of post-positivist work that took Foucault, Habermas, Gramsci, Wittgenstein or any other author that broadened the horizons of social and political theory to the field of IR, but there seemed to be a particular concern of the writers of the time to question a particular dimension of IR. This came in the form of a critique of what can be described as the inside/outside separation of International Relations (Walker 1993). At its core, this debate challenges IR theory to think seriously about the reasons for a separation between the domestic and the international and whether this separation is justifiable at all. This debate, which comes in many substantive forms ranging from discussions of agency/structure (Wendt 1987), community (Linklater 1990), sovereignty (Walker 1993), or globalisation (Rosenau and Czempiel 1990), became a key contesting substantive discussion in IR. The post-positivist move can, therefore, be characterised by the critique it promoted not only at a philosophical level but also at these more substantive dimensions of questioning in greater detail the key constitutive differentiation between an inside and an outside.

Explaining and Understanding. The first dichotomy takes inspiration from the work of Max Weber and assumes explanation and understanding as two poles of the emerging philosophical debate. This dichotomy first emerged in a contribution by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1990). The book itself, on a first reading, seems to be quite open to different postures towards philosophical issues, and one wonders why there needs to be such division in the first place if Weber is taken as an example of the divide. Weber can be referred to as one of those who were able to bring together both dimensions in a way that made sense for social scientific purposes. Including Weber as an example of Understanding could open the way for broader, more conciliatory mappings. But, instead, the authors took a different route. For Hollis and Smith, there are always two opposing approaches.

While explanatory theorists intend to make International Relations a discipline comparable to the study of natural sciences and try to find causes from which hypotheses are extrapolated, interpretive researchers intend to look at the beliefs that the researcher carries and give primary importance to

these internal understandings. For those who support explanation, what matters are visible and measurable data; for the interpretive side, not everything is visible and measurable. It is in the different contexts of action and interpretation that are neither observable nor measurable that the process of investigation takes place. Meaning, which can appear in different forms, is central to the research process in the sense that it guides the researcher during the investigation process. For explanatory theorists, and again ontologically, only that which is observable is subject to investigation: this stance subjects the epistemological and the methodological to this initial ontological predisposition. For positivism, and epistemologically, only that which is observable and factual can constitute itself as a representation of scientific evidence. Only observable evidence allows us to develop a scientific method that gives credibility to legitimate knowledge claims. At the same time, in the act of actual research, there is a factual separation between the researcher and that which is being investigated. The opposite approach doubts the credibility of these dispositions: we can distance ourselves from our compromise with our values. This necessarily leads to a divide between these two postures when it comes to the discussion over the use of methods: explanatory theories privilege quantitative methods of investigation, and all who accept understanding naturally adopt interpretive methods.

These rather stark conclusions do not allow for a broader and more enlightening understanding of the explanation and understanding question. The goal becomes one of criticising middle-way positions, as seen by the comments on the work of Anthony Giddens (1990:6-7). In the end, Hollis and Smith conclude, "The crucial contrast between *X* and *Y* lies in the stuff of their social worlds. For *X* the social world, like the rest of the natural world to which it belongs, is an environment, independent and to some extent predictable. For *Y* it is a construction consisting of rules and meanings. This contrast brings with it different theories of social action and how to study it. It also implies different analyses of human nature" (1990:6). What, in more detail, this means is that Hollis and Smith reject all forms of positivism and even post-positivist approaches that aim to reconcile themselves with positivism and adopt a radical posture of absolute rejection. What this means is never completely clarified in the book. But an extrapolation can be done that, in effect, would lead to adopting a Wittgensteinian / Hermeneutical approach to the study of IR. This broader association with the Understanding position with Wittgenstein and Hermeneutics shows itself in the choice of Peter Winch as the second major inspiration to describe what Understanding actually means (1990:82-88). Even though it is never elucidated what a Wittgensteinian or Hermeneutical approach to IR would involve, *explaining and understanding opens the way for more substantive contributions to* come.

Positivism and Post-Positivism. Another dichotomy presented involved the creation of theoretical dualism centred on a debate between positivism and post-positivism (Smith, Booth and Zalewsky 1995). This dichotomy largely repeats what the previous one intended to translate, but reinforces and

solidifies other points. As it was built by Steve Smith in subsequent work (1995), it keeps the fundamental goal of radically separating positivist positions from post-positivists. As Smith concludes, "There can be little doubt both that these various approaches represent a massive attack on traditional or mainstream international theory, and that this traditional or mainstream theory has been dominated by positivist assumptions" (1995:12). This radicalisation of the debate is further consolidated by the characterisation that Smith puts forward to describe the state of international theory.

On the one side, Smith describes what, for him, are views of International Relations characterised by positivism that have come to dominate the international theoretical debate since the 1950s. First, positivism believes in the unity of science and in the idea that there are no substantive differences between natural and social worlds or, even if there are some differences between these two worlds, the methods used by social scientists can still grasp the true scientific essence of our (social) existence. Second, there is a separation between what is a fact and what is a value. Researchers can always distance themselves from the fact that they are researching through the use of value-free arguments and theoretical predispositions. Theory informs practice and is not influenced by the values that the researcher may carry during the research. Third, positivism relies exclusively on observation and real data. The objective, therefore, is to develop a set of methodological techniques that ensure that knowledge results from the extraction and concrete observation of practical data. The validity of science lies precisely in these rules and methods. For positivism, it is in the aggregation of data in sufficient quantity, extracted thanks to a consistent observation of the matter, that regularities can be extracted. This consistent observation by itself is, subsequently, representative of general laws. These general laws are the concrete representation of observable data and nothing more. Regular processes, empirical validation and causal analysis are three fundamental elements in this lexicon. Fourth and related, all perceivable matter is what counts: non-perceivable data is treated merely as instruments that help but are not decisive. Everything that is not subject to instrumental validation and contains within itself the practical analysis of visible and concrete realities is rejected.

The view that Smith puts forward of positivism sees its epistemological empiricism deriving both methodological and ontological conclusions. In short, according to Smith, "positivism is a methodological position reliant on an empiricist epistemology which grounds our knowledge of the world in justification by (ultimately brute) experience and thereby licensing methodology and ontology in so far as they are empirically warranted" (1995:17). The conceptual separation between explaining and understanding and positivism-positivism is precisely this core assumption that positivism in International Relations comes to represent the intermingling of epistemology, methodology and ontology. Smith's positivism is a methodology that is rooted in an empiric epistemology, which, by itself, also gives credibility to the idea that only ontologically observable facts count as objects of

enquiry. In so doing, Smith closes the idea that positivism in IR is linked with the version that emerged in the philosophy of science after the 1950s and that emerged out of the critique of Carnap, Nagel, Hempel and Popper. According to Smith, this is the version of positivism that characterises most writing on International Relations.

In a discussion that would become more relevant after this initial attempt to characterise the state of the connections between philosophy of science and International Relations (Kurki and Wight 2012, Jackson 2011), Smith concludes that no serious reflection on the topic of philosophy of science is developed inside International Relations at the time of writing and that the word positivism itself is used in multiple conflicting ways by scholars. In an interesting discussion because it justifies Smith's characterisation of how the discipline came to be dominated by positivist assumption, the author concludes that if a minority of scholars – mainly those interested in the behaviouralist transition – do have an understanding of what positivism represents, "many others adopted an unthinking positivism, and worked within a Kuhnian normal science thereby foreclosing debate or theoretical and philosophical self-consciousness". If the effort to place positivism against post-positivism is achieved by seeing the former as dominating International Relations literature up against which new theoretical frameworks seemed to be emerging, the truth is that this dominium was almost unconscious and not fully intended. As Smith himself concludes, most researchers seem to be following an approach to science that is more closely connected to Kuhn than to Carnap, Nagel, Hempel, or Popper. However, and this is the point Smith advances later, even though most are not self-conscious of their fully positivist bias, research carries with it the epistemological commitment to the idea that there is such a thing as a reality and that this factual reality is all that matters to be assessed using specific methodological tools. This epistemological commitment and assumption, joined together with a specific methodology, leads to a limited range of ontological claims. Justified the prevalence of positivism as both a philosophical commitment and how it is expressed in academic research, we come full circle in the attempt to place positivism against opposites. But what are these opposites?

If in a previous work (1995), Smith built the emerging theoretical map of IR Theory as being built between (positivist) explanatory theory and (post-positivist) constitutive theory and described constitutive theory as being composed of foundational (critical theory, historical sociology and some feminism) and anti-foundational (postmodernism and some feminist) theories, Steve Smith now grounds the mapping of IR in different epistemological positions (and not so much in theories of IR). He describes the criteria as being objectivism, empiricism, naturalism and behaviouralism and aims to compare four different types of epistemologies this time: scientific realism, hermeneutics, feminism, critical theory and post-modernism. In the end, as illustrated by the way the chapters are organised, realism, liberalism or Marxism are portrayed as traditional theories and historical sociology, post-structuralism feminism and critical theory as "Openings" (Smith et al. 1995). This organisation of the

volume doesn't correspond fully, therefore, with the intention developed in the initial introduction. No dedicated chapter is given to the alternative epistemologies of scientific realism or hermeneutics in the collection, even though they were emphasised in the introduction. Even though the intention seems to be to give voice to a different epistemological mapping of IR, the volume ends up giving voice to the emerging theoretical disputes emphasised in Smith's previous work.

Rationalism and Reflexivism. If the previous debates ground the discussion in broad conversions about explaining and understanding or between positivism and positivism, a different and more specific reading of the new philosophical mapping of IR was provided by a different formulation: that between rationalism and reflexivism. If the previous conversations described IR as being separated by broad explanatory or positivist assumptions versus adherents to an ontological world of understanding or post-positivistic epistemologies, the contribution of Robert Keohane (1989) creates a new dichotomy: that between a particular version of explanatory theory – rationalism – and reflexivist approaches. Rationalism (not positivism) and reflexivist approaches seem to emerge in this new configuration as the new emergent debate that would map out International Relations' theoretical landscape.

Keohane was essentially concerned with the study of international institutions and how these could be studied by two distinctive philosophical approaches. Rationalism assumes as their main point of departure the idea that individuals, and by extension states, are utility maximisers, ignoring, by doing so, all other aspects that may characterise other social characteristics. These rationalistic motivations lead them to join institutional frameworks because these settings reduce uncertainty and change transaction costs. These institutions will persist as long as the members have rational reasons to keep them alive, and these institutions are themselves an expression of these motives. The rules of the institution will reflect the power dynamics that make them possible in the first place, and these institutions will always benefit those who are able to participate in their activities. The point stressed by Keohane is, therefore, essentially an ontological one. Institutions are described as rationalistic creations that derive from the willingness of the state to create them. These preferences are fixed and endogenous to the agent itself.

Reflexivists, for Keohane, on the other hand, conclude that there is no such thing as fixed preferences; they conclude that preferences are always linked with those who hold them and are always fixed in the course of interaction, and can't be acquired *a priori.* They don't possess just one 'unique' quality exogenous to the interaction itself, but multiple and endogenous to the process of interaction. More specifically, Keohane stresses the argument put forward by reflexivists of the importance of studying the belief systems that allow the formation of preferences in the first place. On the other hand, what is also emphasised is how institutions themselves condition the behaviour of actors when they interact in these institutional contexts. They have a life of their own and have as

much influence on actors as the actors in these contexts. In this sense, different institutional contexts will have different impacts on different actors. Values, norms and practices will vary across cultures, and this differentiation will affect the effectiveness and compliance with institutional contexts. What Keohane is describing is the mutual constitution of agents and structures and he is making essentially an ontological statement about the existence of a reflexive approach that doesn't take institutional preferences for granted. The main epistemological and methodological critique emerges at this stage and is directed at reflexivism. Departing from an implicit empiricist perspective, Keohane challenges the reflexivists to come up with a 'research programme' that would move the critique beyond obscure philosophical critiques. What reflexivists need is to study what goes on in the real world. As he concludes, they need to come up with research that emphasises "theory and the application of theory to practice, but especially through empirical research" (1988:383).

In the end, Keohane designates these new approaches as reflexivists instead of 'interpretative'. This is so to distance these versions from historical sociological and international political theory-inspired arguments. Keohane is not clear and doesn't describe precisely who these reflexivists are, but he suggests works that include the constructivism of Ruggie and Kratochwil, the critical theory of Cox, the postmodernism of Ashley or the feminism of Sylvester (1989).

Explanatory and Constitutive. In an article aimed to further consolidate its original position but to consolidate it further, Smith further characterises what, for him, are different approaches to what he considers to be valid constitutive theory. This highlights a previous debate that also characterised the initial stages of the Third Debate and that made a separation between two different types of (valid) post-positivist theorising.

In the first debate, Smith (1995) stresses how there are still two stories to tell about the world: one explanatory with its ontological, epistemological (and methodological) consequences, and the other what he describes this time as constitutive. As Smith concludes, "[A]t base this boils down to a difference over what the social world is like; is it to be seen as scientists think of the 'natural' world, that is to say as something outside of our theories, or is the social world what we make of it?" (1995:27). The argument of *Explaining and Understanding* is therefore reinforced here, and a more specific condemnation of authors such as Giddens and Bashkar, who attempt to bring together positivism and post-positivism, is developed. On the other hand, Smith distances himself from more radical opinions, which do not accept a division between these two stories in the first place because they see foundationalism as a fruitless attempt to make sense of the (social theoretical) world. A world with foundations is a world with underlying epistemological and ontological assumptions. Smith grounds his understanding divide explicitly in the Wittgensteinian tradition and, more specifically, in hermeneutics.

But what this subsequent clarification of the argument proposes is to illuminate a further debate that characterised the initial stages of the Third Debate, namely its differentiation between celebration and despair (Ashley and Walker 1998, George 1993). Accordingly, for Smith, these constitute reflections, rooted as they are in Wittgenstein and Hermeneutics, found their expression in two substantive, but different, epistemologies: one emphasised by critical interpretative theories and that finds support in the work of Critical Theorists, and another more radical predisposition embraced by the work of post-structuralism. Radical interpretivism criticises the foundationalism of critical theorists and their aspiration for a better human condition as positivism in disguise.

What seems clear is that the new mapping of international theory should at the philosophical level include discussions over different, let us say, epistemologies: positivism and post-positivist (scientific realism, Wittgenstein, Hermeneutics, Critical and Post-Modern) but, substantively, only those inspired by Wittgenstein/hermeneutics, critical and post-modern are considered valid.

This more precise characterisation of international theory mapping, when compared to Keohane's, is, therefore, more limited to the possibilities of post-positivist theorising. Keohane did mention theories that had roots in Scientific Realism, for example.

4.4.5.2. Readdressing the Traditional Approach

Ever since the 1960s – and even before that, as the previous part highlighted – we have been in International Relations concerned with bringing philosophical and meta-theoretical cohesion to the discipline. Even though there was an explicit attempt to bring these discussions to the forefront of the discipline, they keep being read today as just inglorious efforts to discuss 'method' and not 'methodology'. In the words of Patrick Jackson, "But because of the dominance of classically objective methodology, our putative 'methodological' discussions in IR have largely been method discussions: how best to achieve 'progress' in accurately representing the world in our accounts, how to select cases so as to most efficiently test hypotheses, and so forth. There has been comparatively little fundamental interrogation of what we should be doing when we construct IR knowledge: very little methodological discussion" (2008:131). Steve Smith is of a similar opinion when he states that "Bull proposed more traditional and historical analysis. Now the problem with the debate was that it ignored both epistemology and ontology; it was instead a very narrow dispute about what methods were appropriate for the study of international relations" (1995:33).

During the positivist-post-positivist debate, this has been characterised by a rather sterile attempt to ground these philosophical foundations in two competing and irreconcilable views of philosophy and IR. On the one side, there were the positivists; on the other, their post-positivist

critiques. These debates certainly started to bring philosophy and meta-theoretical discussion to the forefront of IR. But it came at a cost. In the words of Colin Wight, "the contemporary meta-theoretical framework the discipline employs is a bar to constructive dialogue; a hindrance to much-needed research into issues of vital concern; a confused misrepresentation of the issues; and most importantly, a construct of those working in the field, and hence they have it within their power to change it" (2013:30).

What is emerging in today's literature is a reconfiguration of the positivist-post-positivist debate and the philosophical foundations IR became engulfed with because of this debate. New positions have emerged that move beyond this dialogue of the deaf. Positions that aim to ground IR in new foundations, others which want to ground it in the plurality of its own discourse, to others which are highly sceptical that any such philosophical grounding is possible. In this part, we aim to highlight these debates.

Elman and Elman's Lakatosian Approach. Imre Lakatos's methodology of research programmes has been applied to IR by several scholars (Biersteker 1993, Brecher 1999, de Mesquita 1988, Vasquez 1998), and we have seen an engagement with Lakatos's philosophical position in IR. Even though the debate is alive and well, we will focus here on the work developed by Colin Elman and Miriam Elman (2002) as an illustration of the application that Lakatos can have in IR.

Lakatos's work emerged at a stage in the discussion of philosophy of science where Popper and Kuhn were engaging in disputes over how best to understand scientific knowledge. Popper endorsed the view that it was through the refutation of theoretical arguments by observation that we could attest to the validity of a theoretical argument. He develops specific criteria to overcome problems of subjectivity that may arise during the process of evaluation. Kuhn builds on this uncertainty and develops a different view of scientific progress. For him, we, as scholars, are debating among ourselves in different paradigms which we acquire subjectively. Changes occur when radical inconsistencies in one paradigm give rise to another. Both Popper and Kuhn share the view, therefore, that we have theories that prevail during certain periods – what they diverge, to put it succinctly, is on the role of we as researchers, in the acquisition and transmission of knowledge. Lakatos aims to side with Popper, for one of the more intriguing problems Popper faced was how to avoid readings of observations that derive subjective conclusions. When confronted by evidence that moves away from theoretical arguments, scientists have the temptation to review the evidence so it fits the theory. This is a major problem that Lakatos also confronted and developed a more balanced solution to it. At the same time, and in line with Kuhn's critique, Lakatos also recognised the claim that multiple scientific communities hold different truths, which condemns scholars to work within these truths. The plurality of subjectivities is, therefore, something that exists in science.

In the spirit of this rational multiplicity, he develops some concepts and ideas that are emphasised by Elman and Elman (2002). The framework proposed by Lakatos is one where there is not one theory but multiple theories that compete among themselves to explain reality. These can be big or small theoretical arguments, so rather than calling them paradigms or theories, Lakatos prefers referring to them as scientific research programmes (SPR). They comprise guiding assumptions and terminology was developed by Lakatos to dissect precisely these assumptions. All research programmes have a *hardcore* with comprises the structural principles of the research program (for example, in Realism, one hardcore assumption is the prevalence of states). This hardcore is protected by a *negative heuristic,* which is the negative rule that will disconfirm the assumptions taken in the hardcore (for example, a negative heuristic in realism would be the existence of non-state actors which needs to be confirmed by evidence). A scientific research program also has a *protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses.* These are hypotheses that derive from the hardcore and that can be tested, adjusted and readjusted (for example, in neo-realism we can say that there are two versions – defensive and offensive realists. Each has its own assumptions that derive from the hardcore and yet create separate explanations of reality – which need to be tested and verified).

Anomalies do emerge in research programs. And Lakatos accounts for two types of such anomalies: intra-program problemshifts and inter-program problemshifts. Intra program problemshifts promote a change in the *protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses* and not the *hardcore*. They should therefore be engulfed in the program's *positive heuristic*. A more serious anomaly emerges when the *negative heuristics* is confirmed and therefore there is a clear challenge to the *hard core* of the research program. When this happens, Lakatos claims that we are faced with inter-program problemshifts. This necessarily involves the development of a new theory that identifies anomalies, proposes a theoretical solution to solve these anomalies, specified by key observational implications, and tests these new hypotheses based on that theoretical implication, searching for novel facts. This new theory or research program will, therefore, create its own hardcore, negative heuristics and a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses (for example, when institutional theory challenged neo-realism and created what came to be known as institutional theory (Keohane 1984).

Research programs and their theoretical assumptions are always confronted by the existence of novel facts that they need to be able to incorporate and predict. If they can do so, they will be considered progressive; if not, and the theories are merely ad hoc, these research programs will be considered regressive, and their assumptions will be highly contested and debated. A debate emerges, however, about what exactly the nature of this 'new' means. Elman and Elman develop four understandings of new "temporal novelty (Lakatos1), new interpretation novelty (Lakatos2), heuristic novelty (Zahar/Lakatos3), and background theory novelty (Musgrave)" (Elman and Elman 2002:35). The first restricts novelty to a particular point in time – when the theory was developed. This, of course,

is very restrictive and was not accepted because of this. The second is meant to be interpreted as a novel fact being the result of a new interpretation developed by a new theory of an old fact. This presents a problem: everything novel can be said to produce a problemshift. This crucial problem opens the way for a more acceptable understanding of the novel: the novel needs to relate to what exists. It is in this way that Lakatos accepted the third understanding of novelty. This is the view that novel needs to relate to what exists but also that it can't be incorporated in pre-existing conditions. In other words, it needs to be a challenge to assumptions that didn't exist before. At the same time, a fact can't be considered novel if it allows the construction of a theory while, at the same time, supporting it. The appearance of an anomaly needs to be completely new to the existing assumptions. A fourth possibility appears in the work of Musgrave. This is the view that novelty comes either from a challenge to existing propositions of 'old' theories or that they are completely new facts not identified by these 'old' viewpoints. The problem with this view, as stressed by Elman and Elman is that it makes all problemshifts necessarily progressive. They therefore think that for something to be new, it needs to in some way provoke a reaction from existing assumptions. We can't transform an old theory with a new fact, nor can we create new theories just because there's a new fact. A new fact needs to become an anomaly to existing assumptions. It is in the challenge that it poses to these assumptions that it gains the form of heuristic novelty. This version of heuristic novelty is, therefore, the one that fully respects the assumptions that underpin Lakatos's framework (Elman and Elman 2020:33-39).

For Lakatos, development in science is not taken to mean a complete and total replacement of one paradigm or theory by another. There is not a single set of assumptions that will rein during particular periods to which scientists convert to irrationally until a new irrationality emerges. Instead, research programs should be judged by the rational criteria that they endorse: by their capacity to continuously generate new ways to understand and explain new facts. It is in their capacity to constantly readjust their core assumptions to new facts and, therefore, to not decline and regress, that research programs survive.

The final discussion deals with points of intersection. The problem with Lakatos is that it grounds its position in research programmes that do not communicate with each other. Confirming Kuhn's assessment, it solidifies the view that different research programmes are not compatible and, therefore, the claim of incommensurability and non-dialogue is inevitable. Research programmes have specific core assumptions, and the process of degeneration is either tackled internally or gives rise to a new research programme. The new research program is not a synthesis of the previous one. Instead, it is constituted by the incapacity of the prevailing research program to explain a novel fact.

Alexander Wendt's Scientific Realism. Alexander Wendt grounds his philosophical foundations in meta-theory and in a specific understanding of meta-theory. Contrary to the previous assumptions where epistemological foundations ground the research, either in the form of theoretical research programmes or theories that are derived from experience, Wendt endorses an approach to philosophy that aims to ground it in ontology. The routes of our knowledge of reality are in the mindful perception we have of it.

The first step to such a philosophical positioning is to situate scientific realism in light of empiricism and postmodernism. Wendt develops three principles of scientific realism: "1 the world is independent of the mind and language of individual observers; 2 mature scientific theories typically refer to this world, 3 even when it is not directly observable" (Wendt 1999:51).

The first distinctive characteristic of scientific realism is that ontology should come first, before epistemology. This implies a view of reality characterised by materialism, which doesn't discount, however, the existence of unobservables. The idea that the world exists independent of our knowledge of it was not just criticised by different kinds of interpretitivists but was also discredited by empiricists such as Hume. Hume accepts the view that our perceptions play a role in what is out there and, therefore, opens the door for interpretivism. Also, anti-realism is seen in behaviouralism when it claims that reality is only constituted by what we can observe – and not by unobservables as well.

The second discussion emphasised by Wendt leads to a debate about different theories of reference. The way scientific realism solves the epistemological problem of how the mind and language hook to understand what surrounds us is by emphasising the power of causal theory. This is rejected by the description theory advanced by empiricists and the relational theory emphasised by postmodernists. For empiricists, meaning is a "function of descriptions within language, not a relation between words and reality" (Wendt 1999:54), and these descriptions need to be derived from observation. They do, however, describe these descriptions as being sense data that ultimately exist in the mind (even though they refer to material substances). Scientific realists would oppose this view by claiming that we always need to have some reference that is not purely internal. It must refer to or deal with the relationship between the words we possess and the external world. We only identify meaning when we make sense of it by reference to something outside ourselves. There are no universal meanings in this sense. On the other hand, for postmodernists, "The claim is merely that reality has nothing to do with the determination of meaning and truth, which are governed instead by power relations and other sociological factors within discourse" (Wendt 1999:55). For postmodernists there is no outside world independent of discourse and the existence of this discourse-driven world is internal to the discourse itself. In other words, postmodernists can't justify an action external to the discourse by which it is constituted. The justification for an action is solely dependent on the discourse

that drove it. The reasons for it are not understood through the assessment of a particular understanding of reality – which, in Wendt's view, contains properties in itself – but only in what the meaning inputted in the discourse is. The conclusion that Wendt arrives at is that both empiricist and postmodern theories of references rely on assumptions embedded in meanings that discount, in this sense, an understanding of an external reality. They therefore place epistemological statements ahead of ontological statements. In the scientific realism promoted by Wendt, we can't have an understanding of knowledge without anchoring it in an external reality. As he concludes, "Underlying the causal theory is an ontological assumption that the world contains ``natural kinds'' like water, atoms, or dogs. Natural kinds are self-organizing, material entities whose causal powers are constituted by intrinsic, mind-independent structures rather than by human social convention. These material entities exert a reality constraint on us, such that if we want to succeed in the world our theories should conform to them as much as possible" (Wendt 1999:58). The goal of knowledge is precisely to understand what is going on in this naturally given realities – we should bring it closer to these natural kinds. Natural kinds, in this sense, produce effects that need to be grasped and understood. Science "must be anchored to the world via the mechanisms described by the causal theory" (Wendt 1999:58).

Finally, Wendt's scientific realism relies on a specific assumption of unobservables that moves beyond empiricism and postmodernism. Against empiricism, which claims that we can only know and develop knowledge through direct observation, scientific realism claims that there's no rigid separation between theory and observation – all observation is theory-laden. Unobservables, therefore, do not pose any problem for theory development. We can rely on them to understand realities and construct a view of these realities. Postmodernists, on the other hand, agree with this proposition. What scientific realists diverge, however, is in claiming that we have access to unobservables beyond the theories in which they are embedded. Scientific realists accept what Wendt describes as "inference to the best explanation" (Wendt 1999:62). And by this, he means a form of induction that allows us to understand reality. Unobservables are, therefore, explained by reference to the work of theorists, who can baptise unobservable realities by proposing hypotheses about how they relate to observable effects. These unobservable realities are best attributed to what is going on in a reality that is accepted to exist independently of ourselves. This existence and this reality separate scientific realism from postmodernism, while the possibility to move beyond observation separates scientific realism and empiricism.

These ontologies are, therefore, crucial for the theory. Wendt understands them as social kinds and develops several assumptions about the formation of these social kinds. The first is that we seek to explain social kinds not by deducing them from universal laws but, instead, by describing certain causal

mechanisms. These causal, mechanical-driven explanations are themselves rooted in spatio-temporal contexts that are specific to each age, but, as Wendt stresses, are also able to have trans-historical elements. Even though this may be an argument that lacks clarification, the fundamental aspect of it is that social kinds are not extracted from generalizations but from assumptions based on causality.

On the other hand, social kinds are conceived as "interlocking beliefs, concepts, or theories held by actors" (Wendt 1999:70), which are a function of belief and action while, at the same time, they are constituted by social relations. Social facts are therefore held by actions which consistently, by their belief and action, reinforce their existence, which are further replicated in their social relations.

A pertinent question arises in the distinction between a pure idealist theory – which emphasises exclusively the role of ideas – and a realist theory, such as the one promoted by Wendt. These social facts are dependent on the mind but preserve a sense of objectivity. Wendt identifies three responses that move realism away from idealism. The first is the role of material forces when developing a theory of social kinds. A theory of social kinds must always refer to something that is material and which exercises by itself some real impact on our lives. Things do not exist just in our brain, they have a material existence and a theory of social kinds must refer to these natural kinds. We can develop causal theories from these material existences.

The second important aspect of social kinds is that they are entirely self-organizing. They possess an existence not because we discuss what that existence is but because they have an internal structure that justifies itself and its materiality. In other words, according to Wendt and his version of scientific realism, a dog is a dog not because we say what a dog is but because it possesses property that defines it as a dog. Similarly, a state is a state not because we say what a state is but because it naturally acquires its distinctive features (that we will then digest in the form of the description of the social kind). This second element is what Wendt describes as the "self-organizing hypothesis". This is complemented, however, by an external element, and here is where Wendt claims that states are also 'what we make of them'. In the combination of internal naturally acquired features and external socially constructed features, Wendt derives the following conclusion: "We might generalize this proposal by saying that social kinds lie on a spectrum of varying combinations of internal, self-organization and external, social construction, the relative weights of which determine whether we should be realists or anti-realists about them" (Wendt 1999:74).

The last element that gives realism to scientific realism and pushes it away from relativism is the conclusion that "though social kinds are not mind/discourse-independent of the collectivity that constitutes them, they are usually independent of the minds and discourse of the individuals who want to explain them" (Wendt 1999:75). By this Wendt means that there are existences -such as the international system, the state – that possess materialities in themselves that are independent of what

we think they should be. What Wendt recognizes, however, is that change is purely dependent on ideas. Endorsing the view that only new cognitive thinking can change the nature of materiality – and not any other theoretical perspective that lives outside our ideational world – he concludes that "in both social and natural science observation of the world is affected by our theories, but social scientific theories alone have the potential to become part of their world as well.94 Such transformations violate the assumptions of the causal theory of reference since reality is caused by theory rather than vice-versa. If societies were constantly doing this ± in a sort of ``permanent conceptual revolution'' we could not be realists about society" (Wendt 1999:76).

The final step of the argument engages with dissecting the nature of explanation and embeds Wendt's scientific realism with positivism. Wendt does this by first opening up the grounds for causal theorising and second by grounding constitutive theorising in a particular framework. He develops a separation between 'why' and how/what questions to better elucidate this differentiation, ending up subsuming why questions to the requirements of what/how questions and then developing a particular approach to how/what questions rooted in positivism.

Causal theorising is viewed by Wendt mainly in light of the empiricist approach put forward by Hume and followed subsequently. It states that we aim to identify cause-effect relations and develop a deductive-nomological model that aims to trace these interactions. This model is rooted in a perceived explanation; in other words, it is based on an unobservable reality. But this unobservable reality is not internal to man, instead, it happens in nature. Things happen by natural necessity where "The relation between cause and effect in nature is reconstructed as a deductive relation between premise and conclusion in logic, with behavioral laws serving as premise and the events to be explained as conclusion" (Wendt 1999:79). Finally, the model presupposes the capacity to extract predictions when an explanation is assumed.

Three arguments were developed to criticize this model. The first was the impossibility of us, as researchers, always achieving the capacity to predict what will happen if we apply the empiricist guidelines. Not only in social sciences but crucial in natural sciences, this prediction is not accomplished. The second criticism, and the one that speaks more to scientific realism, is that we can accept a model that accepts the inference to the best explanation as the way to accept what happens when judging inference. In other words, instead of claiming that the unobserved reality is rooted in nature, we need to understand it as being rooted in the unobservable judgement itself. This unobservable judgement contains, according to Wendt, a logical drive that we should rely on. The conclusion from this criticism seems clear: instead of being able to subsume events under laws, the only way to capture reality is by describing the causal mechanisms that underpin causality. Causality and causal explanations, therefore, "require answers to how- and what-questions" (Wendt 1999:83).

Based upon this criticism, Wendt emphasises exactly how constitutive theorising can be understood as a reliable way to derive positivist assumptions from social facts. He seems clear in the goal "Rather than asking how or why a temporally prior X produced an independently existing Y, how-possible and what-questions are requests for explications of the structures that constitute X or Y in the first place" (Wendt 1999:83). For Wendt, natural and social kinds have internal structures which are the internal properties that can be ascribed or derived from the analysis of an entity. In other words, there is a pre-existing reality that characterises different entities that we want to scrutinise, and these pre-existing – some would say material – properties are independent of the thoughts we have of them. They need to be analysed or simplified. But, on the other hand, natural and social kinds are embedded in external structures. And it is precisely here that Wendt puts forward the inherent socially constructed nature of reality. The external doesn't cause in the sense that X implies Y, but in the sense that their constitutive nature is possible because we are answering specific how-possible questions. Their existence is caused by this broader sense of causality. The question becomes, what are the constitutive elements of how-possible questions.

For Wendt, it is not discourses or speech act theory that matters but, influenced by David Sylan, by constitutive relations. This is further dissected by mentioning William Dray and his view that "the characteristic activity of historians is not explaining why an event occurred, but explaining what it was, which is done by classifying and synthesizing events under a concept, like revolution, hyper-inflation, or poverty trap" (Wendt 1999:86), or Robert Cummins "useful distinction between ``transition theories,'' which explain changes between events or states, and ``property theories,'' which explain how things or processes are put together so as to have certain features" (Wendt 1999:86). Wendt ascribes three crucial elements of a constitutive explanation: first "their description may require more conceptual analysis than many contemporary social scientists are accustomed to" (Wendt 1999:87), second, "this also means that constitutive theories imply hypotheses about the world that can and should be tested" (Wendt 1999:87), third and finally, "international politics we need to recognize the existence of constitutive effects. Ideas or social structures have constitutive effects when they create phenomena – properties, powers, dispositions, meanings, etc. – that are conceptually or logically dependent on those ideas or structures, that exist only ``in virtue of'' them" (Wendt 1999:88).

If this view provides the broader background of an understanding of causality in Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics, we cannot escape the next step. It is in the process of social interaction itself that we will find the scientific realist version of positivism in operation. As Wendt stresses, "Social interaction is in part a causal process of mutual adjustment that often has unintended consequences. Socialization is, in part, a causal process of learning identities. Norms are causal insofar as they regulate behavior. Reasons are causes to the extent that they provide motivation and energy for action" (Wendt 1999:82)

For Wendt, therefore, scientific realism is important for causal theorising because it relies on the understanding of unobservable realities that are viable through an understanding of the causal mechanisms that underpin them. We can't derive a cause-effect understanding of natural and social kinds without accepting the power of unobservables and of the logic of inference to the best explanation. On the other hand, dissecting these logics allows us to place an emphasis on external structures and how they condition the behaviour of states. A conceptual dissection of these normative properties and an understanding of social interaction and the process of socialisation provide the positivism that underpins Wendt's scientific realism.

Wendt wants to move from epistemology to ontology. He criticizes how the IR debate is stuck with positions that radically emphasise different epistemologies. He stresses how the only way to move beyond epistemology is to focus on scientific realism and his emphasis on ontology. However, in doing so, he also engages in an epistemological compromise: he wants a focus on an ontology that privileges positivist epistemology.

Colin Wight's Critical Realism. If Wendt presents an ontological statement with positivist epistemological foundations and Monteiro and Ruby present multiple ontological statements with positivist epistemological foundations, Colin Wight develops a different approach rooted in critical realism.

He starts by criticising how IR theory tended to be either stuck in epistemological fights – between positivists and radical interpretivists – or, in its attempt to 'seize the middle ground' (Adler 1998), to achieve unity without actually finding it – because a unity always presupposes relying on some assumptions while rejecting others. Even if there is a middle ground, as Wendt would aspire, this is due to the limitations of both explanatory and interpretative assumptions. What's important in the argument is that this attempt, even if grounded in an ontological statement, presupposes strong epistemological assumptions, hence the conclusion that "where they have played a role these ontological issues have been based on epistemological considerations" (Patomäki and Wight 2000:215). He traces this divergence to Hume and Kant.

For Hume, there's no outside reality outside experience. Even though he accepts the view that explanations have an element of subjectivity and that the role of perception is important in the qualification of an explanation, he, nevertheless, only accounts for its validity in something observable. In this sense, he condemns a potential ontological independence to its epistemological foundation. Kant, on the other hand, even though he conceived of two worlds, by creating a sharp separation between them, sees them as separate: a mechanical world, in line with Hume, and another one based on reason. This second world is divorced "from that of physical causation and perhaps even causation

itself" (Patomäki and Wight 2000:222). What ends up happening is the creation of a sharp separation between explaining and understanding, rationalism and reflectivism. Positivism and post-positivism. This, again, engulfs the disputes in epistemology and not in ontology. Both Hume and Kant, therefore, solidify the anti-realist position, positions that need to be overcome. Wight proposes Critical Realism as a solution to the anti-realism of what he calls empirical realists – who follow Hume – and linguistic realists – who follow Kant.

The priority for critical realists is given to reality. But by reality, they mean not experiences or discourses, but, rather abstractedly, "structures, powers and tendencies that exist, whether or not detected or known through experience and/or discourse" (Patomäki and Wight 2000:223). This is a conception that relies on unobservables and the power to understand unobservables in the construction of an understanding of the world. Science, in this sense, is the attempt to illuminate precisely these structures by constructing models that facilitate comprehension. These models follow a logic of inference that is not based on deduction or induction but on retroduction. Retroduction is defined, therefore, as the "movement, on the basis of analogy and metaphor amongst other things, from a conception of some phenomenon of interest to the development of a model of some totally different type of thing, structure, or condition that, at least in part, is responsible for the given phenomenon" (Patomäki and Wight 2000:224).

Another important element in the construction of these models is that they lead to the construction of causal laws. The structures, powers and tendencies identified by the model lead us to construct different causal judgements, which are, of course, separate from observable data, relying, instead and exclusively, on our mental development of the model. But how are we specifically able to develop these causal claims?

In an important statement that consolidates the previous point, Wight concludes, "it would seem that it must come about through a transformation of pre-existing knowledge; a set of antecedent materials, what Bhaskar calls transitive objects—theories, paradigms, models, facts, speculations, linguistic conventions, beliefs, hunches, hypotheses, guesses, symbolic gestures, and so on. Knowledge, then, is a social product, actively produced by means of antecedent social products—albeit on the basis of a continual engagement, or interaction" (Patomäki and Wight 2000:224). An important question arises at this stage: how can we evaluate different claims to knowledge? Do some take priority and make more sense than others?

Wight develops this argument succinctly: "knowledge is not totally arbitrary and some claims about the nature of this reality may provide better accounts than others (Patomäki and Wight 2000:224). This is a claim of independence for the nature of reality to speak for itself. The social world

depends on our assumptions and the concepts that we, as agents, carry. It requires forms of conceptualisation. But reality speaks for itself. And it does so in a way that moves beyond the experiment required by positivists and the intersubjectivity required by interpretitivists. The social world can be experienced, and this needs to be accounted for in a way that is not experimentalist, but that is also not interpretivism. There are better causes, and the work of the scientist is to assess and identify these better-qualified causes (Kurki 2006).

Even though Wight gives credibility to achieving better accounts of reality, he is nonetheless against incommensurability. He rejects both the ontological and epistemological statements for incommensurability. Ontologically, the claims for incommensurability rely on the notion that because theories deal with different substantive content while describing reality, these diverse statements inevitably lead to a situation of non-dialogue. In contrast, Wight proposes that we focus on the nature of reality instead of the constitutive elements of the theory itself. In other words, what matters is that theories diverge over something that they are agreeing to discuss. Theories are always confronted with a similar object of enquiry, which leads them to diverge. They are always referring to the same "real phenomena". These ontological overlaps allow us to escape incommensurability.

Epistemological incommensurability relies on the idea that since the epistemological foundations are different, we can't compare theoretical arguments. For Wight, this assumption is based on a mistaken assessment of explanation and understanding. Criticising Hollis and Smith (1990), he claims there is not just one model of explanation or one model of understanding and what the authors, in fact, should claim is that there are differences not over epistemology but over methods. Crucially, Wight argues that the only valid way to understand reality is by incorporating different perspectives into the argument one is making about the nature of social reality. There is no epistemological incommensurability when one is open to different epistemological positions and gives voice to these different positions.

It is at this stage that Wight advocates what he describes as "dynamic synthesis" (Patomäki and Wight 2000:227). Ontological and epistemological incommensurability lead to a joining together of arguments and assumptions in a way that is able to constantly redefine itself into a more comprehensive account of what actually happened. There is not a single reason for something to happen but multiple. And they change.

The notion of causality plays a central role in understanding how this can be achieved. Against empiricists, Wight rejects the Humean model that if X then Y. In other words, it rejects the view of a cause-and-effect relation based on repeated experience. Instead, there is not one but multiple forms of explanation that can coexist to explain or understand a certain phenomenon. However, these

different forms, and against radical interpretivists, are not just 'narratives'. Instead, they are grounded in reality. There is, in fact, an independent ontological notion of causality rooted in a reality that is independent of our perception of it. It is in this sense that Wight concludes that "Explanations are indeed interpretative (narrative) attempts to make explanandum intelligible to us (whoever the "we" are), but they must include existential and causal hypotheses about the real world. Events, episodes, and processual tendencies are caused by the causal powers existing in the world (within which we dwell as a very small part of it and possibly incapable of understanding large parts of it), not by our stories and scientific texts" (Patomäki and Wight 2000:229). What Wight ends up reinforcing is the power that we have in coming up with different stories to explain a certain reality – and here he is aligned with radical interpretivists – however, these interpretations are grounded in a reality that is perceived in all its existence and not just in the mind of the researcher and in the description of the reason. There are causes in the real world that lead to events. A good causal explanation is, therefore, one not necessarily rooted in positivism but one that can open the door to multiple explanations.

Colin Wight, therefore, develops a philosophical foundation rooted in critical realism. For, against empiricists and radical interpretivism, he claims that it is not on epistemological disagreements that we should ground our understanding of IR. It is in ontological statements – multiple and divergent – that we find our reasons. Reasons exist independently of the mind and are found in reality itself. There are multiple reasons for an event to happen, and they change over time, rooted in multiple assessable and perceivable causes.

Fred Chernoff's Causal Conventionalism. Fred Chernoff develops a different approach to the issue of foundations that will be analysed in this part. He calls it causal conventionalism. In essence, he aims to ground research in IR in preliminary strong philosophical foundations.

First, the definition of foundations. Instead of the traditional view of foundations that emphasises epistemological foundationalism, Chernoff proposes a view of foundational that refers, more broadly, "to a set of philosophical and methodological principles that purport to solve questions raised by social science theory and practice. One may offer an epistemological foundation without embracing "epistemological foundationalism" (Chernoff 2002:201). In other words, against the view that we only have foundations if we accept some kind of epistemological closeness – in the form of verifiability or falsifiability -, for the author, we can have foundations without this closeness. By foundations, he is not discussing the search for a foundation of certainty in the sense of aspiring to speak only to foundationalist theories of knowledge. These foundations are foundations because they rely on what seems to be the best answer to a particular problem. They are foundations on shaky grounds, not on

the grandiose and finished product presented by those who believe that an edifice of truth can be erected based on one principle – verifiability or falsifiability principles, for example. The question becomes, how do we define these shakier grounds? To do so, we need a theory of underdetermination and a holistic theory.

Fred Chernoff develops a particular approach to the foundation's problem by grounding his research in the work of Pierce, Duhem and Poicaré. Even though he extracts contributions from all these authors, he describes his philosophical foundation's approach as "quasi-Duhemianism" (2002:202) or a "modified conventionalism" (2002:202). The position advocated by Chernoff emphasises how the main goal of social and natural sciences is to discover facts about the empirical world and that the purpose is to explain these facts. The centrality of empirical data as the building block of knowledge is the first characteristic of Chernoff's approach. After this initial proposal is set up, Chernoff develops other propositions that depart from taking inspiration from three main authors. As he concludes: "The doctrine … suggested here includes Peirce's distinction between the practitioner and the theoretician and resulting endorsement of the notion of "partial belief", and his opposition to foundationalist epistemology, Duhem's fallibilism and holism, and Poincaré's underdetermination thesis" (2002:203).

From Poincaré, Chernoff extracts the idea that there is an underdetermination of theory by data, claiming that he follows a weak version of the argument. Basically, he claims that given the finite evidence, multiple theories can be consistent with it, but the presence of these theories does not anticipate the time that needs to be taken to collect data. Theory choice is not relevant. What is relevant is understanding that data can be read correctly by different theories, and so, the criteria for choosing the right assessment resides in their "consistency, coherence, simplicity, and explanatory scope" (Chernoff 2002:203). We can compare theories based on these criteria. Tests and future events may discard or continuously accept a particular view.

Another important element in Chernoff's quasi-Duhemianism is the idea of holism that he extracts from Duhem. This holism accepts the need for explanation. It accepts the need for multiple explanations. But, at the same time, it advocates that this explanation will "cohere better with the whole of the investigator's belief system" (2002:203). In other words, explanations are relevant to theorise about the specific event, but they are dependent upon the researcher's belief system.
In summary, Chernoff promotes a view of science where an argument is relevant, not only because of the quality of the research design, the nature of the evidence or the strength of theories but also because of the foundational propositions upon which the researcher roots its assumptions.

How do we choose between these different foundations? Here Chernoff talks about the selection process being determined by a 'rhetorical strategy' and how this strategy is dependent on a target

audience. In other words, the selection of the explanatory criteria is highly variable, and it depends on the specific audience one wants to engage with.

Is there a rational basis for choosing a starting point? Scholarship should commit itself to philosophical principles. An author should understand these principles and be able to defend them while, at the same time, understanding that the assumptions or premises that receive support are dependent on the intended audience. Finally, the author needs to be open to multiple possible selections and not understand philosophical compromises as religious faith.

On the other hand, Chernoff aims to develop a view of progress in IR that intersects several philosophical positions in dialogue with one another. But how is progress possible in IR? For Chernoff it is upon practice, leading him to question how IR scholars should conduct their research. And with these arguments, Chernoff's causal conventionalism becomes clearer. He develops five assumptions that need to be taken into account to clarify his position. Namely "(1) that the various forms of theorising published in IR journals, while perhaps not 'science', must at least be regarded as legitimate IR scholarship; (2) that the best and most appropriate methods and methodologies are a function of the sorts of questions those works seek to answer; (3) that there are different kinds of questions asked about IR; (4) that different kinds of questions are best answered by different sorts of methods, which are grounded in different philosophical principles; and (5) that there is no available theory that shows the superiority of one methodology in handling the wide range of kinds of questions posed in IR to the point of successfully degrading all others as 'illegitimate' forms of IR." (Chernoff 2013:362).

What can be extracted from this is that we need to derive our philosophical foundations from methodologies and methods that we use to provide answers to specific problems in IR. Pluralism is therefore grounded on having a questions-first approach to IR and deriving multiple theoretical possibilities to answer these policy-driven and practical dilemmas. Chernoff's pluralism is therefore centred on the multiple answers we can provide to practical problems. It doesn't end there, however.

What he also aims to do is to develop a way to select which of the possible answers is the most viable one. We start with competing theories, but we need to be able to select which one is the best. And this necessarily requires an answer at the level of theory and the level of meta-theory.

At the level of the policy-making dilemma, it means realising that there are different possibilities open to the policy-making community to answer a problem in International Relations. But even though there are these different options, all are embedded in a specific theoretical framework. We should, therefore, be open to this pluralism of choices, but keep in mind that underpinning the pluralism are theoretical options that we cannot escape from. We can, in other words, always convert different policy options in theoretical debate as long as we have that capacity. What we start to

observe here is that a policy option is, therefore, tightly connected with certain theoretical assumptions and that this is unavoidable.

At the level of theory, we come to realise the realms of what's possible and the definition of best for Chernoff. As will be seen, what is best means developing a limited approach to what is theory. For Chernoff, a theory is necessarily linked with the capacity to derive causal assumptions about what goes on in the real world in a way that also allows a theory to predict what may result from its application. He starts by addressing this issue when he concludes that political scientists "apply various theories that have cause-and-effect principles to one or even many cases" (2007:37). This is further supplemented by his view of how policy-makers view theory. Accordingly, he concludes that "Policy makers are able to decide rationally among the available competing options only when they have a theory, empirical evidence, and values or goals … Decision makers may choose a policy when they have a set of factual beliefs about conditions; a set of cause-and-effect beliefs about how states interact, which are the core of a theory of IR; and a set of objectives, goals, or values, which may be part of the theory. So decision makers use the causal beliefs of the theory by applying them to the particular circumstances to find a way to achieve the goals of the state" (2007:36).

This limited view of what the best theory is further consolidated by his view of theory itself. Accordingly, he views theory as a set of propositions that specify specific boundaries of study, that include generalisations that help organise observations, that explain causally these patterns and that generate predictions. With this set of empirically driven assumptions, he goes on to address how political realism, liberalism and constructivism can contribute to a better understanding of policy options.

At the level of meta-theory, the question becomes how to determine which of these theories is the best one. We moved beyond the very empiricist understanding of theory and its many variations to the philosophical debate about what constitutes a good theory from a philosophical standpoint. The goal here is to accept all possible naturalist philosophies of science, cutting short interpretative, critical, theoretical and post-structural positions. This leads to a reductivism of assumptions. A reductivism that necessarily is intended to short-circuit what is a science to positivist assumptions. As he concludes "when we have a specific set of evidence (whether we are looking at theories in natural or social sciences), we would likely draw different conclusions about which theory is best, depending on which philosophical account of science (and thus which specific set of criteria of theory choice) we accept. Most of the time, our choice of a philosophical metatheory will lead us to lean toward or away from one or more theories. But the final decision on the best theory at any given moment in the history of a discipline or field will depend on the metatheory one accepts along with the set of observations available to the investigator and range of competing theories" (Chernoff 2007:129). Once this view of science is put forward, another conclusion can be derived from the assumptions advanced. Chernoff

ends up grounding his meta-theoretical debate "in a way that is descriptively objective, ethically neutral, and capable of producing reliable predictions" (Chernoff 2007:179).

The common ground for Chernoff is an understanding that problems drive science. To answer these problems, we need to have theories and methodologies, broadly defined. These broadly defined methodologies require philosophical assumptions that are themselves embedded in ontological and epistemological assumptions. It's a philosophical position grounded in epistemological foundations that have consequences, therefore.

Patrick Jackson's Philosophical Wagers. Patrick Jackson is one author who also wants to move beyond attributing unique philosophical foundations to IR. However, contrary to Monteiro and Ruby's argument, he aims to develop an argument that is equidistant from any philosophical position, therefore not privileging one position in the name of pragmatism.

For Jackson, the commitment to philosophical foundations comes in the form of different intentions by academics to come to terms with what he designates as the 'demarcation problem'. Coming up with unique answers to this demarcation problem would allow IR theorists to close the discussion on how IR should proceed to become a scientific field. Of course, this discussion would be imported from conversations taking place in the philosophy of science and attempts made here to answer precisely the same question. It would allow academics to decide what counts as science and what doesn't count as science. As Jackson understands it, there were two conventional ways of coming up with an answer to this question and, therefore, rooting IR in two different scientific foundations: verifiability and falsifiability. The first "maintained that a claim could only be scientific if all of its terms could be checked or confirmed through an examination of the empirical world" (Jackson 2011:11). If required a causality principle "redefined to mean a law-like relationship between phenomena" (Jackson 2011:12) where "All inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities" (Jackson 2011:12).

To this verifiability principle, one can contrast the falsifiability one. The issue for Popper became not proving something was right or, in other words, coming up with the right answer to a scientific puzzle, but instead proving something was false. The idea that our scientific claims come from the gathering of data so that we can achieve some kind of general understanding of it and create a law-like proposition was substituted by the idea that we start from a theory, and the goal should be to test it through the collection of empirical evidence. Grounding science in a falsifiability demarcation has brought in some substantive problems.

These problems were enunciated by Kuhn or Lakatos in their criticism of this approach to science. Kuhn acknowledges that relying on falsifiability implicitly acknowledges the relevance a particular research community has in the construction of what we mean by scientific discovery. What Kuhn acknowledges is that scientists are guided much more vividly by their commitment to a certain assumption in the conduct of their work and not by the desire to prove a certain prevailing theory to be right or wrong. Quine further criticised the falsifiability principle by claiming that scientists constantly adjust their various background assumptions to adjust the data to the assumptions that underpin the research. The falsifiability criteria for demarcation came under enormous criticism during the second half of the twentieth century. Kuhn destroys the idea that science can be a single unified field and, instead, pulverises it with the idea that science is created by islands of incommensurable research where scientists work inside their own 'paradigmatic' framework and are guided by their assumptions (and not by proving something wrong).

This was further intensified by the Lakatosian view of scientific endeavour. He also builds a view of science not as a unified field but, instead, as communities of research that already possess assumptions about the world, which are different and subjective. However, what separates Kuhn from Lakatos is his view that these research programmes are not incommensurable. Scholars can compare, after the fact, directly different assumptions and rival claims to understand which one fares better. This is, therefore, not a claim for fusion but, instead, maintaining some of the classical Popperian assumptions, a claim that we can compare different statements about reality to understand which one is the most successful in explaining the world out there. What this brief illustration of the debate leads to is that trying to find reasons for the creation of a scientific IR in the philosophy of science is pointless. No consensus exists among scientists about these matters. What are we to do instead?

Jackson proposes a broader definition of science: one definition and approach to science that avoids the exercise of having to rely on firm foundations. As Jackson concludes, "a broad definition allows us to focus on the knowledge-production techniques in our own field instead of focusing on what we think other fields are doing" (2011:19). This attempt brings to IR the attempt already conducted in other fields of scholarly inquiry to settle the science question: by highlighting the important conceptual value of science. Here, Jackson takes refuge in the work of Max Weber as an example of the position he embraces. According to Weber, there are two worlds: practical politics and science, and in these two fields, words and concepts are used differently. In politics, the goal is to achieve results, and the clarity in the use of words and concepts is of secondary importance. In science, however, there is a systematic application of a set of theories and concepts, and the activity of the scientists necessarily involves understanding these theories and conceptual discussions. There is, for Weber, no fundamental distinction between 'explaining' and 'understanding' – this is a broad notion of science that encompasses both forms of judgment. These arguments, on the other hand, are not

purely theoretical exercises of bringing to light what happens empirically, but, instead, value-judgements that provide assumptions about a certain concept. A qualification here is important to make about what constitutes value judgements, however. For Jackson, following Weber, having value judgements doesn't mean that there are no grounds for objectivity in the research. As he concludes, "the validity of our empirical results within the context of our perspective. The fact that we have a perspective—that our results were produced by the application of concepts and procedures derived from a specific set of values—is philosophically and epistemologically important, but it has little or no bearing on the question of whether a piece of work is "scientific" or not. Instead, the decisive issue is internal validity: whether, given our assumptions, our conclusions follow rigorously from the evidence and logical argumentation that we provide" (Jackson 2011:22). For Weber, this scientific coherence is furthermore achieved in light of their contemporary configuration where the reasons for these occurrences can only be vindicated in a historical time.

In this sense, Jackson's assumption about what science involves produces a view where the research needs to produce an inquiry designed to produce factual knowledge on the one hand and, on the other, a conceptual analysis differentiated from politics and normative evaluation. This is, in essence, the way Jackson found a system of foundations without the claim that there are actual foundations. It's an all-encompassing approach that aims to give voice to several perspectives – and not just one – while, at the same time, excluding the view that science can be more than just the production of factual knowledge and include normative assessments. Instead of a unique master strategy, Jackson finds in a definition of science that includes multiple master strategies the way to close the science demarcation problem. This is consolidated by two other moves.

The first is to focus on methodology to the detriment of ontology and epistemology. Some positions in this debate claim that the ontological or epistemological statements should implicate a specific methodological consequence. Or that certain methods follow logically from the a priori selection of certain ontological and epistemological predispositions. However, Jackson's proposal is that the fundamental aspect of the discussion is methodology itself and not having an ontological or epistemological statement upfront before engaging in academic research. In an extensive overview of Colin Wight's work, he criticises the view that ontology should come first for, in his words, Wight, although giving credit to philosophical ontology – the idea of "how we as researchers are able to produce knowledge" (Jackson 2011:28) – and scientific ontology – "concerned with what exists, or with the general principles on which such existence might be determined" (Jackson 2011:28), ends up discrediting philosophical ontology altogether. In creating statements about what exists and then analysing different analytical realities following these principles, he discredits the idea that there are more fundamental ontological discussions that precede this step. In his words, "most advocates of

putting ontology first seem more concerned with elaborating their particular scientific ontology and putting that first: before epistemology, methodology, or concrete research methods" (Jackson 2011:28). The consequence of this is a research practice that ends up discussing specific frameworks and how they compete against one another, and not a research practice that aims to bring everything together in the name of complementarity. The partisan of a worldview would, therefore, read the world in his own way and prove a reading of the world in that specific way instead of complementing their view with others.

A related argument is that even when privileging philosophical ontology, the proponents of such a proposal forget how the knowledge we have of the world is not independent of ourselves. Privileging philosophical ontology would entail a separation of mind and world and, therefore, would presuppose that we could identify a world out there without our own subjective analysis of it. This would then implicate epistemological and methodological concerns to this (ontological) specific view of the world. But, as Jackson concludes, this is not possible. We cannot understand the world outside the context of the practices of knowledge production. These practices of knowledge production are crucial to assess and understand what surrounds us.

Having criticised the uses of scientific ontology and the consequences of the use of philosophical ontology as they are promoted by different versions of scientific realism, Jackson brings the debate back to methodology. He claims that we should indeed place philosophical ontology first as long as we accept the diversity of available philosophical ontologies. In other words, as long as we recognise that philosophical ontology moves beyond the mind-world dualism. The solution after this criticism comes in the form of a concluding sentence: "In order to realize that potential, we have to affix philosophy of science not merely to scientific ontology, and not merely to epistemology or the choice of methods, but first and foremost to methodology broadly understood: methodology as philosophical ontology, setting the context within which particular practices of knowledge-production might make sense" (Jackson 2011:32).

The second move taken by Jackson to consolidate this pragmatic response to the foundations question is to focus on what he designates as core wagers. Having clarified that philosophical ontology requires understanding practices of knowledge production as our core methodological approach – methodology broadly understood – there is a need to identify what these practices are. It is at this stage that Jackson develops a typology based on two axes, which he calls wagers: first, the relationship between the researcher and the world, and second, the kind of knowledge to which the social scientist is thought to have access. The first typology gives rise to two positions: dualism and monism. Dualism maintains a separation between the researcher and the world; monism presupposes a direct connection between the research and the world, where the world is endogenous to social practices of knowledge production. The second distinction – between knowledge and observation – involves two

positions: phenomenalism – the idea that what is to be researched is verified and observable – and transfactualism – the idea that we can go beyond the facts to grasp deeper processes and factors that promote those same facts.

Putting these two wagers under consideration, we came to understand Jackson's pragmatic foundations for conducting research in IR: neopositivism – dualistic and phenomenalist – analyticism – monistic and phenomenalist – critical realism – dualistic and transfactualist – and what Jackson calls reflexivity – which is not monistic and transfactualist.

Jackson, therefore, promotes a view of science inspired by Max Weber. Inquiries are relevant when they focus on factual knowledge – we need to acknowledge knowledge-production communities to the exclusion of politics and normative practices. The way to accomplish this sense of science is by taking a stance where methodology – broadly understood – comes first and where IR shouldn't be engulfed in uncommunicative disputes about ontological statements. Science needs to be grounded in an epistemological position open to the practices of knowledge that reside in the scientific production of communities of research. This is accomplished by opening up the discussion of methodology to philosophical wagers – dualistic, monistic, phenomenological and transfactual. This will become relevant in IR because it will move the discipline from closed disputes to acknowledging that "when we disagree, we are at least disagreeing about the same or similar things" (Jackson 2011:39)

John Gunnell's Epistemological Realism. Writing in 2011, John Gunnell has this to say about the philosophical foundations debate, "The arguments for and against the application of scientific realism to the study of International Relations have, at times, been edifyingly and expansively discussed, but this has largely been in terms of the relative merits of different meta-theories. The general issue of the relationship between philosophy and social science has not fully emerged" (2011:1458). This is probably a very harsh criticism towards attempts that had already been made in the past to criticise realism and different versions of positivism and empiricism in IR from a position that emphasised language (Kratochwil 2000, Onuf 1989). Gunnell is, however, right in the sense that in this essay, he directly engages, more than it was done in the past, with the literature that was trying to build new philosophical foundations in IR. Gunnell's work is vast and extensive; the main goal here is not to exhaustively go over a detailed analysis of how to transplant their view of philosophical foundations, which, in itself, would encompass all of Gunnell's lifespan. As in the previous sections, the goal is to elucidate and entice more than to exhaustively clarify.

John Gunnell promotes in his writing the sense that we need to move beyond the realist, anti-realist and positivist assumptions. Departing from the assumption that there is a lag between discussions in philosophy of science and the disciplines where these discussions necessarily have an

impact, Gunnell dissects how, mainly realism and its many versions, is having in International Relations. He certainly read Chernoff's work, but his criticism of Chernoff is not as fundamental as it is towards different versions of realism. Chernoff is criticised more in the context of the discussion over the myth of foundations – by claiming that the search for meta-theoretical foundations necessarily hides the "enterprise (that) has been represented in the history of the philosophy of science … in its contemporary form" (2011:1465). This criticism uncovers the fact that providing meta-theoretical foundations necessarily implies a certain view of science to the exclusion of everything else.

If there is an awareness of the work of Chernoff, the lucid engagement with the literature continues in line with the broader goal of criticising different versions of realism. The work of Wendt, Patomäki and Wight is, therefore, scrutinised. Wendt, in particular, is criticised in his attempt to move from epistemology to ontology and in his claim that ontology comes first. What this statement does is understand that realism is primarily an epistemology. As Gunnell dissects, "What might be termed scientific ontologies, that is, those embodied in scientific theories, are claims about the constitution of reality – not simply the philosophical claim that there is a reality independent of theories" (2011:1459). Wendt's position claims that there is a separation between mind and matter as if matter could be analysed objectively. Theories are, therefore, these objective entities that can come to conclusions about what *really* goes on. Theories are separated from reality, which can consequently lead to empirical hypotheses and causal explanations.

More substantively, there is a critique of the view that the concept of state, for example, is anything else other than a concept. But not a concept in the form of a taxonomy or the form of an analytical construct, instead, it should be viewed as a "stipulated class of things bound together by family resemblances and certain historical connections" (2011:1460). It is a pity here that Gunnell doesn't fully engage with Wendt's (explicit) view of this point because Wendt himself is not so much interested in the academic discussion but, instead, in the practical ways in which cultures, identities and interests construct themselves. What can be highlighted here are perceived assumptions, therefore. Be it as it may, there is the notion that concepts do not emerge naturally from reality. They are, instead,

The relevance of the criticism is also highlighted by Gunnell's view of unobservables and the view that they need to incorporate an 'essential' nature that we can capture. Whereas Wendt characterises the nature of the 'unobservable' state as an instrumental construct, Gunnell sees it more from the angle of "what kinds of things states are instances or manifestations of, that is, what are social facts such as institutions, actions, and conventional objects in general" (2011:1460).

Also crucial is his criticism of Wendt's agent-structure proposal, for in Wendt, there is the assumption the view that agents and structures are ontological entities. Instead, they should be viewed as

categories rooted in old philosophical discussions that involve debates about individualism and holism or voluntarism and determinism.

Moving beyond Wendt and focusing on the work of Patomäki and Wight, Gunnell stresses how the position promoted by Patomäki, in particular, is problematic when it comes to his aspiration to create an integration of different theoretical perspectives based on 'hermeneutic mediation' and the embrace of a reductive approach. For Gunnell, such attempts at integration do not allow for all the philosophical incompatibilities to play out fully – if they did, we would see a much clearer and more representative display of possibilities.

Fundamentally, Gunnell argues against having a fixed foundational claim, either in the form of realism, empiricism, or positivism. Even though he doesn't directly engage with positivist literature, he concludes that IR has much to lose in trying to close the philosophical debate in epistemological or ontological foundations. To move beyond foundations, he takes refuge in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, Davidson and Rorty, which takes, as its structural claim, the idea that science is incapable of mirroring the world and, therefore, capable of separating an observable reality out there from a perceived reality in here. The drive towards this separation, which characterises prevailing forms of foundationalism, needs, therefore, to be substituted by a philosophical disposition that is incapable of transcending or denying the value of specific practices of knowledge. Again, Kuhn presents himself here as the relevant figure that highlights the inherent intersubjectivity of scientific writings.

Gunnell describes this position as "anti-representationalist" (2011) precisely to elucidate the representationalist bias of the previous (foundational) positions. For Gunnell, the turn from empiricism/positivism to realism is just another attempt to provide foundations for philosophical discourse. These foundations, however, and in the case of realism, reside not in observations but in their attempt to understand the causality of realities that are socially constructed. This middle-ground position, however, is unconvincing. Trying to find epistemological or ontological foundations misses the point of how epistemology is not independent of ontology and how ontology doesn't work without an implicit or explicit epistemology. These two grounds of debate depend on one another.

Interpretations, therefore, imply "the discursive pre-constitution of the object of inquiry" (Gunnell 2011:1467). Social phenomena do not exist prior to scientific work, they do not exist independently of this scientific work. Social phenomena are not, therefore, "conceptualised" but, instead ", conceptually reconstructed", meaning we can't conceptualise realities independently of our efforts to understand conceptualisations in the first place.

For Gunnell, politics doesn't exist independently of its historical and social configuration. To fully understand politics, we therefore need to move beyond broad meta-theoretical closures and understand the practical matters in which we are involved. Underpinning these endeavours is an understanding of a method that privileges the commitments and actions of political practitioners in

particular social and historical contexts. This is a radical view of the historical seen as the there and then and not the transmuted and eternal. It is an appeal to the writing of a history that is critical of presentism and fatalism.

Gunnell, therefore, develops a view that we can exclude ourselves from the way we interpret the world. Our scientific practices radically influence the way we understand or should understand ourselves. They are not independent of us, nor can they be extracted neutrally from a reality out there. Our work, as scholars, is to conceptualise these realities in a way that gives voice to a plurality of opinions. This is an effort at the same time conceptual, historical and social. The dialogue that emerges in IR is not a dialogue in the name of this plurality, with the certainty that we can't find either epistemological or ontological foundations in our understanding of what surrounds us.

4.5. Conclusion

IR theory literature tends not to conceive very well the importance of philosophy of science in the study of IR. Most of the assessments made are to highlight the importance of the study of epistemology, ontology and methodology – where these terms are described without any detailed analysis of their contents. These broad assessments tend to conflate these debates under the banner of 'meta-theoretical' debates (Jorgensen 2018, Kauppi and Viotti 2020). Alternatively, when a more substantive analysis of the problem is conducted, the contemporary discussion seems to be stuck in the positivist-post-positivist confrontation (Linklater and Burchill 2023).

This chapter aimed to move beyond these assessments not only by rejecting the views that meta-theoretical reflections in IR are a waste of energy but, more substantively, by starting to develop a Beverian approach to the history of philosophy of science in IR. Frameworks that engage in such an exercise (Wight 2002, Wight and Kurki 2013, Jackson 2001, Smith 1995) can be viewed as having a presentist / fatalist bias when presenting the debate. We need to move beyond presentism and fatalism by clarifying the distinctive nature of specific historical periods on their own while, at the same time, not falling into the trap that context is all that matters. Instead, intellectual history needs to be thought in terms of the continuous emergence of a conversation about traditions of thought which, in themselves, can move from the past to the present – a conversation which, therefore, can possess some linearity – but that, at the same time, is not closed. We see how different traditions of thought may emerge in a specific historical context and may not reemerge later on. The history of science in IR can't be told through a confrontation between positivism and historicism, different paradigms, or positivism and post-positivism. Instead, across historical time, we observe authors possessing similar

inspirations which emerge again and again. Also, different people may possess different systems of belief that can be contradictory at times. Moving beyond a conversation about 'great debates' or 'paradigmatic turns' necessarily involves this more context-specific approach while, at the same time, a linear yet disruptive view of ideas and, in particular, of the idea of philosophy of science in IR.

To conduct a Beverian approach to how philosophy of science has been approached by IR scholars, the chapter separated four distinctive periods: an initial embryonic one, the debate between 'historians' and 'scientists', the emergence of the 'paradigmatic' discussions and the current post-positivist debate. All of them demonstrated an intellectual engagement by scholars with materials imported from ongoing debates in the philosophy of science. This intellectual transfer is critical to understanding changes in intellectual conversations. The guiding light of academic reflection seemed to be a continuous attempt to update the philosophical arguments in IR with a more philosophically robust conceptualisation of the field.

If this is the argument for change, we need to revisit how the four periods have been described and, more specifically, how the philosophy of science has been depicted along the way. The chapter, in light of the Beverian approach, engaged in a historical revision of the conventional wisdom. This conventional wisdom sees IR as evolving from idealism to realism, from traditional realism to scientific realism, from realism to pluralism or globalism, and from scientific realism to post-positivism. This story has been told through semi-theoretical frameworks that emphasise successive stages or debates, paradigm shifts, grand traditions or contextualisms. A revisionism is currently underway in IR that aims to reassess these views of IR by revising how the traditional story has been told and the contents that characterise it, by moving beyond the traditional story, by dissecting other context-specific debates that are not incorporated in it but that we can't escape, and by questioning whether IR was a product of World War I. This chapter's main contribution was to question how the traditional story has been told.

The first debate is seen by strong versions as the culmination of better replies by scholars to what goes on in the real world while, at the same time, attempting to better satisfy internal intellectual demands. Idealism is a culmination of better answers to the anxieties caused by World War I, realism is a culmination of better answers to the anxieties caused by the emergence of Nazism, Stalinism and the world post-World War II, behaviouralism(s) provides answers to the anxieties caused by attempts to move IR towards the creation of disciplinary science with clear boundaries. In the process, the contents of the debates are highly simplified. When it comes to the philosophy of science, we seem to forget what comes before World War I by the centrality given to Idealism, we seem to forget to understand how idealists thought about science, and we seem not to understand the dubious scientific claims mainly made by E.H. Carr or Hans Morgenthau. This chapter, by focusing specifically on issues related to philosophy of science, aimed to contribute to a revisionism that is both sensitive to historical

context and to the contribution of authors that moves beyond the presentist and fatalist stories told about this period.

The second debate is seen fundamentally as a methodological dispute. It is accepted that there is unity about substantive concerns (Waltz 1959), the dispute comes when debating methodologies. Here, strong versions view it as the culmination of the victory of a specific version of scientism – structural realism and deductivism –, other versions as a confrontation between different types of scientific approaches to IR – excluding, therefore, the importance of historical approaches – still other versions claim that the debate was fundamentally about scientific approaches and a strong version of historicism. More context-specific interpretations, however, dig deeper into the philosophical nature of the debate (Smith 1995). What this chapter claimed was that instead of the three initial versions, efforts need to continue to highlight how this period saw the emergence of an embryonic debate about the philosophy of science. A debate that, even though it was not deeply grounded, existed nonetheless and needs to be considered.

The third debate is normally assumed to be a period when there was some degree of openness of IR to a plurality of views. Scholars characterise the period as a confrontation between different paradigms. The chapter aimed to open the confrontation about what the underlying assumptions of this view hide. As described by authors such as Margot Light, AJR Groom, Michael Banks, Jim George and most contemporary understandings of the history of philosophy of science during this time, this period saw the victory of either realism and positivism or a plurality of paradigms under the reign of positivism. The chapter started to show how, through a more context-specific analysis, we need to broaden our horizons. During this time, critiques questioned not only the use of Kuhn's paradigms to describe what goes on in IR – by concluding how this is just a way for IR to align itself with its all-encompassing purpose of becoming a social scientific discipline – but also how the presumed positivist consensus was already criticised during this time by other traditions of thought. Continuing with the effort to revise the history of this time, the work of Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach was used to describe this position.

Finally, the fourth debate needs to be revisited. The problem of the post-positivist critique was that it created an unresolved dispute by creating two opposing camps that couldn't speak to each other. Crucial interventions during this time built in IR the view that we can either have positivist foundations or reject any foundation whatsoever, engulfed us as we should be with the view that 'reflexivists' are radicals that reject scientific propositions. This debate has suffered a transformation, and this chapter aims to highlight key contributions that are moving the debate beyond this stalemate. To do so, the chapter highlighted the contemporary debate about the philosophical foundations of IR. IR gained a more solid understanding of these foundations in the last decades. From this debate, we

see a diversity and plurality of assumptions emerging. The chapter made an effort to engage in this debate by highlighting some of the traditions of thought that are animating the debate.

PART IV –THE *WHAT(s)* OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There have been many answers to the question of what can be studied in IR, but no consistent understanding exists among participants about the full scope of the problem. Current proposals come in three forms: intermingling, myopic, and random. These forms do not mutually exclude one another.

Intermingling occurs when *what to study problems* are introduced along with other constitutive concerns, such as *why we study IR* or *how* we do so. The contributions of Steve Smith (1995) and Ken Booth (1995) are examples of this. They start by highlighting how the subject matter of IR has changed and, subsequently, address other theoretical or scope dimensions. Myopism occurs because these presentations are often devoid of a comparative analysis of other possible routes: a full scope of the problem, therefore, is never identified, and other potential alternatives are never compared. The debate becomes one between international politics and global politics only. Examples of such proposals include RJB Walker's suggestion that we are moving from international to world politics (1989), Ken Booth's suggestion that we need to move from high to deep politics (1995), Richard Devetak's view that there is a substantive critical turn against a 'great divide' (2012). Randomness also characterises some of the literature. In this case, substantive matters are presented in IR without a clear sense of why issues or topics are selected. We are never told what (theoretical) argument leads to selecting certain issues – and not others (Carsnaes, Risse and Simmons 2002).

We need to have a better sense of the different ways in which to address *what can be studied* in IR. As proposed in the literature review developed in the introduction to this work, five distinctive arguments can be developed that provide unique answers to the problem of *what* to study in IR.

The first way is through a focus on international political substances. This understanding necessarily involves a concern with history and IR and the traditional topics of order, its creation, maintenance, breakdown and transformation.

The second starts by emphasising how substances in IR can be read from a world-political angle. These substances are, therefore, read in light of changes proposed by individual authors to different dimensions of the debate: definitional, historical, global governance, and state transformation. These dimensions and the justifications for their existence can bring about a particular understanding of the world's political substances that are emphasised.

The third way is through an emphasis on theory's role in defining these substances. This takes the first form through an approach that developed its own analytical framework and substantive repercussions. This form of presentation highlights an interaction between the definition of actors, their main processes of interaction, and the outcomes derived from both. The subject matter is, therefore, read in light of an organic connection with a particular theory.

A second theoretical presentation of substances disaggregates this. Substances can be read as repercussions of a constitutional and normative framework that governs the functioning of international society. Here, we enter the contribution given to this debate by different perspectivisms.

There is, finally, a fifth approach that relies on theory. This one departs from these practical substances in IR and aims to frame these concerns theoretically. Substances, in these cases, come first and are derived from a concern by the scholar; theory comes next. The work of Chris Brown (2001) was given as an example of such a position. Even though it is not grounded in deep philosophical terms, the framework is there. Brown concludes that matter came first; the goal is to devise a solution through an IR theoretical engagement with the matter.

The following substantive chapter will again not deal with all these dimensions of this constitutive problem. It aims to be a contribution to the globalisation/sovereignty debate. It seeks to explore the transformations triggered by globalisation to the notion of sovereign authority by addressing, more specifically, the perspective of one tradition of thought: post-internationalism.

Chapter 5. Globalisation and the Contestation of Sovereign Authority

5.1. Introduction

Phenomena such as the intrusion of international organisations into the individual sphere of the state and its sovereignty, bifurcation of authorities and defragmentation of sovereign central power or the existence of pressure groups that tend to compete to exercise previously inaccessible functions, forcing states to their interests; they are normally seen as abnormal conditions in relation to an ideal – some would say classical – model of the functioning of sovereign authority. With the advent and acceleration of globalisation, however, and for others, all these phenomena are inevitable, created by that same globalised space. This chapter aims to contribute to these debates.

Much has been written about how the concept of a sovereign state is being challenged by international or national processes that disrupt the ideal notion of the concept. For example, some point to notions of *governance without government* (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Guéhenno 1995; Cerny 2010). Others aim to understand transformations of international authority and how "constitutions of international society" (Philpot 2001) condition state independence (Jackson 1999). Others address processes of shared sovereignty (Krasner 2004) and aim to understand how sovereignty appears to be in a new phase of development as it is conditioned by forms of loan and privatisation. Sometimes these transformations are also evaluated all at the same time. For example, in studies on how globalisation is affecting the state, the analytical work tends to converge and integrate in small phases all these processes at the same time, normally under the umbrella of that phenomena of compression of time and space tend to produce changes at international and national levels that contribute to a different structure of state functioning (Scholte 1997, Larner and Walters 2004).

What this chapter will develop, however, is a more delicate and contextual analysis of these processes. In other words, it is the author's feeling that there is no dedicated effort on the part of different approaches to carefully elaborate what different concepts involve. The effort, in this sense, is to develop a more careful study of the concept of sovereign state and its contestation. What we intend to develop here is a decomposition of the concept of sovereign state to expose its different constituent elements and, from this process, understand how international reality can be contested (Walker and Mendlovic 1989, Krasner 1995/96, Liftin 1997). More specifically, it will be the aim of the

chapter to examine and show how the notion of sovereign authority – understood as the right to govern or as the recognised right to govern (Copp 1999) – is under threat.

It will start by framing the discussions over sovereignty as they relate to globalisation. Debates about what we mean when we describe globalisation are numerous in the literature. Some view it as a myth, others as a multidimensional process with non-deterministic historical routes. These debates are important because they help understand why the current discussion over sovereignty can be framed by reference to these broader debates and dynamics. The second important aspect is the debate about how epistemologically the globalisation debate can be framed: is it a direct result of material and causal forces, is it just a result of ideational forces that have distinct causal sources, or is it always an ideational project in both its material and ideational forces? We can instead conceive of globalisation by the importance it has and the impacts it has on different localities. Understanding how different cultures and identities or agencies interact with the global is a key part of the discussion.

These two broad debates help us frame the main contribution of the chapter. We need to better clarify what we mean by sovereignty when engaging in the globalisation debate. Such an effort will be undertaken in this contribution. We need to unpack the concept of the sovereign state in its many dimensions to understand what specific elements are being – if at all – impacted by global forces. Understanding changes in sovereign states only makes sense when we unpack their core constituent elements and assess transformations. We need to move beyond saying that we are at *the end of sovereignty* without qualifying what that means. This contribution will more specifically understand how sovereign authority is being transformed by the process of globalisation. Of particular concern here, to assess changing mutations of sovereign authority, will be the contributions given the tradition of post-internationalism (Hobbs 2000). More specifically, the work of Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (2004, 2008).

The argument is grounded in Mark Bevir's (1999) acknowledgement that the separation between analytical knowledge and synthetic knowledge must be rejected to explain social reality. There is no stability and neutrality in the meanings we attribute to research: they are always context-dependent and also dependent on our own underlying commitments when doing research. If our knowledge emerges in the context of our beliefs, it is not possible that any scientific rationality can build any truth. There are no pure observations or empirical truths, therefore. The only viable option is to understand the rationality of multiple and plural scientific discourse(s). The study of (political) ideas, therefore, accepts the Wittgensteinian axiom that the author's objective should be the study of concepts, theories and habits of thought. The goal should be to engage in an understanding of the 'grammar of our concepts' through deduction – an analysis that makes it possible to identify the categories of these same concepts – and induction – through the analysis of the circumstances that characterise this debate. In particular, the chapter will dissect the grammar of the concept of

globalisation and the grammar that underpins the concept of the sovereign state. It will more precisely focus on one dimension of it – sovereign authority. After this is done, a particular argument rooted in the tradition of thought linked to post-internationalism (Rosenau 1990) will be developed to understand the changing configuration of sovereign authority.

5.2. Globalisation and Sovereign States

This part will dissect two important debates on globalisation, and it will also develop a reconfiguration of the concept of the sovereign state. In doing so, it will set the conceptual stage for, in the next part, a compromised view of this relationship to be developed.

5.2.1. On Globalisation

Globalisation is a condition that includes material, socio-spatial and cognitive shifts. At a material level, globalisation is related to the flows of trade, capital and people across the globe. When discussing globalisation, we are, therefore, discussing this worldwide process of interconnectedness and its enduring patterns. We can trace globalisation to the analysis of these material processes. But globalisation can also include a different view of the socio-spatial. For some, globalisation includes a transfiguration of the spatial reach of social relations and organisation to include the interregional and transnational. This is important because the local becomes enmeshed with the global and in these interregional connections. The constraints of social time and geographical space, therefore, do not constitute obstacles anymore. Cognitively, discussing globalisation alludes to the process of global self-awareness, for the realisation that the outside affects the inside in ways that transcend previously held understandings. Cognitively, we become aware of the shrinking significance of social time and geographical space. There are disputes, however, over whether or not globalisation is a myth, an ideology or more than that.

Some claim that we can assign meaning to globalisation and fix its conceptual boundaries and after we do this, we can assess whether we are under a globalisation process. These studies tend to look at globalisation as a materiality and assess it through a conclusive test (Sterling 1974; Perlmutter 1991; Dore 1995; Boyer and Drache 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1996). There is an assumption that looking at the statistical evidence can shed light on the topic of globalisation. The argument unfolds in the negative. Studies tend to show how, instead of globalisation – a vague and broad concept – we need to discuss these processes in terms of 'internationalisation', 'regionalisation' or 'triadization'. What we are discussing are the growing links between national economies and societies which have

always existed and are nothing new (Ruigrok and Tulder 1995; G. Thompson 1998; Weiss 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1999). They even argue that what seems to be a new current phenomenon was actually more intense in other periods of history. So we are living under the *myth* of globalisation. What the argument further highlights is the continuing importance and primacy of territory, borders, and the role of national governments.

For others, globalisation is more than just a statistical reference point; it is, instead, an ideological construct. Again, the myth approach continues but moves from numbers to ideas. Globalisation, read in this light, becomes the myth that helps legitimise neoliberal ideology and consolidate around the world the creation of global free markets and Anglo-American capitalism (Callinicos et al. 1994; Gordon 1988; Hirst 1997; Hoogvelt 1997). It is not surprising, the argument continues, that discussions about globalisation became so widespread during a period when the Washington consensus of deregulation, privatisation, structural adjustment programs and limited government consolidated itself institutionally in the world. This view of the myth comes in two different approaches: either through a Marxist lens or through a realist lens. Marxists highlight the desire for capital to expand and control the world. The history of the world becomes the history of this expansion and how Western capitalism aims to divide the world into exclusive economic zones. This form of empire is institutionalised in institutions such as the G7, the IMF or the World Bank and even through the use of force (Van der Pijl 1999). Realists, on the other hand, highlight the inevitability of great powers to control the world economically and militarily. Some argue that power is all it takes to control the world (Waltz 1979), while others argue that without hegemony and power, globalisation would not even exist and would even collapse (Gilpin 1987).

We can, therefore, understand globalisation as a myth both statistically and through the means of assessing it as an idea. But for others, globalisation is relevant and more than just ideology. While not denying that globalisation may serve the interests of the most powerful, they view globalisation as having a real impact. Rather than conceiving globalisation as merely or hegemonically an economic process, the argument aims to highlight different dimensions and impacts of globalisation in different social activities. This is an attachment to a view of globalisation that is at the same time ideological but materially significant in many dimensions (not just the economic one). It reflects a Weberian understanding of social reality as being constituted by distinct institutional orders: the economic, technological, political, and cultural (Mann 1986; Giddens 1990). To reduce globalisation to just an economic sense is very limited and does not incorporate the many forces that animate the globalisation process. Globalisation operates across all domains of social power.

This assessment of globalisation also necessarily implies a different understanding of its history. Rather than seeing globalisation as the sole imperative of capitalism and technology or as simply a project of Western modernity across the globe, this view identifies globalisation with different

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social forces. It doesn't have a fixed pattern of historical development. Instead, looking historically, globalisation is an indeterminate process of integration and disintegration (Hurrell and Woods 1995; Rosenau 1997, Clark 1997).

We have to go with the more delicate assumption that assumes that there is, in fact, an ideological premise behind the idea of globalisation, but we need to extract its meaning in its many different dimensions. Adopting this Weberian or post-Marxist understanding of globalisation highlights how it is, on the one hand, both the product of ideological forces, but these forces have dynamics of their own. These dynamics change from historical period to historical period and necessarily require a contextual process of understanding these differing patterns.

5.2.1.1. The Epistemologies and Ontologies of Globalisation

The other relevant question to ask is whether globalisation and its logic have intrinsic causal powers or are rather mere instruments of ideological and political projects. Some claim that globalisation has a specific predetermined economic or cultural logic. Others claim that for these logics to prevail, political action needs to exist behind them. Still others aim to bridge the divide. This is an altogether different problem. Whereas the previous question aimed to address the constitutive elements of a potential conceptual understanding of globalisation (while also addressing the historical debate about globalisation), this discussion aims to highlight whether globalisation as intrinsic causality in itself is not reducible to particular economic, political or social forces.

The first position gives specific substance to the logic of globalisation. Some arguments associate the logic of globalisation with the logic of capital. They read globalisation as the inevitable result of capitalism and its exploitative nature. It's a linear process of causality that unfolds and underpins the globalisation of the world. A different type of argument, but similarly causally objective, broadens the horizon from capitalism to the logic of modernity and the Enlightenment. Globalisation is read, in light of these changes, as the inevitable consequence of cultural determinism. To these two deterministic views, other, more contextual views arise where politics enters. There are, however, different ways to integrate politics.

The conventional view is an understanding of globalisation as the inevitable consequence of the consolidation of the American Empire. John Ikenberry, for example, thinks that globalisation is the inevitable consequence of the Western rule-based international order (Ikenberry 2007). A core component of our current global era is, therefore, American hegemony and its values. Without this specific type of Western dominance over the world, what we call globalisation could be characterised by something completely different. Political rule gives content to what we call globalisation, and there are no causal logics that can be thought of outside this type of politics.

For historical materialists, there is logic behind the existence of globalisation, but such logic cannot be thought of independently of current politics. Instead of a uniform process of causal inevitability, globalisation needs to be thought of as being dependent on the political power of the day. Alex Callinicos, for example, thinks that current globalisation is a form of imperialism, a new form of colonialism without colonies (Callinicos 2007)

Others bring politics differently. They conceptualise the process of globalisation as transforming spatial categories. We can't think of the global without its deep embeddedness in the local, and this local is full of politics. This argument, on the one hand, criticises social theory for its deep reliance on fixed notions of spatiality while, at the same time, crediting the local for its political power. Global convergence is not unilinear in this sense. The local should neither discount the power of the state nor the power of globality (Sassen 1996, 2006).

Politics is also brought in via a constructivist argument. Pure materialist accounts of globalisation are incorrect in discounting the power of ideational factors. We need to accept that there are different ideational motions behind the global project. These ideational constructions are, on the other hand, full of politics as well (Risse 2007). Structures and agents mutually constitute each other, so the argument goes. We can't understand the social construction of globalisation without understanding how different cultures and identities are deeply affected and, in turn, affect the process. Globalisation is, in this sense, a cultural or identitarian phenomenon. There is no such thing as cultural or economic imperialism and homogenisation. Cultures and identities differ, and how one understands the global needs to incorporate the politics of the interaction between the global and its cultural/identitarian demonstrations (Tomlinson 2007).

Understanding epistemological globalisation requires taking a conceptual stance on the possibilities of the debate. It requires highlighting how different causal and non-causal/political constructions view the possibilities of a global world. It also implies giving credibility to the power of constructivism to help us understand the process. Globalisation, in the end, is a result of the mutual constitution of material and ideas, of structures and agents, of a specific understanding of the impact it has on cultures and identities.

5.2.2. Sovereign States: On Sovereign Authority and Beyond

Another important debate is to take a stance on the state sovereign debate. Discussing how sovereignty changes as a result of global forces is the underlying condition of such debate. And here we see the intersection of the previous two debates: the realisation that globalisation should be read along the impacts it has along multiple dimensions while at the same time, being a direct consequence

of normative and political logics. We can't think about the global outside the political context of our time and its ideological contents.

This chapter will focus on a central concept of the more general notion of sovereign state – authority – and how this notion is being challenged in the face of international and transnational forces and processes. The aim is to understand why it can be said that forces of globalisation and interdependence are threatening sovereignty from abroad and, in this way, to understand the pressures developed by international forces on national forces.

5.2.2.1. On the Concept of Sovereign State

The Peace of Westphalia is taken as a milestone for the constitution of modern international society and for the view that this society is formed by sovereign states, each of them with exclusive authority within its geographical limits. The concept of sovereignty is therefore seen as the foundation for the creation of International Relations (Stankiewicz 1969, James 1986). One of the key elements for IR to constitute itself as a field of research was precisely the formation of sovereign states. However, despite this importance, the study of these matters has been marked by little attention to the different nuances that may exist in the definition of the concept. The Westphalian model provides a simple and elegant image. To have a more concrete perception of how this model was constructed, academics need to make an effort to understand the conceptual nuances that constitute it (Miller 1986, Liftin 1997, Caporaso 2000). For this chapter, the concept of sovereign state can be broken down into three constitutive notions: authority, territoriality and autonomy.

Authority. The origin and history of the concept of authority are closely related to the formation of states and, in particular, debates that focus on the development of centralised authority and its administrative system of political control (Raz 1990). The debate highlights the fact that the state refers to the people and institutions that exercise supreme authority within a given territory or society. In this account, the authority of the state is linked to power, and the state, in its use, acts as a court of last resort. The omnipotent sovereign is the only alternative to supplant the anarchy that exists in the state of nature. The relationship between autonomous and equal individuals is thus seen as existing in a condition of permanent insecurity: only the existence of a hegemonic sovereign power can correct this condition. To achieve this end, the state alters the conditions under which individuals pursue their interests by reconstituting society through absolute powers of command exercised by the sovereign legal system and through the ability to enforce the law (coercive power). This type of understanding that characterised the works of Jean Bodin or Thomas Hobbes and which also finds representation in projects to create totalitarian states undergoes revisions with the development of liberal thought and, more radically, with the emergence of Marxist currents (Friedman 1990). For

liberals, sovereign authority ultimately resides in the people. It, therefore, becomes necessary to divide and circumscribe the power of the state with the promotion of majority rule and the notion of representative government. In short, liberals promote a conceptual approach that aims to base sovereign authority on a constitutional theory strengthened by the partnership between ruler and ruled. For Marxists, the benefits of representation, however, force the disappearance of what, for this approach, appears as the main thing: the state, at least in the context of capitalist society, expresses the will of private property as the highest political and moral. In other words, the sovereign state is seen as the official expression of civil society, thus reflecting bourgeois society or the circulation of private interests (Milliband 1983). The state – and its authority – are nothing more than reflections of capitalist and bourgeois interests. Ultimately, the only solution is the dismissal of this state by social forces. The project also idealises the complete dismissal of the state and the existence of alternative constitutional orders (Friedman 1990).

Debating authority also implies discussing government systems and claims about the right to govern: legitimacy and capacity to govern. In Max Weber, we find the consolidation of a conceptual effort that had been developed since Greece but which found with the emergence of the modern state a more solid reason for existing (Spencer 1970). Much has been written about the reflections that Weber developed on the notion of authority. Weber's definition of authority is conceived both as a relationship of command and obedience – a set of claims for the "exclusive right to make laws" – and also encompasses a notion of authority as a reflection of democratic citizenship that actively supports state policies and governance structures (Thomson 1995). The success or failure of these claims rests on a variety of bases, including active political support, widespread acceptance of the rules of the game, deference to experts, fear of retaliation, and complete indifference to the process and its results. It is, therefore, possible to see that, following Weber, two positions emerge to debate this issue (Raz 1990): one based on the Parsonian tradition, which equates more or less authority and voluntary consent of the subject in relation to the holder of power and contrasts this voluntary dimension with force and coercion. Another definition highlights how "the authoritarian relationship between the one who commands and the one who obeys is based neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands: what they both have in common is the hierarchy itself whose justice and legitimacy they both recognise and in which they both have its predetermined stable place" (Arendt 1961:93, cited in Raz 1990:57). Differences aside, the distinguishing feature of authority *is the presumptive right to govern*, which is a structural relationship that unites both rulers and ruled.

Territoriality. Debating territoriality refers to the organisation of political space and, in particular, to the principles underlying the way in which political space is organised. A political organisation is territorial when the legal scope of public authority is contiguous to certain spatial limits,

such as those of the national state or federal jurisdictions within a state. Territoriality relates the geography of authority to the geographic reach of that government (Khaler and Walter 2006).

The territorial state is naturally a space with physical borders and a well-developed logic of exclusion: interior/exterior. The modern state has closed borders, thus altering the possibility of openness to what is external (Delaney 2005). The rise of political parties, the expansion of the electorate, the growing importance of formal representation and parliament and the development of lobby groups can be seen as indicators of this selective but powerful narrowing of state borders.

The emergence of the territorial principle, of domination over a territory by a single ruler or political institution, on the other hand, is subversive. Territorial organisation implies government over a distinct space, the subjects of that space, and the economy of space. It involves consolidating dispersed islands of authority into a hierarchy or separating authority into territorial spheres, such as in federal systems. On the governance aspect, formal and informal constitutions can signify the precise scope of state authorities and can divide state powers between various institutions. It is thus possible to imagine separate authority structures. The medieval organising principle of multiple authorities existing in the same territory, each making claims based on usage, customary rights, and personal relationships, provides a paradigmatic example (Ruggie 1993). The European Union thus appears as a paradigmatic case of this new medievality. A second problem that arises, however, is the scope of the central and territorialised force. The persistence of territorial claims and the lack of sovereignty resulting from non-territorial forms of organisation calls into question the prevailing territorial structure. But whatever the state's borders with regard to society, when conflicts between authorities occur, the sovereign state can claim the right to govern, whether or not contesting forces absorb these principles.

Autonomy. Debating autonomy implies understanding relationships between international hierarchical structures. It is the ability to exclude external authority structures from domestic spheres of influence. This means that no external actor enjoys authority within the state's borders. This notion of autonomy appeals to classical writings on the historical foundations of international society and its development (Wight 1968, Jackson 1999, Hinsley 1986) and founded many of the concerns of the so-called English School of International Relations. In this sense, autonomy expresses the important notion of political independence. It is, therefore, closely linked to the notions of equality of states and non-intervention in relations between sovereign states. For one of the theorists who dedicated the most time to studying this issue, Robert Jackson, autonomy presents itself as a 'golden rule' for the functioning of international society. In his words, "the *grundnorm* of this political arrangement (the sovereign state) is the basic prohibition of foreign intervention that simultaneously imposes a duty to abstain and confers a right of independence on all statesmen. Since states are profoundly unequal in

power, world governance (based on this principle) is much more demanding for powerful states and much more subject to revision when weak states are involved" (1990:6).

Authority, territory and autonomy are distinct notions in that none of them logically implies and exhausts the meaning of the others. True sovereignty is a type of authority, but it is also more than that. Territory involves the fusion of physical space and public authority, but the congruence between the two is far from perfect. Consolidating this Westphalian model also requires that no foreign power or authority governs the state's national destinies. However, these notions are challenged by different literatures and in different circumstances that need to be carefully evaluated. It is precisely this variability in adjustment that provides different angles for investigation.

5.2.2.2. Contesting the Sovereign State

One of the greatest contributions of Stephen Krasner's work (1995, 1999) was to clarify the nuances in contesting the concept of sovereignty and the sovereign state. Whereas in his initial work, Krasner was interested in rejecting institutionalist approaches and the work developed on international interdependence (Thomson and Krasner 1989), in later work, the author is concerned with issues of ceding autonomy and sovereignty (Krasner 1999). Throughout this journey, a clear attention to understanding conceptual nuances motivates this effort. As Stephen Krasner elucidates, "Territorial violations of the Westphalian model involve the creation of structures of authority that are not coincident with geographic boundaries" (1995:116), considering that challenges to the principle of autonomy involve conditions "in which an external actor is able to exercise some authoritarian control within the territory of a state" (1995:116).

Analysing these two forms of contestation would take this chapter in a different direction. For example, it would lead to analysing governance processes at a global level in which broader phenomena of cultural, informational and economic interactions are conditioning and leading to mutations towards supra-territoriality (Brenner, Jessop and Jones 2003).

Debating another type of mutation – related to the notion of autonomy – produces a discussion hostage to debates on 'sovereignty and inequality' or, as some would say, on the development of the conditions of civilisation (Kingsbury 1998, Hobson and Sharman 2005). It would require investigating processes in which a sovereign state finds itself conditioned by international processes of adjustment, in the form of empires or other less hierarchical forms, that condition our way of understanding national autonomy (Donnelly 2006, Simpson 2004).

However, these nuances will not be considered here. The effort will be to understand the changes in the concept of *sovereign authority*. In the next part, such an attempt will be developed by

specifically linking a tradition of thought that has made a lot of contributions in this endeavour: post-internationalism.

5.3. Challenging Sovereign Authority: A Post-Internationalist Proposal

If the previous part allows the chapter to undertake a conceptual analysis of the debate between globalisation and sovereign statehood, this part will develop a particular angle from which to read this interaction. It is rooted in a specific tradition of thought: post-internationalism and, more specifically, the work of Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (2004, 2008). Two important arguments are required before engaging with a qualified assessment of how they analyse our global world.

First, they situate themselves in a tradition of thought that finds its roots in the work of James Rosenau (1990, 1997, 2004). This tradition came to be designated and affirmed as *post-internationalism*. The edited volume by Heidi Hobbs (2000) is an important contribution to the affirmation of this tradition. At its core, the work of Rosenau "tells the story of a world where history is speeding up, a world characterised by a bifurcation of global structures, the proliferation of actors, technological revolutions, the globalisation of economic exchange, the presence of interdependence/collective goods issues, the weakening of state authority, subgroupism, increasingly skilled individuals, and a widening income gap both within and across countries that reflects those who are benefiting from globalisation and those who are not" (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:12). For post-internationalists, therefore, globalisation is an inevitability characterised by material transformations in world politics. This inevitability is further consolidated by the creation of a post-national structure that puts pressure on national authorities along multiple dimensions. Of particular concern for Rosenau is not just the world economy but also the advent of the 'skill revolution' (1990). Ferguson and Mansbach maintain such views of globalisation and its impact on more than one dimension. Their goal is to continue understanding the global world in all its dimensions.

The second important point to make is a conceptual adjustment needed – for the purposes of the argument developed here –, of Ferguson's and Mansbach's work on polities (1996, 2004). Even though it is not always clear what the configurations relate to, if a clearer assessment of the concept of sovereign state was conducted, it would be clear that the ideas put forward relate more to the idea of authority than any other. It is not the concern of the project to deal with such a detailed assessment of terms, unfortunately. Departing from Rosenau's spheres of authority (SOAs), Ferguson and Yale are interested in identifying reconfigurations of *polities.* But polities are entities that have a direct connection to the concept of authority.

These nuances are important to note. One of the fundamental problems with the literature on sovereign statehood is its continuous anarchical (conceptual) state. We are told that sovereignty is at an end, that it is being transformed and forever changed. Under the rubric 'sovereignty' and change/transformation, everything is possible. But it is time to understand the nuances (Caporaso 2000, Jacobsen, Sampford and Thakur 2008). If territoriality relates to the geography of authority to the geographic reach of that government, then assessing transformations of sovereign territoriality needs to be more in line with assessing mutations of these geographical spheres in light of other considerations (Agnew 2017, Brenner, Jessop and Jones 2003, Paasi and Ferdoush 2022).

If by authority we mean the development of centralised authority and its administrative system of political control, these ideas move beyond a geographical focus. This chapter argues that Rosenau's as well as Ferguson's and Mansbach's contributions relate more to nuanced understandings of sovereign authority and not sovereign territoriality. In the next sections, it will be summarised how these transformations are viewed by Ferguson and Mansbach (2004).

5.3.1. Sovereign Authority: Reconfigurations

This section aims to understand more precisely how sovereign authority is being reconfigured. However, before this stage can be consolidated, it is necessary to take a first step and define two different ways of constructing national authorities: horizontal and vertical. Having done this, the reconfigurations of sovereign authority will be analysed in a double sense: through a study of the disaggregation of the authoritarian unit and a study of the bifurcation of the authoritarian government. This translates into an understanding of how there is a mutual constitution going on between processes of globalisation and entities affected by it.

5.3.1.1. Horizontal Reconfigurations

Two conceptual arguments were developed already concerning authority: first, the idea that it is directly related to notions that are particularly interested in debating the development of centralised authority and its administrative system of political control. Second, the debate about how the exercise of this political control is implemented. A third is important to introduce at this stage: the formation of national authorities. It is introduced now because it helps clarify what is meant by horizontal and vertical forms of national authority.

How to understand the notion of national authority and how to dissect what is meant by this notion? In one of the most brilliant chapters of a book designed to describe the *End of Sovereignty,*

Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk promote a conceptual distinction between different forms of national authority (Camilleri and Falk 1992). Developing the effort launched by the authors – and not entering into overly exhaustive debates about different philosophical and theoretical dispositions that characterise this literature –, two major conceptualisations aim to understand, on the one hand, the horizontal development of the nation and, on the other, the vertical creation of nations. It can be said, briefly, that these two perspectives correspond to movements of consolidation of sovereign authorities from two perspectives: from top to bottom or, for a second perspective, from bottom to top.

Horizontally, what is at stake is the vision of a homogeneous cultural process, the result of a linear phenomenon of industrialisation and development, very characteristic of Western Europe. Ernest Gellner (1983) appears as one of the first academics to consolidate this type of perspective. In Gellner's model, secular political units, imbued with ideas of popular sovereignty, seek their fulfilment in the conquest of an independent and integrated state through universal citizenship rights. This culturally homogeneous society is consolidated by the growth of industrial production, in which national authorities grow through the exchange of messages promoted by commerce and the development of the press. Economy, culture and language, therefore, became crucial to Gellner's view of the birth of nationalism. Michael Mann, extending some of the themes that Gellner left undeveloped and starting from a different perspective, further consolidates this sense of horizontal integration. Mann (1988), adding a militarised view of the construction of national authority, observes how military crises turned "proto-nations" into true nations with various social classes, through greater recruitment by the central power, war taxes and regressive war loans. The centrality of authority leads, on the other hand, to the propertied classes demanding greater political representation and, in doing so, politicising the concepts of "nation" and "people".

We have our categories that consolidate the horizontal vision of the construction of national authority: capitalism, technological processes, and war. In this chapter, particular emphasis will be placed on how transformations promoted by both capitalism and war, and present in the post-internationalist proposal, have been transforming global politics and, more specifically, the concept of sovereign authority.

Global Economy and Sovereign Authority. Among the most striking features of Yale Ferguson's and Richard Mansbach's post-international conceptualisation regarding the current functioning of the world economy is the conceptual focus on the growing incompatibility between the borders of states and markets and the growing influence of international markets in relation to states. These two processes of establishing a sovereign authority by the economy and contesting that same sovereign authority by the international economy must, therefore, be analysed.

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In Europe, according to Hendrik Spruyt, "the king's power grew as a result of the bourgeois support for royal policy. Due to the expansion of the market, city spaces sought alternative political institutions more favourable to commerce and their way of life and Western individualism flourished along with the rediscovery of the concept of absolute and exclusive private property" (1996:105-106). The emergence of the sovereign state in Europe was accompanied by the growth of national markets in which individual buyers and sellers could influence the terms of trade. In this sense, economic structures were fundamental in the creation of the Westphalian state and the international system. But if historically the economy was the central authority, what has happened nowadays is that economic structures themselves tend to lose this link that for centuries allowed the state to impose and build its sovereign authority. In other words, economic structures tend to become disconnected from the authority of the state (Schwartz 2010). The industrialisation process is now destroying the very autonomy that, in the first instance, the 19th-century state gave it. Industrialisation continued to produce ever greater division of labour and thus ever greater economic interdependence across state borders. The effective domains of economic markets began to coincide less and less with national government jurisdictions (Helleiner 1994, Arrighi 1994).

On the other hand, the rapid transformation of global society at the end of the millennium drastically altered the relationship between states and economic markets. As in other spheres of global life, the interstate system of exclusive control is being affected by the non-territorial logic of regional and global markets (Cerny 2010). Furthermore, more and more states, regardless of history or culture, are privatising government functions, deregulating more sectors of their economies, reducing their welfare commitments, and adapting, voluntarily or involuntarily, their policies to the demands of intergovernmental and private financial institutions (Sassen 1996, Smith and Topik 1999). Finally, the state itself, for progressives, is becoming a mixture of civil association and business association – of the constitutional state, of pressure groups and the firm-state. In this new condition, what becomes evident is that the action of the state itself and the authors that compose it, have proliferated and, consequently, the authority of the sovereign lives, nowadays, conditioned by a set of economic interest groups that go beyond what would be traditionally accepted (Cerny 1990, Jessop 2002).

War, International Security and Sovereign Authority. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach also develop arguments on how the relationship between war and sovereign authority has also changed. Violence in the pre-modern world took substantially different forms than it had during the interstate era. Violence proliferated in societies without a true central capacity to govern and control its appearance and proliferation. There were simply no means to contain the use of violence within societies (Keegan 1993, Holsti 1996). From the 17th century onwards, both by internally centralising military power and, on the other hand, by externally influencing the balance of power, sovereign states

were reinforcing and building their authority to regulate and restrict the means of violence. The system of sovereign states was thus constructed as the result of an effort to limit and regulate collective violence both between and within states after the pre-Westphalian wars of religion. It was also constructed to legitimise the use of violence by sovereigns against their internal opponents. The limits to the use of internal power and the 'right to life' by the medieval sovereign under his subject were thus conditioned (Keegan 1993, Porter 1994). This entire construction seems to be in jeopardy nowadays, however. From a military point of view, the Westphalian state was superior to rival political forms such as city-states, fiefdoms, tribes, villages, confederations and empires in terms of social and political organisation and economies of scale. The regimentally organised European armies were extensions of state power intended to carry out the policies of sovereign leaders. Given the historical conditions under which states emerged in Europe, it may be more than a coincidence that – as sovereign states have lost relative authority in the current era – the management of global violence is eroding and is, in some ways, becoming decentralised. This represents a challenge to the internal construction of authority through the regulation of war between peoples (Kaldor 2007). Externally, there is also a challenge to the idea that sovereign states engage in forms of balance of power to solidify their own symbolic authority. Progressive narratives allude to a transformation of the assumptions of interstate war as it was theorised by Clausewitz: violence today involves *non-sovereign participants* who fight only for reasons of state. And, despite coordination problems and the superpower role of the United States, state involvement and its military strategy increasingly take the form of participation in alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, coalitions for the maintenance of peace, humanitarian peace sanctions sanctioned by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (Wulf 2005).

There is a second sense in which we can see changes in the way in which the notion of sovereign authority is being reconfigured by changing conditions of international security. The complex web of transnational production and finance is a cornerstone of the global military order, offering crucial analytical insights into the dynamics of military budgets, the pattern of power transfer, the nature of regional conflicts, and the role of government intervention. In short, sovereign authorities are pierced by interests that were previously sealed. Increasingly, state security decisions are not necessarily the main independent variables in the geopolitical equation; they are the by-product of an intricate network of subnational, supranational, and transnational interests in which key considerations are both economic and strategic (Creveld 1991, Cohen 2008). There are versions of the argument that allude to the intertwined process of the communion of military efforts and economic interests. It is therefore possible to predict and associate different international "zones of war and peace" through the borders that are established in this process: between zones of integration and zones of exclusion and adversity characterised precisely by the identity of each state and its

affiliation/disaffiliation in relation to the forces of supra-territorial capitalism (Cooling 1981, Metz 2000). Second, in a time of erosion of state authority, actors such as transnational organisations and non-governmental organisations are acquiring an increasing role in global politics, including war. Of these factors, the most important for the analysis of the contemporary expression of war are the actors who provide private violence or security. The *outsourcing* of war and the conviction that the state should guarantee the security of its citizens are, therefore, producing changes in the conventional concept of sovereignty and authority (Dickinson 2011). Thirdly, the changing relationship between soldiers and civilians in the law of war and the consequences these changes have in undermining the idea that the state is the only sovereign actor to be taken into account, is helping to change international law in the sense of allowing individuals to gain weight against the authority of the state. The interaction further highlights how the very notion of sovereign authority is increasingly becoming a matter of "responsibility to protect" in the name of individual rights. Leaders of countries with responsibility for making life-and-death decisions must, therefore, be more aware that their decisions are being scrutinised by an increasingly stronger regime of international criminal law (Clark 2009, Bellamy 2011).

5.3.1.2. Vertical Reconfigurations

The sense of horizontal community, highlighted above, is just one of two central elements of the conception of sovereign national authority. The other is a sense of national history: a vertical view of the community through time. In this second sense, the existence of the national community is considered natural through the apparent historical inevitability of its emergence and its future (Anderson 1982). National authority, according to this vertical vision, is therefore not understood as constructed in a linear way from pre-industrialisation to industrialisation – or through imperialism. Instead, emphasis is placed on the opposite point of view (bottom-up), which highlights the centrality of origins, the recovery of memory and the past as a path to negotiating the creation of authority. This raises questions of identity, collective identities and their future. Once again, the effort in this chapter will be to understand the transformations that occur when the concepts of identity and sovereign authority interact.

Identity and Sovereign Authority. For Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (2004), the concept of cultural identity is a non-static concept and, therefore, just as identities change, so does the relative strength and importance of different authorities. Based on this meta-theoretical device, it is argued that the triumph of the state over different rival localised powers provided the link between identity and self-governance and claimed the loyalty of its citizens: the exercise of sovereignty expressed

collective identity (Sandel 2005). For hundreds of years, this formation responded to a desire for political agreements that began to situate feelings of citizenship in a world increasingly governed by vast and distant forces that tended to converge on a point of common identity similarity (Sandel 2005). Despite this fact, what becomes true in contemporary times, the argument continues, is that present citizenship has to share its influence with other identities. In other words, there is no longer a clear hierarchy of identity: each of us is wrapped up in old identities and loyalties, but at the same time, that same identity is affected by an unlimited set of identifications. Two essential aspects of contemporary citizenship are, more precisely, being challenged: belonging and *status* (understood as a set of rights) (Kratochwil 1996).

First, the argument is advanced that there is growing evidence that the nature of belonging is changing. The familiar ideas of nation and nationalism today seem to take on a distinctly subversive, anti-state connotation in much of the globe. This even leads to more radical positions that, in the face of growing tension between nation and state, call for the complete abandonment of the Nation-State label (Meisler 1992). At the same time, the relationship between the state and the nation in this first sense of "belonging" seems to be changing through a second process: the perspective of a state at the top of the hierarchy of identification seems to be challenged. The ranking of national identity identification varies significantly depending on the context: the creation of a hierarchy transforms from issue to issue. Thus, each issue provokes a different cast of players and different sets of allies and adversaries (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Power at the national level is, therefore, characterised by a proliferation of a sense of belonging: although it is premature to predict the fall of national citizenship from the top of the identity hierarchy, other centres of power are competing with sovereign states with important consequences to the citizen's willingness to fight and die for this sense of belonging (Judt 1994, Ignatieff 1993).

As for *status*, there are two types of transformation. On the one hand, although citizenship continues to be an important source of self-identity, it is argued that by itself, it has never been sufficient to describe the rights and responsibilities needed and desired by individuals. Just as citizenship confers a *set of rights* on members, some advocate an environment of change that involves an increasingly broader set of associations and communities. At the national level, the functioning of multiple identities then becomes the rule rather than the exception (Lapid 1994, Herb and Kaplan 1999). This phenomenon, in turn, leads to questions of identification: when obligations as a member of different groups conflict, it becomes difficult to determine the hierarchical ordering of the multiple identities in question.

On the other hand, the future of global politics with variable borders and loyalties is characterised by a process of unstable fluctuation that results from the mutation of the concept of collective identity. To understand this perspective, it is necessary to start from the assumption that

leaders manipulate identities to ensure loyalties and acquire the legitimacy (and, therefore, authority) necessary for different centres of power to be taken as moral communities. The way they do this involves rewriting history, mastering literature and art, adapting old myths and creating new ones. However, Yale Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) highlight the difficulties of defining common identities in a way that finds universal agreement in this traditional identity world (Hall 1993). The creation and reappearance of mythologies and religion are explored as examples of how collective identities are being constructed, contributing to the construction of a new sense of belonging (Marty and Appleby 1997). The collective identity of the sovereign competes today with alternative identities and transnational alliances that aim to transcend the opaque vision that links state authority and collective identity. Collective identities are being reconfigured today by processes that transcend state borders and have an impact on those same borders. According to some perspectives, these mutations are not always good (for example, the resurgence of transnational movements that call for *jihad*), but, despite everything, what is highlighted is the tendency and not necessarily the normative judgment of the fact (Habermas 1992).

To conclude, the post-internationalist argument put forward by Ferguson and Mansbach argues that, in the current conditions of multiple authorities, we need to constantly reevaluate what or where our "home" is. The impact in this case on collective identity is not made from the outside in but from the inside out. The nation-state is therefore no longer seen as the main symbol of identification and loyalty for the majority of individuals. In the process of interaction between different identity components, made possible by contemporary globalised society, new identities, loyalties and the symbols that accompany them are forged where the old 'sense of self' is redefined or diluted. In short, post-Westphalian identity is bifurcated, fluid and changing, which in itself allows for the construction of transnational identities (Shapiro 1994). The clearest example of this is given as the call for a 'Muslim Brotherhood' in Middle Eastern countries that transcends the Westphalian sense of belonging to a national authoritarian state.

5.4. Conclusion

After dissecting the conceptual debates about what we mean when we engage in a discussion about globalisation and globalisation's debate about its epistemologies and ontologies (Held 2000), the chapter intends to apply these ideas to the discussions about the end of the sovereignty debate. The literature needs to do a better conceptual exercise in understanding what specific understanding of state sovereignty is being transformed or mutated by global forces. In particular, the argument aimed to disaggregate the concept of sovereign state and focus on a particular notion: authority.

The idea underpinning notions of authority that institutions and individuals responsible for the state represent sovereign power, acting as a court of last resort, has been challenged by international and transnational forces. To better understand how these forces have conditioned the notion of sovereign authority, a distinction was made between horizontal and vertical constructions. Horizontally, sovereign authority is created by processes of capitalist expansion, literacy and communication, as well as through war. Consolidating vertical authority, on the other hand, implies the creation of bonds of identity, belonging and memory.

Inspired by the work of Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (2004, 2008), the chapter evaluated the conception that advocates transformations of sovereign authority in the global political economy, war and identity issues. The argument was developed about how, historically, ties that allowed the constitution of coherent entities in these three areas have lost their static meaning. There is a disaggregation of the historical power of authority, which, due to inevitable transformations, has given way to the power of distinct and dispersed authorities. On the other hand, it was highlighted how this same sovereign authority appears increasingly bifurcated by international and national forces and processes that affect it. Be it the creation of private security entities, the transformation of the public exercise of executive functions, the attribution of power to new centres of influence, or the reconfiguration of the sense of belonging, status or collective identity. In essence, it was shown how sovereign authority is mutating through the disaggregation of the sovereign's direct authority and through the bifurcation of the sovereign's rule of authority.

The general objective of this evaluation was to criticise viewpoints that debate the concept of sovereignty or sovereign state without a detailed analysis of this concept. The contribution presented here is intended, in this way, to bring greater consistency to the analysis of what was described as a component of the sovereign state, namely the concept of sovereign authority, and to highlight its mutations as understood by post-internationalist thought. In so doing, it used Bevir's approach to conceptual analysis and, more lightly, his ideas on traditions of thought.

PART V – Futures

How to think about the future of IR? Manuals dedicated to introducing the field tend to terminate with future aspirations (Hoffmann 1960, Alger 1970, Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008, Booth and Erskine 2016), Devetak and McCarthy 2024). But how to think about the future? One approach would focus on epistemological disputes (McCarthy 2024).

For some, the future is our ability to predict the next big trend in concrete material realities. In an illustration of this view of the future, Robert Keohane concludes the following "Students of world politics have an obligation to democratic publics to help them understand the most pressing problems of the current day. Yet this moral obligation does not imply that we should focus on topical issues or be "policy-relevant" in a narrow sense by speaking to governments in terms that are acceptable to them. Our task is to probe the deeper sources of action in world politics, and to speak truth to power- insofar as we can discern what the truth is" (2008:708-709). For Keohane the commitment to democratic publics leads us to emphasise issues that relate to "war and cooperation, and concepts such as power and interest, remain central to world politics" (2008:710). to these perennial concerns we can adjust to existing trends by looking at changes in the technology of force, mutations in capitalism and issues of progress, better account for the fragmentation of world order and account for its many emerging actors, and take a particular concern with issues such as the internet or the environment.

For others, however, more than our capacity to constantly understand the big trends happening in the real world, we, as participants in IR, need to think of the future as an intellectual exercise (Booth 1996, Smith 2008). This can, of course, be thought in one of two ways, individualistically as in the future is what I make of it, or more collectively by understanding how novel intellectual developments in the field are shaping its future trajectory" (McCarthy 2024:1). It is the latter that interests this thesis.

Since the 1980s, IR has been concerned with broadening its philosophical, epistemological, ontological, theoretical and methodological scopes of analysis. The 'Third Debate' (Lapid 1989, George 1989) became essentially a contestation of IR's positivist framing and the tightening of its own interpretative consciousness. Opening this consciousness characterised this and subsequent decades (Smith, Booth, and Zalewski 1996).

This was also followed in the 1990s with, among other aspects, a critique of a concern with international political substances. Globalisation and global studies became a substantive matter of concern, as well as the overall broadening of the agenda of the study of IR (Walker 1995). This concern

was nothing new. Ever since the consolidation of world society, world systems, and interdependence theories, the global has become more relevant when compared to the inter-national. However, the practical mood of the 1990s further helped this push towards contesting the state sovereign project and the implications this can have for the conduct of internal affairs.

What this agenda created, however, was a tightening of the concerns of IR to two engines: the *how(s)* and the *what(s)*. A tightening that was, however, not just a characteristic of these times. Subjecting *why(s)* to *how(s)* and the inevitable discussion of *what(s)* can probably be traced back to the intentions of some academics during the 1930-40-50s. It consolidated with the drive towards positivism after the end of the Second World War. At the time, the concern was with the creation of a *grand theory*, and debates about its formation became the starting point or the endpoint for discussing philosophy (Thompson 1947, 1955). It continued in subsequent decades. This time, and with the collapse of the possible formation of a *grand theory* because of the emergence of a consensus about inter-paradigmatic debates, which gravitated towards endless and incommensurable disputes, the issue became the consequence of this fragmentation. The collapse of 'the classical tradition' endangered the unity of method (Holsti 1985). The concern became one of understanding the impact of fragmentation in IR, and debates about it became the starting point or the endpoint for discussing philosophy. The so-called 'Third Debate' continued the trend. Lapid's (1989) solution to fragmentation reverses the concern by stressing the importance of pluralism and dialogue. The issue, again, became an entry discussion to more relevant *how* concerns, however. And it has been recently revitalised with questions about whether we are at the end of IR theory (Dunne et al. 2013).

But increasingly, we are returning to 'old issues' characterised here as *why* problems. These seem to have been forgotten ever since they became a focus of attention in the earlier reflection of – mainly US – academics (Wright 1955). This return intensified in the 90s and in the 2000s (Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons 2002) with the solidifying of the historical revisionism of IR (Schmidt 1994, 1998, Dunne 1998). It has been further rejuvenated by debates over the disciplinary nature of IR (Rosenberg 2016), by revisiting foundational reflections on what constitutes the international (Devetak and Dunne 2024), and by moves towards a better understanding of the universalisation of IR (Acharya 2015). These days, introductions to International Relations manuals tend to highlight precisely this welcomed move (Jorgensen 2021, Booth and Erskine 2016, Devetak and George 2017).

Faced with new avenues to think about IR's future, the next chapter will not deal with all these agendas. What Waever and Tickner (2009) describe as a 'sociological reflexive turn' will be, instead, the main focus of the contribution. This is directly and, more specifically, related to the turn towards global IR. Departing from the assumption that we need to return to 'old debates', it will focus on one specific concern: how we can think about national IR communities and change in national IR communities.

Chapter 6 - Conclusion: Global IR and the Transformative Promise for National IR Communities

6.1. Introduction

This thesis aimed to highlight the importance of identifying and debating constitutive questions and constitutive problems in IR. At its core, and following a criticism also presented by Reus-Smit and Snidal (2008), it identified a methodological problem with the literature: IR scholars lack a more solid engagement with each other when discussing IR. Most of the time, scholars do not develop consistent literature reviews on the topics under discussion. Issues are presented without clearly understanding what was said before and why the new contribution differs, either substantively or theoretically. We need to be more attentive to the research process when debating IR as a research field. If this 'descriptive'/methodological presentation of constitutive questions and constitutive problems oriented the presentation of the topics of this work, other types of options could be pursued, as suggested in the Introduction. Taking inspiration from the reasons presented by Quincy Wright (1955), Stanley Hoffmann (1960), or, more recently, Jorgensen (2021), Waever and Tickner (2009), the way to introduce IR's constitutive questions and problems could take disciplinary, theoretical or sociological reflexive form.

Giving content to the methodological presentation, the study, in the literature review, identified constitutive questions – the why(s), the how(s) and the what(s) – and also the constitutive problems that are part of these questions. To further supplement this literature review, the exercise was also done in a way that highlighted a particular theoretical and methodological standpoint through which to read some of these constitutive problems. The study therefore provided three contributions to the current literature: first, it clarified *why* studying IR constitutive questions and constitutive problems is important, second, it organize the literature in way that provided a particular interpretation of what was written before when introducing IR as a field of research, third, it read different constitutive problems through a Beverian lens.

If these three contributions are important to move debates about IR to more solid grounds, this conclusion will focus on the fourth main contribution of the thesis. It will propose a particular angle to read IR's changing configurations. IR concerns should and are changing, and the future of IR needs, in this sense, to be read in light of 'intellectual movements' that are characterising the current

literature[5]. We are increasingly seeing a move towards a better understanding of what IR means (Grenier, Turton and Beaulieu-Brossard 2015), resurrecting 'old' debates (Wright 1955) while engulfed this move is in another move to think about IR in global terms (Waever and Tickner 2007, Acharya 2015). It is the opinion of this thesis that the guiding engine of IR today is, therefore, the struggles over its own identity and how this identity is being reconfigured. We are moving beyond the concern with epistemological, ontological or the discussions of different perspectivisms[6] characteristic of what came to be known as the 'third debate' (Lapid 1989) or the 'fourth debate' (Waever 1995, 2013). We should move beyond the debate about the end of the Cold War, globalisation and the changing configuration of war, peace, security, or cultures/identities (Devetak, Burke and George 2012). Increasingly, issues of disciplinary identity and global understandings of IR are back on the agenda and conditioning how we think about IR (Smith 2008, Booth and Erskine 2016, Jorgensen 2021). IR is not just a field that has solidified itself in an Anglo-Saxon core, guided and driven by academic communities that are already highly professionalised and detailed, able to educate the incoming students in the latest concerns of their highly specialised academics and topics. IR is more than just its Anglo-Saxon oligopoly. As we move to a more self-conscious awareness of IR as a global discipline, its constitutive debates and suggestions about what to do next are increasingly coming to light. Reading the why(s), the how(s) and the what(s) of IR needs to obey the demands of these emerging concerns.

This thesis started by conceptualising different views on the why(s), how(s) and what(s) of IR. This conclusion aims to take a normative stance on this conceptualisation. In particular, it will highlight how national communities can start changing themselves from a condition of submission to being mere outposts of an Anglo-Saxon hegemony or of the foreign and diplomatic policy apparatus. Nationally, IR needs to gain a more distinctive voice. Creating such an environment requires rethinking the way we approach US hegemony and the way we think nationally about science, theory and substantive matters.

This conclusion will be in four parts: the first will revisit Bevir's argument and revise how it was applied in the thesis. It will also propose that change, read in Bevir's terms, must be rooted in the minds of proponents of intellectual exercises. The second part will dissect a pluralistic socio-intellectual framework rooted in sociology of science and analyse how it can be applied to analyse national IR communities with different emphasis being given to the cultural, institutional and ideational aspects of the model. The primary objective of this section is to elucidate various approaches to understanding national contributions to IR. This will allow the last part to address different proposals for national

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[5] See exposition of the argument in the introduction to Part V

[6] As suggested in note 4, by perspectivisms is meant a focus on premises and assumptions (also conventionally described as theories of IR). See Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era'. International Studies Quarterly, 33:3 (1989), pp. 241-243

transformation and reconfigure these proposals in light of the constitutive questions addressed in this thesis – why(s), how(s) and what(s) – and the relevant constitutive problems that are within them.

Theoretically, change, understood simply as the expansion of belief networks through theoretical and intellectual exercises, will operate on two levels: clarifying a theoretical framework to analyse national communities and more coherently apply it in different case studies, and, second, expanding the ways in which we conceive change in national IR contexts by the incorporation of IR constitutive questions/problems in these debates.

6.2. Unpacking Mark Bevir: Knowledge, Concepts, Traditions and Change

This part will briefly summarise how the substantive chapters used Bevir's framework. It will also propose an understanding of change, which will serve as the theoretical framework used in this chapter.

6.2.1. Bringing Theory and Method to (Academic) Practices: Summarising the Contributions[7]

Mark Bevir's work highlighted how all intellectual work is derived from a subjective analysis of knowledge. We can't exclude ourselves from the work we do as individuals and researchers. Our values and subjective analysis always interfere with the way we do research. Knowledge, therefore, is profoundly subjective and dependent intrinsically on who we are and how we develop research.

Departing from this assumption, we, as human beings, and to elucidate further what constitutes knowledge, are condemned to highlight different theoretical predispositions that emerge from any intellectual debate. Since we can't ever find a method that can coherently close an argument or knowledge claim, we need to accept the inevitability of our own predispositions. Knowledge claims need to have their roots in our ability to compare different theories: justification is, therefore, intrinsically linked to the comparison of theoretical arguments. But there is a logic to such madness. It is certainly 'not ideas all the way down'. There's a reality out there that can be assessed objectively. Bevir develops an anthropological epistemology where we, as researchers, agree to debate certain facts. A theory is, therefore, an instrument that helps us understand what the facts are. The possibility

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[7] The conclusions of each individual chapter are intended to summarise the argument presented. The goal for this section is to make the connection between the theoretical and the substantive argument clearer.

of comparison exists because we can read sets of themes that are portrayed multiple times and that, as such, are accepted as relevant. We are not looking, however, for truth: an unaccomplished ideal. The selection of the theories we compare always depends on the interpreter's subjective analysis.

As emphasised in chapter 2, Bevir's interpretivism accepts that we need, as researchers, to engage in a debate about the study of the grammar of concepts. Intellectual debates are built through discussions of different conceptual frameworks – justificatory or explanatory – the selection of which is conceived as a justificatory exercise. On the other hand, these concepts are acquired through deductive and inductive procedures. Deductive procedures extract or define categories within general propositions. They aim to settle the categories that govern concepts. Inductive arguments reinforce the implications of the main propositions or intuitions associated with our concepts. They typically present taxonomic analyses of different theories represented in a discipline.

But Bevir's argument digs deeper and moves from objectivity and concepts to the analysis of traditions. These conceptual debates can also be seen as traditions of thought. Rather than just an exercise of making sense of an argument through elucidating justificatory or explanatory arguments, these justificatory or explanatory arguments can become traditions of thought. We, therefore, dig deeper into the nature of these different types of arguments and theories and aim to understand them through the prism of historical time.

Methodologically, these interpretative assumptions appeal to analysing scientific practices and the views of proponents of intellectual exercises. Conducting interviews was a method considered, but it was decided that relying solely on documents would be enough. Formally, the resort to sources such as diaries, letters, autobiographies, newspaper articles or official documents derived from institutions, sources considered primary in other contexts, makes no sense for this study. It aims to understand how ideas were debated academically and the theoretical debates that these discussions produced. This leads to the selection of the primary sources of this study: books, essays, scientific articles, dissertations, and papers presented at conferences. Inspired by Gadamerian documentary analysis, textual analysis functioned in a hermeneutic circle in which the researcher circulates between the whole and the part and between the part and the whole. Textual interpretation derives from this fluctuation of meanings. Our prejudices or pre-understandings initially enter and force us, socialised as we are in cultural, social or other theoretical frameworks, concepts, and traditions, to frame the text and the research object with our own values. This whole meets the part, however, which, by itself, has a socialising power. The text reveals truths that, possibly, we did not know and, in this sense, transforms what we initially wanted to see or know. This knowledge acquired in practice, in turn, results in the transformation of the vision of the whole and closes, albeit temporarily, the hermeneutic circle. Since our prejudices are infinite, so can the contextual and subjectively 'truthful' interpretations given to texts. Scientific truth is thus always contextual despite obeying a set of foundations. The

hermeneutic cycle is not a vicious circle because it can be escaped every time the researcher makes sense of the perceived reality.

The chapters in this thesis aimed to bring to light these dimensions of Bevir's work and the supporting Gadamerian documentary analysis. The chapter on Global IR highlighted how intersubjective knowledge is built by a confrontation of different theoretical positions. Westerners, pluralists, post-Westerners and non-Westerners are debating among themselves how best to understand the Global IR program. They are, therefore, debating several facts– what is a theory, what is a non-Western theory, what is Western hegemony, what is the history of Western IR and the nature of national communities, among others – that allow for the creation of thematic foundations. The principal function of the theoretical conversation lying not only in revealing the particular character of a fact - when it makes associations between different facts that may be relevant in any approach - but also because it helps to define what is meant by the fact itself - a theory creates or gives a distinctive quality to a fact and, in this sense, develops an interpretation of it. The work of theory is thus to link different facts and give them theoretical meaning. It is to open the possibility of a theoretical comparison of sets of themes that are portrayed multiple times and that, as such, are accepted as relevant. The chapter highlighted how an ongoing (theoretical) conversation is unfolding to characterise what counts as Global IR.

The chapter on sovereign authority highlighted the grammar that underpins its conceptual construction. In particular, it stressed how, to understand the concept of the sovereign state, we need to unpack it more deeply. Unpacking the concept of the sovereign state allows us to highlight the importance of moving beyond mere description of a supposed *end of sovereignty* and better qualify the condition. Following Bevir, we need to give voice to the grammar that composed the concept of sovereign state in all its dimensions. Taking the example of Krasner for the concept of sovereignty (1999), so to the concept of sovereign state needs to be unpacked (Caporaso 2000). We come to realise that this concept is composed of three key qualifiers: authority, territoriality and autonomy. The literature has started to understand much better how each individual concept has been transforming itself (Agnew 2017, Brenner, Jessop and Jones 2003, Paasi and Ferdoush 2022). The argument is particularly interested in classifying the transformations occurring when discussing sovereign authority. To do so, the work of a specific tradition of thought, post-internationalism (Rosenau 1990, Hoobs 2000), was highlighted. First, we need to understand the historical construction of sovereign states along three dimensions: international political economy, war and identity. Second, it was argued that when Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (1996, 2008) discuss *polities*, the underlying idea relates to sovereign authority. The chapter highlighted how, in all three dimensions that led to the emergence of sovereign states, sovereign authority is mutating through the disaggregation of the sovereign's direct authority and through the bifurcation of the sovereign's rule of authority. Post-

internationalism contributes to a specific reading of how sovereign authority is mutating worldwide, constrained by the pressure of globalisation.

Finally, the chapter on the evolving condition of the philosophy of science in IR stressed Bevir's view of traditions of thought. We need to move beyond telling the history of philosophy in IR through a methodology that emphasises an eternal essentialist fight between positivism and its opponent (that is changing across a number of 'great debates'). This traditional account is characterised by presentism – the reading of events, debates, and concepts into the past as if they have a historical unity, not considering the historical specificity of these issues – and/or finalism – debates are presented as a linear and progressive expansion of core and concise thoughts and ideas. The chapter emphasised the importance of understanding the specificity of historical time by re-creating the belief systems and networks that characterise these historical specificities. Such an endeavour necessarily leads to the recreation of the multiple origins of the debate(s) that need to be extracted by analysing the belief networks that characterise the historical period. Also, what was done was the identification of core themes that characterise specific traditions and can be traced/transmitted across time – in ways that naturally change from period to period. Once read in all its historical specificity, historical time brings to light different traditions that naturally emerge with distinctive features during these periods. Tracing their existence is a subjective exercise that depends on the author, however.

6.2.2. (Intellectual) Change in Bevir

Having highlighted different dimensions of the theoretical argument in three different chapters, an analysis of change is missing to complete the theoretical framework proposed in the introduction. This (theoretical) argument for change will be used in this last chapter.

Change of a tradition can't be conceived as being driven by structural, mechanical forces or pure individuality. There are structural forces that certainly constrain us, but are not determinants of change. On the other hand, change is not just random. Embedded as we are in different traditions, we can only understand change by contesting these structural forces. This is done by recognising that we have agency and are free and independent human beings. Having agency makes us the main drivers of change in the contestation we establish towards pre-determined schemes. Second, changes are always happening – we do not need significant paradigmatic ruptures for change to happen; we just need daily events that may be experienced or intellectual exercises that we can engage in. Third, these processes, on the other hand, are intrinsically intellectual and not material. That is, they are not a consequence of any external material change per se but from intellectual work and/or the consequence these material changes have on intellectual work. Fourth, and consequently, being

intrinsically intellectual, there are two sources of change: the first is real experiences. In this case, change occurs through the academic reading given to real experiences in the world. On the other hand, change in tradition can be brought about equally by an intellectual reconfiguration of the tradition and by new moral or theoretical challenges. Four conclusions follow from this: change of traditions requires the mutual constitution of agents and their will in the structure; second, change can occur anytime; third, changes are not material but mainly intellectual; fourth, being intellectual, they can be caused by external material events – that need, however, to be read in light of the intellectual contestation that they generate – or through pure intellectual contribution. Change can be conceived as operating not only at the level of traditions but also as the direct result of dilemmas or at the level of our belief systems.

Change operates at the level of dilemmas: a dilemma may merely extend our knowledge or "change" it. The extension of a belief arises when our system is only changed, and the new challenging belief is compatible with what already exists. Changing our belief system requires a reconfiguration of it – while remaining faithful to a set of temporal and conceptual connections that give it the integrity required not to be rejected in its entirety. Second, dilemmas can be dismissed or accommodated/accepted. When accommodated, the integration is done through the integration of themes and debates. Themes and debates must have an origin in the pre-existing, which must be logically accommodated with the new. The themes debated and accepted in the past must, therefore, be reconfigured, but the origin must be those same themes. This accommodation, by challenging a pre-existing theme, may cause a general revision of other themes. This causes the belief system to be affected in multiple places. A belief system works like a belief network. We modify our beliefs by arranging hooks of understandings that recreate themes that exist in our belief system as it exists.

Change also operates at the level of belief systems: It is in the exercise of thought that, once again, change operates. If we didn't think, our beliefs would remain unchanged. Beliefs change only because we exercise our thinking and reasoning skills – and not because of pure experience. The first consequence is that a dilemma always presents a challenge because it results from an experience, and when entering our belief system, it will always be theoretical. To understand the change in beliefs, we need to highlight theoretical arguments. Second, this requires a way of thinking that can compare beliefs with each other and investigate their validity and strength. This moment of analysis involves the reformulation of our belief about an object; we can highlight this new belief and compare it with the rest of the network of beliefs we have, and continue rebuilding the network.

Applying this framework to the argument being developed leads, first, to promoting a view of change that is not external but necessarily internal, meaning intellectual. Second, an intellectual concern leads to a transformation from a pre-existing theme to an accommodation of a new one. It will identify themes that have been debated and accepted but need to be reconfigured. This

accommodation occurs by challenging a pre-existing theme with new ones, thus expanding the belief network. This is, at heart, and finally, a theoretical debate whose change is subjected to comparing the existing theoretical framework with other networks of beliefs meant to rebuild this network and promote/clarify change proposals.

6.3. Models for a Global IR: A Pluralist Socio-Intellectual Approach to National IR Communities

6.3.1. Models for a Global IR

The movement towards a global IR saw mainly two phases in its intellectual development. The first focused primarily on the US-Euro core and the work developed during this stage primarily focused on two sets of arguments: work that aimed to justify the presence of a US hegemony in the field (Holsti 1985, Smith 1987) and work that aimed to put forward a view of IR as a social science (Hoffmann 1977). The first intervention was done by authors building on a strong argument favourable for the predominance of the US as a hegemon (Turton 2016). The second wave of research aimed to contest this view of hegemony and highlight its limited understanding of what goes on inside European societies and their study of IR. The contestation of US hegemony aimed to stress how there are different ways to tell the story of IR nationally (Friedrichs 2004). On the other hand, building on Hoffmann's original argument, a socio-intellectual argument started to take shape (Waever 1998, Jorgensen 2004). At their core, this literature and its contributions were Eurocentric.

If these two waves of research characterise a first phase of engagement, a second phase was brewing when this stage was consolidating itself (Chang and Mandaville 2001, Jones 2006, Acharya and Buzan 2007, Shilliam 2011). The goal was to move IR from its Eurocentric origin and to start giving voice to the non-Western. Certainly, the writings of post-colonial writers and post-structural contributions are essential to mention to trigger this change. What is emerging from this conversation are four traditions of studying global IR.

The first tradition is rooted in the view that can be traced back to Hoffmann's contribution but in a way that expands his concerns to incorporate not only an application of the original arguments that mainly focused on the European continent but are now, necessarily, understood in contexts beyond Europe (Waever and Tickner 2009). This model sees the emergence of IR as something that can be universally applied worldwide, socialising different communities to the Western framework. Countries would then be invited to participate in the framework rather than incentivised to build their

own institutional and intellectual infrastructure— an incorporation of Western IR reigns supreme in such a model.

The second tradition is grounded not in, broadly speaking, the sociology of science but, instead, in an argument that finds its foundation in Gramsci. It is to this initial influence that one can trace this tradition. The argument is built on the idea that Western and non-Western contributions must be considered when assessing Global IR thought. IR wasn't just born with pre-defined assumptions in Western countries, then exported elsewhere, allowing socialisation processes to operate. Instead, this process needs to be understood alongside the formation of non-Western ideas and contributions. A plural global IR incorporates both intentions. Acharya and Buzan (2007) develop a model to understand how this occurs. They find refuge in Gramsci's interlinking of knowledge and interests. According to them, different nationalities are guided by the state's interests. The issue of power and, more specifically, the idea that the emergence/consolidation of a state on the global scene significantly affects, internally, how IR develops is an important idea in their scheme. IR is directly linked to these forces. And, as one would expect, it didn't emerge equally everywhere. We, therefore, need to be aware of the leading hegemon while accounting for differences. Internally, IR will be a mixture of both dynamics.

The third tradition is a mixture of the original post-colonial and post-structural critique. It brings together arguments that contest the view that we have, in fact, a US hegemony. For Mustapha Pacha (2011), both the previous strategies are limiting. Both convert Global IR to a pre-existing model that accepts Western dominance. The logic of expansion of the first tradition is one that geographically adds new cultural zones to a model that aims to assimilate these zones in a global hegemonic project; the second tradition considers these new zones as having elements of 'pre-theory' that condition the analysis. The non-Westerner is a mere instrument of Westernism. For the post-colonial, therefore, the goal is to move beyond these conditionalities. Instead of adding to what exists, the goal is to identify ways to reconstruct. This is a proposal, however, not for the complete abolishment of the West, but to build ways the non-Westerner can be heard. In so doing, it links with the post-modern project. Indigeneity is seen to be part of a repressive condition. We need to start with the repressed and excluded to give voice to it. The act of liberation must consider the previous awareness of who represses and how domination occurs. A post-Western global IR is a move that aims to unpack both conditions – only then can the indigenous have a voice.

The fourth tradition is wholly rooted in indigeneity. Yaping Quin distinguishes what he describes as inclusive and critical approaches. The first describes Global IR as still a hegemonic project that aims to integrate non-Westerners into this hegemony. It creates a pluralistic universalism that doesn't want to overcome Western contributions but sees them alongside non-Western ones. Contributors to the critical approach, on the other hand, and in his words, "merely provide raw

materials and apply theories made in the core. As a result, a production chain has been established where a superior and subjective self in the core orders and an inferior and objective other in the periphery follows" (Quin 2020:3). Even though it does want to engage with indigenous thought, the problem with the critical approach is that it does not provide a method to do so. Its goal is reconstruction and not construction. We need models to understand indigeneity. We do not need a plural IR, nor do we need a post-Western IR. What is required is more non-Western IR.

After reviewing different proposals for a Global IR, the argument presented here is pluralistic. It will be proposed that the way forward is the continuation of a via media between full Westernism and full particularism (in the form of reconstruction or full contestation). Developing a new Global IR involves continuing to find distinctive national contributions while questioning the role of Anglo-Saxon oligopoly. It means dealing with Anglo-Saxon hegemony and Western culture while aiming to understand – and give credit to – what goes on inside one's country and particular culture. It's an exercise that is, in this sense, counter-hegemonic while accepting the distinctive feature of this hegemony. It is counterculture while accepting the distinctive features of this culture. We need to assess both sides of the argument. In the next part, a pluralist socio-intellectual model will be developed.

6.3.2. Models of Global IR and National Communities

Writing in 1977, Stanley Hoffman identified three reasons why IR emerged in the United States: first, the emerging position of this country as a relevant player in international affairs eager to understand how to interact with the world; second, institutions that, founded on meritocracy, had a strong connection with government and that were also supported by wealthy foundations, and, intellectually, this political and institutional framework was supported by academics that, rooted in an idea of scientific progress and aiming to develop a social scientific enterprise, were able to conceptualise IR and make scientific sense of the 'real' world.

Many different socio-intellectual frameworks have been suggested that take inspiration from Hoffmann's initial contribution. However, not much theoretical effort has been put into such exercises. Ole Waever (1998) condemns the literature that aims to understand what is happening in different countries for lacking theoretical frameworks that solidify the argument. A similar argument was put forward a few years later by Brian Schmidt. He claims that "more attention should be placed on the theoretical and methodological assumptions involved. The absence of such attention in much of the existing literature on the history of the field has served to reinforce the view that the history of IR is self-evident or trivial' (Schmidt 2002: 16). Such an assessment could be delivered today. It is rare for

the argument to start with a clear theoretical argument that highlights where the contribution is coming from.

The argument here will build on Ole Waever's contribution and the foundation of his studies in the sociology of science (Waever 1998, Waever and Tickner 2009, Waever 2018). His argument provides a sound theoretical starting point for the model promoted here. Two other substantive points should be emphasised about this argument.

First, this contribution, on the other hand, also moves beyond the traditional characterisation of this model as being 'Western-centric'. Waever and Tickner make an explicit effort (2009) to move beyond this by incorporating contributions that emphasise ways of approaching IR beyond Westernism (Aydinlu and Mathews 2009, Segounin 2009, Behera 2009). It is certainly possible to include both Western and non-Western thinking about IR in the sociology of science argument. Such a model will be proposed here.

Second, the pluralist approach proposed by Acharya and Buzan (2007) can take forms other than the Gramscianism that they promote. The one advanced here – which accomplishes the same goal of bringing together both Western and non-Western forms of thinking about IR – finds its foundation in sociology of science.

6.3.2.1 On the Socio-Intellectual Model: The Model in Sociology of Science

The socio-intellectual model builds on the sociology of science literature. The goal of this part is not to go over this literature extensively. Its primary purpose is to align broad views of these perspectives to understand the interaction these different positions have with IR. This latter endeavour will be undertaken in the next part.

Constructivist literature accepts the fact that different cultural environments condition science. To understand its sociology, one must consider these (externalist) conditionings. In this sense, science is conceived as being produced by individuals working together within specific cultural contexts. Science, therefore, depends on understanding these structures of meaning that allow its own realisation (Golinski 1998). These cultures can be macro or micro, but they exist nonetheless. Choices are made in the context not only of technical or theoretical interests but also need to consider cultural backgrounds.

From Peter Wagner and Björn Wittrock (1991), he takes the idea that state policies greatly influence how disciplines are constructed and evolve in different national contexts. How disciplines are organised and their outcomes are directly influenced by how various states are constructed. Often, scientific communities are merely demonstrations of such interests. They serve as outputs for practical

policy problems and are driven by a concern with what goes on in state policy – either from a long-term perspective or a short-term perspective.

Through Richard Whitley (1984, 2000), he tries to assess how "Different scientific fields are characterized by varying degrees of "task uncertainty" and "mutual dependence," and (how) they exhibit distinct patterns both socially and intellectually. That is, they are organized differently in terms of both relationships of power, coordination, and key institutions (e.g., how powerful are local professors, leaders of the discipline, and external actors?) and how integrated knowledge in the field is (one paradigm, competing schools, canon varies from university to university, or almost total laissez-faire)" (Waever and Tickner 2009:14).

Furthermore, via the literature that is described as new production of knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001, 2003), an understanding of the institutional settings of modern universities and the consequences it has for scientific production is further highlighted. Specifically, how "The dominant format moves from university-based disciplines to applications-focused projects, often organized in an interdisciplinary format. Power moves from disciplinary elites to a new kind of scientific entrepreneur skilled at the intersection of academe and policy, colleagues, and grant givers. It becomes gradually harder to conceive of the influence of external actors as a separate issue, only intervening, so to say, before and after the actual research – increasingly, the knowledge produced in society is negotiated between many stakeholders" (Waever and Tickner 2009:15).

Finally, Randall Collins (1998) allows for understanding the intellectual dimension. As Waever and Tickner claim, "The methodological advice of Randall Collins (1998: 622) is to consider first . . . the clustering of ideas and the social networks among those who produced them; second, the changing material bases of intellectual production which undergirded [a specific theoretical development]; and third, the surrounding political-economic context which generated these organizational changes". (Waever and Tickner 2009:14)

6.3.2.2. From Sociology of Science to International Relations

It is important to convert these theoretical discussions inside the sociology of science into a program that applies them in IR. Waever (1998, 2009) takes such a step, and it is through Waever's multiple publications on this matter that the chapter now develops a pluralistic socio-intellectual model. This model has three main dimensions: cultural, institutional, and intellectual.

Taking inspiration from Waever's model (1998), the first cultural layer can be analysed following four different criteria: cultural-linguistic/intellectual – dealing with intellectual styles that characterise nations – political ideology – which Waever only characterises as "national traditions of

thought about state and society" (Waever 1998:695), state-society relations and a country's foreign policy situation. IR communities can be said to be influenced by each of these matters. Here, we see the influence of constructivist work and Peter Wagner and Björn Wittrock (1991).

Turning from culture to institutions, Waever wants to understand, first, how IR is "partly about the emergence of ''social science'' as such (2a) and partly about the division into disciplines (2b) that emerged at different times and in different ways in different countries. To become an accepted science depended both on the links that a discipline could make to societal interests (discourse coalitions) and on the formulation of an organizing concept and from that a scientific language" (Waever 1998:695). This dimension clearly shows the influence of both Peter Wagner's work and the social dimensions of Richard Whitley's model.

Also, institutionally, Richard Whitley's influence kicks in more deeply when Waever and Tickner ask, "Has the discipline obtained an internal structure, e.g., a hierarchy between theory and empirical work, the centrality of one or a few journals as criteria of status, or does it run on personalized networks? Although such patterns can be explained to a certain extent by the previous factors, they are likely to form an "intellectual and social organization" (Whitley 1984) that becomes an explanation in itself" (Waever and Tickner 2009:21).

Finally, at this institutional level, the contribution of the new production of knowledge model is incorporated into the analysis. The argument turns to the joint publication with Arlene Tickner (2009). The authors suggest how, increasingly, different departments are being pushed more and more by a culture of finance that implies that all there is to be done with research has 'practical consequences'. As they claim: "With a decline in authority for university/science, the role of epistemology as a key disciplinary principle of legitimacy ("this is true and scientific because I followed the correct procedure") is giving way to non-epistemological legitimacy. Justification – and not least, funding – derives increasingly from policy relevance and a more general, complex field of justification where science is only one among many forms of knowledge (together with political, economic, and sometimes religious authorities). Related to organizational and institutional questions are also how practical tasks to be performed by scholars and their everyday conditions influence the work done" (Waever and Tickner 2009:21).

Randal Collins's influence is more clearly seen in how the intellectual dimension of the project is projected. Three issues are highlighted by Waver and Tickner (2009). The first relates to understanding how different parts of the world relate to the centre. Implicit here is these communities' role with the US hegemon: intellectually, institutionally, theoretically, and meta-theoretically. The second relation is to ask how theorising takes place locally. Here some suggestions are proposed: pure importation, a 'tool-box' approach where theories are picked from the ground up, so they work in specific circumstances, a uniqueness approach where theory is applied to local cases and their

uniqueness or a final approach where the theoretical argument is derived from local analysis and the cultural world that underpins it. The third aims to understand the interaction between theory and practice. Waever and Tickner ask how far the interaction between government and intellectual products influences how theory is consolidated in particular geographies.

Waever's sociology of science model allows us to ground our analysis of specific case studies in more solid foundations. Framing the conversations about contributions of different national IR communities in these more solid theoretical frameworks would constitute a desired change. In the following sections, some case studies will be used to illustrate readings of different national communities that emphasise the model's cultural, institutional or intellectual dimensions. The hope is, therefore, to demonstrate how different dimensions of the model can be emphasised by different contributors.

The Cultural Dimension: Example. An important study to illustrate the influence of cultural variables in the analysis of national communities is the work developed by Breitenbauch and Wivel (2004). In this study, the authors highlight how a country's historically institutionalised political culture is reflected in the construction of that country's IR discipline and how the analysis of geopolitics, market size and global theoretical trends needs to be understood in light of this political culture.

According to the authors, Danish political culture is rooted in a culture based on a consensus norm and a pragmatist decision-making style. Danish are, therefore, not only highly collaborative but also strive for a peaceful resolution of conflict between different interest groups in society while being able to create avenues of negotiation with enemies. These distinctive features affect how IR was born and institutionalised in Denmark. As Breitenbauch and Wivel conclude, "We show how a specific set of social discourses on the 'international' was intertwined with the emergence of Danish political culture and how the Danish IR research community gradually obtained autonomy from the social setting through increasingly theoretical research practices and academic publication patterns" (2004:422)

How did the political culture impact IR discourse? The study of IR in Denmark is marked by two dimensions that can be traced back to the Danish defeat in 1864. This defeat led to a debate about defending a small state such as the Danish one, whose content is intrinsically characterised by a search for consensus and pragmatism. According to the authors, "the main debate over the international realm in the following decades focused on the meaning and implications of neutrality … Thus, concomitant with the gradual emergence of parliamentary democracy in the 19th century two public discourses on the 'international' emerged: one articulated by the conservative government and military establishment (the 'defence cause') and the other by the liberal and social democratic challengers (the 'peace cause')" (Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004:423). An 'internationalist' variant of IR

thought, rooted in a 'peace cause' and a military front concerned with the 'defence cause', further solidified a concern in the 20th century.

If the first Danish academic institution concerned with political and international matters was born in 1926, the lack of disciplinary distinctiveness leads the authors to stress a history of institutionalisation over three generations. Particularly relevant is the fact these generations were not only able to develop a discourse about IR discourse that incorporated Danish political culture and research interests able to construct an IR that is increasingly independent and original where "each generation of IR scholars has, on one hand, addressed and incorporated analytical perspectives predominant in the socio-political field and, on the other hand, targeted increasingly academic and international markets" (Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004:427).

The institutional origins of IR in Denmark can be traced back to the founding of the Institute for Economics and Contemporary History in 1926, the first chairs of IR in Aarhus in 1962 and Copenhagen in 1970. In this institutional context, Erling Bjøl's and Ole Karup Pedersen's (1970) work is particularly relevant. The latter, in particular, allowed for a double affirmation: "internally, a step in the legitimization of the academic IR field in Denmark and, externally, a link between academic IR and the two earlier societal discourses on the international" (Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004:434). Still, during this initial generation, the journal Cooperation and Conflict was founded.

The second generation, on the other hand, contributed to further consolidating the analysis of Denmark as a small power (Due-Nielsen and Petersen 1995). This focus on foreign policy analysis was further solidified through the gradual development of better theoretical tools. As the authors claim, this generation was important because "the development of scientific legitimacy and professionalization rests on the distinction between analytical practices, that is, methodology, employed exclusively within the discipline and those employed in publications accessible to and meant for the public" (Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004:426).

The third generation continued with the theoretical traditions, but, in particular, the Copenhagen School is responsible for bringing to the agenda issues that relate more to the peace movement. This was accompanied by the increased methodological and epistemological complexity of the arguments.

This increased theoretical sensitivity has also contributed to transforming the market of publications in Denmark. Not only did national publications gain an international dimension, but national academics are also more engaged with the publication and networks of academic research internationally.

If the institutionalisation of IR in Denmark is intellectually linked with the prevailing culture, this is a history of the institutionalisation of IR where three other significant moves are emphasised: first, "the establishment of independent academic research institutions and career positions"

(Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004:422), second the move towards theory away from journalism, official reports and public debate, and third, "the founding of academic outlets and organizations such as journals, conferences and professional associations" (Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004:422).

The Institutional Dimension: Example. Ole Waever's initial contribution to these themes (1998) presents an institutional argument for developing different IR communities. He shows how the emergence of social sciences directly results from the state's institutional set-ups and foreign policy interests. These, in turn, affect intellectual production. Waever also analyses recent theoretical contributions to these communities.

In the German case, he explores how, Institutionally, the state's interference led to a weak political science – influenced by many other disciplines, especially by law – and hierarchical structures within departments. It is from this that an IR discipline emerges. As Waever concludes, "In this place and time this set of ideas was seen as the core of history, so it did not trigger attempts to construct a separate discipline of IR. Historicism or the ''power school'' in German history constructed from the idealist, strong concept of the state a general and strict power theory with states as units" (Waever 1998:705). The influence of this institutional and intellectual condition changed after 1945 in a way that is counter-cyclical to the United States. During the 1960s until the 1980s, there were influences in the German academy of Galtung-inspired peace research, and during the 1970s, the move was towards integration, transnationalism, and interdependence. In the 1990s, according to Waever, German IR seemed to be moving towards developing "more independent theory and, to a lesser extent, oriented these theories toward an international audience" (Waever 1998:705). The creation of a journal in 1994, the debates on Habermas, Luhmann and the regime-inspired Tubingen school are examples of this new dynamism. The conclusion seems to be that "the conditions are probably better here than anywhere else for an independent dynamism, drawing on national traditions while fully keeping up with American developments" (Waever 1998:706).

The French example provides another illustration of how the ideology of state structures interferes directly with scientific developments. The tripartite structure of French social science that dates to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – itself subject to transformations of the French state – is the reason behind contemporary institutional formations. A faculty of social sciences is not the usual format in France. The institutional defragmentation is, therefore, something that institutionally characterises the study of political science and IR in France. As Waever concludes, "Today political science can be found in all three parts of the academic system: research within Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique que (CNRS), in the case of IR mainly in Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI); elite training in the Grandes Ecoles; and mass teaching in the universities, where a few have politics departments and the others position politics as the junior

partner of law" (Waever 1998:707). The consequence of this defragmentation is that many themes related to political science can be found under political economy or sociology. A concern with practice also characterises this institutional composition. When political science got an institutional home in 1871, it was intended to form civil servants. This trend continues, to which Waever adds three others: because of the relevance of sociology, when political science turns theoretical, it borrows from sociology; second, practical IR lacks theoretical foundations; and third, intellectuals writing about IR come from a wide range of fields. Because of these institutional orientations and their intellectual implications, no great debates ever impacted France. The work of Raymond Aron, the historical school of the Annales, and the radical transformationalism of writers such as Merle, Badie and Smouts are examples of innovative French writing. In all of these, we find the influence of an institutional structure which is decentralised, characterised by the influence of multiple other fields of research – mainly sociology, history and law – and that finds its intellectual vitality in the work of Aron and the literature on the transformation of the Westphalian system. Beyond these original contributions, the influence of the practical exists, with scholars giving a weak status to theory. On this second front, the conclusion is that "Most French IR scholars do empirical or policy work without the obligation felt by American scholars to locate themselves theoretically or to justify an essay by referring to theory implications. Consequently, many write in the old, state-centric tradition, more or less influenced by Aron" (Waever 1998:709).

The Intellectual Dimension: Example. An essay on the development of IR in India by Navnita Behera (2010) can be used as an example of the operation of the intellectual dimension.

Behera starts by claiming how the relationship with parent disciplines, such as area studies and political science, has contributed to its slow growth in India. IR was born in departments characterised by an emphasis on area studies, where "Area studies is multidisciplinary and IR is only one of the disciplines they embrace, but they were wrongly equated with the latter based on a somewhat simplistic assumption that the areas being studied were 'foreign'" (Behera 2010:342). On the other hand, disciplinary location in political science departments leads to intellectual and theoretical impoverishment. As Behera claims, "Most syllabi consist of an amalgam of diplomatic histories of major powers (read Europe) during World War I and World War II, followed by the Cold War and India's foreign relations with little attention devoted to fundamental concepts and theoretical debates in IR" (Behera 2010:343).

Institutionally, three problems are pointed out: the first is the lack of strategic visioning that would allow for better teacher training and material production. IR in India, on the other hand, also lacks funds and infrastructure. Both publicly and privately, IR is not perceived as an important area for investment. As Behera concludes, "The situation has changed considerably in the past two decades,

but the quantum of such funding remains small, confined to research institutions based in New Delhi and a few other metropolitan centres, and is predominantly devoted to producing 'policy-relevant' research" (Behera 2010:344). Finally, Behera points out that there is no strong IR community of Indian IR scholars. These are communication problems that do not allow for the creation of collaborative work. Also, there "are only a couple of refereed journals to which IR scholars can contribute, and those too hardly ever address theoretical debates or epistemological issues" (Behera 2010:344). Also, Behera points out that career opportunities are characterised by heavy workloads that give scholars little time to conduct their research.

IR development is also highly influenced by state policies and concerns. In this context, Nehru is presented as someone who dominates policymaking and intellectual analysis of what counts as IR. Expertise in IR matters, therefore, derived from what was the primary concern of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Universities reflect these concerns, focusing on issues that help structure India's foreign service concerns.

This disciplinary and institutional environment lead, intellectually, to a debate stuck between two positions: "the first argues: 'we don't theorize,' and the problem does not lie with the Western frameworks per se, while the second proffers: 'we do theorize' but it is not recognized 'as theory' by the predominantly Western IR community" (Behera 2010:345). For some, the problem seems not Westernism but a lack of theory. For others, the problem is not a lack of theory but Westernism.

The quest, for Behera, is to move beyond this impasse by identifying those who do theory in the name of the classical tradition while, at the same time, desiring to overcome this by proposing a move beyond the philosophical and substantive ethos of Realism. In both exercises, Behera is conscious of the theoretical, metatheoretical and substantive dominance of Western IR (particularly Realism) and how this condition impacts India. At heart, this is an analysis of the influence of IR theory in India, either through a traditional ethos or attempts to overcome it.

In looking into greater length at the role of theory in an IR community, Behera frames this theoretical struggle as one between a classical tradition and a counterculture that aims to move beyond this classical approach theoretically. On the first front, it requires starting with US dominance. Behera sees this dominance as playing out in this manner: "The theoretical endeavours of Indian IR are hemmed in by three concentric circles as depicted in Figure 5.1 or three sets of 'givens' – the infallibility of the Indian state modelled after the Westphalian nation-state, a thorough internalization of the philosophy of political realism and a 'positive' faith in the wisdom of modernity" (Behera 2010:348). What can be extracted from this is that dominance is playing out meta-theoretically – through the preponderance of positivism – and the influence this has on what is perceived as 'modern' and, on the other hand, the substantive influence of a framework that approaches IR as "mainly concerned with power struggles among states" (Behera 2010:349). US dominance is theoretically seen as playing out

by the meta-theoretical and substantive ethos of positivism and political realism, respectively. Once this paradigm of dominance is clarified, Behera looks into distinctive ways in which forms of homegrown theorising reproduce this positivism and realist logic. This requires looking at works that can be classified as theory and extracting the ethos of the classical tradition. Before the argument is advanced, another analytical point is advanced: "the disciplinary character of Indian IR cannot be understood without a thorough examination of its umbilical relationship with the Indian state, born as they both were on 15 August 1947. Unlike other social sciences, which study India's 'traditional pasts' to understand their respective notions of the 'Present' and as a legitimate source of learning, Indian IR takes the Indian state as a given starting point of all its scholarly endeavours" (Behera 2010:352).

In particular, looking at Indian IR, Behera identifies two forms of influence: those dominated by Western discourse and theoretical contributions but adjusted to fit Indian arguments. She gives the example of work on "nuclear deterrence (Singh 1998; Subrahmanyam 1994; Tellis 2001; Basrur 2005; Karnad 2002), regionalism in South Asia (Sisir Gupta 1964; Muni 1980; Wignaraja and Hussain 1986; Bhargava et al. 1995) and conflicts and peace processes (Phadnis 1989; Ali 1993; Samaddar and Reifeld 2001) among others. Another genre of writing pertains to Indian perspectives on global issues such as international order (Behera 2005; Bajpai 2003), globalization (Harshe 2004) and international law (Chimni 1993). Some neo-Marxist writings include Dutt's formulation of 'proto second tier imperialism' (1984), Vanaik's writings on globalization (2004) and Harshe's work on imperialism (1997)" (Behera 2010:345). The other source of homegrown theorising that is emphasised is built from the ground up with no external influence from Western literature. She gives the example of Nehru's thought in establishing the philosophical and theoretical formulation of non-alignment and other ideas – the idea of non-exclusionary regionalism, the concept of panchsheel or the mandala theory of regionalism. Also emphasised as further examples of this type of homegrown theorising inspired by the classical traditions are the reflections on nationalism by nationalism by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Rabindranath Tagore, M. S. Golwalkar, V. D. Savarkar, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee and Sri Aurobindo Ghosh. Therefore, both homegrown theorising versions are influenced by the classical tradition. The second step of this theoretical assessment of Indian IR is, however, to move beyond the classical tradition and US meta-theoretical, theoretical, and substantive dominance and to extract theory from other sites.

This quest is observed and collected by initially understanding what influence theories that could be broadly designated as moving beyond positivism and realism have in India IR. It requires, on this first step, to understand examples of work on "postcolonialism, hermeneutics, development theory, critical theory and feminism" (Behera 2010:355). The second step is to appeal for forms of homegrown theorising that are grounded in indigenous knowledge and experiences but that move beyond traditionalism. As Behera describes, "It calls for creating alternative sites of knowledge

construction with an alternative set of tools and resources" (2010:358). This is, on the one hand, an exercise that requires a post-positivist view of knowledge creation and – which Behera is aligned in taking inspiration mainly in post-colonial thought – and, on the other hand, "calls for IR scholars to undertake a thorough re-reading of the Indian history and analyse the political thought of various Indian philosophers and political thinkers including Manu, Valmiki, Buddha, Iqbal, Aurobindo Ghosh, Dadabhai Naroji and Tagore and political leaders such as Gandhi, Nehru, Sardar Patel and Maulana Azad among others" (Behera 2010:360).

6.4. From Assessment to Change: Normative Agendas and IR's Constitutive Problems

This part of the chapter will change gears from assessment and analysis to change. This is often an unexplored topic in the contributions often appearing as a last section after the assessment part (Waever 1998, Behera 2009, Shoeman 2009, Aydinli and Bitkin 2018). The purpose of this part is to provide stronger theoretical and substantive grounds for this debate.

6.4.1. Readdressing Models for a Global IR

The effort to dissect models of Global IR has been conceived in mainly two ways. The most recent one, already emphasised in this chapter, tends to divide global IR between Western (hegemony and social science), plural, post-colonial or indigenous approaches (Qin 2020, Anderl and Witt 2020, Mena 2020). However, there was a previous conceptualisation of these theories that tended to view the debate as one between external and internal approaches (Schmidt 1998, Waever 1998, Holden 2001).

The birth of the externalist-internalist debate lies in an attempt to rewrite and reassess the way in which the history of IR has been told. This move not only opened the door for a re-writing of the history of how US hegemony unfolded – beyond so-called 'great debates' – but also opened the way to understand how particular nationalities understand IR. If the externalist-internalist debate is born from these attempts to rewrite IR history, it consolidated itself in the dynamism of hegemonical/sociologically driven theories and historically inspired ones. Examples of the former include Brian Schmidt (1998), Tim Dunne (1994) or Gerald Holden (2001) importation of historiographical theories to understand how national communities of IR evolved. These are internal perspectives because they exclude from their assessment the hegemonical role of the US in these assessments and are therefore focused on the internal analysis of national communities and, second,

are theoretically rooted in historiographical assessments against others (mainly hegemonical/sociological approaches).

Externalist approaches (Turton 2015, Alejandro 2019) on the other hand, are characterised by focusing on how the American view of the field influences IR and/or because they depart from different theoretical angles from the internalists. if this unites them, there are divisions on how to understand this dominance. Assessing these externalist approaches historically, and according to Breitenbauch "A division of labour within the studies can be identified between theory-constructing and theory-employing studies. Among the theory-employing studies, one can distinguish an older and a newer group. The newer ones primarily employ more or less established theory and seek to establish facts about given cases, very often their home-countries or sometimes regions", on the other hand, according to Breitenbauch "The earlier studies of national IR disciplines thus either belong to the Marxist tradition; are part of those semi-traditional disciplinary histories that evolve from geographically dispersed state-of-the-field-reviews; prolegomena to the present growth in (self-perceptions of) European IR – or all or some of the above, such as, for example, the special issue of Millennium on IR in Europe (1987)" (2013:36). Even though most of the research has been developed in this theory employing framework, there has been a move in the literature to professionalise "the methodology employed; but it is, on the other hand, also a tacit heritage of former peripheral critiques of American IR" (Breitenbauch 2013:36). In other words, we have moved from theory implementation towards a more serious concern with theory construction.

After this characterisation of the debate, Breitenbauch also makes an important contribution: we can separate between two types of externalist approaches, one that focuses mainly on an outside-inside viewpoint and others that put forward inside-outside perspectives. This is an important differentiation between two approaches to externalism. Some are more prone to include the hegemonic influence of the US in their accounts of national IR, while others claim that it is more important to focus on nationalities themselves. What separates the inside-out perspective, in an assessment that Breitenbauch seems to miss, is that this internalism is done differently from the historical approach. The foundations of this internalism can be found in the contribution of Stanley Hoffmann to this debate and, more specifically, his concern with how the discipline in the US was built around three pillars: political circumstances, institutional opportunities and intellectual predispositions. In other words, the theoretical strategy of these second internalist opinions is rooted in one way or another in sociological perceptions of the functioning of IR nationally – with more or less theoretical rigour. The intellectual origins of these externalist approaches are therefore sociological at heart departing from Hoffmann's heritage and the importance of US hegemony (explicitly or implicitly) to the debate.

What emerges from this is that, and keeping the older division between externalism and internalism in mind, there are three types of externalisms: one that derives its theoretical strategy from an understanding of hegemony and its many dimensions (Turton 2015, Smith 2000, Jorgensen 2003) and which is always an outside-inside perspective, and two others rooted in more sociological theories. The latter group can be distinguished between an outside-inside perspective which takes on board some elements of the hegemonical perspective but reinterprets it in light of sociological theory (Waever 1998), and others who focus exclusively on sociological analysis of IR communities nationally, therefore constituting an inside-outside perspective on these matters (Breitenbauch 2013). They are all externalist because either they focus on US hegemony and have different theoretical inspirations when compared to the internalist approach – the first two versions – or because even though sharing a focus on national contributions do so from different theoretical angles – the last version.

In the next sections, proposals for change that can be found in the outside-inside (hegemonical/sociological) and inside-outside (sociological) contributions will be assessed. In the externalist perspective, the works of Ole Waever, Jorg Friedrichs, Knud-Erik Jorgensen and Navita Behera will serve as examples of where the debate moved. Henrik Breitenbauch's, Andres Wivel, Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever will solidify the internalist model.

6.4.1.1 Change in National IR Communities: The Externalist Model

Ole Waever and Jorg Friedrichs. In his 1998 article, Ole Waever offers a normative outlook for Global IR (1998:723-725). Building on the hegemony/sociological template he concludes that there's a problem in the interaction between the US hegemonic core and European IR and some deficiencies in the way European IR theorists work. In his words, there exists "a situation in which European IR can be criticized for insufficient professionalism and too much local control, whereas American IR is threatened by parochialism and sequences of fads" (Waever 1998:723). Parochialism is observed by the reaction in the US academy in security studies to the work developed on the question of identity. According to him "identity was therefore largely a question of how to reconcile it with neorealism" (Waever 1998:724). Europeans, on the other hand, are accused of lack of (theoretical) professionalism and living within hierarchical (not meritocratic) institutional frameworks. Breaking the cycle of low levels of theorising inside Europe may happen when reflections are driven/motivated by the interaction with the intellectual center, however, conditioned as this interaction will be by European-specific cultural backgrounds. The example of the impact that the theoretical work of Andrew Moravcsik (1991) had in European literature is used by Waever to illustrate this point. According to him, it allowed for the intensification of theory discussion in this literature leading to a situation where

"One literature, mainly European (with important American contributions), is organized around the idea of multilevel governance; the other, mainly American (with some Europeans), applies rational choice approaches to the European institutions" (Waever 1998:724). This outlook, therefore, seems to point to the institutional parochialism of the hegemon and to the lack of institutional conditions in Europe that allow for the flourishing of theoretical conversations, which are only broken when Europeans give a cultural touch to American theoretical contributions.

Perhaps picking up on Waever's unclarified contribution, Jorg Friedrichs (2004, Friedrichs and Waever 2009) outlines two strategies to move beyond the peripherical condition for (European) national communities. In this framework, American parochialism is more clearly identified with the institutional nature of American hegemony and the ability European national communities need to have to enter this hegemony. The normative solution to move beyond hegemony and periphery takes shape with two strategies: develop an efficient strategy to enter the institutional hegemony of the US core on the one hand, and develop strategies for theoretical innovation at the same time.

Looking in more detail at the first, Friedrich describes three approaches to deal with US institutional hegemony. The best solution proposed by him is to develop a perspective rooted in what is described as a strategy of multi-level research cooperation (Friedrichs 2004:65-84, Friedrichs and Waever 2009:265-267). This strategy of incorporation in the institutional hegemony of US core is different from one described as self-reliant (Friedrichs 2004:29-47, Friedrichs and Waever 2009:263-264) and another described as resigned marginality (Friedrichs 2004:47-64, Friedrichs and Waever 2009:264-265). It is mainly through these approaches that different national IR communities are read. The interpretation resides, on the one hand, in describing what these conditions are and, second, looking at intellectual contributions in different (European) communities capable – by incorporating in themselves theoretical concepts – of entering US dialogue or staying resigned to national contributions.

Institutionally, the strategy of academic self-reliance is one where a community doesn't engage at all with the centre and where the centre also doesn't engage in this community. France is identified as following this strategy. Even though the majority of the community functions this way, there are some intellectually relevant contributions that extract theoretical content from existing Western discussions and debates. these contributions rarely, however, travel.

Institutionally, the strategy of resigned marginality is characterised by looking at statistics of publications in the US market and a condition where there seems to be a desired wish by some sectors of the IR national community to publish abroad (not massively) but where they receive the influence of North American research to a much higher degree. On the other hand, intellectually, there are some demonstrations in these communities of theoretical work that integrates Western theoretical concepts and ideas.

Friedrichs therefore proposes a normatively better alternative for the institutional participation in the academic market of IR. Giving the example of the Nordic community of scholars, he describes his multi-level research cooperation strategy as one where, "First, most of them have gained access to the academic "world market" by getting their books and articles published by British and American editors (Goldmann 1995). Second, many Nordic scholars are networking with scholars from other European countries, producing excellent edited volumes (e.g. Eriksen et al. 2004). Third, some extend their tentacles to other world regions, from Russia to the developing countries. Fourth, Nordic scholars meet at conferences of the Nordic International Studies Association and publish their articles in Nordic (or Nordic-based) journals, namely Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of Peace Research, Security Dialogue and Scandinavian Political Studies. Fifth, they do not neglect their national audiences either, producing textbooks for national markets, using journals in the vernacular languages as an outlet for some of their academic production, working in national policy think-tanks, and addressing civil society via the mass media and popular publications" (Friedrichs and Waever 2009:265-266).

Alongside this effective multi-level research cooperation strategy another theoretical transitions need to take place. Friedrichs proposes two philosophical strategies to develop theory: one rooted in the English school which, in essence, demonstrates the importance of conceptualising multiple theoretical perspectives when addressing social realities (Friedrichs 2004:89-104) and, secondly, another rooted in pragmatism and by developing middle group approaches to the analysis (Friedrichs 2004:105-124).

Friedrichs is, therefore, able to move beyond the initial reflections developed by Waever. He solidifies an understanding of 'what's in fact wrong with US hegemony' by analysing on the one hand and developing strategies to enter this said hegemony and, second, by proposing theoretical/philosophical debates that need to take place in national communities to enter this hegemonical status. Internationalisation and theoretical/philosophical innovations go hand in hand in the argument.

Knud-Erik Jorgensen. Another important external-internal normative argument is developed by Knud-Erik Jorgensen (2003). He suggests several cures, that would allow IR to become a six-continent social science. These cures will be organised in a way that makes sense to the argument being presented here. It is clearer for the analytical purposes to which this article aims to contribute.

It is important to start with Jorgensen proposals for institutional reforms. According to him, the cure "requires mutual recognition, a notoriously difficult process because it involves foundational myths, disciplinary identity issues, strong path-dependencies, professional power relations and tenure-track career paths. It will be immensely difficult to convince the average American IR scholar,

trained to do the kind of research published in International Studies Quarterly, that there is any value added in going beyond the social science canon or the political science/IR package. Similarly, it will be an almost impossible mission to convince the sovereigns of European IR principalities that they (we) can do much better and that part of it, muß auf Amerikanish sein (to refer back to Michael Zürn's question posed in 1996)" (Jorgensen 2003:339). In essence, this institutional critique reminds us of the importance for US institutional parochialism to be open to European constructivism while, at the same time, and by remembering Zürn's suggestion that 'we can do much better', Jorgensen again stresses how important it is to develop theoretical work in Europe. This cure is a repeat of previous arguments.

If this cure contests the institutional foundation of US hegemony, a second cure also aims to contest another dimension of this hegemony: its intellectual side. For Jorgensen the history of IR has many (national) sides to it and these national particularities in the way the history of IR is told need to be put forward. It is in this sense that he stresses the importance of reconsidering the history of the discipline. This is a requirement to assess how different nationalities or regional spaces have their own ways of understanding IR that have evolved differently in separate spaces. Picking up the work by Brian Schmidt (1998), Jorgensen concludes that one needs to start discussing individual particularities more carefully while, at the same time, referencing Holden's contribution (2004), this shouldn't be done isolated from stories told elsewhere. Jorgensen, therefore, highlights the importance of a historical contextual difference that allows one to understand national or regional developments without losing sight of broader Anglo-Saxon-based debates.

This intellectual contestation of hegemony is related directly to the necessity to construct theoretical devices therefore. In particular, he highlights the importance of first, "exploring national differences in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere" (Jorgensen 2003:337), second, "engage in a systematic programme comparing IR communities" (Jorgensen 2003:337), and third, focusing on a particular concept in an argument that could be extended to others, understand "how the unit of the international system, the state, is understood very differently in continental Europe and in an Anglo-American context" (Jorgensen 2003:337).

Looking inside national communities, several other cures (precisely one, four and six) are highlighted to illustrate the importance of developing more consistent theoretical work. We can start with his sixth cure, in which he talks to a nascent European community of IR theorists, highlighting how more theoretical work needs to be developed. Focusing specifically on the debates about European foreign policy. He complains that "Though categorizations differ, labels like "isolationists", "internationalists" and "unilateralists" illustrate my point. For decades, there has been a lively debate among representatives of these traditions. In Europe, there is no such debate. We even lack a language for describing cross-boundary foreign policy traditions (distinctions between "Atlanticists" vs. "Europeanists" are often as far as we get). Therefore, studies on European foreign policy traditions

across national boundaries are almost completely lacking which, in turn, explains our failure to fully understand underlying issues in debates on the development of the EU's foreign policy. This cure addresses the theory/state practice relationship head-on, suggesting by means of constitutive theory to explore uncharted territory" (Jorgensen 2003:340). In cures one and four, he highlights in more detail the type of theory he is looking for. The argument first stresses the necessity of making theory relevant to practice. At the same time, it emphasises the reflexive nature of such work – we can't understand practice without having some form of theoretical predisposition to back our work. Jorgensen also seems to have a particular normative aspiration here, highlighting in cure four how the "relationship between academic theory and social reflection seems to be an obvious issue for further attention" (Jorgensen 2003:338).

In another contribution dedicated to understanding the world of IR after hegemony, Jorgensen further develops his normative aspirations (Jorgensen 2014). After highlighting how "hegemony appears to be a slightly misleading concept for a situation in which major IR communities around the world practice the discipline in ways they deem best" (2014:58) he goes on to propose four ways in which Europe can illustrate a move beyond hegemony. The first again emphasises the necessity to rethink the history of the discipline. According to Jorgensen "we do not have histories of the trajectories in Europe of the main theoretical traditions, that is, international political theory, liberalism, realism, English School, IPE and the postpositivist tradition" (2014:60). The second way in which Europeans can move beyond hegemony is through institutional build-up. Jorgensen suggests several avenues: "Communication of research is secured by means of a rich collection of scientific journals, book publishing outlets and other means of communication" (2014:61), "define 'best practice' as scholarship that, for example, makes use of at least three languages" (2014:61), another important element is organisation and here "The main organising devices have been the Pan-European Conferences, PhD summer schools/ workshops, and publications (namely, the European Journal of International Relations and the book series Palgrave Studies of International Relations). In order to create appropriate institutional underpinnings for its significantly increased range of activities, the SGIR has created the European International Studies Association, the first continent-wide, individual membership-based association in the field in Europe" (2014:62). Also, Europeans need to engage more consistently in theoretical debates. A deeper engagement with the debates that were marking the literature shows itself here. If "European IR scholars should encourage theory-building outside the traditional centres of theorising" (2014:62), Jorgensen promotes the view that "Theory building needs to follow the principle that, "that there is 'one world, many perspectives' and not 'many worlds, many perspectives'" (2014:62). If this nuance adds to previous contributions, Jorgensen reemphasises in this contribution the necessity to go back to debates about theory and practice and the importance of conceptual analysis for the theoretical, metatheoretical and analytical understanding of IR.

Jorgensen, therefore, has a deeper agenda for change for national IR/European communities. He suggests integrating ourselves in the US market through publications and institutionally using "international norms for 'best practice' and global standards" (2003:339), as do Friedrichs and Waever, but he also emphasises how intellectually different national histories constitute IR. The cure, from a hegemonic point of view, resides in an institutional integration into the IR core but an intellectual contestation of the historical origins of IR – each individual nationality has its own history. This needs to be complemented by other cures – understanding the epistemological and theoretical nature of IR. Jorgensen also emphasises the necessity to engage in debates about theory and practice and the role that conceptual analysis may play as a solution theory, meta-theory and analysis. Also, he opens the theoretical conversation from Western to non-Western opportunities (but in ways that still promote Western primacy).

Navnita Behera's Nativist. Writing from a South Asian perspective, for Navnita Behera (2009), there are mainly three challenges: "rebuilding its institutional infrastructure, rethinking its epistemic foundations, and augmenting its intellectual resource base by reworking its disciplinary boundaries" (2009:153). Even though the order starts with institutions, moves to meta-theory and then to theory, let's order this in terms of the externalist-internalist debate. First, Behera aspires for a reconfiguration of US theoretical and metatheoretical dominance over IR. It is intended to "create spaces for alternative thinking on IR, which cannot be accomplished without a critical self-awareness and questioning of the a priori assumptions, procedures, and values embedded in the positivist enterprise" (Behera 2009:154). The second normative proposal aims to revamp the discipline in the university system by creating more offers in terms of programs and adequate funding. Also important are good quality textbooks. The third proposal requires "stepping out of the box of Western political realism and indigenizing the academic discourses of IR" (2009:153). This is a direct appeal for engagement with local knowledge traditions and non-traditional sites of IR scholarship to understand contemporary problems.

What separates Behera's normative agenda from Waever, Friedrichs, and Jorgensen is its foundation in nativism. The external-internal approach can, therefore, consolidate itself in such a form. When it comes to dealing with the hegemon, for nativists, there is no strategy of institutional accommodation or intellectual reconfiguration. Instead, the debate is about meta-theoretical critique. On the other hand, and internally, institutions need to be reconfigured while, theory internally needs to go not through a philosophical adaptation to Western traditions but, instead, through a re-evaluation of what is means to do theory in order to highlight native perspectives.

6.4.1.2 Change in National IR Communities: The Internalist Model

Henrik Breitenbauch. The necessity to engage in a comparative exercise becomes clearer in Henrik Breitenbauch's study of IR in France (2013). There are still some limitations in this study, however, because it ends up being a study not mainly oriented to understanding IR as a whole, but instead, to understand a particular angle of US hegemony and why certain communities are more prone to align with this aspect when compared to others.

Written during a period where it seemed that the main problem for national communities seemed to be their exclusion (self-promoted or not) from the US intellectual publication market (Holsti 1985, Waever 1998, Friedrichs 2004, Waever and Friedrichs 2009), the question became how this was possible. The main question the argument ends up answering is why France (when compared to the United States) is unable to achieve or participate in the institutional hegemony of the field. The study, therefore, becomes one of understanding a mini-debate inside a broader debate – that of the analysis of why France, through its publication patterns, is unable to compete with the United States or to participate in the US's institutional hegemony of the field.

Theoretically, the argument is mainly concerned first with the role that formal publication patterns play in a broad Mertonian approach to social science, and second with justifying a specific cultural approach to the analysis of national communities. It's an intricate junction of theoretical works and ideas that ends up revitalising the intention that what matters is to understand the outputs of research. Merton is highlighted to stress how "A crucial characteristic of scientific practice is its functional differentiation from other kinds of practice; this functional differentiation is maintained through a continuous reproduction of the practice as "scientific", in that it is evaluated, reviewed and consecrated as such through mechanisms and standards particular to the specific academic specialty and community" (Breitenbauch 2013:16). Even though this is the general statement, what matters for Breitenbauch is the specific "development of social scientific method as a regulator of concrete research practices" (2013:17). In other words, even though Merton is highlighted to stress the importance of building science following mechanisms and standards that guarantee institutional and intellectual independence, Breitenbauch is particularly interested in highlighting how "It is the object which these institutional processes deal with that is interesting: in consecrating (or not) a specific kind of text as a legitimate expression of a given specialty, the form of the argument matters as much and perhaps even more than what is said" (2013:16). If this niches down Merton's argument to one particular dimension, Breitenbauch also highlights how cultural differences matter. And to do so he moves from Merton to more cultural sensitive approaches. This part of the argument starts by stressing the importance of political culture. Structure science activities are dependent on political cultures which is understood as "sets of aggregated beliefs, values and patterns of interaction derived from collective historical experiences over time, which from the macro-level have become sedimented

structures often influencing micro-level outcomes in a given society. In other words, the collective interpretation of an external event defines a particular construction more than the event itself" (2013:45). In order to understand a culturally sensitive understanding of science we therefore need to understand political culture and the impact modern states have in this activity. But this is not enough. Critiquing Richar Whitley's work for his emphasis on the interaction between work organisations and their intellectual organisation, Breitenbauch stresses how at this more formal level what really matters is the analysis of scientific outputs. In his own words, what we should analyse are "two functional kinds of standard forms of legitimate expression can be distinguished: in terms literally of exposition (i.e. production) and of acquisition (i.e. reproduction)" (Breitenbauch 2013:49). But if the cultural sensitive argument is sensitive to political culture and, in particular, to the outputs of the scientific activity, how to understand the interaction between the two in the analysis of research itself? Here the work of Pierre Bourdieu is picked up. According to Breitenbauch "It is thus possible to enlarge the state's socially constitutive function to its interiorisation as habitus with the provisioning of "objective" standards for communicative community, which emerge through the totality of the modern state constellation as high elite culture reproduced in the various institutions" (2013:53). If political culture is relevant, institutionally research outputs should be the main focus of analysis and these two are brought together through the interaction of a socialisation of the educational system is politically driven 'doxas', we came full circle in the succinct conclusion that " the subsequent analysis will show that in the case of France a set of characteristics of the French IR argumentative structure correspond to a public legitimate form of expression and its concomitant political aesthetics, namely the dissertation" (2013:55).

This theoretical argument is then grounded in two main substantive claims. First, how, in the case of France, a focus on the hegemonic research output (dissertations) rather than the optimum Mertonian type (research articles) makes French IR less capable of participating in the institutional hegemony of IR. Second, how this focus on the dissertation itself builds upon a political culture rooted in cultural and institutional practices that lead to the vindication of the dissertation as the main vehicle of scientific expression in France. The argument being presented, therefore, forces the reader to engage in a comparative exercise. This comparative exercise focuses on the institutional hegemony of US academia however. More would be gained if it would focus on the nature of scientific activity as a whole.

Normative patterns of comparative analysis, rooted in the sociology of science, therefore, need to account for divergences from the overall model and not give in to culturally specific models and, more specifically, to niche-specific arguments within the configuration. A broader theoretical argument and a broader comparative exercise is in order, therefore, which Breitenbauch himself alludes to. As he argues "A crucial characteristic of scientific practice is its functional differentiation

from other kinds of practice; this functional differentiation is maintained through a continuous reproduction of the practice as "scientific", in that it is evaluated, reviewed and consecrated as such through mechanisms and standards particular to the specific academic specialty and community" (2013:16). Two steps are important, therefore, for the structural argument: functional differentiation from other kinds of practice and institutional/substantive mechanisms that make it scientific. It is in precisely by claiming a functional differentiation able to build institutional and substantive claims of scientificity that creates the conditions for IR in the US to set standards. According to Breitenbauch "it is the American tradition which stands out for these reasons … the rule of propositionalism at the level of concrete research output, in combination with a high degree of both functional differentiation of scientific and educational institutions from society (professionalisation) and of academia (disciplinary differentiation), and within the disciplines themselves (specialisation)" (Breitenbauch 2013:15).

If one assesses another contribution by Breitenbauch we can understand this broader theoretical and comparative exercise at play. When analysing not the French case but the Danish IR community case, Breitenbauch and Wivel (2004) build an argument that is culture-sensitive yet adheres more to the logics of disciplinary differentiation, specialisation and professionalisation that should serve as a guideline. According to the argument "We show how a specific set of social discourses on the 'international' was intertwined with the emergence of Danish political culture and how the Danish IR research community gradually obtained autonomy from the social setting through increasingly theoretical research practices and academic publication patterns" (Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004:422). This contribution aims, therefore, to address how marked by a specific political culture – characterised by pragmatism and consensus-building – the Danish community of IR achieved (scientific) autonomy from the social setting through disciplinary differentiation (and specialisation), on the one hand, and professionalisation on the other. Marked by a distinctive political culture, for a transformation to occur in Denmark towards a more solid view of IR, three main moves were significant: the creation and consolidation of independent academic research institutions, second, the move towards theory away from journalism, official reports and public debate. This allowed, on the one hand, the consolidation of an institutional setting characterised by the creation of platforms where academics could show their research and exchange ideas – journals, conferences, and professional organisations. On the other hand, it allowed theoretical innovations whose main contribution has been to adapt Western-based theoretical frameworks to the specificities of Danish culture. Reforming realism, constructivism and security studies through this new culture-driven lens is the consequence.

Breitenbauch and Wivel (2004), therefore, describe a transition where disciplinary institutionalisation, theoretical consistency, scientific consolidation, and intellectual innovation are the main drivers that allow IR communities to consolidate themselves. The optimum case of the comparative approach – aspiring for scientific autonomy from a social setting via disciplinary

differentiation and professionalisation (institutional and theoretical) – is brought into the model to exemplify how the Danish community corresponds to its full realisation. If in the French case this ideal model is captured by a cultural-sensitive approach built mainly to understand how France has limitations in competing for intellectual hegemony, the Danish case, departing from a sociological understanding rooted in political culture, highlights how through disciplinary differentiation and institutional and theoretical professionalisation, the Danish community was able to achieve autonomy from social setting and consolidate itself as a scientific community. Both arguments are, therefore, inside-out in the sense that it is within the national community that these debates need to emerge, but the comparative exercise from an ideal scenario is passively ignored or actively incorporated in these two case-studies.

Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever. In their assessment of national communities worldwide, Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever (2009) further contribute to the inside-outside perspective. The framework doesn't clearly attempt to understand the dynamic between autonomy-disciplinary differentiation and specialisation – professionalisation. It instead is a mixture of institutional and intellectual analysis rooted or influenced by many sociological approaches. But some relevant conclusions follow.

Institutionally, the first conclusion is that most national communities analysed have autonomy from public intervention in the sense that institutions are not duplicates of direct policy interests. Even in more authoritarian regimes or regimes characterised by strong cultural variables (such as religion), IR communities are independent. The second element of the institutional analysis is the importance attached to 'real world problems' in the research agendas of these communities. Institutional recognition comes in the form of debating real-world problems and proposing solutions to these problems. As Tickner and Waever conclude "The criterion of success is to develop scholarship that makes sense out of the challenges faced by "x" country and, in some instances, that offers concrete policy recommendations for overcoming them. In cases such as Africa, Latin America, and South Africa, this essentially means becoming "think-tank-like" by engaging in problem-solving and providing specific answers to distinct policy challenges" (2009:331). This can also operate at the level of identity – "In such instances politicians set the academic agenda, not necessarily through a direct policy link to the researchers, but through the general agenda that is set for all of society in the public sphere" (Tickner and Waever 2009:332). The third institutional characteristic deals the fact that even though publishing abroad may be relevant for the development of an academic career "For much of the rest of the world of IR scholars, however, trying to get an article published in a leading journal – unless you actually aspire to a career in the United States or Europe – is not the most relevant or strategic career move. This is partly due to the lack of attention given to this factor by the relevant power holders, but it also reflects just how unrealistic it is to try and publish in a leading IR journal, given the extreme non-

publication of non-Western scholars" (Tickner and Waever 2009:332). The final institutional characteristic is that internally, the structure of power is not one where "international publications are not the key route to influence" (2009:333). Institutionally, and to summarise the argument, "The total picture that emerges regarding professionalization is that in major parts of the world there is actually a relatively high degree of autonomy, but this does not necessarily trigger the expected dynamics and mechanisms of academic regulation" (2009:333).

Intellectually, most national communities around the world are characterized by two dynamics. The first intellectual characteristic is "the lack of theoretical production" (Waever and Tickner 2009:335). The second characteristic, probably because it is rooted in the institutional lack of desire to move beyond 'real-world'- day-to-day problem / solution agendas, is that the main intellectual agenda deals with issues that relate to a "state-centric ontology that in most cases is manifest in the internalization of realist-based ideas concerning concepts such as power, security, and the national interest" (Waever and Tickner 2009:334).

In summary, even though this assessment doesn't fully accomplish the desired attempt to understand autonomy-disciplinary differentiation-professionalisation inside national communities, it does gives hints on how these operate nationally. If there is autonomy, professionalization is conditioned by negative institutional dynamics which, on the one hand, do not allow for great theoretical reflection and, on the other and substantively, focus on 'state-centric ontologies'.

6.4.2. The Normative Agenda and IR' Constitutive Problems: Expanding the Endeavour

From the above, one comes to understand that the outside-in agenda for reform, rooted in hegemony theory, grounds itself in an institutional, intellectual and theoretical critique of US hegemony, which, at the same time, appeals to theoretical and substantive reform. The inside-outside perspective, rooted in sociological theory, aims to place at the centre of the debate the capacity that IR needs to have to identify its disciplinary, institutional and theoretical foundations, only then can a social science be born from the controls of strict societal/political demands. In this last part we will see how these agendas can be translated into the vocabulary of IR's constitutive problems. For reform to happen in global national communities debates about these dimensions need to take precedence over others.

Incorporating Why(s)

1a Global IR: Internationalisation

1b Global IR: Reassessing the History of IR

6.4.2.1. Incorporating *Why(s)*

The thesis has qualified several of what it describes as *why we should study IR* problems. From an understanding of the history of IR to more philosophical disputes engaged in debating grand theory and pluralism. The normative agenda in the form of the outside-inside and the inside-outside approaches leads us to engage particularly with four types of literature, however: Global IR – particularly the role that US Hegemony plays in this literature – and disputes inside the conceptual/disciplinary debates. It is to these issues that we now turn.

What Role for US Institutional Hegemony? Internationalisation. What role should internationalisation play in a national community? Friedrichs has developed three strategies of institutional interaction: academic self-reliance, resigned marginality and multi-level research cooperation. But if he does this, he also never solidly justifies the methods for doing so using two different approaches: one more quantitative and another qualitative.

First, a quantitative understanding looks at participation patterns by foreign communities in the main journals of the discipline. This requires the use of methods to understand the cosmopolitanism of production at the centre and how far it is dominated by US academics (Holsti 1985, Turton 2016). At the same time, one wonders how far the center participates in the periphery (Friedrichs 2004, Holsti 1985). This generates a quantitative understanding of how cosmopolitan/concentrated IR's institutional community is and an understanding of the 'amount' of hegemony there is.

A second important debate to have is less quantitative and questions whether or not we should participate in such institutional hegemony and what exists when one is not doing so. Recent literature has started to understand these conditions a bit better by grounding them in sociological literature.

Nativists adopt a self-reliant/resignation attitude and tend to reify national patterns of publication against an interaction with the core. In his work on these matters, Audrey Alejandro (2019) justifies the lack of internationalisation in cultural reasons, claiming that "IR has been constructed as a foreign policy tool to support postcolonial states' need for international expertise and their construction as international political subjects" (Alejandro 2019:15). This leads some communities to prioritise "on-peer- reviewed publications, which mainly address national and regional elites" (Alejandro 2019:15). Alejandro has further justified the lack of internationalisation in institutional reasons based on different criteria for assessing "the robustness of the national publishing market, the criteria used for research evaluation and the extent to which they are important in career advancement, the relative incentives to produce policy-oriented research, and the nature of national scientific public policies" (Alejandro 2019:15). Communities have different approaches to what grants institutional merit, in other words and publication merit is not the main one in some communities. Internationalisation is, therefore, not a priority for those who adopt a self-reliant/resigned marginality.

Moving from a strategy of resignation and self-reliance to one of engagement, one has to agree with Friedrichs and Waver (2009) that the pulling effect of the institutional hegemony of the main journals pushes national IR communities forward. They stress how a strategy of multi-level research cooperation is characterised by a focus on publication, networking, attending gatherings, producing textbooks, participation in the public sphere and addressing civil society/mass media. Moving forward, however, one further needs to dissect sociologically what these categories mean. We need to ground these categories in better-developed analytical foundations. It seems clear that instead of such vague categorisations, the argument could engage with the institutional turn in sociology of science (Whitley 2001, Zuckerman 1984). This would allow us to understand the importance of processes of institutionalisation for the formation of disciplinary fields, the cognitive and social norms that (should) rule such processes and the importance of communication for the consolidation of national communities of research. Waever and Tickner's (2009) institutional critique would therefore make more sense if introduced at this stage. From hierarchical communities that transgress social and cognitive norms, becoming hierarchical in the process, one should strive to create communities that respect such norms and avoid stratification. This argument would have to be further extended by research that emphasises the importance of communication among scholars for the consolidation of their own identity (and dissect what consolidates such communication).

If the literature has gained stronger theoretical/methodological grounds to understand the quantitative side of institutional hegemony, it also needs to gain more analytical consistency when understanding the sociological side of the equation.

What Role for US Theoretical Hegemony? Rewriting of History. What also needs to continue is understanding and rewriting the history of IR, both in the way it has been told hegemonically and in the way different national communities have their own understanding of this history.

One of the ingredients of US hegemony is, precisely, its theoretical hegemony rooted as it is in a specific 'presentist' reading of the history of IR that tends not only to privilege a certain reading of this 'evolution' but also the centrality of Anglo-Saxon contributions. Hegemonically, several scholars have already undertaken such an endeavour (Schmidt 1998, Schmidt and Long 2012). These studies aim to move beyond the traditional way of seeing IR as a dispute between a number of 'great debates'. According to the argument – read in ways that elucidate a kind of 'growth' in the understanding scholars have of IR – we have four or five great debates. Particularly relevant is the way the initial stage of the 'growth' of IR is characterised. Realists and Idealists were fighting for the soul of the discipline. We certainly need to continue revising how this period is being understood.

During the first decades of the 20th century, we encountered the intellectual institutionalisation of the study of IR in the United States. This institutionalisation process is highly relevant for the production and systematisation of the studies in this discipline. But, scholars were not just discussing the nature of idealism and how realism could overcome it. This is conditioning the study of IR to a very epistemologically and politically driven kind of debate. During this period, scholars wouldn't characterize it as the main debate. In Quincy Wright's *The Study of International Relations* (1955), we can find grounds for broadening the concerns of this period. We need to continue revising how the history of IR is being written and addressed during this period. If Quincy Wright's study provides a guiding light to expand and extract from the contexts different traditions of reflections that move beyond the epistemological/political debate, other studies are also important. During this time a concern emerged – not intensively present in Wright's study – about the nature of the intellectual and institutional setting in which IR was developing. The contexts under which this tradition emerged and expanded must also be understood, explored and expanded. This period of IR reflection marks an example of the anxieties of scholars who, conditioned by multiple influences, were fighting to identify what the core identity of IR could be. They also fought to institutionalize it in the best way they could in different institutions. And they were trying to provide more solid scientific foundations to what was being researched with a particular focus on international political problems (Guilhot 2017). But just emphasising the latter without understanding the former is not only doing a disservice to a more accurate theoretical understanding of this period, it is also not understanding the anxieties of the contributors trying to give IR the intellectual and institutional grounds it needed to differentiate itself.

But if the rewriting of history needs to continue at the hegemonic level, it also needs to continue at the national level. We need to contest, therefore, the way in which this intellectual hegemony has established itself nationally (Jorgensen 2000). In most national communities, there was

no such thing as a series of 'great debates' that replicated what (didn't) happen somewhere else. Each national community had its own understanding of IR, and the IR debate has historically developed differently when compared to any other community (Jorgensen and Knudsen 2004). We need to continue the endeavour to develop a contextual analysis of the history of IR in different nationalities, thus contesting a hypothetical hypothesis of intellectual hegemony in IR.

What Role for US Theoretical Hegemony? Reinventing Theory Construction. Engaging with Global IR would help highly another contestation of US theoretical hegemony – this time by emphasising not how dependent it is on a certain view writing the history of IR, but mainly by stressing how deeply rooted it is in Western philosophy (Acharya and Buzan 2007, Quin 2020, Aydinli and Biltekin 2018, Shilliam 2011) Global IR contributors expose how contemporary IR theory and hegemony privileges Western philosophy and proposes innovative ways to build new theoretical frameworks. A confrontation emerges to the value given to Western IR theory against a strict focus on non-Western contributions. But the foundations of this debate lead us to engage with these two important questions.

One can surely depart from the critique suggested by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan towards US theoretical dominance (2009). IR theories are deeply rooted in Western assumptions of social reality. A move towards a world of post-Western IR theories must start from the assumption that how IR has been built is deeply embedded in Western philosophy and understanding of social life. Classical realism, neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism, Marxism, the English School, Constructivism and postmodernism, and strategic studies are all presented as examples of theoretical constructions that are generated to highlight how their foundations lie in (European) social and political thought and how they end up replicating ideas about the world that are deeply rooted in Western political and social practice. This conditions how they are presented and deeply embeds their view of the world in the experiences of European history.

This theoretical dominance and the Western heritage upon which it builds also leads to a further consequence: the hegemonic role of the United States as the epicentre of intellectual reflection. According to Acharya, "American dominance happens because of its dominance in theory, especially realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and in methodology" (Acharya 2016:6), and the argument is particularly interested in understanding the suppression towards any other theories that may be developed elsewhere. To move towards Global IR, a move towards other perceptions of theory needs to be taken. This structural conditioning leads authors to try to understand the impact this theoretical dominance plays in national contexts while, at the same time, they want to overcome it.

The first approach would look at what specific influence Western literature has had on the theoretical development of a country. This could be done by accepting the dominance of the prevailing

concentration on issues of 'high politics' and political realism. Or by an understanding of alternatives to realism. The literature would read into how other (Western) theories played a role in different national contexts. The contribution of post-positivism is particularly relevant for some authors (Behera 2010). But for some, this approach is not profound enough. After all, it doesn't completely question the intellectual dominance of the US and Western hegemony over different societies. A move needs to take place that allows us to question theoretical assumptions and reconfigure different theoretical contributions. We are here aligned with what, for some, is the development of 'homegrown theorising'.

However, the theoretical foundations of such an exercise and an answer to the question, 'What is theory?' can take different forms. In his contribution to this debate, Vineet Thakur (2015) identifies two types of 'languages' that can be used to answer this question: one that is close to post-colonial thought, claiming that the "assumed "difference" between Western concepts and Eastern concepts is unsustainable. There are non-Western elements in Western concepts (Bilgin 2008)" (Thakur 2015:218). The second one is close to the "enunciation rights for an alternative language. African concepts such as ubuntu, ujaama, pan-Africanism, African personhood, and negritude provide alternative lenses through which the world is understood, experienced, and categorized" (Thakur 2015:218). This second type of language, therefore, aims not to reconcile the Western with the non-Western but to focus on difference itself as a distinctive feature of epistemological standing. This argument can be pushed even further by developing new configurations and answers to the problem 'what is theory'. For example, in his effort to provide more solid foundations to answer the question of how to develop non-Western IR theory, Yaping Quin (2020) understands theory formation as necessarily linked to a culture or a civilisational background. Western thought was founded upon the ideas of nation-states, sovereignty, and security. This developed a community of practice in such a geocultural community that inspired scholars to think and write about such matters. However, other civilisational practices have crystallised in different cultures, and scholars need to be inspired in a different direction. As Quin claims, "Recognizing that there are multiple civilizations and therefore multiple civilization-based geocultural communities provides an inspiring condition for non-Western knowledge production to be legitimately possible and practically achievable" (Quin 2020:12). Alternative suggestions of how to approach this problem can be found on other contributions that route the answer to the problem 'what is theory' in non-western thought entirely. The contribution by L.H.M. Ling and her views on how the *Dao* of World Politics (2014) comes to mind at this stage.

Even though we can find different answers to the question 'What is theory?', a further debate is essential to move IR beyond Western hegemony: where do alternative theories come from? Inspiration can be found in the contribution developed by Aydinli and Biltekin (2018). Two moments in the identification of homegrown theorising are relevant: either the innovation is brought in via a

conceptual re-evaluation of what indigenous scholars have to say about the international – which may or may not have inferential consequences – or the innovation is brought in via the inferential part – when local conditions are used to justify the transformation of a Western concept or when local conditions are used to empirically transform what were preconceived ideas. The authors attribute different names to these different types of transformations.

The first type of homegrown theory is described as alterative. By this, the authors mean the following "they are built by restructuring mainstream theories based on evidence from indigenous experiences. It can be done in two ways: either different definitions for mainstream concepts are suggested or they are applied in a different level of analysis" (2018:22). This type of theory therefore picks up a Western model and changes it based on local circumstances. The change can be conceptual and referential.

The second is what they describe as referential homegrown theory building, which means the attempt to pick up a specific homegrown thinker's idea or any concept from a particular culture and use it to draw conclusions about observed phenomena. In this sense, a non-Western standpoint is used both for concept formation and inference. This type of theory's important and distinguishing feature is that it relies on local thinkers, writers or scholars.

The third type of homegrown theory is described as authentic. According to the authors, "Authentic homegrown theory building begins with putting forward empirical puzzles and coming up with original concepts to explicate these puzzles. Authentic concepts are coined with little or no reference to either homegrown ideas or mainstream theories … Since authentic homegrown concepts are not redefined or refined forms of indigenous conceptualizations, what makes them homegrown is the origin of the data used while making inferences. In other words, authentic homegrown theory is not conceptually, but inferentially homegrown" (2018:25). By starting with real data it develops geo-cultural specific concepts based on specific local experiences. These appear to align with a typical empiricist approach to social scientific research, where conceptual extrapolations are taken from data.

After understanding the importance of theorising, a more solid understanding of the theoretical contexts in which this theorising takes place is important to grasp. Engaging with the literature that aims to move Global IR beyond the West toward different versions of post-western or non-western is an important step in this direction. However, pluralism needs to consolidate itself: the potential for local IR needs to be assessed alongside theoretical contributions that take inspiration from Western influences.

Disciplines. The internal-external viewpoint makes us aware that there are issues of importance when gaining disciplinary autonomy and differentiation. Debates that characterise these endeavours therefore need to take place in national IR communities. To start with, it would be important or not to

forget 'what is international relations' or 'what is the international'. The reader may ask, however, why we should re-engage with such useless terminological problems. We are, after all, done with these debates. One wonders, however, if these issues are not, after all, so relevant as to constitute probably the foundational problem of IR itself.

Quincy Wright (1955) certainly would accept such a view, dedicating one initial chapter to this issue in his essential contribution. Wright was writing at a time when understanding these issues was of high value, and understandably so. IR needed to clarify its terms to qualify as a field of study. And such endeavours need to continue. What is the purpose of International Relations, after all? Should it be equated with 'current affairs'? The study of what happens in particular countries? Foreign policy analysis? Is there any difference – or should there be any difference – between international relations and International Relations, after all? More fundamentally, what is 'international'? And through what distinctive feature did the idea that there is such a thing as *international* relations come from? Furthermore, what are the elements that characterise this thing called IR? Should it be a cosmopolitan purpose to engage with all the interactions in world politics? Should it be a political project that engages with international political substances? These are some of the critical questions that scholars need to answer to grasp the foundational aspects of the study of IR fully. Indeed, the turn to make IR scientific or post-scientific is probably more exciting. It is undoubtedly true that studying the latest exciting problem that matters to politicians and their political existence may also be of interest. But by forgetting these debates, we forget the nature of IR itself. We need to make them matter again.

Further moving beyond strict theoretical concerns also means moving back in time and continuing to undertake a more self-reflective approach to whether or not IR is a discipline. The felt need presented here to return to these constitutive and identitarian debates is also increasingly shared in the literature. In a forum dedicated to understanding what is at stake in the disciplinary debate, Grenier, Turton, and Beaulieu-Brossard conclude the following: "Previous 'disciplinary' debates in IR have often focused on 'theory', meaning that the identity (and arguably existence) of IR is often premised on theoretical activity. The recent special issue of the European Journal of International Relations (EJIR) 'The End of International Relations Theory' exemplifies this tendency ... While theory is integral to any academic discipline, we argue that it is one component, among many sustaining a discipline. ... While the EJIR debate, and even the first or second or third and fourth debates accepted the premise of disciplinarity, many within IR have fiercely opposed this designation and advocated the use of different 'labels' to characterize IR. As such, the objective of this Forum is to reveal the struggle over the status of IR and to make lively what has largely remained static and silent of late by debating: What is or should IR be? Discipline? Inter-discipline? Or substantive focus?" (Grenier, Turton and Beaulieu-Brossard 2015:243).We, therefore, need to understand further the potential to think about the distinctive – if any – nature of IR as a separate field of research with distinctive methodological,

substantive and purposeful concerns (Kaplan 1961, Dunn 1948, Morgenthau 1952), reconceptualise it instead as a reflection of institutional structures, discourses and scholarly identities (Turton 2015), as an interdisciplinary field (Aalto, Harle and Moisio 2012) or, among others, as "a product of the history of academia as anything else"(Ilan Zvi Baron 2015:260) where, "It is significantly easier to define a discipline, not by its subject matter but by its sociology" (Ilan Zvi Baron 2015:260).

6.4.2.2. Incorporating *How(s)*

One of the most important concerns highlighted by Waever and Jorgensen was the importance of emerging IR communities in engaging in theoretical discussions. These *cures*, therefore, involve an understanding that we can't develop IR without some form of theoretical engagement with reality. The importance of theory is consequently highlighted by all the authors independently of whether they approach the normative proposal with an outside-inside outlook or inside-outside outlook. For Jorgensen and Waever, the goal should be to develop concepts deeply connected with practices. Friedrichs (2004) proposes, on the one hand, pragmatism and, on the other, conceptualism as possible philosophical predispositions. On this front, Hoffmann (1977) argued that for the emergence of IR in the US to occur, intellectually, the political and institutional framework was supported by academics that, rooted in an idea of scientific progress and aiming to develop a social scientific enterprise, were able to conceptualise IR and make scientific sense of the 'real' world.

All these debates suggest that, nationally, debating IR theory needs to become an important endeavour. *How* problems and debates about these theoretical problems should be part of the day-to-day of a developed IR community. The thesis identifies several such problems: debates about philosophy, epistemology, ontology, methodology, (Western-based) perspectivisms and, increasingly, educational and scientific matters. Engaging in these debates should be an integral part of a research community that moves beyond the mere discussion of 'day-to-day' issues. Maturity in scientific endeavour is also shown by the internalisation of these disputes inside research communities. Autonomy from politics is gained when academic communities are capable of engaging in these 'internal'/intellectual conversations.

It is therefore important that both the outside-inside and the inside-outside approaches are pushed to the extreme and include all the dimensions of *how* IR can be studied. This thesis, by being aware of all the dimensions of this debate, will push the 'we need IR theory' normative agenda forward.

What kind of philosophical foundations (if any) are there? What is the value of theory and theoretical thought? At its heart, and in the beginning, this is a question of science and what we mean by scientific knowledge. Certainly, we must move beyond mere description of what happens around us. This is the most basic objective of all those who aspire to make more logical sense of reality, and philosophers have explored this question for centuries. This thesis aimed to highlight how this move beyond descriptivism can unfold by looking at the debate about the philosophy of science's role in IR. It promoted a revisionist theory of the study of philosophy of science in IR. A revisionist history that aimed to unpack the history of this issue beyond fatalism and presentism.

Not much research has been conducted on how we tell the history of the philosophy of science in IR. Traditional accounts tend to describe this evolution in the form of a direct correspondence of these debates to IR self-described 'great debates' (Kurki and Wight 2012) or to understand this influence in terms of the advancement of positivism towards a post-positivist era (Smith 1995, George 1994). Both of these perspectives, however, need to be criticised because they are both presentism – they read events, debates, and concepts into the past as if they have a historical unity, not taking into account the historical specificity of these issues – and finalism – debates are presented as a linear and progressive expansion of thoughts and ideas towards something the author is trying to promote currently. An effort to understand contexts and to provide more solid content on how ideas are transmitted through time is required. Beyond presentism and fatalism, these debates must be treated with their own singularity. Over its history, IR has been a gateway for debates that have characterised the philosophy of science. We can't restrict these participations to 'great debates'. Philosophy of science has always played a role in IR. We can't just shrink the participation of philosophy of science in IR to the few arguments that allow it to form the glorious victory towards scientific truth (and their enemies). We must engage with this interaction between the philosophy of science and IR to its full extent. A revisionist history inspired by Mark Bevir does precisely this.

In the early eras, philosophy of science was concerned with stressing different versions of logical positivism and logical empiricism. This account noted the unity of the scientific method and had significant repercussions in the IR literature. Galvanised by an attempt to bring scientific consistency to its ranks, IR moved on (with more or less expressed consistency) to assume that the way forward would be to build explanations that were believed to be able to generate law-like generalisations which could be tested by factual observation. Most of these intentions, as usual, were generalist and didn't care to look for the actual operation and inconsistency of their claims. They were grounded in transcendental normative claims about standards of inquiry. But certainly, during this period of behavioural aspirations, efforts were made to provide this consistency. At its core, the model framed the scientific endeavour as one where the nomological and deductive character of explanation, extracted through observation, could be verifiable or falsifiable. Empirical generalisations result

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precisely through this capacity to verify or falsify hypotheses. These theories were, therefore, mainly heuristic devices that allowed the generation of statements about observable phenomena. Scientists were thus engaged in this effort to move beyond descriptivism through a carefully crafted method of scientific logic.

But again, these were efforts that were proclamations of intentions most of the time. In IR and elsewhere, when scholars started to pay attention to the implications of these aspirations, inevitable inconsistencies were detected. But this was not the only inconsistency detected in IR. The literature on the philosophy of science moved beyond logical positivism and logical empiricism. The critiques of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and V. O. Quine developed in the philosophy of science and impacted IR as well. Also, what played a role in the critique of behavioural assumptions was the resurrection of the historical method of Leopold von Ranke.

More radical postures would also characterise the debate. Since the 1980s, the philosophy of science has rejuvenated its positivist credentials through Lakatos. It has been engulfed in a debate between realism and anti-realism in its many versions, and it saw the advent and consolidation of the post-positivist movement. And this had an impact on what was being written in IR. However, since the so-called 'third debate' (Lapid 1989), IR seemed stuck between different binary constructions: explaining v. understanding, positivism v post-positivism, rationalism v. reflexivism, explanatory v. constitutive. All these simplifications of the debate serve to construct a confrontation between two divergent versions of an argument where the discussion is much more profound and detailed. The so-called fourth debate needs to be revisited. When this is done, we find an interesting discussion about how the philosophy of science can impact IR.

Lakatos's influence in IR was rejuvenated by the work of Elman and Elman (2002). Science, for Lakatos, still serves a positivist function. Research programmes have specific core assumptions acquired through a logic of discovery that resembles positivist aspirations. They are grounded in firm core assumptions that justify these foundations. They are also constantly being challenged by other assumptions and their degeneration. New assertions here are assumed to be statements that contradict the internal heuristic power of the prevailing core. This process of degeneration is either tackled internally or gives rise to a new research program. In this case, the new research program is not a synthesis of the previous one. On the other hand, these formations do not communicate with each other. Science is conceived, following Kuhn, as running with distinctive research programmes being promoted by scientists who do not easily communicate with one another. Incommensurability is, therefore, inevitable.

The debate between realism and anti-realism also found its footing in IR. Both versions agree that "what we mean by the 'world' and 'reality' is a function of operative scientific theories and that it makes little sense to speak of an unrepresented 'real' world to which scientific concepts must

ultimately correspond" (Gunnell 2011:1453). Both realists and anti-realists, therefore, share the assumption that theories are often about unobservable entities.

Even though they share this common ground, realists accept that truth is a matter of correspondence between language and reality and that the fundamental goal of science is achieving this truth. They, therefore, endorse Searle's (1995) attempt to distinguish between a 'mind-dependent' scientist who is nevertheless capable of extracting 'mind-independent' or 'brute facts' in his analysis. This latter accomplishment is an inevitable acceptance of the idea that facts can be explained or judged based on a correspondent theory of truth. This position found its footing in IR in the works of, among others, Alexander Wendt (1998) and Colin Wight (2002). These two positions were analysed as representative of different possibilities of a realist theory of International Relations. The critical realist possibility Colin Wight advocates is more plural than Wendt's.

The important contribution of Fred Chernoff was also emphasised. Although Chernoff, like the realists, also criticised positivism, endorsed methodological pluralism, and supported causal explanation, he argued that a meta-theory rooted in a form of conventionalism, heavily influenced by the philosopher Pierre Duhem, presents the most promising approach and serves as the foundation for a predictive ability that could assist policymakers effectively. This is a quasi-realist version whose proposal is grounded in an empiricist-driven micro-theory of confirmation created to make sense of what goes on in the real world (and, in so doing, better assist policymaking).

On the other hand, anti-realists come on many fronts, but the basic assumption is the endorsement of the rejection of the bifurcation between language and the world. They criticise realist assumptions because they remain tied to the basic problematic of representational philosophy and the correspondence theory of truth, where "theories are construed as claims about what constitutes the world and which are often incommensurable with respect to both past theories and competing reality or world-defining claims" (Gunnell 2011:1453). The work of Patrick Jackson emphasised a particularly relevant contribution to anti-realism. Inspired by Max Weber, Jackson, therefore, promotes a view of science where Inquiries are relevant when they focus on factual knowledge – we need to acknowledge knowledge-production communities to the exclusion of politics and normative practices. The way to accomplish this sense of science is by taking a stance where methodology – broadly understood – comes first and where IR shouldn't be engulfed in uncommunicative disputes about ontological statements. Science needs to be grounded in an epistemological position open to the practices of knowledge that reside in the scientific production of communities of research. This is accomplished by opening up the discussion of methodology to philosophical wagers – dualistic, monistic, phenomenological and transfactual. This will become relevant in IR because it will move the discipline from closed disputes to acknowledging that "when we disagree we are at least disagreeing about the same or similar things" (Jackson 2011:39)

Gunnel's position, finally, wants to move beyond empiricism, realism, and anti-realism. In so doing, his work can be grouped with other forms of anti-representationalism that reject the view that we can, through various means, aspire for a science with foundations. These forms depart from an anti-realism that condemns the view that we can separate language and the world. But they want to move beyond this critique. According to a moderate anti-realist position, science still constructs the world's meaning; it stands outside the practices of science. Post-positivist versions can't support such views. Therefore, the philosophy of science should be devoted to understanding what these practices are – they can't stand outside of scientific enquiry. This is where Gunnell distances himself. According to such a position, "Social objects are not in the first instance conceptualised by the scientist but rather, whatever the methodology, conceptually reconstructed" (Gunnell 2011:1467). This position can't understand truth and reality as singularities incapable of existing outside a particular scientific context. It's a position that aims to bring history and contexts into play. It aims to debate the nature of these contexts and the philosophical trappings of the specificity of historical time.

An essential step in consolidating a view of IR that takes theory seriously is, therefore, to discuss the philosophical assumptions of IR. Its philosophical roots. This necessarily leads to an engagement with the philosophy of science and its role in IR. An endeavour initiated here aims to bring to light a revisionist history of such interactions. Beyond empiricism and behaviouralism, IR saw the birth of movements where discussions occurring in the philosophy of science were translated into IR discourse. These debates are marked today by a plurality of positions, from positivism to post-positivism. However, these views must be described to their full extent, not in a mere presentism and fatalist fashion that serves an eternal dispute between a minimal view of positivism and (now) a limited view of post-positivism.

From 'Real World Problems' to the Epistemologies of Theory and Practice. A particularly important debate to have in IR communities is the connection between theory and practice. Knud-Erik Jorgensen (2003) stresses precisely these debates as one of his cures. This, of course, is a theoretical/philosophical dispute, but awareness of it is important in communities where scholars are instinctively socialised to debate 'what goes on in the real world'.

One of the important contributions of the 'realist turn' before and after World War II was precisely to get a deeper sense of the philosophical and theoretical sources of realism. Hans Morgenthau, in particular, digs deep into these sources, thus solidifying the 'internal' philosophical nature of the theoretical dispute not only in realism but in the field as a whole. Debating the relationship between theory and practice became an important concern for these scholars (Guilhot 2017) and animated subsequent reflections (Hoffmann 1960, Said 1968, Palmer 1970).

For Morgenthau, theories have intellectual and practical/political functions. When it comes to the practical functions of theory, Morgenthau highlights how it is the responsibility of scholars to speak truth to power. As Morgenthau claims "International relations are today one of the major spheres in which prudence and truth are bent to the purposes of power, and in which superstition takes the place of rational knowledge" (1970:246), thus "The main practical function that a theory of international relations must perform in our period of history is to confront what governments do, and what governments and peoples think, about international relations with independent prudential judgment and with the truth, however dimly perceived and tenuously approximated" (1970:246). The role is to remind "policy-makers as well as the public at large of what the sound principles of foreign policy are and in what respects and to what extent actual policies have fallen short of those principles" (1970:259). For Morgenthau, American foreign policy is oftentimes ruled by an (undefined) rationalisation which needs to be debunked in the name of the principles of power politics.

Since these contributions, scholars have debated the theoretical interaction between theory and practice in greater detail. Henry Nau characterises the debate in this manner "The relationship between scholarship and policy engagement depends on how one understands the nature of knowledge or truth, the relationship between different types of knowledge, and the political constraints that affect both scholarship and policy-making" (Nau 2008:645). Empiricism, deductivism, conceptualism and more critical literature emerge that engage the relationship between theory and practice and these debates in different ways (Garnett 1984, Jackson 2010).

But what one wonders, to further push this interaction, is how they need to be framed as a deeper epistemological dispute. The interaction between epistemology and IR certainly has not received the attention it deserves (Reus-Smit 2013, Wight 2019). And all the debate about functions of theory and, specifically, about the relationship between theory and practice can be framed in broader epistemological concerns over the nature of knowledge. Debates between theory and practice derive from traditional epistemological concerns with the view of knowledge *as ability* (Hyman 1999). The move to bring epistemology to IR needs to continue.

Either traditionally framed or through the eyes of epistemology, and taking sides on this debate, one should follow the advice of Hedley Bull. Asking what the role of an academic specialist should be towards society, he sets out to describe five guidelines. First, "The test of an academic contribution to International Relations is that it should have either historical or theoretical depth. Academic work which consists simply of the retailing of information about international affairs, or of ad hoc comment or policy polemic, does not meet this test" (1972:264), second "International Relations is not the study of current international affairs, nor is it our business to provide the community with an information service about such affairs, a task best left to journalists, (who do it much better)" (1972:264), third, "The academic International Relations specialist in a Western

democracy should not be a servant or agent of his government" (1972:264), fourth, "The 'commitment' of an academic International Relations specialist should not be to any political cause but to 'detachment', that is to say to a rigorous and undiscriminating scepticism" (1970:264) and fifth and final "The most important task is to maintain the intellectual integrity of the subject. But given the controversial nature of International Relations, the lack of agreed standards and demands on all sides for instant wisdom this task is also the most difficult" (1972:265).

Gaining Perspective: On Perspectivisms. The previous philosophical and epistemological disputes are empty if we do not engage in debates about how IR realities can be read. Traditionally, when thinking about IR theory, we often think of it in the plural: IR theories. Certainly, allowing us to understand IR theories will help us have a clear view of 'what goes on in the world' from the perspective of IR. We need to have a lens or lenses through which to read international phenomena.

We can start with Western contributions and IR theories grounded in Western philosophy. One of the ways to introduce the subject is to divide between materialism and ideational views of the world. Materialism include Realism, Liberal and Marxist views. Ideational take the social construction of reality seriously and take the form of different versions of Constructivism – from conventional to more postmodern forms. Between materialism and ideationalism, we find viewpoints such as Historical Sociology and the English School.

It is also at this stage that we engage in theoretical contributions beyond the West. Increasingly, we need to take into account the contributions of Global IR reflections and understand how theories of global IR are different in the West and in non-Western contexts. Contributions from China (Quin 2018), Russia (Tsygankov 2023), India (Behera 2010), and other places can be singled out for providing views of the world different from Western philosophy.

Teaching Perspectivisms. If, until now, an effort was made to focus on 'intellectual' disputes, understanding *how* IR can be studied also has an institutional debate. This involves an (old) dispute about how we should engage in the teaching of IR (Harrison 1936, Kirk 1947, Manning 1957). Three debates, among others, are important to stress here: the general orientation of what can best be described as a 'philosophy' of teaching, second, the form that teaching can take and third, the contents of teaching itself.

Some authors propose moving away from cultural biases and moral endeavours and focusing exclusively on education as essentially about developing the skill to think in the student. In this sense, education is not about culture, politics, or morality but is fundamentally about developing thoughtful skills (Garnett 1984).

If the development of thoughtful skills should be the goal of teach, educating students to develop a deeper conceptual analysis of what confronts them in the world – rather than submitting institutions to the dictates of 'real world problems' – could be proposed as grounds for forming a solid curriculum (Garnett 1984, Guzzini 2001). Stephano Guzzini (2001) is particularly incisive in his argument about the importance of introducing students to different functions that theory can have: explanatory and constitutive. Underpinning the conceptual focus of teaching, therefore, is the ability to give voice to multiple voices.

Continuing with Guzzini's proposal (2001), the way in which theory/meta-theory materials are presented. And here Guzzini is more inclined to propose a presentation of this relationship in terms of taking a central concept – say Power – and dissect it's conceptual function by giving voice to different perspectives debating the concept. Even though other forms of presenting theory/meta-theory do have advantages – such as the ones rooted in an evolutionary view of IR rooted in 'great debates' or, instead, one grounded in 'paradimatic disputes' – understanding IR via key concepts and allowing students to understand different theoretical disputes is the way to best prepare them not only for theory acknowledgement but for practical thinking.

If this important (institutional) debate had a particularly important relevance in a certain period of IR's history in the core, it has lost its relevance over time. This, however, is an extremely important debate to have as IR communities gain institutional autonomy and self-awareness.

6.4.2.3. Incorporating *What(s)*: 'High Politics' and Beyond

As Waever and Tickner (2009) emphasise, one of the characteristics of what goes on inside national academies is a concern with daily life and, more specifically, the government's concerns. More specifically, and 'intellectually', substantive research – devoid of theoretical purpose – becomes concerned with issues that relate to 'high politics' and a 'realist' agenda – concerns over history, order, war, military issues, geopolitics, and peace. National communities become full of experts in international policy analysis and the day-to-day commentary of the stuff of politics. They become the realm of international policy analysts.

One cure for this problem certainly involves a deeper engagement with theoretical debates, and it is this thesis option, in forms of knowledge that highlight the role and value of concepts in the development of social research. But if this concern is essential and can differentiate these national communities into two types of scholars – those engaged in theory and those involved in international policy analysis – we must understand what contents characterise IR. In other words, we need to move beyond the centrality given to high politics.

Another cure, therefore, is not just to theorize international politics. It is to open the theorization to other research agendas. This requires an engagement with the question *of what can be studied* in IR.

Searching for the IR's Subject-Matters. The introduction proposed several possibilities for understanding what to study in IR. Fundamentally, the argument addressed two broad conceptions of IR – those that understand it as international politics and those that understand it as world politics. It also addressed the interactions between the *what to study* problem and specific theoretical contributions. Here, three such viewpoints were highlighted: the first took the form of an overall dispute between different perspectivisms and contributions that underline how the subject matter is determined by the definition of the interaction between actors, processes and outcomes. The second theoretical perspective frames the substantive debate as occurring inside specific perspectivisms. Of particular concern was the debate inside the English School between pluralism and solidarism. A third theoretical framework highlights how, rather than departing from theory, substances need to be addressed first before the theoretical argument is built.

This thesis contributed mainly to the view that IR can be seen as global politics in the argument developed in chapter five. This chapter showed how sovereign authority is currently being contested in world politics. In this conclusion, we will continue with the broad intention developed in the introduction while contextualising those broad intentions with the specific arguments developed in this thesis. Because of the enormous task involved in identifying all the webs of theoretical conversations inside these debates, this thesis mainly aimed to elucidate the macro categories of the discussion while making a specific contribution to the globalisation debate.

International Political Substances. For some, IR needs to be read in international political terms. These contributions highlight how IR relates directly to traditional assumptions about the functioning of the international system. Arguments of this type assume two primary forms. The work of global and international historians directly inspires the first. A traditional argument focuses on how this history is formed by states and, according to some arguments, other actors in an inward–outward way.

Therefore, history is told with an emphasis on how states have emerged as core players in international politics. It starts by emphasising different processes for the emergence of these actors. Analytically, it aims to understand what these actors are, their constituent substance, and the history of state formation. It moves on to analysing the state system evolved internally and externally.

The history inside is told in the relation established among the great powers of the day. The balance of power and war are its core elements. Different moments are, therefore, analysed by historians who aim to dissect how these relationships evolved from period to period. Separating such

periods are major catastrophic events which lead states to war. International history is partitioned by these events while, until such events occur, we focus on how state and non-state actors build systems to sustain peace and, when that doesn't happen, analyse the specific causes behind major wars and how they unfold. For this inward story, the international historian is mainly concerned with states, high politics and international systems.

There is also the outward side of the story. This is the process by which other societies are internalised into this (Western) based system. The process in which this unfolds and the standards which constitute such process are a central concern of this analytical movement from the inside to the outside. Alongside state/non-state actors and international systems, we can also move to an understanding of how the ideological process of liberalism and capitalism solidifies itself.

Manuals also emphasise different actors and issues that need to be studied by those interested in IR. Of course, the traditional support goes to states and issues of 'high politics' such as the study of war, balance of power, diplomacy, geopolitics, foreign policy, and sometimes international law. The international political economy is also of concern for these manuals (Grieco, Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2017). Other, more open arguments reinforce a more expansive view of the actors and issues that matter. For example, the argument suggested by Mingst (2003) stresses a concern with states and other actors, while, substantively, to a concern with war and strife, we add international political economy, human rights and issues of environment, global health and crime. The question becomes, why should we study these issues in the first place? The answer can be achieved by looking at how theory is presented.

Therefore, the way in which international political actors and issues are extracted is through the interplay between IR theories and this reality. This consolidates the previous structural move but gives it another, more theoretical, dimension. In other words, even though the argument is developed that we need to read international realities through a theoretical prism, the presentation of IR theories serves the presentation of the historical argument just emphasised. According to Wayne McLean "global politics is a complex combination of political, economic and social factors, and without an organisational framework for analysis, extracting explanations around phenomena is increasingly difficult but necessary" (2020:71). One could further conclude that realism is particularly relevant to solidify the historical inward argument, conditions such as anarchy and the international system, actors such as states and sovereignty, and issues such as war, diplomacy or foreign policy, liberalism to solidify the historical outward argument, conditions such as interdependence or global governance, actors such as the individual and international institutions and issues such as the international law, international political economy or human rights, and the other approaches such as constructivism, by allowing us to understand social cultures and identities from which other ('social') issues such as concerns with the environment, global health, international crime, etc. can be derived.

The second way international political substances can be represented is by analysing the emergence, sustainability and decline of international/global orders. Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (1989) exemplifies this approach. Here, the analytical starting point is not one of tracing the history back in time. Instead, the central point concentrates on how international orders emerge and eventually decline.

The argument starts with the definitional understanding of what order means before tracing the historical argument of creation, maintenance and breakdown. Order can mean different things to different people. Raymond Aron (1960) identified five possible meanings – two descriptive (order as arrangement or order as relations between the parts of a certain reality), one normative (order as the condition for the good life), and two others that are hybrid (partly descriptive and partly normative). We can, therefore, understand order as merely a description or, instead, as containing normative aspirations. We can further try to dig deeper into what these normative aspirations can be. In a recent update to this conversation, Lascurettes and Poznansky (2021) highlight how order can be seen either as a regularity (where there is a pattern) or with purposeful intentions (highlighting the potential ideological or political foundations of the word). These patterns can take many forms but the main criteria for their existence is the position of great powers – hegemonic or balance of power. On the other hand, purposeful orders are orders based on rules or a constitutional framework. Furthermore, seeing order as purposeful can take various forms – he gives content to the hybrid definitions proposed by Aron by concluding that order can be different based on pluralism or solidarist foundations. His last contribution to clarifying and updating the debate is distinguishing global from regional orders and between general and issue-specific orders.

What is also important in the debate about order is to highlight how different arguments understand order creation and maintenance on the one hand and order decay on the other. The realist argument for order creation and maintenance can take many forms. Some believe in the homogenous effect of international anarchy and the structure of power (Waltz 1979), others believe in the culture that prevails among the elites that allows for the continuation of the international system (Kissinger 1957, 2014), and still others emphasise how hegemons dictate the formation of orders (Gilpin 1981). Other explanations can be added. Liberals emphasise that international peace relies, on the one hand, on the presence of governments that need to be republican. This factor is reinforced by a faith in economic interdependence between states arising from capitalism, international trade, and third, institutions and multilateralism. These constitute the three pillars of the liberal peace. In the security realm, liberals focus on mechanisms that help prevent wars. For some, these principles and normative values are deeply embedded in the formation of international orders. We can't escape them when thinking about them. Some emphasise these elements more structurally (Ikenberry 2001), while others emphasise them from an agential point of view (Fukuyama 1992).

Finally, the order breakdown is also explained differently. For Realists, changing configurations of power and nationalism are the main drivers of disintegration. For example, John Mearsheimer (2018) conceptualises three types of orders: realist – which exists in non-unipolar worlds – and agnostic or ideological – which exists in unipolar moments. Realist and agnostic order decay by understanding the changing configuration of power in the international system. Crucial attention needs, therefore, to be given to how great powers emerge and the drivers of a potential clash between these powers. International order is the study of great power relationships and possible conflict. Mearsheimer also elaborates on the decay of what he calls ideological orders. These orders, for him, decay because of its own attempt to export the internal ideology abroad. There are external reasons for the decay – the backlash against this adventurism – and internal reasons – the emergence of populism. Nationalism is, therefore, the main reason Mearsheimer pointed out for ideological order decay. Liberals provide a different argument for decay. They are more interested in understanding how orders have purpose and, in so doing, how this purpose is challenged. Riccardo Alcaro (2018), for example, develops several levels of potential challenge: ideational – to the ideology of liberalism –, clashes of power – by understanding how great powers emerge and confront existing principles –, internal fragmentation of power – as a direct result of the globalisation of principles and regionalism –, and by other ills that come through this globalisation – such as the clash against the hegemonic regime of economic governance.

Global Politics. If the study of international political substances constitutes the traditional way IR is approached, for others, we need to identify the core substances of IR considering a process of global change. These views share in the understanding of IR as world politics, introducing the reader to a global future where globalisation is impacting what we understand IR to be in ways that potentially reconfigure traditional assumptions. The study of the substances of IR becomes the study of such transformations. The globalisation debate has several dimensions: conceptual, historical, theoretical and the studies that aim to address the interaction between changing global structures and processes and the impact these transformations have upon state sovereignty.

Global substances are read as answers to these debates and this thesis proposed a particular angle upon which to read these global political substances. It was argued that to understand changing configurations promoted by a global world, we need to better understand what state sovereignty means. Taking inspiration from post-internationalist work (Rosneau 1990, Ferguson and Mansbach 2004, 2008), the argument started by framing the discussions over sovereignty in the dynamic force of the debate about globalisation.

Debates about what we mean when we describe globalisation are numerous in the literature. Some view it as a myth, others as a multidimensional process with non-deterministic historical routes.

The classical suspects of reluctance reside in both those formulas that aim to criticise the singularity of the concept of globalisation linked as this formula is with the advancement of material forces – such as global flows of trade, finance, and movements. These considerations criticise the existence of novelty in such flows and, looking historically, address how these flows were more intense during other non-contemporary periods (Weiss 1998; Hirst and Thompson 1999). For these arguments, globalisation is linked with a singular logic, and this logic is, in fact, a myth. They argue, furthermore, that the state is not losing any of its powers. Globalisation and the proliferation of decision-making centres are reinforcing the ever-present power of the state to make decisions. In the end, without the state, there is no policy (Weiss 1998). For others, globalisation is a myth, but it is for a different ideological reason. We can't escape the fact that the materiality that may be involved in understanding globalisation is, in fact, the direct result of an ideology. Therefore, the creation of a global world is directly linked to the ideology of free markets and Anglo-American capitalism (Callinicos et al. 1994; Gordon 1988; Hirst 1997; Hoogvelt 1997). The myth of the materiality of flows is that this materiality is devoid of interests and ideology. There is also a third perspective: the view that there are important normative elements in understanding globalisation, but these elements need to be read in the context of actual transformations. Ideas have a material impact, which must be read in all dimensions. This logic reflects a Weberian understanding of social reality as constituted by distinct institutional orders: the economic, technological, political, and cultural (Mann 1986; Giddens 1990). The first conclusion is that we need to accept that globalisation is more than just numbers, power, and ideology: it has a real impact on social realities, and these impacts go beyond its economic dimension and need to be assessed. In particular, the argument highlighted globalisation's economic, political, and cultural dimensions (as they relate to the idea of sovereign authority).

The second important aspect is the debate about how the globalisation debate can be framed epistemologically: is it a direct result of material and causal forces, is it just a result of ideational forces that have distinct causal sources, is it instead always an ideational project in both its material and ideational forces? We can instead conceive of globalisation by the importance it has and the impacts it carries on different localities. Understanding how different cultures and identities or agencies interact with the global is a key part of the discussion. The argument presented here endorses the last view. To understand globalisation, we need to understand it as an ideological process that carries with it a structure-agency relation. To understand the impact of its multi-dimensional social forces, we need to further perceive these interactions from this ideological standpoint and in the interaction between the structural effects it caries to agents and in the mutual constitution of agents with these structures.

More substantively, the argument presented in the thesis highlighted how we unpack the concept of sovereignty in its many dimensions to understand what specific elements are being – if at all – impacted by global forces. Understanding changes in state sovereignty only makes sense when

we unpack its core constitute elements and assess transformations. We must move beyond saying that we are at the end of sovereignty without qualifying what that means. This contribution dissected what can be understood by state sovereignty and, more specifically, sovereign authority.

The idea that institutions and individuals responsible for the state represent ultimate and sovereign power, acting as a court of last resort, has been challenged by international and transnational forces. A distinction was made between horizontal and vertical constructions to understand better how these forces have conditioned the notion of sovereign authority. Horizontally, sovereign authority is created by processes of capitalist expansion, literacy and communication, as well as through war. Consolidating vertical authority, on the other hand, implies the creation of bonds of identity, belonging and memory. The argument proposed a post-internationalist reading that advocates transformations of sovereign authority in the global political economy, war and identity issues. This was done in a double sense that highlighted the mutual constitution of agents and structures: through a study of the disaggregation of the sovereign's single authority and the bifurcation of sovereign authority.

The argument presented here is deeply rooted in a post-internationalist-inspired interpretation of this literature (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996, 2004, 2008). Its purpose was to show how global political substances can be read in light of a tradition of thought.

Theory I – Actors, Processes and Outcomes. Understanding substantive matters of interest in IR can be achieved also by a centrality given to theoretical arguments. Whereas in the previous demonstrations of such substances, they were driven by an engagement either with globalisation literature or with contributions that come out of those whose aim is to grasp 'the real-life' of international politics, substances can also be derived from theoretical constructions. We will, therefore, engage with such arguments in the following sections. The first such demonstration, is the presentation of the subject matter of IR as deriving from a preliminary assessment of who the main actors are and what processes characterise the interactions among these actors. This is an analytical framework that aims to bring together different perspectives under a united front—a kind of perspectivism of perspectivisms.

Diverse analytical arguments are developed that stress an understanding of a perspectivism of perspectivisms that highlights the interplay between actors-processes- outcomes. For example, in 1998, KJ Holsti concluded, "For the broader field of international politics, the 'what to study'? question was answered in several ways. At the most abstract level, theorists needed to develop a conception of the entire international arena. Three major conceptualisations resulted: systems, societies of states and transnational relations … While these answers to the question of 'what to study?' differed substantially in their level of analysis, the conceptualisation of actors, the degree of abstractness, or

the methodologies they employed, they had in common the normative concern with war, conflict, instability and disorder. They shared a view of international politics as a domain in which rivalry, competition, conflict, and violence are frequent if not the normal state of affairs" (Holsti 1998:23). Keeping in mind the same analytical dynamic but with a slightly different presentation is the argument of Vivianne Jabri (2000). She argues, "The boundaries of the discipline are therefore influenced by assumptions relating to significant actors in global politics and (b) the nature of interactions between them. The third area which may come under scrutiny when deciding the boundaries of International Relations and which has been pointed out is the empirical subject matter with which we are concerned. This in itself is intimately related to the emphasis we place on the type of actor that we consider most significant in global politics and the assumptions we make relating to the nature of interactions taking place at this level. How we view the discipline will have an impact on the types of research questions we investigate" (Jabri 2000:267). Barry Buzan (1995) and Richard Little (Buzan and Little 2000) also enter the conversation with a more complex demonstration of the interplay between these levels. For them, theoretical contributions are built around an analytical framework based on units, structures, interaction activities and processes. This argument builds on previous work developed by Buzan and Little (Buzan, Little and Jones 1993) and in the work of Richard Little in a volume edited with Michael Smith (Little and Smith 1991, see also Little 2000). In his latest contribution to the discussion, Little and Smith develop an understanding of different perspectives of world politics along the following dimensions: "First, what appears as the significant actors in world politics in each case? Second, what view of the global political process is implied by each perspective? Finally, what kinds of outcomes are emphasised by each approach, and what kind of world do they see as emerging from the actors and processes dealt with?" (Little and Smith 2005:4). They further solidify this view with the conclusion that "it appears that it is possible to distinguish between them according to their approaches to the three questions posed earlier: who are the *actors* in world politics, what are the characteristics of the global political *process*, and what kinds of *outcomes* express the nature of the world system?" (Little and Smith 2005:8).

If this shows how there is an implicit analytical debate going on, we can now provide an overview of the application of these ideas in the literature on IR. One could say that this approach aims to understand substances as aggregations of perspectivisms. Because these perspectivisms have changed, so did the debate. The historical presentation of the subject matter as a consequence of preliminary decisions about actors and processes is found, for example, in the already cited work of Buzan and Little (2000). Buzan and Little develop a framework to analyse the transition of international systems across time that relies on an analytical proposal that stresses units, structures, interaction activities, and an understanding of processes. Their ambitious project is built on the work developed

on the logic of anarchy, and in the revision of structural realism (Buzan, Little and Jones 1993), the project is one of understanding how their notion of the international system has evolved over time.

Also, we can find the direct application of such a framework in the level of analysis problem as presented by David Singer (Singer 1961). Stressing the character of the literature that characterised much of the discussion in the Anglo-Saxon world during the 1970s, Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg also use this analytical framework to divide the primary debate in IR as one between state-centric view/realism and globalism (Maghroori and Ramberg 1982). A similar influence can be found in Puchala and Fagan (1974), in the work and contribution of Michael Sullivan (1983) or the contribution of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977). If transnationalism and power politics characterised the idealised view of IR during the 70s, in the 1980s the presentation became one of power-interdependence and dependency theory (Smith and Little 1981, Holsti 1998, Jabri 2000). Michael Doyle presents a conversation between realism, liberalism and socialism (Doyle 1986, 1997). The influence of the post-positivist turn during the 1980s and after would change the dynamic of this characterisation and it is to this latest view that we now turn to illustrate more precisely how the substantive matters of IR are analysed as a representation of prior understandings of who the main actors are and the processes that characterise their interactions.

An example of how the interplay between actors, processes, and outcomes is conceptualised is the already-cited work of Little and Smith (2005). They develop four perspectives on world politics: the politics of power and security, the politics of interdependence and globalisation, the politics of dominance and resistance, and what they call a perspective on perspectives that aims to incorporate the postpositivist turn.

Starting with the politics of power and security, they stress the inevitable importance of states and the most relevant actors in the international system, in terms of processes they stress how these states, faced with a permanent security dilemma, seek security as their primary goal. Their foreign policy is therefore guided by an absolute sense of the permanent external threat that derives from an anarchical system. Another relevant process to consider is the international distribution of power, which impacts how all states in the system behave. Substantively, Little and Smith illustrate how the world has, according to this view, worked since the end of the Cold War. Realists critique the view that since the Cold War, the world has become more pacific because of democracy, interdependence, and international institutions. Instead, the logic of great power conflict prevails. Some argue that the unipolar world is unstable and will eventually come to an end. Others would argue that unipolarity is not as unstable as is suggested by the traditionalists and that it brings more peace and stability. Still, others suggest that we can't escape but give ideological and constitutional content to what we mean by distribution of power – in all eras, great powers promote some principles. It is to these principles alongside the mechanical workings of the system, that we should also turn.

The politics of interdependence and globalisation reconfigures our assumptions about the main actors. States are not the exclusive or main actors in world politics – instead, they act penetrated by other states and other actors and lose control of their territory and external sovereignty. States have differing degrees of control of their state sovereignty and subnational, supranational and transnational gain relevance. The analysis of this new condition of state sovereignty is the analysis of how it is impacted by the globalisation process and how states are no longer national but become internationalised. In this context, foreign policy and the decision-making processes related to it are still relevant. But they are constituted by multiple actors and not by uniform decisions. When it comes to the analysis of processes, emphasis is placed on the emergence of a global governance infrastructure – how IOs gain independence and NGOs gain agency. Also, the emphasis moves from the international system and its constraints to the study of 'complex interdependence' (Keohane and Nye 1977). The outcome of this perspective is a world where "world politics constitutes a social system, defined by rules and institutions, and that globalisation creates the demand for new rules and institutions to govern new relationships of communication and exchange" (Little and Smith 2005: 137). The result is the aspiration for the creation of a global cosmopolitanism.

The politics of dominance and resistance have a different conceptualisation of the main actor. The state is viewed as a representation of dominant economic and political interests that use the state to pursue their aims. The state will be used by these interests when it is convenient and discarded when it is not. The process of this perspective of the world is underpinned by the relation between the metropolitan and the colonial areas. When there's the formalisation of territorial occupation and administrative dominance, the metropole dictates directly what goes on in these areas. When these direct forms of intervention disappear what emerges is a 'centre-periphery' relationship. The processes of globalisation are seen in light of these configurations and the forces underpinning global capital. Three mechanisms are identified to serve this purpose: exploitation, penetration, and fragmentation. The outcome of this world is a world of injustice where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer subjected as they are to the unjust structure of dominance and dependence. The poor parts of the world are subjected not only to economic intervention but, when needed to military ones. The aspiration for reform can be found in a simple aspiration to internally reconfigure the system. Instead, the contradictions of these interactions generate social forces that should act to cause the collapse and replacement of this system.

A perspective on perspectives aims to highlight a more philosophical dimension of this debate. It starts by emphasising how knowledge is always contextual. It is an argument about the nature of knowledge and the conclusion that "perspectives are not amenable to empirical verification because they are based on assumptions about individuals and society which are not susceptible to any conclusive empirical test. Adherents of any specific perspective must, therefore, engage in an act of

faith" (Little and Smith:365). The second important argument is that there are differences between problem-solving and critical perspectives. Theoretically, we can promote different assumptions about the international political reality, and it is important to acknowledge that these different positions may emerge. Little and Smith also provide examples of how feminism can be seen as an alternative perspective. But, and crucial, the contribution by Alexander Wendt in the volume highlights the last dimension to this debate: there exist two interrelated philosophical debates when conceptualising world politics according to a perspective of perspectives. The first is a focus on structures and the divide between individualists – who give priority to individuals and how they interact with the world - and holists – who privilege the impact that social forces and structures have on individuals. The second debate is about the importance of ideas. Idealists promote the idea that ideas shape action. Materialists believe that material circumstances shape actions (and therefore condition the formation of ideas). Constructivists are placed by Wendt in the quadrant where holism and idealism intersect. Rationalists are in the quadrant where individualism and materialism intersect. The importance of this move is that, substantively, constructivists of different types tend to view IR through the lens of culture and identity. This is their substantive contribution.

Theory II – Perspectivism(s). Different perspectivisms present their own account of what we can substantively study in IR. If, in the previous versions, they are taken as a whole, they can also be singled out and dissected to understand what matters and what doesn't matter as a subject of substantive analysis in IR. In particular, this work focused on the contributions developed by the English School (ES) to this particular debate.

Debates are unfolding inside this school on several issues: the nature of its intellectual history, different understandings of international society and its relation with other terms such as international system or world society, the interaction between the ES and other perspectivisms such as Realism or Liberalism, the historical presentation and development of international society and its potential regionalisation, debates about ES's institutions and normative basis (plural or solidarist), the universalisation of the study of this perspective, etc. These ongoing debates placed the ES back on the map (Navari and Green 2013, Flockhart and Paikin 2022). The work of Robert Jackson and Tommy Knudsen was particularly relevant for an illustration of ES's approach to IR substances. In them, we can find an illustration of the potential for the ES argument to identify different (constitutional) norms and their operation in international society.

Robert Jackson puts forward a pluralist understanding of international society. The basic procedural norms of contemporary international society are identified by Jackson to have been created after the end of the Second World War. These are constitutional norms that regulate the substantive operation of international society. Jackson calls them the procedural norms of a global

covenant and they are more specified in the 'Helsinki Decalogue' which all the signatories to the Helsinki Final Act (1975) have accepted. To be more precise, these substances are constituted by "the six most important norms all pertain to the sanctity and preservation of equal state sovereignty and the regulation of armed force and peaceful settlement of disputes between states. Human rights became prominent in international discourse in the second half of the twentieth century, but they have not achieved the same standing as the procedural norms of state sovereignty. The global covenant also incorporates additional significant norms, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, international aid, and environmentalism, among others" (Jackson 2000:16). This pluralist constitutional framework emphasized by Jackson highlights how norms of intervention and human rights have limited space in the rightful functioning of international society, and other norms and substantive matters – such as international aid or environmentalism – are read by Jackson as not having "the same standing as the basic procedural norms listed above" (Jackson 2000:20). There is, however, a qualification to the argument: in Western Europe, we have a solidarist constitutional framework in operation. But worldwide, this is not the case.

Also inspired by the English School, Tonny Knudsen proposes a different take on the functioning of contemporary international society. He relies on the notions taken by Wight, Bull, Watson, or James that international societies have always been constituted by customs that are expected to frame the relations between states. These customs are, in fact, core institutions that form the basis of international society. He identifies as core customs, the institutions of the mutual recognition of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, great power management and war. However, if these are indispensable institutions, international societies are not static but dynamic. They change, and in line with Holsti (2004) and Buzan (2004), Knudsen wants to move beyond what he designates as a narrow approach to institutional change (Knudsen 2019). This narrow approach doesn't account precisely for the possibility that institutions have dynamics internal to themselves: they are made up of the mutual constitution between constitutive principles and their practices. Different historical eras have different configurations of such practices. Crucially, Knudsen thinks that contemporary international society is no longer pluralist. Inspired again by Buzan (2004, 2014), he thinks that we need to move beyond the view that either we live in a plural or we live in a solidarist society. Instead, he argues that different dynamics are possible inside one specific international society. He conceptualises contemporary international society beyond the plural institutions emphasised above - the mutual recognition of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, great power management and war. Beyond these, we have seen the emergence of forms of state solidarism – where states still have the last say when deciding what matters in international life – and cosmopolitan solidarism – where, beyond states, the international society has developed instruments to enforce solidarism. Therefore, substantive matters that need our attention

in today's international society involve issues that relate to the market and to environmentalism – which work according to what Knudsen designates as state solidarism – and institutions such as humanitarian intervention, international criminal jurisdiction and international trusteeship – which are reflections of cosmopolitan solidarism. Today's international society, taken as a whole by Knudsen and not in the regionalised manners assumed by Buzan (2004, Buzan and Pelaez 2009), is a mixture of plural and solidarist principles. At its core, it maintains the traditional customs but has moved beyond them as well – not above states, not subordinate to states, but alongside states. (Knudsen 2016).

Theory III – *Let's Start With the 'Real' Instead*. The final way international substances are analysed is not constrained by an analytical or theoretical framework. Instead, the proposal is to start with international problems and derive theoretical conclusions from the analysis.

An example of this is the contribution of Chris Brown (2001). In his book, *Understanding International Relations,* he stresses several substantive matters that should be of interest to students of IR – states and foreign policy, power and security, balance of power and war, global governance, international political and global economy, north-south relations, international order and its future. One wonders, however, why are these matters chosen in the first place. This is probably a question we would sometimes have when we open one of the books that aims to introduce readers to different substantive matters. As already suggested, there seems not to be a logic behind selecting these topics. Similar questions may arise when analysing the selection of substantive problems in Brown's book. But the answer can be found in the introduction to the book (Brown 2001:16:17). According to Brown, "The aim of this chapter has been to discourage the notion that the theory of International Relations can be studied via an initial stipulative definition, the implications of which are then teased out and examined at length. Instead, the process is, or should be, almost exactly the other way around. What is required is that we explore the world of international relations from a number of different perspectives, taking each one seriously while we are examining it, but refusing to allow any one account to structure the whole, denying a privileged position to any one theory or set of theories". (Brown 2001:16). In other words, against previous approaches that started with theory and read substances in light of these theories, Brown suggests starting with substances and coming up with different perspectives to read these substances. In this sense, the precise definition of these substances is not of concern. We should explore the world of international relations, and only when we find a topic of interest, we apply IR theory to it. It is precisely this logic that leads Brown to build his chapters the way he does. As he concludes, "The approach adopted here will be to begin with the recent, twentieth-century history of theorizing of international relations and with the theories which have underpinned this history. This starting point could be said to privilege a rather conventional conception of the field, but to introduce new ideas it is necessary to have some grasp of the tradition

against which the new defines itself. In any event, the approach here, in the first five chapters, will be, to begin with traditional, 'common-sense' perspectives on international relations before opening up the field in the second half of the book" (Brown 2001:17). The book, therefore, starts with two chapters on theory – our lenses through which to analyse substances – it then moves into the description of specific substances. The value added to this logic is the identification of different theoretical perspectives in the analysis of these substances. Even though there is some determinism in this approach – because it highlights that IR substances need to be read in light of IR theories and that even the substances analysed by Brown are intrinsic to his own view of international political theory (Brown 2002) – it is an approach that is open as a whole. It suggests analysing IR unspecified IR substances first and then theorising about them. The value of the presentation of IR substances lies in reading them in light of this plurality of perspectives and coming up with a particular view.

6.5. Conclusion

With a theoretical approach that combines researching (political) ideas with a documentary-based methodology that aims to bring to life webs of theoretical disputes, this study did not identify causes or *whys*, but rather asked *how it is possible* to think about IR as a field of study and requalifies the presentation of this area. It assumes that understanding the foundations of any (inter)disciplinary field requires giving voice to different theoretical understandings in the analysis. The study is not, therefore, a solution to any practical problem; it contributed instead to what comes before (or after) this: knowledge for knowledge's sake. In particular, knowledge for the sake of knowledge of IR as an area of study.

Aiming to make a contribution to a literature that addresses "the field as a whole" (Hoffmann 1960:xi), it took to heart the methodological critique developed by previous contributors (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008) and assumed that there is – unlike other areas of research such as international security, international economic policy, human rights studies, etc. – a problem in the presentation of IR as a field of study. This gap involves the lack of dialogue between the different participants in the debate. To close it, it developed a literature review not only grounded in an innovative theoretical framework, but one that took the previous step of understanding the literature as a whole. In this sense, it interpreted the terms of the debate that seem to characterise different contributions. An effort was made to identify constitutive questions of International Relations – designated as the why(s), the how(s), and the what(s) –, and the specific constitutive problems that solidify these questions. Specifically, it identified seven ways of approaching the question of why we should investigate IR, six possible ways of approaching the question of how we can investigate IR and five

possible ways of answering the question of what to investigate in IR. The cases presented used the work of Mark Bevir to address some of the constitutive problems. The goal was to cover how, through a process of theorisation, conceptualisation or the identification of traditions of thought, we can understand different constitutive problem, namely, theoretical disputes over different understandings of Global IR, a reconceptualisation of how sovereign authority is presented in the field, and disputes over how philosophy of science is understood in IR.

The conclusion of the work, taking inspiration from the literature that contributes to this specific area of research, anticipated a future for IR. For the author, and integrating this anticipation in intellectual movements that have been characterising IR recently, this future involves, on the one hand, giving theoretical strength to the ways we dissect national contributions to IR and, on the other, thinking about how to change the study of International Relations in these different nationalities. This conclusion was mostly dedicated to engaging with a vision of this future.

Thinking about change in national communities.

We need change when thinking about national IR communities. Advancing a more pluralistic Global IR requires that we change the belief networks that engage in these debates, not only in better addressing the theoretical terms of how to interpret contributions to national IR communities but also in proposing agendas for transformation that not only address the normative debate as such but, at the same time, incorporate these discussions in IR's constitutive problems. One theoretical and two substantive arguments were advanced, therefore.

Following Bevir, theoretically, it was argued that this change needs to be intrinsically intellectual. Contrary to views that promote an understanding of change derived from externalities of different sorts, this thesis proposes that for change to happen, it is rooted in intellectual high culture. We need to contrast pre-existing themes with arguments for change to promote change. This exercise will allow an amplification of the belief network. It is an exercise that is intrinsically theoretical but whose purpose is to compare existing assumptions with the possibilities for transformation. The literature on the assessment of national IR communities needs to become more open to theoretical reflection on the one hand and amplify its change proposals and incorporate other dimensions of why, how and what can be studied in IR on the other.

Second, and focusing on the first argument for intellectual change, it was claimed that we need to bring analytical frameworks back when discussing local contributions to IR. In many ways, no analytical framework is suggested when scholars engage in these debates.

To overcome this state of the literature, and departing from the framework proposed by Ole Waever (Waever 1998, Waever and Tickner 2009), a pluralist socio-intellectual framework was

suggested that takes inspiration from sociology of science. In particular, second-generation studies – in the form of constructivist contributions – and third-generation studies – that aim to incorporate institutional and intellectual variables – are important to consider. Constructivism allows us to understand how science is conceived as produced by individuals working together within specific cultural contexts. These cultures can be macro or micro, but they exist nonetheless. Choices are made in the context not only of institutional or theoretical disputes, but they also need to consider cultural backgrounds. An important variant of this work stresses how science is basically state power (Wagner 1991). Often, scientific communities are merely a demonstration of such interests. A second influence comes from the work of Richard Whitley. It helps us understand how science is organised by relationships of power and coordination, looking in particular at the role of local professors and leaders of the discipline and how integrated knowledge in the field is as a result of this influence (in terms of the intellectual outputs that result from it – from competing schools to laissez-faire schemes). A related influence can be extracted from what is described as new production of knowledge (Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny et al. 2001, 2003). This literature helps us understand the close ties between contemporary policies meant to support social scientific research and how these policies – especially as they relate to funding – impact how science develops. Finally, and moving beyond cultural and institutional frameworks and focusing exclusively on intellectual contributions, Randall Collins' methodological advice was also followed. Namely his recommendation "to consider first . . . the clustering of ideas and the social networks among those who produced them; second, the changing material bases of intellectual production which undergirded [a specific theoretical development]; and third, the surrounding political–economic context which generated these organizational changes" (1998: 622).

The chapter emphasised, through some examples, how to better structure these debates with case studies. As an example of cultural influences, the work of Breitenbauch and Wivel (2004) was analysed. They look at Danish culture and its impacts on Danish IR. It impacts how the process of institutionalisation was consolidated and the intellectual construction of IR in that country as well. Ole Waever's (1998) work was used as an example of how state structure significantly impacts IR's institutional and intellectual consolidation. The analysis highlights how state interests and institutions are set up because of these interests, which have a significant impact on how IR is conceived in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Moving from culture and institutions to intellectual contributions – and the influence that Randall Collins's work has in this dimension –, the contribution of Behera (2007) served as an example of the interplay of institutions and ideas in the context of this internal assessment of sociology of science.

This chapter, therefore, started a conversation about the necessity of bringing about a more consistent interaction between analytical models (rooted in the sociology of science) and their implementation in IR in the analysis of national communities.

The chapter also emphasised a second argument for change: change can happen through normative proposals for how IR in national communities operates and how it *should* operate. The chapter, following Breitenbauch (2013) highlighted two approaches suggesting such transformations: the outside-inside and the inside-outside.

Starting with the outside-inside view, and focusing on *why* themes, scholars nationally need to engage in a deeper debate about the nature of internationalisation. Not only to account for whether and how much the centre is cosmopolitan or not and much this centre participates in other discussions around the world but to work on strategies and viewpoints about what constitutes internationalisation. The work and ideas of Jorg Friedrichs (2004, Waever and Friedrichs 2009) and the characterisation he makes of three different types of communities (self-reliant, resigned marginality and multi-level research cooperation) can be picked up and reworked so that we can find more solid theoretical material. If Andrey Alejandro (2019) explores the underlying nature of self-reliant communities, providing more sociology of science insights into the nature of the condition of multi-level research cooperation (Whitley 2000) and, in particular, how specialities and disciplines are born and consolidate themselves (Chubin 1976, Becher and Trowler 1989), will help further understand this condition.

If we need to engage with the centre institutionally, hegemony needs to be contested intellectually. Reworking the history of (Anglo-Saxon) IR will allow us to understand this problem as structurally important for the first institutionalised generation of (mainly US) academics. The first debates that characterised the emergence of IR in the US led them to question the multidisciplinary nature of IR. This historical reassessment would open other avenues of research: academics also engaged in profound and serious discussions about what the disciplinary status of IR is. Once this historical exercise is developed, we also come to the conclusion that each individual national community has its own history. There's no reason to believe that 'great Anglo-Saxon debates' ever happened nationally. Telling the history of national IR communities needs to emerge as an endeavour on its own.

Another way that we need to engage US hegemony critically is via a reconfiguration of its intellectual dominance on a second level: theory. It was argued that IR also needs to understand the dynamics of the theoretical conversation inside each community. At this stage, a debate emerges between Western IR and homegrown theorising. Scholars are invited to explore deeper connections with Western IR while recognising that indigenous contributions also play a role. We should not be

restricted in this context to Westerners' theoretical and metatheoretical dominance. An agenda must explore what the West and different Indigenous communities say about IR.

If these ideas can be picked up from the outside-inside contributions, the inside-outside perspective allows a deeper understanding of how, for a field of study to consolidate itself nationally, it needs to be as close as possible to a model where autonomous, disciplinary self-conscious and professional scientific endeavours go hand-in-hand in the creation of a research field. Cultures (such as the Danish) that are able to come closer to this model are the ones that are more disciplinary self-conscious, and theoretically innovative.

An important discussion to undertake in national communities is, therefore, what is the nature of IR as a discipline. Is IR a discipline, an interdisciplinary constellation of possibilities, a multiplicity of endeavours? This is an important discussion to have since most IR communities are born from the aggregation in departments of multiple areas of study (Kirk 1947). Providing a clear sense of disciplinary self-consciousness and engaging in these debates becomes important in such communities. It consolidates a sense of self and builds institutional credibility.

Moving from a consideration of *why(s)* to a consideration of *how(s),* theoretically, in most national academies—beyond the Anglo-Saxon world—there seems to be a structural dispute between those who do theory and those who don't. Different philosophical avenues of how we can interpret the philosophy of science in IR were advanced. We gain a better sense of IR when we move beyond descriptivism towards science, and national communities gain by engaging in these philosophical discussions.

Also, theoretically, it becomes important to discuss the relationship between theory and practice. Of all the philosophical disputes that may arise, this, as suggested by Jorgensen (2003) is particularly relevant. The debate has evolved but the 'theory turn' that happened mainly after the Second World War in the Anglo-Saxon centre also involved a debate about the relevance of the theoretical discussion. In particular, scholars linked to realism (small r) were particularly keen on showing how, in the end, theory needs to deal with fact, not abstractions, and facts need to be connected to the contributions they give to policy-making (Lepgold and Nincic 2001). An important contribution to this debate is seeing it through its epistemological foundations.

We also need to gain perspective and engage in deeper debates about different perspectivisms in IR. From material conceptions that are able to show how reality may be conceived through struggles of power, interdependence or exploitation, to other approaches that tend to privilege different constructivist views of the world, and still other that build via media between these proposals, IR communities only understand the world via a deeper engagement with proposals that aim to understand this world. In the endeavour, we can't exclude non-Western viewpoints as well. Part of the

intellectual critic of US hegemony needs to include the substantive analysis of different non-Western proposals.

Also, and moving from the intellect to the institutional framing of IR, scholars need to engage with how IR is taught and learned. And here, as suggested by Stephano Guzzini (2001), teaching needs not to be condemned to the dictates of what goes on in 'real life' conditioned that this may be by a normative power outside itself, but, instead, needs to be the art of making people think. Providing foundations to this heart leads us to emphasise conceptual analysis as an alternative to social scientific proposals of an eternal truth. The art of teaching is consolidated in classrooms by allowing different concepts that are foundational to the study of IR – from international order to human rights (or any other) – to come alive via the different and plural theoretical proposals that animate their discussions.

Finally, and substantively, what is also required is to bring the 'we need more theory' discussion together with an argument for a revision of substantive agendas and *what to study* problems. As most academies are concerned over issues of day-to-day research and what can best be described as international policy analysis, IR communities need to be fully aware of *what* can be studied and theorised about. In particular, this thesis highlighted how this *what to study problem* can be understood along five dimensions: the study of international political substances, global political substances, views that explore the linkage between actors, processes and outcomes, views that extract substantive analysis conditioned by a certain perspectivism and, finally, how practical and day to day concerns can condition theory. Bringing (conceptual) theory and these substantive concerns together will open the substantive agendas of national IR communities. We need more theoretical research about IR's subject matters and less international policy analysis.

Reinventing these proposals in terms of a dispute between *institutional* reform and *intellectual* reform, the argument could be reframed. Institutionally, national communities need to become more cosmopolitan, less hierarchical and more communicative while engaged in deeper debates about their own (inter)disciplinary self-identity and the ways IR is taught. Intellectually, national communities need to be more aware of their own national history; the conceptual foundations of IR (what is 'the international' or 'international relations' after all?), they need to become philosophically and theoretically more robust – in a way that emphasises the plurality of (a new) Global IR –, and also more fully aware of *what* can be studied in the field, thus moving beyond 'state-centrism'.

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