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Social tolerance and the relationship with age, socioeconomic performance and the far-right in Europe. The moderating role of age and socioeconomic performance (1981-2021)

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PhD in Political Science

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Social tolerance and the relationship with age, socioeconomic performance and the far-right in Europe. The moderating role of age and socioeconomic performance (1981-2021) Viriato Queiroga

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*First they came for the Communists, and I did not speak out -
Because I was not a Communist.*

*Then they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out -
Because I was not a Socialist.*

*Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out -
Because I was not a trade unionist.*

*Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out -
Because I was not a Jew.*

Then they came for me - and there was no one left to speak out for me.

Martin Niemöller (1892 - 1984)

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² The thesis was entirely written in English, using the assistance of Microsoft Word and Grammarly.

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Resumo – Português

Esta tese investiga a tolerância social na Europa, considerando as recentes transformações políticas e socioeconômicas. Embora as tendências do pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial apontem para um aumento generalizado da tolerância em relação a grupos minoritários (nomeadamente pessoas de outras etnias, imigrantes, muçulmanos e homossexuais), recentemente, esse progresso tem vindo a ser desafiado pelo crescimento do iliberalismo entre os jovens, pelo aumento do apoio a partidos de direita radical que promovem um discurso discriminatório e por condições socioeconômicas adversas que podem alimentar o apoio a esses partidos. No entanto, pós-Segunda Guerra, a literatura tem historicamente observado que os jovens tendem a ser mais tolerantes e a relação entre desempenho socioeconómico e tolerância permanece ambígua.

Para abordar estes problemas, este estudo questiona: *serão a idade, a direita radical e os fatores socioeconómicos correlacionados com a tolerância social? Será que a idade, nomeadamente entre os eleitores mais jovens, modera a relação entre os fatores socioeconómicos e o voto na direita radical com a tolerância social? E, por fim, será que o desempenho socioeconómico modera a relação entre o voto na direita radical e a tolerância social?*

Esta investigação adota uma abordagem comparativa a 31 democracias europeias, agrupadas em três regiões (Centro/Norte, Sul e Leste da Europa), analisando a evolução entre 1981 e 2021. Utiliza um modelo multinível, com dados ao nível individual provenientes do *European Values Study* (EVS) e indicadores ao nível dos países obtidos junto do Banco Mundial e das Nações Unidas.

Os resultados indicam que a idade e os grupos etários (nomeadamente os jovens) apresentam uma relação limitada e frequentemente inconsistente com a tolerância social. No entanto, a tolerância tende a aumentar quando o apoio à direita radical diminui e quando o desempenho socioeconómico melhora, embora de forma contingente. Adicionalmente, verificou-se que os cidadãos mais velhos tendem a agravar a diminuição da tolerância em contextos de fraco desempenho socioeconómico e, por outro lado, que más condições socioeconómicas também agravam a relação negativa entre o voto na direita radical e a tolerância social.

Palavras-chave: Tolerância social, Europa, desempenho socioeconómico, direita radical, idade, jovens

Abstract – English

This thesis investigates social tolerance in Europe, considering recent political and socioeconomic shifts. While post-World War II trends point to a general rise in tolerance towards minority groups (i.e. people of other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals), this progress appears increasingly challenged by a surge in youth illiberalism, growing support for far-right parties, who promote exclusionary rhetoric, and declining socioeconomic conditions that may fuel support for these parties. Yet post-WWII, historically, young people have been observed to be more tolerant, and the relationship between socioeconomic performance and tolerance remains ambiguous in the literature.

To address these issues, this study asks: *Do age, far-right, and socioeconomic factors correlate with social tolerance? Does age, namely younger voters, moderate the relationship between socioeconomic factors and far-right voting with social tolerance? And finally, does socioeconomic performance moderate the relationship between voting for the far-right and social tolerance?*

This research applies a comparative approach to 31 European democracies, grouped into Central/Northern, Southern, and Eastern regions, analysing developments between 1981 and 2021. It employs a multilevel model using individual-level data from the European Values Study (EVS) and country-level indicators from the World Bank and the United Nations.

Findings indicate that age and age groups (namely, the young) show a limited and often inconsistent correlation with social tolerance. However, social tolerance was found to increase when far-right support is lessened and when socioeconomic performance is better, in specific circumstances. Furthermore, older citizens were found to intensify a decrease in social tolerance when there are poor socioeconomic performances. Conversely, poor socioeconomic performances were also found to intensify a decrease in social tolerance when citizens vote more for the far-right.

Key words: Social tolerance, Europe, socioeconomic performance, far-right, age, youth

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

AIDS - Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)

COVID-19 - Coronavirus disease 2019, caused by the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2

DAESH - *al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham*, translated as “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or the Levant)”

EC – European Community

EEC - European Economic Community

EU - European Union

EVS – European Values Study

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

GNP - Gross National Product

GSS – General Social Survey (USA)

HDI - Human Development Index

ILGA - The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association

PIIGS - Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain

UK - United Kingdom

UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

USA – United States of America

USSR - Союз Советских Социалистических Республик (СССР), translated as “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”, and also known as “Soviet Union”

WVS – World Values Survey

WWII - World War II

INTRODUCTION

How did social tolerance evolve in Europe in the last decades? And what explains whether individuals are tolerant towards other social groups? Although social tolerance is a topic of the utmost pertinence due to the social and political environment in many European societies in the last decades, it has surprisingly generated limited attention. This thesis aims to contribute to this still under-explored field of research by striving to answer the two questions above.

This introduction will be structured in the following manner: this section briefly introduces the theme of social tolerance. The following section defines social tolerance in this research. The third section presents the relevance of this research, while also displaying the puzzle and its objectives. The fourth section briefly introduces the methods and their relevance. Finally, the fifth section explores how this thesis is structured.

Social tolerance (or tolerance towards specific minorities and stigmatised social groups) has been observed to be growing over time, particularly in Europe since the end of WWII (i.e. Viegas, 2007, 2010; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020: 136; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Tausch, 2024; Dodson and Brooks, 2024: 10-12). However, while intolerance levels have been on the decline, they still cling to European societies. As strong evidence of this, support for the far-right, which advocates for intolerant policies and a discriminatory outlook on several minorities, has been increasing in Europe in the last decades (Mudde, 2007; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Bjånesøy, 2021). This radical political wing enhances the spread of extremism, racism, and xenophobic discourse in its heart, particularly over the past years. Examples are the growth of nationalist and anti-immigrant far-right parties, such as the French *Rassemblement National* (formerly known as *Front Nationale*) led by Marine le Pen, the Greek Golden Dawn, the Hungarian *Jobbik*, or the Party of True Finns. All these parties have nativist, anti-immigrant, discriminatory rhetoric. More recent examples are the Spanish *Vox*, the Portuguese *CHEGA* (or “ENOUGH”, led by André Ventura), the British parties Britain First, UKIP, and Reform,³ the German *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD, or Alternative for Germany), among many others. Furthermore, it is notorious that the anti-immigrant, sometimes anti-Romani (e.g., the case with CHEGA), anti-feminist, Islamophobic, homophobic, and often conspiratorial discourse adopted by many of these parties expanded to the traditional centre-right (i.e. Akkerman *et al.*, 2016: 39-47; Mondon and Winter, 2020a, 2020b).

³ Well-known populist and staunch BREXIT supporter, Nigel Farage led UKIP and Reform.

The propagation of this rhetoric, along with the normalisation of their underlying extremist perspectives (Valentim, 2021, 2024), and its expansion among mainstream political parties, suggests that such rhetoric may become increasingly mainstream. In this way, tolerance could be affected, particularly when it concerns minorities such as the ones this research focuses on, people of other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals (which are the dependent variables in the present study). Are we truly moving towards a more tolerant society, or have these recent radical political trends negatively affected post-World War II trends in tolerance growth? This thesis pays special attention to how the far-right correlates with social tolerance.

Additionally, we know that young voters have historically (post-WWII) been a more progressive group, with less materialistic and more liberal ideas (i.e. Inglehart, 1977, 1990). They have consistently been acknowledged as more tolerant (i.e. Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Van der Akker *et al.*, 2013; Mattis *et al.*, 2024). However, there has been a recent increase in illiberalism and authoritarian attitudes among the younger cohorts (Foa and Mounk, 2019; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023), which has been accompanied by a recent surge of support of the youth for far-right parties (Tower and Gélis, 2022; Cancela and Magalhães, 2024; Jakli, 2024; Woods, 2024; Vinocur and Goury-Laffont, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025). This apparent contradiction, of the youth historically being more tolerant but, recently, becoming more supportive of far-right parties, raises a question of how both trends may be reconciled. Is the mobilisation of young people by the far-right related to a tendency for them to reduce their traditionally high tolerance levels? The aim is also to address this question.

Moreover, the recent relationship between young voters and their support for far-right parties can encompass a self-reinforcing relationship. On the one hand, young people who have increasingly supported these parties may do so because they are more receptive to be less tolerant, thus opting to vote for these radical parties. On the other hand, when approaching these parties, their underlying extremist and illiberalizing rhetoric (Foa *et al.*, 2020; Kriesi, 2020) may contribute to increasing the previous levels of intolerance. This may be particularly effective among younger voters, due to the lesser rooting of their political identities compared to the older population (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015). That is, there is a good reason to assume that the relationship between these two variables is mutually reinforcing. In that regard, besides looking at how age correlates with social tolerance, this research will also consider how it moderates the relationship between the far-right and social tolerance.

Furthermore, young people suffer more from the effects of economic recessions (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Margalit, 2019; Reeskens and Vandecasteele, 2021), and as Kriesi (2020) explains, these parties capture voters in the most disadvantaged fringes, illiberalizing these voters. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that when they find themselves in a more disadvantaged economic situation, younger people may be more tempted by the intolerant ideas that far-right parties propagate. As such, this thesis shall also look at how age moderates the relationship between socioeconomic performance and social tolerance.

In general, prior scholarship has been stating that socioeconomic development affects tolerance (i.e. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a; Rapp, 2017; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019). However, this is far from consensual, as not all studies can demonstrate the existence of this relationship, being somewhat unclear and contradictory (i.e. Weldon, 2003, 2006; Dunn and Singh, 2014). Given the fact that Europe has been subjected to several socioeconomic crises since 2007, and the lack of empirical evidence testing socioeconomic correlation with tolerance, this begs further research to clarify the nature of that relationship. European socioeconomic troubles (due to the lowering of social standards and poor economic performance) have been succeeded by the rise of the far-right, which suggests a possible connection between the two. In this regard, scholarship already recognises that more far-right voting (Weldon, 2006) and poor socioeconomic performance (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; Rapp, 2017; Lee, 2021) conditions social tolerance. However, there is no relevant evidence that socioeconomic performance has reinforced the far-right's negative depressive relationship with social tolerance. As such, this thesis aims to assess whether socioeconomic performance explains social tolerance and if socioeconomic performance moderates the correlation of the far-right with tolerance.

a. The research's object: defining social tolerance

In this section, I briefly tackle a first designation of tolerance, *lato sensu*, and then, to define this thesis object, I will tackle the definition of social tolerance. As such, what is tolerance? According to the *Online Etymology Dictionary*,⁴ the word *tolerance* came from Old French *tolerance*, which originated from the Latin *tolerantia*. It meant "a bearing, supporting, endurance", and, when referring to individuals, it became the "tendency to be free from bigotry or severity in judging other". To modern dictionaries, such as the Cambridge Dictionary,⁵

⁴ Available here: https://www.etymonline.com/word/tolerance#etymonline_v_15343 [10/08/2019].

⁵ Available here: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tolerance> [23/10/2024].

tolerance is defined as a “willingness to accept behaviour and beliefs that are different from your own, although you might not agree with or approve of them” and is frequently related to the word *toleration*.

Despite some variations, scholarship has defined tolerance in two very close meanings: it is either a willingness to "put up with" or permit the expression of ideas or interests that one opposes (Sullivan *et al.*, 1979: 784; Sullivan *et al.*, 1982; Crick, 1971; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989: 28; Gibson, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013), or the notion of accepting an act, of ideas, ideologies, by any person, even if this constitutes visions contrary to their own conceptions of the world (Viegas, 2007: 110; 2010: 94). While there does not seem to be a consensus between researchers to agree to a definitive definition of tolerance, both fields of thought are close.

From this point on, the authors divide themselves, diversely characterising types of tolerance. For instance, Sniderman *et al.* (1989: 35-40) distinguish between situational tolerance (defined as tolerance towards whether there is a coherent set of tolerant responses, from a specific situation) and principled (when acts depend on how committed someone is to the democratic principles of tolerance). These types are coherent with Hurwitz and Mondak (2002), who distinguish between generic (act aversion) and discriminatory (actor aversion) tolerance. They are also in agreement with Viegas (2010), who refers to a structural type (coincident with principled tolerance, or the democratic ideas of the individual) and circumstantial (which results from reactions to changes in the social environment, namely due to feelings of insecurity in individuals caused by external factors like economic crisis or institutional reforms).

Another type of tolerance, importantly, is social tolerance, or the tolerance for social minorities, and political tolerance, referring to how citizens accept rights for those same minorities (Weldon, 2006: 335). Social tolerance is more focused on the stigmatised groups, which are the object of said tolerance (Weldon, 2006: 336), instead of how tolerance is exerted towards a given object, as in how much freedom one would deem homosexuals or Muslims to make political speeches, for example.

The present research adopts the classical definitions of tolerance researched by the authors revisionists of tolerance, who defined it as the ability to put up with those or ideas one disapproves of (Sullivan *et al.*, 1979: 784; 1982; and Sniderman *et al.*, 1989: 28). The use of this definition is due to Sniderman *et al.*'s argument (1989: 28) that when tolerance is referred to as full acceptance, it only refers to political tolerance. Not to the acceptance of specific social groups. Note that, in this thesis, when I refer to my own research on tolerance, I use this term as synonymous with social tolerance. However, when I am speaking about other authors'

contributions, I shall specify which kind of tolerance they study, or use the word tolerance as a general term, when the type of tolerance is not as relevant. The definition of tolerance will be approached in detail in subchapter 1.3.

With the advent of the Third Democratic Wave (Huntington, 1991) and the expansion of democratic values (Dalton, 1994), tolerance has become globally recognised as crucial among those values, whether among elites or citizens. As an example, the UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981 acknowledged the core role of tolerance in the relationship between states and other actors, by approving the “Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief”. Later, UNESCO approved the “Declaration of Principles on Tolerance” (16 November 1995).

Otherwise, the antonym of tolerance, intolerance, has been omnipresent in human history. An example would be during the events that swept across the world, and Europe in particular, in WWII, when Nazi barbarism ripped through millions of individuals based on the so-called concept of racial purity (Arendt, 1968: 27; Furedi, 2011). However, the mention of this traumatic episode in the history of mankind is a mere example of the acts perpetrated for similar intolerant reasons. Early examples could be the Roman massacre by Mithridates VI of Pontus in 88 BC, Julius Caesar’s campaigns of destruction (or, arguably, genocide) in ancient Gaul between 58 and 50 BC, or the various atrocities committed during the formation of the Mongol Empire and its successor states (13th century AD). However, many more recent examples can be mentioned: the Kurdish genocide, carried out by Saddam Hussein (1987-1989), Miroslav Milosevic’s mass murders in the former Yugoslavia (1991-1999), or the destruction and prosecution of Yazidi people carried out by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as DAESH or ISIS) in 2014, among others that raged (and continue to rage) across the planet.

This research will continue the tradition of empirical studies, initiated by Stouffer (1955) and the revisionists, who studied tolerance using its explanatory dimensions, such as sociodemographic, political or institutional dimensions (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989). The present study will focus on political and socioeconomic explanatory factors to explain social tolerance over the later decades in Europe.

b. European social tolerance: pertinence, puzzle, objectives, and the research questions

In this section, I first look at why it matters to study social tolerance, how the several pieces of the puzzle may fit into how social tolerance can be connected or, in other words, how each

factor may relate to social tolerance. Across this section, I will present each objective as it becomes relevant. Finally, I will present my research questions and, later, a subsection on Portuguese tolerance exceptionalism.

Why is this thesis relevant? Social tolerance constitutes a key feature through which the quality of democracy and political culture can be observed (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: chapter II; Viegas, 2007, 2010; Hjerem *et al.*, 2020: 897-898). That is an inherent democratic value which interplays with economic, social, and political factors which shape it (Inglehart, 1990: 177; Viegas, 2004: 99-100).

The social relevance of this study is related to social integration and the way human beings react to their peers (Putnam, 2007). Tolerance is often assumed as a value capable of sustaining societies, *the status quo*, and social peace, but given the rise of radicalism, it may hinder its objective. As Popper puts it (1945: note 4 to Chapter 7), tolerating the intolerant may bring about the destruction of said tolerant society. Meaning that understanding how a society may peacefully coexist is important, and justifies its development (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Uslaner, 2002). It involves accepting and respecting the beliefs, values, and opinions of others, even when they differ from one's own. In this way, this thesis is of relevance as it aims to understand how groups which historically have been highly vulnerable to radicalism and violence are tolerated, namely, people of other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals. Furthermore, understanding how tolerance towards these groups of discriminated people has been evolving displays how much acceptance a given group is getting, in the context of a given society. Also, it reveals how well a country accepts a given group of people, allowing for a diagnosis of sorts, and how they compare with their peers. In a nutshell, understanding what makes people tolerate (or not) is instrumental in providing governments with the tools to fight intolerance and promote a more inclusive society.

Many questions are still left unanswered in social tolerance research. Despite its centrality, tolerance is not a popular topic within political science, and the number of studies on it is relatively limited. We therefore have restricted knowledge about how much some individual and contextual factors of the current European situation may be affecting levels of social tolerance. Politically speaking, given Europe's rise in far-right populist movements, which seek to foster social divisions and intolerant rhetoric, studying tolerance may prove instrumental to achieving knowledge that can promote more political stability and more political inclusivity (Putnam, 2007; Mudde, 2007; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Tolerance has the potential to promote further European integration, as the EU project is heavily rooted in the principles of tolerance and mutual respect between member states (European Commission,

2015; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009). The study of social tolerance within the European context is not only academically enriching but also of practical significance for policymakers (particularly for diversity, equality and anti-discrimination departments), civil society actors (namely social movements and minority protection societies), and community leaders. By unpacking the relationship of age, socioeconomic performance, and support for the far-right with the tolerance citizens express towards minorities, this research seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of democratic values present in European societies.

Regarding the scientific relevance of this research, there is already knowledge of some of the most discriminated against groups: other races (Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Plenković *et al.*, 2022), Muslims (Peach and Glebe, 1995; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Ekici and Yucel, 2015; Plenković *et al.*, 2022; Berggren *et al.*, 2025), immigrants (Lazarus, 2011; Borgonovi, 2012; Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Belot, 2012; Rapp, 2017; Azedi, 2025), and homosexuals (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Tausch, 2024; Lee, 2024). These studies show that intolerance remains to some degree, and it seems to fluctuate according to socioeconomic circumstances (i.e. Berggren and Elinder, 2012a, 2012b), age and age cohorts (i.e. Andersen and Fetner, 2008b), and political circumstances (i.e. Weldon, 2006; Bjånesøy, 2021). However, what is currently unknown is how the severe economic fluctuations that affected Europe over the last decades influenced social tolerance (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a, 2012b; Rapp, 2017; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019), as well as how age and age cohorts, due to the sudden growth of youth support for the far-right, may effect social tolerance (Tower and Gélis, 2022; Jakli, 2024; Woods, 2024; Vinocur and Goury-Laffont, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025; Soares *et al.*, 2025). It is also unknown how the rise in support for the far-right may generally explain a growth of intolerance in Europe (Weldon, 2006; Bjånesøy, 2021). There are two other instances where little is known, namely: how age might be moderating support for the far-right and the relationship between socioeconomic performance and social tolerance.⁶ This dissertation aims to contribute to filling these gaps in previous research.

Another contribution of the present project stems from the fact that comparative models of tolerance studies are still scarce: as most tolerance studies are case studies, and even most comparisons are small (comparing two to five countries), they do not specifically approach social tolerance and tend not to use a timeframe. This is something that both Candeias (2012:

⁶ The moderations by age and socioeconomic performance will be further explained and explored in the second section.

1) and Weldon (2006: 333) point out in the early 2000s and it does not seem to have changed since then. Duch and Gibson (1992), Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003), and Sullivan *et al.*, (1985) were some of the few comparative studies available at the time. More recently, other authors have been executing comparative studies (Viegas, 2007, 2010; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a; Candeias, 2012; Hadler, 2012; Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Rapp, 2017; Ribeiro *et al.*, 2019; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020; Plenković *et al.*, 2022; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Vanagt *et al.*, 2024; Tausch, 2024). However, the availability of comparative studies addressing social tolerance in particular is still small, with most authors focusing on a single country or even communities (i.e. Billiet, 1995; Persell *et al.*, 2001; Gibson, 2006; Belot and Bréchon, 2012; Haas and Cunningham, 2014; Brown-Iannuzzi *et al.*, 2019; Fuks *et al.*, 2020; Bjånesøy, 2021; Brown and Mettler, 2023; Siegel, 2024; Mattis *et al.*, 2024; Mayer *et al.*, 2024; Dodson and Brooks, 2024).

Moreover, macro-level studies, in the context of tolerance, are also scarce (some of the exceptions being: Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Dima and Dima, 2016; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; Tausch, 2024). A comparative study, such as the one this research aims to develop, allows a broader variability of tolerance (across European countries), which allows for the generalisation of the factors explaining tolerance (in the present research: concerning how age, support for the far-right and socioeconomic performance may affect social tolerance). To my knowledge, there is no relevant comparative study simultaneously focusing on these three variables, and this is despite the rarity with which voting for the far-right and socioeconomic performance variables are tested, and the fact that self-positioning in the far-right has never been tested.

A longitudinal study is also an important contribution of this thesis, as, although it has been known that Europe has been growing in tolerance levels (Viegas, 2007, 2010; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020: 136; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Tausch, 2024; Dodson and Brooks, 2024: 10-12), the changing socioeconomic conditions of the late 2010s and early 2020s justify a look at European tolerance over the later years. Looking at tolerance in a longitudinal perspective is valuable to understand whether circumstances have changed or not. Most studies of tolerance tend not to look at the longitudinal perspective, notable exceptions being Andersen and Fetner (2008b: but they only look at two countries, USA and Canada in three WVS waves, while I compare 31 countries across five EVS waves), and Peffley *et al.* (2015: although they used 18 surveys between 1980 and 2011).

Explaining the puzzle: the role of socioeconomic performance, the far-right, and age

In this subsection, I first approach how tolerance has been growing across time, and how it may be different across European regions. Then, I explain how the three main explanatory dimensions (age, support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance) are part of the puzzle to relating with social tolerance.

First, I need to look at how time and European regions may play a role in explaining the relationship with social tolerance. First, time, as although tolerance has had a growing tendency in Europe and other countries (Viegas, 2007; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Candeias, 2012; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Tausch, 2024; Dodson and Brooks, 2024), the socioeconomic crises in Europe has been known to have generated behavioural changes, namely regarding social and political values (i.e. Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Dalton, 2000; Freire *et al.*, 2014; Belchior, 2020). It remains to be known whether it has affected tolerance over the later years. This, associated with the growing support for illiberal attitudes (i.e. Foa and Mounk, 2016, 2019; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023) and more support for the far-right (i.e. Tower and Gélis, 2022; Jakli, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025), brings about the need to further verify social tolerance across time.

Secondly, different European regions and countries have been developing values of tolerance differently (Viegas, 2007, 2010; Todosijevec and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). Tolerance is higher in central and northern European countries, steadily growing in southern European ones, and growing at a slower pace in eastern European countries (Todosijevec and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023), with Eastern European countries tending to be less tolerant than the rest of Europe (Todosijevec and Enyedi, 2008; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). Nevertheless, since recent regional comparative analysis is absent, these patterns lack verification. Thus, this thesis also aims to cover a gap in the literature concerning these patterns of growth in tolerance. Also, tolerance towards stigmatized groups (other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals), while related, varies differently across European regions (i.e. Candeias, 2012, 2016; Strabac *et al.*, 2011; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023), with more tolerance expressed towards certain groups than others, which makes a comparative analysis between these European regions (central/northern, southern and eastern) important. Thus, this thesis will look for patterns of tolerance between these four minority groups and between European regions, descriptively and in an explanatory manner, at the individual level.

Thus, further objectives are (Objective 1.1) to ***identify patterns of social tolerance growth across time, individuals, and countries***, and (Objective 1.2) to ***assess how much social***

tolerance differs across European countries in the four different minority groups: other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals. Moreover, (Objective 1.3) to *assess how tolerance has evolved between 1981 and 2021, across the selected European countries, identifying specific (positive or negative) outliers.*

As such, this thesis will look at how tolerance evolves across the 1981 to 2021 time frame, using a comparative perspective of European countries and regions. Social tolerance is assessed by looking at four stigmatised groups most salient and readily available on the *European Values Study* surveys (thereafter referred to as EVS): other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals.

Finally, according to Inglehart's value change theory (Inglehart, 1977, 1997, 2018; Abramson and Inglehart, 1992; Norris, 2017), over time, citizens have supposedly been embracing more post-materialistic values, particularly younger citizens. In this vein, the scholarship concerning tolerance (in general and social, in particular) also observes that age is important, with younger people tending to be more tolerant (Stouffer, 1955; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Vala *et al.*, 2003; Inglehart, 1990). This claim is disputed by later research: the youth have been gradually becoming less liberal and seem to be acquiring more authoritarian attitudes and beliefs (Foa and Mounk, 2016, 2019; Foa *et al.*, 2020; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023: 3-6, 15). This means that a closer look at age, particularly at how young people behave towards tolerance, is also research-worthy.

Parallely, a new trend seems to be rising in most of Europe: more young people support and vote for the far-right. For example, Tower and Gélis (2022) show a growth of support from young voters in Le Pen's party over time in the French legislative elections. Research has also shown rising support for Fratelli D'Italia (2022, 2024), Vox (2024), CHEGA (2024), or AfD (2024) amongst the young (Woods, 2024; Vinocur and Goury-Laffont, 2024; Jakli, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025). This indicates that, while young people traditionally tend to be more tolerant (Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Candeias, 2012), recently, large swathes of the younger cohorts could be fluctuating more to the right, becoming less supportive of liberal values, and more supportive of authoritarian rule (Stockemer *et al.*, 2018: 577; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023). Youth support for the far-right stems also from protest voting against ineffective and corrupt mainstream parties (Rydgren, 2018), reactions to cultural change associated with immigration (Ivaldi, 2018), and the formative impact of underperforming economies combined with propaganda on social media (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015; Mayer *et al.*, 2024).

This is pertinent as there is no clear-cut answer to the question of how tolerant the newer generations are. Furthermore, while tolerance authors often use age as a factor (i.e. Inglehart, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Viegas, 2007, 2010; Plenković, *et al.*, 2022), very rarely does the scholarship try to isolate the effects of age cohorts on social tolerance (one of the few exceptions is Andersen and Fetner, 2008b, who isolate several age cohorts, and they only analysed the period from 1981 to 2000 in the US and Canada, before the expansion of the European far-right).

This trend of increasing illiberalism from the more youthful cohorts encounters more evidence justifying this phenomenon: economic disenfranchisement, and unemployment, as well as the backlash towards the social advancements among the youth, make it more likely that these youthful voters may support far-right parties and candidates (Foa and Mounk. 2016, 2019; Kriesi, 2020). To assess whether this growing illiberalism and growing support for the far-right changes tolerance for the worse, it is necessary to observe age and age groups throughout time, especially regarding the later years, when young voters became more disenfranchised and more likely to display fewer progressive views, and thus, less tolerance.

In short, there is a need for further evidence when it comes to how age, especially among the youth, may explain social tolerance. By assessing the relationship of age and young age group with social tolerance, and contrasting them with older age groups, this thesis aims (Objective 2) ***to observe if social tolerance is associated with age and age groups, especially over the later years.*** This objective, and the use of age as a variable, is made on the individual level (micro-level).

Another relevant dimension to be approached is a political one: support for the far-right. Politics has been a commonly and extensively studied dimension regarding its effect on tolerance. In particular, the scholarship found that, when it comes to ideology, the more liberal or leftist a person is, the more tolerant he/she will tend to be (i.e. Rapp, 2017; Ribeiro and Borba, 2019). This is not without some caveats, as, for example, some groups, like fascists, will tend to be disliked by leftists or liberals, but not as much by conservatives (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1979; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989).

As mentioned, the period of economic, social and political instability, in Europe, has coincided with the rise of the European far-right (Mudde, 2016, 2019, 2021) and the normalization of its rhetoric (Valentim, 2021, 2024; de Jonge and Gaufman, 2022), emerging as a significant concern posing threats to democratic values and societal harmony. The resurgence of nationalist ideologies and xenophobic rhetoric, as Mudde observes (2016, 2019, 2021), is fuelled by socio-economic anxieties and cultural insecurities. This trend not only

exacerbates social divisions but also undermines efforts towards fostering tolerance and multiculturalism. Meaning that, to understand social tolerance in Europe, there is also a need to understand how the far-right might lead to it.

The far-right often champions exclusionary ideologies which reject diversity and promote ethnonationalism and nativism, embrace authoritarian tendencies, and promote populism and anti-elitist views of society (Mudde, 2007, 2019; Bjånesøy, 2021; Valentim, 2021, 2024). This is likely to affect how tolerance is developed across cultures. A few authors have already observed that there is evidence of how support for the far-right affects tolerance (namely: Billiet, 1995; Weldon, 2006; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Vanagt *et al.*, 2024; and Dodson and Brooks, 2024). In particular, Weldon observes that electoral support (or voting) for the far-right affects political tolerance, but not social tolerance (2006: 342-344).

We can look at support for the far-right as divided into two levels: one, the citizen-level, where tolerance is defined by citizens' ideological position in the far-right and political preferences, namely, voting for the far-right. So far, there is no relevant research which studies how individuals ideologically self-positioned in the far-right tolerate minority groups. Although the scholarship knows that more liberal and/or left-leaning individuals tend to be more tolerant (e.g. Sullivan *et al.*, 1979, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Viegas, 2007; Peffley *et al.*, 2023), there is a gap regarding how positioning in the far-right conditions social tolerance. And a second one, at the aggregate-level, points to evidence that country-level tolerance may be correlated with the level of voting for the far-right (Weldon, 2003, 2006; Billiet, 1996; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Bjånesøy, 2021; Bjånesøy *et al.*, 2023).

Research suggests that tolerance tends to fall in countries where there is a higher voting share for the far-right. However, works that analysed the macro-level effect of voting for the far-right on tolerance are quite uncommon, with Weldon (2006) being one of the few notable exceptions, and untested in the most recent social tolerance data. Therefore, although the link between support for far-right parties and higher levels of intolerance at the country level is plausible, there is a notable lack of relevant studies with a comparative approach conducted to clarify its prevalence. Another way in which this study is innovative is by expanding on Weldon's use of voting for the far-right variable: it expands on both countries (31) and periods used (five different points in time), in relation to Weldon (who only used 17 countries present in the 1997 Eurobarometer). Also, by selecting all parties considered belonging to the far-right party family, it is intended to weigh the far-right's effect on whether European populations become more or less tolerant. I am thus looking at its total effect on social tolerance, and not

merely the main far-right parties with more electoral success. As such, I decided to gather results for all parties within this party-family, in each year, for each country.

Supporting on both subdimensions of support for the far-right (the micro-level, ideological self-positioning in the far-right, and the macro-level, level of voting for the far-right) is also important to cross-validate the effects of support for the far-right on social tolerance.

By examining the individuals who self-position in the far-right (micro), and how much voting for the far-right has been getting across time in each country (macro), it is possible to assess how micro and macro level support for the far right (both ideological and electoral) relates to social tolerance. This research, thus, aims at (Objective 3) *estimating how support for the far-right relates to social tolerance*. This objective is subdivided into two levels: the individual-level and the country-level. At the individual level, this research (Objective 3.1) *aims to understand if ideological self-positioning in the far-right correlates with social tolerance*. At the country level, (Objective 3.2) *aims to understand if electoral support for the far-right (far-right voting) correlates with social tolerance*.

Europe has been ravaged by successive socioeconomic crises since 2007, which may have recently affected social tolerance. Scholarship has been reporting that *it is the economy*. That is, socioeconomic performance affects how citizens behave (i.e. Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Dalton, 2000). Furthermore, Joppke (2017a, 2017b) states that Europe stands at a crossroads marked by increasing cultural diversity, economic globalisation, and political polarisation. This is an important context in light of the arguments by Sullivan and Marcus in the late 80s. He noted that the Red Scare had influenced how communists, socialists, and atheists were tolerated by their peers (1988: 29). In the same sense, Stouffer (1955) and subsequent authors (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989) had previously made similar observations.

The recent crises which afflicted Europe were the Great Recession of 2007/2008,⁷ which saw a socioeconomic decline in most European and North American economies and led to widespread economic problems, which led to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (2009-2015).⁸ In the meantime, the migrant crisis of 2015⁹ contributed to a concerted effort by the

⁷ Detailed information on the Great Recession of 2007/2008 can be found at Britannica, here: <https://www.britannica.com/money/financial-crisis-of-2007-2008>. [11/06/2024].

⁸ Detailed information on the Euro Zone Debt crisis can be found at Britannica, here: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/euro-zone-debt-crisis>. [11/06/2024].

⁹ Detailed information on the 2015 migrant crisis can be found here: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e9465e4f-b2e4-11e7-837e-01aa75ed71a1>. [11/06/2024].

European countries to take in these migrants, but caused several political and social tensions. Another later crisis affected the World and Europe: The COVID-19 pandemic (2020).¹⁰ The lockdowns brought general chaos, while those countries that did not adhere to the lockdowns faced the death of their citizens by the thousands due to COVID-19 (see Queiroga and Freire, 2023: 259).¹¹

The fact that Europe has been effected by these crises, with economic downturns increasing support for populist and far-right parties (Gidron and Hall, 2017), and more support for them by the youth, in addition to the classical observations that the economy affects citizen's behaviour, substantiates the idea that tolerance may be affected by specific macro-level circumstances of several natures, like political, health, and even socioeconomic.

This also justifies why studying socioeconomic fluctuations is important, as socioeconomic development plays a pivotal role in shaping perceptions and democratic attitudes. Economic inequality, unemployment, and austerity measures influence social attitudes (Letki, 2008; van Oorschot, 2006; Kroknes *et al.*, 2015; Belchior *et al.*, 2016; Belchior, 2020). As Krugman observed (2009), economic downturns could breed resentment and intolerance towards marginalised groups, as socioeconomic crises have historically been followed by surges in xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments, blamed on economic instability.

There is a prevalent notion that economic growth and socioeconomic development are connected with tolerance, particularly HDI, GDP per capita and unemployment rate (Persell *et al.*, 2001; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Berggren and Elinder, 2012; Rapp, 2017; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019). However, knowledge on how socioeconomic performance affects tolerance is still relatively scarce, with few studies approaching and demonstrating the effect of macrolevel socioeconomic factors on tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a, 2012b; Rapp, 2017; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019).

Furthermore, this notion that the economy relates to tolerance seems to be thwarted by authors who have previously observed that economic growth and socioeconomic performance do not influence tolerance (Weldon, 2003, 2006; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Dunn and Singh, 2014: 24; Peffley *et al.*, 2015). That is, these authors tested whether GDP, Gini coefficient and

¹⁰ More detailed information on the Covid-19 pandemic can be found here: <https://www.who.int/europe/emergencies/situations/covid-19>. [11/06/2024].

¹¹ The invasion of Ukraine, on 24 February 2022, which, in turn, is one of the main causes of the inflation crisis of 2022 is not approached in this thesis because it is beyond the available data (1981-2021). However, on the economic effects of this event, see Yagi and Managi (2023).

unemployment rates might have had an effect on tolerance, yet they found no statistical connection between tolerance and socioeconomic performance. These results on the effects of socioeconomic development are equivocal and contradictory, which calls for further, preferably comparative and longitudinal, research to eliminate doubts about whether the effects of socioeconomic performance are important to explaining tolerance or not.

There are, nonetheless, even more relevant contradictions to be approached: Portugal, a country which does not have high social and economic development, was observed to be one of the most tolerant ones in Europe in the early 2000s (Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010). Another important contradiction is that Eastern European countries have been known to be less tolerant than their peers (Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023), but they are also the ones that have lately had greater economic growth (World Bank, 2024). As such, an analysis of tolerance must encompass an examination of the country-level socioeconomic factors.¹² The present research aims to contribute to bridging this gap about the relationship between socioeconomic performance and social tolerance, assessing whether it indeed *is the economy*. Thus, this research aims (Objective 4) ***to estimate how macro-level socioeconomic performance relates with social tolerance.***

The role of youth and socioeconomic performance in explaining social tolerance

The previous section examined how three dimensions (age, support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance) are relevant to explaining social tolerance. I now also claim that two of these dimensions (age and socioeconomic performance) may affect how the independent factors relate with social tolerance.

Starting with age, it is necessary to revisit the argument that support for the far-right has been growing among younger voters (Tower and Gélix, 2022; Cancela and Magalhães, 2024; Jakli, 2024; Woods, 2024; Vinocur and Goury-Laffont, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025). The scholarship also strongly suggests that there is a growth of authoritarianism among the youth (i.e. Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015; Foa *et al.*, 2020; Foa and Mounk, 2019: 1016; Kriesi, 2020: 252; Belchior and Pequito, 2023).

Given this growth of illiberal attitudes amongst the youth (i.e. Foa and Mounk, 2019; Foa *et al.*, 2020; Kriesi, 2020), and greater adherence to the far-right (Jakli, 2024; Woods, 2024; Vinocur and Goury-Laffont, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025), it stands

¹² Economic data will be exclusively country-level, as individual-level economic data, covering five or four EVS waves, is absent from the EVS surveys.

to reason that intolerance may correlate with the youth, especially those voting for the far-right. That is, as young supporters of far-right parties are more affected by the polarising rhetoric of these parties, the propensity towards ideological illiberalisation among young voters will tend to intensify, with one consequence being the increase in intolerance. In other words, it is reasonable to consider that support for far-right parties plays a moderating role in the correlation of age (i.e. younger *versus* older) with social tolerance.

Furthermore, although the literature points out that the socioeconomic condition of the youngest cohorts is relevant in explaining tolerance, there is little to no evidence of age or age groups moderating other variables' influence on tolerance. One of the few exceptions is Quillian (1995: 598, 600), who found that the interaction between age and individual income negatively affects racial prejudice. This suggests that younger people may be more likely to become less tolerant when their socioeconomic condition declines. Using other sources, the scholarship also suggests that young voters are more likely to be affected by downward trends in socioeconomic performance (i.e. Piketty, 2014; Kern *et al.*, 2015; Margalit, 2019; Reeskens and Vandecasteele, 2021). Likewise, the literature finds that after young people are exposed to declining socioeconomic conditions, their values change, becoming more materialistic, valuing more tradition and security (i.e. Sortheix *et al.*, 2017; Tormos *et al.*, 2017). Thus, it is likely that the correlation of younger voters in explaining social tolerance is dependent on the socioeconomic context, as they are affected by a negative socioeconomic context, which can lead to increased intolerance. In other words, it is reasonable to consider that age (i.e. younger *versus* older) plays a moderating role in the relationship between the socioeconomic context and social tolerance.

As such, this research also aims at understanding how age, namely the belonging to younger groups, moderates the correlates of voting for the far-right and socioeconomic performance with social tolerance. Thus, it is this research's aim (Objective 5.1) ***to assess the role of age (particularly younger vs. older age groups) in the relationship that macro-level socioeconomic performance and voting for the far-right have with social tolerance.*** Given that voting for the far-right and socioeconomic performance are country-level variables, this goal reports to the macro-level.

Furthermore, the study of the moderation effects of socioeconomic factors on independent factors is relatively uncommon. In fact, there is little evidence of how these factors moderate others, especially political factors, in their effect on social tolerance, although there are a few exceptions (Weldon, 2006: 342-344; Rapp, 2017: 52).

As such, socioeconomic variables have been known to moderate other variables' effects on social tolerance but have not been shown to intensify the far-right's negative effect on social tolerance. There are, however, a few exceptions which study how socioeconomic performance and the far-right may be related (Funke *et al.*, 2016; Gozgor, 2022; Sipma and Berning, 2021; Dehdari, 2022). These works exposed a clear connection between socioeconomic underperformance and the far-right. Suppose I associate these findings with the observation that voting for the far-right is, indeed, detrimental to social tolerance (Weldon, 2006). In that case, it becomes plausible that there is a connection between socioeconomic performance and support for the far-right, and their relationship with social tolerance. Socioeconomic underperformance will push voters to economic insecurity, making them more likely to support and vote for the far-right, which should intensify the relationship that the vote for the far-right has with social tolerance, potentially stalling its growth or reducing it.

As such, a final goal of this research is (Objective 5.2) ***to assess the role of socioeconomic performance in the relationship that voting for the far-right has with social tolerance.***

In a nutshell, this thesis seeks to determine whether age and socioeconomic performance can function as a catalyst for how the previously mentioned explanatory factors (age, far-right support and socioeconomic performance) correlate with social tolerance.

Is there a Portuguese exceptionalism?

A final observational piece of this puzzle is the apparent Portuguese tolerance exceptionalism. The modernisation theory states that a more developed country, in socioeconomic terms, has a better democracy and better democratic values. And in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Portugal was still a young democracy. One which was not able to fulfil the requirements of the modernisation theory to be considered on par with its Northern and Central European peers (Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010). Yet, although Portugal did not have as high democratization scores as some of its European counterparts, it was, in the 90s and early 2000s, one of the best-performing countries in terms of tolerance (Viegas, 2004, 2007 and 2010; Candeias, 2012). This can be interpreted as a Portuguese exceptionalism when it comes to how tolerant its population is.

Nonetheless, there are at least two reasons to believe that Portuguese exceptionalism has more recently been called into question. First, tolerance is an important component of post-materialist values. Thus, generations who grew up in better socioeconomic conditions are more likely to adopt post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1990: 41, 177), and this has also been

observed in Portugal (i.e. Braga da Cruz, 1995; Belchior, 2000; Freire, 2003). Since younger generations in Portugal have faced political and socioeconomic upheaval since 2007, this may have affected their post-materialist values and, consequently, diminished their social tolerance towards certain minorities.

Second, Portugal saw the rise of a new far-right party: CHEGA. While far-right parties, in Portugal, are not a new phenomenon, they have never held a place in the Portuguese Parliament, until October 2019, when their leader, André Ventura, was elected. This party manifests most of the far-right characteristics, and, indeed, is classified as such (Marchi and Alves, 2023: 114-115; Manucci, 2024): CHEGA displays intolerant rhetoric towards minorities, namely gypsies, homosexuals, immigrants, other races, and Muslims. However, the rise of this party happened in a country which, in light of prior research, is supposed to be one of the most tolerant countries in Europe (Viegas, 2007). This begs whether the far-right's breakthrough may hinder Portuguese tolerance of minorities by trying to propagate intolerant and discriminatory rhetoric.

As few relevant studies on social tolerance in Portugal have been conducted since 2010 (e.g. Viegas, 2010; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Nascimento, 2018) and none since 2020, an unanswered question is whether there is still a Portuguese tolerance exceptionalism or whether the country has receded in its tolerance levels. Tolerance may also be affected by the growing ideological support for the far-right among the younger Portuguese cohorts (Cancela and Magalhães, 2024). Not forgetting that younger populations are especially vulnerable to populist and illiberal rhetoric (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015; Foa *et al.*, 2020; Mudde, 2021: 12–13), ideological self-positioning in the far-right and age are important variables to explain social tolerance in the Portuguese case.¹³ Furthermore, these arguments are supported and further developed above, in this section, when providing for the justifications for analysing the relation of age and ideological self-positioning in the far-right. This is to understand if this country is still an exception, being more tolerant than its European peers, or not.

As such, the final goal of this thesis is to (Objective 6.1) ***assess whether high tolerance levels for the Portuguese case detected since the beginning of 2000 until 2010, are confirmed in the following decade.*** Furthermore, this thesis also intends to (Objective 6.2.) ***assess if social tolerance, in the Portuguese case, is related with age, and ideological self-positioning in the far-right.***

¹³ As this analysis will only regard the Portuguese case, it is not possible to analyse country-level data. Thus, analysis will be done at the individual-level, using ideological self-positioning in the far-right.

Finalising this section, it becomes relevant, now that I have approached every factor explaining how they are important to explaining social tolerance, to present my research questions. They are as follows: *Do age, far-right, and socioeconomic factors correlate with social tolerance? Does age, namely, younger voters, moderate the relationship between socioeconomic factors and far-right voting with social tolerance? And finally, does socioeconomic performance moderate the relationship between voting for the far-right and social tolerance?*

c. Methods: relevance and contribution

This thesis is a comparative and longitudinal study of social tolerance in 31 European democracies, between 1981 and 2021. As such, it will be using data available at the *European Values Study* (EVS) projects' integrated surveys, contained within the GESIS website.¹⁴ This project comprises five different waves: EVS wave 1 (1981-1984), wave 2 (1990-1993), wave 3 (1999-2001), wave 4 (2008-2010), and wave 5 (2017-2021).

The available data allows for the exploration of four social tolerance variables: tolerance to other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals, which are the dependent variables. This set of variables has been extensively used to study social tolerance in the past (i.e. Berggren and Elinder, 2012a, 2012b; Berggren and Nilsson, 2013; Hadler, 2012; Dima and Dima, 2016; Inglehart *et al.*, 2008; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019). The questionnaires used in this project are common to every country within the EVS datasets over time, which enables comparability across waves and countries.

In this sense, this project seeks to study social tolerance using the statistical method, while also in an extensive, longitudinal, and comparative way. It contributes to the scholarship by building on the existing literature on the relationship of tolerance with socioeconomic performance, support for the far-right and age factors. However, it expands them, not only by analysing these main factors, but also by understanding their moderation effects with social tolerance, in Europe.

d. Structuring the thesis

This work is structured in seven chapters. The theory is approached in two chapters: I and II. Chapter I approaches the history and the philosophical development of tolerance (subchapter

¹⁴ The data used on this thesis may be found in the following links: https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA7503 and <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSEVStrend.jsp>. [05/10/2024].

1.1), its seminal and revisionist empirical discussions (subchapter 1.2), and finally, defines the concept of social tolerance for this thesis (subchapter 1.3). Chapter II carries out a theoretical discussion about the most relevant contributions to tolerance and the main explanatory variables used to study tolerance. It is divided into five subchapters: firstly, it approaches how tolerance has evolved across time in Europe, the importance of sociodemographic, psychological, and institutional factors, as these variables are used as controls in the analytical chapters (subchapter 2.1). The next three subchapters approach the groups of variables which will be used as explanatory factors, thus, subchapter 2.2. analyses how age and age group variables were used and researched to explain tolerance, and how the youth has been studied as an explanatory factor. Then, subchapter 2.3. approaches the relationship of political factors and support for the far-right on tolerance, and subchapter 2.4. displays research which has approached how socioeconomic performance correlates with tolerance. Finally, subchapter 2.5. makes a theoretical analysis of what is known about Portugal, asking whether it is still exceptional, regarding its tolerance levels. Each subchapter systematises the literature and defines the hypotheses in sequence with the objectives and the theory.

Chapter III presents the methodology used. Subchapter 3.1. discusses the methodological approach used in this thesis, forthcoming the advantages and disadvantages of using the comparative method for the study of social tolerance in the European context, with a multilevel approach. Subchapter 3.2. presents the sources of empirical data, explores the methodological approaches which support this research and justifies the choices made. Subchapter 3.3. refers to the variables, namely, which social tolerance indicators are used and empirically operationalised, as well as which independent variables are used in this study (approaching the age, far-right support, and socioeconomic performance variables) on two levels: micro-level and macro-level independent variables. Finally, it is stated which variables are used as controls.

Regarding the empirical chapters: Chapter IV analyses the data, looking at social tolerance, with subchapter 4.1. serving as a comparative overview of social tolerance across Europe. Subchapter 4.2. focuses on comparing countries, ranking them, then looking at the four minority social groups (another race, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals), how social tolerance has evolved across time, how regional European areas compare with each other, and how socioeconomic and political factors are related to social tolerance. Subchapter 4.3. looks at how different tolerant and intolerant groups of citizens in Europe are, regarding the considered factors: age, far-right, and socioeconomic status. Subchapter 4.4. summarises the chapter's findings.

Chapter V studies how social tolerance is correlated with age and far-right self-positioning, on the individual level. Particularly, subchapter 5.1. looks at how these variables relate to social tolerance, at the individual level, in general, and in subchapter 5.2. explores the correlation between age and self-positioning in the far-right and tolerance towards each specific social group. Subchapter 5.3. looks at the curious case of Portugal, while subchapter 5.4. summarises chapter V's findings.

In Chapter VI, subchapter 6.1. tests how age, support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance correlate with social tolerance, using multilevel techniques. Subchapter 6.2. approaches how age moderates the correlation of socioeconomic performance and far-right voting with social tolerance, while subchapter 6.3. tests whether socioeconomic performance moderates voting for the far-right's relation with social tolerance. Once again, chapter 6.4. summarises chapter VI's findings.

In the Final Thoughts chapter, a brief evaluation of the work presented and the main results obtained is made, assessing if I was able to answer the questions and objectives, while, at the same time, clarifying how this analysis contributes to the theoretical background built up within the social tolerance area of knowledge.

CHAPTER I. The concept of (social) tolerance: History and empirical origins

This theoretical chapter delves into the multifaceted nature of tolerance, exploring its historical evolution, empirical origins, theoretical underpinnings, and contemporary relevance within the Western societal context. As such, section 1.1 states how tolerance evolved throughout time, “From Antiquity to the Information Age.” Section 1.2. follows, showing how tolerance was approached through the lens of its first social science research pieces and how the early discussions and empirical findings helped revise the concept, which suffered a heavy wave of empirical debates and revisionism. Finally, the concept of tolerance, specifically social tolerance, is approached in section 1.3, where it is discussed and defined for this research.

1.1.The idea of tolerance: From Antiquity to the Information Age

This section aims to look at how the idea of tolerance has been seen throughout the ages. When has tolerance become an important value to be held by both societies and states? While tolerance may have varied throughout history, as Edelstein wrote, it is: “a modernist fallacy to assume that all the values that we regard as positive today are the product of recent developments and had never been defended in the past” (2010: 62).

This means that the theoretical idea of tolerance (or *toleration*) has been used before landmarking philosophical treaties, like Popper’s *Paradigm of Intolerance* (1946) or Voltaire’s *A Treatise on Toleration* (1783). To fully understand the concept of tolerance, which should be considered in this thesis, it is relevant to approach the history behind it, and how it changed from Antiquity to the Information Age.

This subchapter is divided into four sections: first approaching the first mentions of tolerance in Antiquity and Medieval eras (section 1.1.1), then jumping to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment periods (section 1.1.2), moving forward to modernity (section 1.1.3) and, finally, approaching tolerance in contemporary times (1.1.4).

1.1.1. First mentions of tolerance: Antiquity and Medieval times

The mention of tolerance, more specifically regarding religious tolerance, can be traced as far back as classical antiquity, namely during the Achaemenid Empire, or Persia (sometimes referred to as ancient Persia) (Fisher, 1968: 412; Walzer, 1997: 14; Edelman *et al.*, 2016). When this Empire first formed, it established a system of statehood under Cyrus II the Great, where the satrapies retained a relative level of freedom, preserving their status as kingdoms,

while responding to the *King of Kings*.¹⁵ This freedom extended not only to the states but also to religion, as the ancient Persian state would not enforce a religion over a given kingdom, allowing for such diverse groups as the Egyptians, Greeks, and Bactrians to freely profess their religion. In the same vein, the Hellenistic period also demonstrates how tolerance towards religious freedoms and ethnicities was common practice, such as in Alexandria during the Ptolemaic period (Walzer, 1997: 17).

According to Dodds (1951: 194), Socrates' method of questioning, which encouraged dialogue and understanding, could be credited as a foundational stone for the idea of tolerance in philosophy. In the Roman period, Cicero's writings also touched on the importance of respect for diverse opinions, particularly in the realm of politics (Griffin, 1986). Rome showed nominal religious and ethnic tolerance of the several populations incorporated into the Empire, albeit with some exceptions, such as the Christian persecution of the 1st to the 4th century AD (Witte and van de Vyver, 1996: 74).

As to the Medieval period, religious dogmatism and conflicts largely overshadowed the concept of tolerance (Walzer, 1997: 17-18), essentially limiting it. There were, however, some exceptions, such as the relatively tolerant periods under Islamic rule in the Iberian Peninsula, during the Umayyad dynasty (756 to 1031AD), where Christians, Jews, and Muslims coexisted and collaborated intellectually (Walzer, 1997: 17-18; Menocal, 2002; Fletcher, 2006).

Another example of tolerance, during the Medieval Ages, is Norman Sicily (1061-1194), where Latin, Greek, Arab, and Jewish communities coexisted relatively peacefully, ruled by Norman leaders, such as Roger II, who had adopted a policy of religious and cultural tolerance (Metcalf, 2009). Genghis Khan and his successors' Mongol Empire (1206-1368) also promoted religious tolerance. They allowed conquered peoples to maintain their religious practices, while policies promoted religious freedom and protected the rights of Buddhists, Muslims, Christians, and others within the empire. This facilitated trade and cultural exchange along the Silk Road, contributing to the empire's stability and prosperity (Weatherford, 2004).

In turn, contradicting much of the European intolerance for other religions and ideas, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was deeply engaged with Muslim and Jewish philosophical works, like Averroes (1126-1198) and Maimonides (1138-1204), who, like Aquinas (particularly in *Summa Theologica*), advocated for a tolerant and rational approach to religious differences (Kretzmann and Stump, 1993). Finally, the Ottoman Empire, with its Millet System (1299-1922), was established to allow several religious communities (millets) to govern

¹⁵ The original term was: "shāh".

themselves under their laws and leaders, acknowledging Ottoman sovereignty (Walzer, 1997: 14-34; Masters, 2001).

This brief historical tour shows that the idea of tolerance has been present in recorded human history, with its mentions beginning in classical antiquity, until the medieval period, with extensive evidence of tolerance being practised throughout several societies and even empires (Walzer, 1997; Streeter, 2021). This demonstrates that tolerance is not a modern idea, even if during the Middle Ages it was limited to a few civilizational pockets. However, information on tolerance during the Antiquity and the Medieval periods is scarce, at least when compared to the thinkers who came after, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment times.

1.1.2. Tolerance rejuvenated: from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment

In this subsection, I pick up from the end of the previous section, approaching tolerance contributions starting in the Renaissance, until the Enlightenment. With the Renaissance in Europe, several thinkers arose in defence of the idea of tolerance, after it had been circumscribed during the Middle Ages. Some authors only look at religious tolerance, while others argue for tolerance in other areas, such as ethnicity and politics. In this subsection, I will look at these various forms of tolerance chronologically.

Regarding religious tolerance, Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466-1536) argues for a return to simple Christian piety and a focus on inner spirituality over rigid doctrinal adherence, promoting a more tolerant approach to differing religious views and challenging the prevailing dogmas of the time (Bainton, 1953). Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), author of the “Oration on the Dignity of Man,” argued for the unity of all philosophical and religious truths, proposing a coexistence of all religions (Garin, 1965). Another example is Thomas More (1478-1535), who explored the idea of Utopian tolerance: an ideal society where religious tolerance is practised and individuals are free to worship, provided they do not disrupt public order (Logan, 1983). Luther (1483-1546) advocated for limited tolerance, namely through the right of individuals to interpret the Bible and follow their faith, but he later supported the persecution of Anabaptists and disapproved of Jews (Brecht, 1985); and Castellio (1515-1563), argued that no one should be persecuted or executed for their religious beliefs, stating "To kill a man is not to defend a doctrine, but to kill a man" (Castellio, 1935). Queen Elizabeth I (1533-1603), who observed the religious and political turmoil during her predecessor's reigns, imposed the Elizabethan Religious Settlement, which sought to establish a middle way between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. However, strict penalties remained for extreme dissenters (Haigh, 1998).

In political terms, there is Machiavelli's (1469-1527) "Discourses on Livy" (1996 [1531]), advocating for the inclusion of diverse viewpoints while governing, emphasising the prominence of flexibility and tolerance of different opinions to maintain stability and power (Mansfield, 1979). Regarding other types of tolerance, Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566) argued for the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples (Wagner and Parish, 1967). In the same vein, Montaigne's "On Cannibals" (c. 1580) compares the so-called barbarism of indigenous peoples in the Americas with the violence displayed by European colonisers. By advocating for understanding and respecting different cultures and criticising the arrogance of supposed European superiority, Montaigne (1533-1592) approached tolerance to ethnicities and races (Frame, 1958).

The Enlightenment period (XVII and XVIII centuries) saw further development of tolerance as a philosophical and political principle, advancing its religious meaning, and expanding on its cultural, political and gendered forms. Concerning its religious form of tolerance, Locke's "A Letter Concerning Toleration" (Locke, 1689; Dunn, 1969) articulated an argument against religious persecution, stating that civil government should not have authority over individual conscience and belief, laying the groundwork for the separation of church and state. Montesquieu's "The Spirit of the Laws" (1949 [1748]) explores the relationship between laws, climate, religion, and social customs, while arguing for a system of government that accepts cultural diversity and promotes religious tolerance (Cohler, 1989). Voltaire (1694-1778) criticised religious intolerance and advocated for freedom of expression and thought in his works. His "Treatise on Tolerance" deserves a mention as he displayed the threat of religious fundamentalism (Voltaire, 1763: 24-26) by defending the memory of Jean Calas, a Protestant merchant who had fallen victim to torture and death in a biased trial, due to his and his family's religious beliefs. Hume (2009 [1779]) also advocated for religious tolerance and criticised dogmatism and superstition, while also promoting scepticism and empiricism (Gaskin, 1988). Thomas Jefferson (1786) declared that individuals have the right to practice their religion without interference from the government. Jefferson's ideas influenced the First Amendment to the US Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of religion (Malone, 1948).

Other authors were also relevant: Diderot aimed at compiling and disseminating knowledge across various fields, challenging traditional authority and promoting critical thinking (Proust, 1995). In economic and social terms, Adam Smith (2002 [1776]) believed that individuals should be free to pursue their economic interests, promoting a tolerant and open society where diverse talents and perspectives could flourish (Skinner, 1996). Regarding tolerance and gender issues, Mary Wollstonecraft pioneered as an activist for women's rights

and gender equality (2017 [1792]), arguing for the education and empowerment of women, challenging the prevailing notions of female inferiority, and promoting tolerance for women (Todd, 2000). Kant (2016 [1795]) argued for the principles of tolerance, cosmopolitanism, and universal rights, believing that rational individuals could coexist peacefully by adhering to laws derived from reason (Wood, 1999).

1.1.3. Tolerance in modern times (XIX to the late XX centuries)

The Enlightenment further pressed the notions of tolerance but continued to develop through the XIX and XX centuries, influenced by the civil rights movements, gender equality, and multiculturalism. In this subsection, I approach tolerance in the XIX and XX centuries, first by mentioning the most important contributions from individuals (not only as authors, but also as politicians, or activists), and then, I approach the authors who started to further tolerance as a study subject.

An important milestone in the evolution of the idea of tolerance concerns racial issues. This is when the USA's President Lincoln became relevant (1863) by declaring freedom for slaves in Confederate states and backing the 13th Amendment, which abolished slavery in the USA. Lincoln's efforts to promote racial equality and unity are examples of tolerance and human rights advocacy (McPherson, 1991), changing how tolerance towards race was expressed in the USA. Contemporary to Lincoln, John Stuart Mill (1859) argues for the importance of individual freedom and tolerance (Ryan, 1974). Frederick Douglass (1818-1895), a former slave turned prominent abolitionist, exposed slavery and made a robust case for racial equality and tolerance (Blight, 2018), which were important to forward the idea of racial and ethnic tolerance.

Similarly, the feminist movement (beginning in the XIX century) advocated for gender equality and challenged traditional gender roles, contributing to a more inclusive understanding of tolerance. Feminist theorists and activists worried about the intersections of oppression, arguing for a society that respects and values diverse identities and experiences (Hooks, 1984). An important theorist and activist of the feminist movement was Harriet Tubman (1822-1913), an escaped enslaved woman who became a leading abolitionist and conductor of the Underground Railroad. She helped numerous enslaved people escape to freedom, advocated for the abolition of slavery, and became involved in the women's suffrage movement. More contributions came from Susan B. Anthony, whose efforts culminated in the eventual passage of the USA's 19th Amendment in 1920 (Barry, 1988), or Pankhurst, founder of the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), whose activism contributed to women's suffrage in the

UK in 1918 and 1928 (Purvis, 2002). All these women were dedicated to promoting racial and gender tolerance (Larson, 2004).

When it comes to human rights, there is also a set of relevant examples. Eleanor Roosevelt, US First Lady to Roosevelt during WWII, and a prominent human rights advocate, played a crucial role in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), supporting civil rights, women's rights, and social justice, advocating for tolerance and equality on a global scale (Cook, 1992). Mahatma Gandhi (lawyer, statesman, and spiritual leader, 1869-1948) led the Indian independence movement, which promoted nonviolent resistance and religious tolerance to unite Hindus and Muslims in India. He advocated for mutual respect and peaceful coexistence while resisting British colonial rule through peaceful means (Brown, 1991). Another example would be Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor, author and Nobel laureate, who wrote "Night" (1956) as a testament to the atrocities of the Holocaust and a call for tolerance, human rights, and the prevention of future genocides (Fine, 1982).

In 1955, Rosa Parks (activist, 1913-2005) refused to give up her seat to a white person on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama. This act, along with the subsequent Montgomery Bus Boycott, was decisive in challenging American segregation laws (Brinkley, 2000). The 1960s Civil Rights Movement challenged racial segregation and promoted tolerance and equality (Carson, 1991). Martin Luther King Jr (pastor, activist, and political philosopher, 1929-1968) emphasised a philosophy of non-violence and understanding, calling for justice and tolerance to achieve social justice, advocating for a society where individuals were judged by their character rather than the colour of their skin (Branch, 1988). Other important figures for racial tolerance were the Lovings, an interracial couple, who disputed laws banning interracial marriage in the US Supreme Court case *Loving v. Virginia* (1967), ultimately striking those down (Carter, 2016). Last, but not least, Nelson Mandela, South Africa's first black president, embodied the struggle against racism and racial intolerance by fighting against the apartheid regime, leading reconciliation and nation-building after 27 years in prison (1962-1990): Mandela inspired millions with his anti-racism and policymaking.

These XX century individuals were instrumental in the promotion of tolerance: they acted as politicians, activists, lawmakers, researchers, and other occupations. Einstein (theoretical physicist, 1879-1955) spoke out against racial segregation in the USA, supported the civil rights movement, and was a member of the *National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* (NAACP) (Isaacson, 2007). Rustin was a key organiser of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963 and was also an advocate for LGBTQ rights, emphasising the interconnectedness of racial, economic, and sexual issues for equality

(D'Emilio, 2003). Rustin's ideas were somewhat continued by Harvey Milk (politician and activist), who was one of the first openly gay elected officials in the US, serving on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, advocating for LGBTQ rights in 1977 (Shilts, 1982). Margaret Mead (anthropologist, 1901-1978), on the other hand, promoted cultural tolerance by conducting fieldwork among various indigenous cultures, challenging Western ethnocentric views and contributing to greater tolerance and respect for cultural differences (Said, 1978). Rigoberta Menchú (human rights activist, 1959) promoted the rights of indigenous peoples to preserve their cultural heritage, raising international awareness on the struggles of indigenous communities in Latin America (Burgos-Debray, 1984).

Another important example is Hannah Arendt. She became one of the most important authors of political science and political philosophy when she explored the nature of power, authority, and totalitarianism in "The Origins of Totalitarianism" (1951), approaching the roots of antisemitism, imperialism and totalitarianism. In her 1958 work, "The Human Condition", she warns of the dangers of cojoining work with the public sphere, as a threat to political engagement and freedom. In 1963, Arendt launched the work which truly made her famous: "Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil". Eichmann is portrayed as an ordinary human who performed his duties of logistics for the Holocaust with no critical thought or morality. Arendt's main point was that compliance without thought was dangerous. Her works, which emphasised the importance of pluralism and open dialogue in a healthy political community, made her an important contributor to tolerance and democratic values (Arendt, 1963).

Arendt's works, as well as the other authors in this section, were important to contextualise tolerance as an important value, precisely because they looked at tolerance as social and political players, rather than scholars. In this context, I mention the most influential authors of the time, who contributed to the problematization and conceptualisation of tolerance, marking a new approach to how tolerance is thought. From here, tolerance is a philosophical and scholarly focus, rather than a value to be pushed for the collective good.

Adorno and Horkheimer (1944) scrutinise tolerance as part of the broader critique of liberal democracy and capitalist society. They suggest that what is often termed tolerance in modern societies can be superficial, serving to mask more profound systemic inequalities and forms of control. Tolerance, in their view, is sometimes reduced to mere acceptance of the *status quo* rather than fostering genuine understanding or social change (i.e. Lucero-Montaña, 2012).

Karl Popper, with his *Paradox of Tolerance* (1945: note 4 to Chapter 7), here illustrated in Figure 1.1, reflects on how tolerance should be dealt with.




Figure 1.1. Popper’s Paradox of Tolerance

Source: Pictoline.com

Popper upholds the idea that either a given tolerant society is intolerant towards its intolerant members, or it will not remain tolerant. More specifically, Popper says:

“I do not imply (...) that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be unwise. (...) we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal (...).” In *The Open Society And Its Enemies* (Popper, 1945: note 4 to Chapter 7).

Popper’s reasoning has been approached as an important contribution towards democratic thought, namely when it comes to extremist speech, as it offers a way to deal with radicalism and right-wing populism (Rosenfeld, 1987; Rijpkema, 2012: 93).

In “A Critique of Pure Tolerance” (1965), Wolff, Moore Jr., and Marcuse reinforce this idea of repressive tolerance by observing a limitation to liberal tolerance, namely that it leads to moral relativism and the protection of intolerance (1965: 107). They proposed the idea of liberating tolerance, advocating for selective intolerance towards ideologies and actions that perpetuate oppression and restrict human freedom (p. 113). They called for a more radical form of tolerance that supports marginalised voices and challenges dominant power structures through active resistance, which is coherent with Popper’s arguments for protecting a tolerant society.

Dworkin further contributes to this discussion (1986) by stating that tolerance is contained in the protection of individual rights. Going on the same liberal wave, Rorty (1989) argues for a form of “ironic tolerance”, where individuals accept the contingency of their own beliefs while remaining committed to democratic values and the protection of individual rights, emphasising open-mindedness and the willingness to engage in dialogue with others (pp. 44-72). This view on how dialogue between citizens should be is somewhat shared with Habermas (1996 [1992]: 313), viewing tolerance as a fundamental principle for achieving consensus in a pluralistic society. Habermas outlines how legal and political institutions can support inclusive and participatory dialogue, ensuring that diverse perspectives are respected (1996 [1992]: pp. 264-265).

In this section, I approached how tolerance evolved from the Enlightenment ideals through the 19th and 20th centuries, influenced by movements for civil rights, gender equality, and multiculturalism, focusing on the contributions by key players such as Lincoln, Mill, and Gandhi. However, philosophers like Popper and Habermas furthered how tolerance is thought from a democratic perspective, focusing on it as a fundamental concept, being problematized and conceptualised.

1.1.4. Critical conceptual perspectives on tolerance in the Information Age

In this subsection, I approach the discussion of tolerance for the late XX and early XIX centuries, following a time sequence from the 1990s to the later contributions. This approach will be done according to the authors who considered tolerance as a study subject and concept, as well as historical moments which were relevant to the affirmation of tolerance as a structural concept of liberal democracies.

The late XX and early XXI centuries saw further advancements, particularly with the rise of global interconnectedness and multicultural societies (Kymlicka, 2001). The push for LGBTQ+ rights has been a significant part of this evolution by advocating for the social

acceptance and inclusion of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. Legal milestones, such as the legalisation of same-sex marriage in many countries, reflect growing societal acceptance and institutionalisation of tolerance (Eskridge, 1996; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; 2008b).

Authors such as Popper, Marcuse, Rawls (1971, 1993), and Dworkin remained extremely influential regarding how tolerance should be seen, influencing how governments implemented tolerant policies of integration and acceptance of individuals (such as LGBTQ+, immigrants, other ethnicities, other religious groups, etc.). However, new authors rose to discuss tolerance, particularly after the Information Age sprang up.¹⁶

The authors who arose from this new age are interested in issues related to multiculturalism and how melting pot types of societies may coexist peacefully while remaining functional economies. Barry, a critic of multiculturalism, conceives tolerance in the context of treating individuals equally under the law, regardless of their cultural or religious background (2001: 131-146, 165-168). Kymlicka, on the other hand, conceives tolerance as rooted in the liberal commitment to individual autonomy and equality, balancing respect for cultural identity and liberal justice, contending that a tolerant society must not only protect individual rights, but also recognise the importance of cultural membership for personal identity and well-being (2001). Barry responded to Kymlicka, proposing that minorities should be granted special rights and protections to uphold their cultural identities and to incentivise them to participate in society (2001).

Several important authors argue that tolerance cannot be a mere placeholder of social relational coexistence with peers and must move beyond mere acceptance to genuine recognition of cultural differences, addressing issues of identity, respect, and inclusion to be part of a broader framework of equity and inclusion of historically stigmatised groups (Taylor, 1992: 31; Badiou, 2001; Parekh, 2006: 204-205; Modood, 2007; Fraser, 2008: 16-18; Forst, 2013). In short, these authors think that mere tolerance, or the traditional definition of tolerance, i.e. putting up with something one disagrees with (Furedi, 2011: 36), is insufficient to generate functioning societies and economies.

Concomitantly, some authors focus on tolerance as a conceptually central phenomenon for liberal democratic societies, without losing their emphasis on the issue of how tolerance affects diverse societies. Walzer (1997) does so by exploring different forms of toleration

¹⁶ The Information Age is a historical period, established from 1947, when the first transistor was developed and, thus, it facilitated the near-instantaneous transmission of information (Castells, 1996).

historically and in contemporary contexts (pp. 14-36). He differentiates between three types of toleration (which is used as a synonym to tolerance): resigned toleration, or when members have “acceptance of difference for the sake of peace” (p. 10); passive toleration (pp. 10-11) or allowing the differences to coexist without interference; and affirmative toleration, which is a proactive and positive acceptance and embrace of diversity (p. 59). The author argues that understanding these differences is crucial for navigating the complexities of modern pluralistic societies.

Some authors uphold an even less positive and more suspicious view of tolerance. For instance, Žižek suggests that tolerance serves as a mechanism of control within a given society, allowing dominant groups to maintain their power while appearing open-minded and accepting (2008: 668). He questions whether there are inherent limits to tolerance: uncritical tolerance of all viewpoints can lead to acceptance of oppressive ideologies and behaviours. He points out that tolerance can be used to exclude certain groups or viewpoints and used as a form of symbolic violence, legitimising the marginalisation of those who do not conform to societal norms (Žižek, 2008: 681). Thus, he deems a more critical approach to tolerance necessary to understand its implications for social justice and equality. This negative view of tolerance to maintain power structures and the *status quo* is shared by other authors, viewing tolerance as a form of controlling a society, instead of acceptance (Brown, 2006), and in need of more proactive stances against racism and inequality (Kendi, 2019).

In turn, Furedi (2011) argues that tolerance is often misunderstood and underestimated and that it is a crucial aspect of freedom, peace, and the pursuit of truth (2011: 30-31). He argues that the meaning of tolerance has changed in recent times, focusing on group identities rather than individual beliefs (p. 32). Furedi defines tolerance as beliefs and behaviour, not cultural or national identities, saying that tolerance demands that we accept the right of others to hold different beliefs and opinions (pp. 32-35). Indeed, he argues that tolerance has become a means of consenting to prevailing power relations rather than challenging those. He proposes the expansion of the definition of tolerance to full acceptance, rather than the traditional definition of tolerance: putting up with what one disagrees with (Furedi, 2011: 36).

Alternatively, Horton criticises these views on the traditional definition of tolerance, contending that these authors overlook the reality of the conflict of values and ways of life in modern societies. The traditional concept of tolerance helps to navigate these conflicts and find a viable form of accommodation between groups with differing beliefs and practices (Horton, 2011: 294-298). Horton argues that acceptance of deep differences that cannot be conclusively resolved (meaning calling for complete acceptance), as the critics ask, is asking for too much

(p. 298). Instead, he argues that, even if tolerance cannot be guaranteed by politics alone, historical evidence suggests that a “tolerant *modus vivendi* can be a viable and sustainable political outcome” (p.298).

During the 2010s, terrorism (primarily Islamic terrorism) started to influence how the concept of tolerance was viewed in the World and European arenas. Religious tolerance regained traction as an important research topic. On 7 January 2015, in Paris (France), 12 people died and 11 were injured because of an attack on the French satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, followed by a series of other attacks across the Ile-de-France.¹⁷ This was not the last of terrorist attacks to happen on European soil after the Refugee crisis of 2015: from the Bataclan attack (13/11/2015), to the Ariana Grande’s concert attack in Manchester (22/05/2017), nearly all attacks were (except for the Munich shooting) committed by Islamic extremists supporting Al-Qaeda or DAESH.

In this context, Tate (2016) explores the concept of toleration in extreme cases, when individuals with deep religious beliefs or practices at odds with their faith, as the *raison d’être* of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack. Tate argues that for religiously devout individuals, their faith is foundational, and any attempt to require them to prioritise other values over their faith or abandon their faith to tolerate conflicting beliefs is unlikely to be successful (p. 665). As such, he aims to establish a conception of toleration that allows individuals to tolerate what goes against their faith while maintaining a full commitment to that faith. For this, Tate distinguishes between two primary justifications for toleration: an attitude towards the good and a set of affirmed values. He argued that the second type of justification is ill-equipped to deal with extreme cases because it does not address the challenge of maintaining religious faith while tolerating conflicting beliefs (Tate, 2016: 671). Thus, he discusses Charlie Hebdo’s attack as an example of an extreme case of religious violence which arose from blasphemy and the motivation to avenge a deity's honour. Further argues that scepticism may encourage the devout to recognise that tolerating conflicting beliefs does not diminish their faith. Therefore, it may be possible to persuade them to tolerate such beliefs despite the offence they may cause (pp. 674-75). This goes in the same direction as other authors such as Nussbaum (2012: 244).

Also, Avramenko and Promisel (2018) observe that the traditional definition of tolerance evolved, later becoming an avoidance of causing discomfort or pain in conversations or differences of opinion (2018: 850). The authors define tolerance as full acceptance through

¹⁷ For a more complete account on the Charlie Hebdo attack, check here: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Charlie-Hebdo-shooting>. Last accessed on 05/07/2024.

the Aristotelian virtues. They suggested that understanding toleration as a mean between two vices, either in excess or in scarcity, allows for a more nuanced understanding of this tolerance (pp. 854-856), placing themselves along with many others in this field (i.e. Taylor, 1992; Parekh, 2006; Modood, 2007; Fraser, 2008; Furedi, 2011).

More recently, Gasser (2022) holds a less cynical view of tolerance, than other authors such as Žižek (who argues that tolerance is a control mechanism and status quo maintenance), arguing that due to the context of religious pluralism and both the epistemic and psychological aspects of tolerance may contribute to how individuals develop a deeper understanding and tolerance for different religious beliefs (pp. 406-410).

Today, at the institutional level, tolerance is recognised as a cornerstone of democratic societies, essential for social cohesion and peaceful coexistence among diverse populations. It encompasses not only tolerance to different races, religions, and cultures but also tolerance to diverse viewpoints and lifestyles (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; UN, 1981; UNESCO, 1995). However, issues such as immigration, global terrorism, and rising nationalism present new complications in balancing tolerance with security and social cohesion. The ongoing debate about the limits of tolerance, as seen above, especially in the context of hate speech and extremist ideologies, means that this principle has not stopped evolving and being discussed (Brown, 2006; Sardoč, 2021, 2025).

Many of the previously mentioned authors, who generally came from a philosophical background, are primarily focused on defining what tolerance is, whether it is a mere way of putting up with diversity or a way to fully embrace and accept said diversity. Lately, the idea that tolerance is a mere *status* placeholder is seen as woefully insufficient, hindering the conception of multicultural and diverse societies, with several authors arguing against using tolerance as merely *putting up with* (i.e. Avramenko and Promisel, 2018; Tate, 2016). The exploration of tolerance, as a study subject and as a concept, under these authors, is important, but none of them explores tolerance as an empirically researchable social phenomenon. For this, one needs to look at the seminal and revisionist social scientists, who looked at tolerance as a phenomenon that exogenous and endogenous factors can explain. The following section will look at how social scientists first approached research on tolerance, and then, how they revised the respective approaches to this area of research.

1.2. Seminal and revisionist approaches to tolerance: State of the art

In this section, I approach the first social science studies on tolerance. At first, I present the first studies (focusing on Stouffer) made on tolerance, presenting both how the first authors

conceptualised and measured tolerance, and what factors were found to influence tolerance. Later, I approach the revisionists, who were a group of social scientists who critically revised the concept of tolerance and its operationalisation. Finally, in the last subsection, I explore how these same revisionists brought new research factors into the explanation of tolerance and introduced the comparative method, changing the field.

1.2.1. Stouffer's impact: a seminal approach to tolerance

One of the very first approaches to tolerance was first published in the 1950s in the USA, authored by Stouffer (1955). In this seminal work, tolerance is not concisely defined. However, his study is central to the conceptual definition, as he argues that tolerance is *not* merely conflicting with others but accepting differences of opinion and attitudes (p. 57).

Stouffer argued that increasing tolerance would be due to the advent of democracy in Western societies, and concomitant rising levels of education, and factors linked to economic development, such as market liberalisation. His study referred to specific groups, namely communists, atheists, and socialists, primarily focusing on the attitudes of Americans towards communists during the *Red Scare* (as Sullivan *et al.* put it, 1982: 782).¹⁸ His empirical contribution was significant: most Americans were intolerant towards admitted communists, while not being as intolerant towards socialists, atheists and suspected communists (Stouffer, 1955: 220-236).

Another of his contributions was to the study of factors that influence tolerance. Younger generations, those with more education, men, the less religious, the more interested in tolerance, and those who live in less rural communities all tended to be more tolerant (Stouffer, 1955). Finally, he approaches the feeling of threat. Stouffer tests whether the feeling of threat by Communism is associated with tolerance, finding a negative relation: with less sense of threat, there could be more tolerance towards non-conformists (Stouffer, 1955: 208). Furthermore, Stouffer hopes that a society characterised by tolerance will be better equipped to withstand threats to civil liberties and individual freedoms, as it fosters an environment conducive to open debate, diversity, and the exchange of ideas (p. 236). Stouffer's work was impactful, as he also systematised how the American public saw civil freedoms.

His contributions, particularly regarding education's effect on tolerance, were validated by other authors (Prothro and Grigg, 1960; Davis, 1975: 509-510; Williams *et al.*, 1976;

¹⁸ For more information on this phenomenon, please check here: <https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States/The-Red-Scare> [08/11/2024].

Lawrence, 1976: 89-90). Nunn *et al.* (1978) further validate Stouffer's hopes by observing that the growing tolerance levels in the US, between the 1950s and 1970s, were due to educational levels improving, ageing, cohort replacement and the changing political environment, moving past the Red Scare, the embracement of secularisation and support for democracy.

In summary, Stouffer's 1955 research impacted the field of study to the point that, from then on, it became a reference which influenced how tolerance was studied in three ways: how tolerance was empirically gauged through survey techniques, which groups were studied, and which factors affected tolerance. However, Stouffer's research lacked a cohesive and circumscribed conceptualisation of tolerance, which was later criticised by those who would be known as *the revisionists of tolerance*. Furthermore, up to this point (the 1970s), tolerance research was delimited to the USA and to left-leaning stigmatised groups.

1.2.2. *Stouffer's coattails: his critics and the revisionists of the concept of tolerance*

Regardless of Stouffer's groundbreaking merits, his study was criticised for the above-mentioned reasons and more. This subsection exposes the criticism made to Stouffer by his later colleagues, and then, how the study on tolerance evolved through the new ideas these researchers brought, namely regarding their specific conceptual contributions, and pointing out the most important explanatory factors. Among the criticisms of Stouffer's seminal work, having the results too close to his assumptions is of particular importance, as it puts at stake the study's scientific validity (Lane, 1956: 223). The critics focusing on this point would later be named *the revisionists of tolerance* (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989: 27).

First, one needs to look at the authors who built upon Stouffer's results' coattails. Strictly focusing on the concept of tolerance, Ferrar criticises Stouffer's works on measuring tolerance for not accounting for the difference between permissive ideology and tolerance. This author argues that Stouffer measured how permissive people are towards a group, not whether they are tolerant. Because the leftist groups studied by him also may have some unpermissive attitudes towards the right (1976: 77). The author also contributes by dissecting several dimensions of tolerance (p. 64), composing a conceptualization of tolerance, to contrast with Adorno *et al.*'s *Authoritarian Personality* (1950), thus creating *the tolerant personality*.

Beyond criticism, a few authors changed the study of tolerance over 20 years after Stouffer's models. In this regard, Sullivan *et al.* (1979) assume a greater impact, first, because they offered more solutions on how to measure tolerance (1979, 1981). They also added more stigmatised groups (1979) and retested Stouffer's factors, proposing the inclusion of new variables (1981), observing the evolution of tolerance after the *Red Scare* period. Finally, they

proposed the inclusion of an explanatory model of tolerance (Sullivan *et al.*, 1981: 9). As such, these authors use a classic conceptualisation of tolerance: a willingness to put up with or permit the expression of ideas or interests that one opposes (Sullivan *et al.*, 1979: 784).

Later on, Sullivan and Marcus (1988), keep the definition used in Sullivan *et al.* (1979) but argue that tolerance is only relevant when there is a significant level of objection towards a group, noting that attitudes towards a group range from strongly positive to neutral to strongly negative, and tolerance is only at issue when there is serious dislike and objection towards a group (1988: 27-28).

Importantly, Sniderman *et al.* (1989) further discuss what tolerance is, in the context of political (the willingness of individuals to allow others to express their opinions and beliefs freely, even if they disagree with them) and racial tolerance (the acceptance and respect for individuals from different racial or ethnic backgrounds). They also propose the idea of *principled tolerance*, which suggests that individuals support tolerance as a value or principle, rather than simply tolerating groups they like or agree with, suggesting that principled tolerance involves consistent and affirmative responses to various forms of tolerance (1989: 27-33). This challenges the "emotivist thesis" (the idea that one can only be tolerant of something he or she dislikes [1989: 28]) by the 1950s, 1970s and 1980s authors. This also suggests that people's attitudes towards tolerance are based on their personal feelings towards specific groups, rather than on principled beliefs. Ultimately, Sniderman and colleagues found that a large majority of the public supported various forms of tolerance consistently, not just based on their personal preferences, but also on principled beliefs in democratic values (1989: 36-38).

Other authors further contributed to the advancement of knowledge on tolerance. Gibson further explains that political tolerance includes support for institutional guarantees of the right to oppose the existing regime, such as the rights to vote, participate in political parties, politically organise, and attempt political persuasion (Gibson, 1988: 516-517). Later, this same author (1992a) discusses the relevance of mass political intolerance to the theory of public opinion in democratic politics and the allocation of political freedom. In the same sense, Gibson (1992b) discusses different measures of political tolerance and explores whether these measures are equivalent or if they capture different aspects of tolerance. This article is relevant as it focuses on two main measures: the *least-liked* approach (Barnum and Sullivan, 1989; Gibson, 1992b), where respondents are asked to select their most disliked group and then answer questions about that group. The second approach is the Stouffer items, which ask respondents about their willingness to allow certain groups or individuals to engage in specific activities (Gibson, 1992b: 562).

These approaches to tolerance became entrenched in its underlying definition and the methodology to measure it, discussing whether tolerance was either dichotomous or continuous (Mondak and Sanders, 2003: 496; Gibson, 2005: 313). However, the revisionists' impact on how tolerance was researched was undeniable, and, from here, the revisionists and respective successors explored how tolerance is explained and how best to research it. The following subsection will explore the factors being researched by the revisionists and their eventual study of countries other than the US.

1.2.3. The revisionists and new explanatory factors of tolerance: from a focus in the USA to comparative studies in Europe

In this subsection, I explore the factors used by the revisionists to explain tolerance, as well as the evolving focus from the USA to comparative perspectives with European countries.

Armed with the knowledge that levels of tolerance had significantly increased between 1953 and the 1970s, Sullivan *et al.* (1979) observe that, regarding the liberal-conservative scale, liberals are more likely to dislike right-wing groups, while conservatives are more likely to dislike left-wing groups. They found that, when it comes to tolerance, the least-liked groups are described as “uniformly bad, undemocratic, and dangerous” by the respondents (1979: 788).

This study is further complemented by Sullivan *et al.* (1981), arguing that bivariate variable analysis between tolerance and other independent factors is not enough to establish the explanatory factors of tolerance, proposing, for the first time, a multivariate approach (1981: 92). They found sociodemographic explanatory factors had a limited effect; psychological factors had a great effect on political tolerance; and norms and threat perception also effected strongly. They also used political variables, namely political ideology, but its effect was negligible (pp. 101-104).

Furthermore, in the 1982 Sullivan *et al.*'s book, democratic norms and perception of threat held an effect on tolerance. Further, this study observed that intolerance increased the more the individual perceived a group as threatening important values or constitutional order (Sullivan *et al.*, 1982: 186). Finally, these authors' contribution to the revisionism of Stouffer was furthered by their critique of Stouffer's choice of studying only a few groups of differentiated ideological association. They also claim that tolerance, as a value, is not principled: people would tolerate the groups they approve of, but, as to groups they disapprove of, citizens will probably show just how intolerant they may be (Sullivan *et al.*, 1982). From here, Sullivan *et al.* (1982: 2) claim that the growth of tolerance, observed by previous authors,

was exaggerated. However, as Weil puts it, they were unable to show that tolerance had not grown and that there were more targets available to be intolerated, other than the communists (1984: 965).

This idea that threat perception is important was further tested: Sullivan and Marcus (1988) found that threat and fear play a significant role in shaping political tolerance. However, Mueller (1988) argues that although threat and fear can show changes in attitudes towards Communists over time, these effects are questionable, as they change depending on which groups are perceived as the most threatening ones at a given time (pp. 12-17).

To examine tolerance, Sniderman *et al.* (1989) focused on whether citizens would support the right of a few groups (namely, atheists, racists, communists, those who advocate for military rule, and homosexuals) to make a speech, teach in a college, or hold a public office (1989: 28-31). The independent variables used were education and ideology: more educated and more liberal people tended to be more tolerant. Their findings challenge the emotivist thesis, that is, they found a distinction between *principled* and *situational* consistency in attitudes towards tolerance. A substantial number of the public support various forms of tolerance consistently, not just based on their personal preferences, but on principled beliefs in democratic values (pp. 36-38). Sullivan *et al.*'s (1981) and Sniderman *et al.*'s (1989) works are central in tolerance studies, influencing the conceptualisation of tolerance and thus complementing various dimensions (such as principled, situational, political, or social).

Picking up from this tradition, another important author, Gibson (1989), refers to the theory of pluralistic intolerance, which suggests that tolerance only makes sense in the context of one's political opponents. He observes that being either liberal or conservative correlates with how much one dislikes left or right-wing groups (pp. 566-569). He concludes by observing that Americans are quite intolerant of political minorities they dislike, suggesting that commitments to fundamental democratic liberties for all citizens are weak (pp. 569-570). Other pieces of research by this same author are coherent with his previous findings (Gibson, 1992a). However, he introduces a few new variables, namely those related with degrees of political freedom: the intolerant perceive more constraints to their freedom, and more intolerance also contributes to less perception of freedom (p. 350; see also Gibson (2013) on radical Muslims, atheists, communists, and religious fundamentalists). The findings also suggest that the indices of political tolerance and support for civil liberties are only weakly intercorrelated, indicating that they are distinct constructs (Gibson, 2013).

Up until here, the most important studies had been circumscribed to the USA. Studies of tolerance outside the US start in the 80s: with a study of tolerance in Israel and Costa Rica

(Caspi and Seligson, 1983), Canada (Fletcher, 1989), and the UK (Barnum and Sullivan, 1989). Some of these studies are of a comparative nature, but these were still not common (Gibson, 1989: 563). As Weldon (2006: 333) observes, comparative studies would be relatively uncommon, with few exceptions, well until the 2000s (i.e. Duch and Gibson, 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Sullivan *et al.*, 1985).

Gibson would later go on to ask Western Europeans if they would provide political freedoms to fascists (Gibson and Duch, 1991: 196), like in Gibson's other studies (i.e. 1988), albeit not using the least-liked approach. As for results, there are not many differences between tolerance levels in Western European countries (Portugal and Greece are the significant exceptions, p. 199). When comparing the opinions of leaders and ordinary citizens, they find that it is the leaders in Greece, Portugal and West Germany who are less tolerant than citizens towards fascists (pp. 200-202). They also observed that younger people tend to be more tolerant (Gibson and Duch, 1991: 205). Likewise, Duch and Gibson (1992) run a cross-level analysis of political tolerance in western Europe (West Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the UK, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), asking respondents about their dislike towards fascists and then asking whether this group should have political rights. They observe that perception of threat is the best predictor, followed by education, ideology, efficacy and support for democracy (Duch and Gibson, 1992: 245).

These studies are important because they provide evidence on the levels of tolerance and how it is explained in the Western world (Gibson and Duch, 1993; Gibson, 1998, 2006, 2008).

Summarising this section: beyond revisiting the concept of tolerance, the revisionists were also instrumental to the development of the research on tolerance, by furthering political variables (like ideology and perceptions of freedom), but also by discovering that threat perception was also potentially important (albeit not always consistently). More than that, this is when the study of tolerance was developed to move beyond the single case of the USA, starting to use the comparative method to address tolerance in European countries.

1.3. Defining the concept of (social) tolerance

The theoretical definition of social tolerance is presented at this point. I first define what tolerance conceptually means, and then I move on to define what social tolerance is. Starting by defining the term according to the Cambridge Dictionary (2024),¹⁹ tolerance is a

¹⁹ Retrieved from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tolerance>. Last accessed 06/05/2024.

“willingness to accept behaviour and beliefs that are different from your own, although you might not agree with or approve of them”, and is a term synonymous with toleration.²⁰ Note that when referring to tolerance, I am referring to attitudes towards differing beliefs, practices, or identities (Velthuis *et al.*, 2021: 1107-1108). This is different from the typical definition of discrimination, which is defined as a behaviour treating people unequally due to group membership (Thomsen, 2017).

Another important note to take into consideration is that studies on tolerance tend to define it regardless of whether they study political or social tolerance (i.e. Weldon, 2006; Viegas, 2007, 2010; Hadler, 2012; Rapp and Freitag, 2014; Rapp, 2017; Liberati *et al.*, 2021; Constantini *et al.*, 2024). In this sense, the term *social* regards the type of tolerance, not the central definition of tolerance itself. Thus, the definition of tolerance in the coming subsections will regard the dominant understanding of the definition and conceptualisation of tolerance. Only after will it address the social delimitation of tolerance.

1.3.1. Tolerance as the minimum common social (and democratic) denominator

There are two schools of thought on how tolerance is defined. One sees tolerance as full acceptance of others, and the other sees it as a minimum social placeholder. This subsection approaches the contributions made for the latter, while juxtaposing it with the first one.

While Stouffer did not curiously define tolerance, he did argue that it was a form of acceptance of others (1955: 50-54). Nevertheless, his operationalization would not allow for the measurement of political tolerance (or tolerance for the political rights of stigmatised groups), because it focused on specific social groups, instead of political rights (Sullivan *et al.*, 1979: 784; 1982: 81). This research by Sullivan and colleagues uses Crick’s definition of tolerance: “(...) the degree to which we accept things of which we disapprove” (1971: 144) and was complemented with the idea that tolerance is the ability to allow a wide range of ideas that challenge one’s way of life. In short, tolerance arose when there were grounds for disagreement, which could be measured by how much someone would be willing to provide freedom for the ideas a given recalcitrant has, but one rejects (Sullivan *et al.*, 1979: 784). Regardless, Sullivan *et al.* (1979: 782-784) further criticise Stouffer by suggesting that targets

²⁰ The dictionary definition of tolerance seems to be similar in the European languages, such as in Romanic language groups, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, French and Romanian, but also in other major language groups, the Germanic family (German, English, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic), Hellenic (Greek), and the Slavic language group (Polish, Czech, Slovak, Bulgarian, Croatian, Slovene). In table A.1.1. (please check the appendix A1), I present evidence of how each language used in the studied countries defined the word tolerance.

of intolerance have expanded over time: they now include civil rights activists, feminists, opponents of the Vietnam War, and various radicals and reactionaries. Later, tolerance was suggested to become theoretically pertinent primarily in the face of considerable opposition towards a group (Sullivan and Marcus, 1988: 27; see also Sniderman *et al.*, 1989: 28).

This definition of tolerance is influential to a point that many other authors, throughout the years, adopted it for their research pieces (e.g. Gibson, 1989: 516, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 243; Froese *et al.*, 2008: 30; Haas and Cunningham, 2014: 291; Neuner and Ramirez, 2023: 702) and I highlight them to contextualize these authors' contributions to the definition of tolerance. They are relevant, as they are the classical authors who followed Stouffer's seminal contributions and defined tolerance as a minimum common social denominator. A key difference should be highlighted: for Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003: 243), tolerance is whether someone is willing to allow a disliked group to hold public office and hold demonstrations, considering these indicators as a minimal requirement of a liberal democracy.

Another important contribution, furthering the approach to the empirical study of tolerance, is the different approaches to the study. The types of approach are, essentially, three: the fixed-group; the least-liked approaches; and the focus on support for restrictive public policies (Gibson, 2013: 45). The fixed-group approach refers to presenting a specific group of people to a respondent and seeing if they would show intolerance/tolerance towards it. The least-liked approach asks the respondents to nominate the groups of people they dislike out of a list provided.²¹ The third approach focuses on support for restrictive public policies, being defined as whether respondents would approve or not of public policies designed to limit the freedoms and rights of others (pp. 46-47; see also Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002: 93-94). It is important to distinguish between discriminatory (in)tolerance (meaning that it targets specific groups) and generic (in)tolerance (defined as a more general opposition to political expression) (Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002: 93-94).

In other words, these authors who share this definition of tolerance (e.g. Sullivan *et al.*, 1979; Gibson, 1989, 2006; Haas and Cunningham, 2014; Neuner and Ramirez, 2023) consider tolerance to be the minimum common requirement (or denominator) for life in a liberal democracy. Nevertheless, this definition is not consensual. Philosophy authors, who approached tolerance in a preconceptual manner in section 1.1.4., hold the idea that tolerance, in the sense that one must "put up" with what they disapprove, is not enough (Taylor, 1992;

²¹ This is the approach used for this research. For more details, please check Chapter III.

Modood, 2007; Fraser, 2008: 16-18; Badiou, 2001; Tate, 2016: 674-75; Gasser, 2022: 406-410). This entails that these authors, while recognising the idea that there is a concept of tolerance, see it as a mere placeholder for peaceful coexistence. And, as such, they contend that tolerance should go further beyond and fully accept others. This idea is explored in the next section.

1.3.2. Defining tolerance as acceptance towards others

This section starts with the rival definition of tolerance to the one presented in the previous section: it is the acceptance and respect for individuals from different racial or ethnic backgrounds (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989: 36). However, this definition of tolerance reports to a specific kind of tolerance: political tolerance, or, more specifically, when it comes to what is called as “racial tolerance” (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989: 28). This definition encounters a twist: it constitutes the acceptance and respect for individuals from different racial or ethnic backgrounds (p. 36). In other words, political tolerance is when someone is allowed to express their opinions and beliefs freely, even if their opinions are disagreed with. It is distinguishable from racial tolerance (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989: 36), which refers to the acceptance of individuals from different racial or ethnic backgrounds.

Some authors share this sort of communion between political tolerance and racial tolerance, by looking at tolerance as an acceptance of others’ opinions or social characteristics. Weldon (2006: 335) defined tolerance as the recognition and acceptance of the basic political rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities, and the acceptance of ethnic minorities in various social contexts, such as living in the same neighbourhood, having them as bosses, or accepting them into one's family through marriage (p. 335). Viegas (2007: 110; 2010: 94) defined it as the extent to which acceptance is accorded to potential targets of discrimination, such as political and religious extremists, stigmatised groups, and ethnic minorities. He argues that tolerance goes beyond simply getting to know another person and their ideas but also involves a predisposition towards understanding someone else's motives and accepting them, albeit conditionally (2007: 110-111).

Several other authors coalesce into Weldon and Viegas’ point of view (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Ribeiro, 2010; Petersen *et al.*, 2011; Hobolt *et al.*, 2011; Hadler, 2012; Powell and Clarke, 2013; Crawford and Pilanski, 2014; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Twenge *et al.*, 2015). Coherently, several more recent works adopted this specification (i.e. Ribeiro and Borba, 2019; Ribeiro and Fuks, 2019; Ribeiro *et al.*, 2019, 2022; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020; Elsinbawi and Wolosin, 2023). For them, tolerance is not simply the idea that one can (or should) “put up” with others,

as Sullivan *et al.* argued. A liberal and democratic society requires its citizens to fully accept differences.

The last two sections expose this debate between the competing definitions of tolerance, which has been raging across the field throughout the years. However, they are of very similar meanings. The definition of tolerance, which was chosen for this thesis, will be exposed in section 1.3.4. The following section will approach what social tolerance is.

1.3.3. Defining social tolerance: how it differs from political tolerance and why it is important to focus on it

Section 1.3. has been focused on defining the concept of tolerance, exploring the precedents present in the research made about it. While I have already defined tolerance, I also need to define the type of tolerance being studied in this thesis: social tolerance. For this purpose, at times, I will approach the difference between social tolerance and its twin, political tolerance.

Social tolerance is the tolerance displayed to a given social group (Persell *et al.*, 2001: 214; Weldon, 2006).²² To these authors, social tolerance is a measurement of tolerance towards people of different social groups. However, they recognised a few issues with measuring social tolerance: bias due to social desirability, as respondents know how they are supposed to answer in tolerating different sexual orientations and races and being aware that tolerance is considered a fundamental democratic value. They added that, although equality is professed as a universal idea, this does not mean that respondents would be tolerant of people different from themselves in a real-world scenario, if they felt threatened (Persell *et al.*, 2001: 214).

Another relevant perspective regards the importance of distinguishing between discriminatory intolerance, which targets specific groups, and generic intolerance, which is a more general opposition to political expression (Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002: 95-96; Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Gibson, 2002). Later, Hadler (2012) also focused on social tolerance, which was measured by the acceptance of members of various social groups as neighbours. He examines two dimensions of prejudice, xenophobia and homophobia, to understand the influence of contextual factors on different dimensions of tolerance. Furthermore, Viegas also (2007: 110) stated that there was a difference between studying social tolerance and political tolerance: the first one refers to the targets of discrimination (stigmatised groups), while the second one refers to the acceptance of the political rights of people belonging

²² In Weldon's case, ethnic groups, but, in general terms, I refer to the disliked groups discussed by Sullivan *et al.* (1981) and Sniderman *et al.* (1989). Note that Weldon's research asks about freedom of speech, of association, religious liberty and freedom of consciousness, equality before the law, and the right to vote and be a candidate

to these stigmatised groups. These distinguishing definition of this subtype of tolerance, if you will, is shared by many other authors of tolerance, meaning that this definition becomes widespread in the scholarship (i.e. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Rapp, 2017; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; Seligson *et al.*, 2019; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020; Velthuis *et al.*, 2021; Krzyżanowski and Ekström, 2024).

Seeing as how stigmatised minorities are the target of discrimination, their study is relevant, especially given what Dunn *et al.* argue: political tolerance constitutes the bulk of the work in the literature about tolerance (2009: 288). This justifies the idea that social tolerance needs to be more addressed by the scholarship, as it constitutes a knowledge gap within the area. However, studying social tolerance comes with some disadvantages, namely that there is a bias in the effect of education: it is more pronounced, due to the social circles in which people move around (Persell *et al.*, 2001: 214).

There are more arguments which favour the study of social tolerance. Political tolerance is focused on political rights, like freedom of speech, reunion and voting (Gibson, 2006), which are more abstract and intangible than asking whether a respondent would accept or be a neighbour of a given group of people different from themselves. Social tolerance, however, encompasses acceptance for diverse cultural, religious, racial, and ideological social groups (Velthuis *et al.*, 2021; Verkuyten, 2021a). This focus on groups is important to fostering peaceful coexistence, reducing discrimination, and promoting inclusive societies. Thus, studying social tolerance instead of political tolerance has the benefit of looking at a broader effect of social attitudes on everyday interactions, social cohesion, and intergroup relations.

Furthermore, unlike political tolerance, which is primarily concerned with abstract principles such as free speech, social tolerance directly affects how individuals interact with one another in daily life, making it a pressing subject for research in efforts to reduce prejudice and inequality, especially in a scenario in which it lacks research. Besides, studying political tolerance means that the focus is on the rights and freedoms, rather than the victims of discrimination, which directs questions on how they are perceived, allowing for further testing. Additionally, rights may also be harder to quantify (Sullivan *et al.* 1981; Sniderman *et al.* 1989; Gibson 1992b). Studying political tolerance would circumscribe this thesis to a framework of political rights, rather than a more specific view on stigmatised groups.

This section explores the distinguishing definition of social and political tolerance, expanding on why I chose to focus on social tolerance. In the next section, 1.3.4., I expose the full definition of social tolerance being used in this thesis.

1.3.4. *Defining social tolerance for this thesis*

The idea that tolerance is either a negative liberty or that it implies full acceptance for both minorities and their rights (Berlin, 1969), stands at the centre of this thesis. Suppose tolerance is seen as simply the ability to put up with a minority. In that case, the implication might be that an agenda-setting agent or a legislator cannot simply produce a piece of legislation to improve and promote acceptance. However, if it is seen as the ability to accept the rights and minorities themselves, then the results of such research could lead to anti-discrimination bills and thus contribute to improving societies in Europe.

Indeed, some scholars postulate tolerance as accepting others (e.g. Weldon, 2006: 335; Viegas, 2007: 110; Elsinbawi and Wolosin, 2023: see section 1.3.2 for more details). However, some advocate that tolerance needs to go further than simply putting up with someone, paradoxically, recognising that tolerance is this social minimum common denominator (e.g. Gasser, 2022). This is in line with the original definitions of tolerance by influential authors: “a willingness to allow the expression of ideas or interests one opposes” (e.g. Sullivan *et al.*, 1979, 1981, 1982: 784, Sullivan and Marcus, 1988; Sullivan and Tansue, 1999; Gibson, 1988, 2002; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002: 93). And while this one gather recognition from more classical authors, it also has ample recognition from more recent literature (i.e. Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 243; Froese *et al.*, 2008: 30; Gibson, 2013: 48; Haas and Cunningham, 2014: 291; Neuner and Ramirez, 2023: 702).

Regardless of how we see tolerance, whether it means *accepting* or *putting up with* someone else, and despite this research positioning itself, it still recognises that these two positions are close. Looking at Sniderman *et al.*'s arguments (1989: 28), full acceptance refers only to political tolerance, particularly when others are allowed to express their opinions and beliefs. It does not necessarily mean accepting groups.

As this thesis will be looking at social tolerance, namely how historically stigmatised groups are tolerated, that is, tolerance regarding other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals, the definition of tolerance adopted here will be the one by Sullivan *et al.* (1982: 784), which is mentioned above. The social group selection procedure used in this thesis will follow the least-liked group (inquired citizens nominate the groups they do not like), as this is the approach available in the EVS/WVS projects to study social tolerance (Gibson, 2013: 45-48). Furthermore, the least-liked groups allow for the understanding of how much these populations are tolerated, by asking the respondents if they would accept a given stigmatised member of a group of people as a neighbour, as done by several authors (e.g. Viegas, 2007:

114; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Candeias, 2016; Yigit, 2020; Plenković *et al.*, 2022).

In addition to the theoretical reasons mentioned, the availability of data contributes to the decision of the conceptualisation of social tolerance adopted for this research. Indeed, the EVS project has data from five different points in time, between 1981 (other races and immigrants) and 1990 (all four groups) until 2021, asking voters how they would be able to accept neighbours of certain stigmatised groups.

CHAPTER II. State of the art: how age, support for the far-right and socioeconomic performance may explain social tolerance

Chapter II builds upon the first chapter's review of early tolerance studies, exploring the various relevant explanatory dimensions of tolerance. It addresses the sociodemographic, psychological, institutional, political, and socioeconomic factors of tolerance, distinguishing between those that will be used as controls in this thesis and those that contribute to an original explanation of how tolerance is affected.

This chapter will begin with Subchapter 2.1, which examines the role of sociodemographic, psychological, and institutional factors and their known effect on tolerance. Each dimension is approached in its section. The next subchapters approach the main explanatory factors in this thesis: age (2.2), the far-right (2.3), and socioeconomic performance (2.4). Subchapter 2.2. introduces and discusses the first explanatory factor in this thesis, age and the youth, exploring its historical importance to the study of tolerance (i.e. Stouffer, 1955) and how age and the youth group could relate and moderate the relationship of the rise of the far-right with tolerance.

Subchapter 2.3. examines the scholarship's finding that political factors (including the far-right) are important in explaining tolerance. Subchapter 2.4. examines the role that socioeconomic performance plays in how tolerance varies. Subchapter 2.5. approaches the scholarship on Portugal, stating why this country is such a paradigmatic case.

Note that in this chapter, as in the previous one, the tolerance literature regards both political and social tolerance, as the scholarship uses both, since they are seen as very much related (i.e. Weldon, 2006; Hadler, 2012).

2.1. The growth of tolerance across time and European regions, and the importance of personal and environmental factors: sociodemographic, psychological, and institutional factors

The scholarship has been able to indicate that tolerance has been growing across the World and Europe, in particular (i.e. Inglehart, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Viegas, 2007, 2010; Vala *et al.*, 2010; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020: 136; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Tausch, 2024; Chong *et al.*, 2024; Dodson and Brooks, 2024: 10-12), but there is reason to believe that this growth may be hindered by recent world events (the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2013, the 2015 migration crisis, among others).

Changes in tolerance have been studied at length, in the past, with earlier literature on tolerance focusing mainly on the following set of explanatory dimensions: sociodemographic

(i.e. Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan *et al.*, 1981, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989), psychological (Sullivan *et al.*, 1979, 1981, 1982), political (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Ribeiro and Borba, 2019), institutionalism/institutionalization (Gibson and Duch, 1991; Gibson, 2002; Viegas, 2004; Weldon, 2006; Candeias, 2012; Ribeiro and Borba, 2019), and socioeconomic (i.e. Persell *et al.*, 2001; Weldon, 2006; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Viegas, 2004, 2007; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Dunn *et al.*, 2009, Dunn and Singh, 2014; Hadler, 2012; Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; Rapp, 2017; Salahodjaev, 2021). In this first subchapter, I first approach how tolerance has been growing, in Europe, across time and European regions. Then, I make a general literature review of the factors most used in tolerance studies, namely, personal and environmental factors are first approached, specifically, sociodemographic, psychological, and institutional factors. The last section will approach which variables, within the presented groups, are used in this research.

2.1.1. The growth of tolerance across time and European regions

In this section, I approach how tolerance is seen as having grown in both Europe and the World, and how recent changes could be causing it to fluctuate.

There is a consensus that levels of tolerance have been growing all across the World, and in Europe, in particular (i.e. Inglehart, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Viegas, 2007, 2010; Vala *et al.*, 2010; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020: 136; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Dodson and Brooks, 2024: 10-12; Tausch, 2024), and thus, it is reasonable to expect that this trend, will continue to be observed over the last years. This is coherent with Stouffer's expectations that tolerance would keep growing over the years (1955). While Stouffer's ideas were somewhat naïve, the literature overwhelmingly points in this direction, both in the USA, the World, and Europe.

However, circumstances have changed for Europe over the past years. The Great Recession of 2007/2008, the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (2009-2015), and successive implementation of austerity measures threw European populations into socioeconomic disarray, which caused changes in social and political attitudes and behaviours (e.g. Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Dalton, 2000; Freire *et al.*, 2014; Kroknes *et al.*, 2015; Belchior, 2020). The refugee crisis of 2015, and the fact that public rhetoric has been turning hostile towards immigrants and Muslims (Krzyżanowski and Ekström, 2024), can be pointed as another reason for how tolerance (particularly towards Muslims and immigrants) can be changing. Finally, and more recently, the Covid-19 pandemic, its lockdowns and its draconian socioeconomic

consequences (2020, see Freire *et al.*, 2023), are events whose socioeconomic and political consequences could potentially explain social tolerance (Eisenstein *et al.*, 2017). It is therefore important to assess whether these events correlate with the trend towards greater tolerance that had been observed.

Beyond these changing circumstances, evidence has been found that tolerance levels across European regions and countries display distinct developmental trends (Viegas, 2007, 2010; Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). More specifically, central and northern European countries display higher tolerance, while southern European nations show a gradual increase, and eastern European countries demonstrate slower growth (Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). Eastern European countries tend to exhibit lower tolerance compared to their counterparts (Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). However, the absence of recent regional comparative analysis calls for verification of these patterns, which this thesis aims to address, leading to the objective of identifying *patterns of social tolerance growth across time, individuals, and countries* (objective 1.1.) and assessing *how tolerance has evolved between 1981 and 2021, across the selected European countries, identifying specific (positive or negative) outliers* (objective 1.3).

Furthermore, tolerance towards stigmatised groups such as other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals varies across European regions (Candeias, 2012, 2016; Strabac *et al.*, 2011), but this is currently unconfirmed for the latest data.

More specifically, regarding each minority group, acceptance of homosexuality, in general, and of gay marriage and gay adoption in particular, have been growing (i.e. Tausch, 2024). Racism has also known a coherent curb over the latest decades, in Europe, albeit, far from completely subsiding (Solomos, 2020; ESS, 2022; FRA, 2018; Pew Research Centre, 2018, 2019). Immigrants have been more tolerated and less discriminated against over time (Pew Research Center, 2016; Heath and Richards, 2020; ESS, 2022), but this minority group is still facing intolerance, and indeed, research has observed that the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 refugee crisis were accompanied by surges in anti-immigration rhetoric and policies in several European countries (Hatton, 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2017).

As to Muslims, there was a decline in discrimination towards Muslims until 2016 (ESS, 2022; FRA, 2024). However, macro-level conditions do matter, as intolerance to Muslims remains relatively high and has been increasing since then, due to the politicization of Islam by far-right populist parties (Norris and Inglehart, 2012) and due to acts of terrorism in Europe and the 2015 refugee crisis (Helbling, 2014; Peffley *et al.*, 2015; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023;

FRA, 2024). Recent surges in immigration in European countries have also been linked to a raise in anti-immigration rhetoric (i.e. Mudde, 2019). As such, certain groups are likely to experience more tolerance than others, and this accentuates the importance of comparative analysis among central/northern, southern, and eastern European regions, meaning that to *assess how much social tolerance differs across European countries in the four different minority groups: other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals* (objective 1.2.) is important.

Although there are reasons to believe that tolerance may have changed, the theoretical consensus that tolerance has been growing is overwhelming and, indeed, the available studies do point in that direction (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010; Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Tausch, 2024). As such, the first hypothesis (H1) expects *that general levels of tolerance will have increased across time*.

However, as stated, there is also evidence that different countries and different European regions have different levels of tolerance (Candeias, 2012, 2016; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). As such, it is expected that there are regional differences between north, south and east Europe, based on Inglehart's theory of value change, which shows that different regions, even democratic ones, change at different paces (Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997, 2018). Therefore, my hypothesis is that *it is expected that there will be differences between European regions: the north/central European countries will be more tolerant, followed by south European countries, which are then trailed by east European countries, which is the least tolerant region*. (H1.1).

The complete set of hypotheses is therefore the following:

H1. *It is expected that general levels of tolerance will have increased across time.*

H1.1. *It is expected that there will be differences between European regions: the north/central European countries will be more tolerant, followed by south European countries, which are then trailed by east European countries, which is the least tolerant region.*

2.1.2. The role of the sociodemographic factors

Sociodemographic factors have long been identified as important factors in explaining tolerance (i.e. Allport, 1954; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989). Several of these factors have been extensively studied to the point that in the scholarship on social and political tolerance (as in many of the areas of study in political science, sociology, and social psychology), they are used as control variables (see, for example, in the latest

literature: Djupe, 2015; Brown-Iannuzzi *et al.*, 2019; Ribeiro and Borba, 2019; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020; Liberati *et al.*, 2021; Elsinbawi and Wolosin, 2023; Dodson and Brooks, 2024). Some of the most used control variables are gender, age,²³ educational level, religious affiliation, religiosity, belonging to minority groups, habitat, income, civil status, social status, and social class.

When it comes to gender, the amount of scholarship on it, as an explanatory factor, is enormous, with nearly all quantitative studies on tolerance using it. Stouffer (1955) set the tradition by observing that women tended to be less tolerant, due to their religiosity, because they had less freedom (as youths), and because men were more exposed to diversity in their daily lives. However, Stouffer's studies occurred before the 1960s feminist revolution, and thus, further later studies found that women became more tolerant than men (Inglehart, 1990; Sotelo, 1999; Gołębiowska, 1999, 2009; Froese *et al.*, 2008; Elsinbawi and Wolosin, 2023). Some studies, later, pointed out that men tended to be less tolerant towards homosexuals (Hooghe *et al.*, 2010; Persell *et al.*, 2001; Candeias, 2012), meaning that though gender might affect tolerance, this also depends on what type of tolerance is under scrutiny (political or social) and which group is being tested. However, recent research suggests that women have been becoming increasingly more liberal, while men either remain equally liberal or become more conservative, creating more ideological polarisation (Gillion *et al.*, 2020; Lutterbach and Beelman, 2025). This has also been linked to the increasing likelihood of men supporting far-right parties (Christley, 2022; Anduiza and Rico, 2024).

Educational level is another variable classically approached by the first tolerance studies (i.e. Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan *et al.*, 1981): Stouffer contends that schooling exposed people to more diverse situations and information. With time, the effects of schooling and generational replacement should have increased tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). However, Inglehart (1977) warned that education is quite a complex variable, and that "the available evidence indicates that formal education seems to have surprisingly little impact on one's basic attitudes" (Inglehart, 1977: 75). This inaugurated a line of thought, where several authors find that education (or even the interaction between education and age) are weak, mediated or affected by other variables or unobservable factors (Sullivan *et al.*, 1982; Bobo and Licari, 1989; Vala *et al.*, 1999). However, a second line of thought regarding the study of how education influences tolerance and, especially, social tolerance has more contemporary authors

²³ As age, along with derived age groups and/or cohorts, is used as an important independent variable. This study dedicates, as previously stated, a sole section to age as an explanatory factor.

consistently confirming the idea that more educated individuals tend to be more tolerant individuals (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Mestvirishvili *et al.*, 2016; Zhang and Brym, 2019; Lee, 2024). But they also do recognise that this may depend on the groups being studied (i.e. Bangwayo-Skeete and Zikhali, 2011),²⁴ or the level (micro or macro) at which the study of education's effect on tolerance is being conducted (Borgonovi, 2012; Van den Akker *et al.*, 2013; Lee, 2024).

Religious affiliation has been classically studied by revisionists such as Sullivan *et al.* (1981: 94) and Sullivan *et al.* (1982: 99). These authors realise that being non-religious or Jewish is connected to more tolerance and being Catholic or Protestant is connected to less tolerant attitudes. Another example is that Muslims tend to express less tolerance towards homosexuals (Hooghe *et al.*, 2010: 378). Concomitantly, Pereira *et al.* (2016) also observe that a religious belief moderates how individuals are more or less tolerant.

In the same sense, religiosity (usually measured as how frequently people go to church) has been seen as important. Religiosity has been found to influence tolerance, rather than the type of religious affiliation (i.e. Duch and Gibson, 1992; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Kirchner *et al.*, 2011; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Halperin *et al.*, 2014; Peffley *et al.*, 2015; Plenković *et al.*, 2022), especially in contexts where the population is relatively homogeneous in religious affiliation, which is somewhat the case in Western, Central, Northern and Eastern Europe. In general, the more churchgoing, the less socially tolerant a citizen tends to be.

Belonging to minority groups is important because if someone is a victim of discrimination, the likelihood of them being more sympathetic towards others is greater (Gibson, 1987: 432). Yet, more recent research (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, 2008, 2011) shows that while contact between different racial and ethnic groups improves prejudice, it depends on the circumstances of these contacts, which could contribute to improving prejudice, thus raising tolerance levels.

Habitat has also been typically seen as an important explanatory factor of tolerance. Stouffer initially identified a tendency for more tolerance in more urbanised areas, due to more diversity and learning to live with said diversity, and less tolerance in more rural areas (1955: 120-124). This is also connected to the size of each respective town (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Viegas, 2007; Belot and Bréchon, 2012). This is coherent with the political cleavage literature (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), particularly concerning the urban-rural divide, which is still very

²⁴ More education is associated with more positive attitudes toward outgroup members which may improve tolerance (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008).

much verifiable in both the US (Brown and Mettler, 2023) and Europe (Schoene, 2018; Hooghe and Marks, 2018). Since Stouffer, the size of the habitat has been frequently controlled in tolerance studies (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Viegas, 2007; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Belot and Bréchon, 2012).

Finally, variables concerning social class, such as income, civil status, social status, and subjective social class, were also studied as explanatory factors for tolerance. Lipset (1959) contends that the working classes are more authoritarian than other social classes, implying that they would show more intolerance towards minorities for the following reasons: because they perceive more socioeconomic insecurity (threat perception); greater isolation regarding democratic norms; and more restrictive familiar socialisation. However, these variables (income, social status and subjective social class) typically elicit fewer survey responses than other sociodemographic variables, such as gender, age or employment. Social class tends not to elicit significant results (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a and 2008b). Looking at how the social class related proxies were treated, class self-identification (a heuristic to test social class) was tested and found to be either statistically insignificant (Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Duch and Gibson, 1992: 258-260) or with weak effects on political tolerance (Sullivan *et al.*, 1982: 123-125). Working-class status is found to be non-significant (Weldon, 2006) as well as income (Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008). Through these examples, social class does not seem to be an important factor in explaining tolerance, despite Lipset's theories and his arguments.

It is important to emphasise that these variables are widely recognised as important factors within tolerance research. As displayed here, their relevance has been consistently acknowledged in the literature. This repeated use means that there is a broader scientific consensus regarding their potential influence on tolerance, which has led researchers to routinely include them as control variables in their studies.

2.1.3. The role of psychological factors

The inclusion of important psychological variables has characterised the study of tolerance, since they measure how citizens feel internally, and thus express their emotions, which could have a social effect, becoming, thus, a psychosocial dimension. This section, thus, approaches the psychosocial variables which have been used in tolerance research. Note that this dimension has a smaller focus within the literature when compared with the sociodemographic factors. For this reason, this section will be smaller than the previous one.

The first researcher to, arguably, use a psychological dimension to study tolerance is Stouffer, when measuring *categorical rigidity* (or the idea that someone has less flexible way

of thinking and is more given to prejudgements, see Stouffer, 1955: 94). However, Sullivan *et al.* (1979) innovated when they decide to explain tolerance using *self-esteem*,²⁵ *authoritarianism*,²⁶ and *dogmatism*, measured by understanding open-mindedness and flexibility (Sullivan *et al.* 1979, 1981: 95-96).

Other important psychological explanatory factors were later introduced, namely subjective well-being (Diener, 1984; Diener *et al.*, 1999; Lyubomirsky *et al.*, 2005; Crowley and Walsh, 2021; Korol and Bevelander, 2023) and conformism (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003), which are known to have positive effects on tolerance. Another factor approached is personality (Sibley and Duckitt, 2008), specifically measured by the Big Five, which several authors found that agreeableness and openness to experience (two of the Big Five dimensions) are positively correlated with tolerance, while neuroticism and conscientiousness, in some situations, are negatively significant (i.e. Oskarsson and Widmalm, 2016; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020: 913; Ng *et al.*, 2025). In this context, the literature has also recently started to explore the effects of emotions, such as anger, hatred, and fear, which were found to affect tolerance negatively (Gibson *et al.*, 2019; Berntzen *et al.*, 2024).

Another psychological factor that has been considered in prior research is interpersonal trust. This variable was widely observed to affect tolerance positively (Sullivan and Transue, 1999; Vala *et al.*, 2004; Golebiowska, 2009: 378; Candeias, 2012: 19; Dima and Dima, 2016; Korol and Bevelander, 2023).

More psychological variables which have been studied are intergroup contact, exposure to diversity and positive attitudes toward outgroup members which are found to be positively associated with greater levels of tolerance to outgroup members (Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Tropp and Pettigrew, 2005; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, 2008; Kijewski and Rapp, 2019; Verkuyten *et al.*, 2022). Somewhat related to this is the observation that shared emotional attachment to common social areas also fosters more tolerance (for example, when individuals share sport fandom and experiences: see Warner, 2025).

Threat perception is seen as an important factor in explaining tolerance, or, rather, intolerance: the more perception of threat a given population has, the more intolerant a population will tend to be (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1982; Gibson, 2002, 2006; Weldon, 2006; Ramos *et al.*, 2016; Rapp, 2017; Peffley *et al.*, 2023: 7; Persson and Widmalm, 2025: 11). Previous studies on political tolerance have shown that an individual's level of intolerance of a specific

²⁵ They use Sniderman's personality unworthiness scale (Sniderman, 1975: 178).

²⁶ Authoritarianism comes from the authoritarian personality studies and is studied using the following indicators: the faith the respondent has in others, threat orientation scale, and Maslow's inspired scale on hierarchical needs.

political group is equivalent to his or her perception of the threat posed by that group (Stouffer, 1955). This means that intolerance increases the more the individual perceives the group as threatening important values or constitutional order (Sullivan *et al.*, 1982: 186). It is relevant to mention that Stouffer (1955), when approaching tolerance to communists, is criticised by the revisionists because greater tolerance may not be due to greater acceptance, but rather to said group being perceived as being less threatening (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989). Candeias' literature review on threat perception points out that threat perception is the main explanation for tolerance, and is also helpful to realise the structure of how it influences tolerance, namely by mentioning Inglehart's scarcity hypothesis (1990: 68-70; Inglehart and Welzel, 2010: 553; Candeias, 2012: 7), in which survival comes before anything else when citizens feel insecure. Although political and social factors are important, they are still not as important as threat perception (i.e. Vala *et al.*, 2003; Vala *et al.*, 2006; Vala *et al.*, 2010; Vala, 2013), especially when it comes to socioeconomic threat (Vala and Pereira, 2020).

Nonetheless, there are a few arguments against using threat perception in this research project. On the one hand, while acknowledging its importance, it has such an effect that it may eclipse every other factor's contribution to the explained variance. Furthermore, as this project intends to analyse how the socioeconomic performance and support for the far-right affects social tolerance, the inclusion of threat perception could be seen as redundant, as threat perception has been strongly associated with conservativeness and far-right parties in the past (Jost *et al.*, 2003; Duckitt and Sibley, 2009; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). On the other hand, this project argues that socioeconomic performance relates with social tolerance, which might also be redundant with an eventual measurement of socioeconomic threat (precisely because that is frequently argued by far-right parties, when it comes to eventual rises in unemployment due to an influx of immigration: Mudde, 2007, 2019). Indeed, Sinclair *et al.* (2022) showed that threats to a population's well-being (among which, increased unemployment) raise tolerance to right-wing extremist groups (but not to left-wing extremists). Finally, there are no socioeconomic and far-right threat perception variables available in the EVS/WVS datasets. For these reasons, this thesis will not use threat perception as a control or an independent variable.

2.1.4. The role of democracy, support for democracy, institutions, institutional trust and social capital

In this section, I approach how tolerance is explained by support for democracy, institutional trust and social capital, which are institutional variables connected to how democracy matters in the context of studying tolerance.

Some authors, interested in the idea that more democratic societies would be more tolerant, due to tolerance being considered a cornerstone of democracy itself (Sniderman, 1975; Duch and Gibson, 1992; Gibson, 2006), tended to measure democratization in at least two ways: either by asking citizens whether they support democracy or how much they trust institutions. As such, testing whether citizens are more or less democratic is important to understand their tolerance. Indeed, support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy or preference for democracy in detriment to a dictatorship, or trust in political institutions such as the parliament or political parties are all related variables found to influence tolerance: more support for democracy or trust in institutions is associated with more tolerant citizens. (i.e. Duch and Gibson, 1992; Wilson, 1994; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Vala *et al.*, 2004; Vala *et al.*, 2006; Weldon, 2006; Gibson, 2006: 26-27; Gibson, 2008: 106; Viegas, 2007; Ribeiro, 2010; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Berggren and Nilsson, 2013, 2016; Korol and Bevelander, 2023).

There other ways of measuring how democracy is related to tolerance, namely using macro-level variables, such as democracy's duration, its quality, federalism, EU membership which, like the previous group, are also positively correlated with tolerance (i.e. Persell *et al.*, 2001; Viegas, 2004; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 252; Hadler, 2012: 217; Ribeiro and Borba, 2019; Ribeiro *et al.*, 2019).

The study of how institutions influence tolerance can be further dimensioned. It is possible to divide institutional influence into conjunctural/circumstantial (Viegas, 2007: 118) and structural ones (Viegas, 2007: 111; see also Sniderman *et al.*, 1989). Circumstantial factors refer to the inherently changing factors of a society, or the extent to which macrosocial and macropolitical data change to influence citizens' tolerance, which is further divided into three subdimensions: modernisation, democratisation and feeling of threat. More modernisation and democratisation tend to lead to more tolerance, while a greater feeling of threat tends to lead to less tolerance. Structural factors are about factorial typification in the face of issues that are socially present and difficult to change (Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Putnam, 1996). They have three sub-dimensions: sociopolitical valuation, social capital, and psychosocial characteristics, which tend to improve tolerance.

Other somewhat important factors, related to institutions, are social norms and underlying values which promote equality, respect, and tolerance towards diversity, and tend to promote more tolerance (or its reverse). As an example, social norms which dictate how individuals must see a given group of people help in determining whether a minority group is accepted or not (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Estevan-Reina *et al.*, 2025; Gurbisz *et al.*, 2025; Aldar *et al.*, 2025). These norms can be transmitted through formal institutions, such as laws and policies, as well as informal sources, like family, peers, and the media (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Dovidio *et al.*, 2010; Elliott-Dorans, 2020).

Moreover, support or trust in institutions is also often tested to have a positive effect on increasing tolerance (i.e. Duch and Gibson, 1992: 249; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Vala *et al.*, 2004; Vala *et al.*, 2006; Viegas, 2007; Hadler, 2012; Berggren and Nilsson, 2013, 2016). However, there are some instances where it does not have significant effects (i.e. Ribeiro and Borba, 2019: 653).

Still within the institutional dimension is social capital (Putnam, 2000): the idea that social networks build a sort of capital from how relationships and norms interact with the individual. This type of variable has been assessed in two ways, regarding explaining tolerance: by citizens' associative participation (Persell *et al.*, 2001: 207), or interpersonal trust (Persell *et al.*, 2001; Sullivan and Transue, 1999).²⁷ The argument is that as social capital becomes higher, social tolerance will also grow (Putnam, 2000; Persell *et al.*, 2001: 207; Candeias, 2016: 98; Crowley and Walsh, 2021).

2.1.5. The sociodemographic, psychosocial and institutional control variables

This subchapter's final section focuses on the variables that, although important, are approached as control variables and why they were chosen. There are three dimensions here, namely the sociodemographic, psychological, and institutional dimensions.

Regarding the sociodemographic dimension, gender (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Gillion *et al.*, 2020; Elsinbawi and Wolosin, 2023), education (i.e. Stouffer, 1955; Vala *et al.*, 1999; Seligson *et al.*, 2019), religiosity (i.e. Duch and Gibson, 1992; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Plenković *et al.*, 2022), and habitat/town size (Stouffer, 1955: 120-124; Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Viegas, 2007; Schoene, 2018; Belot and Bréchon, 2012; Hooghe and Marks, 2018) are extremely well known variables, previously tested in tolerance research. Social class, and

²⁷ Although this thesis uses interpersonal trust as a psychosocial control, it is also used as a belief in how others could hurt a given person, or not (Newton, 2004: 63).

similar variables (such as subjective social class, income, occupation, or employment, which are proxy variables to social class), are also important (e.g. Sullivan *et al.* 1982: 123-125; Duch and Gibson, 1992: 249; Weldon, 2006; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b). However, given the absence of social class variables common throughout all the available EVS waves, I opted to use a proxy of social class, namely employment (i.e. Freire *et al.*, 2024). Married people are also known to be more conservative than non-married people in the USA and Europe (Bytyçi, 2022). Thus, the variables I use to control for the sociodemographic dimension are sex, age of complete education, employment status, marriage status, religiosity, and town size.

Regarding the psychosocial control dimension, some variables were introduced throughout the years: self-esteem, authoritarianism, dogmatism (Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Altemeyer, 2002), subjective well-being (Diener, 1984; Diener *et al.*, 1999; Lyubomirsky *et al.*, 2005), conformism (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003), personality (Oskarsson and Widmalm, 2016; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020), and intergroup contact with outgroup members (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2005). Interpersonal trust is also used as the more interpersonal trust, the more tolerant citizens tend to be (Sullivan and Transue, 1999; Vala *et al.*, 2004; Golebiowska, 2009: 378; Candeias, 2012: 19; Kirchner *et al.*, 2011; Dima and Dima, 2016). In this thesis, this psychological variable is considered part of a psychosocial dimension and is used as a control as it measures the feelings of psychological trust that citizens express towards others (Vala *et al.*, 2004).²⁸

Another important dimension is institutions. Support for, satisfaction with, or preference for democracy in detriment to a dictatorship, or trust in political institutions, are all commonly used micro-level measurements (i.e. Duch and Gibson, 1992: 249; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Viegas, 2007; Berggren and Nilsson, 2013, 2016; Korol and Bevelander, 2023). Democratic duration, quality of democracy, federalism, and EU membership are other types of institutional factors used to study tolerance (i.e. Viegas, 2004; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 252; Hadler, 2012: 217; Ribeiro *et al.*, 2019). In my research, the institutional control will be trust in parliament.

All the controls used in this thesis were selected, not only because they are appropriate to controlling the main explanatory effects of age, support for the far-right and socioeconomic

²⁸ Interpersonal trust could also be considered a social capital variable (Putnam, 2000), as it indirectly concerns the social position someone occupies in the social ladder.

performance, but also because they are common to at least four of the five available EVS waves (1990-2021).

2.2. Age, the young and their correlation with tolerance

In this subchapter, I approach the relevant literature on age and its known effects on tolerance, focusing on the potential effects of youth on tolerance.

Stouffer had seminally tested this variable, observing that younger people (though mediated by increased education) often had greater tolerance levels (Stouffer, 1955). However, this could be due to the life cycle effect: older people become more conservative, and thus, less liberal, over time (Inglehart, 1990; Vala *et al.*, 2003: 402; Candeias, 2012: 9). Nevertheless, Stouffer's findings were further confirmed by more contemporary authors (i.e. Gibson and Duch, 1991; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Van der Akker *et al.*, 2013; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Younas, 2024; Persson and Widmalm, 2025; Mattis *et al.*, 2024). The findings regarding age's effects on tolerance are consistent enough for age to be used in models as a control.

More thoroughly, Andersen and Fetner's study (2008b) observes an attitudinal change in age cohorts in Canada and the USA: younger cohorts tend to be more tolerant of homosexuality, as time moved on (pp. 320-322), which is consistent with Inglehart (1977, 1997, 2018). This observation is later confirmed by Twenge *et al.* (2015), this time moving beyond tolerance to homosexuality, also approaching four other groups: anti-religious people, communists, militarists, and racists. Tolerance not only increases over time (in the USA), but younger people tend to be more tolerant (Twenge *et al.*, 2015: 11). This is further confirmed by Janmaat and Keating (2017), in the UK.

Other authors also demonstrated the same tendency: Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) showed that older cohorts are more likely to dislike homosexuality than younger cohorts. Van der Akker *et al.* (2013) observed that older cohorts were less tolerant, especially those with less education. Political generation is an original variable used by Ribeiro and Fuks (2019: 549), based on whether a generation was socialised in democratic times or during the Brazilian military regime. The authors conclude that the generations socialised during a dictatorship tend to display less tolerance. Hjerm *et al.*'s research (2020: 913) shows that younger citizens are positively correlated with tolerance. On the other hand, intolerant youths participate more politically online than those who are more tolerant (Bosi *et al.*, 2021). Younas (2024) found that in Pakistan, age, particularly younger cohorts (especially of younger, better-educated individuals), displayed greater levels of tolerance to homosexuals (pp. 19-21).

Persson and Widmalm (2025), who approach political tolerance in Sweden, test whether there is an ideological effect on ethnic acceptance, with age being effectful (Persson and Widmalm, 2025: 11). These authors found that age harms tolerance, reinforcing the conclusion that young people tend to promote tolerance, both towards different groups and in different contexts.

Similar findings have been reached regarding racial prejudice, finding that intolerance is reduced among young voters, and that age interacts with income negatively affecting racial prejudice (Quillian, 1995: 597-606). This finding is important, as it is the only instance I could find in the literature of an author using age as a moderator, let alone as a moderator to an explanatory socioeconomic performance variable, attempting to explain a tolerance variable. Regardless, this result, which is circumscribed to 12 EEC countries in 1988, has not been further tested since then.

While the effects and correlations produced by age, age groups, generations and age cohorts are somewhat known, recent evidence suggests that young voters could display a new trend of intolerance, meaning they will be considered an important explanatory and mediating factor to help explain social tolerance in Europe. Although younger cohorts are well established as tendentially more tolerant, there is a recent phenomenon of increased illiberalism and authoritarian attitudes among the younger cohorts (i.e. Foa and Mounk, 2019; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023). Furthermore, this illiberal sentiment has been compounded by increasing electoral support for far-right parties in Europe (Cokelaere, 2024; Serhan, 2024; Vinocur and Goury-Laffont, 2024;²⁹ Tower and Gélis, 2022; Cancela and Magalhães, 2024; Jakli, 2024; Woods, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025), which contradicts prior studies (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Inglehart, 1990). The increase in far-right voting and intolerance, as related phenomena, has some possible explanations: socioeconomic disenfranchisement, unemployment, as well as the backlash towards the social advancements among the youth, make it likely that these youthful voters could support far-right parties and candidates (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Indeed, young voters are more likely to be affected by poor socioeconomic conditions (i.e. Piketty, 2014; Kern *et al.*, 2015; Margalit, 2019; Reeskens and Vandecasteele, 2021). As a consequence, unlike the youth from the 30 glorious years of the post-WWII period (studied by Inglehart, 1977), young people born in the 1980s, 1990s or 2000s may not expect to have a

²⁹ These references are news articles by two reference publications: *Politico* and *Times*, based on information gathered by the authoring journalists made available on the exit polls after the 2024 European Elections and in preparation to the French 2024 Parliamentary election.

better life than their predecessors, nor do they expect to socially ascend as easily (Clancy *et al.*, 2022).

Therefore, while there is an expectation that youthful voters will tend to be more progressive, many of them could also be drifting towards more conservative positions, and thus, display more support to traditional rhetoric, such as the one offered by the far-right parties and candidates, leading to more voting for the far-right (i.e. Jakli, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025). Beyond poor economic conditions, there are more reasons that could lead the youth to the far-right. Evidence for this is that protest voting is taken to contest traditional parties (by the youth, although not exclusively), particularly if they are seen as ineffective and corrupt (Rydgren, 2018). Secondly, this growing support seems to be linked to a reaction to cultural changes prompted by an increase in immigration (Ivaldi, 2018). Thirdly, the youth's growing illiberalism is due to disinterest in politics, abstentionism, right-wing polarization, and sympathy towards far-right populist parties (Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023: 12). Since these young voters are exposed to underperforming economies in their formative years (and especially vulnerable to political propaganda in social networks), they may become less liberal (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015; Mayer *et al.*, 2024: 2), which is coherent with the circumstantial tolerance theoretical viewpoint presented by the revisionist authors (i.e. Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; see also Viegas, 2007).

Fourth, is the kind of political solution offered by the far-right to the so-called *losers of Globalization*, or those who tend to feel threatened by globalization and multiculturalism. And this is because they materially lost with the expansion of international markets (Kriesi *et al.*, 2008): such is the case in Austria (Rooduijn, 2018).

Furthermore, in a context of difficult socioeconomic circumstances, the literature has consistently shown that the youth tend to become more materialistic, traditionalistic and securitaristic (i.e. Sorthaix *et al.*, 2017; Tormos *et al.*, 2017). Another explanation comes rather recently, with evidence suggesting that teenagers increasingly support the far-right due to how they see their own culture and whether they have an ancestry-based identity (Mayer *et al.*, 2024: 12). Reasons for more support to the far-right which are not exclusive to the young, but confluence between these reasons and a poor economic environment, make the youth an age group ripe for the far-right to electorally exploit.

In this subchapter, it is possible to gaze into a debate: the tolerance scholarship, on one hand, tells us that the young are supposed to be more tolerant, but more recent evidence tells us that the young are becoming more supportive of less liberal ideas and of less democratic political parties. This means that there is a research gap: it is relevant to understand the young

are indeed becoming less tolerant, or if this new tendency in the literature is leading them to becoming less tolerant. For this reason, I intend to *observe if social tolerance is associated with age and age groups, especially over the later years*, which constitutes one of my objectives (objective 2).

Seeing as the youth have had a role in European societies: having more progressive views, they are not only expected but confirmed to have held more tolerant attitudes (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b). Hjerme *et al.* (2020: 913) observed that younger people (18-29) are excellent predictors of tolerance, and thus, in this research. However, there is a changing paradigm that the youth is getting increasingly more illiberal and authoritarian (i.e. Stockemer *et al.*, 2018: 577; Foa and Mounk, 2019; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023), and more supportive of the far-right parties (i.e. Jakli, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025). Even so, the scholarship strongly supports the idea that the youth are more tolerant, and this research's expectation is that the *younger the individuals, the more tolerant they will tend to be, at the individual level* (H2.1). This hypothesis generates a sub-hypothesis: this research looks at tolerance from both an individual and a country-level perspective. And, as such, there is still an expectation of observing that *younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, at the country-level* (H2.2).

However, with the recent social, political, and economic changes came changes in the behaviour of the youth. Young voters seem to be becoming more illiberal and authoritarian due to disinterest in politics, abstentionism, right-wing polarisation, and growing sympathy towards far-right populist parties (Stockemer *et al.*, 2018: 577; Kriesi, 2020; Tower and Gélis, 2022; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira 2023; Cancela and Magalhães, 2024; Jakli, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025; Soares *et al.*, 2025). Furthermore, seeing as young people are the most affected group in difficult socioeconomic situations (Piketty, 2014; Kern *et al.*, 2015; Margalit, 2019; Reeskens and Vandecasteele, 2021), and that two groups are especially targeted by intolerant rhetoric (immigrants and Muslims), it is also reasonable to expect that *younger (18 to 35-year-olds) and older citizens (65+) will tend to be less tolerant towards immigrants and Muslims in the latest wave (2017-2020)* (H2.3.). This is due to these groups being the most frequently scapegoated by the far-right parties (Mudde, 2007, 2019; Duina and Carson, 2019), especially considering the normalisation of anti-immigrant rhetoric (Valentim, 2021, 2024).

As such, this research uses age and the youth, as an age group, to understand, on the one hand, whether it could relate to social tolerance, and on the other hand, how connected it

is to the two other important explanatory factors: support for the far-right and socioeconomic performance.³⁰ The hypotheses formulated are:

H2.1. *The younger the individuals, the more tolerant they will tend to be, at the individual level.*

H2.2. *Younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, at the country-level.*

H2.3. *Younger (15 to 35-year-olds) and older citizens (66+) will tend to be less tolerant towards immigrants and Muslims in the latest wave (2017-2020).*

2.3. Politics as a factor: how the far-right might be an explanatory factor

Political factors have been known to be important in explaining tolerance (i.e. Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan *et al.*, 1981; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Gibson, 2002). Variables such as ideological identification (be it the left-right scale or the liberal-conservative scale), political/party identification, political interest, or support for democracy are a few of these variables used extensively in the study of social and political tolerance. This subchapter focuses on the political variables commonly used in tolerance studies (beyond the institutional variables which have already been approached in section 2.1.3), as well as the far-right as a potential explanation for (in)tolerance.

This subchapter is divided into two sections: the first documents which political variables are commonly used to study tolerance. The second section looks at the far-right and issues of tolerance related to the far-right. This state-of-the-art will focus on how tolerance has a relationship with the far-right, without forgetting other important explanations.

2.3.1. Political variables and their relationship with tolerance

To understand how politics affects tolerance, this section examines which variables have been previously used to explain tolerance. I start with a small chronological literature review, and then I approach each of the most important political variables for tolerance studies.

The origins of the study of political effects on tolerance (at least in a systematised way) come from the revisionist authors. The first variable to be mentioned is ideological identification, with the main conclusion being that the more leftists and liberals tend to be more tolerant (Sullivan *et al.*, 1979, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Gibson, 1992b). Another type of study is how tolerance to a given group has been observed to depend on one's political stance:

³⁰ I decided to present all hypotheses related to how age moderates the other factors (far-right voting and socioeconomic performance) in the next subchapters, to approach age as a moderator only after I explain the other factors.

American conservatives (1977) were more tolerant towards specific groups, such as militarists and racists, rather than to atheists and communists (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989: 32; Gibson, 1989). Some more factors started to be used: political culture, polyarchy, freedom, civil rights and civil liberties, policy liberalism and policy outputs (Gibson, 1988); Frequency of political discussion and perception of freedom (Gibson, 1992a: 347 and 349); general norms and procedural norms of democracy (Gibson, 1992b); and democratization (or democracy longevity) (Gibson and Duch, 1991: 205) were all found to exert influence on tolerance.

It is from this point that research on tolerance started to differentiate increasingly and became more prolific when it comes to political explanatory factors. Beginning in the early 90s, those variables have been tested as explanatory factors in the context of tolerance studies. Here, I approach the main political explanatory factors: ideology, partisanship, interest in politics, political discussion, sophistication, patriotism and some others.

By far, ideology has been the most widely present explanatory factor in tolerance studies. This is no coincidence: ideology has been known as a sort of a super issue, widely used to understand how political and social attitudes and behaviours are shaped (i.e. Freire, 2006, 2022; Freire *et al.*, 2024). There are several ways to empirically measure ideology in quantitative studies. However, the most common way is by either asking respondents whether they think of themselves as more to the left or the right (i.e. Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010; Peffley *et al.*, 2023), in a Likert scale, or as liberal or conservative (i.e. Gibson, 1988, 1992b; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002). Both scales are used interchangeably, depending on the local political traditions (see, for example, Dunn and Singh, 2014: 18). As such, when relevant, I shall refer to the liberal-conservative scale, but that will be scarcer, as my focus is on European cases, whose projects tend to use the left-right scale. Regardless, the study of the effects of ideology on tolerance is remarkably coherent: ideology usually has a significant effect, meaning that, the more leftist an individual is, the more tolerant he/she tends to be (Wilson, 1994; Vala *et al.*, 2004; Weldon, 2006; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Golebiowska, 2009: 380; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Belot and Bréchon, 2012; Hadler, 2012; Candeias, 2012: 14-17; 2016; Halperin *et al.*, 2014: 1118; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Peffley *et al.*, 2015: 823; Rapp, 2017; Peffley *et al.*, 2023: 7; Siegel, 2024; Mattis *et al.*, 2024: 10-11). Likewise, the more liberal, the more tolerant the inquired tends to be (Gibson, 1988, 1992b; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002; Gibson, 2013: 57; Crawford and Pilanski, 2014; Twenge *et al.*, 2015: 14; Garneau and Schwadel, 2022; Brown and Mettler, 2023: 18; Folberg *et al.*, 2025).

Political variables, particularly ideology, influence tolerance levels, which are also mediated by threat perceptions and affected by factors such as party affiliation and knowledge (Crawford and Pilanski, 2014; Peffley *et al.*, 2015).

There are also a few exceptions to this state-of-the-art, which ought to be referenced: Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) observe in the 90's that the left-right scale does not usually have a significant effect in a 17-country comparative study. Halperin *et al.* (2014) show that intolerance is influenced by cognitive reappraisal and right-wing authoritarianism, with political orientation playing a mediated or negligible role depending on context. Haas and Cunningham (2014: using a liberal-conservative scale) are also unable to observe an effect of ideology on tolerance, and even its tested interaction effects on uncertainty and threat perception, similarly to later authors (e.g. Persson and Widmalm, 2025: 11). Similarly, Ribeiro and Borba (2019: 653) do not observe a significant effect in the Brazilian case (in 2014). Ribeiro and Fuks, however (2019: 537), do observe some effects of being a leftist on tolerance in Brazil (2017), but only when individuals are strongly leftist. Stoeckel and Ceka (2023) compared 10 EU member-states in 2017, allowing respondents to choose their least-liked groups (Fascists, Neo-Nazis, Communists, Homosexuals, Jews, Anti-globalisation activists, Muslims, Blacks, or Roma). In their case, being a right-winger harmed tolerance to all groups, except for neo-Nazis/fascists, who are the only exception.

Among the subfamily of ideological variables, one could also account for political conservatism and moral conservatism: the more conservatism, the less tolerant individuals tend to be (i.e. Vala *et al.*, 2004; Vala *et al.*, 2006; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Belot and Bréchon, 2012). Partisanship, or party identification, is another variable which is widely used and has produced significant effects on tolerance. In general terms, identification with more leftist parties, tends to generate more tolerant attitudes, while identification with more right-wing parties, especially far-right parties, tends to generate less tolerant attitudes (Billiet, 1995; Petersen *et al.*, 2011; Hadler, 2012; Gibson, 2013: 56-58; Garneau and Schwadel, 2022; Neuner and Ramirez, 2023; Trüdinger and Ziller, 2023; Mutz, 2024; Marom, 2024). However, some authors found that, in certain circumstances, these do not elicit statistically significant results (Gibson, 2013: 56-58; Twenge *et al.*, 2015: 14; Persson and Widmalm, 2025: 11). Fuks *et al.* (2020) approach tolerant and intolerant antipartisanship as explanatory factors, and their effect on tolerance to homosexuals (other variables were used). They found that non-antipartisanship and tolerant antipartisanship have positive effects on the five dependent variables (people who advocate the legalisation of abortion, people who defend the military regime, communists, PT sympathisers, and PSDB sympathisers) (Fuks *et al.*, 2020: 10-12).

Interest in politics is also sometimes used as an explicative variable or a control, generally with a statistically significant and positive effect on tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Golebiowska, 2009: 380; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Ribeiro and Fuks, 2019: 537; Fuks *et al.*, 2020; Persson and Widmalm, 2025: 11). Political discussion, in turn, can vary, depending on the type of tolerance, or even social tolerance. For example, political discussion regarding tolerance to extreme groups had a significant and positive effect in Spain, the Netherlands, and Russia, and a significantly negative effect in Norway (Viegas, 2007, 2010). When it comes to tolerance towards stigmatised groups and ethnic minorities, there was a significant and negative effect on Denmark and West Germany (Viegas, 2007). Nevertheless, the effect of political discussion is not always observed to have a significant relation (e.g. Candeias 2012, 2016).

Other related variables are political sophistication and political expertise. Political sophistication was introduced in the study of tolerance by Bobo and Licari (1989), but was later approached by more contemporary authors. An example is Golebiowska (1999: 57) observing that political expertise (or sophistication) moderates norm commitment, while lacking a direct correlation with political tolerance. Later, some authors confirmed the idea that more political sophistication was connected to an increase in tolerant attitudes (i.e. McClosky and Brill, 1983: 84; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Kirchner *et al.*, 2011: 216; Gibson *et al.*, 2019).

Another important variable (although not strictly a political variable, it is still related) is post-materialism, whose origin comes from Inglehart (1977, 1990), who thought that this variable would affect democratic and liberal values, such as tolerance. When testing the effects of post-materialism on tolerance, the general conclusion is that more post-materialist values meant more tolerant attitudes, while more materialism is associated with less tolerance (i.e. Freire, 2003; Vala *et al.*, 2004: 155; Vala *et al.*, 2006; Weldon, 2006; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Ribeiro, 2010: 226-236; Kirchner *et al.*, 2011: 216; Belot and Bréchon, 2012; Candeias, 2012: 14-17, 2016; Hadler, 2012).

There are, as well, variables regarding political participation, like extra-electoral political participation, or the participation in protests, which tend to be associated with more tolerance (Sullivan *et al.*, 1982: 199; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 246; Candeias, 2012: 37; 2016; Ribeiro and Fuks, 2019: 537; Claassen and Gibson, 2019; Ribeiro *et al.*, 2022: 18; Verkuyten *et al.*, 2024: 10). Associated with participation is, often, association membership, which also tends to increase tolerance (Persell *et al.*, 2001; Vala *et al.*, 2004: 155; Vala *et al.*, 2006; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Persson and Widmalm, 2025: 11).

Other variables tested the relationship between tolerance and democratic values were importance of democracy (i.e. Ribeiro, 2010), which did not seem to affect tolerance (to people with AIDS or homosexuals); index of democracy (i.e. Ribeiro and Borba, 2019: 653; Ramos *et al.*, 2019; Tausch, 2024); adhesion to democratic values (Belot and Bréchon, 2012); democratic activism (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 252); democratic ideals (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 252; Kirchner *et al.*, 2011: 216); acceptance of democratic norms (Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008); democratic orientation (Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008); and liberal educational attitude (Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008). All these variables tend to affect tolerance, having a positive general effect. Inversely, there are studies which approach the relationship of authoritarian-libertarian values (or a preference for authoritarianism) in tolerance, with more authoritarian views being associated with less tolerance (i.e. Weldon, 2006; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Petersen *et al.*, 2011; Belot and Bréchon, 2012). Similarly, the binomial freedom vs. order shows that a preference for civil liberty is associated with more tolerance (i.e. Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002: 111-115; Vala *et al.*, 2004: 155; Vala *et al.*, 2006; Gibson, 2013; Zhang and Brym, 2019), but the results are somewhat inconsistent (Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002: 111-115).

There are other variables related to politics that are important to gauge how tolerance varies, concerning nationalism and the integration of foreign populations, as tolerance is frequently measured in relation to immigrants and immigrant-related groups. In this sense, support for multiculturalism has been found to increase tolerance (i.e. Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Verkuyten, 2010; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Elsinbawi and Wolosin, 2023; del Tronco, 2024). Another important variable, which is somewhat opposed to multiculturalism, is patriotism, often observed to decrease intolerance (i.e. Vala *et al.*, 2003; Weldon, 2006; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Vala *et al.*, 2010; Belot and Bréchon, 2012; Candeias, 2012, 2016). Related to multiculturalism and opposed to patriotism and nationalism, but rarely used, cosmopolitanism also tends to increase tolerance (i.e. McClosky and Brill, 1983: 84; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Samba *et al.*, 2025). On a related note, migration can also foster tolerance by affecting support for cosmopolitanism and globalisation (e.g. Gaikwad *et al.*, 2025).

There are still other factors which have seldom been studied, even though their application is not widespread. They support the rule of law, which hurts fixed group tolerance and augments the effect on highly disliked group tolerance (Gibson, 2013). Free speech for all and legal rights for all, with a positive effect on tolerance (Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002: 111-115), and free speech priority, which has a positive effect on tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 252). Further, rarely tested factors are citizens' positions to pro-welfare

rights, which increases tolerance (Vala et al., 2004: 155; Vala et al., 2006), and a negative evaluation of government contributes to more religious tolerance (Golebiowska, 2009: 380-385). Finally, conspiratorial thinking has been observed to decrease social tolerance, and political efficacy has a positive effect on social tolerance (Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023).

This section explored the main political factors used to explain tolerance. Since early studies, the scholarship has known that politics matters in explaining tolerance. Ideology is the most tested variable in tolerance studies: the more liberal, and/or the more leftist, the more tolerant a citizen tend to be, and this observation has established itself as a staple when studying social tolerance, still being used and validated today in modern tolerance studies (i.e. Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Peffley *et al.*, 2023; Siegel, 2024; Vanagt *et al.*, 2024).

Ideology is the most important political variable in tolerance studies, as seen above. However, there are more important variables to study tolerance: political/party identification, political interest, political participation in discussions about politics, political participation (other than in elections), political sophistication, patriotism, post-materialism, and support for multiculturalism are all examples which have been observed to affect tolerance. However, from these, patriotism has been frequently used to understand how intolerance increases in certain circumstances (i.e. Vala *et al.*, 2003; Weldon, 2006; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Vala *et al.*, 2010; Belot and Bréchon, 2012; Candeias, 2012, 2016), and is thus critical when available. This is especially because the other variables are either not as widely used (e.g. political interest, political participation in discussions about politics, political participation, political sophistication) or not as relevant to determining effects of political phenomena on tolerance (e.g. post-materialism).

For these reasons, in this research, the political controls considered will be the left-right scale and patriotism, which are also the ones most common to at least the four most recent EVS waves.

2.3.2. *(In)Tolerance and the far-right*

Before approaching how tolerance and the far-right are related, it is necessary to first define what the far-right is. Cas Mudde (2007: 15-31) provides an instrumental framework for distinguishing between what will be called “far-right” parties from others that, while somewhat related, do not fulfil all characteristics. To Mudde, far-right parties are political entities characterized by their opposition to liberal democracy, their emphasis on nationalism, xenophobic or anti-immigrant stances, advocacy for a strong centralized authority, and those that exhibit a nativist ideology, seeking to prioritize the interests of the native population over

those of immigrants or minority groups (Mudde, 2007: 23-26). Far-right parties employ populist rhetoric, framing themselves as representatives of the true will of the people against a perceived corrupt elite or other groups deemed harmful to national identity or security (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). Their manifestos often include opposition to globalisation, scepticism towards international institutions, and advocacy for traditional values and social hierarchies (Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2007, 2019).

These parties typically reject multiculturalism and support policies aimed at preserving cultural homogeneity within a nation-state (Minkenberg, 2000). However, according to the definition by Mudde (2007: 31; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012, 2017, 2018; Mudde, 2019), being *far-right* or, as Mudde puts it, populist radical right, is not the same as being *extreme-right*. Extreme-right parties are fascist and neo-Nazi parties. Mudde (2007) proposes an inclusive definition of the far-right, by including the populist right and extreme right parties into a wider family: the far-right political party family (Mudde, 2007: 32-38). This is what is called as the *umbrella* term of *far-right*, one which includes parties within the radical, populist and extreme-right family (Pirro, 2023).

Another characteristic is that there is a misunderstanding between equality/inequality and statism within the far-right party family (Pirro, 2023: 107). Multiple far-right parties have a contradictory expansionist economic program (Chega in 2024 and 2025, Reform in 2024, AfD in 2025, and Rassemblement Nationale in 2024). Moreover, this increased statism is similar between radical right and far-right parties, which makes them increasingly difficult to distinguish in economic and financial terms (Pirro, 2023: 107).

Having defined what the far-right is, it is now important to examine its relationship with tolerance. Indeed, the scholarship is not prolific in studying the relationship between the far-right and tolerance. There are several studies which approach how right-wing extremists (e.g. Viegas, 2007, 2010; Persson and Widmalm, 2025) or far-right parties themselves (Bjånesøy, 2021; Bjånesøy *et al.*, 2023) are tolerated, with these groups typically being among the most intolerated. This is coherent with other findings: groups typically identified with the far-right itself are usually very much disliked by citizens (i.e. Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Neuner and Ramirez, 2023), with such dislike depending on the citizens' and political circumstances (Olsen, 2023).

Another contribution shows that tolerance growth over the later decades in the UK, particularly towards LGBT people (Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020: 156), is used by radical right organisations to affect tolerance towards other groups, namely Muslims. Comparing two UK organisations (EDL and UKIP) and the Polish party Law and Justice Party (PiS), they find

that PiS attacks both LGBT people and Islam, seeing them as threats to the traditional Polish way of life. But in the UK, UKIP and UKIP's supporters feel stigmatised. Thus, this party used liberal principles of respecting gender, LGBT issues and Jews, to directly impose costs on Islam and Muslims (pp. 158-160). They successfully created a narrative where LGBT and gender rights are threatened by Muslims and Islam, with EDL expressing the same type of strategy. This research confirms the findings by other authors, confirming that far-right parties use certain minorities to scapegoat others, seen as more threatening, namely Muslims and immigrants (e.g. Duina and Carson, 2019; Foster and Kirke, 2022). However, these works do not establish a direct relationship between how tolerance is conditioned, or not, by the far-right. Thus, my objective of *estimating how support for the far-right relates to social tolerance* (objective 3) is highly relevant.

To start understanding this possible relationship, one needs to look at Billiet's work (1995), which shows how positive or negative attitudes towards immigrants affect voting in Vlaams Blok (a Belgian far-right party). More positive attitudes towards immigrants stir voters away from far-right voting. Coherently, more populist attitudes among the Dutch population tend to lead to more intolerance of different views, although they may not necessarily be politically intolerant of adversaries (Bos *et al.*, 2021). More recently, in the 2012, 2016 and 2020 US elections, it was found that more tolerance for race, gender, and immigrants equated to less support for Trump's election efforts (Dodson and Brooks, 2024: 16). These are among the very few examples of relevant works which use tolerance and far-right parties as factors. However, these two examples look at tolerance as an independent variable, rather than the phenomenon being studied.

A study which finally uses tolerance as a dependent variable is Weldon (2006). In a comparative tolerance study of 17 European countries, he examines how far-right support (measured through voting in each country) influences tolerance, concluding that there was a negative and significant effect (Weldon, 2006: 342-344). That is, voting for the far-right lowers political tolerance, but he was not able to observe the same effect on social tolerance (2006: 343; and Weldon, 2003). There is evidence that the far-right does discriminate and is intolerant towards certain minority groups, such as immigrants, gypsies, Muslims, homosexuals and others (e.g. Mudde, 2007, 2019; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Pirro, 2023). However, from this literature review, there is little evidence on how support for the far-right, specifically, affects tolerance. A reference author (Weldon, 2006) points out that this relationship may exist, and indeed, in some instances, it does. However, his work is largely unconfirmed, with more recent data having not been tested for this type of relationship.

Furthermore, while ideological explanatory factors are common in tolerance studies (as seen above, e.g. Wilson, 1994; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Hadler, 2012; Rapp, 2017; Peffley *et al.*, 2023: 7; Siegel, 2024), ideological identification with the far-right is circumscribed to identification with right-wing parties, and only rarely does the scholarship use *specific* far-right parties (exceptions being: Billiet, 1995; Petersen *et al.*, 2011; Hadler, 2012; Gibson, 2013: 56-58; Neuner and Ramirez, 2023; Marom, 2024). Crucially, recent data finds that more radical right parliamentary representation does lead to more negative attitudes to immigration (Gul, 2023). However, this research only concerns attitudes towards immigration, not specifically addressing tolerance and other minorities, and only addresses radical right representation, not voting. Regardless, one should consider the idea that the social, political and ideological reasons which lead citizens to be less tolerant could be similar, if not the very same, to those which lead them to increasingly support the European far-right.

This means that there is a double research gap to be explored. I address it first by using ideological positioning in the far-right in my analysis as a micro/citizen-level variable explaining tolerance: while ideology is a common variable, an ideology variable isolating the individuals who position themselves in the far-right has not been previously used. This means that *aiming to understand if ideological self-positioning in the far-right correlates with social tolerance* (objective 3.1) is quite important, filling part of the research gap. Second, by using vote for the far-right, similarly to Weldon (2006), which has not been used in other studies, I expand on this author's use of far-right voting as a variable, by increasing both the number of countries (from 17 to 31) and the points in time analysed (from one to five). Additionally, by including all parties classified within the far-right party family, instead of limiting the analysis to the most electorally successful ones, this approach aims *to understand if electoral support for the far-right (far-right voting) correlates to social tolerance* (objective 3.2) in Europe, and thus, this other research gap can be fulfilled. Another important argument for the use of far-right voting is the need for it to cross-validate the previous measure of ideological positioning in the far-right by making use of a measurement of far-right support on another level (country-level vs the individual level measured with ideological self-positioning).

Furthermore, I previously explored how young voters are connected to the far-right and, in turn, how the literature connects age to the far-right and tolerance, although these connections have not been tested together. As stated, the literature has been reporting a growth in support by the young for the far-right (Jakli, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025), which makes it plausible that youth groups might be functioning as a catalyst for increased far-right vote, which could affect tolerance. This constitutes another research gap,

which I aim to assess the role of age (particularly younger vs. older age groups) in the relationship that macro-level socioeconomic performance and voting for the far-right have with social tolerance (objective 5.1).

On the other hand, the literature has previously observed that poor socioeconomic conditions incentivise votes for the far-right (Funke *et al.*, 2016; Dehdari, 2022; Gozgor, 2022; Sipma and Berning, 2021). We also know that far-right voting may affect tolerance and that poor economic growth has previously been found to catalyse intolerance (Weldon, 2006). However, what we do not know, is how socioeconomic performance could catalyse the relationship that far-right voting has with social tolerance, which leads to the need to assess the role of socioeconomic performance in the relationship that voting for the far-right has with social tolerance (objective 5.2.), which is, as of now, an unanswered question.³¹

Scholarship, while not in possession of abundant literature concerning variables support or position in the far-right and its correlations with tolerance, knows that the more conservative or right-wing a given citizen is, the more likely they are to showcase less tolerant behaviours (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1979, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Weldon, 2006; Hadler, 2012; Peffley *et al.*, 2023). Moreover, the few works that approach how support for the far-right affects tolerance show that more support for far-right parties tends to depress tolerance (Billiet, 1995; Weldon, 2006; Bjånesøy, 2021). These recent changes are also in line with the concept of *circumstantial tolerance*, meaning that those who vote or self-position in the far-right may be affecting tolerance (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Viegas, 2007). This also opens two venues to understanding how far-right support affects social tolerance. On one hand, there is the individual level, which the literature points out as using the ideological variables. On the other hand, the country-level allows for a multilevel cross-check of the influence of support for the far-right on tolerance.

Focusing on the individual level, now, the more leftist citizens show themselves to be, the more tolerant they tend to be. However, ideological position in the far-right has not been isolated as an explanatory factor. But the previous authors (e.g. Billiet, 1995; Petersen *et al.*, 2011; Hadler, 2012) provide an approximation for me support the idea that those who do *not* self-position in the far-right, are more likely to be more tolerant, and this offers a glimpse into how a micro-level mechanism might work: not self-positioning in the far-right should increase

³¹ As I am yet to make the literature review of the socioeconomic variables, I will present the corresponding hypothesis, H7., in the next chapter.

tolerance levels, and thus I expect that self-positioning in the far-right *will negatively relate to the levels of tolerance, at the individual level* (H3.1).

Now, at the country-level, the expectation is that the less support for the far-right, through voting, the better tolerance should be (Weldon, 2003, 2006). Using this variable is important due to its link to intolerance, as the far-right tends to emphasise intolerant policies towards stigmatised minorities (Mudde, 2007, 2019). By measuring voting for the far-right, I hope to assess how they could correlate with social tolerance (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Moreover, one should consider that far-right parties have experienced increased electoral success, and thus, there is a need to evaluate their correlation with socio-political behaviour further. Note that Weldon's study only covered the 1997 Eurobarometer survey and was limited to 15 EU countries. As such, Weldon's sample needs to be expanded to assess whether his results are generalisable. In this regard, I expect that *the less votes far-right parties have at the country level, will contribute to higher social tolerance levels* (H3.2).

Now, regarding this subchapter and the previous one, which concerns how age relates to social tolerance, it is relevant to briefly remind the reader that the scholarship expects younger individuals to be more tolerant (e.g. Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; see subchapter 2.2). However, the literature also recognises that the youth have started to become more illiberal and more supportive of the far-right at least, in electoral terms (e.g. Jakli, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025; see subchapter 2.2. for the literature review), as well as protest voting against ineffective and corrupt mainstream parties (Rydgren, 2018). Further, the youth has recently taken to reacting to cultural change driven by immigration (Ivaldi, 2018), and the formative/traumatic effects of underperforming economies coupled with exposure to political propaganda on social media (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015; Mayer *et al.*, 2024). This last piece of evidence is instrumental for this research, as it demonstrates a clear connection between age, especially youthful voters, and voting for the far-right.

As young people are more vulnerable in terms of party identity and voting, and to the economic context (being more negatively affected by it), the fact that they allow themselves to be mobilised by the far-right suggests that these factors act together, intensifying the negative correlation of youth with tolerance. As such, there is a theoretical expectation that, *when compared to older people, the relationship of younger people with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when they vote for the far-right* (H6).

The list of hypotheses in this subchapter is the following:

H3.1. *Self-positioning in the far-right will negatively relate to the levels of tolerance, at the individual level.*

H3.2. *It is expected that the less votes far-right parties have at the country level, will contribute to higher social tolerance levels.*

H6. *When compared to older people, the relationship of younger people with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when they vote for the far-right.*

This subchapter revised how politics and the far-right are important variables to study tolerance and social tolerance. In the second section, I show how the far-right has been defined and has been studied in the context of tolerance studies. I present the explanatory variables used in this research for the support for the far-right dimension: self-positioning in the far-right (micro/individual level) and far-right voting (macro/country level). I show how these variables are important for this research, in the context of the scholarship, why they were chosen, and the research objectives for which they are used to fulfil the research gaps. Finally, I present and discuss the hypotheses concerning how support for the far-right may correlate with social tolerance, and how age could possibly intensify the relationship between far-right voting and social tolerance.

2.4. Is it the economy? How socioeconomic fluctuations may relate to tolerance

Several researchers have been interested in the effects of economic fluctuations on citizens' behaviour (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Madsen and Snow, 1991; Dalton, 2000). They pointed out that socioeconomic performance, especially macro-level economic problems, affected individuals' political behaviour. This section will look at how this literature has correlated socioeconomic variables with tolerance, across time. A disambiguating note should be added that, even though the variables I use are socioeconomic variables (as I make use of GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, unemployment and HDI), it is relevant to approach all types of socioeconomic variables in this literature review, before pointing out, more specifically, the variables I chose for my research.

The classic tolerance studies have neglected to specifically focus on how socioeconomic conditions influence tolerance. This indicates that thinking of how socioeconomic performance affects tolerance is a relatively new empirical approach.

With the advent of the crisis in Europe (2009-2014), research on the effects that changes at the socioeconomic level caused on citizens and political decision-makers escalated, especially in Southern Europe (Freire and Moury, 2014; Freire *et al.*, 2014; Kroknes *et al.*,

2015; Belchior, 2015; Belchior *et al.*, 2016; Freire *et al.*, 2016; Belchior, 2020; Freire *et al.*, 2023). A main conclusion has been that changing socioeconomic conditions affect citizens' political attitudes and behaviours. Over the following few pages, I will go over the socioeconomic variables mostly used by prior research on tolerance, before and after the sovereign debt crisis. For this, I explore the literature in two ways: first, I approach micro-level socioeconomic factors, and second, I approach macro-level socioeconomic factors' effect on tolerance.

Starting with the micro-level factors, the authors use employment (i.e. Belot and Bréchon, 2012; Dima and Dima, 2016), which tends to increase the likelihood of more tolerant attitudes towards socially stigmatised groups. Income distribution across populations is shown to matter in explaining social tolerance, with more income being linked to more tolerance (Quillian, 1995; Dima and Dima, 2016: 451).

Subjective micro-level socioeconomic evaluations were also used: better economic evaluations were connected to more tolerance (Hobolt *et al.*, 2011: 372; Daoust and Nadeau, 2021); however, in Hobolt *et al.*'s case, tolerance was studied as a covariate of economic evaluations.

Good economic conditions (an indicator composed of unemployment, real income, job security, and financial distress), improved tolerance (Persell *et al.*, 2001: 207-211). Other authors use this idea of economic condition, but it is operationalised as a macro-level socioeconomic factor (economic conditions with a negative significant effect), while also using a micro-level factor (income in the lowest quartile, which produced a negative significant effect on prejudice) (Quillian, 1995: 598, 600). It is worth noting that this is one of the few instances in tolerance literature where an author used an interaction effect between an age variable and a socioeconomic factor (in this case, individual income), producing a significant negative effect on racial prejudice (Quillian, 1995: 598, 600). Later, it was also found that, when major events occurred (Brexit and the 2015 Refugee Crisis), poorer populations were less likely to be tolerant of minorities, and richer populations were more likely to be tolerant (Kromczyk *et al.*, 2021).

Regardless, the use of explanatory socioeconomic factors is mostly measured with macro-level factors, which tend to be more widely used in comparative tolerance studies than micro-level ones. Not only that, but the number of used factors is also far greater. As such, I now approach the most relevant macro-level socioeconomic factors.

Starting with GDP, which represents the total amount of wealth a given nation has, the socioeconomic effects are mixed, with some authors advocating positive effects, others

negative effects and others not detecting effects at all in the European context. Among those who were unable to detect significant results, are Dunn *et al.* (2009: 294) and Ekici and Yucel (2015). Then, Hadler (2012) and Seligson *et al.* (2019) found that a greater GDP contributes to improving tolerance. However, Rapp (2017: 52) finds a positive relationship with social tolerance and a negative effect of GDP on both social and political tolerance, contradicting Hadler.

Some other works examined how changes in GDP affect tolerance. In this regard, authors tend to use GDP annual growth, but it is used sparingly and often, tolerance is an independent variable and not the studied phenomenon. Due to source scarcity, however, I still revise the works using tolerance as an independent variable.

Once again, GDP annual growth displays incoherent results within the literature: some authors are unable to find a relationship between GDP annual growth and tolerance (Weldon, 2003, 2006; Peffley *et al.*, 2015: 823), while others were able to find a relationship. Lazarus (2011) observes that the more economic growth there is, the less intolerant a society is. Differently (by using tolerance as an explanatory variable, and GDP annual growth as a dependent variable), Berggren and Elinder (2012a) provided evidence that tolerance to homosexuals *negatively* affects GDP growth, and tolerance to different races positively affects GDP growth (Berggren and Elinder, 2012a: 300-301). One should be careful with interpreting it, as tolerance is used as an independent variable, during a time when the World economy was experiencing a downturn (due to the 2007 Subprime crisis), which coincided with a time when tolerance was growing (especially concerning the growing acceptance of homosexual marriage), which may have skewed results. What this shows is that results in many countries, especially involving European ones during the Sovereign Debt crisis, tend not to display significant results (Weldon, 2003, 2006). Alternatively, they have a negative significant relationship (Berggren and Elinder, 2012a: 300-301).

This shows that GDP annual growth is largely untested and has not been so in the context of several points in time. This highlights a need to further later studies, given the successive crises affecting Europe in the 2000s, 2010s, and 2020s. Furthermore, these studies do not use GDP annual growth in recent years, justifying, thus, their study in more recent European data.

By far, however, the most widely used socioeconomic indicator in tolerance studies is GDP per capita, as it measures the amount of wealth each citizen has on average in each country. This is a more accurate representation of individual wealth within a given country, which is especially useful when studying populations, with results being especially coherent:

GDP per capita was found to improve tolerance (Quillian, 1995; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a: 946-947; Das *et al.*, 2008: 201; Berggren and Nilsson, 2013, 2016, 2025; Vogt Isaksen, 2019; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; Yigit, 2020; Lee, 2021; Salahodjaev, 2021). This is coherent with other studies, namely Inglehart *et al.* (2008), who show that elevated GDP per capita works in tandem with more tolerance to generate a happier, more satisfied society. Viegas's studies (2004, 2010) strongly suggest that socioeconomic development, in the form of GDP per capita, is important enough to understand how Portugal (compared to the other European countries), despite not being as socially and economically developed, is still more tolerant than most European countries.³²

However, a few authors, despite testing GDP (or GNP) per capita's effects on tolerance, are also unable to find significant effects in certain circumstances (Weldon, 2003; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Yigit, 2020, in the general case; Alhendi *et al.*, 2021). Yigit (2020), however, finds a correlation between GDP and social tolerance when he tests Turkey, the USA and South Africa separately.

While authors are primarily focused on purely economic data (GDP, GDP growth, GDP per capita), they have also been concerned with the effects that other socioeconomic variables could have on tolerance. A good example is Das *et al.*, (2008), who not only considers HDI as a measurement of economic development which ponders income with education, and life expectancy, connecting the economy with socially related development, but they also find a correlation between HDI and tolerance: the more development, the more tolerant a country tends to be. This is coherent with Viegas' use of HDI (2004, 2007, 2010): even though his macro data is displayed without using statistical tests, it is still important enough to understand how Portugal (compared to Spain and its other European peers), despite not being as socially and economically developed, is still more tolerant than its peers. The use of HDI is furthered by other authors, demonstrating that more socioeconomic development generally means more tolerant societies (i.e. Kirchner *et al.*, 2011; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Lee, 2021; Tausch, 2024). An important note, however, should be considered: in some circumstances, HDI does not have a significant effect on tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 252).

Another important socioeconomic variable is unemployment, the idea being that, as unemployment rises, so does intolerance. However, this effect has been somewhat inconsistent, with some authors observing that a higher unemployment rate is negatively correlated with tolerance (Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Berggren and Nilsson, 2016; Ramos *et al.*, 2016; Rapp, 2017;

³² Note, however, that Viegas' socioeconomic macro-level data (2004, 2007, 2010) is used without statistical tests.

Tausch, 2024), but with others being unable to demonstrate a significant effect in the European case (i.e. Weldon, 2003; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Hadler, 2012; Ekici and Yucel, 2015; Berggren *et al.*, 2025). Other authors even show that unemployment increases tolerance, postulating that this may be because those who have been unemployed are more likely to show more acceptance of others in a more precarious position; in other words, they show more empathy (i.e. Persell *et al.*, 2001: 224).

Recently, some authors used GDP, GDP per capita, and others to build an index, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, BTI (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024b), to test whether tolerance is affected by economic performance. The results are coherent with the main indicators previously explored: the better the economic performance, the higher are tolerant attitudes towards minorities (e.g. Sendra and Bohigues, 2022).

Other socioeconomic measurements have also been used, like inequality, measured through the Gini coefficient. The scholarship has found that inequality tends to have a depressing effect on tolerance, regardless of the type of tolerance (i.e. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a: 946-947; Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Yigit, 2020; Salahodjaev, 2021), but its results are not always significant (i.e. Hadler, 2012; Yigit, 2020; Lee, 2021), meaning that, in some circumstances, inequality is not a good predictor of tolerance. Another common economic indicator is the inflation rate (Peffley *et al.*, 2015: 823), but it was not observed to have significant effects on tolerance (in Israel, 1980-2011).

From here, other factors are seldom used, like economic freedom, which is used by Berggren and Nilsson (2013, 2016, 2025) and Berggren and Elinder (2015) to find evidence of a positive correlation between economic freedom and tolerance (homosexuality, different races, Muslims, Jews, and gypsies). But their use of economic freedom has been restricted and has not been replicated in other works. Another successfully tested indicator was social expenditure (health and unemployment) by Rapp (2017: 52) using the Eurobarometer survey (1997), testing how the total expenditure of the welfare state affects tolerance (political and social), finding a positive relationship with social tolerance. She also found a moderation effect of health expenditure and unemployment expenditure on ethnic diversity, on both social and political tolerance. Nevertheless, social expenditure is not a measurement which refers to individuals or the nationwide characteristics of populations.

The percentage of the population in the tertiary sector (Weldon, 2003) and the percentage of the migratory population (Hadler, 2012) elicit no evidence of influencing tolerance. Although Tausch (2024: 68) tests the percentage of migrants' effects on homonegativity, observing a significant and positive correlation, more migrants mean less

tolerance to gay people. Tausch (2024) used correlations to test the relationship between tolerance and several variables, and he opened the doors to rarely tested but potentially relevant variables. Economic globalization index, worker remittance inflows as per cent of GDP, migrant populations, and foreign savings rate (2024: 68) increase the likelihood of homonegativity, while economic gender gap, social globalisation, expenditure on education, health expenditure as per cent of GDP, and labour force participation rate of migrants (2024: 69-70), decrease the likelihood of homonegativity.

This literature review summarises that tolerance has become a topic generating interest in terms of how it may be explained by (or explains, in some cases) socioeconomic performance. However, not only are analyses of tolerance using socioeconomic performance still uncommon, but the research also carried out to date presents some limitations: either analysis without selecting a specific region to be studied, or approach too few countries to use macro-level analysis, or the number of years being studied is too small or all of the above (e.g. Weldon, 2006; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Peffley *et al.*, 2015: 823; Lee, 2021; Sendra and Bohigues, 2022; Berggren *et al.*, 2025). All these problems are parallel with the disadvantages of each socioeconomic indicator.

This thesis seeks to take a step forward by providing a socioeconomic explanation for social tolerance in liberal democratic Europe. To curb the problems seen on previous works related to socioeconomic influence on tolerance, I build on the notion that better socioeconomic performance can lead to more tolerance (Persell *et al.*, 2001; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a; Rapp, 2017; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019), *to estimate how macro-level socioeconomic performance relates with social tolerance* (objective 4). For this, I use the variables which have been, on one hand, more thoroughly and more coherently tested in the tolerance literature, and on the other, which consider both a macroeconomic and human developmental perspective. The variables which will be used are HDI, GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment as explanatory factors to build this theory of socioeconomic influence on tolerance.

Furthermore, previous literature notes a correlation between disadvantaged socioeconomic conditions and increased support for far-right political movements (Funke *et al.*, 2016; Dehdari, 2022; Gozgor, 2022; Sipma and Berning, 2021). Moreover, poorer socioeconomic performance (e.g. Weldon, 2006; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Berggren *et al.*, 2025) and more support for the far-right (Billiet, 1995; Weldon, 2006; Dodson and Brooks, 2024) have been linked, separately, to less tolerance. What is currently unknown is whether socioeconomic performance can act as a catalyst to intensify the relationship that

voting for the far-right has, depressing social tolerance. And for this, this thesis aims *to assess the role of socioeconomic performance in the relationship that voting for the far-right has with social tolerance* (objective 5.2).

While socioeconomic variables are not common in this type of research, there are already a few authors who have studied the socioeconomic performance correlates with tolerance (i.e. Persell *et al.*, 2001; Weldon, 2006; Anderson and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Peffley *et al.*, 2015). However, in many cases, the correlation of socioeconomic performance on tolerance is null (i.e. Dunn and Singh, 2014; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Weldon, 2006; Peffley *et al.*, 2015). Nonetheless, there is evidence that tolerance might be explained by socioeconomic performance in some circumstances (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Rapp, 2017; Quillian *et al.*, 2019; Salahodjaev, 2021; Tausch, 2024).

Indeed, socioeconomic variables, namely HDI, GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment, have all been known to influence tolerance. Nonetheless, as per my previous arguments, retesting whether socioeconomic performance may correlate with social tolerance in the specific context of Europe is still relevant because the use of socioeconomic factors is uncommon, because Europe is not usually isolated (nor are its regions), and especially because the inclusion of the later years inserts socioeconomic variation in a context when continent has been experiencing several crises. As such, there is an expectation that a *country's social tolerance level will likely be positively correlated with better socioeconomic performance and negatively related with less favourable socioeconomic performance* (H4).

Now returning to how socioeconomic performance is related to how the other explanatory factors explain social tolerance, I have already shown how age could intensify the relationship of far-right voting with social tolerance (H6). Here, we should recover the observation that young voters are more likely to be affected by socioeconomic downturns (i.e. Piketty, 2014; Kern *et al.*, 2015; Margalit, 2019; Reeskens and Vandecasteele, 2021). It is known that age can moderate how socioeconomic performance affect tolerance: indeed, age can intensify the negative correlation that a negative socioeconomic performance has on tolerance, or, more specifically, it was found a significant negative effect of the interaction effect between age and individual income on racial prejudice in 12 EEC countries in 1988 (Quillian, 1995: 598, 600). However, the interaction between age and socioeconomic performance's relationship with social tolerance can be improved upon by expanding and updating the sample.

As young people are more vulnerable to socioeconomic fluctuations, this suggests a relationship between them, with these factors potentially working in tandem to intensify the

negative relationship between socioeconomic status and social tolerance. As such, I expect that *when compared to older people, the relationship between younger people and decreasing levels of social tolerance is intensified when exposed to worse socioeconomic performance* (H7).

Moving forward to the final hypothesis, the literature has long known that not only do citizens react to changing socioeconomic conditions (i.e. Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Dalton, 2000), but negative socioeconomic development also has a changing effect on social and political behaviour (i.e. Freire and Moury, 2014; Kroknes *et al.*, 2015; Freire *et al.*, 2016; Belchior, 2020; Freire *et al.*, 2023). Moreover, a few authors successfully tested how socioeconomic variables are able to moderate effects on tolerance (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a: 951; Rapp, 2017: 52). Weldon (2006: 342-344) also tested the interaction effects of GDP growth on left-right ideology's effect on tolerance. He observed a significant positive interaction effect between GDP and left-right on political tolerance. Weldon's research is relevant: it hypothetically approaches a relationship between socioeconomic performance, voting for the far-right and ideologic position. In sum, better socioeconomic performance seems to be associated with more tolerance, while more voting for the far-right is associated with less tolerance (Weldon, 2006).

Furthermore, moving even further beyond, the scholarship has already uncovered that those economic crises (Funke *et al.*, 2016) and localised economic distress (Dehdari, 2022) were found to lead to more support for far-right parties. This is compounded by the growth of the far-right in Europe. Economic uncertainty was found to raise voting for populist candidates in the EU (Gozgor, 2022). Further data shows that negative perceptions of economic performance also raise voting for the far-right (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Sipma, and Berning, 2021). Socioeconomic underperformance will push voters to economic insecurity, making them more likely to support and vote for the far-right, which should intensify the correlation that voting for the far-right has with social tolerance, potentially stalling its growth or reducing it.

As such, the literature strongly suggests that socioeconomic performance can act as a catalyst of the relationship between far-right voting and social tolerance, which leads to my expectation that the relationship between worse socioeconomic performance and *decreasing social tolerance is intensified when there is higher far-right voting* (H8).

The summary of the hypotheses I relayed in this subchapter is the following:

H4. *A country's social tolerance level will likely be positively correlated with better socioeconomic performance and negatively related with less favourable socioeconomic performance.*

H7. *When compared to older people, the relationship between younger people and decreasing levels of social tolerance is intensified when exposed to worse socioeconomic performance*

H8. *The relationship of worse socioeconomic performance with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when there is higher far-right voting.*

This subchapter revised how socioeconomic performance has been known to affect tolerance in the literature. In this section, I present the most important variables, which were chosen for this research, and the underlying objective. Finally, I discuss and present the hypotheses on how socioeconomic performance could affect social tolerance. I also present two hypotheses related to moderation effects: the first one concerns whether age, namely the youth, moderates how socioeconomic performance affects social tolerance. The second is concerned with whether socioeconomic performance intensifies the relationship between far-right voting and social tolerance. This is to show evidence that it is, in fact, the economy!

2.5. The curious case of Portugal – part I

This section approaches Portugal as a curious case, showing what literature is available about tolerance in Portugal. Marujo and Franco (2009) offer a historical perspective on intolerance in Portugal, which, the authors argue, has become an open and tolerant society. However, this assertion can only be found in the first empirical studies about tolerance in Portugal.

Several studies approach tolerance, using Portugal as one of the cases, but few focus on Portugal or compare it with other countries. The first study using Portugal as a case is that of Gibson and Duch (1991), using an elite-mass comparison of 12 European countries. This study, which displayed a significant mean difference of opinion between elite-mass political tolerance (p. 201), shows a significant effect of democratisation on the Portuguese leaders' opinions (p. 205).

Then, comparative research including Portugal found that it displayed greater levels of tolerance than other northern and southern European countries (Viegas, 2004, 2007). Viegas found that the modernisation theory is a good predictor of how tolerant a given society is.

This is particularly relevant because, according to Inglehart's theory of modernisation (Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 2008), countries with greater levels of development should display more liberal values (among them, tolerance). Yet, contradicting the modernisation theory's connection with economic and social development and the higher levels of tolerance thesis, Portugal shows itself to be an exception: the second most tolerant country, according to Viegas' research (2004, 2007: 115). This is despite having low levels of democratic, social and

economic development (in comparison to the more advanced countries in Europe at the time, such as West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland or the Netherlands).³³ The socioeconomic variables are HDI and unemployment, which are used as arguments to substantiate an analysis of how Portugal is an exception to the rule that a country will be as tolerant as it is developed. Nearly the same arguments and indicators (duration of democracy, average voter turnout, year women were given the vote, GDP per capita, HDI) are afterwards used by Viegas (2010: 104). However, it is still important enough to understand how Portugal, despite not being as socially and economically developed, is still more tolerant than Spain.

Portugal has been found to be consistently tolerant, particularly regarding immigrants (i.e. Vala *et al.*, 2003; Vala *et al.*, 2006; Vala *et al.*, 2010; Vala, 2013; Vala and Pereira, 2020). A good example of this observation is Vala *et al.* (2004), who compare European countries, dividing them into two groups: those that receive immigrants, like Germany, Belgium, and France, and those that have emigration traditions, such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy. When it came to accepting immigrants or discriminating towards other races, they found that these two country groups behave differently towards immigrants: immigration tradition countries show less job discrimination, but also less solidarity towards immigrants, while the reverse is observed in emigration-tradition countries (pp. 156-158). These authors also found that, when it came to accepting immigrants, there were several important explanatory variables. Left-right, political conservatism, and moral conservatism had negative effects, with trust in political institutions, satisfaction with democracy, postmaterialism, freedom, pro-welfare rights and social community participation having a positive effect (Vala *et al.*, 2004). They also found that socio-political factors, while being significant, are not that important in explaining tolerance (or acceptance), especially in Portugal, Italy, and Spain, which confirms other studies (Thalhammer *et al.*, 2001; Vala *et al.*, 2004: 158).³⁴

Still regarding tolerance in Portugal towards immigrants, a recent study offers a more updated longitudinal perspective on explanatory factors of tolerance: age and instruction are the most important factors in explaining tolerance to immigrants in Portugal, between 2008 and 2012 (Nascimento, 2018). This research also observes that conservatism vs progressivism is also important, with negative effects, but only in 2008.

³³ Ordered group by tolerance levels: Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, West Germany, Spain, East Germany, Switzerland, Russia, Romania, and Moldova (Viegas, 2007: 115).

³⁴ As previously noted, on subchapter 1.3., discrimination is a distinct concept from tolerance: tolerance is an attitude, while discrimination is a behaviour. For this reason, caution is advised when comparing results from discrimination studies with tolerance studies (such as Vala, Ramos and colleagues who worked on racism and discrimination).

Other authors who specifically approach tolerance in Portugal are Lopes *et al.* (2011), using it as an explanation for how tolerance is important for regional economic development. Note, however, that these authors use tolerance as an independent variable, rather than the phenomenon being studied. They find that tolerance contributes to Portuguese economic performance, but also that it moderates the effect of optimism on development. This idea comes from a similar test from Inglehart *et al.* (2008) 's study, using the *Tolerance in Creative Capital Theory*, and successfully replicating Inglehart *et al.*'s findings. While these works' focus is on economic performance, the fact that tolerance establishes a statistical relationship is an important clue for this thesis.

Stoeckel and Ceka (2023) also specifically targets Portugal, by comparing 10 EU member-states in 2017 (Czechia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and UK) (p. 706), in which they focus on the study of political tolerance to Fascists, Neo-Nazis, Communists, Homosexuals, Jews, Anti-globalisation activists, Muslims, Blacks, Roma, and Others. The most disliked groups are neo-Nazis/fascists, followed by Muslims and Roma. However, in Portugal, Muslims are not as disliked as Roma and other groups, and neo-nazis/fascists are not as disliked as in France, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany (pp. 710-711). When it comes to Muslims, Portugal is one of the most tolerant countries, with a large majority of the Portuguese thinking that neo-Nazis and Fascists should be banned from parliament (right behind France and Italy). Which, once again, confirms Viegas' assertion that Portugal is still an outlier: still one of the most tolerant countries in Europe.

More studies come from institutional sources. The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) reported that individuals from ethnic minorities continue to face significant challenges in accessing housing, education, and employment (FRA, 2018). According to SGI (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024a), Portugal was the 8th best country in immigrant integration policy.³⁵ Public attitudes toward immigrants are generally positive, with Portugal ranking as one of the most welcoming European countries in several surveys (Pew Research Center, 2018). This comparative perspective is corroborated by ESS data (Goubin *et al.*, 2022), which sees Portugal as the 7th most favourable country to immigrants in the EU in 2018, and on the rise, from 2014. Likewise, Portugal is the 5th least antimigrant country in Europe, according to ESS's 2002-2016 data (Ponce, 2023: 43).

³⁵ See data here: https://www.sgi-network.org/2024/Sustainable_Policymaking/Social_Sustainability/Sustainable_Inclusion_of_Migrants. Last accessed: [17/07/2025].

Regarding LGBTQ+ rights, there were important advances, including the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 2010 and adoption rights for same-sex couples in 2016. Public opinion has become increasingly supportive of LGBTQ+ rights, reflecting broader trends of social liberalisation (European Commission, 2019; Gouveia *et al.*, 2020). The scholarship has recognised Portugal as one of the most tolerant countries to gay people: 31st in 2014, 28th in 2009, 33rd in 2004, and 27th in 2000, according to WVS (Flores, 2019: 31; Zhang and Brym, 2019).

There are not, however, further studies encompassing social tolerance in Portugal, using longitudinal data from 1990 to 2020 (the four waves when Portugal was included in the EVS project). And while there are several studies on how Portugal has evolved, recently, in terms of discrimination (i.e. Casquilho-Martins *et al.*, 2022; Neves *et al.*, 2023), none approach tolerance, and few compare Portugal with its European peers, meaning that this thesis aims to contribute to filling this research gap by *assessing whether high tolerance levels for the Portuguese case detected since the beginning of 2000 until 2010, are confirmed in the following decade* (objective 6.1).

Furthermore, these studies of tolerance do not approach the recent developments of the growth of support for the far-right in Portugal (particularly after 2019, when CHEGA got its first MP in the Portuguese parliament). The same reasoning is exposed in subchapter 2.2. is valid here: if younger people are more exposed to socioeconomic hurdles (i.e. Piketty, 2014; Kern *et al.*, 2015; Margalit, 2019; Reeskens and Vandecasteele, 2021) and to the far-right rhetoric (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015; Mayer *et al.*, 2024: 2), and this leads them to become less liberal (i.e. Foa and Mounk, 2019; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023), it is plausible that they become less tolerant, in the Portuguese case. As such, this thesis also aims to *assess if social tolerance, in the Portuguese case, is related with age, and ideological self-positioning in the far-right* (objective 6.2).

Viegas's works are a hallmark of the studies of tolerance in Portugal: they show that the country is an exception, and show that, much in the same ways as its peers, Portuguese tolerance can be explained in the same way as the other countries. This is especially, if taking into consideration the theoretical background of *circumstantial tolerance*, laid by the revisionist authors, namely Sniderman *et al.* (1989; see also Viegas, 2007): Portugal was not affected by shocking and traumatic events such as terrorist attacks. These are some of the reasons why the idea that social tolerance in Portugal can be explained by age and by ideology is valid (Viegas, 2004, 2007). However, once again, the literature has not explored how tolerant

the Portuguese population is in the years following the sovereign debt crisis, which greatly affected Portugal between 2010 and 2014.

Knowing that younger individuals are more vulnerable to economic crisis, there are some reasons to believe that young people, in Portugal, could be less tolerant (Stockemer *et al.*, 2018: 577; Foa and Mounk, 2019; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023; Soares *et al.*, 2025). However, Viegas's works are remarkably coherent in the sense that Portugal follows a European trend, and that includes how variables affect Portuguese tolerance. For this reason, I still expect *younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, in Portugal* (H5.1).

In the same vein, the emergence of the far-right in Portugal, particularly when it used not to have strong far-right parties (until 2019), may suggest that it could depress Portuguese tolerance. However, the few works that approach how support for the far-right affects tolerance show that more support for far-right parties tends to depress tolerance (Billiet, 1995; Weldon, 2006; Bjånesøy, 2021). The more leftist the citizens show themselves to be, the more tolerant they tend to be and, indeed, the literature tends to show that the left-right ideological indicator tends to generate a negative impact: the more leftist a citizen is, the more tolerant he tends to be, however, the literature shows that the opposite is also true (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1979, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Weldon, 2006; Hadler, 2012; Peffley *et al.*, 2022; Peffley *et al.*, 2023). Once again, ideological position in the far-right has not been isolated as an explanatory factor, and this includes Portugal. However, the literature offers an expectation, just like in subchapter 2.3, that *self-positioning in the far-right will negatively correlate with the levels of tolerance, in Portugal, just like in North and Central Europe* (H5.2).

The hypotheses presented in this subchapter are the following:

H5.1. *Younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, in Portugal.*

H5.2. *Self-positioning in the far-right will negatively correlate with the levels of tolerance, in Portugal, just like in North and Central Europe.*

In this subchapter, I presented the literature on the Portuguese case, exploring why Portugal is such an exception in terms of tolerance. Here, I present the research objectives concerning tolerance in Portugal, as well as the hypotheses, to determine whether Portugal remains such a curious case.

CHAPTER III. Methodology and data

This chapter presents the methods and data used in this research, discussing its adequacy. It shall be divided into three subchapters: the first subchapter explains the comparative method, outlines why the comparative method is chosen for this research, discusses its problems and virtues, and approaches the typology of this study. The second subchapter approaches the data, including data sources and selection criteria, as well as the analytical strategy regarding the usage of the levels of analysis employed in this research, namely micro, macro, and multilevel analysis. It explains why only European democracies were chosen, as well as the country groups and the time lapse being studied. The third subchapter displays the selected dependent and independent variables (distinguishing the micro and macro-level ones), finishing with the control variables.

This research is a comparative and longitudinal study of social tolerance in 31 European democracies, between 1981 and 2021, seeking to explain social tolerance using age and age groups (particularly the youth), support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance.

3.1. Why use the comparative method to study social tolerance?

I will start by defining the comparative method, then presenting its pros and cons, and later explain how adequate the comparative method is to this research, by showing how I can establish the analytical approach based on empirical data and theoretical propositions. After which, I approach the research design I use to address the objectives and hypotheses.

The comparative method is defined as the one which establishes empirical propositions, based on social, political and/or other aspects relevant to social science research (Lijphart, 1971: 682; Kalleberg, 1966: 72). This definition is somewhat ambiguous (Lijphart, 1975; Ferrinho Lopes and Heyne 2024: 39). In this regard, Ragin (1989: 5) states that the comparative method is the one which uses macrosocial units' characteristics as explanatory factors of phenomena. It is as a method which tests, systematically, an elevated number of variables, when compared to the number of cases, in which the analysed units are countries, political systems or institutions (Peters, 1998; Landman, 2003; Geddes, 2007; Ferrinho Lopes and Heyne, 2024: 40; Steinmetz, 2021: 174). Case in point that the definition of the comparative method is not always consistent, and indeed, several authors make use of macro (Matilla and Raunio, 2002), micro (i.e. Gibson and Duch, 1991), and multilevel country studies (i.e. Weldon, 2006). As stated, this research uses the comparative method but uses it in two different analytical levels: the individual level (citizens, micro-level, Chapter V) and the country level

(macro-level, Chapter VI). Furthermore, the comparative method being used is quantitative, rather than using qualitative techniques proposed by authors such as Geddes (2007) or Skocpol (1985).

The comparative method is thus used to describe a context in which macrosocial units are comparable, classify countries by organising empirical evidence, test hypotheses to eliminate rival explanations, and generalise or predict outcomes to non-included countries (Landman, 2003: 4-10). Testing hypotheses is not exclusive of the comparative method. But its test using these macrosocial units, as what is meant to be compared, is what, in essence, distinguishes the comparative method (Freire, 2006; see also Landman, 2003: 17-19).

According to Landman (2003: 24), we can classify the type of comparative analysis according to the number of countries one uses in the comparison. By using *many* countries, this approach is deemed closer to the experimental method, with case selection guided by the selected variables. This is typically associated with quantitative data analysis and high levels of conceptual abstraction (Landman, 2003: 24-27). Comparing a *few* countries means that controls come from the chosen cases, the definition of concepts is less abstract, country selection is more directed by each specific case (or country), and it allows for some analytical detail for each country. In this research case, it falls between the "few cases" and "many cases" categories (Landman, 2003). However, considering that the present research is based on the study of 31 countries, which are analysed throughout the five points EVS waves (1981-1984, 1991-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010, and 2017-2021), there will be a total of 125 country cases. As such, this research positions itself as comparing many countries, and thus, has a relatively large number of cases (I will present the complete list of countries per EVS wave in Table 3.1, in subchapter 3.2).

Another characteristic of the comparative method is that it can establish causal inferences, via the suppression of rival explanations by separating the groups being controlled (Landman, 2003: 36-57; Ferrinho Lopes and Heyne, 2024: 41). This is important, as it might enable some level of simultaneous internal and external validity within the research: meaning that a study using the comparative method can observe how the phenomenon being investigated is truthfully represented by said study's observations, while, at the same time, being capable of being generalized towards other circumstances (Andrade, 2018: 499).

But why is it the most adequate method for this thesis? First, the comparative method has been a well-established approach in political science for analysing patterns across cases and over time, which allows for the observation of differences in patterns of attitudes of tolerance between countries, country regions, times, and a combination of regions across time

(Lijphart, 1971; Landman, 2003). Secondly, while I do use micro-level data, my research aims at studying 31 European countries, and not merely their populations (see Chapter IV). Furthermore, it also aims at testing the potential individual and country-level correlations of age and age groups, support for the far-right and socioeconomic performance may have with social tolerance using the micro-level (Chapter V) and the macro-levels (Chapter VI), which constitute the macrosocial units frequently referred to in the comparative methods scholarship (Landman, 2003: 4-10). The comparative method offers the necessary tools to research the effect which factors may have on tolerance by comparing regional areas and countries, that is, a comparative perspective. For this, as macrosocial units, the European countries were chosen based on a set of criteria, which will be presented in the following subchapter. This comparison also allows for the control of the variance in social and political behaviour across European countries, meaning that the *ceteris paribus* condition is fulfilled (Lijphart, 1971: 683).

Mueller (1988) argues that comparing attitudes towards different groups across countries or periods can be misleading, as the meaning of these groups may vary, emphasizing the need for a standardized criterion to compare attitudes of tolerance (1988: 29). For Mueller, the solution for this problem lies in testing how the independent and the dependent variables are influenced by each other between countries; thus, using regional blocs is important to explaining social tolerance, and adds to how the choice of the comparative method is the most adequate. A way to counter Mueller's criticism is by selecting countries which are close in terms of culture and concept. As seen in subchapter 1.3. and Appendix Table A.1.1., the concept and the definition of tolerance are common to the selected European countries, which adds to the fact that the regional blocs of European countries (north/central, south, and Eastern Europe) all have close cultures and languages. It is due to these reasons that I selected an enlarged sample of countries to make a European comparison of social tolerance.

Furthermore, using the comparative method also allows the classification of countries concerning their social tolerance levels, revealing how different factors produce similar or different outcomes, depending on each case (Ragin, 1989), which would not be possible with any other method. Furthermore, studying the 31 countries enables the identification of structural, contextual, and individual-level correlates with social tolerance (Lijphart, 1971, 1975; Landman, 2003; Iyengar *et al.*, 2010). When employed in conjunction with the time in this research, it allows for a comparative longitudinal analysis of tolerance in several regions and countries across time, increasing variance. This is not only instrumental to the research objectives, but it is also an uncommon approach in the context of tolerance studies.

Thirdly, the use of the comparative method is particularly advantageous, as it leverages the key independent variables (age, far-right support, and socioeconomic performance in my case), while controlling other factors which are well known to influence my dependent variable (Landman, 2003: 36-57; Ferrinho Lopes and Heyne, 2024: 41), allowing to test under what national conditions social tolerance grows or declines. In turn, this enhances causal inference by using country and individual-level variation over time, which increases the number of observations and allows for the systematic testing of covariations among variables (King *et al.*, 1994). Fourth, as the only way for me to test the macro-level relationship of voting for the far-right and socioeconomic performance with social tolerance is by using macro-level data for these factors, this forces me to use multi-level analysis. Thus, using the comparative method is necessary, as it allows the exploration of how individual-level attitudes are moulded by country-level factors (van Deth, 1998; Immerfall and Therborn, 2010).

Methodologically, this research fills a gap in the literature by adopting a simultaneous comparative and longitudinal approach to the study of social tolerance: this is an area where macro-level, cross-national analyses remain scarce. While a few studies have addressed tolerance over time (e.g. Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Peffley *et al.*, 2015) or across countries (e.g. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Seligson *et al.*, 2019; Yigit, 2020; Tausch, 2024), they are exceptions and often rely on earlier waves of survey data.³⁶ My research builds on and extends these limits by using the full span of European Values Study (EVS) data from 1981 to 2021, encompassing 31 European countries, and focusing on historically stigmatised groups, namely immigrants, Muslims, homosexuals, and people of other races. By doing so, it not only enables the identification of age correlates, which are especially relevant considering recent far-right support among the youth (see subchapter 2.2), but also systematically compares patterns of tolerance in different national and regional contexts.

Using these macro-social units in an explanatory manner, while simultaneously studying individuals' attitudes and behaviours, points to specific analytical techniques capable of using both micro and macro-level units. As such, a multilevel analytical approach might be important to gauge how social tolerance is influenced, not only by the partially already known microsocial correlations, but also by macro-level factors, namely socioeconomic performance, and electoral support for the far-right (see subchapters 2.3 and 2.4). In short, the use of multilevel analysis is likely to lead to better estimations of how the explanatory variables affect

³⁶ See the Introduction's second subchapter for more details on the research gap aimed at being fulfilled.

the studied phenomenon (Bartels, 1996; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Jones, 2009). Multilevel analysis, as described by Hox and De Leeuw (2003), becomes important as it is designed to analyse variables from different levels simultaneously. The variables can be combined through the hierarchical structuring of a model to estimate the statistical effects that each level has on the dependent variables.

The great advantage of using a multilevel approach for this research is that it allows for the insertion of variables that belong to the country-level, without losing the variability of individual-level opinions. Since, in this case, what is relevant is the study of how individuals state that they tolerate socially stigmatised groups, and what leads citizens to tolerate them, or not, at the individual/micro and country/macro-level, the multilevel methodological approach seems to be particularly adequate. However, the disadvantage also implies that the correction of the model is carried out considering only the reported cases. That is, if a respondent has not answered one of the questions, be it an independent or dependent variable, or if a national variable (macro-level) is not available, then that observation is automatically taken out from the model, which will cause the loss of cases and may cause the model itself to be biased (Hox and De Leeuw, 2003). However, this disadvantage is common to other types of regression analysis, namely linear regression. Thus, variable selection needs to be careful, for using control or explanatory variables with high missing rates (such as individual income) can lead to high losses in variability. Nevertheless, the choice of multilevel analysis seems to present itself with its advantages outweighing the disadvantages, as it allows for testing social tolerance across the 31 selected countries, between 1981 and 2021 (descriptively), and 1990 and 2021 (explanatory, with both micro and multilevel approaches).

Finally, I opt for a three-pronged analysis strategy: first, I analyse social tolerance on the micro-level, comparing countries, country regions, and how it has evolved between 1981 and 2021, using descriptive statistics (Chapter IV) and ANOVA tests to assess whether there are significant differences between tolerant and intolerant populations, and differences in tolerance across time (subchapter 4.3). Later, using logistical and linear regressions, I explore the micro-level correlations of age and ideological support for the far-right with social tolerance (Chapter V). Thirdly, using multilevel analysis, I explain how social tolerance is correlated with age, support for the far-right (ideological and electoral) and socioeconomic performance (Chapter VI), including the moderations of age and socioeconomic performance.

In a nutshell, the comparative method is the most adequate for this thesis because it enables a systematic analysis of a sample of countries to explain how contextual and institutional diversity influences patterns of social tolerance at the macro, micro and multilevel,

as is my purpose. By treating countries as individual cases, this method allows for the identification of both commonalities and variations across the unique circumstances faced by each considered country, thereby offering a nuanced understanding of the mechanisms at play. Moreover, this topic has not yet been examined through such a methodological lens, making this approach not only appropriate but also necessary to advance the scholarly understanding of social tolerance from a cross-national perspective. In the following subchapter, I approach the selected cases, justifying them, along with the time and allotted country groups.

3.2. Europe: micro and macro data sources and country-level case selection criteria

This subchapter presents the data sources and cases at both the individual and the country levels, which I use to study social tolerance. I also point out why studying European populations is so important, and the case selection criteria, at the country level.

As stated, there are two types of data being used for this research: individual (micro-level) and country data (macro-level). The micro-level data comes from the *European Values Study* (EVS).³⁷ EVS has been chosen for two simple reasons: first, it is a project which collects data from European citizens in representative surveys of the countries, encompassing several social, personal, economic, and political issues. Among them is tolerance towards several minority groups. Secondly, EVS' project has also been a longitudinal one, spanning 40 years, so far: from 1981 to 2021, which allows this thesis to analyse social tolerance in Europe longitudinally, and this research is supported on all five EVS waves (1981-1984, 1991-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010, and 2017-2021). The individual-level data is comprised of a total of 169556 individuals, with 15487 coming from wave 1, 34340 from wave 2, 35224 from wave 3, 43659 from wave 4, and 40846 from wave 5 (see Table A.3.2.1., in the Appendix). This allows this analysis to go far and wide simultaneously: both while comparing all the considered countries and providing an analysis throughout periods, which allows the introduction of more data variability than would otherwise be available.

The country data (macro-level sources) depends on the type of data I collect to use my macro independent variables. In this sense, the variable “voting for the far-right” had its data gathered from the national election websites from the selected 31 countries: for each election in the year of when each EVS survey was implemented, or the election immediately before, in case the election year did not coincide with the survey year. As to the socioeconomic performance variables, I collected the data from two sources, the UN and the World Bank. I

³⁷ EVS' website can be accessed through: <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/>. Last accessed on: 20/02/2024.

used the UN's website to gather the Human Development Index (n.d.) variable for each EVS survey year.³⁸ Finally, the data for GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment were collected from the World Bank website.³⁹ Finally, the selected 31 countries are analysed throughout five points in time provided by the EVS project (1981-1984, 1991-1993, 1999-2001, 2008-2010, and 2017-2021). This means that these countries will be studied several times, and thus, the unit's total is not merely 31, but as many times as those 31 countries were included in those same studies, equalling 125 cases (13 in the 1981-1984 wave, 26 in the 1991-1993 wave, 28 in the 1999-2001 wave, 31 in the 2008-2010 wave, and 27 in the 2017-2021 wave). The countries available in each EVS wave are in Table 3.2.1. The data used comes from secondary data sources (EVS/WVS for the individual-level data; National election result agencies, UN, and the World Bank for the country-level data).

Concerning the analytical levels, as put by Viegas, "most explanatory models of political and social tolerance adopt a micro social perspective (...), in order to determine the variables that contribute most to the explanation of attitudes of political and social discrimination" (2004: 101), and this observation is still valid today, with most tolerance studies still privileging a micro social perspective. Thus, this research benefits from including country-level data, and to do this, I establish a set of criteria to select the European cases. They are explored in the next section.

3.2.1. Why study Europe? Case selection criteria for countries

Having indicated the origins of both individual and country-level data, I now justify the case selection criteria for countries used in this research.

The European case is of particular interest to study social tolerance for several reasons. First, the continent has known significant change after WWII and the Cold War, especially over the last decades, with successive crises having hit it, with citizens' social and political behaviour having changed in the process (i.e. Inglehart, 1977; Freire *et al.*, 2016). Second, in Europe, there are several countries in close regional proximity, fully or partially democratised, with different cultures, histories and languages in a relatively small area, are usually loosely grouped in regional groups due to these physical, cultural, linguistic and historical proximities,

³⁸ HDI's data is available at: <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>. Last accessed in 14/01/2025.

³⁹ GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment data, in the World Bank website, is available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/>. Last accessed in 08/01/2025.

in comparative politics (i.e. Freire, 2006; Van Deth *et al.*, 2007; Todosijević and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Freire *et al.*, 2016; Freire and Kivistik, 2018; Lisi *et al.*, 2020).

Furthermore, these European countries are (or used to be, in the case of the UK) also under the common umbrella of the European institutions (the European Union and other institutions, like the single market and Schengen). Furthermore, the continent has a colonial, imperialistic, and discriminatory past (Mazower, 1998; Judt, 2005), which ties in with studying tolerance and, thus, how these societies deal with their most vulnerable groups of people.

Finally, because Europe has been facing a period of socioeconomic turmoil since 2007, compounded with political changes (with the rise of the far-right), and social changes, with some evidence already pointing at the fact that the press has been becoming more aligned with exclusionary politics (Krzyżanowski and Ekström, 2024: 17-18). These developments may be at the root of a recent growth of intolerance in Europe towards its most vulnerable groups of people. Thus, it is relevant to analyse their correlations with social tolerance.

Regarding the countries included in this study, the list is detailed in Table 3.2.1. Some caveats should be noted: not all countries are present in every wave. In addition, the time span may vary during waves: for example, on wave 5, most countries had their survey during 2017 or 2018, but Portugal and Latvia had their survey in later years (respectively, 2020 and 2021). These are the countries which will be used in this thesis's analyses. A few important notes to be considered are that none of the Eastern European countries participated in the first wave (1981-1984), as well as three of the Southern European ones (Portugal, Greece and Cyprus). This reduces some of the variability in the overall research. However, as there are 125 macro-level cases and 169556 micro-level cases, this research is not lacking when it comes to variability.

Table 3.2.1 shows the countries I selected from each EVS wave. The first selection criterion is whether countries have their territories in Europe, which excludes the USA and Canada from the sample. Some other countries, however, have some of their territory in Europe, but most of their area and at least large percentages of their population do not live in Europe; this is the case of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, the Russian Federation, and Turkey.

Table 3.2.1. Countries selected from each EVS wave

Countries	I (1981-1984)	II (1990-1993)	III (1999-2001)	IV (2008-2010)	V (2017-2021)
Austria		1990	1999	2008	2018
Belgium	1981	1990	1999	2009	
Bulgaria		1990/1991	1999	2008	2019
Croatia			1999	2008	2017
Cyprus				2008	2019
Czechia		1991	1999	2008	2017
Denmark	1981	1990	1999	2008	2017
Estonia		1990	1999	2008	2018
Finland		1990	2000	2009	2017
France	1981	1990	1999	2008	2018
Germany	1981	1990	1999	2008/2009	2017
Great Britain	1981	1990	1999	2010	2018
Greece			1999	2008	2017
Hungary		1991	1999	2008/2009	2018
Iceland	1984	1990	1999	2009/2010	2017
Ireland	1981	1990	1999/2000	2008	
Italy	1981	1990	1999	2009	2018
Latvia		1990	1999	2008	2021
Lithuania		1990	1999	2008	2018
Luxembourg			1999	2008	
Malta	1983/1984	1991	1999	2008	
Netherlands	1981	1990	1999	2008	2017
Norway	1982	1990		2008	2018
Poland		1990	1999	2008	2017
Portugal		1990	1999	2008	2020
Romania		1993	1999	2008	2018
Slovakia		1991	1999	2008	2017
Slovenia		1992	1999	2008	2017
Spain	1981	1990	1999	2008	2017
Sweden	1982	1990	1999/2000	2009/2010	2017
Switzerland				2008	2017

Source: European Values Study (<http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/>). Last accessed on: 20/02/2024.

However, other countries could have been included, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Northern Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine, and Kosovo. The second criterion I used has to do with how democratic countries are. Countries that are not full democracies were excluded to ensure that the effect of the regime on tolerance is controlled. This is important because authoritarian regimes tend to be less inclusive, which could affect social tolerance. Several examples of this have become famous, such as Russia's discrimination against LGBTQ+ populations (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

For this case selection, it was necessary to identify which countries were classified as democratic to select them for analysis, as done in prior research (i.e., Dunn *et al.*, 2009: 290). This is due to dictatorial regimes being known to exert pressure on their citizens, which causes a risk of skewing results against political and social attitudes in these countries (e.g. Dunn *et al.*, 2009: 290; Geddes and Zaller, 1989; Tannenber, 2021), tolerance being one value among them.

To this end, two variables are used to characterise the country's position regarding democracy: V-Dem's variable of liberal democracy (as an indicator of democratic quality).⁴⁰ This variable is continuous and ranges from 0 to 1; the lower the number, the less democratic a country is, and the higher, the more democratic (Coppedge *et al.*, 2024: 47).⁴¹ There is no established and consensual value when V-Dem considers a country not a democracy, according to this indicator. While V-Dem does not attribute qualitative interpretations to the values obtained in their indices, Hildebrandt *et al.* (2019) argue that there is a connection between modernisation, democratization values and tolerance, and thus, the indicator of democratic quality is reliable: the higher it is, the more democratic a country is. Meaning that the lower the values of democratisation, potentially the lower the tolerance values, and thus why using this indicator to select which countries are democracies is important. As such, I established a theoretical *a priori* criterion of a tendentially democratic country having at least an above median value of this variable of the liberal democracy indicator scale. In other words, I consider a democracy every country with at least a 0,5 electoral democracy score. As Table 3.2.2. displays, this criterion is fulfilled by 31 European countries (even though Hungary has a score lower than 0,5 in the latest wave, I still maintained it due to its previous scores).

In a complementary manner, and used to cross validate V-Dem's liberal democracy indicator, the second indicator is the year when these countries become a democracy, according to Polity V's variable on democratic longevity (Marshall and Gurr, 2020), for which I chose the last year in which a country was considered a democracy⁴² (if a country was never considered a democracy, the year is not shown).

⁴⁰ This is due to this variable being the one which study democratic quality for the longest timeframe, which includes the time-span this thesis approaches, from 1981 to 2021.

⁴¹ V-Dem's "liberal democracy" indicator is available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/electoral-democracy-index#sources-and-processing>. Last accessed 20/01/2025.

⁴² Some of the countries were under military occupation by Nazi Germany, during WWII, and were democratized during or immediately after. For this reason, the year of democratization is during the 1940s for these countries, even though some, like Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria, already had democratic systems before they were occupied.

Table 3.2.2. Democratisation year and quality of democracy for each EVS' country and wave

Countries	Year of democratisation	Wave I (1981-1984)	Wave II (1990-1993)	Wave III (1999-2001)	Wave IV (2008-2010)	Wave V (2017-2021)
Austria	1946	--	0,780	0,778	0,799	0,754
Belgium	1944	0,780	0,800	0,815	0,829	--
Bulgaria	1990	--	0,521	0,626	0,632	0,512
Croatia	2000	--	--	0,275	0,640	0,620
Cyprus	1968	--	--	--	0,719	--
Czechia	(1990 as Czechoslovakia) 1993	--	0,807	0,812	0,835	0,725
Denmark	1945	0,883	0,881	0,881	0,898	0,892
Estonia	1991	--	0,692	0,803	0,811	0,842
Finland	1944	--	0,816	0,828	0,840	0,837
France	1944	0,790	0,806	0,803	0,816	0,803
Germany	1949 (as West Germany, and 1990 as reunified Germany)	0,829	0,857	0,866	0,866	0,833
Great Britain	1879	0,740	0,752	0,783	0,808	0,813
Greece	1975	--	--	0,797	0,806	0,748
Hungary	1990	--	0,765	0,756	0,771	0,368
Iceland	--	0,749	0,783	0,789	0,806	0,785
Ireland	1921	0,740	0,769	0,812	0,826	0,827
Italy	1947	0,716	0,736	0,765	0,777	0,792
Latvia	1991	--	0,448	0,700	0,674	0,748
Lithuania	1991	--	0,742	0,765	0,773	0,755
Luxembourg	1889	--	--	0,795	0,795	0,800
Malta	1964	0,487	0,570	0,616	0,627	0,567
Netherlands	1945	0,810	0,815	0,817	0,826	0,831
Norway	1945	0,828	0,851	--	0,862	0,852
Poland	1991	--	0,667	0,806	0,825	0,524
Portugal	1976	--	0,824	0,821	0,842	0,813
Romania	1996	--	0,393	0,442	0,492	0,555
Slovakia	(1990 as Czechoslovakia) 1993	--	0,807	0,755	0,741	0,748
Slovenia	1991	--	0,771	0,765	0,745	0,736
Spain	1978	0,792	0,814	0,822	0,820	0,805
Sweden	1914	0,879	0,883	0,880	0,892	0,885
Switzerland	1847	--	--	--	0,856	0,872

Sources: Our World in Data (based on "Varieties of Democracy" by V-Dem project), available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/democracy#explore-data-democracy>. The year of democratisation is based on Polity V's variable on democratic longevity available at: <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

Notes: There is no data available for Iceland's date of re-democratisation (the UK and the USA occupied it during WWII). However, Iceland's liberal democracy indicator is relatively high, being close to countries such as Britain or Ireland; for this reason, I decided to include Iceland still.

Table 3.2.3. shows the same type of data in Table 3.2.2 but focuses on the data for non-selected countries. There, the median value of the V-Dem variable (0,5) is not achieved by

Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine. Beyond that, all these countries scored below the 0,5 median threshold. This means that Albania, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia are not considered as democratic as the countries in Table 3.2.2. One exception could have been Serbia, which had an above 0,5 in the 2008 wave, but unlike Hungary, Serbia does not feature on EVS before the 2008 wave, and thus it was excluded from the analysis.

To cross-validate V-Dem's variable and complement it, Polity V's democratic longevity indicator was used to confirm whether these countries are confirmed as democracies, or not. And, indeed, some countries were never considered a democracy (cases of Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Cyprus, and Northern Ireland) or no longer considered one (Ukraine).

Finally, two more cases are excluded: Northern Ireland is not an independent country, which means that macro-level data availability is limited. Beyond that, as Northern Ireland is a member of the UK, it brings the potential to generate endogeneity data issues with the British data. Northern Cyprus was excluded because it is mostly not recognised as an independent country, and its available macro-data is thus limited.

Table 3.2.3. Democratisation year and quality of democracy: non-selected EVS countries

Countries	Year of democratisation	Wave I (1981-1984)	Wave II (1990-1993)	Wave III (1999-2001)	Wave IV (2008-2010)	Wave V (2017-2021)
Albania	2002	--	--	--	0,439	0,414
Belarus	--	--	--	0,111	0,099	0,113
Bosnia and Herzegovina	--	--	--	--	0,396	0,367
Kosovo	2008	--	--	--	0,347	--
Moldova	1994	--	--	--	0,358	--
Montenegro	2006 (2003 as Serbia and Montenegro)	--	--	--	0,401	0,363
North Macedonia	1991	--	--	--	0,416	0,414
Northern Cyprus	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Northern Ireland	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Serbia	2006 (2003 as Serbia and Montenegro)	--	--	--	0,535	0,292
Ukraine	1994-2013	--	--	0,260	0,402	0,314

Sources: Our World in Data (based on "Varieties of Democracy" by V-Dem project), available at: <https://ourworldindata.org/democracy#explore-data-democracy>. The year of democratisation is based on Polity V's variable on democratic longevity available at: <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

Notes: There is no data available for Northern Ireland and Northern Cyprus.

My case selection counters the too many variables for a low number of cases problem in comparative research (or *many-V, small-N* [Lijphart, 1971]), by raising, as much as possible, the number of cases per wave (a maximum of 31 countries) and in total (125 cases). Another common problem in comparative research is Sartori's *concept stretching* (1970), where a concept is inadequately extended to cases where the concept is not properly applied. In my case, the solution to this problem was to reduce, as much as possible, the number of explanatory variables for this research, to the variables which the scholarship provides some level of evidence indicating a possible influence: of age, socioeconomic performance, and support for the far-right on social tolerance, and the control variables (Peters, 1998: 41-43; Pennings and Keman, 2020: 61-65; Ferrinho Lopes and Heyne, 2024: 42). As such, only the variables I deemed essential are used, excluding all others.

In summary, all European countries available in the EVS, classified as democracies by V-Dem, and above the 0,5 threshold in at least two or more EVS waves, were selected for this study.

3.2.2. Comparing countries: country groups

This section will now present the country groups and why they are important for this research. Country groups have been a feature of political science to compare regional areas (i.e. Freire, 2006; van Deth *et al.*, 2007). Sometimes comparing them with other regional areas (i.e. Freire and Kivistik, 2018), or during important World events, such as Southern European political behaviour during and after the Troika years (i.e. Freire *et al.*, 2016; Lisi *et al.*, 2020). Additionally, in political science, it is common to group countries according to their general geographic proximity (i.e. Freire, 2006; Todosijevec and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012, 2016), and also due to other factors, like cultural, linguistic, and economic proximity (Freire, 2006), as well as closer social and political attitudes (Freire *et al.*, 2014; Kroknes *et al.*, 2015; Belchior, 2020; Freire *et al.*, 2016; Lisi *et al.*, 2020). Albeit not common, this is not new to the study of social tolerance, with Todosijević and Enyedi (2008) studying 30 countries, divided into West and Eastern European countries (1995-1998), or Candeias (2012, 2016) separating countries into seven regional groups (Balkans, Mediterranean, Western Europe, Northern Europe, Eastern Europe, ex-USSR, and Western Asia).

In this research, I seek to explain tolerance through the action of socioeconomic performance and support for the far-right, which one could argue are circumstantial-type factors (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Viegas, 2004). What we know is that Southern Europe was more affected by the several crises than other European regions (i.e. Alesina *et al.*, 2019;

Beramendi and Stegmueller, 2020). Furthermore, prior studies demonstrate that Southern European political behaviour was more affected by these crises, accompanying the socioeconomic downturns faced (i.e. Freire *et al.*, 2016; Freire and Kivistik, 2018; Lisi *et al.*, 2020). Another important argument is cited by Viegas' studies on tolerance (2004, 2006), linking it to the Modernisation theory: the more democratised a country is, the more tolerant its citizens will be. This is connected to Huntington's democratic wave theories (1991): democratic and political culture also depend on when a country has democratised, namely that some southern European countries democratised at the beginning of the third wave of democratisation in a sort of spill-over effect. This is important because not only do groups of countries share a close geography, linguistic and cultural proximity, but they can also share democratisation processes. Likewise, the literature has already shown that different European regions have different tolerance levels: Northern and Central European countries tend to score higher, South Europe tends to lag behind them (Viegas, 2006, 2010; Todosijevec and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012, 2016), while Eastern Europe tends to be more intolerant (Todosijevec and Enyedi, 2008; Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023).

These country groups were chosen based on these arguments, to compare them and to use the regional areas as explanatory factors, due to the high likelihood that different countries and different European regions have differing values of tolerance (Todosijevec and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). As such, I used a series of criteria to group the countries: close geographical proximity, close languages, close social culture, close political cultures, and closer democratisation periods. Appendix Table A.3.2.1. showcases the three different groups of countries: northern and central European, eastern European, and southern European countries.

The first group of countries, the Northern and Central European countries, encompasses Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. All these countries have been democratised or redemocratised during the 19th century, in the early 20th century or right after the events of WWII. Many of them had been under military occupation during WWII (by the Axis powers, or by the UK and USA, in the case of Iceland). These countries were partially redemocratised by 1949 or fully democratised in 1990 with the German reunification (as Huntington's First and Second Waves of Democracy, 1991). These countries occupy the central and northernmost areas of Europe, in relative proximity to each other. They also share a close democratic culture (Inglehart, 1977; 1999), have built an advanced political culture

(Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) and are economically more developed than other European countries in the south and the east of Europe (Piketty, 2014).

The second group reports to the Southern European countries: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. In this group, while Greece, Portugal and Spain's democratisation processes resulted from Huntington's Third Wave of Democracy, which occurred during the mid to late 1970s, Cyprus and Malta became independent in the 1960s, during the decolonisation period of the British Empire. Also, Italy redemocratised right after WWII. However, these same countries are usually considered to be countries of closely tied cultures. This is due to their geographical positions, formerly being part of the Roman Empire, sharing a linguistic base in Latin, and having similar cultural behaviours regarding familial, social and political norms. Also considering that Portugal, Spain and Greece transitioned to democracies in the same democratic wave and that Malta and Cyprus transitioned at a closer time, and that Italy is a society with such close ties to Portugal and Spain, all these arguments contribute to their classification as the same group of Southern Europe. These countries are geographically close, and many of which share borders. As an illustration of its comparability, scholarship widely compared Southern European countries on issues related to the euro crisis (Hutter *et al.*, 2018; Teperoglou and Belchior, 2020; Tsatsanis *et al.*, 2021).

Finally, the Eastern European country group is composed of: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. These countries' democratic transition began right after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as the USSR, the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia's collapse. Thus, nearly all these countries transitioned towards democracy between 1990 and 1993, after over four decades of USSR domination over them (either directly or through puppet governments). The only exception to this is Croatia, which, even though it became independent in 1991, Polity V's democratic longevity variable only classifies it as a democracy in 2000. However, Croatia shares the historical event of the fall of the Communist States (through the Referendum for Croatian Independence), and had regular elections, a working parliament, and separation of powers, thus being a democracy at the time. Culturally speaking, these countries are rather close, sharing a linguistic base, a Slavic one. Geographically, they are in the easternmost part of Europe. These countries have previously been studied together by other tolerance researchers (Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012, 2016; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023).

3.2.3. Comparing countries: time lapse

Given that this research intends to examine the evolution of tolerance across time (objectives 4.1, and 4.3, second section of the introduction), a valid way to observe the evolution of tolerance values in Europe over time is by using a survey project which asks European citizens about their tolerance to minorities, over an enlarged period. This is why the EVS/WVS (2022) project is picked to study tolerance: it is one of the few survey research projects with social tolerance questions, spanning 40 years of surveys (1981 to 2021), divided in five different points in time (wave 1: 1981-1984, wave 2: 1991-1993, wave 3: 1999-2001, wave 4: 2008-2010, and wave 5: 2017-2021).

As previously stated, tolerance longitudinal studies are relatively scarce, with very few exceptions (e.g., Peffley *et al.*, 2015), especially considering simultaneous comparative and longitudinal studies of tolerance (e.g., Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Ribeiro, 2010; Hadler, 2012). Thus, this study utilises these five EVS/WVS waves to compare social tolerance across time, aiming to understand, on the one hand, how tolerance has evolved in Europe over time, and, on the other, how time affects social tolerance.

3.3. The variables

In this subchapter, I approach the variables in this study: dependent, independent and control variables. This subchapter is subdivided into three sections. The first section approaches the dependent variables. The second section relates to the independent variables, of which there are four main variable groups approached: age, support for the far-right, socioeconomic factors, country region, and time.⁴³ Finally, the third section approaches the control variables, which are divided into four different types: sociodemographic, political, institutional, and psychosocial controls.

In each section, I will document which variables were used, describing them in detail, and arguing why these were chosen.

3.3.1. Social tolerance: the dependent variable(s)

This subchapter's section displays the dependent variables. As stated in the theoretical background, especially as Gibson points out (2013: 46-48), there is a long-standing tradition of studying tolerance (namely, social tolerance), whose survey methods are based on Stouffer's

⁴³ The literature revision of factors used in tolerance studies is present in Chapter II, subchapters 2.1., 2.2., 2.3., and 2.4.

seminal works (1955). This author uses binary items, in which individuals would agree with more or less civil rights for communists, socialists and atheists. But other authors used other methods, namely Sullivan *et al.* (1979) used survey methods different from Stouffer's binary kind of items, using a Likert scale on agreement with civil rights regarding each socially stigmatised group [1979: 787-788; 1982: 2]. Generally, there are two ways in which tolerance is measured: when it comes to how the social groups are selected, and how these same social groups are chosen in said research. When it comes to selecting the social groups, these methods were identified by Gibson, who systematized the approaches defining them: the least-liked group (where respondents name the groups they most dislike), the fixed-group (which identifies the groups over which researchers ask questions about which activities are they allowed to do), and the focus on support for restrictive public policies (which asks respondents about their support for public policies which restrict access to certain civil liberties) (i.e. Gibson, 1992b; Gibson, 2013: 45-48). Gibson concludes that the alternative measures of tolerance perform equally well in terms of their implications for substantive conclusions, which means that all methodologies may be used, without concern for technique reliability.

When it comes to how the social groups are measured, they can be either through Likert scales, like Sullivan *et al.*'s studies, or by dichotomous indicators, like Stouffer's study. This is approached in a debate held between Gibson and Mondak and Sanders (2003), who contend that: "the question of tolerance versus intolerance is inherently dichotomous, not continuous" (Mondak and Sanders, 2003: 496), meaning that when asking about tolerance to a specific group, one should ask whether people either are tolerant or not. Gibson (2005: 313), on the other hand, discussed the merits of using dichotomous or continuous methods to study tolerance as a response to Mondak and Sanders', stating that their work is an important deviation from the history of research on tolerance. Gibson argues that seeing tolerance as "continuous and unidimensional" is the best strategy because it allows for more opportunity for test subjects to express their intolerance (2005: 319).

As such, in this research, the approach used is the *least-liked* approach, which asks an interviewee if they would mind being a neighbour to a group of people. This is the approach used in the EVS and WVS surveys, and the indicators used are dichotomous.⁴⁴ This is a common option. Indeed, authors, from an early stage, started to use social acceptance of

⁴⁴ The initial question asked on EVS was: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you identify any that you would not like to have as neighbours?", later being followed by a list of groups, which then the individual being interviewed either mentions that they wouldn't like to have them as neighbors (1=mentioned), or they do not mention these groups (0=not mentioned).

neighbours as indicators of tolerance by themselves (i.e. Heltai and Szokolczai, 1988; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Candeias, 2016; Yigit, 2020; Plenković *et al.*, 2022).

The studied groups of people in EVS (and the literature, as well) varies immensely from study to study, ranging from political groups (extremists and radicals on both the Left and the Right sides of the political spectrum), personal issues (drug users and HIV-positive individuals), religious groups (Christians, Hindus, Muslims) and minorities (homosexuals, Roma, Jews, other minority ethnic and nationality groups). However, on EVS' 2022 joint datafile version, the traditionally discriminated minority groups were 16 in total: People of a different race (waves 1 to 5), Muslims (waves 2 to 5), Immigrants/foreign workers (waves 1 to 5), Homosexuals (waves 2 to 5), People with a criminal record (waves 1 to 4), Heavy drinkers (waves 1 to 5), Emotionally unstable people (waves 1 to 4), People who have AIDS (waves 2 to 4), Drug addicts (waves 2 to 5), Jews (waves 2 to 5), Gypsies (waves 3 to 5), Christians (waves 4 and 5), Left wing extremists (waves 1 to 4), Right wing extremists (waves 1 to 4), People with large families (waves 1 to 4), and Hindus (wave 2). From the EVS list of socially stigmatised groups, only seven of them included data spanning at least the most recent EVS wave (2017-2020) until wave 2 (1990-1993), or wave 1 (1981-1984): people of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers, and heavy drinkers (waves 1 to 5), and, Muslims, homosexuals, drug addicts, and Jews (waves 2 to 5). This means that these groups are the only ones I can longitudinally analyse individually, and, at the same time, use them to create an additive social tolerance index; that is, these are the only variables available to be used.

However, these seven groups are not in equal standing with each other. As such, I decided to further restrict the use of socially stigmatised groups to just four of the groups: people of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers, Muslims, and homosexuals. My argument also follows the idea in the scholarship that other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals are social groups which are more salient and more politically relevant, especially due to how they are frequently attacked by the far-right's rhetoric (i.e. Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2021, 2024; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020). Racial minorities and immigrants are groups that often face exclusion based on both ethnic/national origin and socio-economic status. In Europe, immigration (particularly from the Global South) has increasingly been associated with processes of racialisation and the construction of "outsider" identities (Balibar and Swenson, 2004; Essed and Goldberg, 2002). Thus, immigrants of colour are subject to systemic discrimination in several areas, like housing, employment, and legal status (Meuleman *et al.*, 2009; Scholten and van Ostaijen, 2018; Quillian *et al.*, 2019). As to Muslims, this minority have become a focal point of cultural and political contestation in contemporary Europe. The

post-9/11 security discourse, as well as ongoing debates over multiculturalism, religious symbols (e.g., hijab bans), and national identity, have positioned Muslims at the centre of public anxiety and populist rhetoric (Fekete, 2009; Modood, 2007). The Muslim identity is thus heavily politicised, often conflated with notions of incompatibility with European values, systematically othered in political and media discourse, and politically disputed by conservative and populist politicians (Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2024; Cesari, 2009; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Gómez del Tronco, 2024).

These three groups (other races, immigrants, and Muslims) are also heavily associated with the 2015 migratory crisis (Kromczyk *et al.*, 2021; Gómez del Tronco, 2024). This crisis intensified racialisation processes towards non-white individuals, and migrants from Africa and the Middle East were often portrayed as a threatening other (De Genova, 2018). Black and Arab individuals were particularly affected, as their racialised visibility became intertwined with narratives of uncontrolled borders, criminality, and civilisational decline (Rexhepi, 2018). The crisis catalysed a surge in anti-immigrant sentiment across Europe. Far-right populist movements, already on the rise before 2015, capitalised on the migration influx to stir fear and resentment, portraying immigrants as economic burdens, potential terrorists, and cultural invaders (Dennison and Geddes, 2019; Mudde, 2024; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020).

Moreover, because a significant proportion of the migrants and refugees arriving during the 2015 migration crisis were Muslim, the crisis reinforced pre-existing narratives that associated Islam with extremism, cultural backwardness, and violent masculinity. These narratives were amplified by political rhetoric and media coverage, particularly following events like the Paris and Brussels attacks, and the Cologne New Year's Eve incidents in 2015–2016, which framed Muslim refugees as threats to European values and public safety (Bayrakli and Hafez, 2016; Lemay, 2021). This narrative construction drew on long-standing orientalist tropes and served to legitimise exclusionary policies and the securitisation of Muslim communities in Europe (Ekici and Yucel, 2015; Rexhepi, 2018; Farris, 2017), particularly by the far-right parties (Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020).

When it comes to homosexuals, while many Western European countries have made significant legal advances in terms of LGBTQ+ rights (with the legalisation of gay marriage and adoption rights in some cases), large portions of Central and Eastern Europe still exhibit legal and cultural hostility towards homosexuality (Takács and Szalma, 2011; Ayoub, 2016; Jung and O'Dwyer, 2024; Ayoub *et al.*, 2025). In addition, far-right political narratives tend to depict homosexuality as a threat to traditional family values, and backlash against LGBTQ+

visibility remains common (Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2021; Paternotte and Kuhar, 2018; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020; Tausch, 2024).

By contrast, heavy drinkers and drug addicts are typically marginalised not because of their fixed social identities, but due to behaviours constructed as socially deviant. Their exclusion tends to be framed through the lenses of public health, criminality, or moral failure rather than systemic identity-based discrimination (Room, 2005; Radcliffe and Stevens, 2008). Consequently, they are generally not subjected to the same entrenched structural exclusions tied to categories such as race, ethnicity, religion, or sexuality, which are historically embedded in state institutions, legal regimes, or cultural hierarchies (Yuval-Davis, 2006). They are also not usually tackled by the far-right discourse, which focuses on anti-establishment, racist, xenophobic, anti-migrant, Islamophobic, and homophobic rhetoric (Mudde, 2007, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2021, 2024; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020).

Similarly, while Jews have been among the most persistently persecuted minorities in European history (enduring centuries of religious and racial violence, culminating in the Holocaust), Jewish communities benefit from legal protections, cultural funding, and robust interfaith initiatives (Ariel, 2011; Abu-Nimer and Nelson, 2021). Antisemitism remains an ongoing concern and has resurged in various forms, both from the far-right and in connection with global political tensions (Marcus, 2015; Bergmann, 2008; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). However, much of recent social scientific attention has shifted to more recently arrived or demographically growing minority groups, namely migrants and Muslim populations (Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2021; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020). While Jews and alcohol and drug users are sometimes used in social tolerance studies, they tend not to be the focus. Furthermore, the selected four groups, other races (e.g. Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Plenković *et al.*, 2022), immigrants (e.g. Lazarus, 2011; Borgonovi, 2012; Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Belot, 2012; Rapp, 2017; Azedi, 2025), Muslims (e.g. Peach and Glebe, 1995; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Strabac *et al.*, 2012; Ekici and Yucel, 2015; Plenković *et al.*, 2022; Berggren *et al.*, 2025), and homosexuals (e.g. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Tausch, 2024; Lee, 2024) are also among the most studied groups in social tolerance literature.

Having set the choice for the variables being used as dependent variables, as these social groups are either mentioned or not, the respective variables of tolerance to each group are dichotomous. As Liberati *et al.* pointed out, by using the *least-liked* approach, dichotomous variables can be used to build an additive index variable. This allows for ranking tolerance in several countries: the more a given citizen states that they dislike social group 1, 2, and so forth, the more it allows for a tolerance index, or rank (Liberati *et al.*, 2021: 155). The more groups

a citizen dislikes, the more tolerant he/she will be. This technique has become widely used in studying social tolerance (Weldon, 2006; Kirchner *et al.*, 2011: 204-207; Candeias, 2012: 30-31, 2016; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019: 1169; Liberati *et al.*, 2021: 155; Plenkovic *et al.*, 2022: 667).⁴⁵ Furthermore, while some authors use large scales of tolerance (more than five points in the scale, e.g. Viegas, 2007; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Candeias, 2012), others use smaller scales of tolerance, with anywhere between two and seven response categories. These “categories” correspond with the amount of social tolerance dichotomous variables which were used to build their respective additive social tolerance indices (Candeias, 2012, 2016; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Das *et al.*, 2008; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019). As an example, if a researcher uses three different dichotomous tolerance variables, he can build a new social tolerance additive index with four categories. In this index, 0 means that an individual is completely intolerant to all three tolerance indicators, 1 means that the individual is tolerant of one group, and so forth until the highest category, which means that the individual is tolerant of all social groups.

Thus, based on this previous research, I created a new variable by adding the answers of respondents about those four social tolerance groups. As such, if an individual shows himself to be tolerant towards all four considered social groups, that individual gets a four rating. If said individual shows himself to be intolerant towards all considered social groups, he will get a zero rating (as done by: Bogardus, 1933: 265-271).

To validate the internal consistency of these indexes, I first run an association test between the four variables using the *phi coefficient*, ϕ , because all variables are of a nominal and bivariate nature (Khamis, 2008: 159). The results, which can be seen in detail in Table A.3.3.1. (in the Appendix) shows that the association between all variables is statistically significant. Tolerance to different races, Muslims, and immigrants is closer to each other in association values (always over 0,450), while homosexuality has an association value with the latter three, always between 0,314 and 0,356. A second test was performed, a reliability analysis (Cronbach’s Alpha), to assess whether the four EVS dichotomous variables have sufficient consistency between themselves to validate the creation of a composite variable. Cronbach's Alpha result was 0,721, which is considered a good value, indicating that the four chosen variables have satisfactory internal consistency, which enables the usage of a composite additive variable. For the detailed results, please check Appendix A.3.3.2.

⁴⁵ For more details on tolerance indices, check Appendix A.3.

Table 3.3.1. shows all the dependent variables, their scales and sources. All these variables encode the attitudes of tolerance to minority and vulnerable groups of people by the EVS respondents by asking individuals if they “don’t like as neighbours” certain groups of people, which are read out to the inquired from a list. The original variables were recoded so that “1” means “mentioned” and “0” means “not mentioned. When these individuals mention that they do not want to live with a certain group of people, as neighbours, that individual is seen as *intolerant* of that group. If the individual does not mention a group, he/she is classified as *tolerant* (e.g. Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan *et al.*, 1993; Viegas, 2007). As such, the categories have been recoded to mean the following: 1=tolerant, and 0=not tolerant.

Table 3.3.1. Social tolerance: dependent variables list

Dimensions	Variables	Categories	Origin
Social Tolerance	Tolerance towards Homosexuals	0=intolerant 1=tolerant	EVS – waves 2 to 5
	Tolerance towards Immigrants	0=intolerant 1=tolerant	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Tolerance towards other races	0=intolerant 1=tolerant	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Tolerance towards Muslims	0=intolerant 1=tolerant	EVS – waves 2 to 5
	Tolerance (additive variable)	0 (min) – 4 (max)	EVS – waves 2 to 5

Sources: own elaboration, based on EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed in 28/08/2024.

For this study, the variables are used both individually and in a composite manner. The dichotomous tolerance variables are used to study tolerance to each stigmatised group, individually, using statistical descriptive and explicative analysis. I also use the additive social tolerance index for statistical descriptive and explicative analysis.⁴⁶ Another relevant note is that all analyses based on the EVS individual-level data use the survey weight provided by the EVS datasets (EVS weight variable: S017 “Weight”), ensuring that each national sample is representative of the population from which it was drawn.

Some particularities should be mentioned: the variables tolerance to Muslims and homosexuals were not asked on EVS wave 1 (1981-1984). As such, the empirical analysis cannot be performed for this wave regarding these two variables. In the same way, the additive tolerance index, created using the four dichotomous tolerance variables, will be missing for

⁴⁶ I use several statistical techniques: linear regression (for micro-level analysis) and multilevel regression analysis (for multilevel analysis). Multilevel analysis of each of these groups, individually, is beyond this thesis’s scope and thus is not an objective.

wave 1, as the lack of data in these two variables makes it impossible to create an additive indicator for wave 1, coherent with the other four waves. Thus, the social tolerance additive index only ranges from 1991 to 2021. However, I still analyse, at the micro-level, the dichotomous social tolerance variables, including other races and immigrants, which have data available from 1981 to 2021.

Table 3.3.2. Valid and missing cases by dependent variable, wave, and country group

EVS-wave	Country groups		Tolerance: Race	Tolerance: Muslims	Tolerance: Immigrants	Tolerance: Homosexuals	Social Tolerance: additive scale	
1981-1984	Northern/Central Europe	N	Valid	11369	0	11369	0	0
			Missing	0	11369	0	11369	11369
	Southern Europe	N	Valid	4118	0	4118	0	0
			Missing	0	4118	0	4118	4118
1990-1993	Northern/Central Europe	N	Valid	16798	16798	16798	16798	16798
			Missing	0	0	0	0	0
	Eastern Europe	N	Valid	11287	11289	11283	11295	11279
			Missing	22	20	26	14	30
	Southern Europe	N	Valid	6233	6233	6233	6233	6233
			Missing	0	0	0	0	0
1999-2001	Northern/Central Europe	N	Valid	15122	15122	15123	15124	15121
			Missing	233	233	232	231	234
	Eastern Europe	N	Valid	11523	11523	11523	11523	11523
			Missing	1002	1002	1002	1002	1002
	Southern Europe	N	Valid	6344	6344	6344	6344	6344
			Missing	0	0	0	0	0
2008-2010	Northern/Central Europe	N	Valid	18431	18410	18431	18455	18234
			Missing	899	920	899	875	1096
	Eastern Europe	N	Valid	18934	18877	18848	19088	18291
			Missing	839	896	925	685	1482
	Southern Europe	N	Valid	8343	8299	8312	8340	8121
			Missing	229	273	260	232	451
2017-2020	Northern/Central Europe	N	Valid	21204	21197	21203	21211	21171
			Missing	347	354	348	340	380
	Eastern Europe	N	Valid	15539	15679	15578	15742	14763
			Missing	1175	1035	1136	972	1951
	Southern Europe	N	Valid	4527	4494	3885	4507	3769
			Missing	174	207	816	194	932

Source: own elaboration, based on EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last checked on 28/08/2024.

A final, albeit important note should be referenced here. Other authors previously found that social tolerance can have effects on other variables, thus being an explanatory factor, along with being both dependent and explanatory, simultaneously. A good example of this is the variable *income* explaining and simultaneously being explained by tolerance (Dima and Dima, 2016). For this reason, some authors used tolerance both as an independent and a dependent variable (i.e. Dima and Dima, 2016; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019: 1172).

This thesis may suffer from this endogeneity issue, and one of the reasons is that the data I am relying on does not allow for studying causality. An example is the potential relational problem between social tolerance and the four explanatory socioeconomic performance variables: the relationship between unemployment and social attitudes may be bidirectional. This could make it challenging to establish causality (Di Tella *et al.*, 2003), and a few authors have tested tolerance as an explanatory factor rather than a dependent variable (i.e. Berggren and Elinder, 2012a; Rapp, 2017). This endogeneity problem cannot be solved by the use of time-series or structural equation modelling, since in EVS, there are not enough points in time to apply these techniques, as most specialists recommend a minimum of 40 to 50 points in time (i.e. McCleary *et al.*, 1980: 20; Warner, 1998: 2–3; Poole *et al.*, 2002: 56; Jebb *et al.*, 2015: 3; Hecht and Zitzmann, 2021: 229).

To fulfil the principle of parsimonious research, this thesis focuses solely on explaining social tolerance, instead of assessing endogeneity underlying the study of tolerance. Furthermore, the endogeneity problem is quite common in political science and social science research (i.e. Esping-Andersen and Przeworski, 2015; Ando *et al.*, 2022; Avramovska, 2021), with the possibility that dependent and independent factors could interchangeably influence each other which has not precluded researchers from studying the correlational effects of several phenomena. Thus, there is no reason not to move forward with this research.

Hence, this research does not claim to study causal mechanisms of social tolerance, but merely the relationship between social tolerance and the three main factors previously identified. This research also recognises that there may be reciprocal relationships between socioeconomic performance (as well as electoral support for the far-right) and social tolerance. However, much in the same way as Belchior and Conceição Pequito (2023: 89), this research is focused on how social tolerance is explained by its explanatory factors exclusively.

3.3.2. *The independent variables and analytical levels*

Regarding the independent variables, the analysis is based on five dimensions, with three of them being the main ones being tested, namely age, support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance. Concomitantly, the European region and time dimensions are also further explored to complement the main dimensions being tested. Before explaining each of the independent variables, it becomes relevant to first approach this research's analytical levels. Afterwards, I will approach each of the independent variables.

Each of the dimensions contains several variables, which will be approached in detail over the next few pages. The age dimension is measured exclusively at the individual level

(level 1), while support for the far-right dimension is measured on both levels, individual and country level (level 2), with the individual level variable being self-positioning in the far-right, and the country level variable being voting for the far-right. Finally, the socioeconomic performance dimension, region, and time are exclusively level 2 dimensions. In this section, I present each independent variable and how they were operationalised.

Table 3.3.3. Independent variables

Dimensions	Analytical level	Variables	Categories	Origin
<i>Age</i>	Individual	Age	15-82+	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Individual	Age ²	-	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Individual	Youth: 15-35	0=Not 15-35 1=15-35	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Individual	Old: 66+	0=Not 66+ 1=66+	EVS – waves 1 to 5
<i>Support for the far-right</i>	Individual	Self-positioning in the far-right	0=not far-right 1=Far-right	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Country	Far-Right voting %	0-100%	National election results
<i>Socioeconomic performance</i>	Country	HDI	0-1	UN
	Country	GDP Annual Growth (%)	σ^2	World Bank
	Country	GDP per Capita (PPP \$)	-	World Bank
	Country	Unemployment (annual %)	0-100%	World Bank
<i>Region</i>	Country	Southern Europe	0=Not Southern Europe 1=Southern Europe	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Country	Eastern Europe	0=Not Eastern Europe 1=Eastern Europe	EVS – waves 1 to 5
<i>Time</i>	Country	EVS wave 3	0=Not EVS wave 3 1=EVS wave 3	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Country	EVS wave 4	0=Not EVS wave 4 1=EVS wave 4	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Country	EVS wave 5	0=Not EVS wave 5 1=EVS wave 5	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Country	Year survey	1=Wave 1 (1981-1984) 2=Wave 2 (1990-1993) 3=Wave 3 (1999-2001) 4=Wave 4 (2008-2010) 5=Wave 5 (2017-2021)	EVS – waves 1 to 5

Sources: own elaboration, based on EVS/WVS (2022) (available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/> [last accessed in 28/08/2024]), United Nations (2024) (available at: <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI> [last accessed in 14/01/2025]), and World Bank (2024) (available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/> [last accessed in 08/01/2025]).

All micro-level variables originate in the EVS questionnaires, while the macro-level variables were gathered from several different sources. The complete list of independent variables and corresponding sources is presented in Table 3.3.3. below.

Age

The use of age in the study of the tolerance phenomenon is old, with Stouffer (1955) providing the first evidence.

The analysis incorporates four distinct age measures, which all derive from the original EVS age variable. However, this variable is not fully harmonised across survey waves. Notably, in the 2017–2021 wave, age data is recorded only up to 82 years, with all respondents aged 82 and above aggregated into a single category labelled “82 and more” (EVS 2017). For this reason, the first variable, which I call “Age”, is a harmonised variable, where all categories above 82 years old were categorised into “82 and more”. Consequently, this variable ranges from 15 years old to 82 or more years old. Next, I created three variables from the first age variable. Age² is calculated by using the compute command on SPSS to multiply the age variable by itself. I do this to test a possible non-linear correlation of age with social tolerance.

The following variables are dummies generated to isolate the association between the youth and their older counterparts. The variables are “Youth: 15-35=1”, which is obtained by coding all individuals between 15 and 35 years of age as “1”, and all other ages as “0”, with the next dummy, “Old: 66+=1”, serving to isolate the association of the older age group, and thus, coding all 66 or more years old into the same category, as “1”. All age variables are individual level.

Support for the far-right dimension

There are two variables in this dimension of support for the far-right.

Self-positioning in the far-right – individual/micro-level

This variable constitutes an original contribution from this thesis to the literature, seeking to isolate the association that self-positioning in the far-right has with social tolerance, as the scholarship used party-self-identification (i.e. Billiet, 1995; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020) or the left-right self-positioning scale (i.e. Weldon, 2006; Viegas, 2006; Ribeiro, 2010;

Peffley *et al.*, 2015; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). In general, the more leftist or liberal a person is, the more tolerant they tend to be. This variable is, thus, individual-level (micro).

Self-positioning in the far-right derives from the Left-Right self-placement question, which is an extensively used variable in political science due to its capability to summarise political ideology. In the EVS, this variable is asked in the following manner in the questionnaire: “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?”, with the scale varying from 1=Left, to 10=Right. Using this variable, I recode the response categories on the left-right self-placement variable into 1 to 8=0 (reference category, ‘Others’), and 9 and 10 to =1 (‘Far-Right’). This variable will be used to measure how much ideologically self-positioning in the far-right influences social tolerance.

Electoral support for the far-right– country/macro-level

Regarding electoral support for the far-right, I use voting for far-right parties (as done by Weldon, 2006). For this, it was necessary to take some steps in preparation. First, the definitions of what constitutes a far-right party were taken from Mudde’s (2007, 2019), Pirro’s (2015, 2023), and Rooduijn *et al.* ‘s *PopuList* (2023a; 2023b) works. That is, this thesis considers the far-right party family as including radical right and right-wing populist parties, as well as extreme and far-right parties. In general, these parties have several characteristics in common. Thus, the difference between radical right, populist right-wing parties and extreme right parties is more tenuous, with both being nativist and authoritarian. As such, the selection of far-right parties is based on the list of far-right parties made available in the literature, namely by the *PopuList* (Rooduijn *et al.*, 2023a, 2023b). As such, the selected parties are not merely restricted to fascist and neo-Nazi parties; I also include parties which, even though they have not shown themselves to be extreme-right, are still classified as radical-right and right-wing populists.

As to the second step, I list the considered far-right parties (see Table A.3.3.3. in Appendix A.3.), identifying, for each of the 31 countries, the parties considered to be radical right, populist right wing, extreme-right or far-right.

In the final step, I check each country’s national election results, using their respective national elections governing body’s website, immediately before or in the year when each EVS survey was applied to the population, gathering every electoral result for all considered political parties. This study expands on Weldon’s (2006, 2003) research on how far-right voting

correlates with tolerance⁴⁷ by adding more countries and widening the period (Weldon only used 1997 Eurobarometer data).

This led to the final step in creating this variable: the macro-level support for the far-right results from the sum of every result, in voting percentage. By originating in the national election results, this variable is a percentual one (ranges from 0 to 100) and it is calculated by adding all the percentual results of the far-right parties in each country at a given election. As an example, to correspond with the 2020 EVS survey in Portugal, I used the National electoral results of the 2019 election, in which the two considered parties (CHEGA and PNR) would have their respective results added and then considered as the total vote in populist and far-right parties. This variable is macro-level.

Socioeconomic performance dimension – country/macro-level

From a macro-level perspective to measure socioeconomic performance, I use four variables: HDI, GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate. HDI was taken from the UN's website (available at: <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>), and the other socioeconomic variables were taken from the World Bank (2024) (available at: <https://data.worldbank.org/>). These variables were chosen because all four of them had already been tested in the literature (successfully and unsuccessfully), being useful to compare countries, longitudinally study them, and assess their relationship with tolerance (e.g. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a; Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Peffley *et al.*, 2015; Salahodjaev, 2021; Rapp, 2017; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019). I call these variables “socioeconomic performance”, because they concern indicators of pure economic performance (namely GDP annual growth rate and GDP per capita), and also because I include two other variables which concern social development (HDI and unemployment).

One way in which the choice of socioeconomic indicators distinguishes this thesis from the works which have previously been done, has to do with the specific combination of the chosen factors: I am not just measuring how the economy or development, separately, affects social tolerance (as done by Weldon, 2006; Hadler, 2012; Berggren and Nilsson, 2013; Berggren *et al.*, 2025). Economic and social development are parallel with each other (Sen, 1999; Przeworski *et al.*, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012); as such, while not a completely

⁴⁷ Although, like Weldon, I also must recognise that the relationship between far-right and tolerance is, likely, mutual (2006: 340).

new combination of factors (Candeias, 2012, 2016; Beramendi and Stegmueller, 2020; for example used it), it makes sense to use measures which are both economic and developmental to simultaneous control of its influence on social tolerance.

Human Development Index (HDI) is used to summarise how some dimensions of human development have been developing in Europe. The dimensions that this variable uses are named *long and healthy life* (which is given by life expectancy at birth), *knowledge* (given by expected years of schooling and mean years of schooling), and *decent standard of living* (given by gross national income [GNI] per capita in PPP\$).⁴⁸ This variable varies between 0 and 1, meaning that the closer the index is to 1, the more developed a given country is. However, some disadvantages of using HDI are that it oversimplifies several measurements into one (life expectancy, which is a health proxy, education and income) (UNDP, 2023), it does not account for inequality (Alkire and Foster, 2011). It can overlook contextual and cultural differences (Sen, 1999). These problems are controlled by my pick of only liberal democratic European countries, as their cultures are closer, their evaluative standards for health, life expectancy, education, and income are harmonised, and thus, this indicator is more adequate. HDI has been commonly used in tolerance research (e.g. Viegas (2004, 2010), Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003: 251), and Lee (2021: 4-5).

Gross Domestic Product annual growth rate (or GDP growth) is the added measure of the total market value of all the goods and services provided and produced by a country, in a given year, compared to the previous year, in percentage points. However, GDP annual growth has an important disadvantage in measuring a contextual economic result, in general. This problem is particularly acute in my thesis due to the limited number of data points, which could result in skewed results. For this reason, I introduced two more economic variables: GDP per capita (measured in dollars PPP) and annual unemployment rate. Numerous researchers have used GDP annual growth to capture how economic growth affects social phenomena. In the case of tolerance, as the dependent variable, it is the most used economic factor, with several studies using it for this reason (i.e. Weldon, 2006; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Peffley *et al.*, 2015; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a; Lee, 2021).

As to GDP per capita, it is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output, divided by mid-year population. It provides a measurement of economic and social living standards, often used as a broad indicator of economic development (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The

⁴⁸ Check here how to calculate HDI: <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/documentation-and-downloads>.

fact that it is an average income per person in each country does not make it capable of measuring well-being, per se, but the inclusion of HDI complements this (Stiglitz *et al.*, 2009; Piketty, 2014). GDP per capita has also been used in several tolerance studies (i.e. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Berggren and Elinder, 2012a; Dunn and Singh, 2014; Dima and Dima, 2016; Rapp, 2017; Seligson *et al.*, 2019; Yigit, 2020; Salahodjaev, 2021; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019).

The final measurement is the annual unemployment rate, as given by national estimates provided to the World Bank. It is the percentage of workers who are without work each year. Unemployment is another variable of economic performance, which can signal economic distress when high or excessively low (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2019; ILO, 2023) and is also known as a proxy of economic inequality (Stiglitz, 2012). However, some disadvantages of this variable include the underrepresentation of unemployed, underemployed citizens, and the “discouraged workers” (those who stopped looking for jobs) (ILO, 2023). Another argument in favour of using this variable is that it has been previously used as a factor by the researchers of tolerance with it often affecting social tolerance (i.e. Persell *et al.*, 2001; Weldon, 2003; Viegas, 2004, 2006, 2010; Hadler, 2012; Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Dima and Dima, 2016; Rapp, 2017; Tausch, 2024).

These three variables, along with their definitions, presented here,⁴⁹ have been collected from the World Bank⁵⁰ and are measured in percentages. They have been chosen for their capability to accurately measure how a given country (or region) is faring. Furthermore, the use of HDI, GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment, as in this research, presents several additional advantages. First, they are the most used socioeconomic variables in tolerance studies. Second, HDI is a holistic, multifunctional and robust variable to assess human development, GDP growth provides a short-term dynamic variable (Barro, 1991), GDP per capita provides a snapshot of income and living standards, and unemployment displays economic and social distress (World Bank, 2024). When used together, the chosen socioeconomic variables allow for a valid operationalisation of the concept of socioeconomic performance. Finally, they are readily available.

There are some other variables which could have been used to measure socioeconomic performance, namely, the Gini coefficient (inequality), which is often used (i.e. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Yigit, 2020), inflation rate (Peffley *et al.*,

⁴⁹ Check the respective definitions of these three variables at the World Bank’s DataBank Metadata Glossary, here: <https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/all/series>. [08-01-2025].

⁵⁰ World Bank’s data website is accessible here: <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

2015), or even poverty rate, or labour force participation rate. However, these indicators do not bring different information to be measured, and they would also not be more valid than the variables I chose. Moreover, the Gini coefficient and inflation, or other variables, are too limited in their measurement scope, focusing more on specific population and country characteristics than more broadly on socioeconomic performance, as intended in the present research.

Region

Based on the EVS respondents' country, the given European regions were identified (South, East, and North/Central), by first creating a variable where all 31 countries were assigned to each corresponding European region (see Appendix Table A.3.2.1). Then, to be able to isolate each region's association, dummy variables were created using Northern and Central Europe as a reference (=0), and the other two regions were coded as dummies, specifically Southern Europe (*Southern Europe=1*), and Eastern Europe (*Eastern Europe=1*).

Time

The correlation of time with social tolerance is assessed in two ways: by using the *Year of the survey*, and by using each EVS wave as a separate dummy variable. As such, the first wave was excluded, due to the dependent variables "Tolerance: Muslims" and "Tolerance: Homosexuals" being absent, and I thus used EVS wave 2 as a reference (=0), building three dummy variables: *EVS wave 3=1*, *EVS wave 4=1*, and *EVS wave 5=1*.

3.3.3. *Control variables*

The control variables used are all individual/micro-level in nature and can be observed in Table 3.3.4. Several other variables were excluded from this research because they were not common to all EVS waves. The variables were of a political nature, namely: political discussion, support for democracy, non-voting political participation, support for multiculturalism, and social capital (namely associative participation). There were also psychosocial factors, such as well-being (happiness), dogmatism, and conformism. If this thesis were to include all these variables, the explicative analysis, through the methods of linear, multilevel linear and logistic regression, would be severely limited, due to the number of missing cases caused by the

unavailability of these variables in all or some of the waves. Also, the inclusion of all these indicators, along with the already chosen independent indicators, would introduce so many variables that this study would violate the principle of parsimonious research (e.g. Landman, 2003).

Coupling these arguments with the fact that other literature has already explored these factors (e.g. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Hadler, 2012; Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Tausch, 2024), which are not central to the objectives of this thesis, these variables were excluded from the study at hand. As such, there are four types of controls, as observed in Chapter II, subchapter 2.1. and were all chosen due to being among the most well-known variables to have effects on tolerance, in general, as well as for being the ones which are common to all EVS waves (1 to 5). The four control dimensions, which are detailed below, are sociodemographic, political, institutional, and psychosocial.

Sociodemographic controls

I consider six different sociodemographic control variables. The first one chosen was sex, which is asked as “Are you a man or a woman?” in EVS. The response categories are “1=male” and “2=female”. As such, this variable was recoded into a dummy variable, with the female category being used as a reference (0) and the other category being “male=1”.

The education variable chosen was “Age at which the individual completed his or her education”, with the question being “At what age did you/do you expect you will complete your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education?”, and the response categories varying from 0=“No formal education”, to until 10=“21 and more years”. This variable was not recoded.

Employment status is asked through the question “Are you yourself gainfully employed at the moment or not? Please select from the card the employment status that applies to you”. The response categories were “1=30h a week or more”, “2=less then 30h a week”, “3=self employed”, “4=military service”, “5=retired/pensioned”, “6=homemaker not otherwise employed”, “7=student”, “8=unemployed”, “9=disabled”, “10=other”. This variable was recoded as a dummy variable, using the unemployed as the reference category, recoding any work category as “Employed=1”, and all others as missing.

Marital status is asked as “What is your current legal marital status?”, and the response categories were “1=married”, “2=registered partnership”, “3=widowed”, “4=divorced”, “5=separated”, and “6=never married and never registered partnership”. This variable was also

recoded as a dummy variable, using the unmarried, divorced and separated as a reference, and married and in a partnership were recoded as “Married=1”.

Religiosity is asked through the question “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...”, followed by the response categories, from 1 (“A religious person”) to 3 (“A convinced atheist”). This variable was reversed, with 1=“A convinced atheist” to 3=“A religious person”, to match the ordering given to the other variables.

The final variable is town size, and is not asked in the question; it is, instead, filled by the research team. The question asks the “Size of town where interview was conducted” and is composed of five categories, ranging from 1=“under 5,000” to 5=“500,000 and more”. This variable suffered no recoding process.

Political controls

The group of political controls includes two well-known variables to the scholarship: left-right ideology and patriotism. Self-positioning in political scale is asked as “In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?”, and its scale ranges from 1=“Left” to 10=“Right”. This variable was not recoded.

Patriotism asks the individuals, “How proud are you to be a {COUNTRY} citizen?”. This variable’s scale ranges from “1=very proud” to “4=not at all”. As such, it was recoded to be reversed, with the respective scales now ranging from “1=not at all” to “4=very proud”.

Institutional control

The next group is the institutional control. The included variable is *Trust in the Parliament*. The question is formulated as “Please indicate how much confidence you have in... Parliament”. No other variable of trust/confidence, or even regarding satisfaction with democracy, was asked in all five waves. The response categories for this variable were “1=A great deal”, “2=Quite a lot”, “3=Not very much”, and “4=None at all”. This question was reversed to align with all the other independent variables fully.

Psychosocial control

The final group of control variables is the psychosocial, for which interpersonal trust was selected. Interpersonal trust asks individuals whether “Most people can be trusted”, and was a binomial variable, ranging from 1=“Most people can be trusted”, to 2=“Can’t be too careful”. It was recoded from the original variable into a dummy variable, using the lack of

trust in others as the baseline, with the new codes now being “0=Can’t be too careful” and “1=Most people can be trusted”, with the variable now designated “Interpersonal trust=1”.

Table 3.3.4. Control variables

Dimensions	Variables	Scales (after recoding)	Origin
<i>Sociodemographic controls</i>	Male = 1	1=Male 0=Female	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Age complete Education (0-10)	0=No formal education 1=Less than 12 years ... 10=“21 and more year”	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Employment status=1	0=Not employed or unpaid 1=Employed	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Married=1	0=Not married 1=Married	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Religious person=1	1=A convinced atheist 2=Not a religious person 3=A religious person	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Town size (1-5)	1=under 5,000 ... 5=500,000 and more	EVS – waves 1 to 5
<i>Political controls</i>	Left vs Right (1-10)	1=Left ... 10=Right	EVS – waves 1 to 5
	Patriotism (1-4)	1=not at all ... 4=very proud	EVS – waves 1 to 5
<i>Institutional control</i>	Trust in the Parliament (1-4)	1=None at all 2=Not very much 3=Quite a lot 4=A great deal	EVS – waves 1 to 5
<i>Psychosocial control</i>	Interpersonal trust=1	0=Can’t be too careful 1=Most people can be trusted	EVS – waves 1 to 5

Sources: own elaboration, based on EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed in 28/08/2024.

3.4. Systematising social tolerance: an empirical model


In this subchapter, I illustrate a general sketch of the model explaining social tolerance through the independent variables.

Figure 3.1. shows that this analysis is run on two levels: the individual (level 1, or micro-level) and the country level (level 2, or macro-level). There are three main explanatory dimensions: age factors, support for the far-right factors, and socioeconomic factors. The age

variables are age, age square, youth voters (between 15 and 35 years of age), and old voters (66 or more years-old), and are exclusively individual level. The far-right dimension is composed of two variables: self-positioning in the far-right (individual-level) and far-right vote (country-level). The socioeconomic performance dimension is exclusively country-level and is composed of four variables: HDI, GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment. Beyond these variables, this research also tests the effect of European regions and time, namely by using East and South European regions dummies, and, regarding time, it uses survey year, and dummies isolating three of the EVS waves: from waves 3 to 5.

This research uses a multilevel approach to study the micro- and macro-level correlations with social tolerance. This is to observe the correlations and then test for the moderations between the variables at the level 1 and level 2. I used sociodemographic, institutional, political, and psychosocial controls. Age variables are used to moderate the correlation of far-right voting and socioeconomic performance with social tolerance. Conversely, it also uses socioeconomic performance as the moderator of how electoral support for the far-right explains social tolerance.

Micro: Individual level (level 1)



Macro: Country level (level 2)




Figure 3.1. The effects of age, far-right support and socioeconomic performance on social tolerance, and the moderation effects, in Europe

Source: Figure of own elaboration, based on the literature and this research's problematization.

CHAPTER IV. Do you tolerate me? How social tolerance evolved in Europe

This chapter analyses social tolerance across Europe over time, employing descriptive and inferential statistics to observe the fluctuation of tolerance for each of the four analysed groups (people of another race, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals) and, in general.

This chapter is divided into three subchapters. The first subchapter overviews how social tolerance, in general, and towards each socially stigmatised group, evolved in Europe over time and compares regions, to answer objective 1.1: *to identify patterns of social tolerance growth across time, individuals, and countries*. The second subchapter looks at tolerance to the specific stigmatised social groups studied in this thesis, namely other ethnic groups, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals, per country and period. That is to answer this thesis's objective 1.2, *to assess how much social tolerance differs across European countries in the four different minority groups: other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals*. Finally, the third subchapter looks at how tolerance correlates to the main explanatory factors, and whether there are significant differences between regions and across time, in Europe, aiming to answer objective 1.3.: *to assess how tolerance has evolved between 1981 and 2021, across the selected European countries, identifying specific (positive or negative) outliers*, and provide further evidence to answer objective 1.2.

4.1. An overview of social tolerance across Europe⁵¹

Here, the focus is on tolerance across time in all cases. As stated in the methodological chapter, the decision to use the WVS and EVS studies is advantageous as it allows for a longitudinal analysis of how tolerance has been evolving in Europe, throughout time, while being able to address the 31 selected countries individually and in the three indicated regions comparatively. As such, I can look at five distinct points in time: wave 1, covering 1981-1984 (mostly during 1981), wave 2 between 1990 and 1993 (mostly 1990), wave 3 between 1999 and 2001, wave 4 between 2008-2010 and, finally, wave 5, covering 2017 to 2021.

There are a few limitations to mention: the questions regarding tolerance to Muslims and homosexuals were not asked in the first wave, thus it is not possible to observe how tolerance to these two stigmatised social groups evolved, starting in the 1980s, unlike for immigrants and other races, and I cannot use the 1980s data to build the social tolerance

⁵¹ In the next chapters (IV, V, and VI), I will use the terms “tolerance” and “social tolerance” interchangeably for the sake of simplifying the writing.

additive indicator.⁵² The data still allows for an analysis of five points in time regarding tolerance to other races and immigrants, and four points in time concerning tolerance to Muslims and homosexuals.

The results over the selected 31 countries suggest that, while there is a perception of growth in social tolerance, not all social groups are seen in the same way. Table 4.1. shows how tolerance evolved. Discounting wave 1, because it only encompasses 13 countries, European tolerance levels were at their peak in wave 3 (1999-2001) regarding other races, Muslims, and immigrants. There are three different patterns of tolerance: other ethnic groups tend to maintain their tolerance levels, immigrants and Muslims saw a slight but steady decrease in tolerance, while homosexuals saw a sizeable increase, coming from, by far, the worst performing group, it quickly recovered, now being comparable to tolerance to immigrants and Muslims. Possible explanations are that, while in Europe the shadow of the Holocaust remains, the recent events, such as the migration crisis of 2015 and terrorist attacks heavily associated with Muslims and immigrants, means that these two groups would not see to a growth in tolerance (De Genova, 2018; Verkuyten, 2021b; Gómez del Tronco, 2024). Homosexuality has known a sizeable change in acceptance, with the legalisation of gay marriage and the progressive institutional acceptance of gay rights possibly being tools for societal change (ILGA-Europe, n.d.).

Table 4.1. Tolerance across time, in Europe

<i>EVS/WVS Wave</i>	<i>Tolerance: Other Race (%)</i>	<i>Tolerance: Muslims (%)</i>	<i>Tolerance: Immigrants (%)</i>	<i>Tolerance: Homosexuals (%)</i>	<i>Tolerance: additive variable (mean)</i>
<i>Wave 1 - 1981-1984</i>	92,56	--	91,78	--	--
<i>Wave 2 - 1990-1993</i>	84,37	79,52	83,23	58,26	3,05
<i>Wave 3 - 1999-2001</i>	88,37	82,02	85,70	70,93	3,27
<i>Wave 4 - 2008-2010</i>	87,51	78,50	83,88	73,64	3,25
<i>Wave 5 - 2017-2021</i>	87,91	77,63	80,07	79,75	3,31

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

With these results, it is tempting to consider that, contrary to the argument in the literature, tolerance is not increasing (Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020: 136). Instead, it is either stable or outright decreasing if

⁵² As discussed in the Methodology chapter, this a Cronbach's Alpha reliability analysis test was run on the four social tolerance single-item variables before building the additive social tolerance index, obtaining satisfactory results (0,721). Check this variable's detail in Chapter III, subchapter 3.3.

one considers tolerance to Muslims and immigrants. However, looking at the average scores of the social tolerance additive index (ranging from 0 to 4), there is an increase between waves 2 and 3, but afterwards, the trend is towards a timid increase or even stability.

Separating European countries into three different regions (Northern/Central, Eastern and Southern), here in Figure 4.1, it is possible to more accurately identify the trends in tolerance across Europe (still supported on the additive tolerance index). While South and Central/Northern European countries have known a rise in tolerance, being steadier in Central/Northern European countries, and abrupt in Southern European countries (with a sharp increase between waves 4 and 5). The variations observed in South European countries coincide with the economic and financial crisis of the late 2000s and early 2010s, when tolerance decreased, while it rose again over the latest wave.

Eastern European countries started from lower levels of tolerance, which initially increased after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR. However, from waves 4 and 5 onward, tolerance declined again, approaching earlier levels. This gives reason to think that there is a Europe evolving at two paces: one becoming more tolerant, and another becoming less so.




Figure 4.1. Tolerance across time in the European regions

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

To look at these first results, one must keep in mind that 1981 did not encompass many of the countries whose populations were later surveyed for the EVS. These same countries

were, mostly, northern and central European which, as we know from the literature, tend to display greater levels of tolerance than southern and eastern Europeans (beyond the fact that the questions regarding tolerance to Muslims and homosexuals were not asked in the first wave) (Viegas, 2004, 2006, 2010; Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023). Another note is that only three countries from southern Europe were present in that first wave: Italy, Spain and Malta. As such, tolerance to other races and immigrants may be positively biased, due to Eastern and Southern European countries not being included in that wave.

These results confirm that general levels of tolerance have increased (objectives 1.1). However, the decline in tolerance to immigrants and Muslims provides preliminary information to eventually corroborate hypothesis H1.2, which will be further tested in subchapter 4.3.

4.2. Who do you tolerate? Tolerance to stigmatised groups

In this section, I look at tolerance to the four stigmatised groups, for each specific country, analysing them descriptively from a comparative and longitudinal perspective. Each social group is analysed in a separate subsection, seeking to answer objective 1.2: *to assess how much social tolerance differs across European countries in the four different minority groups: other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals.*

4.2.1. Tolerance to another race

When it comes to how tolerant European populations are to other races, wave 1 (1981-1984) displays a very high level of tolerance, with all countries around or above 90 per cent tolerance. Note that the 1981 EVS wave only encompasses a limited number of countries, namely, Eastern European countries are not included, which may affect tolerance, as these countries tend to have lower tolerance levels (see Figure 4.2.1).


The second wave (1990-1993) was applied during or shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR and thus includes recently independent and democratised countries (especially in Eastern Europe). The most tolerant countries tend to be Northern and Central European countries, as well as three Southern European countries. Some Eastern European countries (Poland, Estonia and Lithuania), Portugal (recently democratised), and Belgium also display high levels of tolerance (between 80 and 85 per cent). Eastern European countries tend to have much lower percentages of tolerance, compared to Northern and Central

European countries, with Southern European countries varying and not having a fixed tendency of tolerance at this period. This is coherent with the literature, which states that ethnic tolerance is lower in Eastern Europe (Strabac *et al.*, 2011: 475; Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012: 29) and countries with lower socioeconomic development (Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010).

Wave 3 (1999-2001) displays a more gradual and nuanced ranking of European countries tolerant towards different races. Scandinavian countries still lead. However, a few surprises show up: Latvia is the third most tolerant country to other races in this wave, and Portugal ranks sixth. There are no countries with less than 70 per cent of the population saying that they would mind another race. The fourth wave (2008-2010) still has high tolerance values. However, some countries, such as Spain and France, had a sharp increase, while other countries had a sharp decrease in tolerance: Czechia, Lithuania, and Estonia are examples.

The fifth wave (2017-2021) sees the Scandinavian countries still topping the charts with some marginal gains, overall. An important observation is that it is in this fifth wave that we see several declines in tolerance amongst Southern and Eastern European countries, with this wave returning to numbers below 70 per cent of the population tolerating people of other races.

Figure 4.2.1. Tolerance towards another race, by country over time



Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Looking at how tolerance to other races evolved. Figure 4.2.2. shows how tolerance towards another race has evolved, confirming the trends in each region of Europe. Overall, tolerance is always high (never below 70 per cent, above 95 per cent in some circumstances). Northern and Central European countries are the most tolerant group towards other races in all five time periods, with slight variations (a decline from the first wave to the second, and increasing since then, towards the 96 per cent tolerance in the later wave). Southern European countries trail closely behind their Northern and Central counterparts. In general, Southern European countries have been stable, with some decrease from 1981 to 2008-2010 (note that in 1981 only three countries were comprising this group: Malta, Spain, and Italy, which tend to score very high in tolerance, while Greece and Cyprus tend to score lower values of tolerance).

Eastern European countries have known a large variation: a 10-point increase from 1990 to 1999, and then a gradual decrease between 2008 and 2017.




Figure 4.2.2. Tolerance towards another race, across time, in different European regions

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

The 2015 migratory crisis might help explain the sizable decrease in tolerance, verified in countries particularly exposed to the Syrian refugees trying to reach Europe, namely Hungary, which came from 91 per cent in the 2008-2010 wave, down to 72.2 per cent in the 2017-2020 one. The 2008-2010 wave also coincides with the time when Europe (particularly the countries known as PIIGS) went through a period of economic and financial turmoil, the Sovereign Debt Crisis. The 2008 wave sees a sudden decrease in tolerance in Portugal, while the same sharp decline is seen in Greece, but in the 2017 wave (Greece, beyond being affected by the debt crisis, is also one of the most affected countries by the 2015 migration crisis).

4.2.2. Tolerance to Muslims

Unlike tolerance to other races, tolerance to Muslims was only applied in the EVS survey beginning in 1990. However, the available data still allows us to look at tolerance towards Muslims over four different waves (1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017).


In Figure 4.2.3, the 1990 wave shows a relatively high level of tolerance to Muslims across Europe: varying from 90 per cent to 59 per cent. In this regard, it is relevant to stress that several European countries have historically had significant Muslim populations (like

Bulgaria), and historical conflicts with Muslim nations such as the former Ottoman Empire (i.e. Poland or Hungary), which may partially explain lower levels of tolerance, in comparison to some of their peers. Eastern European countries display the lowest tolerance levels to Muslims, but there are some central and northern European countries with relatively lower levels. The rest of the countries display varying high levels, between 80 and 90 per cent, including North, Central, South and East European countries, with no discernible pattern emerging. The 1999-2001 wave⁵³ sees a general growth in tolerance levels, with Portugal as the most tolerant country to Muslims, followed by Spain, which solidifies Viegas' observations on the Portuguese tolerance exceptionalism (2007, 2010).

2008-2010 saw a downward trend in several extremely tolerant countries (like Portugal or the Netherlands), but other Northern/Central countries (i.e. France, Denmark, UK) had important gains in attitudes to Muslims. The 2017 wave continues this decline in tolerance to Muslims, as there were several sharp declines in tolerance, with only some slight gains in some democracies. Lithuania became even less tolerant towards Muslims over time: going from 69,4 per cent on the third wave (1999-2001) to just 34,5 per cent on the 2017-2020 wave. While Lithuania was the worst-performing country, several other Eastern European countries regressed all the progress they had made over the previous waves.

⁵³ Most surveys occurred before 9/11, the War on Terror and the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).

Figure 4.2.3. Tolerance towards Muslims, by country over time



Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

An interesting note is that the UK became the most tolerant country towards Muslims (94,2), which is especially curious as one of the driving factors for the 2016 Brexit referendum was, precisely, intolerance towards immigrants, xenophobic behaviours, and anti-Islam sentiments (Golec de Zavala *et al.*, 2017). Beyond that, the terrorist attacks of 2014/2017 by Muslim extremists connected to DAESH have contributed to more suspicion towards the Muslim population (e.g. Gilks, 2020; Dell’Isola, 2022). However, the fact that tolerance to Muslims has grown in the UK could be explained by in-group tolerance, that is, the growing number of Muslims living in the UK (Census, 2001, 2011, 2021), will tend to be more tolerant towards other Muslims (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, 2008, 2011). Indeed, the literature identifies that when people belong to specific groups, they tend to accept them more easily (Sullivan *et al.*, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989). At the same time, one must consider Stouffer’s

idea that the more diverse a society, the more exposure to this diversity, and thus, the more tolerance (1955).

In Figure 4.2.4., it is observable that, while in Northern/Central Europe there was a general growing trend (while a slight decrease between 2008-2010 is evident), in Southern Europe it is noticeable a downwards trend from the beginning of the 90s until 2008-2010, when the Great Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis started. However, there was a slight recovery from 2008-2010 to 2017-2020. In Eastern Europe, however, there was an improvement from the early 90s to the end of the decade and the beginning of the new Millennium (1999-2001), and then tolerance to Muslims started to decline.




Figure 4.2.4. Tolerance towards Muslims, across time, in different European regions

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.


Tolerance to Muslims, regionally, follows a slightly different pattern to the one observed in tolerance to other races: North/Central Europe has a slight overall increase, South Europe had a decrease until 2008-2010, and a recovery in the latest wave. Eastern Europe declines further than their tolerance to other races. This is a development from what had previously been observed by the scholarship: tolerance to Muslims used to be higher than to other races, in Eastern Europe (Strabac *et al.*, 2011: 475), but the 2017 data expose that tolerance to Muslims in this region is in fast decline.

4.2.3. Tolerance to immigrants

The 1981 wave shows that, at the time, tolerance to immigrants (like tolerance to other races) was relatively high, no country being lower than 80 per cent, and with the three southern European countries being among the most tolerant. However, the 1990 wave displays more variability and a clearer pattern: Eastern European countries tend to be less tolerant of immigrants, while Northern, Central and Southern Europeans still tend to exhibit high or extremely high levels of tolerance. Southern European countries are still among some of the most tolerant, but there has been a decrease in their values. In the third wave (1999-2001), the lowest performing countries on the previous wave had massive improvements (i.e. Slovenia), while a few others (i.e. Poland) went down. The 2008 wave continues to have several countries with above 90 per cent levels of tolerance, but initiates a trend of slight decline, especially among Eastern European countries (i.e. Czechia, Estonia). This trend continued in the 2017 wave: while there were still several countries with extremely high levels of tolerance, those values tended not to be as high, with the South European countries declining (except Cyprus). It is also observable that there is a very strong decline in Eastern European countries. These countries are all close to or at the frontier regions of the European Union, and particularly exposed to the 2015 migration crisis, meaning that there could be some spillover effect in these populations.

An interesting observation ought to be made as Portugal tops the ranking in 1999, with extremely high levels of tolerance. While it declined in 2008 and 2020, it is still among the most tolerant countries in this sample.

Figure 4.2.5. Tolerance towards immigrants, by country over time



Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at:

<https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Figure 4.2.6. exposes that tolerance is consistently lower in Eastern Europe and has tended to decline more recently, widening the gap in comparison to the other two regions. Levels have traditionally been very high in Southern Europe, although there is a gradual downward trend over time. The Central/North countries remained stable throughout the analysed period, showing a modest tendency to increase over time.




Figure 4.2.6. Tolerance towards immigrants, across time, in different European regions

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Regarding Southern Europe’s tolerance to immigrants, the baseline in these countries (particularly Spain, Italy and Malta) were extremely high in 1981. However, with the inclusion of more recently democratised Southern European countries in the remaining EVS waves, there was more variation in tolerance: Spain and Italy maintained their levels, but Malta has a sizeable decline.


Another important note is that the 2017-2020 wave coincided with the tumultuous aftermath of the 2015 Migration crisis, which especially affected frontier countries in Europe, namely: Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Spain, which had sharp declines in tolerance at that time.

4.2.4. Tolerance to homosexuality

Unlike the other social groups, homosexuality has the biggest overall growth of tolerance over time. In 1990, tolerance to homosexuality is observable with an extremely low baseline in some of the selected countries (i.e. Lithuania, Latvia, or Romania). Eastern European countries tend to have the lowest values, while northern and central Europeans tend to have far higher levels of tolerance to homosexuality. When looking at the 1999 wave, there is sizeable progress in tolerance to homosexuality. The leading countries became even more tolerant, with Southern European countries becoming more tolerant, as well as Eastern European. However, this last group still has several members (i.e. Lithuania, Romania, Poland) where most of the population was intolerant of gay people (Figure 4.2.7).

Further increases in tolerance are observed over the fourth and fifth waves, with most countries increasing their tolerance levels to gay people. But there was still a clear apparent divide: Eastern European countries still tended to have far lower tolerance (marginally increasing their tolerance levels) than their Northern, Central and Southern peers. This tendency is still observed in 2017-2020.

Figure 4.2.7. Tolerance to homosexuality, by country over time



Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

The trend in Figure 4.2.8. is quite clear: a general growth across European regions. However, growth does not come in equal terms for each country group, with the North/Central European countries starting with a much higher baseline in the beginning of the 90s, at 73,3 per cent, tolerance to homosexuality grows to 94,6 per cent by the end of the 2010s. South Europe follows a similar pattern, with continuous growth in tolerance to homosexuality over

time, but it ends up not being as pronounced as its North/Central peers, and starting with a much lower baseline value. Finally, Eastern Europeans overwhelmingly start with very low levels of tolerance, at the beginning of the 1990s (33,6 per cent), but had an enormous growth of nearly 20 percentage points in 1999, but afterwards, growth is marginal.




Figure 4.2.8. Tolerance towards homosexuals, across time, in different European regions

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

A relevant note to take into consideration is that, when citizens self-identify with social groups, such as being gay, Muslim and others, there is a tendency to accept peers more easily (Sullivan *et al.*, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989). Add to this that in each population there is always a sizeable minority of people who see themselves as gay, lesbian or bisexual, which means that, with the growth of awareness and impact of the LGBTQ+ movements, plus the progressive legalization of gay marriage in Europe (de Groot, 2023) there is an incentive for citizens to cease discriminating and start tolerating homosexual peers.

This growth of tolerance to homosexuality has already been observed (i.e. Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Tausch, 2024) and these results further confirm this tendency, although they also confirm the idea that East Europe is not as tolerant (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008; Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Strabac *et al.*, 2011; Candeias, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023).

General results in this subchapter help in the assessment of how much tolerance differs across European countries in the four minority groups (objective 1.2), providing further evidence of variation of tolerance depending on which group is being analysed.

4.3. Are tolerant and intolerant populations different? Comparing age, far-right vote and socioeconomic performance on European citizens across time

In this section, I look at how different the groups of tolerant and intolerant European citizens are, seeking to understand how the proposed independent factors (age, the far-right and socioeconomic performance) underlie tolerant and intolerant populations. This is to determine whether objective 1.2 (*to assess how much social tolerance differs across European countries in the four different minority groups: other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals*) and objective 1.3. (*assess how tolerance has evolved between 1981 and 2021, across the selected European countries, identifying specific (positive or negative) outliers*) are observed.

For this reason, this subchapter first uses T-tests to assess mean differences between tolerant and intolerant populations when it comes to the independent variables. In this sense, only the independent variables were tested concerning the four socially stigmatised groups (other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals), which were divided into either tolerant (1) or intolerant (0) groups. A t-test is performed on each socially stigmatised group, using these independent variables, to assess whether there are significant differences between tolerant and intolerant populations, regarding the set of populational characteristics. The way the t-test is performed is by assessing the mean differences between the intolerant (0) and tolerant (1) populations. This means that, when a value is positive, the intolerant population has a greater average than the tolerant population, and vice versa. As an example, in tolerance to homosexuals, the GDP per capita value is -12335,938, which means that, on average, tolerant populations to gay people are \$12335,938 wealthier than their intolerant counterparts in the 2017 wave.

In general terms, Table 4.3.1. shows that there is a tendency that each variable has a statistical significance, i.e., there are statistical differences between tolerant and intolerant populations regarding age, voting percentage for the far-right, HDI, GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate. And this is true for every one of the stigmatised groups considered. There are, however, a few exceptions. For example, unemployment does not elicit statistically significant results for tolerance to other ethnic groups, immigrants and homosexuals, in the 1990 wave.

Furthermore, intolerant populations, regardless of time and minority group, are always older and less wealthy (GDP per capita) than tolerant populations, while higher HDI usually occurs in more tolerant populations. In the same vein, intolerant populations tend to vote more for the far-right than intolerant populations, except in the 1981 wave. When it comes to

tolerance to homosexuality, the all-time test reveals that more tolerant populations of gay people voted more for the far-right. GDP annual growth and unemployment exhibit more volatility, and thus, no clear pattern emerges.

Table 4.3.1. Mean differences between tolerant and intolerant populations, according to age, far-right voting and socioeconomic performance variables

Variables	Other ethnic groups						Immigrants					
	All time	1981-1984	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021	All time	1981-1984	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021
Age	4,479***	9,412***	4,848***	4,862***	2,610***	4,811***	3,288***	5,641***	3,876***	3,747***	1,637***	2,736***
Far-right voting	0,485***	-0,320***	-0,123	0,108	0,630***	1,693***	2,151***	-0,334***	0,507***	0,533***	0,652***	2,769***
HDI	-0,024***	0,000***	-0,014***	-0,018***	-0,013***	-0,031***	-0,012***	0,000***	-0,008***	-0,015***	-0,010***	-0,029***
GDP annual growth	-0,153***	-0,219***	-2,174***	-0,853***	0,913***	0,662***	0,084***	-0,461***	-1,359***	-0,894***	0,638***	0,778***
GDP per capita	-5322,676***	-	-1831,835***	-3185,408***	-3659,799***	-9595,796***	-3309,101***	-	-769,312***	-3151,658***	-3812,913***	-9299,537***
Unemployment	0,102***	0,285	0,126	0,741***	-0,669***	0,507***	-0,235***	-0,601***	0,023	0,847***	-0,706***	-0,022

Variables	Muslims					Homosexuals				
	All time	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021	All time	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021
Age	3,176***	3,183***	4,099***	2,379***	2,930***	3,781***	3,957***	5,455***	3,559***	5,417***
Far-right voting	1,164***	-0,090	0,518***	0,103	2,374***	-1,381***	-0,011	0,241**	1,324***	0,033
HDI	-0,008***	-0,007***	-0,013***	-0,006***	-0,017***	-0,051***	-0,031***	-0,037***	-0,028***	-0,039***
GDP annual growth	0,017	-0,973***	-0,550***	0,389***	0,765***	-0,010	-1,348***	-1,251***	1,282***	0,932***
GDP per capita	-2178,629***	-757,198***	-2399,744***	-2554,894***	-6598,494***	-10824,561***	-2887,127***	-6134,721***	-8649,597***	-12335,938***
Unemployment	-0,201***	-0,251***	0,611***	-0,486***	-0,085***	0,473***	0,011	1,317***	-0,339***	0,461***

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Note: $p < .05^*$; $p < .01^{**}$; $p < .001^{***}$

This subchapter also provides further evidence of how social tolerance evolved across Europe (objective 1.3), which relates to testing whether there are significant differences in the levels of tolerance across time (hypothesis 1). I use the tolerance additive index (section 3.3.1, chapter III) to test these differences in tolerance across time, as this variable can be treated as a quantitative one, and because this variable allows a look at tolerance as an attitude towards all four socially stigmatised groups, together. As such, Table 4.3.2 presents an ANOVA test to assess the potential differences in social tolerance over time, showing that there was a significant difference in social tolerance over time ($F(3, 146860) = 352,042, p = 0,000$).

Table 4.3.2. ANOVA test for differences between values of social tolerance across time, in Europe

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1398,388	3	466,129	352,042	0,000
Within Groups	194453,413	146860	1,324		
Total	195851,802	146863			

Dependent Variable: Social tolerance additive variable

Furthermore, the ANOVA test performs multiple comparisons (using Scheffe post-hocs, see Table 4.3.3), showing that there are significant differences between the three groups (see Appendix A.4.3. for detailed post-hoc comparison results). The 1990 EVS wave is group 1, which has significantly lower tolerance than group 2, composed of EVS waves from 1999 and 2008 (which have no significant differences between each other). In turn, Groups 1 and 2 are significantly different and have lower tolerance values than group 3, composed of EVS wave 5, from 2017, which has the highest average social tolerance level in this test (3,301).

Table 4.3.3. Scheffe post-hoc social tolerance European groups per EVS wave

EVS waves	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05		
		1	2	3
1990-1993	34307	3,049		
2008-2010	41624		3,262	
1999-2001	32982		3,266	
2017-2020	37948			3,301
Sig.		1,000	,977	1,000

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 36415,901.; b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed.

Dependent Variable: Social tolerance additive variable.

I performed a second ANOVA test to determine whether there are significant differences between European regions, to test hypothesis 1.2, and determine whether there are significant differences between European regions, once again, using the tolerance additive index as a dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 4.3.4. whose ANOVA test to assess the potential differences in social tolerance between regions and over time, shows that there was a significant difference in social tolerance between European regions, in each EVS

wave: 1990 ($F(2, 34304) = 1533,831, p = 0,000$); 1999 ($F(2, 32979) = 854,453, p = 0,000$); 2008 ($F(2, 41621) = 1408,870, p = 0,000$); 2017 ($F(2, 37945) = 4193,568, p = 0,000$).

Table 4.3.4. ANOVA test for differences between values of tolerance, on aggregate, across European region

EVS waves		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1990-1993	Between Groups	3954,881	2	1977,441	1533,831	0,000
	Within Groups	44225,303	34304	1,289		
	Total	48180,184	34306			
1999-2001	Between Groups	2062,085	2	1031,042	854,453	0,000
	Within Groups	39794,743	32979	1,207		
	Total	41856,827	32981			
2008-2010	Between Groups	3400,664	2	1700,332	1408,870	0,000
	Within Groups	50231,422	41621	1,207		
	Total	53632,086	41623			
2017-2020	Between Groups	9193,079	2	4596,539	4193,568	0,000
	Within Groups	41591,238	37945	1,096		
	Total	50784,316	37947			

Dependent Variable: Social tolerance additive variable

The Scheffe post-hoc multiple comparisons test between European regions, and year in Table 4.3.5. (see Table A.4.3.2 in Appendix A.4.3 for detailed results), confirms that there are significant differences, in every wave, between east, south and north/central European groups. Eastern Europe is always the least tolerant group (1), with southern Europe (which is group 2) always trailing behind the most tolerant group, composed of the northern and central European countries, which are, in turn, the most tolerant group (3). Some interesting observations, which also confirm section 4.1's Figures, are that tolerance in Eastern European countries is on the decline, on average, since 1999, while north and central European countries keep increasing from wave to wave. South Europe reduced its tolerance levels in 2008 (to 3.28, from an average of 3.30 in 1999), having recovered since.

This subchapter's results speak to objectives 1.2. and 1.3, by, on the one hand, assessing that there are significant differences in tolerant and intolerant populations, towards the four minority groups (other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals).

Table 4.3.5. Scheffe post-hoc social tolerance per European region

Regions	EVS 1990-1993			EVS 1999-2001			EVS 2008-2010			EVS 2017-2021						
	N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			N	Subset for alpha = 0.05			N	Subset for alpha = 0.05		
		1	2	3		1	2	3		1	2	3		1	2	3
Eastern Europe	11279	2,564			11520	2,940			15339	2,913			12901	2,621		
Southern Europe	6232		3,256		6342		3,301		8137		3,275		3795		3,472	
Northern/Central Europe	16795			3,297	15120			3,500	18147			3,552	21251			3,684
Sig.		1,000	1,000	1,000		1,000	1,000	1,000		1,000	1,000	1,000		1,000	1,000	1,000

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size. 1990-1993 = 9720,223; 1999-2001 = 9658,579; 2008-2010 = 12336,725; 2017-2021 = 7731,009. b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Type I error levels are not guaranteed. Dependent Variable: Social tolerance additive variable.

On the other hand, observes that there are three different tolerance groups composed by how tolerant populations are in 1990, with an average of 3,049 on a scale from 0 to 4 (group 1), 1999 and 2008 have an average of 3,266 and 3,262, respectively (group 2) and 2017 has an average of 3,301 (group 3), which confirms hypothesis 1: tolerance has increased across time, and the most tolerant time is the latest (2017-2021).

Finally, significant differences were also detected in a test of how different the European regions are from each other. The test shows that, regardless of time, east, south and north/central Europe are always separate and their own groups. Eastern Europe is always less tolerant (2,564 in 1990, 2,940 in 1999, 2,913 in 2008, and 2,621 in 2017) and is following a trajectory of falling tolerance over the later waves. South and north/central Europe are much closer in values and display higher tolerance levels than their eastern European peers. However, north/central Europe still displays significantly higher tolerance levels than southern Europe: for example, in 2017, north/central Europe scored a tolerance average of 3,684, while the south scored 3,472. Regardless, southern Europe has been increasing its tolerance levels, in general (from 3,256 in 1990, to 3,472 in 2017). This test, thus, confirms hypothesis 1.1.

4.4. Has tolerance increased? Differences in social tolerance between European regions and points in time

This subchapter analyses and summarises the main results in this chapter, answering objectives 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, and analysing whether hypotheses 1 and 1.1 are confirmed.

Subchapter 4.1. demonstrates that tolerance in Europe has been increasing over the years. This is the case when looking at how tolerance to homosexuals evolved (from 58,26 per cent in 1981 to 79,75 per cent in 2017). In turn, tolerance to Muslims and to immigrants has

decreased, even though subchapter 4.2. allows the identification of some outliers: northern European countries continue to show exceptional tolerance towards these minorities: for example, the UK, Sweden, France and Iceland are examples of countries showing themselves to be quite tolerant of Muslims and immigrants. On the other hand, Lithuania, Czechia and Slovakia are amongst the most intolerant countries to these minority groups, and have worsened their tolerance values towards them, across time.

As Krzyżanowski and Ekström (2024) point out, public rhetoric has been turning hostile towards immigrants and Muslims, and these results tend to contextualise and solidify this observation: European populations are becoming less tolerant towards Muslims and immigrants. My findings show, in section 4.1. and 4.2., that this is the case: tolerance to Muslims and immigrants has been decreasing in Europe, especially in 2017-2021, while tolerance to other races has been slowly growing, and tolerance to homosexuals knew a massive growth, being comparable to immigrants and Muslims in the 2017 wave.

In this sense I tested whether tolerance grew across time, or not as it was *expected that general levels of tolerance will have increased across time* (hypothesis 1), and results confirm that general levels of tolerance have, indeed, increased across time, which confirms hypothesis 1. The confirmation of this hypothesis validates the theoretical expectations that tolerance has been growing in Europe and thus corroborating results in prior research (e.g. Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Tausch, 2024). This is an important takeaway for Europe: the expansion of tolerance values, as a democratic value, is a positive indicator of the success of the European project, with Europe becoming ever more tolerant, across time. However, the slight dip in tolerance values in the 2008 wave, which coincides with the economic crisis of 2007/2008 and the beginning of the Sovereign Debt Crisis (2009-2015), may indicate that these crises, along with the austerity measures, may be detrimental to social tolerance. The socioeconomic confirmation on whether socioeconomic performance affects social tolerance or not will be analysed in Chapter VI.

However, the literature had previously observed that not all countries had the same pattern of tolerant attitudes and, indeed, they indicate that there may be differences between European regions. The analysis of the European country groups (North/Central, South and East Europe) was made on the expectation that *there will be differences between European regions: the north/central European countries will be more tolerant, followed by south European countries, which are then trailed by east European countries, which is the least tolerant region* (H1.1.). And, in fact, the results expose a reality which indicates that there are two Europes:

western, central, and southern Europe, where tolerance keeps increasing, and eastern Europe, where tolerance suffered a setback. Eastern Europe not only trails in comparison to its northern/central and southern peers, but its values have also been falling since 1999, being far less tolerant than their peers, all around. This could be attributed to how these countries have been disproportionately affected by the various crises affecting these countries: a heavy influx of (mostly Muslims) migrants from 2015 onwards, and to a renewed wave of terrorist attacks on European soil (Helbling, 2013, 2014; Peffley *et al.*, 2015; Verkuyten, 2021b; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2022). These events, while not directly relating the circumstantial theory of tolerance, suggest that circumstantial changes are important for how tolerance values are expressed in Europe (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Viegas, 2007). However, southern Europe, even though it is still significantly less tolerant and different from its northern/central European peers, has its respective values of tolerance much closer to northern/central Europe than to eastern Europe. Also, the results suggest that certain groups (migrants and Muslims) are seen more as threats in some areas of the continent (east) and not as much in others, which is still according to the revisionist authors' critique of Stouffer: perhaps those groups have ceased to be seen as threats. However, one could argue that, given the mid-2010s terrorist attacks on central and northern Europe, that this revisionist thesis does not apply here, otherwise, France, the UK and Germany would display low tolerance levels to Muslims and migrants, groups which rate high in these three countries.

This means that H1.1. is confirmed: there are significant differences between European regions, and the most tolerant one is north/central Europe, with the east being less so, and the south trailing right behind the north. This is important, as it suggests that there is a change in how citizens are becoming more tolerant of their peers in Europe.

In a nutshell, while overall social tolerance has increased across Europe over time, it is crucial to avoid generalisations when examining stigmatised groups and across European regions. This is an important contribution to emphasise the nuanced nature of social tolerance.

CHAPTER V. Does age and ideological self-positioning in the far-right correlate with social tolerance? An individual-level analysis

In this chapter, I analyse how social tolerance is influenced, using micro-level independent variables (age and ideological self-positioning in the far-right). The use of these variables ties with objective 3, aiming *to estimate how support for the far-right relates to social tolerance, or more specifically, to understand if ideological self-positioning in the far-right correlates with social tolerance (objective 3.1)*. The other objective approached is objective 2, which aims *to observe if social tolerance is associated with age and age groups, especially over the later years*.

The analysis will test five different hypotheses, which are all of a micro-level nature. The first group of hypotheses states the following: *The younger the individuals, the more tolerant they will tend to be, at the individual level (H2.1); and younger (18 to 35-year-olds) and older citizens (65+) will tend to be less tolerant towards immigrants and Muslims in the latest wave (2017-2020) (H2.3)*. The second group of hypotheses being used in chapter V is composed of the following: *Self-positioning in the far-right will negatively relate to the levels of tolerance, at the individual level (H3.1)*. And finally, the last two hypotheses concern the Portuguese case and state that *younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, in Portugal (H5.1) and self-positioning in the far-right will negatively correlate with the levels of tolerance, in Portugal, just like in North and Central Europe (H5.2)*.

As with the previous chapters, this will be divided into several subchapters. The first one (5.1) seeks to establish whether the main micro-level independent variables, age and self-positioning in the far-right, correlate with social tolerance, to provide an answer to hypotheses H2.1 and H3.1. The second subchapter (5.2) will also approach how age and self-positioning in the far-right affect social tolerance, but over the individual socially stigmatised groups, to provide further answers to hypotheses H2.1, H3.1, and approach H2.3, which specifically concerns effects over tolerance to Muslims and immigrants. Subchapter 5.3. will be focused on an analysis on Portugal. This will provide an answer to hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2, as well as objectives 6.1 and 6.2. The last subchapter (5.4) will summarise both this chapter's findings and discuss the test of the hypotheses.

5.1. Age,⁵⁴ and far-right self-positioning effects on social tolerance

In this subchapter, age and self-positioning in the far-right are tested on whether they affect social tolerance, to observe if hypothesis 2.1. (*The younger the individuals, the more tolerant they will tend to be, at the individual level*) and hypothesis 3.1. (*Self-positioning in the far-right will negatively relate to the levels of tolerance, at the individual level*) are confirmed. As the objective is to grasp the independent variable's relationship with social tolerance as a whole, I will use the additive social tolerance index as the dependent variable.⁵⁵ This subchapter will also test whether European regions, and the specific periods, influence social tolerance.

To test whether the independent variables relate to social tolerance, I use a linear regression technique to observe the effects of these variables on social tolerance. Even if this thesis does not seek to establish causality between variables, I use controls to keep these variables' statistical influence on social tolerance constant and thus highlight the statistical effects of the independent variables on social tolerance.⁵⁶ Furthermore, when running the linear regression, I phased the introduction of variables in the model: first, each group of independent variables, then all independent variables together, and finally, independent variables and controls together.

Table 5.1.1. shows that some age variables have an effect on tolerance: while age, itself, is not significant, age square (positive effect) and the older citizen's dummy (negative effect) are significant. Citizens younger than 66 or more years-old, and a non-linear, exponential progression of age, tend to increase the levels of tolerance. These effects are only observed on the first and third models, with age square being significant when all independent micro-level variables are inserted, which then render these factors non-significant, except for the older cohort dummy variable, which has an expectedly negative effect on the additive social tolerance variable. Another important detail is that the youth dummy is always non-significant.

This analysis shows that age effects are rather limited: when all controls are introduced, only *not* being 66 or more years old is connected to more social tolerance. This, however, does

⁵⁴ The age variable may inflict non-linear effects on the dependent variables. As such, in a mathematical exercise, I squared the variable "Age" (multiplying it by itself), which thus ranges from 225 to 6724. Thus, "Age²" was generated to test non-linear effects of age on the dependent variable.

⁵⁵ Before moving on to explanatory techniques, I tested whether age and self-positioning in the far-right are correlated and/or associated with social tolerance variables, namely, each specific historically stigmatised group, and the social tolerance additive index. These correlation and association tests, which can be viewed in detail in appendix A.5., show that there are significant, albeit weak, correlations between the age, and self-positioning in the far-right, and the various dependent social tolerance variables.

⁵⁶ From here on after in this Chapter and Chapter VI, every time I use the expressions "effect", "affect", "impact", or "influence", I am referring to statistical effects, and not to causal theoretical causal mechanisms.

not mean that the effects of age on social tolerance are innocuous. Age square has some positive effect on social tolerance, which not only indicates that a relation between social tolerance and age is non-linear, but it also indicates that age is a factor not to be ignored, by itself. Regarding far-right self-positioning, results show a significant and negative effect on social tolerance. In essence, not being self-positioned in the far-right tends to generate greater levels of tolerance, which also indicates that far-right self-positioned individuals tend to lower tolerance.

I also tested the effects that both time and European regions have on social tolerance, which ties up with objectives 1.1 and 1.2. Results show that a given individual not being a citizen of Southern or Eastern Europe makes them more likely to be more tolerant, meaning that Northern/Central European countries tend to have a more positive influence on social tolerance. This can be explained by the higher levels of modernisation and democratisation that north and central European countries have (Inglehart, 1990, 1997; Viegas, 2004, 2007).

Furthermore, each EVS wave dummy variable, which uses the year 1990 as the reference category (1999=1, 2008=1, and 2017=1) had a positive effect on tolerance, but the quantitative variable considering survey year displayed a significant and negative effect on social tolerance. As time progresses, tolerance lowers, which seemingly is contradictory with the wave dummy variables. However, one must consider that the year with less tolerance levels is 1990, but that tolerance lowered in 2008, possibly because of the economic and financial crisis. This negative effect may be due to these fluctuations in tolerance and may indicate that time effects on social tolerance might not be linear.

To assert the relative impact of these variables on social tolerance, I use the linear regression's Betas to observe how each variable compares with the others, in terms of relative impact on social tolerance (see Appendix Table A5.3.1). Not accounting for the control variables, far-right self-positioning is systematically more important than any age variable to explaining social tolerance when all variables are considered. However, the Beta values of the time variables are greater than those of far-right self-position, with Eastern Europe being more important than far-right self-positioning and age. This means that, even though citizens' self-positioning in the far-right is important to explaining social tolerance, their circumstances (the region they live in and the time period) matter even more.

Table 5.1.1. The effect of far-right self-positioning, and age groups on social tolerance (dependent variable: social tolerance additive index)

Variables	Model: Age		Model: Far-right position		Model: Independent Variables		Model: all Independent Variables		All variables		
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	
(Constant)	3,413***	0,043	3,317***	0,003	3,488***	0,048	79,360***	12,038	97,435***	13,808	
Regions	Southern Europe=1						-0,203***	0,009	-0,097***	0,010	
	Eastern Europe=1						-0,727***	0,007	-0,633***	0,009	
Time	EVS wave 3 (1999)=1						0,569***	0,053	0,639***	0,061	
	EVS wave 4 (2008)=1						0,955***	0,108	1,091***	0,124	
	EVS wave 5 (2017)=1						1,301***	0,164	1,485***	0,188	
	Year survey						-0,038***	0,006	-0,047***	0,007	
Age	Age	-0,001	0,002			-0,001	0,002	0,001	0,002	-0,002	0,002
	Age ²	0,000**	0,000			0,000**	0,000	0,000***	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year-olds=1	-0,009	0,014			0,005	0,015	0,009	0,014	0,014	0,017
	66 + year-olds=1	-0,053**	0,016			-0,040*	0,018	-0,032	0,017	-0,040*	0,019
Self-positioning in the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right: far-right position=1			-0,458***	0,012	-0,430***	0,012	-0,333***	0,012	-0,168***	0,016
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1									-0,119***	0,007
	Age complete education									0,024***	0,001
	Employed=1									0,021*	0,009
	Married=1									0,015	0,008
	Religious person									-0,031***	0,006
	Town size									0,026***	0,003
Political controls	Left vs Right									-0,027***	0,002
	Patriotism									-0,048***	0,005
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament									0,039***	0,005
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1									0,256***	0,008
N		146434		117839		117546		117546		86725	
Adjusted R Square		0,011		0,012		0,023		0,111		0,135	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

The scholarship demonstrated that tolerance is correlated with how younger citizens tend to be more tolerant and socially progressive (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Hjern *et al.*, 2020: 913). However, Table 5.1.1. results show that being younger (15-35 years old) is not important in explaining social tolerance, which is detrimental to the confirmation of hypothesis 2.1. Indeed, in this subchapter, I am unable to show that the younger group of people is connected to social tolerance.⁵⁷ But *not* belonging to the older cohort (66 or more years old) is significant. One could state that it is not the young cohorts who tend to be more tolerant, but rather those who are *not* older.

Another important observation is how consistently far-right self-positioning is significant in generating negative effects on social tolerance, which confirms hypothesis 3.1. This observation is coherent with the scholarship, as it has repeatedly shown that more leftist and/or liberal individuals tend to be more tolerant (Weldon, 2006; Sullivan *et al.*, 1979; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Gibson, 1989; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002; Hadler, 2012; Peffley *et al.*, 2022; Peffley *et al.*, 2023). This variable contributes to literature by being the first instance in which one can isolate and test an effect of ideological self-positioning in the far-right (based on the left-right scale). However, this variable does not test, as the left-right scale,⁵⁸ how much to the left one needs to be to be more tolerant; instead, these models demonstrate that merely not being self-positioned in the far-right is enough to show more tolerance, while also confirming that far-right individuals tend to display less social tolerance.

5.1.1. Are age and self-positioning in the far-right correlated with social tolerance across time?

This section will look at how the micro-level independent variables influence tolerance over the four comparable time EVS waves. This test is done to provide further explanations of how age, particularly younger individuals, and self-positioning in the far-right, may affect social tolerance across time. In the previous section, I demonstrate that these variables can explain social tolerance.

I tested the same dependent variable (tolerance additive variable) using linear regression per each EVS wave (1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017) while comparing how the main independent variables fare in their influence over social tolerance, across time (see Table 5.1.2). These results are similar to the ones observed in Table 5.1.1: the age variables are non-significant in

⁵⁷ Even testing this effect for specific EVS waves, particularly concerning the latest wave (2017), the youth age group does not have a significant impact on social tolerance (see appendix Table A5.1.2).

⁵⁸ Although this variable is built by recoding the left-right scale into 1=far-right, 0=not far-right.

all four waves (1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017), except for not belonging to an older cohort (66 or more years old), which is significant in 2008 and 2017. This is consistent with previous studies, although age square, now, is not significant. As to self-positioning in the far-right, and coherently to Table 5.1.1, it is significant and keeps a negative effect: not being self-positioned with the far-right tends to generate more social tolerance.

Regarding the regional variables, being from a Southern European country generated a significantly negative effect on social tolerance between the 1999 and the 2017 waves. Also, the east European country dummy generates an effect, with a negative effect across the board. Not being from these regions tends to generate more social tolerance.

Table 5.1.2. The effect of far-right self-position and age groups on social tolerance, across time (DV: social tolerance additive index)

Variables		1990-1993		1999-2001		2008-2010		2017-2021	
		B	Std. Error						
(Constant)		3,598***	0,135	3,590***	0,126	3,473***	0,116	3,606***	0,121
Regions	Southern Europe=1	0,039	0,022	-0,138***	0,020	-0,160***	0,019	-0,064**	0,024
	Eastern Europe=1	-0,632***	0,019	-0,445***	0,017	-0,527***	0,016	-0,960***	0,017
Age	Age	-0,001	0,005	0,002	0,005	0,004	0,004	-0,002	0,004
	Age ²	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year-olds=1	-0,046	0,036	0,036	0,033	0,038	0,031	0,052	0,034
	66 + year-olds=1	0,029	0,044	0,013	0,040	-0,075*	0,036	-0,079*	0,037
Self-positioning in the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right: far-right position=1	-0,188***	0,037	-0,119***	0,034***	-0,174***	0,031	-0,158***	0,031
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1	-0,133***	0,017	-0,139***	0,015	-0,120***	0,014	-0,082***	0,014
	Age complete education	0,028***	0,003	0,023***	0,003	0,023***	0,003	0,023***	0,003
	Employed=1	0,009	0,020	0,092***	0,018	-0,007	0,017	-0,025	0,019
	Married=1	0,007	0,020	-0,002	0,017	0,012	0,015	0,024	0,015
	Religious person	-0,037*	0,014	-0,057***	0,013	-0,019	0,011	0,009	0,011
	Town size	0,026***	0,006	0,028***	0,005	0,032***	0,005	0,024***	0,005
Political controls	Left vs Right	-0,019***	0,005	-0,023***	0,004	-0,027***	0,004	-0,035***	0,004
	Patriotism	-0,088***	0,011	-0,048***	0,010	-0,030**	0,010	-0,016	0,010
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	0,061***	0,010	0,044***	0,009	0,026**	0,009	0,035***	0,009
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,270***	0,017	0,254***	0,016	0,210***	0,015	0,272***	0,016
N		18837		21031		24864		21992	
Adjusted R Square		0,130		0,097		0,094		0,231	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

Once again, to compare the relative impact of each independent variable, I use the linear regression's Betas to compare age, far-right self-positioned and regional variables' impact in

each EVS wave (see Appendix Table A5.3.1). While the age Betas, in each wave, are sometimes higher than self-positioned with the far-right, the latter have a higher Beta when age variables are significant (which is only the older cohort, during the 2008 and 2017 waves). And being from Eastern Europe is always more impactful than any other independent variable. However, far-right self-positioned is more important than the South Europe dummy in 1990 and 2017, which inverts the logic that circumstances may be more important than ideology.

These results highlight and further confirm hypothesis 3.1: not being self-positioned in the far-right tends to generate more tolerance, and, more than that, this study demonstrates that this is common in all EVS waves from the earliest possible to be studied (1990) to the latest 2017-2021 wave. Once again, this validates previous findings: the more progressive an ideological standpoint, the more tolerant a citizen tends to be (Weldon, 2006; Sullivan *et al.*, 1979; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Gibson, 1989; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002; Hadler, 2012; Peffley *et al.*, 2022; Peffley *et al.*, 2023).

This study also further demonstrates that that being younger (15-35 years old) is still not important to explain social tolerance, further denying the confirmation of hypothesis 2.1., even if *not* belonging to the older cohort (66 or more years old) is significant, but only in the general model (with all variables) and, during 2008 and 2017 when time models were isolated, which is coherent with the findings in Table 5.1.1. This also contradicts the literature, which expected younger citizens to foster more socially tolerant attitudes (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020: 913).

This section tested the relationship between age, specifically among younger citizens, and far-right self-positioning on social tolerance in comparative and longitudinal terms. There were two hypotheses to analyse: hypothesis 2.1, which posits that *the younger the individuals, the more tolerant they will tend to be, at the individual level*, is concerned with the relationship that age has with social tolerance. When tested by themselves, the age variables (divided into age, age squared, a dummy comprising the younger citizens, 15 to 35 years-old, and another dummy with the older citizens - 66 or more) were not generally significant: only age square and the older citizens' dummy were significant. However, this significance disappeared when introducing the other independent variables and controls (Table 5.1.1), except for the older cohort. However, the effects of the older cohort dummy variable were negative, meaning that younger citizens are connected to higher levels of social tolerance, although this effect does not necessarily apply to the youngest group. The same could be said of age square, with some instances having significance, signifying that there is a non-linear relationship between age and social tolerance.

As such, hypothesis 2.1. is mostly rejected, as the data mostly does not show a consistent effect of young people on social tolerance, although, in some circumstances, younger people may promote more tolerant attitudes, like in 2008 and 2017. The idea that classical and revisionist literature had that young citizens tend to improve social tolerance due to their progressive views (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020: 913) is dismissed in this context. However, my results also suggest that some intermediary age groups, meaning, not old nor young, may actually improve tolerance.

As to the other microlevel hypothesis, self-positioning in the far-right, hypothesis 3.1. stated that *self-positioning in the far-right will negatively relate to the levels of tolerance, at the individual level*. In practically all tested scenarios, self-positioning in the far-right has a significant negative effect on social tolerance. Meaning that individuals who are not positioned in the far-right promote more social tolerance, and vice versa: self-positioning in the far-right means that a certain citizen is more likely to be intolerant. These observations confirm hypothesis 3.1. While the literature expects that more leftist or liberal individuals will display more tolerance (e.g. Weldon, 2006; Sullivan *et al.*, 1979; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Gibson, 1989; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002; Hadler, 2012), my data successfully ties in with the scholarship, but also goes beyond that: it implies that, to improve social tolerance values, it is enough that citizens do *not* self-position in the far-right.

5.2. On toleration to stigmatised groups⁵⁹

This subchapter seeks to analyse how tolerance is influenced by the micro-level variables age and age groups, and ideological self-positioning in the far-right, now individually analysing the four socially stigmatised groups that are the object of this research. This is designed to answer hypothesis H2.3, which concerns explicitly the effects of tolerance to Muslims and immigrants, expecting younger citizens to be less tolerant of these groups.

I thus consider as dependent variables the binomial social minority questions, which ask EVS respondents whether they tolerate neighbours who are of other races, Muslims, immigrants and homosexuals. Note that all models in this subchapter use logistic regression techniques. Furthermore, all models which do not introduce the control variables have been made available in this thesis's Appendix A5.2.

⁵⁹ An important note to take into consideration when looking at the results on the tables, from here on, is that I was forced to eliminate the control variable "town size" due to it only being available from the wave 1990 onwards, on the models where I observe effects on tolerance to other races and immigrants, which are the dependent variables which were studied by EVS on wave 1. Regardless, I maintained this same control on the models where effects on tolerance to Muslims and homosexuals are tested.

5.2.1. *Tolerance to another race*

First, I examine how my independent variables affect tolerance to other races in Table 5.2.1, which uses logistic regression to test the statistical effects of age variables and far-right self-positioning. In general terms, results show that, on one hand, non-self-positioning in the far-right has a significant impact on tolerance to other races: those who self-position in the far-right tend to be more intolerant of people who are not of the same race as they are. On the other hand, age does not influence social tolerance; unless controls are excluded, younger citizens tend to be more tolerant toward other races. However, once all controls are included (see Appendix Table A5.2.1), age no longer has a significant effect, and none of the other age variables are significant either. The regional variables have a negative effect: being southern or eastern European makes it more likely that a given citizen is more intolerant of other races. As to the waves and survey year, none of these variables has an effect on tolerance to other races.

When it comes to how these variables affect tolerance to other races across time, first, it ought to be stated that no age variable holds a significant effect in any of the models regarding each of the waves. However, being self-positioned in the far-right makes the individuals more likely to be intolerant of other races in waves 2 (1990) and 4 (2008).

Regarding the effects of living in certain countries in Europe, not being Southern or Eastern European also produces effects on tolerance in every wave.

Putting this analysis into perspective, it has been known that racism has been curbed, across the decades, in Europe, however, still being far from being eliminated (ESS, 2022; FRA, 2018; Pew Research Center, 2020). The literature tells us that less racist prejudice is connected to more progressive thinking, ideologically associated with the left and liberalism (i.e. Inglehart, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Viegas, 2007, 2010; Vala *et al.*, 2010; Jennings and Ralph-Morrow, 2020: 136), and thus, it comes as no surprise that being ideologically positioned in the far-right is correlated with more intolerance to people of other ethnicities. What is surprising is that, longitudinally, being self-positioned in the far-right is only significant on social intolerance in 1990 and 2008.

Table 5.2.1. The effect of far-right self-position and age groups on tolerance to other races (DV: tolerance to other races)

Race		General (IV's and controls)		1981-1984		1990-1993		1999-2001		2008-2010		2017-2021	
Variable		B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Regions	Southern Europe=1	-0,400***	0,030	-0,115	0,092	0,032	0,063	-0,448***	0,061	-0,492***	0,059	-0,797***	0,075
	Eastern Europe=1	-1,073***	0,024			-1,006***	0,046	-0,521***	0,053	-0,917***	0,048	-1,832***	0,052
Time	EVS wave 2(1990)=1	-0,192	0,158										
	EVS wave 3(1999)=1	0,375	0,298										
	EVS wave 4(2008)=1	0,522	0,450										
	EVS wave 5(2017)=1	0,632	0,607										
	Year survey	-0,017	0,017										
Age	Age	-0,009	0,006	-0,042	0,024	-0,022	0,014	0,018	0,014	0,000	0,012	0,004	0,013
	Age Square	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000*	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year olds=1	0,012	0,049	-0,122	0,199	-0,044	0,099	0,166	0,109	-0,029	0,096	0,103	0,108
	66 or more year olds=1	-0,047	0,049	-0,122	0,174	-0,019	0,104	0,154	0,110	-0,113	0,102	-0,112	0,102
Self-positioning in the far-right	Far-right position=1	-0,251***	0,041	0,201	0,148	-0,446***	0,087	-0,173	0,093	-0,378***	0,082	-0,102	0,080
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1	-0,154***	0,021	-0,122	0,082	-0,179***	0,043	-0,206***	0,046	-0,149***	0,041	-0,108*	0,042
	Age complete education	0,051***	0,004	0,054***	0,014	0,039***	0,008	0,063***	0,009	0,062***	0,008	0,049***	0,009
	Employed=1	0,025	0,025	0,184	0,095	-0,005	0,054	0,199***	0,054	0,002	0,050	-0,160**	0,056
	Married=1	0,018	0,023	0,123	0,089	-0,015	0,051	0,022	0,052	-0,015	0,044	0,009	0,044
	Religious person	-0,008	0,018	0,189*	0,074	-0,053	0,039	-0,020	0,042	0,021	0,034	0,047	0,034
	Town size												
Political controls	Left vs Right	-0,055***	0,006	-0,149***	0,025	-0,023	0,013	-0,066***	0,014	-0,017	0,012	-0,086***	0,012
	Patriotism	-0,073***	0,014	-0,095	0,050	-0,130***	0,029	-0,027	0,030	-0,078**	0,029	0,002	0,030
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	0,070***	0,013	-0,054	0,046	0,143***	0,026	0,087**	0,028	0,019	0,025	0,103***	0,027
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,560***	0,024	0,447***	0,084	0,434***	0,047	0,642***	0,057	0,469***	0,048	0,670***	0,050
	(Constant)	37,599	33,309	4,294***	0,684	3,130***	0,372	1,911***	0,399	2,463***	0,346	2,972***	0,372
Nagelkerke R Square		0,099		0,081		0,101		0,066		0,064		0,197	
chi² (p)		5440,697 (0,000)		348,366 (0,000)		1163,802 (0,000)		723,258 (0,000)		880,513 (0,000)		2828,555 (0,000)	
N		105714		9750		20025		21371		26834		27734	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, [28/08/2024].

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

The analysis regarding tolerance to other races comprehends data from EVS' wave 1 to 5, due to tolerance to other races indicator being asked since wave 1 (1981). Town size is not available one wave 1 (1981-1984), thus I cut it out from this analysis. Since EVS wave 1 is available for this dependent variable, it is used as reference on the time dummies.

5.2.2. Tolerance to Muslims

Table 5.2.2. shows that age explains tolerance to Muslims negatively: the younger the person, the more tolerant they are. Age squared also has an effect, but only when all the controls are inserted into the model. Finally, not being an older citizen is also related to tolerance, with being an older citizen making it more likely to generate less tolerance to Muslims. And, once again, being self-positioned in the far-right also influences intolerance, even when all controls are inserted.

There are some differences regarding the effects of not living in Southern or Eastern Europe, consistent with my prior findings: not being a citizen in Southern or Eastern Europe is more likely to generate more tolerance to Muslims. Finally, when all wave dummies are inserted, they tend to positively influence tolerance to Muslims, but not when it comes to the survey year, which negatively influences the likelihood of being tolerant towards Muslims.

In general, the tendency is that as age has a negative effect (younger people are more tolerant), the young group's effect on tolerance to Muslims is not significant, and the older group of citizens (66 or more) is less tolerant, generating a negative effect, which means that younger citizens than 66 years-old are more tolerant of Muslims. This means that hypothesis 2.3. is not confirmed.

The fact that younger citizens tend to be more tolerant of Muslims confirms, in this case, the scholarship's expectation that younger people have more progressive views and more tolerant attitudes (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b). This is also relevant, as it provides further evidence of Muslims being scapegoats of far-right parties (Mudde, 2007, 2019; Duina and Carson, 2019) may affect how the population views Muslims.

Table 5.2.2. The effect of far-right self-position and age groups on tolerance to Muslims (DV: tolerance to Muslims)

Muslims		General (IV's and controls)		1990-1993		1999-2001		2008-2010		2017-2021	
		B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Regions	Southern Europe=1	0,031	0,026	0,461***	0,056	-0,036	0,052	-0,094*	0,047	-0,074	0,059
	Eastern Europe=1	-0,588***	0,020	-0,386***	0,042	-0,349***	0,043	-0,348***	0,038	-1,229***	0,040
Time	EVS wave 2(1990)=1										
	EVS wave 3(1999)=1	0,602***	0,136								
	EVS wave 4(2008)=1	0,880**	0,276								
	EVS wave 5(2017)=1	1,153**	0,422								
	Year survey	-0,048**	0,016								
Age	Age	-0,018***	0,005	-0,017	0,012	-0,017	0,012	-0,008	0,010	-0,011	0,010
	Age Square	0,000*	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year olds=1	-0,004	0,042	-0,137	0,087	0,006	0,087	0,011	0,076	0,156	0,085

	66 or more year olds=1	-0,121**	0,044	0,025	0,096	-0,123	0,093	-0,197***	0,083	-0,129	0,085
Self-positioning in the far-right	Far-right position=1	-0,139	0,036	-0,303***	0,081	-0,097	0,079	-0,122	0,067	0,000	0,067
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1	-0,152***	0,018	-0,147***	0,039	-0,158***	0,038	-0,171***	0,033	-0,132***	0,034
	Age complete education	0,029***	0,004	0,026***	0,007	0,032***	0,007	0,032***	0,007	0,036***	0,007
	Employed=1	0,009	0,022	-0,003	0,048	0,181***	0,045	-0,078	0,041	-0,086	0,045
	Married=1	0,044*	0,019	0,010	0,046	0,020	0,043	0,030	0,035	0,088*	0,036
	Religious person	0,008	0,015	0,016	0,034	-0,041	0,034	0,075**	0,027	0,031	0,027
	Town size	0,053***	0,007	0,029*	0,014	0,049***	0,014	0,058***	0,012	0,075***	0,013
Political controls	Left vs Right	-0,087***	0,005	-0,045***	0,012	-0,073***	0,011	-0,091***	0,010	-0,124***	0,010
	Patriotism	-0,068***	0,012	-0,095***	0,025	-0,087***	0,025	-0,065**	0,023	-0,028	0,025
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	0,100***	0,011	0,094***	0,024	0,111***	0,023	0,058**	0,021	0,139***	0,022
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,520***	0,020	0,446***	0,042	0,535***	0,044	0,439***	0,037	0,590***	0,039
	(Constant)	97,102***	31,036	2,211***	0,327	2,260***	0,330	1,804***	0,281	1,964***	0,299
Nagelkerke R Square		0,078		0,060		0,057		0,046		0,175	
chi² (p)		4496,082 (0,000)		726,968 (0,000)		740,210 (0,000)		754,255 (0,000)		2809,263 (0,000)	
N		88280		18908		21030		25238		23104	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, [28/08/2024].

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

5.2.3. Tolerance to immigrants

When it comes to tolerance to immigrants (Table 5.2.3), non-self-positioning in the far-right maintains its significance in the general model, but not when it comes to each wave. Age variables, however, have no significant effects in any of the models (in general and per wave).

As to the effects of being a citizen of a given European region, not being from Eastern Europe is significant, as is not being from Southern Europe, but only when no controls are inserted. As to the wave effects, they are all negatively significant, but only when controls are inserted, while the survey year is not significant. Analysing regions per wave, being southern European elicits more likelihood that a citizen is more tolerant to immigrants, in 1990. However, this effect is nullified by 1999, and reversed over the two subsequent waves, 2008 and 2017, meaning that not being a South European citizen makes it more likely to be tolerant of immigrants in 2008 and 2017. This is an observation valid for Eastern European citizens: not being from Eastern Europe makes it more likely that one might be more tolerant of immigrants.

Regarding hypothesis 2.3, while the scholarship expects that younger people have more progressive views and more tolerant attitudes, this is not verified, once again. In an era when the anti-immigration rhetoric has been normalised (Valentim, 2021, 2024), there is no evidence that young voters have turned their backs on immigrants.

Table 5.2.3. The effect of far-right self-position and age groups on tolerance to immigrants (DV: tolerance to immigrants)

Immigrants		General (IV's and controls)		1981-1984		1990-1993		1999-2001		2008-2010		2017-2021	
Variable		B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Regions	Southern Europe=1	0,012	0,029	1,596***	0,142	0,479***	0,063	-0,059	0,060	-0,422***	0,052	-0,085	0,068
	Eastern Europe=1	-0,940***	0,021			-0,648***	0,044	-0,658***	0,047	-0,792***	0,042	-1,579***	0,039
Time	EVS wave 2(1990)=1	-0,645***	0,148										
	EVS wave 3(1999)=1	-0,576*	0,278										
	EVS wave 4(2008)=1	-0,876*	0,419										
	EVS wave 5(2017)=1	-1,442*	0,564										
	Year survey	0,024	0,016										
Age	Age	-0,002	0,005	-0,008	0,022	0,007	0,013	0,013	0,013	0,002	0,011	0,002	0,010
	Age Square	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year olds=1	0,025	0,044	-0,169	0,188	-0,050	0,095	0,189	0,097	-0,008	0,085	0,114	0,086
	66 or more year olds=1	-0,041	0,046	0,049	0,185	0,068	0,101	-0,068	0,103	0,011	0,092	-0,094	0,087
Self-positioning in the far-right	Far-right position=1	-0,106**	0,037	0,033	0,146	-0,063	0,087	-0,110	0,087	-0,097	0,074	-0,068	0,068
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1	-0,125***	0,018	-0,142	0,081	-0,140***	0,042	-0,176***	0,042	-0,120***	0,036	-0,086*	0,035
	Age complete education	0,039***	0,004	0,020	0,014	0,047***	0,008	0,052***	0,008	0,032***	0,007	0,045***	0,007
	Employed=1	0,013	0,023	0,156	0,093	0,015	0,051	0,106*	0,050	-0,011	0,045	-0,078	0,046
	Married=1	0,042*	0,020	0,174*	0,089	0,019	0,049	0,064	0,047	0,028	0,039	0,003	0,037
	Religious person	0,037**	0,015	0,093	0,072	0,034	0,037	-0,020	0,037	0,056	0,030	0,132***	0,027
	Town size												
Political controls	Left vs Right	-0,071***	0,005	-0,122***	0,025	-0,042***	0,013	-0,042***	0,013	-0,055***	0,010	-0,110***	0,010
	Patriotism	-0,070***	0,013	-0,087	0,049	-0,116***	0,027	-0,033	0,027	-0,058*	0,025	-0,039	0,025
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	0,128***	0,011	0,072	0,047	0,193***	0,025	0,185***	0,026	0,052*	0,023	0,134***	0,022
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,603***	0,021	0,638***	0,084	0,575***	0,046	0,523***	0,050	0,462***	0,042	0,693***	0,040
	(Constant)	-45,073	30,978	2,976***	0,637	1,700***	0,348	1,389***	0,360	2,178***	0,307	1,839***	0,299
Nagelkerke R Square		0,103		0,098		0,085		0,064		0,055		0,209	
chi² (p)		6361,970 (0,000)		425,001 (0,000)		1010,673 (0,000)		766,713 (0,000)		849,353 (0,000)		3705,052 (0,000)	
N		105266		9750		20023		21372		26793		27328	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, [28/08/2024].

Notes: The analysis regarding tolerance to immigrants comprehends data from EVS' wave 1 to 5, due to tolerance to immigrants indicator being asked since wave 1 (1981). Town size is not available one wave 1 (1981-1984), thus I cut it out from this analysis. Since EVS wave 1 is available for this dependent variable, it is used as reference on the time dummies.

p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

5.2.4. Tolerance to homosexuality

Regarding the final group of stigmatised minority populations, homosexuals (Table 5.2.4), and first looking at the general model (encompassing all years), not being self-positioned in the far-right regains its significant effect on tolerance to homosexuals. As to the age variables, contrary to the previous variables, they have a significant and positive effect on tolerance to homosexuals, although not quite consistently. This is also true for the youth group variable. The older cohort (66 or more years-old) is only significant when age variables are tested, and its effect is negative.

Table 5.2.4. The effect of far-right self-position and age groups on tolerance to homosexuals (DV: tolerance to homosexuals)

Homosexuals		General (IV's and controls)		1990-1993		1999-2001		2008-2010		2017-2021	
Variable		B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Regions	Southern Europe=1	-0,513***	0,025	-0,374***	0,044	-0,558***	0,047	-0,666***	0,050	-0,454***	0,074
	Eastern Europe=1	-1,726***	0,021	-1,498***	0,039	-1,445***	0,040	-1,776***	0,041	-2,314***	0,051
Time	EVS wave 2(1990)=1										
	EVS wave 3(1999)=1	0,768***	0,142								
	EVS wave 4(2008)=1	1,088***	0,288								
	EVS wave 5(2017)=1	1,456***	0,440								
	Year survey	-0,005	0,016								
Age	Age	0,012*	0,005	0,008	0,010	0,010	0,011	0,031**	0,010	0,007	0,012
	Age Square	0,000***	0,000	0,000*	0,000	0,000**	0,000	0,000***	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year olds=1	0,100*	0,041	0,002	0,075	0,070	0,079	0,257**	0,079	0,125	0,100
	66 or more year olds=1	0,034	0,043	0,091	0,087	0,206*	0,086	-0,044	0,083	-0,110	0,094
Self-positioning in the far-right	Far-right position=1	-0,224***	0,036	-0,117	0,075	-0,119	0,073	-0,247***	0,069	-0,338***	0,076
	Male=1	-0,438***	0,018	-0,388***	0,034	-0,477***	0,035	-0,435***	0,033	-0,444***	0,039
Sociodemographic controls	Age complete education	0,063***	0,003	0,074***	0,006	0,047***	0,007	0,061***	0,007	0,078***	0,009
	Employed=1	0,108***	0,021	0,023	0,041	0,182***	0,041	0,105*	0,041	0,075	0,051
	Married=1	-0,034	0,019	0,009	0,040	-0,110**	0,039	-0,008	0,036	-0,056	0,042
	Religious person	-0,293***	0,015	-0,186***	0,030	-0,324***	0,032	-0,305***	0,029	-0,282***	0,033
	Town size	0,076***	0,006	0,072***	0,012	0,088***	0,013	0,095***	0,012	0,043**	0,015
Political controls	Left vs Right	-0,036***	0,005	-0,048***	0,010	-0,028**	0,010	-0,041***	0,010	-0,033**	0,011
	Patriotism	-0,153***	0,012	-0,245***	0,022	-0,193***	0,023	-0,055*	0,023	-0,062*	0,028
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	0,055***	0,011	0,032	0,021	0,012	0,021	0,088***	0,021	0,076**	0,025
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,503***	0,019	0,459***	0,035	0,549***	0,039	0,455***	0,038	0,518***	0,045
(Constant)		11,156	32,288	1,990***	0,282	2,954***	0,303	1,892***	0,287	3,236***	0,349
Nagelkerke R Square		0,257		0,207		0,199		0,225		0,321	
chi ² (p)		17111,167 (0,000)		3124,138 (0,000)		3129,522 (0,000)		4133,899 (0,000)		5110,318 (0,000)	
N		88429		18907		21032		25357		23133	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/> [28/08/2024].

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

As to the region and time variables: not being from south or east Europe is, once again, an important and significant variable, while the 1999, 2008, and 2017 waves generate positive effects on tolerance to homosexuals, meaning that, as time goes on, the more tolerant populations become to homosexuals (see appendix A5.2., Table A5.2.4).

Age variables become significant in the 1999 and 2008 waves. In 1999, older adults (66+) were more likely to be tolerant of gay people, but this effect does not appear in other years. Between 2008 and 2010, both older and younger people (15–35) showed more tolerance, though the effect was much stronger among the younger group.

Far-right self-positioning has significant results, but only on half of the waves. On the other hand, confirming the graphic observations at the beginning of this chapter that, indeed, South and Eastern European countries tend to be less tolerant of gay people than their North/Central European peers.

Making a more general look on tolerance to socially stigmatised groups, the analysis in this subchapter shows that tolerance to the selected socially stigmatised groups (other races, immigrants, Muslims, and homosexuals) is, indeed, explained by (*non*)far-right self-positioning, and, in rare instances, by age and younger age cohorts.

Age variables only hold a significant effect when it comes to tolerance to Muslims and homosexuals. The younger a person is, the more tolerant they tend to be of Muslims (Table 5.2.3). Not being a 66 or older citizen means a greater likelihood of expressing tolerance to Muslims (appendix A5.2). Finally, regarding age's effects on homosexuals, the older citizens are, the more tolerant they tend to be, but the 15-35 year-old age group also displays more tolerance. This may be because, in 2008, there is a powerful positive effect of the youth on tolerance to gay people (which coincides with the time when several countries legalised or discussed gay marriage).

Self-positioning in the far-right affects tolerance, in general and to the minority groups, but does not always affect tolerance significantly: positioning in the far-right tends to increase intolerance to other races, Muslims, immigrants and homosexuals. Far-right self-positioning also does not have a significant effect on tolerance to these minorities at some points in time (e.g. other races in 1981, 1999, and 2017; Muslims in 1999 to 2017; immigrants between 1981 and 2017; and homosexuals in 1990 and 1999). The increase in impact in the 2017 wave seems to suggest that self-positioning in the far-right is not important in explaining intolerance in that period to these socially stigmatised groups.

Being Southern European is also significant regarding tolerance to all groups, but consistently negative, except towards Muslims, having a positive effect (being Southern

European makes citizens more likely to tolerate Muslims), while *not* being an Eastern European citizen is also significant towards every stigmatised group. In the same sense, each wave tends to influence positively tolerance, except in 2008 and 2017 regarding immigrants (meaning that citizens tended to feel less tolerant to immigrants during those times, which coincide with the economic and financial crisis of 2007-2008 and 2009-2013, and the 2015 migratory crisis), with wave 3 having a negative and significant effect on tolerance to immigrants.

Regarding hypothesis 2.3. stating that *younger (15 to 35-year-olds) and older citizens (66+) will tend to be less tolerant towards immigrants and Muslims in the latest wave (2017-2020)*, this is rejected. On one hand, age does not have a significant effect when it comes to tolerance to immigrants (globally and across time). On the other hand, regarding Muslims, results show that the younger citizens tend to be more tolerant of Muslims. This confirms the scholarship's expectation that younger people have more progressive views and more tolerant attitudes.

An important implication of these results is that the youth do not seem to be penalising these groups, which are especially vulnerable to the far-right's rhetoric. While tolerance to immigrants and Muslims is getting lower, the youth is not to blame for this: on the contrary, in some circumstances (Muslims), it seems younger people are more tolerant.

Furthermore, these models show a more complex and nuanced relationship between age and social tolerance. In some cases, it means that younger citizens are more tolerant (namely, towards Muslims), while, at the same time, not being tolerant of other minority groups.

5.3. The curious case of Portugal – Part II

As stated in Chapter II., Viegas' studies (2004, 2007, 2010) were instrumental in showing that Portugal was an interesting case-study, with it being more tolerant than most its European peers, even though it did not fulfil the theory of modernization's assumption: more tolerance should have been observed in more economically and socially developed countries (Inglehart, 1990: 68-70; Inglehart and Welzel, 2010: 553; Candeias, 2012: 7). But is this still a reality? Is there a Portuguese tolerant exceptionalism? Is Portuguese tolerance higher than its peers?

This subchapter explores the Portuguese case in more depth, addressing *whether high tolerance levels for the Portuguese case detected since the beginning of 2000 until 2010, are confirmed in the following decade* (objective 6.1.) and if *social tolerance, in the Portuguese case, is related with age, and ideological self-positioning in the far-right* (objective 6.2.). These objectives relate to hypothesis H5.1, younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, in

Portugal and hypothesis 5.2, self-positioning in the far-right will negatively correlate with *the levels of tolerance, in Portugal, just like in North and Central Europe*.

For this, I replicate my procedures in subchapters 5.1. and 5.2.: first, I look at social tolerance, using the additive social tolerance index to compare Portugal with the European regions, to show whether Portugal follows a pattern akin to its North European peers. Then, I descriptively analyse Portuguese tolerance values for each of the minority social groups, comparatively with their European peers. Finally, to answer objective 6.2. and test hypotheses 5.1. and 5.2., I assess whether Portuguese tolerance is correlated with age and self-positioning in the far-right using regression analysis comparatively to assess whether the explanatory factors act in the Portuguese population in the same way as in the country groups.

Using the additive social tolerance indicator (Figure 5.3.1), while Portugal has lower tolerance values than its northern European peers in most waves (except in 1999-2001, where Portugal was slightly above Northern European countries), it has demonstrated higher tolerance values than its southern European peers since 1990. While Portugal started by having a lower baseline than its northern and central European peers (1990), it did not deter it from obtaining levels of tolerance which were higher than its southern European peers. Later, Portugal displays similar levels of tolerance to northern/central Europe and has a far higher level of tolerance to each minority group than its southern and eastern European peers. Beyond these observations, Figure 5.3.1. shows that Portugal has an average classification of tolerance which is closer to north/central Europe than its South European peers, from wave 3 (1999-2001) onwards. This solidifies the idea that Portugal has a tolerance attitude more akin to its north/central European peers than in the South or the East.




Figure 5.3.1. Portuguese tolerance in a comparative perspective: additive tolerance variable

Figure 5.3.2. displays how Portugal may be compared with its European peers. Its baseline tolerance values (in 1990) were not low, in general (being much higher than Eastern Europe). Indeed, its tolerance of Muslims was comparable to North/Central Europe, and its tolerance of immigrants was almost as high as the rest of South Europe, with only tolerance of homosexuality being lower. But it grew in the 1999 wave: its tolerance levels were higher than its joint peers concerning other ethnicities, Muslims, and immigrants, and are higher in comparison to homosexuality than its south and east European peers, having massive growth.

In the 2008 wave, Portugal's tolerance values were overall lower than before, but still quite high, and, in general, comparable to its northern and central European peers. The 2017 wave shows a recovery, with sizeable gains in relation to its peers, and, once again, Portuguese tolerance being more akin to North/central European countries than South or East Europe.




Figure 5.3.2. Portuguese social tolerance in comparative perspective

To test whether age variables influence social tolerance, and self-positioning in the far-right (Table 5.3.1), I compare Portugal and the other European regions (minus Portugal, in the

case of South Europe). While in the three European regions, age variables are not significant, in Portugal, the younger a voter is, the more tolerance they tend to display. Age square is also significant and positive, indicating that this relationship is likely non-linear. Moreover, Portugal also has a negative and significant effect of self-positioning in the far-right on social tolerance: those who positioned in the far-right tend to be more intolerant, and this is verifiable in the other models, which isolate the effects of far-right self-position in the European regions. However, age correlations are different, and there is no discernible pattern.

Regarding the period's influence on tolerance, the 1999 wave, which coincided with an enormous growth of social tolerance in Portugal, generated a significant and positive effect. While this effect is also common with North/Central Europe, the rest of South Europe had this same variable with a significant negative effect, but, indeed, the best waves for South European social tolerance were the first (1990) and the last one (2017). The later the survey year (which was significant), the more tolerance was detected in Portugal and South Europe, but the reverse was observed in Eastern Europe. As time passed, less tolerance was displayed in each region. This lack of pattern might, once again, be due to the fluctuations in values of tolerance across time, indicating that this relationship may be non-linear.

Comparing the relative impact of each independent variable, using Betas in each region, compared with Portugal (see Appendix Table A5.3.3), age and age square have greater Betas than far-right self-positioning in Portugal, Eastern Europe and Southern Europe, but only in Portugal are age variables significant. Meaning that being younger (as Beta is negative) is more important to explaining social tolerance than self-positioning in the far-right, in Portugal.

When running a separate regression analysis for the effects of age variables and self-positioning in the far-right in Portugal, for each EVS wave, I find no significant results (see Table A5.3.2 in Appendix A5.3). Furthermore, the relative importance of the explanatory power of the independent variables (age variables and self-positioning in the far-right) in Portugal across time (see Appendix table A5.3.4) shows that there is a large variation in how much age variables correlate with social tolerance. Indeed, age and age square score much higher Beta values than the far-right in every wave, but they are never significant.

Table 5.3.1. Portuguese social tolerance explained by age and far-right self-position in a comparative perspective (DV: social tolerance additive index)

Variables	Portugal		North and Central Europe		East Europe		South Europe (minus Portugal)		
	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	B	Std. Error	
(Constant)	-33,318***	3,397	24,860	24,363	438,825***	32,970	-217,571***	66,084	
Time	EVS wave 3 (1999)=1	0,356***	0,049	0,293**	0,112	2,073***	0,129	-1,059***	0,300
	EVS wave 4 (2008)=1	0,017	0,042	0,427	0,224	4,018***	0,277	-2,023***	0,605
	EVS wave 5 (2017)=1			0,629	0,334	5,728***	0,432	-2,922**	0,915
	Year survey	0,019***	0,002	-0,011	0,012	-0,219***	0,017	0,111***	0,033
Age	Age	-0,032**	0,011	-0,003	0,003	-0,002	0,005	0,007	0,006
	Age Square	0,000*	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year olds=1	-0,143	0,075	-0,006	0,020	0,064	0,034	0,019	0,045
	66 or more year olds=1	-0,005	0,114	-0,019	0,023	-0,042	0,040	-0,060	0,053
Self-positioning in the far-right	Far-right position=1	-0,221**	0,084	-0,273***	0,021	-0,086**	0,031	-0,217***	0,044
Controls	Male=1	-0,147***	0,036	-0,137***	0,009	-0,090***	0,015	-0,122***	0,020
	Age complete education (intervals)	0,034***	0,006	0,031***	0,002	0,018***	0,003	0,026***	0,004
	Employed=1	0,149***	0,042	0,041***	0,011	-0,006	0,019	-0,001	0,024
	Married=1	0,043	0,040	0,020*	0,010	0,005	0,017	0,010	0,023
	Religious person	0,047	0,031	-0,005	0,007	-0,040**	0,013	-0,095***	0,019
	Town size	0,020	0,014	0,030***	0,003	0,030***	0,005	0,026***	0,008
Political controls	Left vs Right	0,004	0,010	-0,040***	0,003	-0,006	0,004	-0,028***	0,006
	Patriotism	-0,003	0,029	-0,056***	0,006	-0,036***	0,010	-0,034*	0,014
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	-0,005	0,022	0,078***	0,006	-0,006	0,009	0,015	0,012
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,126**	0,044	0,228***	0,009	0,283***	0,018	0,237***	0,021
N	3123		42513		28819		12270		
Adjusted R Square	0,084		0,109		0,052		0,063		

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

Variable EVS Wave 5 was eliminated from the Portuguese model, and thus, results for that variable are not presented.

In this subchapter, I sought to provide answers to objectives 6.1. and 6.2., as well as testing H5.1. and H5.2, all specifically related to Portugal. My results show that the Portuguese exceptionalism remains: its most recent tolerance values (in the 2017 wave), be them in general (using the additive social tolerance index) or in relation to specific social minorities, are closer to the north/central European region, than to south Europe, and are far higher than east Europe (Figures 5.3.1., and 5.3.2).

Moreover, the results expose similar patterns of behaviour with the other country groups: while self-positioning in the far-right is significant in every region (and Portugal), this country shows itself to be unique; unlike the other regions, younger Portuguese citizens tend to display more tolerance. These results suggest that Portugal fulfils the expectations by the

classical tolerance literature. At the same time, its peers do not: in Portugal, younger people do seem to display more tolerance, and this goes against the European grain.

These results exhibit that Portugal is more similar to its north/central European peers, while at the same time demonstrating that it has its own caveats. This means that the Portuguese exceptionalism thesis, advanced by Viegas (2004, 2007, 2010), is confirmed, which confirms hypothesis 5.1. and 5.2.

5.4. Is tolerance correlated with age and far-right self-positioning? Confirming hypotheses and summarising social tolerance in Europe, across time

This chapter sought to explain how age and far-right self-position influence social tolerance, in general and towards the four specific minority groups. In this subchapter, I revisit each hypothesis' confirmation and observe the implications of this chapter's results.

Testing whether H2.1. (*the younger the individuals, the more tolerant they will tend to be, at the individual level*), the analysis yielded the following results: age variables were not generally significant; only age square and the older citizens' dummy were significant in the general model of social tolerance (using the social tolerance additive index), and only the older citizens were significant when controls were inserted. Even when looking at age effects when testing each stigmatised group, age (and the other age variables) does not affect tolerance to other races and tolerance to immigrants. Based on the previous results, hypothesis 2.1 is largely rejected, as the data does not indicate a consistent effect of younger individuals on social tolerance, that is, except in certain specific cases, particularly regarding attitudes toward Muslim (see more details on this social group below).

Looking at age variables' relationship with each minority group, hypothesis 2.3. states that *younger (15 to 35-year-olds) and older citizens (66+) will tend to be less tolerant towards immigrants and Muslims in the latest wave (2017-2020)*. The results, however, show that the younger age group does not have a significant effect towards immigrants (globally, and across time). As to Muslims, instead of age having a negative correlation, or younger people being less tolerant, results show that the younger the citizens are, the more tolerant of Muslims they tend to be (although the youngest age group lacks a significant effect). This partially confirms the scholarship's expectation that younger people have more progressive views and more tolerant attitudes (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b), and contradicts the idea that, because these social minorities (immigrants and Muslims) are being scapegoated by the far-right, they suffer more intolerance from younger and older citizens. This

means that hypothesis 2.3 is rejected. On the other hand, however, these results also show that young individuals are not necessarily the best predictors of tolerance.

Finally, regarding age's correlations with tolerance to homosexuals, the older the citizens, the more tolerant they tend to be towards homosexuality. But the younger age group (15 to 35 years-old) also tends to be more tolerant to homosexuality. These results are not maintained across the board, as age and the younger group lose its significant effect except on wave 4 (2008).

My results show a more complex and nuanced relationship between age and social tolerance, where younger citizens could be more or less tolerant, depending on context and social groups being evaluated.

When it comes to the influence of self-positioning in the far-right, which underlies the test of H3.1. (*self-positioning in the far-right will negatively relate to the levels of tolerance, at the individual level*), in practically all tested scenarios throughout the chapter, self-positioning in the far-right has a significant consistent negative effect on social tolerance. Meaning that individuals who do not position in the far-right will tend to increase social tolerance, while positioning in the far-right is correlated with less tolerance, confirming hypothesis 3.1. Some implications of these results are that, as expected, far-right ideological positioning is more correlated with less tolerance, and vice versa, but my research also shows that it is enough to *not* position in the far-right to display more tolerance. This speaks to how most of the left-right European political spectrum is aligned with the values of tolerance. Another observation is the coherence of this result: across time and regions, far-right self-position has always a negative effect on social tolerance, which implies that this effect has been ever-present, and is not a new phenomenon.

The third subchapter analysed Portugal, in a comparative perspective with the other European regions. In the 1990 wave, Portugal had lower levels of tolerance compared to North/Central Europe. However, Portugal's low baseline did not deter it from obtaining levels of tolerance which were higher than its southern European peers, quickly recovering, according to Figures 5.3.1. and 5.3.2., now has values of tolerance closer to the average tolerance in its north/central European peers, rather than south and east Europe.

Now looking at H5.1. (*younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, in Portugal*), and H5.2. (*self-positioning in the far-right will negatively correlate with the levels of tolerance, in Portugal, just like in North and Central Europe*), the regression results, first, unlike their peers, in Portugal, younger people tend to be more tolerant (even though the youngest group does not show significant effects on tolerance), and this confirms H5.1. Moreover, *not*

positioning in the far-right tends to increase tolerance in Portugal and this country group, just like in the north and central European region, showing that Portugal follows a pattern closer to north/central European countries, and confirming H5.2.

However, Portugal is unique in the sense that younger people show more tolerance. In a nutshell, the Portuguese exceptionalism thesis, advanced by Viegas (2004, 2007, 2010), remains valid. This subchapter shows that high tolerance levels in Portugal were maintained between 2008 and 2020, and that social tolerance is indeed explained by age and by (not) self-positioning in the far-right, meaning that there is a concentration of population, in certain age groups, who look with sympathy, rather than hostility, to stigmatised social groups. In turn, this could be decisive for political actors who seek to capitalise on how to involve these populations in decision-making regarding the discrimination faced by these groups.

CHAPTER VI. The roles of age, support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance: A multilevel analysis of social tolerance

This chapter is focused on how social tolerance is explained by the three main factors (age, support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance), focusing on correlations at the country level. As such, this chapter will be using multilevel techniques to assess the relationship between the three independent variables and social tolerance.

Given that this research looks at the three main variables, using the country-level this chapter ties in with the macro-level objectives defined in the introduction: first *to observe if social tolerance is associated with age and age groups, especially over the later years* (objective 2), the age variables will also be used to validate the results observed in Chapter V; then (objective 3.), aiming to *estimate how support for the far-right affects social tolerance*, and more specifically (objective 3.2.) *aiming to understand if electoral support for the far-right (far-right voting) correlates with social tolerance* (country-level variable). Finally, it seeks to (objective 4.) *to estimate the effect of macro-level socioeconomic performance on social tolerance*.

This chapter also approaches how age and socioeconomic performance may moderate the relationship between the other independent variables and how social tolerance varies across European countries. As such, I aim to *assess the role of age (particularly younger vs. older age groups) in the relationship that macro-level socioeconomic performance and voting for the far-right have with social tolerance* (objective 5.1). This chapter will also focus on *assessing the role of socioeconomic performance in the relationship that voting for the far-right has with social tolerance* (objective 5.2). Given these objectives, this chapter will be of an explanatory nature. Thus, I will make use of multilevel regression analysis to explain social tolerance through the micro and macro-level independent variables.

This chapter is divided into four parts. Subchapter 6.1. observes the influence of the independent macrolevel variables (age, far-right voting, and socioeconomic performance) on social tolerance. This subchapter aims to answer the socioeconomic objective (4.) and hypothesis (H4), voting for the far-right macro-level objective (3.3.) and hypothesis (H3.2.), and the age objective (2.) and hypothesis (H2.2.). Subchapter 6.2. focuses on how age moderates the effects of far-right voting (H6) and socioeconomic performance (H7) on social tolerance. Subchapter 6.3. studies how socioeconomic performance moderates the far-right voting effect on social tolerance (H8). Subchapter 6.4. summarises this chapter's findings, hypothesis confirmation and how it contributes to the scholarship.

6.1. Age, the far-right and socioeconomic performance: effects over the multilevel analysis

In this subchapter, I first test the relationship between each group of independent variables and social tolerance, analysing them, and then I analyse the hypotheses, as well as the main implications of the results.

As with the beginning of chapter V, I begin this analysis by running correlation analysis using the independent variables, on two levels: micro and macro, and correlate them with the additive social tolerance variable. These correlation and association tests, which can be viewed in detail in Appendix A.5.1., show that there are significant, albeit weak, correlations between age (microlevel), self-positioning in the far-right, voting for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance variables, and the additive tolerance dependent variable. For this reason, I carried on with multilevel testing.

I use multilevel modelling, resorting to two levels: level 1 is citizen-level, while level 2 is country-level.⁶⁰ But before moving forward, it is first necessary to understand whether there is evidence of clustering in the data, particularly in the dependent variable (the additive tolerance variable, previously tested), or not. Using the estimation of covariance parameters, results show that $p < 0,001$ ($F = 0,1525$),⁶¹ meaning that there is evidence of clustering in the dependent variable, validating this multilevel analysis. The three sets of independent variables, far-right support (microlevel: self-positioning in the far-right; and macrolevel: voting for the far-right), age (microlevel), and socioeconomic performance variables (macrolevel) are tested independently. Later, the regional and time variables are added, and only after are the control variables added to obtain the final model (model 6).

When tested independently (Table 6.1.1, Model 1), self-positioning in the far-right (micro-level) and far-right voting (macro-level) generates significant effects on social tolerance: as expected, given the previous results on the micro-level models, not self-positioning in the far-right tends to generate more tolerant attitudes. However, the macro-level variable voting for the far-right expressed a positive (albeit small) effect on social tolerance in

⁶⁰ Two robustness checks are run, using two different regression techniques to the one present in this chapter. First, a Hierarchical Multiple Linear Regression, using the same dependant variable (the social tolerance additive index, created by myself). I built this regression in a similar manner to Candeias (2012, 2016). A second technique was used, with a binominal dependant variable: 1=some tolerance (individuals answered that they would tolerate at least one stigmatised social group), 0=intolerance (only individuals who were intolerant to all groups). I used a multilevel binary logistic regression technique, using the same independent variables and controls. The results were consistent with the ones presented in this chapter, with the same independent macro-level variables exerting significant effects on social tolerance, thus I decided to move forward with this analysis.

⁶¹ Please check the full results of this test on Appendix 6.1.

the first model. But over the other models, when the other independent variables and controls are inserted, far-right vote returns to the expected negative effect: more far-right voting harms social tolerance.

Regarding age: in model 2, age square has a positive effect on tolerance, meaning that age has a non-linear effect on social tolerance. However, age square ceases to have a significant effect on tolerance in model 6 when controls are inserted. Another variable displaying significant results was the dummy, which identifies older people ($66+=1$), displaying a negative effect on tolerance: not being an older citizen tends to generate more tolerant behaviour, but this is only for model 2, as for the others, it completely loses significance.

As to model 3, where only socioeconomic variables (macrolevel) are tested, all of them display a significant effect on social tolerance. HDI, GDP per capita, and unemployment rate generate a positive effect on social tolerance, meaning that countries with more human development, more per capita economic output and more unemployment rates tend to have greater levels of social tolerance, while GDP growth (in annual per cent) tends to generate a negative effect on social tolerance: more GDP growth means less tolerance, which might be connected to the fact that the countries which have been growing more in Europe, are the Eastern European ones, which we know tend to have social tolerance levels lower than their North and South European peers. However, in model 6, HDI loses its effect, but having less GDP annual growth, more GDP per capita, and more unemployment are all connected to more tolerant societies within these European country samples.

As to the other independent variables, not being east or south European, on one hand, has an effect on tolerance, meaning that it tends to generate more tolerance, not being a citizen from either of these areas. On the other hand, the Wave 3 (1999) dummy also generates a more positive and significant effect on tolerance: citizens from 1999 tend to be more tolerant, while all other waves did not generate a significant effect.

Table 6.1.1. Multilevel analysis on the correlation of age, support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance with social tolerance (DV: social tolerance additive variable) ⁶²

Variables		Model 1 - Far-Right variables (levels 1 and 2)		Model 2 - age variables (level 1)		Model 3 - economic variables (level 2)		Model 4 - independent variables (level 1 and 2)		Model 5 - independent variables (level 1 and 2), waves and Euro regions		Model 6 - complete model, with all variables				
		B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE			
Micro-level	Regions	Southern Europe=1										-0,394**	0,108	-0,337**	0,115	
		Eastern Europe=1											-0,799***	0,092	-0,722***	0,098
	Time	EVS wave 3 (1999)=1											0,165*	0,073	0,229**	0,084
		EVS wave 4 (2008)=1											0,114	0,147	0,267	0,168
		EVS wave 5 (2017)=1											-0,006	0,224	0,191	0,256
		Year survey											0,014	0,008	0,004	0,009
	Age	Age			0,000	0,002			0,000	0,002	0,000	0,002	-0,003	0,002		
		Age Square			0,000***	0,000			0,000***	0,000	0,000***	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
		15-35 year-olds=1			-0,014	0,015			-0,007	0,018	-0,006	0,021	-0,001	0,021		
		66 or more year-olds=1			-0,043*	0,020			-0,018	0,022	-0,022	0,021	-0,025	0,022		
Support for the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right: far-right position=1	-0,377***	0,045					-0,345***	0,045	-0,342***	0,045	-0,176***	0,041			
	Far-right voting %	0,002***	0,000					-0,008***	0,001	-0,007***	0,001	-0,006***	0,001			
Macro-level	Socioeconomic performance	HDI				2,185***	0,150	2,543***	0,160	-0,179	0,249	0,150	0,290			
		GDP Annual Growth (annual %)					-0,004***	0,001	-0,006***	0,001	-0,005***	0,001	-0,004**	0,001		
		GDP per Capita					0,000***	0,000	0,000***	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000*	0,000		
		Unemployment					0,019***	0,001	0,014***	0,002	0,003	0,002	0,008***	0,002		
Controls	Sociodemographic controls	Male=1												-0,117***	0,007	
		Age complete education													0,030***	0,002
		Employed=1													0,014	0,009
		Married=1													0,018*	0,008
		Religious person													-0,007	0,006
	Town size													0,030***	0,003	
	Political controls	Left vs Right													-0,028***	0,002
		Patriotism													-0,048***	0,005
	Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament													0,038***	0,005

⁶² All models were run with variance components type of random effects, selecting only micro-level variables as random effects.

Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1											0,239***	0,008
Variances													
r²	0,159843688	0,142205263	0,127493028	0,098459587	0,042749909	0,05095224							
σ²	1,123512363	1,175651066	1,181003329	1,09028847	1,086497297	1,090294069							
ICC	11,91%	10,73%	90,26%	7,84%	3,57%	4,28%							
AIC	354430,504	447829,484	423279,492	337471,860	337085,156	250069,822							
BIC	354459,586	447888,961	423299,203	337539,442	337152,737	250135,300							
Observations	119868	149167	140812	115229	115229	85330							
Groups (countries)	31	31	31	31	31	31							

Sources: Microlevel data: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024. Macrolevel data: World Bank, National Election Results, and UN.

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

There are several takeaways from these tests. Starting with age, hypothesis 2.2 states that *younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, at the country-level*. The multilevel analysis, as shown in Table 6.1.1, demonstrates that age variables have a limited effect on social tolerance.

Age square has a positive and significant effect, while those who do not belong to the older citizen group (66 or older) tend to be more tolerant. However, this effect disappears when the other independent variables, micro and macro, are inserted into the models. From the scholarship, younger people tend to be more tolerant, and older people tend to be less so (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020: 913), but what is found here, is that there is no statistical significance to state that the youth are more tolerant. It is also found that *not being* an older citizen (66+), positively influences social tolerance, but only in a limited capacity, as this case is not universal in the tested models.

Thus, hypothesis 2.2. is rejected, as the data does not confirm that the young push for either more or less tolerance. But this also contributes to the literature by observing that people who are not older (while not necessarily belonging to the younger age groups) tend to contribute to more social tolerance, albeit before considering the insertion of controls. It also validates the results obtained in the micro-level regression models (Chapter V), which also found that age's effects were mostly null, and one of the few significant correlations was that of the oldest age having a negative effect on social tolerance. Meaning: younger people (although not the youngest) tend to increase tolerance levels, but these results were limited and thus, it is possible to conclude that the insertion of the macro-level factors did not change this relationship.

Then, further studying the influence that the far-right has on social tolerance, hypothesis 3.2 states that *it is expected that the less votes far-right parties have at the country level, will contribute to higher social tolerance levels*, and this hypothesis runs on the coattails of the previous analysis. As such, the previous chapter showed that *not self-positioning* in the far-right was an important variable in explaining social tolerance. Here, voting for the far-right also revealed itself to be an important variable, and, just like self-positioning in the far-right, coherently. But this study allows for a broader understanding of how the far-right influences social tolerance, as it shows that less voting in far-right parties is correlated with more social tolerance attitudes in European countries. In short, less voting per cent for the far-right means that countries are more likely to be tolerant, which validates the results previously obtained for the self-positioning in the far-

right individual-level variable, which found that fewer citizens positioning in the far-right means that citizens are more likely to be tolerant.

These results confirm hypothesis 3.2. and, more than that, are an important contribution to the scholarship: Weldon's claim that lower levels of far-right voting led to greater tolerance was largely unsupported by replication studies (2006: 343). This test both validates and expands the scope of Weldon's finding. This is particularly significant, as Weldon was unable to demonstrate that reduced far-right voting fosters more social tolerance, because his findings were limited to increased political tolerance, and in fewer countries than this sample, and focused on only one time frame (1997).

Finally, hypothesis 4. relates to the effect that socioeconomic performance may have on social tolerance: *a country's social tolerance level will likely be positively correlated with better socioeconomic performance and negatively related with less favourable socioeconomic performance.*

When it comes to socioeconomic performance, an important observation is that it is not only *the economy*. Perhaps more surprisingly than realising that non-discriminating political preferences generate more social tolerance, is that not always mean that more socioeconomic development relates to more tolerance. A good example of this is the observation that less GDP annual growth tends to generate more social tolerance, while more GDP per capita (more accumulated wealth per individual) affects positively, meaning that societies with more GDP per capita are more tolerant. Another interesting observation is that there seems to be some social solidarity between citizens, as when we observe more unemployment, there seems to be more social tolerance.

While there are some recent findings that better economic performance helps explaining rising levels of tolerance (Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; Rapp, 2017; Salahodjaev, 2021), most scholars were unable to show that this relationship exists (Dunn and Singh, 2014; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Weldon, 2003, 2006; Peffley *et al.*, 2015).

The data, regardless, shows that socioeconomic effect on social tolerance is observable, but it has several idiosyncratic observations to consider: GDP annual growth harms social tolerance, which contradicts the idea that more socioeconomic growth leads to more tolerance (Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Viegas, 2004, 2007). But it is connected to the fact that the countries which have been growing more, in terms of their annual GDP, were the less tolerant Eastern European countries, such as Poland or Czechia (Rapp, 2017: 52).

On the other hand, I observe that GDP per capita has been shown to positively correlate with social tolerance. A possible interpretation is that while tolerance has been

negatively influenced in short-term economic growth (GDP annual growth), development (measured in GDP per capita) is a positive factor, which tends to increase tolerance. As to unemployment, it has a positive effect on social tolerance, which may indicate that, instead of creating a threat to citizens, instead, it may create more empathy. Contextual changes have shown themselves to negatively affect tolerance, while structural socioeconomic changes tend to have a more positive effect. As hypothesis 4 tests whether the macro-level socioeconomic variables have an effect on social tolerance, stating that *a country's social tolerance level will likely be positively affected by better socioeconomic performances*, given this research's results, hypothesis 4 is confirmed.

6.2. Does age (namely, young citizens) moderate the relationship between far-right voting and socioeconomic performance with social tolerance?

This subchapter analyses the moderation of age variables on the effects that far-right voting and socioeconomic performance have on social tolerance, to answer objective 6.1. For this end, there are two variables to be tested in this subchapter (H6.) *when compared to older people, the relationship of younger people with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when they vote for the far-right*, and (H7.) *when compared to older people, the relationship between younger people and decreasing levels of social tolerance is intensified when exposed to worse socioeconomic performance*.

To test these hypotheses, I use multilevel modelling, much in the same way as the previous subchapter, but I insert interaction effects between the age variables and far-right voting (H6), and between age variables and socioeconomic performance. Each model tests the moderating effect of age variables on far-right voting and socioeconomic performance variables. Models 7 and 8 only test the variable's age moderating effect, while models 11 and 12 test all age variables' moderating effects on the relationship between far-right voting and socioeconomic performance with social tolerance.

First, results (Table 6.2.1) show that age variables have no moderating effect on far-right vote: age does not moderate how voting for the far-right influences social tolerance.

Secondly, when testing the moderating effects of age on socioeconomic performance, age moderates GDP annual growth on tolerance in model 7. Meaning that the effects of GDP annual growth varied depending on the age of the respondents, and, on model 11, being a youth (between 15 and 35 year-olds) moderates the effect of unemployment on social tolerance, while being an older citizen (66 years-old on more)

has a negative moderating effect on HDI's effect on social tolerance. The effect of unemployment on social tolerance varies depending on whether citizens are younger, and a similar observation is possible to be made for the second significant interaction on model 11: the effect of HDI on social tolerance depends on whether citizens are older or not. Specifically, HDI has a stronger positive effect on social tolerance with citizens under 66 years old, and unemployment has a stronger effect on social tolerance with younger citizens between the ages of 15 and 35.

Table 6.2.1. Moderation of age variables on the explanatory variables of social tolerance (DV: social tolerance additive variable)

Variables		Model 7 - complete model, and interaction effects AGE x SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE		Model 8 - complete model, and interaction effects AGE x FAR-RIGHT VOTE		Model 11 - Testing complete model, and interaction effects ALL AGE x SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE		Model 12 - Testing complete model, and interaction effects ALL AGE x FAR-RIGHT VOTE		
		B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	
Micro-level	Regions	Southern Europe=1	-0,368**	0,117	-0,340**	0,116	-0,364**	0,117	-0,346**	0,117
		Eastern Europe=1	-0,746***	0,100	-0,719***	0,100	-0,755***	0,101	-0,715***	0,101
	Time	EVS wave 3 (1999)=1	0,235**	0,084	0,229**	0,084	0,231**	0,084	0,229**	0,084
		EVS wave 4 (2008)=1	0,279	0,168	0,268	0,168	0,270	0,168	0,268	0,168
		EVS wave 5 (2017)=1	0,207	0,256	0,192	0,256	0,193	0,256	0,192	0,256
		Year survey	0,004	0,009	0,004	0,009	0,004	0,009	0,004	0,009
	Age	Age	-0,013	0,008	-0,004	0,002	0,015	0,053	-0,004	0,003
		Age Square	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,001	0,001	0,000	0,000
		15-35 year-olds=1	0,001	0,020	-0,001	0,021	-0,380	0,445	-0,021	0,026
		66 or more year-olds=1	-0,021	0,022	-0,024	0,022	1,187*	0,507	-0,018	0,029
Macro-level	Support for the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right: far-right position=1	-0,175***	0,041	-0,176***	0,041	-0,175***	0,041	-0,176***	0,041
		Far-right voting %	-0,006***	0,001	-0,008***	0,002	-0,006***	0,001	-0,011*	0,004
	Socioeconomic performance	HDI	-0,374	0,537	0,166	0,290	-0,097	1,859	0,159	0,290
		GDP Annual Growth (annual %)	0,005	0,003	-0,004**	0,001	-0,005	0,015	-0,004**	0,001
		GDP per Capita	0,000*	0,000	0,000*	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000*	0,000
	Unemployment	0,014**	0,005	0,008***	0,002	-0,006	0,017	0,008***	0,002	
Interaction effects	Age * Socioeconomic performance	Age * HDI	0,012	0,010			-0,029	0,071		
		Age * GDP Growth	0,000**	0,000			0,000	0,001		
		Age * GDP per Capita	0,000	0,000			0,000	0,000		
		Age * Unemployment	0,000	0,000			0,000	0,001		
		AGE_square * HDI					0,001	0,001		
		AGE_square * GDP growth					0,000	0,000		
		AGE_square * GDP per capita					0,000	0,000		
		AGE_square * Unemployment					0,000	0,000		
		YOUTH * HDI					0,305	0,589		

						0,003	0,005			
						0,000	0,000			
						0,012*	0,006			
						-1,493*	0,664			
						-0,001	0,005			
						0,000	0,000			
						-0,003	0,006			
				0,000	0,000			0,000	0,000	
								0,000	0,000	
								0,002	0,002	
								-0,001	0,002	
Micro-level	Sociodemographic Controls	Male=1	-0,116***	0,007	-0,117***	0,007	-0,116***	0,007	-0,117***	0,007
		Age complete education	0,029***	0,002	0,030***	0,002	0,030***	0,002	0,030***	0,002
		Employed=1	0,011	0,009	0,014	0,009	0,010	0,009	0,014	0,009
		Married=1	0,014	0,008	0,017*	0,008	0,014	0,008	0,017*	0,008
		Religious person	-0,009	0,006	-0,008	0,006	-0,008	0,006	-0,008	0,006
		Town size	0,030***	0,003	0,030***	0,003	0,030***	0,003	0,030***	0,003
	Political controls	Left vs Right	-0,028***	0,002	-0,028***	0,002	-0,028***	0,002	-0,028***	0,002
		Patriotism	-0,047***	0,005	-0,048***	0,005	-0,047***	0,005	-0,048***	0,005
	Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	0,038***	0,005	0,038***	0,005	0,038***	0,005	0,038***	0,005
	Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,239***	0,008	0,239***	0,008	0,239***	0,008	0,239***	0,008
		Variiances								
		τ_{00}	0,052666559		0,052292858		0,053225739		0,053365353	
		σ^2	1,089720379		1,090228225		1,089687293		1,090250703	
	ICC	4,43%		4,39%		4,47%		4,48%		
	AIC	250093,992		250085,762		250262,099		250131,610		
	BIC	250159,470		250151,239		250327,575		250197,088		
	Observations	85330		85330		85330		85330		
	Groups (countries)	31		31		31		31		

Sources: Microlevel data: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024. Macrolevel data: World Bank, National Election Results, and UN.

Notes: $p < .05^*$; $p < .01^{**}$; $p < .001^{***}$

After testing the interaction effects over a regression, graphical testing, using the saved fixed predicted values for each model in the figures below, shows that in model 7 (Figure 6.2.1),⁶³ there was only one significant moderation effect: how age moderates the effects of GDP annual growth⁶⁴ on social tolerance. Within all the age groups, the third GDP annual growth tercile (the highest growth level), tolerance levels are lower. These levels are especially lower in the older citizens' age group (66 years-old or older): higher GDP growth is connected to lower tolerance levels, while low to medium growth, regardless of the age group, tends to have higher levels of tolerance.

As to model 11, which has two significant moderation effects, regarding unemployment and HDI. First, unemployment (Figure 6.2.2) is moderated by the younger age group (15 to 35 years-old) having higher tolerance levels in every unemployment tercile (low, medium or high) than the older age groups, but the older age group get even less tolerant when unemployment is higher, confirming this moderation effect. As to the older age groups moderating HDI (Figure 6.2.3), with a negative and significant effect, it is visible that the higher the HDI is, the better the tolerance values are, regardless of age. However, the older age group still tends to have less tolerance, especially when comparing the old and the youngest at each tercile: in the highest HDI tercile, the younger are more tolerant than the older, and the same can be said for the other terciles.

⁶³ Since, on model 7, there are two continuous variables being tested, it becomes necessary to convert the continuous variable which is used to moderate the main effects on social tolerance. In the case of model 7, age is one of the tested moderators, and thus was recoded into 3 categories (15-35 year-olds, 36 to 65 year-olds, and 66 or older), so that it can be tested over this plot analysis.

⁶⁴ To test the socioeconomic and far-right voting variables, both as moderators and independent factors, it was necessary to convert them into categorical variables, so that error bars graphs could be readable in a parsimonious and intuitive way. To this end, these two factors were converted into terciles (each being 1/3 of each variable's variability), and were then used in building these moderation graphs. The use of terciles allows for comparing effects between variables. For disambiguation purposes, each variable's first tercile is called "low", the second "medium", and the third "high".




Figure 6.2.1. Age moderation of GDP annual growth's relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.2.2. Youngsters' moderation of unemployment's relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.2.3. Older citizens moderation of HDI's relationship with tolerance

In this subchapter, I study how age moderates both far-right voting and socioeconomic performance. The literature suggests a connection between age, far-right, and their intensifying effects on tolerance, however, analysing H6. (*when compared to older people, the relationship of younger people with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when they vote for the far-right*) shows that there is no evidence, whatsoever, of age moderating electoral support to the far-right, thus hypothesis H6. is rejected. Indeed, not only did the moderation of far-right votes' influence on social tolerance fail, but there is also no instance in which I could detect any moderation effect. Means that, as of this data, there is no reason to think that young voters intensify far-right voting's negative relationship with social tolerance.

Further, I also tested how age moderates the effects of socioeconomic performance on social tolerance. The scholarship suggests a connection between age, socioeconomic performance and tolerance, and the test to H7. (*when compared to older people, the relationship between younger people and decreasing levels of social tolerance is intensified when exposed to worse socioeconomic performance*) shows that age moderation on the socioeconomic performance's effect on social tolerance is present but limited. Only three of the interactions were significant. Age positively and significantly moderated GDP growth, on model 7: the youngest group tends to be more tolerant than the older, but when there is more GDP growth, tolerance is always lower in comparison with the other tertiles within the age groups.

And, on model 10, the younger age group positively moderated unemployment's effect, while the older age group moderated HDI's effect on social tolerance (this one

negatively). While the younger group tends to be influenced negatively by more unemployment, older people are more so. However, the older age group tends to moderate HDI's effect, growing more than those of the youngest, while the youngest still tend to be more tolerant than the oldest. As such, H7 is partially confirmed: age and age variables moderate the relationship between socioeconomic performance and social tolerance, but this is only observed in specific circumstances. Regardless, one of the most important implications of this observation is that disgruntled, and more affected people tend to contribute to less tolerant countries, which, in turn, may negatively impact democratic quality in said countries.

This successfully contributes to the literature, showcasing that age and socioeconomic performance are joint variables that are related to social tolerance, and that different age groups dictate how different socioeconomic circumstances correlate with national-level social tolerance, in some circumstances. In general, the youth still tend to be more tolerant, but they are exposed to harsh socioeconomic circumstances, which serves as a warning to policymakers. Also, the expectation that age is an important variable is only partially confirmed, and dependent on the existence of circumstances which translate age into having an effect and thus contradicts the idea that the youth might be connected to less tolerance.

6.3. Does socioeconomic performance moderate how voting for the far-right relates to social tolerance?

This subchapter analyses the moderation effect of socioeconomic performance on how far-right voting (H8) relates to social tolerance, expecting that *the relationship of worse socioeconomic performance with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when there is higher far-right voting*. To test these moderations, I run two models: one where I test the moderation of socioeconomic performance on the relationship between the far-right vote and social tolerance (model 9); the next model (model 14) tests this relationship, while validating the moderation effects tested in the previous subchapter.

The moderation effect of socioeconomic performance on voting for the far-right in Europe was run, once again, using a multilevel analysis and interaction effects between these two variables. The results are shown in Table 6.3.1. The moderation effects are significant for every socioeconomic variable. Socioeconomic performance does, indeed, moderate how voting for the far-right influences social tolerance.

Table 6.3.1. Moderation of socioeconomic performance on how voting for the far-right influences social tolerance (DV: social tolerance additive variable)

Variables		Model 9 - complete model, with independent variables (level 1 and 2), waves and Euro regions, and controls, and interaction effects SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE x FAR-RIGHT VOTE			
		B	SE		
Micro-level	Regions	Southern Europe=1	-0,491**	0,141	
		Eastern Europe=1	-0,894***	0,120	
	Time	EVS wave 3 (1999)=1	-0,184*	0,088	
		EVS wave 4 (2008)=1	-0,607***	0,177	
		EVS wave 5 (2017)=1	-1,216***	0,270	
		Year survey	0,068***	0,010	
	Age	Age	-0,003	0,002	
		Age Square	0,000	0,000	
		15-35 year-olds=1	0,000	0,020	
		66 or more year-olds=1	-0,022	0,022	
Support for the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right: far-right position=1	-0,176***	0,039		
	Far-right voting %	-0,182***	0,013		
Macro-level	Socioeconomic performance	HDI	-2,973***	0,437	
		GDP Annual Growth (annual %)	0,007***	0,002	
		GDP per Capita	0,000	0,000	
		Unemployment	-0,005	0,003	
	Socioeconomic performance * Far-Right vote	HDI * Far-right vote	0,207***	0,016	
		GDP Growth * Far-right vote	-0,001***	0,000	
		GDP per Capita * Far-right vote	0,000***	0,000	
		Unemployment * Far-right vote	0,001***	0,000	
	Controls	Sociodemographic controls	Male=1	-0,117***	0,007
			Age complete education	0,030***	0,002
Employed=1			0,013	0,009	
Married=1			0,017*	0,008	
Religious person			-0,006	0,006	
Town size		0,029***	0,003		
Political controls		Left vs Right	-0,028***	0,002	
		Patriotism	-0,049***	0,005	
Institutional control		Trust in the Parliament	0,037***	0,005	
Psychosocial control		Interpersonal trust=1	0,240***	0,008	
Variances					
τ00			0,077475533		
σ2			1,085306518		
ICC			6,41%		
AIC			249756,259		
BIC			249821,736		
Observations			85330		
Groups (countries)			31		

Sources: Microlevel data: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Macrolevel data: World Bank, National Election Results, and UN.

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

Once again, the interaction effects tested were further confirmed graphically, using the saved fixed predicted values for model 9, and testing the moderating effects of

the four socioeconomic performance variables on far-right voting percentage: HDI (Figure 6.3.1). GDP annual growth (Figure 6.3.2), GDP per capita (Figure 6.3.3), and unemployment (Figure 6.3.4).

Of the four interaction effects, only one, where GDP annual growth moderates the effects of voting for the far-right, has a negative slope. The other three display positive effects. When it comes to HDI’s moderating effect on voting for the far-right, higher HDI levels tend to coincide with higher values of social tolerance when far-right voting is lower (first tercile). When there is more voting for the far-right (third tercile), there tends to be less tolerance in each HDI tercile. However, social tolerance is still lower when HDI is lower, becoming even more so when far-right voting is greater.

GDP annual growth, on the one hand, shows a different pattern: when there is a high level of GDP annual growth, there is less tolerance for more far-right voting, and vice versa. However, in medium and low GDP growth, tolerance is higher when voting for the far-right is higher.

GDP per capita, on the other hand, shows that the tendency to have lower electoral support for the far-right, as social tolerance increases, is steady in GDP per capita terciles. However, those with higher income and low far-right voting are the most tolerant ones.

Finally, regarding unemployment, tests show that countries with low and medium unemployment tend to be more intolerant when there is more far-right voting. However, when there are higher levels of unemployment, tolerance is higher when far-right voting increases (although its overall value is still lower than in the other low and medium unemployment groups).




Figure 6.3.1. HDI moderation of far-right voting’s relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.3.2. GDP annual growth moderation of far-right voting's relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.3.3. GDP per capita moderation of far-right voting's relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.3.4. Unemployment moderation of far-right voting’s relationship with tolerance

The complete moderation model, where age and socioeconomic performance variables interact with how voting for the far-right (and socioeconomic performance, in the case of age) influences social tolerance, is tested simultaneously in Table 6.3.2. Once again, socioeconomic performance is still seen to moderate the effects of voting for the far-right, even if the socioeconomic performance variables lose their significance (model 14): the socioeconomic state of a country moderates far-right voting and might increase tolerance, according to its circumstances.

Age variables maintain a more limited moderating effect on socioeconomic performance effects on social tolerance, and age has no moderating effect whatsoever on the effects that voting for the far-right has on social tolerance. The youth do moderate unemployment effects on tolerance, and the older age group moderates HDI’s effects on tolerance.

Table 6.3.2. Full moderation models: how age variables and far-right vote affect the explanatory variables of social tolerance (DV: social tolerance additive variable)

Variables		Model 14 - complete model, with independent variables (level 1 and 2), waves and Euro regions, and controls, and ALL interaction effects (with all AGE variables)		
		B	SE	
Micro-level	Regions	Southern Europe=1	-0,528 ⁺	0,145
		Eastern Europe=1	-0,928 ^{***}	0,124
	Time	EVS wave 3 (1999)=1	-0,176 ⁺	0,089
		EVS wave 4 (2008)=1	-0,592 ^{***}	0,177
		EVS wave 5 (2017)=1	-1,198 ^{***}	0,270

	Year survey	0,067***	0,010		
Macro-level	Age	Age	0,027		
		Age Square	-0,001		
		15-35 year-olds=1	-0,230		
		66 or more year-olds=1	1,061		
			0,508		
	Support for the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right: far-right position=1	-0,174***	0,039	
		Far-right voting %	-0,183***	0,014	
	Socioeconomic performance	HDI	-2,786	1,892	
		GDP Annual Growth (annual %)	0,006	0,015	
		GDP per Capita	0,000	0,000	
		Unemployment	-0,020	0,017	
	Interaction effects	Age * Socioeconomic performance	Age * HDI	-0,045	
			Age * GDP Growth	0,000	
			Age * GDP per Capita	0,000	
			Age * Unemployment	0,000	
AGE_square * HDI			0,001		
AGE_square * GDP growth			0,000		
AGE_square * GDP per capita			0,000		
AGE_square * Unemployment			0,000		
YOUTH * HDI			0,106		
YOUTH * GDP growth			0,003		
YOUTH * GDP per capita			0,000		
YOUTH * Unemployment			0,012*		
OLD * HDI			-1,337*		
OLD * GDP growth			-0,002		
OLD * GDP per capita			0,000		
OLD * Unemployment			-0,002		
Age * Far-Right voting %			Age * Far-right voting %	0,000	0,000
			Age Square * Far-right voting %	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year olds=1 * Far-right voting %	0,001	0,002		
	66 or more year-olds=1 * Far-right voting %	0,001	0,002		
Socioeconomic performance * Far-Right vote	HDI * Far-right vote	0,208***	0,016		
	GDP Growth * Far-right vote	0,000***	0,000		
	GDP per Capita * Far-right vote	0,000***	0,000		
	Unemployment * Far-right vote	0,001***	0,000		
Controls	Sociodemographic controls	Male=1	-0,116***		
		Age complete education	0,029***		
		Employed=1	0,009		
		Married=1	0,013		
		Religious person	-0,007		
	Town size	0,029***			
	Political controls	Left vs Right	-0,028***	0,002	
		Patriotism	-0,048***	0,005	
	Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	0,038***	0,005	
	Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,240***	0,008	
Variances					
τ00		0,082881345			
σ2		1,084728242			
ICC		6,84%			
AIC		250013,087			
BIC		250078,563			
Observations		85330			
Groups (countries)		31			

Sources: Microlevel data: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Macrolevel data: World Bank, National Election Results, and UN.

Notes: p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***

In these models, the interaction effects were once again tested and graphically confirmed, using the saved fixed predicted values for model 14. In these models, as only six moderating effects were confirmed for model 14, these were the only effects tested, namely youth (15-35=1) moderating unemployment, old (66+=1) moderating HDI, and the socioeconomic variables' moderating effect on far-right voting. Graphical analysis confirms the moderation effects since there is no overlap between each category's standard deviation error bars.

As to the age moderations, they are similar to the results obtained for model 11: unemployment is moderated by age, with the younger cohort (15 to 35 years old) exhibiting higher levels of tolerance across all unemployment terciles (low, medium, and high) compared to older age groups (Figure 6.3.5). Social tolerance among older individuals decreases further as unemployment increases, which reinforces the moderating effect of age (Figure 6.3.6).

Now turning to the socioeconomic performance variables used as moderators of far-right voting, the observations are the same over in models 9 and 14, with the moderation effects behaving in highly similar ways.

Higher HDI levels are associated with increased tolerance across all age groups; however, older individuals consistently demonstrate lower tolerance levels. In the highest HDI tercile, younger individuals display greater tolerance than their older counterparts. This pattern is observable across the remaining terciles (Figure 6.3.7). As to GDP annual growth, countries with a low annual growth will tend to display more social tolerance, even with growing electoral support for the far-right; those with high GDP growth show higher intolerance, as support for the far-right grows (Figure 6.3.8). All GDP per capita groups maintain the tendency to have lower electoral support for the far-right, as social tolerance increases. However, those with high income and low far-right voting are the most tolerant ones (Figure 6.3.9). Unemployment still shows that countries with low unemployment tend to decrease tolerance as electoral support for the far-right increases, and vice versa. But countries with higher unemployment levels display a tendency to vote for the far-right increases, as social tolerance also increases (Figure 6.3.10).




Figure 6.3.5. Youngsters’ moderation of unemployment’s relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.3.6. Older citizens moderation of HDI’s relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.3.7. HDI moderation of far-right voting's relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.3.8. GDP annual growth moderation of far-right voting's relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.3.9. GDP per capita moderation of far-right voting’s relationship with tolerance




Figure 6.3.10. Unemployment moderation of far-right voting’s relationship with tolerance

In this subchapter, to explain the moderating effects, I specifically look at H8, *the relationship of worse socioeconomic performance with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when there is higher far-right voting*. The literature could not offer a clear answer when it comes to the question of whether socioeconomic performance could moderate the effects of far-right vote on social tolerance, intensifying its depression. These results present evidence that fluctuating socioeconomic conditions condition how far-right voting influences the countries’ social tolerance, increasing or decreasing it.

Indeed, results find a moderation effect of socioeconomic variables on electoral support for the far-right. This effect is quite consistent, across the board, and is even observable at model 14, where all interaction effects are run, which means that H8 is confirmed.

6.4. Do socioeconomic performance and far-right voting have a relationship with social tolerance? A summary

In this chapter, tolerance was studied using two levels, the individual and the country level. As such, the studied techniques were explanatory and focused on the countries, as the study subject, rather than the individuals, which were studied in more detail, over chapters IV and V. In this subchapter, I address whether hypotheses 2.2, 3.2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 are confirmed, as well as how each of them contributes to the scholarship.

Starting with hypothesis 2.2. (*younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, at the country-level.*), unlike the scholarship's expectations, age variables have a limited effect on social tolerance. Age square has a positive and significant effect, while those who do not belong to the older citizen cohort (66 or older) tend to be more tolerant, but this effect disappears when the other independent variables, micro and macro, are inserted into the models. Thus, hypothesis 2.2. is mostly rejected, validating results for H2.1., as the expectation that younger age groups would be displaying less tolerant attitudes, the data does not confirm that age or age groups improve or harm tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020: 913).

As to hypothesis 3.2. (*it is expected that the less votes far-right parties have at the country level, will contribute to higher social tolerance levels*), the tests, just like with H3.1., consistently show that far-right voting percentage has a systematic, significant negative effect on social tolerance (the only exception is over at model 1).⁶⁵ This confirms hypothesis 3.2, while validating the effects found while testing H3.1., at the individual level. The implication is that the suspected idea that social tolerance was affected by far-right voting (Weldon, 2006) is now confirmed, which means that, given the recent growth of far-right voting in Europe, socially stigmatised minorities may be at an increased risk.

⁶⁵ This exception occurred when the far-right variables, micro and macro, were run by themselves, with far-right voting displaying a positive significant impact, and was reversed, when the other variables were inserted into the model, and thus, this exception is mentioned but not considered as too important to contend this chapter's conclusions.

As to hypothesis 4 (*a country's social tolerance level will likely be positively correlated with better socioeconomic performance and negatively related with less favourable socioeconomic performance*), the data, however, shows that socioeconomic effect on social tolerance is, indeed, observable, but it has several idiosyncratic observations to take into account: first, GDP annual growth harms social tolerance. This contradicts the idea that more socioeconomic development leads to more tolerance (Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010), but it is connected to the fact that the countries which have been growing more, in terms of their annual GDP, were the less tolerant eastern European countries, such as Poland or Czechia (Rapp, 2017: 52). GDP per capita, however, has been shown to positively affect social tolerance, which is coherent with the theory of modernization (Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010). As to unemployment, it has a positive effect on social tolerance, which may indicate that, instead of creating a threat to citizens, it may create more empathy and confirms similar findings by other authors (Twenge *et al.*, 2015; Berggren and Nilsson, 2016). These results confirm hypothesis 4. Better socioeconomic performance promotes more tolerant countries. But context matters to explaining why it is important, as global growth rates indicate a type of economic effect different from the effects by GDP per capita, indicating global national wealth per individual. An important question to ask, is what each indicator means for how tolerant populations become. Regardless, data stands in support of the idea that socioeconomic performance plays a role in getting more tolerance among the population.

Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8 test the moderation effects on social tolerance: (H6.) *when compared to older people, the relationship of younger people with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when they vote for the far-right*; (H7.) *when compared to older people, the relationship between younger people and decreasing levels of social tolerance is intensified when exposed to worse socioeconomic performance*; and (H8.) *the relationship of worse socioeconomic performance with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when there is higher far-right voting*.

First, results show that there is no evidence whatsoever of age moderating electoral support to the far-right, thus hypothesis H6 is rejected. The takeaway from this result is that, as of the available data, there are no reasons to think that countries' tolerance is being harmed by the catalysation of far-right voting by young voters, which serves to ease the worries of researchers and politicians. While the young are indeed more

vulnerable, they are not supportive enough of the far-right to change how tolerant countries are of social minorities.

Furthermore, data show that age moderation on the socioeconomic performance's effect on social tolerance is present but limited. Only three of the interactions were significant, with age positively and significantly moderating GDP growth, on models 7 and 10, and the younger age groups moderating unemployment's effect, and the older age group moderating HDI's effect on social tolerance (this one negatively). As such, H7. is partially confirmed: age and age variables do moderate the effects that economic performance has on social tolerance, but this is only observed in specific circumstances.

These results allow the discussion that the expectation that age is an important variable is only partially confirmed, and dependent on the existence of circumstances which translate age into an effect. This also contradicts the idea that the youth might be connected to less tolerance, due to how they have been more vulnerable to the far-right's rhetoric (Immerzeel and Pickup, 2015; Foa *et al.*, 2020; Foa and Mounk, 2019: 1016; Kriesi, 2020: 252; Belchior and Pequito, 2023: pp. 11-16). On the contrary, data show that the youth tend to be more tolerant, regardless of the studied wave. However, the data does not show that the youth, specifically, correlate with more tolerance, which means that these positive takeaways should be taken carefully.

Finally, evidence is found of a moderation of socioeconomic factors on the relationship between electoral support for the far-right and social tolerance. This effect is quite consistent across the board and is even observable at model 14, where all interaction effects are run simultaneously. It contributes to the scholarship by showcasing that better socioeconomic performance conditions higher far-right voting, which, in turn, increases tolerance (Weldon, 2006: 342-344; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a: 951; Rapp, 2017: 52; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019: 1173), while its reverse is also a valid observation. This means that H8. is confirmed. As an added note, it also serves as a warning sign to governments: better socioeconomic performance restricts how the far-right shapes tolerance to socially stigmatised minorities.

FINAL THOUGHTS

This thesis seeks to understand social tolerance, a central democratic principle, in light of the recent changes in Europe, using age, far-right support and socioeconomic performance as explanatory factors.

While tolerance to certain minorities has been growing in Europe (i.e. Viegas, 2007, 2010; Janmaat and Keating, 2017; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023; Tausch, 2024), this same continent has been subjected to several socioeconomic and political crises over the past decades. Socioeconomic growth has been irregular, if not flimsy and outright negative at times (Piketty, 2014; Margalit, 2019).

At the same time, the far-right has been growing in support (both in terms of ideological position and vote), particularly amongst the European youth (i.e. Woods, 2024; Jakli, 2024; Popa *et al.*, 2024; van der Brug *et al.*, 2025). And young people are the same group of citizens who were the most affected by the European economic woes (Piketty, 2014; Kern *et al.*, 2015; Margalit, 2019; Reeskens and Vandecasteele, 2021), even though they are supposed to be more tolerant than their older peers (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Vala *et al.*, 2003, Inglehart, 1990). This thesis's starting point was to ask whether these three important factors, age, far-right support, and socioeconomic performance, correlate with social tolerance (this thesis's dependent variable) *in the European context*.

Given that the scholarship suggests a possible relationship between these factors, namely age and socioeconomic performance in explaining social tolerance, I also asked, in a more specific manner whether *age, namely younger voters, moderate the relationship of socioeconomic factors, and far-right voting with social tolerance? And if socioeconomic performance moderates the relationship of voting for the far-right and social tolerance?*

Additionally, I also sought to assess the evolution of social tolerance across time and European regions. In sum, this research is a comparative and longitudinal study of social tolerance in 31 European democracies, between 1981 and 2021, using the five waves available in the EVS dataset, and it studies tolerance towards specific historically stigmatised social groups (namely Muslims, immigrants, other races and homosexuals) and using a constructed social tolerance indicator. This was to be tested on both the individual (micro) and country-level (macro), using descriptive, inferential and explanatory statistical techniques, with the latter being performed using linear regression, logistic regression, and multilevel regression analysis. My research expected social

tolerance to be associated with age factors (at the individual-level), support for the far-right factors (self-positioning in the far-right, at the individual-level, and voting for the far-right, at the country-level), and socioeconomic performance factors (country-level).

Over the next few pages, I present my main findings, separating them into six sections. In each section, I present the corresponding research objectives, hypotheses, results and takeaways from each result. The first section is about the evolution of tolerance in Europe, across time and European regions. The second section assesses how age relates to social tolerance. The third section evaluates the correlation between support for the far-right and social tolerance. The fourth section approaches how social tolerance is explained by socioeconomic performance. The fifth section explores whether Portugal is still an exceptional case, and the sixth section approaches the moderation effects. Finally, a seventh section briefly discusses implications, limitations and potential future paths for research in this area.

European social tolerance in a comparative perspective

Has social tolerance grown over the years? This set of objectives approaches how tolerance has evolved throughout time, and in the European countries and regions being studied. For this reason, objective 1.1. sought to *identify patterns of social tolerance growth across time, individuals, and countries*, objective 1.2. was meant to *assess how much social tolerance differed across European countries in the four different minority groups: other races, Muslims, immigrants, and homosexuals*, and, finally, objective 1.3. looked at *assess how tolerance has evolved between 1981 and 2021, across the selected European countries, identifying specific (positive or negative) outliers*.

The set of descriptive hypotheses expected that *general levels of tolerance will have increased across time (H1.)*, additionally believing that *it is expected that there will be differences between European regions: the north/central European countries will be more tolerant, followed by south European countries, which are then trailed by east European countries, which is the least tolerant region (H1.1)*.

I was able to observe that there were significant differences between time periods and that these differences were positive. As time moved on, I identify a general pattern of tolerance growth in Europe, although tolerance to some of the specific groups under analysis, namely Muslims and immigrants, has recently started to decline. The scholarship postulated that tolerance would keep growing and, later, it confirmed that it grew (e.g. Inglehart, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, 2008b; Viegas, 2004, 2007,

2010). My research's results validate the scholarship's expectations: tolerance kept growing, despite the challenges which Europe has been facing. This confirmed hypothesis 1. But there is a more nuanced and complex story to be told when looking at each historically stigmatised social group. In 2015, there was a migratory crisis in the European continent, due to a sudden massive influx of predominantly Muslim refugees coming from neighbouring war-ridden areas (such as Syria and Iraq), which caused social unrest and made the public more hostile towards both Muslims and immigrants (Krzyżanowski and Ekström, 2024). This likely meant tolerance to these groups would have declined over the later wave.

In sum, over time, social tolerance increased in Europe. However, there were strong reasons to suspect that certain historically discriminated groups, studied here, could be subject to a newly increased intolerance. This has been confirmed, which may be connected to the 2015 European migratory crisis, and due to a renewed wave of terrorist attacks. Indeed, while hostility to immigrants and Muslims has been increasing, it has been decreasing toward other ethnicities and homosexuals.

Some takeaways from this result are that the thesis of tolerance growth is validated (Inglehart, 1990; Viegas, 2007; Janmaat and Keating, 2017), but also that tolerance should not be looked at uniformly. Furthermore, the growth of tolerance to some social groups (homosexuals), but decline to others, exposes a potential risk of growing (and new) social cleavages, and potential growth of societal fragmentation.

Furthermore, I tested if tolerance levels were significantly different between European regions, and results were clear: North and Central European countries displayed greater tolerance, and Eastern Europe showed less tolerance, which allows the identification of clear patterns: tolerance has been growing, but not everywhere (Eastern Europe). Moreover, these findings are coherent with the literature, which had previously observed that North and Central Europe were more tolerant, while Eastern Europe was less tolerant (i.e. Viegas, 2004, 2007, 2010; Todosijevic and Enyedi, 2008; Candeias, 2012; Stoeckel and Ceka, 2023).

The implications of this are that there are two Europes when it comes to social tolerance: a more progressive and tolerant selection of countries, in the Western part of the continent, and a more intolerant part, in the East. The divisions from the Cold War are still very much present, which may indicate that authoritarian heritage could be an important factor to consider in the future. Also, the fact that the Eastern European countries are more intolerant bears political implications in policymaking areas in the

European Union. It exposes a potentially larger cultural conflict between those who seek more equality, and those who feel threatened by people who are different from themselves.

Is the youth bringing tolerance levels down?

In this section, I examine how age, particularly among the youth, relates to social tolerance on two levels: the individual and the country levels. For this, objective 2 sought *to observe if social tolerance may be explained by age and age groups, especially over the later years*. In order to approach this objective, I composed three hypotheses: the first one expects that (H2.1.) *the younger the individuals, the more tolerant they will tend to be, at the individual level*, and then the second one tests the same effect on the country level (H2.2.) *younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, at the country-level*, and finally, the third is exclusively individual level, and concerns two social groups: (H2.3.) *younger (18 to 35-year-olds) and older citizens (65+) will tend to be less tolerant towards immigrants and Muslims in the latest wave (2017-2020)*.

Testing age effects demonstrates that the correlation between age variables and social tolerance is largely statistically insignificant, and statistical effects are also quite inconsistent, depending on the models. Even when I tested for age variables' effects, isolating each socially stigmatised group as a dependent variable, their results were largely insignificant. This was verified when tested at both the individual and country levels, meaning that hypotheses H2.1. and H2.2 are mostly rejected. The only relevant instance for this thesis is that, in some cases, those who are not of an older age group tend to promote more social tolerance, but the fact that the youngest age group does not promote more tolerance also disproves the idea that the youngest are the most tolerant.

The main takeaways from these results are that the scholarship's expectations that youth are more tolerant are largely dispelled (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b; Hjerm *et al.*, 2020). But so is the idea that the youth, through their growing illiberalism, became more intolerant (Foa and Mounk 2016, 2019; Foa *et al.*, 2020; Kriesi, 2020; Belchior and Pequito Teixeira, 2023: 3-6, 15). Neither position is verified in this research. And while it may be encouraging for some politicians that the youth, indeed, are not more intolerant, the fact that the young, who have historically been those who push for more progress, are not more tolerant is, in itself, a concerning observation. A suggestion is that an increase in material scarcity (Inglehart, 1977, 1990) can lead the youth towards a discriminatory path, although this is yet unclear.

Now looking at age's effects (particularly the youth) on tolerance to two groups especially targeted by intolerance in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2015-2017 and the migration crisis of 2015: Muslims and immigrants. Results show that the young group's effect on tolerance to Muslims is not significant, but the older group of citizens (66 or more) is less tolerant. But looking at the age variable, the younger the citizen, the more tolerant they tend to be of Muslims. As such, hypothesis 2.2 is rejected as age does not correlate with tolerance to immigrants, and there is no evidence that younger people are less tolerant of Muslims.

Ironically, unlike with the previous hypotheses, these results confirm the scholarship's expectation that younger people have more progressive views and more tolerant attitudes (Stouffer, 1955; Inglehart, 1977, 1990; Andersen and Fetner, 2008b). Although the authors I use in this thesis (namely Stouffer and Inglehart) refer to youth born in much older times (the 1930s and the 1950s, respectively), my results confirm that Millennials are, like their ancestors, more tolerant than previous generations. This is also relevant, as it provides further evidence that Muslims being scapegoats of far-right parties (Mudde, 2007, 2019; Duina and Carson, 2019) may affect how the population views Muslims. As to tolerance towards immigrants, there were no significant effects detected of age variables on tolerance to this minority group, both globally and across time. In an era when anti-immigration rhetoric has been normalised (Valentim, 2021, 2024), there is no evidence of difference between age groups. Thus, we cannot say that young voters have turned their backs on immigrants.

These results also contradict Hjerm *et al.* (2020: 913)'s observation that younger people (18-29) are excellent predictors of tolerance: these models show a more complex and nuanced relationship between age and social tolerance. In some cases, this means that younger citizens are more tolerant (for example, towards Muslims), while, at the same time, not actually being tolerant of other minority groups.

However, this does not mean that, in some cases, younger citizens may display more tolerance. This is the case when looking at the older age variable producing negative effects on the social tolerance additive index: younger people do tend to be more tolerant, but instead of being the youngest, they are not the oldest. Does this mean that the authors who have recently been alerting the scholarship to how young people have started to become less liberal and voting more for the far-right are correct, in the sense that younger people have become more intolerant? As of the available data, no, the youth are not more intolerant. However, not being able to observe young people as being consistently more

tolerant also dispels Stouffer's naïve expectations that the young are supposed to become increasingly more tolerant, as this is not the case in Europe.

How does support to the far-right correlate with social tolerance?

Regarding the influence of support to the far-right, I had three objectives: objective 3, related to the far-right, seeking to *estimate how support for the far-right relates to social tolerance*. This objective was divided into two levels, which generated two new objectives: objective 3.1. (individual-level) *to understand if ideological self-positioning in the far-right correlates with social tolerance*; and objective 3.2. (country-level), *aims to understand if electoral support for the far-right (far-right voting) correlates with social tolerance*. Thus, I created two hypotheses, which stated that *self-positioning in the far-right will negatively relate to the levels of tolerance, at the individual level* (individual level, H3.1), and *it is expected that the less votes far-right parties have at the country level, will contribute to higher social tolerance levels* (country level, H3.2).

First, approaching the individual level results, self-positioning in the far-right usually has a negative effect on social tolerance. Meaning that individuals who do not self-position in the far-right will tend to promote more social tolerance, and, more than that, this study demonstrates that this is common in the time lapse of my analysis. This confirms hypothesis 3.1.

Now, regarding hypothesis 3.2, which is related to how voting for the far-right (which is a country/macro-level variable) correlates with social tolerance, results show that far-right voting percentage has a significantly negative effect on social tolerance. As expected, the more a given country votes for its respective far-right parties, the less tolerance its population tends to have. This confirms hypothesis 3.2.

The confirmation of these two hypotheses validates previous findings: on one hand, the more progressive an ideological standpoint, the more tolerant a citizen tends to be (i.e. Sullivan *et al.*, 1979, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Gibson, 1989; Hurwitz and Mondak, 2002; Hadler, 2012; Peffley *et al.*, 2023). This variable contributes to the literature by being the first instance in which one can isolate and test an effect of ideological self-positioning in the far-right (based on the left-right scale). However, this variable does not test, as the left-right scale,⁶⁶ how much to the left one needs to be to be

⁶⁶ Although this variable is built by recoding the left-right scale into 1=far-right, 0=not far-right.

more tolerant; instead, they show that merely not positioning themselves with the far-right is enough to display more tolerance.

As to voting for the far-right, Weldon's studies (2003, 2006) are important to this research because they are among the few that statistically link far-right voting to political tolerance, though not to the social tolerance studied here. The literature shows a notable gap in explaining tolerance through far-right voting, relying almost exclusively on Weldon's work, which used data from 1997 across 15 EU countries. Recent studies (Vanagt *et al.*, 2024; Dodson and Brooks, 2024) have found that tolerance correlates with progressive voting, reinforcing the need to revisit and update Weldon's findings, which I did. This thesis contributes to this area by using far-right voting in 31 European countries, at four different points in time. And shows that far-right voting conditions social tolerance, furthering scientific evidence.

However, an important takeaway from these results is that, even if I find that less far-right voting means more tolerance, the opposite is also true. Meaning that, when far-right voting increases, tolerance will tend to decline. As tolerance declines due to an increase in the normalisation of intolerant rhetoric, the risk to the safety of these minority groups increases. Thus, Governments and other political actors should be wary in their acceptance of intolerant rhetoric.

Does socioeconomic performance condition social tolerance?

Regarding socioeconomic performance, objective 4 sought to estimate how macro-level socioeconomic performance relates to *social tolerance*. And, for this, I use one hypothesis: *a country's social tolerance level will likely be positively correlated with better socioeconomic performance and negatively related with less favourable socioeconomic performance* (H4).

My results showed that, against expectations, lower annual GDP growth tends to generate more social tolerance. My result confirms Berggren and Elinder's observations (2012a), and one explanation for this is that the countries with greater annual growth, between 1990 and 2021, were those that also display lower social tolerance levels, namely the Eastern European countries, like Poland or Czechia. But the other socioeconomic indicators had different effects: more GDP per capita and more HDI promote social tolerance, and both confirm the theoretical expectations (e.g, GDP per capita: Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; HDI: Hadler, 2012: 237; Lee, 2021: 1191). The final variable was unemployment, with a positive effect on social tolerance, which, in

turn, confirms the expectations of the scholarship (Tausch, 2024: 104; Rapp, 2017: 48), and suggests a sort of empathy effect on citizens' tolerance: with more unemployment, individuals feel more inclined to tolerate their peers. However, it also suggests that high unemployment goes against the grain in explaining why social tolerance grows: difficult circumstances are supposed to generate less tolerance, but here populations in difficult circumstances are more tolerant, not less.

From these variables, GDP annual growth was the most consistent one (generating significant effects in all models), while GDP per capita and unemployment also generated effects in the final model. However, all of them generated the effects described in the literature.

These results contribute in several ways: first, my data confirms that better socioeconomic conditions are associated with more tolerant populations, as generally predicted by the cultural modernisation theory (Inglehart, 1990; Viegas, 2007).

Second, not all socioeconomic circumstances lead to greater levels of tolerance (as demonstrated by higher GDP annual growth being correlated with lower levels of social tolerance). But annual growth does not always coincide with social values, and thus, this variable may not be the best indicator to assess the correlation between socioeconomic performance and social tolerance, making it the least relevant one in my research.

Nevertheless, higher levels of GDP per capita were consistently associated with increased social tolerance, suggesting that greater economic well-being supports more tolerance. This finding aligns with previous research which have pointed to wealth as a key factor for tolerant societies (e.g., Andersen and Fetner, 2008a; Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; Rapp, 2017: 52). Among the variables examined, GDP per capita emerged as the most reliable indicator of change in social tolerance, reinforcing the idea that material security creates more favourable conditions for tolerance.

HDI had a strong positive effect on social tolerance until the controls were inserted, losing, thus, its statistical effects. However, this test confirmed the previous studies by the scholarship, which allowed the observation that greater human development does lead to more tolerance (i.e. Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003: 252; Hadler, 2012: 237; Candeias, 2012: 37; Lee, 2021: 1191). But the loss of significance means that social tolerance is more dependent on other factors than on HDI, as they share common social explanatory components (namely educational level) and, as such, this variable ought to be approached with caution.

However, more unemployment being connected to more social tolerance is paradoxical, and contradictory to the idea that more socioeconomic development means more social tolerance. But this is before considering that the countries with less unemployment were the ones with lower levels of social tolerance. This is particularly relevant because unemployment rose massively during the 2008-2010 period in countries which had some of the highest levels of social tolerance: examples include Portugal, Spain, and France. And this contradicts the idea that certain generations will become less tolerant due to less economic opportunities, worse life expectations and less faith in social mobility (Clancy *et al.*, 2022).

Given these results, I see that the most important indicators do positively correlate with social tolerance and, as such, I have considered hypothesis 4 as partially confirmed.

The main implications of these results are that, while economic development is an advantage, it does not guarantee a more tolerant society: if growth is uneven or occurs in contexts of weak democratic norms (e.g. in some Eastern European countries), it will not promote more tolerance. This is also connected with the idea of material scarcity: even if growth is happening, if the economic baseline is lower, higher levels of tolerance should not be expected. On the other hand, as my research shows that GDP per capita and HDI are positively correlated to tolerance, social policies that improve education, health, and income equality are likely to further improve social tolerance.

Is Portugal still a curious case?

Now focusing on whether the Portuguese case, in particular, is still a curious case, I had two objectives: the first one more descriptive, the second more explanatory. Objective 6.1. aimed to *assess whether high tolerance levels for the Portuguese case detected since the beginning of 2000 until 2010, are confirmed in the following decade*. Additionally, objective 6.2. proposed to *assess if social tolerance, in the Portuguese case, is related with age, and ideological self-positioning in the far-right*. As to the hypotheses, they were H5.1. *younger individuals will tend to be more tolerant, in Portugal*, and H5.2. *self-positioning in the far-right will negatively correlate with the levels of tolerance, in Portugal, just like in North and Central Europe*. Both hypotheses are individual-level.

When it comes to age's relationship with social tolerance, in Portugal, the tests confirm that the younger the individuals, the more tolerant they tend to be. Not only does this confirm H5.1, but it also confirms that the scholarship expectations are observable in

the Portuguese case. And this is also unlike the other European regions, where age variables do not have statistically significant results.

As to the effects that self-positioning has on social tolerance, the Portuguese case is no exception: just like above (in the general European case) and just like with its European peers, in other regions, self-positioning with the far-right generates a negative effect on social tolerance, while those who do not self-position with the far-right tend to be more tolerant. This partially confirms H5.2, as Portugal displays similar attitudinal patterns to the north/central region.

A few important observations and implications must be made here: the extraordinary levels of tolerance verified in Portugal by Viegas (2004 and 2007) were confirmed over time. Although the 1999 EVS data suggest a peak in tolerant attitudes in the country, this trend was also reflected in the CID project. Nevertheless, Portugal is still more tolerant than its southern and eastern European peers, and is closer, in tolerance values, to the northern and central European countries. Secondly, the outstanding Portuguese tolerance levels rise even higher in the 2017 EVS data. My research successfully replicates Viegas' results, using a different source, although Portugal is still not quite as tolerant as other countries, namely the northern and central European ones; it is still observed to be an exceptional case. This is because its social, political, and economic development is not as high as the other peers, yet it stands shoulder-to-shoulder with them, which confirms the modernisation theory (Inglehart, 1990; Viegas, 2007). Although, as with Viegas' studies, Portugal is yet to face the kind of traumatic events (such as terrorist attacks) which, using the *circumstantial tolerance* theory as a framework, would serve to bring tolerance down in Portugal, and other countries (Sniderman *et al.*, 1989).

Furthermore, this contributes to the literature by confirming that the young, in Portugal, are indeed more tolerant and successfully contribute to this value's growth, which is coherent with the classical tolerance literature, where the younger citizens are expected to be more tolerant, which is not observed in the rest of Europe.

Another important takeaway is that, if in Portugal, younger people are more likely to display more tolerant attitudes. This suggests that there may be a generational divide in Portugal, which does not exist in other European countries.

Do age and socioeconomic performance moderate explanatory effects on social tolerance?

As to the set of objectives 5, they concerned how two of the main explanatory variables, age and socioeconomic performance, could hold a moderating effect over the other main explanatory variables. As such, in a more specific manner, objective 5.1. was designed to *assess the role of age (particularly younger vs. older age groups) in the relationship that macro-level socioeconomic performance and voting for the far-right have with social tolerance*; while objective 5.2. was meant to *assess the role of socioeconomic performance in the relationship that voting for the far-right has with social tolerance*.

The final set of hypotheses concerns the effects that age and socioeconomic performance moderate the explanatory correlates with social tolerance. Specifically, I expect that *when compared to older people, the relationship of younger people with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when they vote for the far-right* (H6), and likewise that *when compared to older people, the relationship between younger people and decreasing levels of social tolerance is intensified when exposed to worse socioeconomic performance* (H7). The last hypothesis is an expectation that *the relationship of worse socioeconomic performance with decreasing social tolerance is intensified when there is higher far-right voting* (H8).

Concerning H6, findings show that age is unable to moderate the effects of far-right voting on social tolerance, in any circumstance, thus, hypothesis H6 is rejected. My results help dispel the idea that being younger intensifies how greater levels of electoral voting for the far-right depresses social tolerance. While it may be true that the youth have recently become more illiberal and started to vote more for the far-right, there is, as of this data, no evidence to suggest that being younger intensifies the depressing effects that voting for the far-right has on social tolerance.

Some explanations could be offered for H6 having completely failed: first, as I opted by not isolating the EVS waves in this type of analysis, so as not to lose variability in the macro-level (as I only have 31 cases at any given time), there could be so differences in some EVS waves which I was not able to detect. Secondly, if there is no connection between the youth and how the far-right may be intensifying intolerant attitudes, other reasons could be the culprits for greater intolerance: economic threat, especially in the context of the 2022 inflation crisis provoked by the Ukraine War, is a possible explanation. A third possibility is that some far-right parties are not as hostile towards some of the social groups (namely, homosexuals, see Jennings and Ralph-

Morrow, 2020), and thus, leading them to possibly being less intolerant. As such, the youth would not become less tolerant, in general, but a future course of action would be to test each socially stigmatised group individually. Finally, a fourth possibility, is that it is still early to observe this effect: the far-right success, in Europe, happens, especially, after the Covid-19 pandemic. EVS data only goes as late as 2021 (most of it predating the pandemic, after which the far-right picked up electoral success and governmental momentum). The next EVS data should provide the necessary evidence to further test this hypothesis.

Hypothesis H7 was partially confirmed, as there is some indication that age helps explain how citizens respond to a country's socioeconomic performance in terms of social tolerance. The results suggest that younger and older people react differently to socioeconomic conditions. When GDP grows, younger individuals tend to become more tolerant, while older people (aged 66 and above) become less tolerant in the same context. Similarly, higher unemployment has little impact on the tolerance levels of younger people, who remain relatively unaffected compared to older age groups. In contrast, increases in HDI increase tolerance across all age groups, but the effect is stronger among older individuals.

In general terms, these results, while not coherent across the board, do suggest that age moderates the effect of socioeconomic performance on social tolerance, with the young tending to be more tolerant in better economic conditions. However, this relationship is limited, as younger citizens tend to be less influenced by difficult socioeconomic conditions in terms of their tolerance levels. Both hypotheses 6 and 7 allow the assessment of how age conditions socioeconomic performance and voting for the far-right effects on social tolerance.

Observing hypothesis H8 is clearer: the socioeconomic context has a moderating effect on how the vote for the far-right affects social tolerance, with this effect existing with all the socioeconomic variables. In short, far-right voting tends to be associated with lower levels of social tolerance, but this relationship is shaped by a country's socioeconomic context.

In countries with higher levels of HDI, intolerance is generally lower, even among those who vote for the far-right, especially where far-right support is low. In countries with low or moderate GDP annual growth, tolerance increases as far-right voting rises, suggesting that growth may buffer the negative effects of far-right support. However, in countries with high economic growth, tolerance is highest when far-right voting is low,

once again substantiating the previous observations that economic growth alone does not guarantee inclusive attitudes.

When it comes to GDP per capita, far-right voting is linked to lower tolerance across all income levels, but the effect is most powerful in lower and middle-income countries. High-income countries maintain higher levels of tolerance overall, even if they experience a slight decline when far-right support increases. The takeaway being that socioeconomic development seems to function as a “shield”, protecting social tolerance levels.

As to unemployment, in countries with moderate unemployment, tolerance tends to drop as far-right voting rises. Yet, in countries with high unemployment, the opposite happens: tolerance actually increases with far-right support, contrary to my previous findings, and means that this relationship merits further investigation.

Beyond all doubts, this allows me to state that H8 is confirmed, but beyond that, this test’s results allow for the interpretation of how each socioeconomic variable interacts with far-right vote, either conditioning or improving social tolerance.

All these pieces of the puzzle are important as they suggest that socioeconomic performance moderates how social tolerance is affected by voting for the far-right. My results not only confirm this but also assess the moderating role of socioeconomic performance in how voting for the far-right catalyses social intolerance and fill this literature gap. It also furthers my research agenda; by showcasing exactly how the several socioeconomic factors intensify or dampen the relationship that the far-right vote has with social tolerance.

Contributions to the scholarship and the future of tolerance research

This thesis offers a comparative and longitudinal analysis of social tolerance in Europe, showing that while tolerance has generally increased, it varies across regions and minority groups. It challenges the assumption that youth are consistently more tolerant but also observes that they are not necessarily less tolerant. It demonstrates that far-right support, both at the individual and country level, strongly correlates with lower tolerance. It also shows that while socioeconomic development promotes tolerance, growth alone does not.

Additionally, the Portuguese case stands out for its high tolerance levels and for the youth promoting more tolerance among the Portuguese: a unique setting in the tested European regions. Finally, the thesis reveals that age partially moderates the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and social tolerance, and, more importantly,

socioeconomic conditions moderate the impact of far-right voting on tolerance, filling a key gap in the literature.

However, there are a few limitations that affected this thesis. The first one I should mention is the endogeneity problem, which had already been mentioned in Chapter III. The fact that EVS does not have enough points in time means that this thesis cannot claim to study a causal effect of its independent variables (age, support for the far-right, and socioeconomic performance) on social tolerance. However, this has not impeded social science research and, as such, I make no claims that my thesis presents a causal effect between the independent variables and social tolerance.

Another limitation is that this research is limited in terms of the data availability to study social tolerance. While EVS has five waves, two of the indicators (tolerance to Muslims and tolerance to homosexuals) are unavailable for the first wave: 1981. This limits the longitudinal analysis, as the social tolerance additive index must exclude from the analysis the countries and individuals in the first wave, because these variables are not present. Furthermore, many of the tolerance variables in EVS (as well as others) are not asked in all waves. For example, tolerance to right and left-wing extremists is not asked in the latest EVS wave (2017). The same can be said about some important variables, such as social class, and subjective social class.

Still regarding data limitations, EVS is rather scarce, when it comes to micro-level economic variables: they are mostly absent from the datasets, which means that, unlike with the far-right variable, I am not able to use a micro-level socioeconomic variable to validate the macro-level socioeconomic variables' relationship with tolerance. Furthermore, my results suggest that short-term socioeconomic performance is not as important as long term living conditions across generations. While the WVS and EVS provide data over relatively long intervals (40 years, spaced out by 9 years per wave), these are not sufficiently extensive to capture the impact of economic performance on tolerance across three generations (approximately 60 years, assuming a generational span of around 20 years). This limitation should be borne in mind when considering the scope of the findings presented here, as they necessarily focus on shorter-term dynamics. Of course, this also means that using EVS/WVS data over the next few decades is important to fully capture how socioeconomic performance impacts how human populations tolerate their peers. These limitations, as well as others, may have potentially affected this thesis's results.

As to future contributions, an observed problem, which seems not to have a solution as of yet, is the debate between scholars who think that tolerance means putting up with someone or fully accepting them. A way forward for other researchers, more interested in homogenising the research field on the meaning of tolerance and moving beyond the conceptualisation efforts, would be to study what citizens think tolerance means comparatively. Nevertheless, studying the conceptualisation of tolerance and social tolerance for populations is beyond this thesis's scope.

When it comes to tests, assessing the effects of age, the youth age group and the moderating effects of age in future research is important to understand whether young people have become less tolerant, as my results suggest that they are neither, as of now. Another way to test potential age effects is a three-way moderation between age variables, the latest wave and the independent variable, far-right voting (age variables x 2017-2021 EVS wave x far-right voting), to isolate the effects of age's moderating power on far-right voting in the latest wave. While this study finds no evidence that age moderates the effects of far-right voting on social tolerance, data limitations and the timing of recent far-right success suggest caution. Future survey waves, particularly those capturing the post-Covid-19 pandemic context, will be important to reassess whether age intensify the link between far-right support and declining tolerance.

The support for the far-right goes in the same grain as the literature had previously studied (Sullivan *et al.*, 1979, 1982; Sniderman *et al.*, 1989; Weldon, 2006): the less support to the far-right, be it in terms of ideological position, be it in votes, correlates with more tolerant attitudes. What remains to be seen is whether this tendency, at the macro level (using, thus, a larger sample, with more elections and countries), validates these results, especially given that there are remarkably few works making use of far-right voting and how it influences tolerance.

The idea that socioeconomic performance affects tolerance, while not new in tolerance studies, is not common and has inconsistent results, with some authors finding that socioeconomic results are relevant (e.g. Buitrago *et al.*, 2019; Rapp, 2017; Salahodjaev, 2021). But others find them to be insignificant (e.g. Dunn and Singh, 2014; Dunn *et al.*, 2009; Weldon, 2003, 2006; Peffley *et al.*, 2015). My research shows that socioeconomic performance is important to explaining social tolerance: in general terms, better socioeconomic performance means more tolerance, but this also depends on the indicator: less GDP annual growth is connected to more tolerance, but more GDP per capita is connected to more social tolerance, along with HDI and unemployment. If more

tolerance can be connected to more wealth, growth does not always explain more tolerance. And, sometimes, harsh circumstances, such as higher unemployment levels, could breed more empathy for stigmatised groups.

Is it the economy? My results show that socioeconomic performance is important to explaining social tolerance. And they are even more so when considering their moderating effects on far-right votes: when an economy fares better, votes for the far-right tend to be lower, which, in turn, correlates with higher levels of tolerance.

This is important: it confirms that better socioeconomic conditions restrict the far-right's influence on tolerance. In essence, the far-right's intolerant societal effects are limited when citizens are not facing a harsh socioeconomic environment. But, in turn, testing the relationship between socioeconomic performance and social tolerance could be improved upon by expanding the sample of countries to as many as possible, analysing them longitudinally (which is a gap in the literature, still).

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APPENDIX

A.1. CHAPTER I. Appendix

Table A.1.1. Tolerance dictionary definition per official language ⁶⁷

Official language spoken	Countries	Spelling	Tolerance dictionary definition	English Google translation ⁶⁸
Bulgarian	Bulgaria	толерантност (tolerantnost)	“Който проявява търпимост към чуждото мнение; либерален, с голяма душа.” (Source: rechnik.chitanka.info/w/толерантен)	“Who is tolerant of other people's opinion; liberal, with a big soul.”
Croatian	Croatia	tolerancija	“2. Način postupanja ili stajalište o ljudima, stvarima ili idejama koje ne smatramo vrijednima ili poželjnima, ali postojanje kojih ne želimo ni na koji način otežavati ili ugrožavati. (...) 3. U politologiji i sociologiji, općenit ili konkretan stav nezabranjivanja, nesprječavanja i neometanja drugih u njihovu ponašanju ili djelovanju u nekom području unatoč neodobravanju onih koji u tom području imaju moć, vlast ili autoritet. Tolerancija u sociološkom smislu podrazumijeva nejednakost u raspodjeli moći u društvu, stoga su jedni uvijek u posjedu većega stupnja moći, vlasti ili autoriteta (znanja) u odnosu na druge.” (Source: https://www.enciklopedija.hr/clanak/tolerancija)	“2. A way of acting or a point of view about people, things or ideas that we do not consider valuable or desirable, but whose existence we do not want to hinder or endanger in any way. (...)3. In political science and sociology, a general or specific attitude of not forbidding, preventing and not hindering others in their behavior or actions in some area despite the disapproval of those who have power, authority or authority in that area.”
Czech	Czechia	tolerance	“tolerance, snášenlivost vůči komu/čemu, respekt ke komu/čemu k odlišnému názoru ap.” (source: https://slovník.seznam.cz/preklad/spanelsky_cesky/tolerancia)	“tolerance, tolerance towards someone/what, respect for someone/what for a different opinion, etc.”
Estonian	Estonia	tolerantsus	“psühh sallivus nii kaasinimese kui ka inimrühma eriarvamuste ning käitumis- ja suhtumisviiside suhtes” (source: https://arhiiv.eki.ee/dict/vsl/index.cgi?Q=tolerantsus&F=M&C06=en)	“tolerance towards the differences of opinions and behavior and attitudes of fellow human beings as well as of a group of people”
Hungarian	Hungary	tolerancia	“Más nézetek elfogadása; más emberek eltérő véleményének megkülönböztetés nélküli, és az ilyen emberek tisztelete, tisztességes kezelése a nézeteltérések ellenére.” (Source: https://wikiszotar.hu/ertelmezoszotar/Tolerancia)	“Acceptance of other views; tolerating other people's differing opinions without objection, and respecting and treating such people fairly despite differences of opinion.”
Latvian	Latvia	tolerances	“Izcelsme - latīņu tolerantia ‘ieciētība’. 1. Iecietība (pret citu uzskatiem, ticību, paražām).” (Source: https://www.letonika.lv/default.aspx?q=tolerance)	“Origin - Latin tolerantia 'tolerance'. 1. Tolerance (toward the opinions, beliefs, customs of others).”
Lithuanian	Lithuania	tolerancija	“Tolerancija (lot. tolerantia – kantrybė), kitokios nuomonės, elgesio arba įsitikinimų gerbimas, pakanta (Tarptautinių žodžių žodynas, Vilnius, 2013, p. 820).” (source: https://vlkk.lt/konsultacijos/2850-tolerancija#:~:text=Tolerancija%20(lot.,820.))	“Tolerance (lat. <i>tolerantia</i> – patience) ,respect for different opinions, behavior or beliefs, tolerance (Dictionary of international words, Vilnius, 2013, p. 820).”
Polish	Poland	tolerancja	“poszanowanie czyichś poglądów, wierzeń, upodobań, różniących się od własnych” (https://sjp.pwn.pl/slowniki/tolerancja.html)	“respect for someone's opinions, beliefs, preferences that differ from one's own”
Romanian	Romania	toleranță	“ Faptul de a tolera; îngăduință, indulgență” (source: https://m.dex.ro/toleran%C8%9B%C4%83)	“permissive attitude”
Slovak	Slovakia	tolerancia	“tolerancia -ie ž. 1. znášanlivosť voči presvedčeniu, spôsobom ap. iných: názorová t. 2. tech. najvyššia prípustná odchýlka: dovolená t.,” (Source: https://slovník.aktuality.sk/pravopis/kratky-slovník/?q=tolerancia)	“Tolerance -iež. 1. tolerance towards beliefs, ways, etc. others: opinion t. 2. tech. the highest permissible deviation : holiday t. ;”
Slovene	Slovenia	toleranca	“izkazovati toleranco do drugačnih” (source: https://sl.pons.com/prevod/sloven%C5%A1%C4%8Dina-angle%C5%A1%C4%8Dina/toleranca)	“to display tolerance towards people who are different”

⁶⁷ Maltese was excluded, due to online dictionary not being readily available. Regardless, Maltese is not the only official language in Malta: so are English and Italian.

⁶⁸ The author corrected the translation to grammatically correct forms whenever Google Translate could not translate it as such.

Danish	Denmark	tolerance	“evne eller vilje til at acceptere det der afviger fra det normale; forståelse og accept af andre menneskers meninger, væremåde, kultur, religion el.lign.” (Source: https://ordnet.dk/ddo_en/dict?query=tolerance)	“ability or willingness to accept that which deviates from the normal; understanding and acceptance of other people's opinions, way of being, culture, religion etc.”
Finnish	Finland	suvaitsevaisuus	“suvaitsevuus, avaramielisyys, ennakkoluulottomuus.” (Source: https://www.suomisanakirja.fi/suvaitsevaisuus)	“tolerance, open-mindedness.”
French	France, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg	tolérance	“Attitude de quelqu'un qui admet chez les autres des manières de penser et de vivre différentes des siennes propres” (Larousse: https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/tolerance/78312).	“Attitude of someone who accepts ways of thinking and living in others that are different from their own”
German	Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium	Toleranz	“Achtung und Duldung gegenüber anderen Auffassungen, Meinungen und Einstellungen“ (The Free Dictionary: https://de.thefreedictionary.com/toleranz)	“Respect and tolerance for other views, opinions and attitudes.”
Icelandic	Iceland	umburðarlyndi	“það að taka vægt á yfirsjónum eða andstöðu annarra” (Íslensk nútímamálsorðabók: https://islenskordabok.arnastofnun.is/ord/42858)	“taking lightly the oversights or opposition of others”
Dutch	Netherlands, Belgium	tolerantie	“verdraagzaamheid tegenover andersdenkenden” (van Dale: https://www.vandale.nl/gratis-woordenboek/nederlands/betekenis/tolerantie)	„tolerance towards those who think differently“
Norwegian	Norway	toleranse	“evnen til å være rettferdig og forståelsesfull overfor mennesker hvis måter, meninger osv. er forskjellige fra ens egne” (Source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/norwegian-english/toleranse)	“the ability to be fair and understanding to people whose ways, opinions etc are different from one’s own”
Swedish	Sweden, Finland	tolerans	“förmågan att vara rättvis och förstående mot människor vars sätt, åsikter etc är annorlunda än ens egna” (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/swedish-english/tolerans)	“the ability to be fair and understanding to people whose ways, opinions etc are different from one’s own”
English	United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta	tolerance	“willingness to accept behaviour and beliefs that are different from your own, although you might not agree with or approve of them (...)” (Source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tolerance)	
Greek	Greece, Cyprus	ανοχή (anochí)	“Ψήφος ανοχής, η ψήφος που δίνει κάποιος για να δείξει ότι απλώς ανέχεται κτ. (ή κτ.) χωρίς όμως και να τον υποστηρίζει” (Modern Greek Language: https://www.greek-language.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/triantafylides/search.html?lq=%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%87%CE%AE&dq=)	“Toleration vote, the vote someone gives to show that they are just tolerating etc. (or etc.) but without even supporting him”
Italian	Italy, Switzerland, Malta	tolleranza	“Disposizione a comprendere e a rispettare idee e comportamenti diversi dai propri” (Dizionario Corriere: https://dizionari.corriere.it/dizionario_italiano/T/tolleranza.shtml)	“Willingness to understand and respect ideas and behaviors different from one's own”
Portuguese	Portugal	tolerância	“atitude que consiste em deixar aos outros a liberdade de exprimirem opiniões divergentes e de atuarem em conformidade com tais opiniões; aceitação” (Infopédia: https://www.infopedia.pt/dicionarios/lingua-portuguesa/tolerancia)	“an attitude that consists of leaving others the freedom to express divergent opinions and to act in accordance with such opinions; acceptance”
Spanish	Spain	tolerancia	Respeto a las ideas, creencias o prácticas de los demás cuando son diferentes o contrarias a las propias. (Real Academia Española: https://dle.rae.es/tolerancia)	“Respect for the ideas, beliefs or practices of others when they are different or contrary to my own.”

Source: National dictionaries publicly available on the web.

A.3. CHAPTER III. Methodology Appendix

Table A.3.2.1. Country groups and number of respondents per country

Sources: EVS 1981-2022. Year of democratization is based on Polity V's indicator on democratic longevity available

Country Groups	Country	Democracy	Wave I - 1981-1984	Wave II - 1990-1993	Wave III - 1999-2001	Wave IV - 2008-2010	Wave V - 2017-2021
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria	1990	NA	1034	1000	1500	1558
	Croatia	2000	NA	NA	1003	1525	1487
	Czechia	(1990 as Czechoslovakia) 1993	NA	2109	1908	1821	1811
	Estonia	1991	NA	1008	1005	1518	1304
	Hungary	1990	NA	999	1000	1513	1514
	Latvia	1991	NA	903	1013	1506	1335
	Lithuania	1991	NA	1000	1018	1500	1448
	Poland	1991	NA	982	1095	1510	1352
	Romania	1996	NA	1103	1146	1489	1613
	Slovakia	(1990 as Czechoslovakia) 1993	NA	1136	1331	1509	1432
Slovenia	1991	NA	1035	1006	1366	1075	
Northern/Central Europe	Austria	1946	NA	1460	1522	1510	1644
	Belgium	1944	1145	2792	1912	1509	NA
	Denmark	1945	1182	1030	1023	1507	3362
	Finland	1944	NA	588	1038	1134	1199
	France	1944	1200	1002	1615	1501	1870
	Germany	1949 (as West Germany, and 1990 as Germany)	1305	3437	2036	2075	2170
	Great Britain ⁶⁹	1879	1167	1484	1000	1561	1788
	Iceland	1944	927	702	968	808	1624
	Ireland	1921	1217	1000	1012	1013	NA
	Luxembourg	1889	NA	NA	1211	1610	NA
	Netherlands	1945	1221	1017	1003	1554	2404
	Norway	1945	1051	1239	NA	1090	1122
	Sweden	1914	954	1047	1015	1187	1194
Switzerland	1847	NA	NA	NA	1271	3174	
Southern Europe	Cyprus ⁷⁰	1968	NA	NA	NA	1000	1000
	Greece	1975	NA	NA	1142	1500	1200
	Italy	1947	1348	2018	2000	1519	2277
	Malta	1964	467	393	1002	1500	NA
	Portugal	1976	NA	1185	1000	1553	1215
	Spain	1978	2303	2637	1200	1500	1209
Total			15487	34340	35224	43659	40846
			169556				

at: <https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

⁶⁹ Excludes Northern Ireland.

⁷⁰ Excludes Northern Cyprus.

A.3.1. Tolerance index: the precedents in literature

As stated in Chapter III, subchapter 3.3., section 3.3.1., the use of dichotomous variables to produce tolerance indices has become more common in tolerance studies over the past years.

For example, Candeias (2012: 21-24; 2016: 99-101) uses seven groups (other races, immigrants, gypsies, homosexuals, people with AIDS, drug users and alcoholics) to build four indices: general (in)tolerance (with all seven variables), the ethnic minorities group (with other races, immigrants, and gypsies), the stigmatised group (with gypsies, homosexuals, and people with AIDS) and the drug users' group (with drug users and alcoholics). Each created index by Candeias (2012: 37; 2016: 104) was used as a dependent variable.

More authors are making similar use of social tolerance/intolerance indices: Dunn and Singh (2014) uses people of a different race, immigrant/foreign workers, people with AIDS, homosexuals, drug users, and heavy drinkers in two separate scales to test robustness: one focusing solely on race and immigration (thus creating a dependent variable with a three point-scale) and the other on AIDS, homosexuals, drug users, and heavy drinkers (creating a five point-scale variable) (p. 13). Both scales are additive indices serving as dependent variables and were taken from the EVS/WVS datasets. Likewise, and previously, Dunn *et al.* (2009: 308), using WVS datasets (1999-2000 wave) had also used eight social groups (people with a criminal record, other races, emotionally unstable people, immigrants, homosexuals, people with AIDS, heavy drinkers and drug addicts) to create a tolerance scale, which is also an additive variable, this time, with a nine point-scale.

There are more examples of authors using tolerance indices: Inglehart *et al.* (2008: 267), while not specifically studying tolerance as the explained phenomenon, uses the 1981-2007 WVS/EVS tolerance to stigmatised groups (namely drug addicts, people of a different race, people with AIDS, immigrants/foreign workers, homosexuals, people of a different religion, and heavy drinkers), creating an index of tolerance to predict whether tolerance can predict subjective well-being. Das *et al.* (2008: 195-196) build what they call a "global tolerance index" or GT index on WVS 5, by using four questions: tolerance to homosexuals, other races, and different ethnic backgrounds (but they slashed the previous one, using the later as a proxy), and the fourth question is whether respondents

think it is important that “kids learn tolerance”. Afterwards, the authors equally weigh the three indicators: homosexuals, other ethnic backgrounds and teaching kids tolerance, creating thus their tolerance index (also used by Berggren and Nilsson, 2013). Buitrago *et al.* (2019: 1169) run an ethnic tolerance index between tolerance to other races and immigrants, using WVS 4, 5, and 6.

Table A.3.3.1. Association measures between tolerance towards minority groups

	People of a different race	Muslims	Immigrants/foreign workers	Homosexuals	Heavy drinkers	Drug addicts	Jews
People of a different race	-	0,462	0,507	0,319	0,131	0,084	0,475
Muslims	0,462	-	0,513	0,330	0,171	0,167	0,480
Immigrants/foreign workers	0,507	0,513	-	0,314	0,162	0,136	0,428
Homosexuals	0,319	0,330	0,314	-	0,264	0,292	0,356
Heavy drinkers	0,131	0,171	0,162	0,264	-	0,445	0,103
Drug addicts	0,084	0,167	0,136	0,292	0,445	-	0,076
Jews	0,475	0,480	0,428	0,356	0,103	0,076	-

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Note: all results are is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

A.3.3.2. Reliability analysis tables

Tolerance variables		Cronbach's Alpha	Corrected item-total correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if item is deleted
All available 7 variables	People of a different race	0,726	0,487	0,687
	Muslims		0,528	0,673
	Immigrants/foreign workers		0,510	0,679
	Homosexuals		0,485	0,682
	Heavy drinkers		0,342	0,725
	Drug addicts		0,334	0,724
	Jews		0,476	0,691
Variables excluding drug addictions	People of a different race	0,770	0,586	0,716
	Muslims		0,593	0,709
	Immigrants/foreign workers		0,585	0,713
	Homosexuals		0,418	0,783
	Jews		0,581	0,720
Selected variables	People of a different race	0,721	0,554	0,642
	Muslims		0,558	0,629
	Immigrants/foreign workers		0,573	0,623
	Homosexuals		0,392	0,743

All waves and country groups with just the four selected tolerance variables (people of a different race, Muslims, immigrants/foreign workers, and homosexuals)

Cronbach's Alpha	N of items
0,721	4

	Scale mean if item deleted	Scale variance if item deleted	Corrected item-total correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if item is deleted
Neighbours: People of a different race	0,65	0,878	0,554	0,642
Neighbours: Muslims	0,57	0,775	0,558	0,629
Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers	0,61	0,813	0,573	0,623
Neighbours: Homosexuals	0,50	0,814	0,392	0,743

By each wave and all countries

EVS waves	Cronbach's Alpha	N of items
1990-1993	0,688	4
1999-2001	0,722	4
2008-2010	0,721	4
2017-2020	0,765	4

By each wave and each country group

EVS waves	Country Groups	Cronbach's Alpha	N of items
1990-1993	Northern/Central Europe	0,701	4
	Eastern Europe	0,641	4
	Southern Europe	0,669	4
1999-2001	Northern/Central Europe	0,744	4
	Eastern Europe	0,676	4
	Southern Europe	0,752	4
2008-2010	Northern/Central Europe	0,729	4
	Eastern Europe	0,689	4
	Southern Europe	0,733	4
2017-2020	Northern/Central Europe	0,672	4
	Eastern Europe	0,724	4
	Southern Europe	0,797	4

Table A.3.3.3. Far-right parties in each country

Regional country groups	Country	Far-right parties
Eastern Europe	Bulgaria	IMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (IMRO-BNM) – 1999-now Volya Movement – 2007-now Attack – 2005-now National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) – 2011-now Revival – 2014-now Reload Bulgaria – 2014-now
	Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights (HSPczec) – 1990-now Croatian Party of Rights — Dr. Ante Starčević (HSP AS) – 2009-now Independents for Croatia – 2017-now Homeland Movement (DP) – 2020-now
	Czechia	Workers' Party of Social Justice (DSSS) – 2010-now Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) – 2015-now Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR–RSČ) – 2016-now Public Affairs (VV) – 2001-2015 Dawn – National Coalition (ÚSVIT) – 2013-2018 National Party (Czech: Národní strana) – 2002-2011
	Estonia	Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) – 1988 – now (as Pro Patria) Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) – 2012-now
	Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) – 2003-now Fidesz – 1988-now Our Homeland Movement (MHM) – 2018-now
	Latvia	National Alliance (NA) – 2011-now All for Latvia! (Visu Latvijai!) – 2006-2011 Who Owns the State? – 2016-now
	Lithuania	National Alliance (NS) – 2020-now Order and Justice (TT) – 2002 (as LDP)-2020 Young Lithuania – 1994-now
	Poland	League of Polish Families (LPR) – 2001-2014 (ceased to be far-right) Law and Justice (PiS) – 2001-now

		National Movement (RN) – 2012-2017 and 2018-now Kukiz'15 – 2015-now New Hope (NN) – 2015-now Confederation Liberty and Independence – 2018-now
	Romania	Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) – 2019-now Romanian Nationhood Party (NR) - 2019 Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) – 1990-2006 Greater Romania Party (PRM) – 1991-now
	Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS) – 1990-now Kotleba - People's Party Our Slovakia (L'SNS) – 2010-now We Are Family (SR) – 2015-now
	Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) – 1989-now
Northern/Central Europe	Austria	Freedom Party of Austria - FPÖ - 1956 - now Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) - 2005-now Free Party Salzburg (FPS) – 2015-2019
	Belgium	Front national (Belge) (FNb) – 1985-2012 Vlaams Blok (VB) – 1979-2004 (banned) Vlaams Belang (VB) – 2004-now Libertair, Direct, Democratisch (LDD) – 2007 – now Parti Populaire (PP) – 2009-2019 VLOTT – 2006-now
	Denmark	Danish People' Party (DFP) – 1995-now Nye Borgerlige (NB) – 2015-now Progress Party (FrP) – 1972-now Stram Kurs – Hard Line – 2017-now
	Finland	Finns Party – 1995-now Blue and White Front (VP) – 2009-now
	France	National Front (FN) – 1972-now Alsace First – 1989 – now Debout la France (DLF) – 2008-now
	Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD) – 2013 – now National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP) – 1964-now The Republicans – 1983-now German Freedom Party – 2010-2016 German People's Union (DVU) – 1987-2011 Pro Germany Citizens' Movement – 2005-2017 Pro NRW – 2007-2019
	Great Britain ⁷¹	UKIP – 1993-now National Democrats (ND) – 1995-2011 British National Party (BNP) – 1982-now For Britain Movement – 2017-2022 Reform UK – 2018-now National Front – 1967-now (fascist)
	Iceland	Icelandic National Front – 2016-now Citizens' Party – 1987-1994
	Ireland	National Party (NP) – 2016-now Irish Freedom Party (IFP) – 2018-now
	Luxembourg	Alternative Democratic Reform Party (ADR) – 1987-now
	Netherlands	Centre Party (CP) – 1980-1986 Centre Democrats (CD) – 1984-2002 Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) – 2002-2008 Forza! Nederland – 2004-now Party for Freedom (PVV) – 2006-now Forum for Democracy (FVD) – 2016-now JA21 – 2020-now
	Norway	Progress Party (FrP) – 1973-now
	Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD) – 1988-now New Democracy (NyD) – 1991-2000 Alternative for Sweden (AfS) – 2018-now
	Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP) – 1971-now Geneva Citizens' Movement (MCG) – 2005-now Ticino League – 1991-now Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland (UDF) – 1975-now

⁷¹ Excludes Northern Ireland.

		Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS) – 1984-now Swiss Democrats (SD) – 1961-now
Southern Europe	Cyprus ⁷²	ELAM – 2008-now
	Greece	Golden Dawn - 1993-now Greek Solution – 2016-now National Popular Consciousness (ELASYN) – 2019 National Party – Greeks – 2020-now Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) – 2000-now ANEL – 2012-now Recreate Greece – 2011-now National Political Union (EPEN) – 1984-1996
	Italy	Northern League (LN) – 1991-now Brothers of Italy (Fdl) – 2012-now Tricolour Flame (MSFT) – 1995-now Italian Social Movement (MSI) – 1946-1995
	Malta	Maltese Patriots Movement (MPM) – 2016-now Imperium Europa – 2000-Now
	Portugal	PNR – 2000-now CHEGA – 2019-now PPV/CDC – 2009-2020
	Spain	VOX – 2013-now Platform for Catalonia (PxC) – 2002-2019 Union National (1979-1982)

Sources: own elaboration based on Mudde (2007, 2019) and Pirro (2023)'s classification of far-right political parties, and using subsequent works of Mudde, Pirro, and other authors to gather and classify all these parties (Pirro, 2015, 2023; Pytlas, 2016; Mudde, 2007, 2014, 2016, 2019; Rooduijn *et al.*, 2023a; 2023b).

⁷² Excludes Northern Cyprus.

A.4. CHAPTER IV. Appendix

A.4.3. CHAPTER IV, Subchapter 3 Appendix - ANOVA tests

Table A.4.3.1. Scheffe post-hoc multiple comparisons test between EVS waves

EVS waves		Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
	1999-2001	-,21733*	,00887	,000	-,2421	-,1925
1990-1993	2008-2010	-,21345*	,00839	,000	-,2369	-,1900
	2017-2020	-,25236*	,00857	,000	-,2763	-,2284
	1990-1993	,21733*	,00887	,000	,1925	,2421
1999-2001	2008-2010	,00387	,00848	,976	-,0198	,0276
	2017-2020	-,03503*	,00866	,001	-,0592	-,0108
	1990-1993	,21345*	,00839	,000	,1900	,2369
2008-2010	1999-2001	-,00387	,00848	,976	-,0276	,0198
	2017-2020	-,03891*	,00817	,000	-,0617	-,0161
	1990-1993	,25236*	,00857	,000	,2284	,2763
2017-2020	1999-2001	,03503*	,00866	,001	,0108	,0592
	2008-2010	,03891*	,00817	,000	,0161	,0617

Notes:

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Dependent Variable: Social tolerance additive variable.

Table A.4.3.2. Scheffe post-hoc multiple comparisons test between European regions, per EVS wave

EVS waves		Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval		
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
1990-1993	Northern/Central Europe	Eastern Europe	,73328*	0,01382	0,000	0,6994	0,7671
		Southern Europe	,04153*	0,01684	0,048	0,0003	0,0828
	Eastern Europe	Northern/Central Europe	-,73328*	0,01382	0,000	-0,7671	-0,6994
		Southern Europe	-,69175*	0,01792	0,000	-0,7356	-0,6479
	Southern Europe	Northern/Central Europe	-,04153*	0,01684	0,048	-0,0828	-0,0003
		Eastern Europe	,69175*	0,01792	0,000	0,6479	0,7356
1999-2001	Northern/Central Europe	Eastern Europe	,56029*	0,01358	0,000	0,5270	0,5935
		Southern Europe	,19928*	0,01643	0,000	0,1591	0,2395
	Eastern Europe	Northern/Central Europe	-,56029*	0,01358	0,000	-0,5935	-0,5270
		Southern Europe	-,36102*	0,01718	0,000	-0,4031	-0,3190
	Southern Europe	Northern/Central Europe	-,19928*	0,01643	0,000	-0,2395	-0,1591
		Eastern Europe	,36102*	0,01718	0,000	0,3190	0,4031
2008-2010	Northern/Central Europe	Eastern Europe	,63944*	0,01205	0,000	0,6099	0,6689
		Southern Europe	,27666*	0,01466	0,000	0,2408	0,3125
	Eastern Europe	Northern/Central Europe	-,63944*	0,01205	0,000	-0,6689	-0,6099
		Southern Europe	-,36278*	0,01507	0,000	-0,3997	-0,3259
	Southern Europe	Northern/Central Europe	-,27666*	0,01466	0,000	-0,3125	-0,2408
		Eastern Europe	,36278*	0,01507	0,000	0,3259	0,3997
2017-2020	Northern/Central Europe	Eastern Europe	1,06292*	0,01168	0,000	1,0343	1,0915
		Southern Europe	,21159*	0,01845	0,000	0,1664	0,2568
	Eastern Europe	Northern/Central Europe	-1,06292*	0,01168	0,000	-1,0915	-1,0343
		Southern Europe	-,85133*	0,01933	0,000	-0,8986	-0,8040
	Southern Europe	Northern/Central Europe	-,21159*	0,01845	0,000	-0,2568	-0,1664
		Eastern Europe	,85133*	0,01933	0,000	0,8040	0,8986

Notes:

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Dependent Variable: Social tolerance additive variable.

A.5. CHAPTER V. Appendix

A.5.1. CHAPTER V, Subchapter 1 Appendix

Table A.5.1.1. Correlations and associations between the independent variables and social tolerance additive dependent variable

Level	Dimension	Variable	Test	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021	Overall
Micro-level	Age	Age	Spearman's Rho	-0,131**	-0,147**	-0,083**	-0,114**	-0,102**
		Youth: 15-35	Rank-biserial	0,097**	0,111**	0,044**	0,073**	0,071**
		Old: 66+	Rank-biserial	-0,093**	-0,108**	-0,094**	-0,112**	-0,089**
Macro-level	Support for the far-right	Self-position in the far-right	Rank-biserial	-0,090**	-0,094**	-0,113**	-0,163**	-0,115**
		Far-right voting %	Spearman's Rho	0,037**	-0,020	-0,023**	-0,016**	0,035**
	Socioeconomic performance	HDI	Spearman's Rho	0,271**	0,274**	0,243**	0,333**	0,257**
		GDP Annual Growth	Spearman's Rho	0,080**	0,175**	-0,172**	-0,336**	-0,054**
		GDP per Capita	Spearman's Rho	0,190**	0,279**	0,271**	0,370**	0,227**
Unemployment		Spearman's Rho	0,001	-0,145**	0,111**	-0,000	-0,022**	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes:

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A.5.1.2. Correlations and associations between the independent variables and tolerance to other races

Level	Dimension	Variable	Test	1981-1984	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021	Overall
Micro-level	Age	Age	Rank-Biserial	-0,138**	-0,105**	-0,090**	-0,054**	-0,089**	-0,083**
		Youth: 15-35	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	0,103**	0,078**	0,064**	0,025**	0,057**	0,058**
		Old: 66+	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	-0,118**	-0,066**	-0,071**	-0,052**	-0,080**	-0,069**
Macro-level	Support for the far-right	Self-position in the far-right	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	-0,069**	-0,079**	-0,067**	-0,071**	-0,093**	-0,077**
		Far-right voting %	Rank-Biserial	-0,003	0,018**	-0,000	-0,008	0,000	-0,001
	Socioeconomic performance	HDI	Rank-Biserial		0,115**	0,107**	0,106**	0,236**	0,113**
		GDP Annual Growth	Rank-Biserial	0,042**	0,118**	0,075**	-0,101**	-0,168**	-0,022**
		GDP per Capita	Rank-Biserial		0,126**	0,119**	0,110**	0,242**	0,100**
Unemployment		Rank-Biserial	-0,032**	-0,023**	-0,064**	0,094**	-0,033**	-0,007**	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes:

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A5.1.3. Correlations and associations between the independent variables and tolerance to Muslims

Level	Dimension	Variable	Test	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021	Overall
Micro-level	Age	Age	Rank-Biserial	-0,074**	-0,091**	-0,058**	-0,073**	-0,072**
		Youth: 15-35	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	0,048**	0,062**	0,031**	0,050**	0,048**
		Old: 66+	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	-0,061**	-0,079**	-0,058**	-0,058**	-0,064**
Macro-level	Support for the far-right	Self-position in the far-right	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	-0,068**	-0,073**	-0,083**	-0,124**	-0,091**
		Far-right voting %	Rank-Biserial	0,005	-0,032**	-0,007	-0,037**	-0,031**
	Socioeconomic performance	HDI	Rank-Biserial	0,049**	0,096**	0,067**	0,177**	0,041**
		GDP Annual Growth	Rank-Biserial	0,057**	0,065**	-0,074**	-0,226**	-0,033**
		GDP per Capita	Rank-Biserial	0,039**	0,106**	0,085**	0,212**	0,036**
Unemployment		Rank-Biserial	0,009	-0,061**	0,088**	0,017**	0,019**	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes:

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A5.1.4. Correlations and associations between the independent variables and tolerance to immigrants

Level	Dimension	Variable	Test	1981-1984	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021	Overall
Micro-level	Age	Age	Rank-Biserial	-0,076**	-0,086**	-0,074**	-0,041**	-0,067**	-0,067**
		Youth: 15-35	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	0,060**	0,058**	0,054**	0,014**	0,042**	0,046**
		Old: 66+	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	-0,078**	-0,067**	-0,066**	-0,037**	-0,055**	-0,059**
Macro-level	Support for the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	-0,062**	-0,042**	-0,049**	-0,057**	-0,113**	-0,071**
		Far-right voting %	Rank-Biserial	0,015	-0,042**	-0,020**	-0,009	-0,021**	-0,057**
	Socioeconomic performance	HDI	Rank-Biserial		0,058**	0,105**	0,096**	0,275**	0,064**
		GDP Annual Growth	Rank-Biserial	0,110**	0,058**	0,107**	-0,091**	-0,220**	-0,045**
		GDP per Capita	Rank-Biserial		0,030**	0,129**	0,115**	0,276**	0,055**
Unemployment		Rank-Biserial	0,031**	-0,019**	-0,076**	0,105**	0,012*	0,024**	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes:

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A5.1.5. Correlations and associations between the independent variables and tolerance to homosexuality

Level	Dimension	Variable	Test	1990-1993	1999-2001	2008-2010	2017-2021	Overall
Micro-level	Age	Age	Rank-Biserial	-0,113**	-0,146**	-0,083**	-0,121**	-0,096**
		Youth: 15-35	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	0,091**	0,111**	0,051**	0,071**	0,067**
		Old: 66+	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	-0,073**	-0,099**	-0,092**	-0,120**	-0,083**
Macro-level	Support for the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right	Phi coefficient (ϕ)	-0,069**	-0,076**	-0,091**	-0,119**	-0,085**
		Far-right voting %	Rank-Biserial	0,059**	0,004	-0,046**	0,048**	0,078**
	Socioeconomic performance	HDI	Rank-Biserial	0,358**	0,318**	0,306**	0,356**	0,334**
		GDP Annual Growth	Rank-Biserial	0,052**	0,177**	-0,183**	-0,281**	-0,058**
		GDP per Capita	Rank-Biserial	0,246**	0,307**	0,336**	0,389**	0,299**
Unemployment		Rank-Biserial	0,002	-0,152**	0,064**	-0,081**	-0,060**	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table A5.1.6. Relative statistical impact of age, and far-right self-position on social tolerance (dependent variable: social tolerance additive index)

Variables		Model: Independent Variables		Model: all Independent Variables		All variables		1990-1993		1999-2001		2008-2010		2017-2020	
		Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Regions	Southern Europe=1			-0,066	0,000	-0,033	0,000	0,013	0,072	-0,050	0,000	-0,057	0,000	-0,017	0,007
	Eastern Europe=1			-0,298	0,000	-0,261	0,000	-0,240	0,000	-0,189	0,000	-0,229	0,000	-0,390	0,000
Time	EVS wave 3=1			0,212	0,000	0,240	0,000								
	EVS wave 4=1			0,383	0,000	0,433	0,000								
	EVS wave 5=1			0,517	0,000	0,567	0,000								
	Year survey			-0,339	0,000	-0,408	0,000								
Age	Age	-0,013	0,636	0,020	0,453	-0,037	0,267	-0,020	0,779	0,034	0,624	0,057	0,377	-0,025	0,689
	Age Square	-0,079	0,004	-0,124	0,000	-0,036	0,282	-0,113	0,110	-0,123	0,075	-0,087	0,176	-0,027	0,666
	15-35 year olds=1	0,002	0,735	0,004	0,528	0,006	0,418	-0,019	0,203	0,015	0,272	0,016	0,218	0,020	0,129
	66 or more year olds=1	-0,013	0,024	-0,011	0,058	-0,013	0,041	0,008	0,513	0,004	0,745	-0,026	0,039	-0,027	0,031
Far-Right position	Far-right position=1	-0,102	0,000	-0,079	0,000	-0,040	0,000	-0,042	0,000	-0,029	0,000	-0,042	0,000	-0,038	0,000
Controls	Male=1					-0,052	0,000	-0,057	0,000	-0,063	0,000	-0,054	0,000	-0,035	0,000
	Age complete education					0,060	0,000	0,071	0,000	0,059	0,000	0,056	0,000	0,051	0,000
	Employed=1					0,009	0,019	0,004	0,638	0,041	0,000	-0,003	0,685	-0,010	0,179
	Married=1					0,006	0,073	0,003	0,713	-0,001	0,887	0,006	0,400	0,010	0,119
	Religious person					-0,017	0,000	-0,019	0,011	-0,030	0,000	-0,011	0,101	0,005	0,393
	Town size					0,031	0,000	0,030	0,000	0,036	0,000	0,039	0,000	0,027	0,000
Political controls	Left vs Right					-0,050	0,000	-0,032	0,000	-0,042	0,000	-0,051	0,000	-0,065	0,000
	Patriotism					-0,031	0,000	-0,059	0,000	-0,034	0,000	-0,020	0,002	-0,009	0,127
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament					0,028	0,000	0,042	0,000	0,032	0,000	0,019	0,002	0,024	0,000
Psychoemotional control	Interpersonal trust=1					0,109	0,000	0,112	0,000	0,108	0,000	0,092	0,000	0,114	0,000
N		117546		117546		86725		18837		21031		24864		21992	
Adjusted R Square		0,023		0,111		0,135		0,130		0,097		0,094		0,231	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

A.5.2. Logistic regression tables on age and far-right self-position effects on tolerance to specific groups

Table A5.2.1. The effect of far-right self-position and age groups on tolerance to other races⁷³

Race	Age			Far-Right position			Age & Far-Right position			All IV's			IV's and controls			
	Variable	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.
Regions	Southern Europe=1										-0,634	0,025	0,000	-0,400	0,030	0,000
	Eastern Europe=1										-1,192	0,021	0,000	-1,073	0,024	0,000
Time	EVS wave 2=1										-0,217	0,122	0,074	-0,192	0,158	0,226
	EVS wave 3=1										0,373	0,228	0,102	0,375	0,298	0,209
	EVS wave 4=1										0,539	0,343	0,116	0,522	0,450	0,246
	EVS wave 5=1										0,667	0,463	0,150	0,632	0,607	0,298
	Year survey										-0,017	0,013	0,173	-0,017	0,017	0,299
Age	Age	-0,015	0,004	0,000				-0,014	0,005	0,006	-0,010	0,005	0,049	-0,009	0,006	0,141
	Age ²	0,000	0,000	0,910				0,000	0,000	0,935	0,000	0,000	0,280	0,000	0,000	0,762
	15-35 year-olds=1	-0,056	0,036	0,124				-0,029	0,042	0,487	-0,024	0,043	0,579	0,012	0,049	0,813
	66 + year-olds=1	-0,051	0,037	0,167				-0,033	0,043	0,434	-0,036	0,044	0,410	-0,047	0,049	0,337
Far-Right position	Far-right position=1				-0,717	0,026	0,000	-0,659	0,026	0,000	-0,550	0,027	0,000	-0,251	0,041	0,000
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1													-0,154	0,021	0,000
	Age complete education													0,051	0,004	0,000
	Employed=1													0,025	0,025	0,318
	Married=1													0,018	0,023	0,435
	Religious person													-0,008	0,018	0,651
	Town size															
Political controls	Left vs Right													-0,055	0,006	0,000
	Patriotism													-0,073	0,014	0,000
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament													0,070	0,013	0,000
Psychoemotional control	Interpersonal trust=1													0,560	0,024	0,000
	(Constant)	2,674	0,113	0,000	2,099	0,009	0,000	2,774	0,133	0,000	37,838	25,330	0,135	37,599	33,309	0,259
Nagelkerke R Square		0,013			0,010			0,022			0,079			0,099		
chi² (p)		1190,911 (0,000)			683,805 (0,000)			1522,753 (0,000)			5573,483 (0,000)			5440,697 (0,000)		
N		167621			134493			134180			134180			105714		

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes: The analysis regarding tolerance to other races comprehends data from EVS' wave 1 to 5, due to tolerance to other races indicator being asked since wave 1 (1981). Since EVS wave 1 is available for this dependant variable, it is used as reference on the time dummies.

The significant effects ($p > 0,05$) are highlighted in grey.

Dependant Variable: Tolerance to other races

⁷³ As the control variable, town size, is not available one wave 1 (1981-1984), I cut it out from this analysis, which also includes the longitudinal analysis regarding tolerance to other races.

Table A5.2.2. The effect of far-right self-position, and age groups on tolerance to Muslims

Muslims		Age			Far-right position			Age & Far-right position			All IV's			IV's and controls				
		B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.		
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1													-0,152	0,018	0,000		
	Age complete education (intervals)													0,029	0,004	0,000		
	Employed=1													0,009	0,022	0,688		
	Married=1													0,044	0,019	0,024		
	Religious person													0,008	0,015	0,589		
	Town size													0,053	0,007	0,000		
Political controls	Left vs Right													-0,087	0,005	0,000		
	Patriotism													-0,068	0,012	0,000		
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament													0,100	0,011	0,000		
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1													0,520	0,020	0,000		
Regions	Southern Europe=1												-0,180	0,022	0,000	0,031	0,026	0,241
	Eastern Europe=1												-0,808	0,016	0,000	-0,588	0,020	0,000
Time	EVS wave 2=1																	
	EVS wave 3=1												0,347	0,122	0,004	0,602	0,136	0,000
	EVS wave 4=1												0,365	0,247	0,140	0,880	0,276	0,001
	EVS wave 5=1												0,403	0,376	0,284	1,153	0,422	0,006
	Year survey												-0,017	0,014	0,234	-0,048	0,016	0,002
Age	Age	-0,007	0,004	0,048				-0,010	0,004	0,014	-0,009	0,004	0,031	-0,018	0,005	0,001		
	Age ²	0,000	0,000	0,541				0,000	0,000	0,849	0,000	0,000	0,970	0,000	0,000	0,046		
	15-35 year-olds=1	-0,031	0,031	0,307				-0,015	0,035	0,668	-0,011	0,036	0,763	-0,004	0,042	0,915		
	66 + year-olds=1	-0,100	0,033	0,003				-0,082	0,038	0,029	-0,099	0,038	0,010	-0,121	0,044	0,006		
Far-Right position	Far-right position=1				-0,724	0,023	0,000	-0,685	0,024	0,000	-0,584	0,024	0,000	-0,139	0,036	0,000		
(Constant)		1,759	0,095	0,000	1,462	0,008	0,000	1,947	0,111	0,000	35,128	27,683	0,204	97,102	31,036	0,002		
Nagelkerke R Square		0,009			0,012			0,020			0,055			0,078				
chi² (p)		833,779 (0,000)			881,663 (0,000)			1533,456 (0,000)			4216,127 (0,000)			4496,082 (0,000)				
N		148720			119719			119422			119422			88280				

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

The significant effects (p>0,05) are highlighted in grey.

Dependant Variable: Tolerance to Muslims.

Table A5.2.3. The effect of Far-Right self-position, and age groups on tolerance to immigrants ⁷⁴

Immigrants		Age			Far-right position			Age & Far-right position			All IV's			IV's and controls		
Variable		B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1													-0,125	0,018	0,000
	Age complete education (intervals)													0,039	0,004	0,000
	Employed=1													0,013	0,023	0,584
	Married=1													0,042	0,020	0,035
	Religious person													0,037	0,015	0,016
	Town size															
Political controls	Left vs Right													-0,071	0,005	0,000
	Patriotism													-0,070	0,013	0,000
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament													0,128	0,011	0,000
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1													0,603	0,021	0,000
Regions	Southern Europe=1										-0,212	0,024	0,000	0,012	0,029	0,680
	Eastern Europe=1										-1,111	0,018	0,000	-0,940	0,021	0,000
Time	EVS wave 2=1										-0,430	0,111	0,000	-0,645	0,148	0,000
	EVS wave 3=1										-0,180	0,206	0,381	-0,576	0,278	0,038
	EVS wave 4=1										-0,270	0,309	0,383	-0,876	0,419	0,037
	EVS wave 5=1										-0,658	0,418	0,115	-1,442	0,564	0,011
	Year survey											0,005	0,012	0,694	0,024	0,016
Age	Age	-0,003	0,004	0,492				-0,001	0,004	0,767	0,000	0,004	0,938	-0,002	0,005	0,722
	Age ²	0,000	0,000	0,037				0,000	0,000	0,046	0,000	0,000	0,034	0,000	0,000	0,325
	15-35 year-olds=1	-0,010	0,032	0,749				0,016	0,037	0,658	0,017	0,038	0,648	0,025	0,044	0,560
	66 + year-olds=1	-0,040	0,034	0,250				-0,026	0,039	0,511	-0,061	0,040	0,128	-0,041	0,046	0,375
Far-Right position	Far-right position=1				-0,617	0,024	0,000	-0,574	0,024	0,000	-0,451	0,025	0,000	-0,106	0,037	0,004
(Constant)		1,967	0,099	0,000	1,771	0,008	0,000	2,045	0,116	0,000	-6,285	22,854	0,783	-45,073	30,978	0,146
Nagelkerke R Square		0,008			0,008			0,015			0,080			0,103		
chi² (p)		815,835 (0,000)			597,622 (0,000)			1184,755 (0,000)			6302,735 (0,000)			6361,970 (0,000)		
N		166923			134023			133708			133708			105266		

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes: The analysis regarding tolerance to immigrants comprehends data from EVS' wave 1 to 5, due to tolerance to immigrants indicator being asked since wave 1 (1981). Since EVS wave 1 is available for this dependent variable, it is used as reference on the time dummies.

The significant effects (p>0,05) are highlighted in grey.

Dependant Variable: Tolerance to immigrants.

⁷⁴ As the control variable, town size, is not available one wave 1 (1981-1984), I elected to cut it out from this analysis, which also includes the longitudinal analysis regarding tolerance to immigrants.

Table A5.2.4. The effect of Far-Right self-position, and age groups on tolerance to homosexuals

Homosexuals		Age			Far-right position			Age & Far-right position			All IV's			IV's and controls		
Variable		B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.	B	SE	Sig.
Sociodemographic controls	Male=1													-0,438	0,018	0,000
	Age complete education (intervals)													0,063	0,003	0,000
	Employed=1													0,108	0,021	0,000
	Married=1													-0,034	0,019	0,075
	Religious person													-0,293	0,015	0,000
	Town size													0,076	0,006	0,000
Political controls	Left vs Right													-0,036	0,005	0,000
	Patriotism													-0,153	0,012	0,000
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament													0,055	0,011	0,000
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1													0,503	0,019	0,000
Regions	Southern Europe=1										-0,849	0,020	0,000	-0,513	0,025	0,000
	Eastern Europe=1										-1,825	0,017	0,000	-1,726	0,021	0,000
Time	EVS wave 2=1															
	EVS wave 3=1										0,914	0,100	0,000	0,768	0,142	0,000
	EVS wave 4=1										1,430	0,203	0,000	1,088	0,288	0,000
	EVS wave 5=1										1,972	0,311	0,000	1,456	0,440	0,001
	Year survey										-0,023	0,011	0,045	-0,005	0,016	0,773
Age	Age	-0,001	0,003	0,787				-0,001	0,004	0,798	0,009	0,004	0,037	0,012	0,005	0,021
	Age ²	0,000	0,000	0,002				0,000	0,000	0,004	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
	15-35 year-olds=1	0,025	0,027	0,357				0,053	0,032	0,098	0,077	0,034	0,026	0,100	0,041	0,014
	66 + year-olds=1	-0,076	0,030	0,010				-0,054	0,034	0,116	-0,007	0,037	0,857	0,034	0,043	0,426
Far-Right position	Far-right position=1				-0,647	0,022	0,000	-0,601	0,022	0,000	-0,476	0,024	0,000	-0,224	0,036	0,000
(Constant)		1,207	0,084	0,000	1,122	0,007	0,000	1,434	0,101	0,000	46,977	22,680	0,038	11,156	32,288	0,730
Nagelkerke R Square		0,014			0,010			0,026			0,214			0,257		
chi² (p)		1503,305 (0,000)			817,672 (0,000)			2133,412 (0,000)			19135,304 (0,000)			17111,167 (0,000)		
N		152530			122577			122281			122281			88429		

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes: significant effects ($p > 0,05$) are highlighted in grey.

Dependant Variable: Tolerance to homosexuals.

A.5.3. CHAPTER V, Subchapter 3 Appendix: The effects on social tolerance in Portugal

Table A5.3.1. The effects of age and far-right self-position on social tolerance in Portugal (no controls)

Variables	Model: Age			Model: Far-right position			Model: Independent Variables			Model: all Independent Variables			
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.	
(Constant)	4,082	0,197	0,000	3,421	0,016	0,000	3,991	0,230	0,000	- 34,59 8	2,924	0,000	
Time	EVS wave 3 (1999)=1									0,349	0,041	0,000	
	EVS wave 4 (2008)=1									0,018	0,038	0,626	
	EVS wave 5 (2017)=1												
	Year survey									0,019	0,001	0,000	
Age	Age	-0,019	0,008	0,014			-0,014	0,009	0,117	-0,028	0,009	0,002	
	Age Square	0,000	0,000	0,174			0,000	0,000	0,643	0,000	0,000	0,078	
	15-35 year olds=1	-0,169	0,061	0,006			-0,152	0,071	0,031	-0,197	0,069	0,004	
	66 or more year olds=1	0,026	0,087	0,767			0,112	0,101	0,265	0,049	0,098	0,619	
Self-position with the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right: far-right Id=1				-0,252	0,064	0,000	-0,244	0,064	0,000	-0,162	0,062	0,009
N	4850			3807			3805			3805			
Adjusted R Square	0,007			0,004			0,013			0,065			

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Notes: significant effects ($p > 0,05$) are highlighted in grey.

Table A5.3.2. The effects of age and far-right self-positioning in Portugal, across time

Variables	1990			1999			2008			2020			
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.	
(Constant)	3,935	0,539	0,000	3,756	0,630	0,000	3,226	0,696	0,000	3,744	0,706	0,000	
Age	Age	-0,023	0,021	0,272	-0,015	0,021	0,485	-0,040	0,026	0,129	-0,015	0,024	0,537
	Age Square	0,000	0,000	0,533	0,000	0,000	0,720	0,000	0,000	0,173	0,000	0,000	0,612
	15-35 year olds=1	-0,213	0,154	0,167	-0,159	0,142	0,262	-0,055	0,141	0,697	-0,087	0,168	0,603
	66 or more year olds=1	-0,110	0,216	0,610	0,208	0,207	0,316	-0,047	0,328	0,887	0,084	0,194	0,666
Self-positioning in the far-right	Self-positioning in the far-right: far-right position=1	-0,245	0,141	0,083	-0,133	0,139	0,342	-0,141	0,243	0,561	0,155	0,203	0,446
Controls	Male=1	-0,230	0,071	0,001	-0,107	0,066	0,107	-0,125	0,071	0,078	-0,097	0,071	0,170
	Age complete education (intervals)	0,033	0,011	0,003	0,022	0,013	0,083	0,037	0,012	0,002	0,039	0,013	0,003
	Employed=1	0,128	0,081	0,112	0,122	0,076	0,110	0,209	0,087	0,017	0,095	0,091	0,295
	Married=1	-0,077	0,085	0,360	0,026	0,082	0,747	0,156	0,078	0,046	0,002	0,073	0,978
	Religious person	0,018	0,062	0,773	-0,084	0,076	0,271	0,188	0,064	0,003	0,014	0,055	0,800
	Town size	0,021	0,024	0,393	0,031	0,026	0,227	0,142	0,032	0,000	-0,085	0,030	0,005
Political controls	Left vs Right	-0,031	0,021	0,150	0,002	0,018	0,893	0,052	0,020	0,010	-0,016	0,021	0,458
	Patriotism	-0,013	0,048	0,793	0,120	0,063	0,056	-0,018	0,056	0,748	-0,010	0,069	0,885
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	-0,011	0,042	0,796	-0,034	0,040	0,392	-0,098	0,043	0,024	0,132	0,045	0,004
Psychosocial control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,072	0,081	0,375	-0,025	0,096	0,792	0,197	0,086	0,022	0,192	0,092	0,037
N	939			572			876			736			
Adjusted R Square	0,067			0,011			0,066			0,042			

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Table A5.3.4. Relative statistical impact of age, and far-right self-position on social tolerance, in Portugal and other European regions (dependent variable: social tolerance additive index)

Variables		Portugal		North and Central Europe		East Europe		South Europe (minus Portugal)	
		Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Controls	Male=1	-0,074	0,000	-0,073	0,000	-0,035	0,000	-0,055	0,000
	Age complete education (intervals)	0,119	0,000	0,089	0,000	0,035	0,000	0,077	0,000
	Employed=1	0,071	0,000	0,021	0,000	-0,002	0,769	0,000	0,981
	Married=1	0,021	0,280	0,010	0,040	0,002	0,769	0,004	0,671
	Religious person	0,028	0,133	-0,003	0,483	-0,019	0,002	-0,048	0,000
	Town size	0,026	0,143	0,041	0,000	0,033	0,000	0,031	0,001
Political controls	Left vs Right	0,007	0,725	-0,085	0,000	-0,011	0,160	-0,056	0,000
	Patriotism	-0,002	0,914	-0,045	0,000	-0,021	0,000	-0,023	0,014
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament	-0,004	0,807	0,063	0,000	-0,004	0,504	0,011	0,219
Psychoemotional control	Interpersonal trust=1	0,050	0,004	0,121	0,000	0,094	0,000	0,099	0,000
Time	EVS wave 3=1	0,139	0,000	0,132	0,009	0,684	0,000	-0,438	0,000
	EVS wave 4=1	0,008	0,682	0,201	0,057	1,441	0,000	-0,842	0,001
	EVS wave 5=1			0,299	0,059	1,983	0,000	-0,920	0,001
	Year survey	0,212	0,000	-0,117	0,378	-1,580	0,000	0,916	0,001
Age	Age	-0,510	0,004	-0,056	0,244	-0,031	0,615	0,106	0,249
	Age Square	0,410	0,016	-0,024	0,610	-0,030	0,627	-0,176	0,053
	15-35 year olds=1	-0,070	0,058	-0,003	0,773	0,023	0,065	0,008	0,667
	66 or more year olds=1	-0,002	0,962	-0,008	0,407	-0,012	0,296	-0,020	0,259
Far-right position	Far-right position=1	-0,055	0,008	-0,068	0,000	-0,021	0,006	-0,053	0,000
N		3123		42513		28819		12270	
Adjusted R Square		0,084		0,109		0,052		0,063	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

Table A5.3.4. Relative statistical impact of age, and far-right self-position on social tolerance, in Portugal (dependent variable: social tolerance additive index)

Variables		Model: Independent Variables		Model: all Independent Variables		All variables		1990-1993		1999-2001		2008-2010		2017-2020	
		Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.	Beta	Sig.
Time	EVS wave 3=1			0,142	0,000	0,139	0,000								
	EVS wave 4=1			0,008	0,626	0,008	0,682								
	EVS wave 5=1														
	Year survey			0,220	0,000	0,212	0,000								
Age	Age	-0,241	0,117	-0,466	0,002	-0,510	0,004	-0,364	0,272	-0,322	0,485	-0,470	0,129	-0,259	0,537
	Age Square	0,070	0,643	0,260	0,078	0,410	0,016	0,198	0,533	0,161	0,720	0,393	0,173	0,212	0,612
	15-35 year olds=1	-0,075	0,031	-0,097	0,004	-0,070	0,058	-0,102	0,167	-0,107	0,262	-0,026	0,697	-0,041	0,603
	66 or more year olds=1	0,035	0,265	0,015	0,619	-0,002	0,962	-0,029	0,610	0,087	0,316	-0,006	0,887	0,032	0,666
Far-Right position	Far-Right position=1	-0,062	0,000	-0,041	0,009	-0,055	0,008	-0,074	0,083	-0,050	0,342	-0,020	0,561	0,032	0,446
Controls	Male=1					-0,074	0,000	-0,110	0,001	-0,073	0,107	-0,060	0,078	-0,051	0,170
	Age complete education (intervals)					0,119	0,000	0,116	0,003	0,099	0,083	0,121	0,002	0,143	0,003
	Employed=1					0,071	0,000	0,058	0,112	0,081	0,110	0,088	0,017	0,049	0,295
	Married=1					0,021	0,280	-0,036	0,360	0,017	0,747	0,074	0,046	0,001	0,978
	Religious person					0,028	0,133	0,010	0,773	-0,048	0,271	0,102	0,003	0,010	0,800
	Town size					0,026	0,143	0,029	0,393	0,055	0,227	0,152	0,000	-0,105	0,005
Political controls	Left vs Right					0,007	0,725	-0,062	0,150	0,007	0,893	0,093	0,010	-0,031	0,458
	Patriotism					-0,002	0,914	-0,008	0,793	0,085	0,056	-0,011	0,748	-0,005	0,885
Institutional control	Trust in the Parliament					-0,004	0,807	-0,008	0,796	-0,037	0,392	-0,076	0,024	0,107	0,004
Psychoemotional control	Interpersonal trust=1					0,050	0,004	0,028	0,375	-0,011	0,792	0,078	0,022	0,078	0,037
Adjusted R Square	N	3805		3805		3123		3123		3123		3123		3123	
		0,013		0,065		0,084		0,084		0,084		0,084		0,084	

Sources: EVS/WVS (2022), available at: <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/joint-evs-wvs/data-and-documentation-joint-evs-wvs/>, last accessed on 28/08/2024.

A.6. CHAPTER VI. Appendix

A.6.1. Evidence of clustering in the social tolerance data

Type III Tests of Fixed Effects^a

Source	Numerator df	Denominator df	F	Sig.
Intercept	1	30,004	2075,565	,000

a. Dependent Variable: RANK_Tolerance Tolerance: composite variable.

Estimates of Fixed Effects^a

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Intercept	3,198293	,070202	30,004	45,558	,000	3,054922	3,341664

a. Dependent Variable: RANK_Tolerance Tolerance: composite variable.

Estimates of Covariance Parameters^a

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald Z	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Residual	1,195267	,004371	273,462	0,000	1,186731	1,203864
Intercept [subject = Variance S003]	,152485	,039444	3,866	,000	,091842	,253170

a. Dependent Variable: RANK_Tolerance Tolerance: composite variable.

Random Effect Covariance Structure (G)^a

Intercept S003	
Intercept S003	,152485

Variance Components

a. Dependent Variable: RANK_Tolerance Tolerance: composite variable.