

**Self-reported bilingual outcomes
and
language acculturation
among
descendants of Turkish immigrants
in France, Germany and the Netherlands**

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Many say that a PhD is a long and solitary journey, from which we learn great things. According to my supervisor, one of its main lessons is that research is, in fact, an exercise in humility, and, in the words of one colleague, that most of the content is the fruit of a mix between resistance and persistence. As I reach the end of this “long journey,” I agree with them both, except in one respect—the journey was not at all lonely. I have greatly benefited from the support and encouragement of many people during these years, and although there is not enough space here to mention everyone, I will nevertheless mention the most important ones.

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Summary

This study looked in detail at the management of language diversity among the descendants of Turkish immigrants and their families of origin in France, Germany and the Netherlands. I took a sociological approach to the use of self-reported language proficiency in early adulthood as an indicator of linguistic self-esteem (Bourdieu, 1991; Fishman 1991; Brizić, 2006; Norton, 2006). Approaching reported language outcomes as a consequence of collective processes, I aimed to understand the extent to which linguistic self-esteem in each of the three countries was associated to other variables, both linguistic and non-linguistic. The data for the study were drawn from The Integration of European Second Generation (TIES), I first analyzed respondents' linguistic starting point through indicators of parents' linguistic capital and the respondents' childhood language environment; second, I assessed current language dynamics, through language uses in the family; and third, I used other variables as indirect indicators of individuals' language contact opportunities, specifically those related to social background and to the city where individuals' grew up and currently live, with a particular focus on school experiences.

Key concepts: descendants of Turkish immigrants, linguistic-self esteem, linguistic socialization experiences, bilingualism, language acculturation

Resumo

Esta tese pretendeu estudar a gestão da diversidade linguística entre os descendentes de imigrantes turcos e suas famílias de origem em França, Alemanha e Holanda. A partir duma abordagem sociológica, utilizei o conceito de auto-relato da proficiência linguística em idade adulta como um indicador de auto-estima linguística (Bourdieu, 1991; Fishman 1991; Brizić, 2006; Norton, 2006). Abordando os resultados obtidos como consequência de processos colectivos, pretendi analisar a forma como a auto-estima linguística em cada um dos três países se encontrava associada a outros factores, sejam eles linguísticos e não-linguísticos. Utilizando os dados do inquérito The Integration of European Second Generation (TIES), analisei, numa primeira etapa, o ponto de partida linguístico dos descendentes dos imigrantes turcos nos três países, através de indicadores relacionados com o capital linguístico dos pais, o ambiente linguístico dos inquiridos durante a infância e no seio familiar; em segundo lugar, procurei identificar as mais recentes dinâmicas linguísticas na família, através de práticas linguísticas e, numa terceira etapa, analisei os indicadores que reflectem, de forma indirecta,

as diferentes oportunidades de contacto linguístico, em relação à condição social de origem e ao contexto local onde os indivíduos cresceram e vivem actualmente, focando particularmente nas suas experiências escolares.

Key concepts: filhos de imigrantes turcos, auto-estima linguística, socialização linguística, bilinguismo, aculturação linguística

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Glossary

Chapter 1

BICS - Basic Interpersonal Communicative Skills (Cummins, 1980s)

CALP - Cognitive/Academic Language Proficiency (Cummins, 1980s)

CPH - Critical Period Hypothesis

(Johnson and Newport 1989, 1998, Penfield and Roberts 1959, Newport and Johnson 1989, Newport 2002, Birdsong and Molis 2001, Mayberry and Lock 2003, Hakuta, Bialystock and Wiley 2003)

CUP - Common Underlying Proficiency (Cummins, 1980s)

LIH - Language Interdependence Hypothesis (Cummins, 1980s)

GIDS - graded intergenerational disruption scale (Fishman, 1960s)

RLS - reversing language shift model (Fishman, 1960s - 1980s)

SES – Socio-Economic Status, usually defined by a combination of income, educational attainment and occupational status.

TIES - The Integration of the European Second Generation

Chapter 2

ACOM - Adviescommissie Onderzoek Culturele Minderheden, the Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (in English), since 1976 in the Netherlands

ACSE - Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances, inter-ministerial funding created in 2006 in France

AEE - L'Amicale pour l'enseignement aux étrangers, ONG in France in the 1960s-1970s

AEFTI - the Association pour l'alphabétisation et l'enseignement du français aux travailleurs immigrés, NGO since 1971 in France

AFPA - Association de formation professionnelle des adultes, ONG in France since the 1960s

AmkA - Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten, Office for Multicultural Affairs (in English), from early 1980s in Germany

ANAEM - Agence nationale de l'accueil des étrangers et des migrations, public institution created to substitute other institutions created since 1926 (SSAE, ONI, OMI)¹, and was created in 2005 when the Contrat d'Accueil et d'Intégration (CAI) was generalized

CALO – Commissie Allochtone Leerlingen in het Onderwijs, Committee for Immigrant Minority Pupils in Education (in English), in the Netherlands

CLAP Comité de liaison pour l'alphabétisation et la promotion, NGO umbrella since 1967 in France

CLRAE - Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe

¹See in http://www.ofii.fr/qui_sommes-nous_46/notre_histoire_22.html (last seen December 2012)

CDU - Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, Christian Democratic Union of Germany (in English)

CEFR - Common European Framework of Reference for Languages

CLA - Classes d'Accueil, Introductory Classes of French second language in lower secondary (in English), by the French national education

CLIN - Classe d'initiation pour non-francophones, Preparatory Courses in primary school (in English), by the French national education

DGESCO - Direction générale de l'enseignement scolaire, in France

DGLFLF - Delegation générale à la langue française et aux langues de France, Ministry of culture since 1996

ECHR - European Convention on Human Rights

ELCO - Enseignement des langues et cultures d'origine, one form of IMLI in France

FAS - Fonds d'Action Sociale pour les travailleurs musulmans d'Algérie en métropole et pour leur famille, public institution created in 1958 in France

FASILD - Fonds d'Action et de Soutien pour l'Intégration et la Lutte contre les Discriminations, actually FAS since 2001 in France

FDL - Formation à Dominante Linguistique, language policy from 1975 in France

FLE - Français Langue Etrangère, French as a foreign language (in English), training offered in public and private institutions, for professional reasons

FLP - Français langue professionnelle, training offered in public and private institutions in France for worker who are French native speakers and non-French native speakers.

FLS - Français langue seconde, French as second language (in English), training offered in public and private institutions in France for integration reasons

FOS - Français sur objectifs spécifiques, as FLE but applied only to workers and university public

FGR - Federal Republic of Germany (in English)- Bundesrepublik Deutschlan (BRD, in German)

GDR - German Democratic Republic (in English) - Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, in German)

HALDE - Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l'égalité, High Authority for the Struggle Against Discrimination and for Equality (in English), created in 2005

HC- Haut Conseil à l'intégration, 1991-2010, in France

HLI- Home Language Instruction, one form of IMLI in the Netherlands

IMLI - Immigrant Minority Language Instruction

ISCED - the International Standard Classification of Education, developed by UNESCO

KMK - Kultusministerkonferenz, the assembly of ministers for education of each state in Germany (in English), founded in 1948 in Germany

LV - Langues Vivantes, modern language programs from the French Ministry of Education

MTI - Mother Tongue Instruction, one form of IMLI in the Netherlands

NGO – Non-Governmental Organizations

OALT - Onderwijs in Allochtone Levende, Education in Living Ethnic Languages or Minority language Teaching (in English), substitute OECT, a form of IMLI in the Netherlands

OECD- The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OECT - Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur, Own language and culture teaching (in English), a form of IMLI in the Netherlands

OFII - Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration, substitutes ANAEM in 2009, in France

PEN - Worldwide Association of Writers, founded in London in 1921

PISA - Programme for International Student Assessment, of the OECD

SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Social Democratic Party of Germany (in English).

UNESCO - The United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture

VVD - Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie , People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (in English), in the Netherlands

WBO - Wet op het Basisonderwijs the Primary Education Act (in English) of 1985, in the Netherlands

WIN – Wet inburgering nieuwkomers Law on integration for newcomers (in English), 1998 in the Netherlands

WRR - Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Scientific Council for Government Policy (in English), since 1972 in the Netherlands

WVO - Wet Voortgezet Onderwijs, Secondary Education Act (in English), in the Netherlands

ZEP - Zones d'éducation prioritaire, Priority Education Zones programme (in English), introduced in France in early 1980s

VBO - Voorbereidend Middelbaar Beroepsonderwijs, technical and vocational education (in English), changing in 1999 to VMBO, in the Netherlands

MAVO - Middelbaar algemeen voortgezet onderwijs, lower general education (in English), in the Netherlands

HAVO - hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs, higher general education (in English), in the Netherlands

VWO - Voorbereidend wetenschappelijk onderwijs, pre-university education (in English), in the Netherlands

Introduction

Main research aims

In recent decades, Western European cities have experienced increasing cultural diversity due to families of immigrant origin. Individuals' language patterns have been the centre of much debate, in relation to concerns about social integration or the impact of language diversity in official monolingual contexts. For those of immigrant origin, the main expectation has been to assimilate through the use of the host language, even at home. Thus, second/host/national language skills are perceived as the main prerequisite for socioeconomic mobility and associated with a greater sense of belonging and participating in society.

However, understanding the social role of language for the descendants of immigrants is a complex challenge. Increasing awareness of the linguistic consequences of immigration phenomena has led researchers to pay greater attention to the diversity of language dynamics. Attention has been drawn to questions about language beyond the accumulation of educational capital and opportunities in the labour market, such as its importance as a tool for family cohesion and subjective feelings of belonging to groups in socially unequal societies. In this context, in recent times migration studies research has been showing a growing sensitivity to the social and historical complexity of different languages and minority language groups, alongside accounts from other scientific fields.

The foremost interdisciplinary inputs have been those from linguistic and psycholinguistic studies. Studies in these fields have extensively demonstrated that competent bilingualism strengthens individuals' cognitive development, allowing them to acquire further abilities and skills. Such considerations necessarily call into question the pursuit of language assimilation as the most successful outcome for those of minority language background, whose background offers them considerable bi- or plurilingual potential. However, sociolinguistic inputs from these fields have also helped to develop the understanding that the cognitive advantages of competent bilingualism are not a straightforward story. Instead, the claimed advantages are dependent on an individual's linguistic socialization experiences, i.e., on the combination of linguistic and non-linguistic factors that play a role from childhood onward. Only on the basis of this combination is it possible to explain, on one hand, individuals' successful or unsuccessful acquisition of uni-, bi- or plurilingual competences, and on the

other hand, not only individuals' acquisition of a language, but its utility for them and their linguistic self-esteem in relation to it.

Taking the above considerations as its starting point, this study aimed to investigate the management of language diversity among the descendants of Turkish immigrants in six cities and three countries (Paris and Strasbourg in France, Berlin and Frankfurt in Germany, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands). Germany, the Netherlands and France were the main destination countries for "classical" labor migrants from Turkey: currently more than 3 million individuals of Turkish origin live in the three countries combined. Today the descendants of Turkish immigrants in these three countries are in the phase of the transition to adulthood—finishing their educational careers, entering the labour market and starting to form families. Each country has had distinct integration and educational policies since their parents migrated, which have involved variable degrees and types of recognition of language diversity. Indeed, previous studies have shown that the management of immigrant language diversity has been a major issue in terms of integration policies in Germany and the Netherlands, and particularly for individuals' of Turkish origin, while being less so in France. Like many other groups of descendants of immigrants, Turkish descendants in these three countries have shown a trend toward language assimilation. However, this has taken place in the context of distinct language patterns that reflect country differences, with notably a higher prevalence of problematic language outcomes in Germany compared to the other two countries.

For my study, I used data from The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) survey, a project launched in 2003 to study the descendants of Turkish immigrants living in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Each sample included about 500 individuals aged between 18 and 35 years, who were born in these countries and were living in one of the two cities in each of these countries, and either one or both of whose parents had been born in Turkey. The TIES data provide information concerning respondents in each country and city both in childhood and at the time of the survey. I applied both descriptive and logistic regression analysis to search for city, country, and overall patterns. Control variables included demographic factors, socio-economic background, objective and subjective school variables, indicators on linguistic starting points, current language dynamics in the family, and other language contact variables (such as visits to Turkey and origins of main peers).

I took a sociological approach to the use of self-reported language proficiency in early adulthood as an indicator of linguistic self-esteem (Bourdieu, 1991; Fishman 1991; Brizić, 2006; Norton, 2006). Individuals' self-reported proficiency in different skills (reading, speaking and writing) was taken here as reflecting not only individuals' mastery of linguistic tools, but the corresponding form of linguistic self-esteem. The average index of the different self-reported proficiencies in each language was interpreted as an indicator of individuals' general linguistic self-esteem in this language. The combination of the average indices in the national language and in the respondents' parents' native language yielded a bilingual profile—understood, again, in terms of linguistic self-esteem.

Approaching reported language outcomes as a consequence of collective processes, I aimed to understand the extent to which linguistic self-esteem in each of the three countries was associated to other variables, both linguistic and non-linguistic. I first analyzed respondents' linguistic starting point through indicators of parents' linguistic capital and the respondents' childhood language environment; second, I assessed current language dynamics, through language uses in the family; and third, I used other variables as indirect indicators of individuals' language contact opportunities, specifically those related to social background and to the city where individuals' grew up and currently live, with a particular focus on school experiences.

A first glance at the TIES data showed that a large proportion of Turkish descendants reported the expected dominance of the survey country national language over the parents' native language. Many did not develop the bi- or plurilingual competences that they could theoretically have inherited from their parents. This loss was reflected by language uses with younger generations in the family (i.e., with siblings), slightly less for reported linguistic self-esteem, and considerably less in language uses with parents, as expected. However, this unfolded differently in each country.

For instance, while in France the degree of Turkish parents' acculturation in the national language was the lowest, two paradoxical acculturation trends emerged in the reports of Turkish descendants: while this was the group of respondents with the highest reported rate of national language acculturation for language uses with siblings, in terms of linguistic self-esteem they also showed the highest rate of competent bilingualism. In contrast, German data presented a pattern of language acculturation in both parents and respondents. This was more

evident in Frankfurt than Berlin, and was observed for indicators such as parents' reported proficiency in the national language, respondents' childhood language in the family, current language uses with siblings, and, to a lesser extent, current language uses with parents. Thus, compared to the other countries, Turkish descendants in Germany reported lower linguistic self-esteem in their parents' native language, but also in German. In the Netherlands, parents' degree of acculturation in the national language was in between in France and in Germany, while many Turkish descendants reported language assimilation. These observations suggested the possibility of a high degree of language shift in this country. However, respondents in the Netherlands also showed the lowest degree of language assimilation in terms of language use with siblings, particularly in Rotterdam.

Starting from these observations, I proposed to pursue five aims in the present study. First, to explore patterns of language dynamics for Turkish descendants in the three countries; second, to examine the influence of the survey country context and individuals' social background on these dynamics; third, to disentangle different linguistic starting positions and their implications; fourth, to understand which current family dynamics most influence individuals' bilingual profiles; and, last but not least, to assess the main factors behind potential risks related to Turkish descendants' linguistic integration in society. The main research questions can be reformulated as follows:

- Are the patterns of language acquisition and maintenance among descendants of Turkish immigrants in the countries and cities of the TIES similar?
- What are the main patterns of intergenerational language acculturation in the family that can be observed among Turkish descendants and their immigrant parents?
- What are the main factors associated to significant language shifts over the course of one generation and, inversely, to immigrant descendants' successful acquisition of their parents' native language?
- What are the main social dynamics that most distinguish competent bilingual profiles from those of linguistically assimilated and limited-bilingual individuals?

Data, method and sample design in the TIES project

The data used was collected by The Integration of the European Second Generation project (TIES), an international research project on the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia, and Morocco in fifteen European cities in eight countries. The general objective of the TIES project was to create the first European dataset of more than 10,000 respondents

focusing on the transition to adulthood of the descendants of migrants in relation to questions of integration, such as economic, social, educational, religion and identity.

The criteria chosen for the TIES project to define the standardized survey were the following:

a) To include respondents from fifteen cities for the eight countries, namely: Paris and Strasbourg in France, Berlin and Frankfurt in Germany, Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Madrid and Barcelona in Spain, Vienna and Linz in Austria, Brussels and Antwerp in Belgium, Zurich and Basel in Switzerland, and Stockholm in Sweden; b) To provide, for each city, at least two groups of 250 interviewees aged between 18 and 35 years, born in the survey country, and having had their entire education there. The TIES survey targeted the descendants of immigrants with the aim of reducing differences between the opportunities available to individuals in different countries due to the history of their parents' migration and culture of origin, while emphasizing the impact of aspects of the city context, such as school experiences. There were two groups of descendants of immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands and Belgium, and of Turkish and ex-Yugoslavian origin in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. In Sweden and France the focus was on Turkish origin respondents, and in Spain on the descendants of Moroccan immigrants; c) Finally, to provide a control group comparison of individuals from the same age group as the descendants of immigrants whose parents were both born in the survey country.

The Dutch sample became available in 2007 and the French and the German samples in 2008, and the fieldwork was organized in a different way in each of the survey countries. Until very recently, France had no statistical data that could be used to describe and analyze the descendants of Turkish immigrants, because information on parents' country of birth was not collected because precluded by the law. Similarly, in Germany there were no available representative sampling frames. Of the three countries, only in the Netherlands was it possible to use municipal population registers as sampling frames. For these reasons, the framing for each country's fieldwork was different. An onomastic procedure based on telephone directories was used to build the sample frame for the fieldwork in France and Germany. In France both Turkish descendants and control group respondents were identified on the basis of postcode areas in each city. The probabilities were proportional to the number of Turkish and French names listed as residents, and the list was updated to include potential respondents through telephone screening and via the snowball method. This resulted in a higher residential dispersion of both groups in Paris compared to Strasbourg. In Germany, the procedure was

different: simple random samples of 250 names, taken from the deduced sampling frames of names of each study group, were used. This reduced the chances that the respondents would come from the same neighbourhood. In the Netherlands, both the descendants of Turkish immigrants and comparison group were sampled in the same neighbourhood, through independent random samples of equal size, guided by the systematic selection method.

The structure of this thesis

This thesis is divided into three parts. Chapters 1 and 2 explore theoretical and political aspects of language diversity, the latter centered on the three countries under study here. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the social background and socio-demographic characteristics of the Turkish descendants in the TIES data. Chapters 5 and 6 present the analysis of language dynamics for Turkish descendants in the TIES data. The following paragraphs summarize each chapter individually in more detail.

In Chapter 1, I aim to understand the relevance of linguistic phenomena such as language shift, language maintenance and limited bilingualism for the descendants of immigrants: not only the accumulation of “human capital” in the form of linguistic skills, cognitive abilities, and educational and professional capital, but also the importance of functionally differentiated multilingualism in unequal societies. To this end, I aim to demonstrate that language dynamics are social practices both embedded in and resulting from specific socio-historical conditions, as part of a broader discussion on minority language groups that evokes a large field of domains of study that have contributed to the current state of understanding on language in migration studies. I survey the various schools of thought in fields that have influenced research on language in migration studies, with three aims: first, to understand why different approaches sometimes appear to be highly contradictory; second, to show that the development of assimilation, acculturation and pluralist approaches in social sciences parallels, and is sometimes directly linked with, the evolution of language studies research; and third, to present and discuss the main concepts used and their relation to this study.

Chapter 2 discusses the management of linguistic diversity in France, Germany and the Netherlands, while assessing the status of different languages, and particularly Turkish, as immigrant minority languages. This discussion unfolds in three steps: first, a description of the existing variety of bilingual or plurilingual individuals within these three officially

monolingual countries; second, an examination of the recognition of language diversity from a top-down perspective, in the framework of international debates and official documents of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union; third, a survey of national approaches to cultural diversity. The final part identifies commonalities and differences between the three countries in terms of national language policies and immigrant minority language teaching, highlighting the place of the Turkish language and the enrolment of descendants of Turkish immigrants in immigrant language trainings.

In Chapter 3 I focus on the family background of Turkish descendants in the TIES data, comparing Turkish parents to those of control group respondents. The Turkish parents migrated mainly during the last phase of guest worker recruitment (1970 onwards), a period of X migration recruitment, when social networks from certain regions in Turkey were gaining ground in Turkish immigration inflows to Europe. Compared to the first phase of guest worker recruitment, the profiles of these parents were more diverse in terms of academic and professional qualifications, regional origins, previous work experience and birth cohorts. Finally, analyses indicated that Turkish parents in France brought more advantageous educational capital from Turkey, whose transferability led to a high level of participation in the labour market in France (particularly among mothers), but brought few advantages in terms of professional opportunities when compared to Turkish parents in the Netherlands, being more similar to those of the parents in Germany, the lowest educated.

Chapter 4 focuses on Turkish descendants' life trajectories, such as access to citizenship and school experiences, as well as the main cornerstones of transition to adulthood, such as leaving the parental home and partner choices, and initial indicators on individuals' labour market participation. These domains are interpreted here in terms of social mobility—comparing individuals of Turkish immigrant background in the three countries to those of non-immigrant origin, taking into account social class as well as individuals' birth cohort and gender. This chapter also examines school experiences, first describing each country's educational system, and, in a second step, trying to understand the respective influence of social background and school institutional arrangements on the educational trajectories and attainment of respondents. A descriptive analysis indicated that the social contrast in terms of school and labour market achievement between Turkish descendants in Germany and their control counterparts was smaller than in France or the Netherlands, but that they lag behind in terms of school attainment and occupational skills in country comparisons. Analysis of

predictive effects on school attainment pointed to the greater importance of social background and origin, as well as of specific school variables, in Germany compared to the other countries.

Chapter 5 looks in detail at the management of language diversity in Turkish immigrant families in France, Germany and the Netherlands using the TIES data, investigating parents' linguistic capital, childhood language in the family, self-reported linguistic self-esteem and current language uses. This chapter has two main aims: to determine, first, how language has shifted between generations in the three countries, and second, how the observed language shifts can be understood in terms of individuals' social background and socio-demographic characteristics. The findings clearly suggest that language diversity among descendants of Turkish immigrants has been a major issue in Germany and the Netherlands, while this has been less true in France.

Chapter 6 focuses on Turkish descendants' opportunities to acquire and maintain both their parents' native language and the survey country national language, within and outside the family. I focus first on patterns of intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family; second, on the comparison between various language exposure factors, which reflect various opportunities for contact with parents' native and national languages. The conclusions of this chapter highlight that Turkish descendants are more likely to report competent bilingualism in the case of bicultural family attitudes rather than assimilation practices, i.e., in cases where individuals' national language acquisition is combined with the use of the parents' native language as the main tool for family communication. Beyond these patterns, significant country differences reflected different sociolinguistic dynamics, wherein the main factors were linguistic starting points, social background, and school experiences.

The conclusion summarizes the main sociolinguistic dynamics that may explain the observed country and city differences. First, the status of language diversity among descendants of Turkish immigrants as clearly a major issue in Germany and the Netherlands (but less so in France); second, the fact that the co-existence of two or more languages in the family of origin, both during childhood and currently, negatively affects immigrant descendants' chances of learning their parents' native language(s), while increasing the gap between their levels of self-esteem in different languages; third, that a monolingual family environment had

positive effects on Turkish descendants' general linguistic self-esteem, increasing the likelihood of competent bilingualism; finally, a bi- or plurilingual family environment with parents had positive effects on Turkish descendants' linguistic self-esteem where family language dynamics were shown to be associated to parents' linguistic capital—namely parents' educational attainment and proficiency in the national language. Otherwise, the evidence surveyed here confirms the view that when the level of linguistic capital provided to parents by their own linguistic socialization experiences is low, a monolingual family environment for their children is preferable, to avoid an increased risk of limited bilingualism, i.e., of low proficiency in any language.

Chapter 1 - Language as a process of social change

1.1. Understanding the role of language in migration studies research

Language is a key issue in debates on the integration of individuals of immigrant origin, who have often been expected to assimilate through the use of the host language, even at home. This was required for a few generations for immigrants starting at the beginning of the twentieth century, as well as for those who settled in European countries during the late twentieth century, and whose range of mother tongues and social backgrounds was more diverse (Fishman, 1989; Alba and Nee, 2003; Esser, 2006). Indeed, it is hard to refute that “inequalities in terms of access to education, income, central institutions, societal recognition and social contact are significantly, although not exclusively, determined by linguistic competence in the relevant national language.” (Esser, 2006: i-ii). This is equivalent to saying that for those of immigrant origin, second/“host”/national language skills are a “prerequisite for socioeconomic mobility” (in Bean, and Stevens, 2003:143) and likely associated with a greater sense of belonging and participating in society.

In addition, at various moments in history, fears that the retention of foreign languages, or plurilingual skills, would provoke important social disruption in countries with official linguistic homogeneity have repeatedly arisen—notwithstanding the fact that linguists, psychologists, psycholinguists and sociolinguists have been systematically demonstrating since the 1960s, that bilingual education results in significant cognitive advantages. Regardless of this scientific fact, empirical data continue to show also that native bilingualism remains quite exceptional, and that the those of immigrant origin inevitably develop a dominant proficiency in the national language (since Park, 1928). Others, such as Lieberman et al. (1975) argue that this trend turns societies into “a cemetery of languages at high costs to the immigrants’ heritage.”² In 1966 Fishman was one of the first to outline patterns of language loss across generations through a sociolinguistic approach (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001:114, August and Hakuta, 2005) often in one generation, showing that while immigrants mainly tend to demonstrate an instrumental (language) acculturation, the language uses of their children show a highly functional separation: speaking the national language at school and in the labour market, and

² Cited from Lieberman et al. (1975) international comparative research, emphasized that the transition to monolingualism in the heart of families with a migrant origin *is so swift* and the disappearance of foreign languages *so thorough*, focusing lately in the United States, in Portes and Rumbaut (2001), “Lost in translation. Language and new second génération,” pp.114

parental languages at home. Thus, already in the space of a single generation it is common to observe a limited bilingualism that leads to use the national language as the home language with the composition of new family units. For the grandchildren of immigrants, proficiency in their grandparents' native language is lost in most cases, since it is supported neither outside nor inside the home. Thus, monolingualism among individuals of immigrant background is expected from the third generation—a phenomenon that, although it is not new, appears to be taking place much more rapidly today (Fillmore, 2005). In addition, language assimilation has been perceived as a political aim and almost as an anachronic phenomenon. Nonetheless, a smoother pace of transition from minority language use toward language assimilation over the generations is seen in some cases. This has been further explained by specific combinations of diverse individual and contextual factors (Rumbaut, Massey and Bean 2006: 447-460, Esser, 2006:ii; Fishman and Terry, 1969, Fillmore 2005).

Understanding the social role of language for descendants of immigrants is a complex challenge. First of all, because language practices are social practices both embedded in and resulting from specific socio-historical conditions, which necessarily need to be taken account (Bourdieu, 1991; Lahire, 2005). Second, language acquisition and practices are part of a broader discussion on minority language groups, be they of immigrant, foreign, regional or other background, evoking a large field of domains of study (see chapter 2). Migration studies research has been showing a growing sensitivity to the social and historical complexity of different languages and minority language groups in recent times. Increasing awareness of the linguistic consequences of immigration phenomena has led researchers to give an increasing amount of attention to two main issues. First, in terms of human capital formation it is made through examinations of the importance of first and second languages in processes of cognitive development, language acquisition and educational achievement. Second, in more pluridimensional and interactional approaches those aim to describe the role of different languages, and their interrelations, in societies where languages are differently valued. The combination of these two main issues has shown that the social value of languages as “human capital” is not solely related to linguistic skills and cognitive abilities, but also to the importance of functionally differentiated multilingualism in society. It is clear that the pertinence of linguistic phenomena, particularly for descendants of immigrants, is related not only to the

accumulation of educational capital and opportunities in the labour market, but also to subjective feelings of belonging to groups in socially unequal societies.

In the following section, focus is given to the development of perspectives in social science on assimilation and acculturation processes for people of immigrant backgrounds, particularly the descendants of immigrants. This overview aims to survey the various schools of thought in other research areas that have influenced research on language in migration studies. This overview has a twofold aim: first, to understand why different approaches sometimes appear to be highly contradictory; and second, to show that the development of assimilation, acculturation and pluralist approaches in social sciences has paralleled, and sometimes been directly linked with, the evolution of language studies research.

1.2. Language as an interdisciplinary object of study in migration studies research

1.2.1. From assimilationist approaches to “ethnicity” as a form of social interaction in plural societies

*Into the crucible with you all!*³ or *We are all ethnic*⁴ ?

From the beginning of the 20th century until the 1960s, the assimilation of immigrants was perceived not only to be inevitable in the long term, but, tacitly, to be politically desirable. It reflected a liberal credo in the progress of individualism, with the main argument that assimilation allowed the individual to pursue a social destiny (achievement), while escaping from the constraints of group belonging and the fatality of legated status (ascription). Such approaches were also a product of the opposition between traditional and modern communities – the former built on traditional legacies and solidarity mechanisms, the latter based on cultural and political units that aimed precisely at individuals’ emancipation from traditional and inherited ascriptions.⁵ Underlying this dynamic was the emergence of the conception of modern societies and the birth of the social sciences

³ From Israel Zangwill (writer) novel , *Children of the Ghetto: A Study of a Peculiar People* (1892), describing the life of a Russian-Jewish immigrant family. Between 1908-1910 it was adapted for a Broadway play *The Melting Pot*, including a symphony called “The Crucible”, which expressed a world in which all ethnicity has melted away. “America is God's Crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and reforming... Germans and Frenchmen, Irishmen and Englishmen, Jews and Russians - into the Crucible with you all! God is making the American.”

⁴ Postulated by Everett and Hughes (1952), in Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 1995, pag 74-86.

⁵ Thus, recalling the classic oppositions between tradition and modernity, drifted from the Durkheimian distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, or Tönnies distinction between community and society, or even Weber's theory of rationalization Lapeyronnie 1993 pp.43. See also discussion in Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 1995, pag 70-74.

in Western Europe starting at the end of the 19th century.(Lapeyronnie,1993:31-32, 43) Both were linked to the postulate of industrial societies—the standardization of lifestyles and behaviours, aiming at a scientific and rational civilization that linked production to notions of efficiency and universalism, while demanding cultural secularization (understood here as the separation of state and religion). It thus implied some degree of conformity linking rational planning to social cohesion, in the form of more intimate connections between economy, social relations and social behaviour. (Lapeyronnie, 1993:31-32, 43) This was achieved through society-wide rational planning programs, such as the promotion of universal literacy, the standardization of language in unified education systems, certification of the labour market, and economic industrialization (Westin, 2010). Social politics and the welfare state were to serve as the most legitimate way to correct economic inequalities, making cultural specificities irrelevant. “La société qui se voit elle-même comme composée d’individus [the society that sees itself as composed of individuals]”⁶ was the kind of society that allowed nation-states to centralize decision-making processes, and that resulted in the production of “modern culture” (Lapeyronnie 1993:43), meaning a cultural homogeneity that responded to the requirements of industrial production and to illuminist ideals, centred on the individual citizen.

Particularly during the 1940s and 1950s, acculturation was assumed to apply to individuals of immigrant background: it was taken as an inevitable fact, and assimilation in general meant the disappearance of all minority groups. Four main analytical aspects of approaches in the social sciences are underlined here (Juteau, 1999; Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, 1995). First, that “socialisation” was approached as a process that assured the transmission and interiorization of norms, values and representations of society. Second, that “ethnicity,” measured as an independent variable, was perceived as having an effect on individual behaviour through socialization, capable of modifying the social system and being modified by it in turn (similar to age, sex and religion). Third, that society could absorb “new” or “different” elements without compromising its main structure, i.e., in a one-way progressive assimilationist trend, interpreted as a universal process.⁷ Fourth, that such assimilation occurred through occupational mobility, abilities and education, leading individuals to identify increasingly with class/status characteristics rather than ethnic ones; thus social

⁶citation from Louis Dumont 1966, French anthropologist that wrote on individualism in modern societies, in Lapeyronnie 1993 pp.31-32, 45

⁷ See discussion in Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 1995, pp. 70-74, making reference to Warner and Srole (1945), Francis (1947), Eisenstadt (1954), Broom and Kitsuse (1955), Borris (1959).

mobility was considered to be directly linked to individuals' degree of acculturation (seen as equivalent to the adoption of a pre-existing uniform culture), and this capacity to acculturate was validated by "mainstream" society. Among those responsible for the classical understanding of how immigrants and their offspring are incorporated into society were two Chicago School researchers, Park and Burgess (1921), who approached assimilation as a series of ultimately inevitable stages. The three main factors that favoured assimilation were: learning the language (facilitated by educational attainment and occupational mobility), urban de-segregation (from poor inner cities to suburban middle-class districts) and intermarriage.

However, these approaches took on two contradictory faces, in the form of two basic strategies adopted by nation-state models when faced with diversity: either altering borders, or altering people (Westin, 2010). Indeed, already in the core of early assimilationist approaches the inevitability of assimilation during the process of alteration is not taken for granted. Back at the beginning of the 20th century, Park himself, along with Stonequist, approached immigration phenomena as an issue of cultural conflict.⁸ By definition, for these authors, immigrants experience a crossing of "frontiers" between different cultural norms, behaviours and practices, leading them into a stage of suffering from insecure identities that can weaken their capacity to achieve structural incorporation. Based on this stage, Park and Stonequist proposed the concept of a dual-natured "marginal man" who is simultaneously a "disturbing element" of the existing social order and a "crucial element" for societal change.⁹ The nature of their potential as social change elements was also dual, related not only to individual emancipation (here in the sense of changing from the state of "immigrant" to the state of "individual," while experiencing a loss of "cultural differences or contrasts") but also to societal individualism (as described above, in the modern state's approach).¹⁰ Stonequist further suggested a "marginal man life-cycle," including different scenarios from this cultural conflict. For instance, when there was a

⁸ Clear example of this is Stonequist classical study of migrant marginality, incorporating Durkheim concept of "anomie," later reformulated by Merton in his study of social roots of deviance – presenting a more negative view on acculturation. See discussion also in Westin, Charles (2010), pp.51

⁹ In Stonequist (1935) pag 10. For urban sociologists from the Chicago school, it was developed a dynamic conception of the actor embedded in the symbolic interactionism of their works, further combined with a structuralist focus of the individuals processes of integration. Their main innovation was the configuration of the cities in ecological terms, wherein the conception of *assimilation* was the last phase of ethnic and racial relations, after *competition*, *conflict* and *adaptation*. Although not conceptualizing the destruction of minority cultures when adapting to the hosting society, this approach implied degrees of structural assimilation, particularly determinant for specific ethnic groups who were not considered to be able to survive structural assimilation. See discussion in Juteau 1999, pp.7-23.

¹⁰ The "marginal man" "appeared (as) a new type of personality, namely, a cultural hybrid (...) not quite accepted, because of racial prejudice, in the new society in which he now sought to find a place. He was a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies, which never completely interpenetrated and fused. Further, it is in the mind of the marginal man – where the changes and fusions of culture are going on – that we can best study the processes of civilization and progress. (...) the effect of mobility and migration is to secularize relations which were formerly sacred. One may describe the process, in its dual aspect, perhaps, as the secularization of society and the individuation of the person," in Park (1928), pp. 892-893, and 888.

questioning of the social equality assumed under the assimilation view, individuals could resist adaptation and a new “social category” could then emerge, running against initial expectations of assimilation. The cultural conflict was then transformed into a social conflict, and attempts to reverse existing social positions resulted.¹¹ The role of language was seen as determinant in this context, because it unveiled the lack of a shared system of symbols between those of immigrant and non-immigrant background—thus the evident lack of communicative skills and language (in)abilities that hinder societal change and adjustment from all sides.¹² Descendants of immigrants, on this type of view, found themselves in between two (almost) non-communicative cultures, risking becoming a “lost generation,” stuck in a “marginality” of a different type from the one experienced by their parents, now structural.

Thus, the dissonant faces of modern nation-states had called attention since earlier times. But it was not before the late 1950s that the debate came to the heart of social interactionism, where ethnicity and culture were less perceived as subject to straightforward assimilative trends. “Ethnicity” was approached by the latter not just as a belonging to a group of origin which influenced individuals’ behaviour. It was also perceived as a continuous process of dichotomy, distinguishing members and outsiders (*us* and *others*), expressed and validated mainly in social interactions (Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, 1995:123 - 132.) In addition, the relation between ethnicity and social change was re-interpreted in the context of macrosocial processes (such as colonisation, urbanisation, and migration). This was largely a consequence of the aftermath of the WWII, when a new assumption of human equality emerged, a process within which Kymlicka (2010), among others, distinguished three waves: 1) decolonization, 1947-1965; 2) struggle against racial segregation and discrimination, e.g. the African-American civil rights movements, 1955-65; and 3) struggle for multiculturalism and minority rights, emerging in the late 1960s.¹³ Concomitantly, three patterns of multiculturalism

¹¹ “introduction to the two cultures, crisis and adjustment. If the group increases, the movement develops a goal some kind of equality and independence – the final outcome may be a new social framework. If assimilation is facilitated, the minority may be incorporated into the dominant group, or become the dominant group, and the cycle ends.” In Stonequist (1935), pp 893.

¹² “Is it not clear that the immigrant who left his home culture and is not yet assimilated into the new situation may, if he encounters an unfriendly attitude, become a marginal man? (...) if not the immigrant, then the children of immigrants – the second generation – frequently are in this position. This is likely to happen when the children adopt, as they readily do, the new culture more rapidly than their parents, and when the culture of the latter stands in sharp contrast with that of the new land.” In Stonequist (1935), pp1,8

¹³ For instance, the new waves of largely non-European immigrants to USA by then, ushered in by changes in the immigration law in 1965, or the civic rights movements and general political mobilization of “America’s racial minorities”, and still, although to a less extent, the permanent symbolic ethnic attachment among individuals whose family background was intimately related to the European immigration in the turn of the XIX to 20th century (Waters, 1990, preface). In general, it was an epoch of conflicts and reinvidications labeled as “ethnic” issues, in all kind of societies in the world, that were supposedly more or less pluralistic or cultural homogenous. For instances, the regionalisms movements in France and United Kingdom, the linguistics conflict in Canada and Belgium, the nationality issues in Eastern Europe, the tribalism upraises in Africa. See also Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 1995.

emerged in the Western democracies: 1) the empowerment of indigenous peoples; 2) new forms of autonomy and power-sharing for sub-state national groups; and 3) new forms of multicultural citizenship for immigrant groups. In the three cases, language was perceived as an important tool, leading to further support for public funding for minority language, bilingual, or mother-tongue instruction (Kymlicka, 2010). In Western Europe, where labour migration happened just before, the “problem of integrating” postcolonial, labour, and new settler immigrants, and especially for their offspring, emerged more concretely beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, in the context of this postwar discourse of liberalism and human rights (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). They argued that the notion of integration was first applied as “intransitive”: immigrants were presented as subjects of freely willed integration, for which the state can at best set the parameters but never guarantee a specific result; second, there was no need for immigrants to acculturate (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). Thus, approaches moved away from the assumptions of cultural assimilation and one homogenous majority population in Western states, relating social movements of the 1960s to cultural liberalism and the subsequent explosion of “life-style enclaves” and “individualization.” Such changes contributed significantly to disturbing the previous conceptions on the part of both researchers and the actors themselves. At the same time that an “academic industry of ethnicity” emerged,¹⁴ the postulate “We are all ethnic,” presented by Everett and Hughes (1952), summed up the change in perspective to one where, although some groups would progressively become structurally integrated, individuals were not assumed to give up their ethnic identity (Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, 1995: 74-86).

Among the pluralist approaches, we find the primordialists, who, like at the beginning of the twentieth century, essentialized ethnic organization at the same level as other forms of social groups. They clearly stressed the importance of language acquisition as a unique form of socialization into a linguistic, cultural and ethnic community, as well as a vehicle for group cohesion and the creation of strong bonds of identification with others. Others—instrumentalists, constructivists and situationists—saw it differently, viewing ethnicity as constructed for instrumental reasons—political, economical or other. Adopting both interactionist and situationist approaches, Barth (1969) interpreted ethnicity as a social category that creates boundaries but is validated only through social interaction, presenting language as an extremely selective tool to be judged as a “type of person” but socially than

¹⁴Like the creation of the specialized review “Ethnicity” in 1974, as well the production of an impressive number of works. For more details on this period, see Basham and De Groot 1977 and the Rinaudo et al. 1991, in Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 1995.

culturally (Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, 1995). Thus, for Barth, cultural features such as language have, first of all, a contextual meaning, which is lost outside the field of relations wherein they are organized.

This notion of constructed boundaries is currently perceived as one of the main characteristics of contemporary more globalized societies, not only defining the frontiers between territories, but distinguishing insiders and outsiders within the same system. Within these boundaries, there are two pillars of society's social cohesion: demands for "equality of conditions" combined with claims of respect for individual and groups differences. These two pillars present two further main causalities in more open societies (Lapeyronnie, 1993): one of an economic nature—as national economies are incorporated into a globalized economy, social mobility becomes more determined by an external environment and international competition; and another (more central for the present study) whose nature is cultural—in the same globalized context, the development of culture takes a double direction, being simultaneously more internationalized and more individualized (Lapeyronnie, 1993:47-61). This double evolution of "culture" redefines the boundaries between individuals inside and outside the same society, while also redefining the individual's role in society, as well as that of the societal structure in the lives of individuals. For some, this dual nature became a source for the construction of individuality and the affirmation of a radical subjectivity, (Lapeyronnie, 1993: 47-61) for others the emergence of a post-industrial and post-national society (Westin, 2010:33).

Moreover, with increasingly individualized concepts of culture, contemporary Western societies began a new questioning of the early pillars of national belonging—i.e., civic belonging (citizenship issues independent of cultural specificities, on the basis of universalist value claims) and ethnic belonging (one history, one culture, one language, in Bourhis, Barrette et Moriconi, 2008). There has been an emerging awareness that existing ethnic diversity has been incorporated asymmetrically, (Lapeyronnie, 1993; Westin, 2010). as the "cultural integration" and "socio-economic integration" of different individuals or groups have been systematically demonstrated not to be equivalent. In some cases, the cultural integration of the children of immigrants has developed much faster than their structural integration, as they have adopt the common lifestyle much faster than they have been able to achieve parity in terms of educational attainment or employment opportunities.

In other cases the reverse has been observed, with descendants of immigrants attaining socio-economic positions similar to members without such a recent immigrant background without abandoning key aspects of their identificational and cultural references, such as language. Such findings have promoted further perceptions that different ethnic minority groups are characterized by specific and distinctive experiences of social stratification (e.g., integration policies in the Netherlands and Germany during the 1990s, see chapter 3).

It is precisely this separation between “economy” and “culture” that has been evoked when aiming to disentangle several stages in the socialization experiences of the descendants of immigrants, and to explain the systematically observed ethnic asymmetry of society’s ethnic incorporation. More recent approaches to this separation have further contributed to the undeniable mobilization of public support for assimilation claims, (Lapeyronnie, 1993:47-61) and to the rapid re-emergence of the four benchmarks of assimilation patterns from the early 20th century Chicago School (Waters and Jiménez, 2005). These are: *marriage patterns*, *socioeconomic status* (SES, educational attainment, occupation specialization and parity in earnings), *spatial concentration* (dissimilarity in spatial distribution and of suburbanization) and *language assimilation* (language ability and loss of mother language). Joppke and Morawska (2002) have further added that in relation to cultural communities, liberal immigrant-receiving states have always shown a lesser inclination toward pluralism with respect to language, because states have less space for linguistic pluralism, and language assimilation has been perceived as more compatible with liberal values. Moreover, and particularly around the turn of the millennium, political and public debates have tended to more openly highlight the “delicate” relations between cultural diversity and social cohesion, particularly focusing on issues of social order and security. Thus, recent approaches can be summarized by three premises (Vertovec and Weseendorf, 2010): a) that multiculturalism fosters accentuated or preserved cultural differences; b) that such differences lead to communal separateness and threaten social cohesion; and c) that separateness deepens socio-economic differences (the balance of blame between the system and the individual), thus leading to the breakdown of social relations and providing an incubator for extremism and possible terrorism—all with some blame laid on immigrants themselves.

Recently, a range of approaches to these paradoxes has emerged. For instance, Portes and Zhou (1993) proposed a “segmented assimilation theory,” analyzing the observed paradoxes while conceptualizing different forms of incorporation for those of immigrant origin. Thus, for these authors, assimilation always occurs, but its patterns are different in different cases: sometimes classic upward mobility into the mainstream, sometimes downward assimilation into the underclass, and sometimes within ethnic enclaves that are used to maximize returns on social and cultural capital in the form of “ethnic resources” (including language) in terms of socio-economic mobility. Other authors, from the emergent “self-segregation” or “glass ceiling” approaches, inverted this perspective on ethnic enclaves, suggesting that they represent a coercive and forced form of ethnic segregation (Westin, 2010). They argued that discrimination and racism at both personal and social levels lead to the reinforcement of ethnic ties and support for forms of ethnic institutional mobilization. Many others, such as Alba and Nee (2003), follow current assimilationist approaches, arguing instead that individuals of immigrant background become indistinguishable across the spectrum of social inequalities and over the course of few generations; or others, such as Brubaker (2002), add to this two broader senses of assimilation: first, different groups become more similar, and second, acculturation leads to the complete absorption of one group into another, but through two-way assimilation. The next section aims to show that the development of assimilationist, acculturationist and pluralist approaches in social sciences has in each case been concomitant to, and sometimes gone hand in hand with, developments in language studies.

1.2.2. Language diversity in the family as a consequence of immigration phenomena and acculturation processes

Language in both reception and production can, bluntly, be a killer.
(Giles and Coupland, 1990:37)

Since the end of the 1950s, anthropologists, linguists and sociolinguists have called our attention to the sensitivity of language to social hierarchy, and its consequences at the individual level.¹⁵ Today, the social value of languages is known to be related not only to linguistic skills and cognitive abilities, but also to the functional differentiation of

¹⁵ see discussion and introduction on Ferguson 1959, Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner and Fillenbaum (1960), and Anisfeld, Bogo and Lambert (1961), Fishman 1969, Gumperz 1982 or Preston 1989. in Achard (1993), also In August and Hakuta (2005) pp. 233-245. Important here is the authors’ “switch-coding” concept, also Myers-Scotton 1993, and Fishman (1972), discussion in Negadi negadi, m.(2007); and Maas and Mehelem 2003 in Esser (2006) and in Norton, B. (2006).

the role of specific languages in human societies. Thus, understanding the linguistic consequences of immigration has implied increasing attention to more pluri-dimensional and interactional approaches.

Recent research on human capital has demonstrated that individuals' investment in first and second languages are strategies to acquire both knowledge and symbolic and material resources to increase their cultural capital. To this end, individuals define strategies, in the family or individually, aiming at a "good" return on their investment, in general meaning access to unattainable resources, and when justified, to gains in the form of social mobility. Here, upward social mobility is intrinsically associated to language assimilation, and some forms of cultural capital have a higher exchange value in relation to a set of social forms (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). These social constraints determine, on one hand, existing opportunities for acquisition, practice and socialization in each language; on the other hand, they also influence the motivations of individuals and groups, and their attitudes when transmitting, learning, using, and changing languages. Consequently, individuals' strategies, emotional ties, and perceptions of belonging in relation to different languages depend on contextual particularities beyond simply notions of language utility (Norton, 2000). That said, strategies of monolingualism or language assimilation are more a matter of constrained choice than of cognitive development and linguistic dynamics.

Existing studies on language among the children of immigrants share the aforementioned concerns, but propose distinct approaches. One of the principal points of disagreement is the main focus of this chapter: the relevance given to the non-linguistic factors that influence linguistic socialization experiences and that influence the (un)transferability of acquired and accumulated human capital, such as language, within the family. A large number of studies depart from assimilationist approaches (e.g., second language acquisition theory). These studies take a particular interest in second language acquisition (or the national language of the country where the children of immigrants were born), with a secondary and complementary focus on individuals' first language (usually, parents' native language). Because they link individuals' language proficiency to "bread-and-butter issues," framed by the relationship between socio-economic success, social contact and (socio-spatial) segregation dynamics, they emphasize the need for linguistic acculturation to overcome unequal opportunities, with primary attention to the role of individuals. Moreover,

because of the fear that retaining an immigration-related language over a number of generations may promote more segregation or social disruption than emancipation, or simply have a limited effect on their educational or labour careers, they give little further attention to the loss of these languages. Consequently, often these authors do not support bilingual education policies, because they do not consider it to be a central issue.

For instance, analytical frameworks such as Chiswick and Miller's (2001), Portes and Schauffler (1996), Portes and Rumbaut (2001); Esser (2006), Casey and Dustmann (2005) have studied the linguistic consequences of immigration as a result mainly of language contact and acculturation orientations. Centred on the increasing influence of the linguistic socialization experiences of descendants of immigrants in educational and labour market systems, and competent bilingualism leans more on proficiency in their parents' native language and less on their proficiency in the national language. Thus, for them, exposure and incentive factors are expected to work more efficiently in favour of the acquisition of the national language than those that promote the acquisition of minority languages, particularly factors of non-linguistic nature and outside the home. For this reason, individuals with a minority language background are expected to experience rapid national language acculturation in relation to proficiency, uses and preference. Only when there is significant immigrant replenishment, or a concentrated immigrant population, or when the parents' native language is socially valued (particularly when parents possess sufficient (recognized) resources for efficient language transmission create more institutional and relational opportunities), are language shifts over the course of generations likely to take place more slowly, and competent bilingualism to continue for several generations (as shown also by Fillmore, 2005; August and Hakuta, 2005; Esser, 2006; Fishman 1964, 1991, 2007; Waters and Jimenez, 2005).

Acculturation models focus on the distance between groups and their relationship to "integrative outcomes"¹⁶: when inter-group contact is maximized, the acculturation of the "national-language group" is correspondingly facilitated and, consequently, national language learning is enhanced. Inversely, when these distances are greater and the position of individuals with a minority language background is perceived to be

¹⁶ For „groups“ is meant, in one side, "second-language learners" - immigrants and their descendants if their first language is in contrast to the national official language of the parents' immigration country, on the other side, "target-language speakers" - the native speakers of the official of immigration country, with no direct immigrant background.

subordinate/inferior, little acculturation may take place and individuals of immigrant background consequently risk failing to become proficient in the national language. These frameworks have four crucial analytical strengths (Norton, 2000): 1) recognition of the importance of socio-cultural context (without neglecting the role of individuals in the language learning process); 2) recognition of the importance of regular contact between language learners and speakers of the target language for successful language learning; 3) the emphasis on measuring social and cultural distance between different language groups (measured through social indicators such as education, labour market, housing and social networks, as well as lifestyles and values); 4) examination of learners' ethnocentric tendencies and their attitudes towards other groups, which are believed to determine individuals' success in learning a new language.

Again, human capital theory proves its usefulness for research in social science on languages. Their main advantage relies on its derivation on statistical interaction between motivation and opportunities for language acquisition, such as education, age at migration, ethnic concentration, and so on. Nevertheless, opinions have diverged on the order in which “acculturation of behaviours and attitudes” happens—*before, after* or *during* “linguistic acculturation.” In more recent studies, it is argued that “second language acquisition is just one aspect of acculturation and the degree to which learners acculturate to target language group will control the degree to which they acquire the second language. The logic is: if acculturation does not take place, instruction in the target language will be of limited benefit to the language learner.”¹⁷ However, these approaches are less able to assess the differential encouragement in the environment (or lack thereof) to learn specific languages; they are also poorly equipped to assess individuals' linguistic motivations beyond acculturation strategies or the influence of ethnic discrimination, the availability of language options, or unobserved additional characteristics. We will now survey approaches in language studies that look at needs for social change in unequal societies.

¹⁷ See discussion in Schumman, 1978: 34, influencing by Brown, 1994; Ellis, 1997; Larsen-Freeman and Long, 1991; Spolsky, 1989; all in Norton 2000:114

1.2.3. Language as a social resource and an aspect of identity in unequal societies

Other authors have drawn attention to the negative consequences of the “universal assimilation processes” represented by the “loss” or “death” of immigrant parents’ native language.”¹⁸) Exactly because they highlight the impact of social inequalities on individuals’ options, they remind us of the double nature of the “marginal man” (Stonequist, 1935), who disturbs social order but is also one of the main actors in social change, and for whom language is a powerful resource. And although there is general agreement on the assumption that bilingualism has advantages extended beyond individuals’ cognitive capacities and applied to individuals’ and society’s enrichment and emancipation. Some follow accounts on language political emancipation (through its symbolic power), and the promotion of different types of the existing resources (like languages) for a society where “heritage culture would not or could not be assimilated.” (Taylor, 1990: 5). Thus, the authors who follow these lines put a positive value on minority language programs as a force against the stigmatization of minority language groups (Fillmore, 2005), i.e., speaking in favour of affirmative action policies on language diversity.

A particular helping tool for the understanding of these approaches is Bourdieu's founding concept of “habitus.”¹⁹ As Bourdieu understood it *habitus* is a set a dispositions that inclines agents to act and react in certain ways that give individuals a “practical sense.” These dispositions have four main characteristics (Bourdieu, 1991:12) they are acquired through a gradual process of “inculcation” that begins in early childhood; they are necessarily “structured ” because they reflect the social conditions of the individual’s existence, in which they were acquired; they endure through the individual's life trajectory, operating in a pre-conscious way and not being readily amenable to conscious reflection and modification ; and finally, they are “generative” and “transposable ” because they are capable of generating a multiplicity of practices and perceptions in fields other than those in which they were originally acquired. To this Lahire added that what is incorporated or interiorized is not the “social world” or the “objective structures of the social world,” but instead schemes of action that are transmitted to individuals through social practices, during the repeated actions that

¹⁸ Crystal, 2000 linguist expression, in Rumbaut, and Bean 2006:447-460.

¹⁹ Bourdieu “habitus” concept comes from his interest in the opposition between individuals’ “subjectivism,” as an intellectual orientation to the social world, seeking to grasp the way the world appears to the individuals who are situated in it and presupposes an apprehension of the life experiences of others (as for phenomenological and interpretative sociology and anthropology of Schutz), and “objectivism », seen as an intellectual orientation to the social world which seeks to construct the objective relations with structure practices and representations (as a temptative to elucidate the structures and principles upon which primary experiences depend but which cannot be directly grasp, like for Levi-Strauss), in Bourdieu(1991) pp.11

individuals share with others, and through particular objects and social situations. (Lahire, 2005:205).

Thus, and contrary to rational choice theories that view action as the outcome of conscious calculation, Bourdieu, and later Lahire, explained that the habitus predisposes individuals to act in certain ways, and can never be analyzed adequately as the outcome of conscious calculations. (Bourdieu, 1991:16-17) This is the case because individuals' actions are the product of particular histories and specific social contexts. Moreover, for Bourdieu individuals act in "fields" that are structured spaces where individuals position themselves and define their interrelations with others. Each individual's position is determined by the distribution of different kinds of resources and capital (economic capital namely material wealth, cultural capital ex knowledge, skills, competences, symbolic capital vs. prestige and honour) Thus, capital (cultural, economic, social) is *transmitted* to each individual, which s/he will *possess* during their life trajectory, and further *transmit* to others, and *transform* into other forms of capital through different experiences.(Bourdieu, 1991:16-17). The main implicit conditions in Bourdieu's frame are that individuals act upon their motivations, according to their capital and position in the field, and believing in the game they are playing.

Finally, language plays a crucial role in Bourdieu's habitus framework, particularly in explaining social inequalities in terms of social practices. In detail, for Bourdieu language was both as a social practice and a form of capital (Bourdieu, 1991). For instance, linguistic utterances and expressions are forms of practice that result from the relation between a "linguistic market" and a "linguistic habitus." "Linguistic markets" endow "linguistic products" with a certain "value," giving some products a higher value than others. "Linguistic habitus" is a subset of dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak in specific contexts (family, peer group, school, neighbourhood, labour market, and others), forming one dimension of bodily hexis.²⁰ Moreover, "linguistic habitus" includes individuals' expectations, their anticipation of the value that "acquired linguistic products" will receive in other fields (such as the labour market or tertiary education). It thus determines the strategies implicit in practices of language transmission or language acquisition. Also important in Bourdieu's approach is the notion that "linguistic capital" is not only to *know how to* produce highly valued expressions (skills and proficiency), but to *be able to do it* in each situation. Linguistic

²⁰ For Bourdieu, the bodily hexis dimension are the different accents, intonations and ways of speaking that classes and groups have, which are manifestations of the socially structured character of the habitus. Bourdieu (1991), pp. 16-121

utterances indicate differences in terms of accent, grammar and vocabulary that are indices of speakers' social positions, reflecting the quantities of "linguistic capital" (as well as other capital) that they possess, and influencing others' expectations. In sum, Bourdieu's "linguistic capital" is the capacity to produce expressions that are *à propos* for a "particular market," from which the location of an individual in the social space can be defined, as the distribution of language capital is also related to other forms of capital distribution (the "generative" quality of capital). Thus, language plays a role of social distinction and the more diverse "linguistic capital" speakers possess, the more able they are to exploit differences in the system on their own behalf, and thereby to secure a "profit of distinction" for themselves. (Bourdieu, 1991: 18-21). Consequently, possessing a diversity of linguistic capital offers individuals a wider range of resources with which to negotiate their social identity.

Departing from Bourdieu, Norton (2000) identified important limitations on the aforementioned acculturation frameworks.²¹ The first point raised was that these frameworks do not address the language learners' experience of inequitable power relations. Norton argued that unequal relations between language learners and target language speakers work independently of individuals' motivations, preventing the former from maximizing contact with the latter. Second, acculturation approaches heavily link acculturation and second language acculturation to individuals' one-way acculturation, giving less attention to bilingual learning models, the cognitive advantages of competent bilingualism, or the role of social and psychological distance between groups as determined by learners' age and abilities. Finally, they also give little attention to the potential of bilingualism in creating more consonant communication, and its importance for the uses of family resources, but also in society more generally.

Norton (2000) also recalled Lambert's (1963); Gardner and Lambert (1972) distinction between "instrumental orientations" (the utilitarian value of linguistic achievements) and "integrative orientations" (the desire to join a language community), which differs from human capital theories. Exactly because learners want to overcome existing inequalities when facing discrimination, many opt to learn a second language, avoiding one-way acculturation choices and aiming instead to achieve competent bilingualism. Thus, they may pursue second language acquisition on the basis of "integrative" aims while maintaining first-language communication within the family, assuring family

²¹ See discussion on Schumman, 1976; 1977; 1986, from Norton, 2000:18, 119

control over children and its members' access to the family's own symbolic, psychological and material resources. Others may also opt for bilingual skills but remain more oriented towards their own cultural background, acquiring a second language strictly for "instrumental motivations" (e.g., "to get a good job"). Others instead adopt linguistic acculturation strategies out of "integrative motivations," while giving less value to retaining their parents' native language, at a cost of losing access to associated symbolic and material resources. Last but not least, others express feelings of social uncertainty or dissatisfaction in relation to both language contexts, falling in between two languages, without particular integrative purposes, situations more reminiscent of analyses of "social anomie" or the "marginal man."²² These different motivations in relation to language acculturation find some equivalent in Portes, Zhou and Rumbaut (1993, 1996) "segmented assimilation" theory, and in Lambert's earlier works (1963). (Lambert and Peal, 1963:179) Here, the role of language as social distinction clearly defines different motivations, depending on how language enters into individuals' negotiation of a sense of self within and across different sites and points in time (Norton, 2000). In Norton's opinion, language is central because it is language that gives or denies individuals access to powerful social networks and, consequently, the opportunity to speak (i.e., to participate). Finally, and contrary to the previous approaches to acculturation, for Norton sustained contact with the dominant language community per se is not sufficient to assure the opportunity to speak and be heard, whereas access to "adequate" social networks within a "language community" is (Norton, 2000):72). Thus, "linguistic identity" and the place for language diversity are at the centre of Norton's analysis of language transmission, acquisition, retention or loss, with Bourdieu as a key influence.

The following section gives a brief introduction to the history of scientific fields of language studies. Attention is first given to the work of psycholinguists, linguists and sociolinguists whose assumptions would provide the groundwork for later research. The focus then shifts to the approaches in sociology, economics and sociolinguistics that provide the conceptual structure of the present study, one that is widely used in migration studies. The aim is to grasp the determinants behind language outcomes, necessarily implying the intersection of insights from multiple disciplines—mostly from linguistics, anthropology, pedagogy, psychology, psycholinguistics, sociology, sociolinguistics and economics. Many have centred their

²² Different authors have referred feeling of social uncertainty or dissatisfaction in relation to both language contexts, for instance, either "anomie" as described by Durkheim 1897, Srole 1951 and Williams 1952, Simmel, Lambert 1963, or the "marginal man" of Park and Stonequist.

research on immigrants, others on the children of immigrants or on individuals from minority language background. They have variously focused on the relationships between language transmission, acquisition and maintenance, cognitive intelligence, school achievement, labour market outcomes, and the sense of self and belonging.

1.3. Founding approaches from psychologist and linguistic to sociolinguistics and the sociology of language

This literature review outlines the principal approaches within language studies to research on descendants of immigrants, with a sociological focus. Given that the main assumptions in the sociology of language depend on multidisciplinary groundwork, it is imperative to begin with a historical introduction to these contributions. Particular attention is given here to those psycholinguistic, linguistic and sociolinguistic investigations whose findings produced assumptions that became the background for current research, and especially for sociological quantitative research. These assumptions led to manifold methodological and theoretical improvements in language studies, bringing into focus the importance of non-linguistic factors in processes of language transmission, acquisition and retention, and opening the field for sociology of language. Consequently, investigators have shown an interest in sharpening their understanding of the social role of different languages, and their interrelations in plural societies. Not surprisingly, bilingualism came into the foreground as a central linguistic fact, with the differentiation of types of bilingualism and their comparison to monolingualism. In this context, the distinction between cognitive and social advantages (or disadvantages) was highlighted and explored. Finally, the investigation of bilingualism as a sociolinguistic phenomenon is now known to presuppose an understanding that different languages often present highly varying, or even conflicting, social status.

As initially mentioned, during the first half of the twentieth century the presence of different languages aroused additional fears of national language disruption: childhood bilingualism was often associated with intellectual inferiority.²³ Political consensus on this matter was rooted in intelligence testing in psychological, linguistic and educational domains, many of which were comparative studies on the school performance of monolingual native speakers with bilingual children from immigrant backgrounds (the latter

²³ Fears that “society as we know it can fade into a noisy Babel and then chaos,” from an US English policy statement, in Portes and Rumbaut (2001), pp.116

typically showing a delay in their development).²⁴ Two schools of thought emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. One, based on hereditarian and eugenic arguments, held that it was immigrants' low intelligence which led to foreign language maintenance and low national language proficiency.²⁵ A second school of thought presented the converse thesis, attributing mental retardation in immigrant children to bilingualism, holding that the use of more than one language promoted low proficiency in the national language, consequently leading to low intelligence.²⁶ Bilingualism was regarded with distrust, leading to policy measures against bilingual education.

However, these accounts were not reflected in another contemporaneous literature, namely biographies describing the successful development of bilingual children. These biographies highlighted age as an important factor for understanding the experiences of those whose learning took place through different languages.²⁷ Despite their initial detachment from science, these works ended up contributing to the development of a distinct perspective on bilingual education and bilingualism during the second half of the twentieth century. Linguists, anthropologists and linguistic anthropologists (such as Edward Sapir, and later Labov, Gumperz, Hymes, and Silverstein²⁸) denounced the previous "evolutionary prejudice," while focusing instead on the relationship between the structure of language and its cultural relativity. (Paulston, and Tucker, 2003:5) These scholars approached the process of learning two languages as an intersection of different social and cultural universes—expected to determine individuals' socialization experiences, and, consequently, their cognitive capacities and linguistic proficiency.

²⁴ See review Diaz 1983 in August and Hakuta (2005), Portes and Schaufli 1996., Portes and Rumbaut (2001), also see discussion about Pintner and Keller 1922, Saer 1923, in Hamers (1990) pp. 127

²⁵ Portes and Schaufli 1996, Portes and Rumbaut (2001). For instance, the works of the psychologist Goodenough (1926), to whom the additional use of a foreign language was not the cause but an indicator of retardation in cognitive development "the use of a foreign language in the home is one of the chief factors producing mental retardation as measured by intelligence tests. A more probable explanation is that those national groups whose average intellectual ability is inferior do not readily learn the new language" in Goodenough (1926), pp.393, cited in August and Hakuta (2005), pp.235. Similarly, Carl Brigham's (1923) analysis of scores on intelligence tests administered to foreign-born individuals during WWI concluded that their limited English vocabulary was due to the innate inferiority of southern and eastern Europeans, in Portes and Rumbaut (2001), pp.115

²⁶ For instance, in the 1930s Madorah Smith studied the speech patterns of preschool Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese in Hawaii, and concluded that their attempts to use two languages simultaneously were an important factor contributing to the retardation of speech, in Portes and Rumbaut (2001), pp.115

²⁷ For instance, Leopold 1949 — a writer who recorded extensive observations on the mental development of his own child, who learned two languages from an early age — argued that bilingual children benefit from the fact that they learn to conceptualize the same object in two different ways: "I attribute this attitude of detachment from words confidently to the bilingualism. (...) she had her attention drawn to essentials, to content instead of form"; or Evan of Wales 1953, also a writer, argued that bilingualism is a form of emancipation, because "it frees the mind from the tyranny of words (...) he who can express his ideas in two languages is emancipated" by Peal and Lambert (1962), and in Lambert, Wallace E. (1972), pp.118-119

²⁸ Edward Sapir, from the beginning of the twentieth century, was a linguist interested in the relation between linguistic differences and differences in cultural world views, working on the relationship between linguistics and anthropology. His thinking was later developed into the principle of linguistic relativity, by one of his students, Benjamin Lee Whorf — the well-known "Sapir-Whorf" hypothesis. William Labov was a linguist from the second half of the twentieth century, student of Uriel Weinreich and one of the founders of variationist sociolinguistics.

More context-sensitive approaches emerged stepwise, although bilingualism or foreign languages were not always perceived as an advantage. For instance, the linguist Paul Christophersen argued in 1948 that bilingual individuals who belong to two different communities possess two personalities which conflict if the two language communities are in social conflict (Peal and Lambert, 1962). From a different direction, the linguist Uriel Weinreich argued in 1953 that “the language handicap reported for bilinguals is attributed to interlingual interference” (Peal and Lambert, 1962) between the different social and cultural contexts of each language. Similarly, the linguist Charles Ferguson suggested in 1954 that linguistic differences between bilinguals and monolinguals depend on the experiences of individuals while learning a language, as well as on the way they balance their own experiences while acquiring proficiency in and practicing a different language.²⁹

Thus, since the late 1960s, researchers in various fields have taken an interest in the relations between language and other social phenomena, particularly in connection to unequal social structures such as segregation (notably racial segregation in the United States), poverty, and educational underachievement (Paulston and Tucker, 2003:9). However, the main comparative studies on language in sociology and sociolinguistics appeared only after a large number of scholars in other fields, such as anthropology, ethnography, linguistics and psycholinguistics, had already begun to investigate the relationship between language and society.³⁰ One important turning point for the entry of sociology into language studies happened during a historic interdisciplinary seminar in 1964 in Bloomington, USA.³¹ At this event, linguists conducted a seminar that included researchers from various disciplines, including educators, sociologists, geographers and psychologists—many of whom would go on to take part in the founding of both the sociology of language and sociolinguistics. A second turning point was an informal meeting held in 1966, attended by linguists and sociologists who were interested in the emerging field of sociolinguistics.³² The

²⁹ Ferguson: “Human abilities are learned, through experience and its transfers from one situation to another. As the structure of the intellect will vary from one individual to another due to their different experiences, and learning abilities depends greatly on language, bilinguals can have different and more complex contexts for learning than monolinguals.” Or before him, Arsenian (1937) to whom “the two different words in two different language systems for the same referent may carry different connotations and put the bilingual person in contact with two worlds of experience”; in Peal and Lambert (1962).

³⁰ See discussion on Giglioli, 1972; Gumperz & Hymes, 1972; Pride & Holmes, 1972, in Giles and Couplan, 1990:21

³¹ During an interdisciplinary seminar on sociolinguistics in the 1964 summer, at Indiana University (Bloomington), sponsored by the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Sociolinguistics and The National Science Foundation, conducted by the Linguistic Society of America, which happened after the ‘Sociolinguistic’ conference in California from the same year, the latter sponsored by the UCLA Center for Research in Language and Linguistics. This second seminar counted with the present of Gumperz, Haugen, Labov, Bright, Ervin, Rubin and Grimshaw, among others.)See Fishman (1985), pp.113 and see also Paulston, C. B. and R. Tucker (2003), pp10-11; also in Garcia, Ofelia, and Harold Schiffman (2006), pp.3-7

³² While sociologists showed interest in linguistic variables and processes, linguists were interested in broad contextualization. This meeting, holded at Willian Bright home, counted with the presence of Charles Ferguson, Joshua Fishman, Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, Jonh Gumperz, Dell Hymes, William Labov, Harvey Sacks, Edgar Polomé, Leonard Savitz and Emanuel Schegloff , reported by Hymes 1966 in Paulston, C. B. and R. Tucker (2003), pp 7

social psychology of language, which had first broken ground in the early 1960s,³³ came more clearly onto the scene in the late 1970s, when research interest in language studies was significantly increasing. In a nutshell, from the late 1960s to the 1970s much foundational research was produced, and each domain provided distinct contributions to the developments that followed. This evolution in theoretical multidisciplinary is mirrored in the emergence of sociolinguistics and its convergence with sociology of language. For instance, although early sociolinguists were trained in linguistics, their interest in the field progressively turned to more sociological topics, such as ethnic and national identity, minorities, social stratification, education, and gender roles, particularly from the 1980s onward. (Fishman, 1985:115-118)

In sum, the main contributions of psycholinguistics reflect the field's attention to individual factors such as intelligence, motivation and self-esteem, as well as to family factors or contextual factors related to the learning environment, language interaction and interdependence (Brizić, 2006); pedagogical studies highlighted the fact that there is no straightforward relationship between educational success and linguistic assimilation, and the fact of significant variations in relation to attitudes towards languages and language groups, and relatedly, in linguistic self-esteem (Brizić, 2006); sociolinguists have focused on the importance of parental attitudes and aspirations for their children, as well as on deconstructing the so-called "orientation problems of specific origins" (Brizić, 2006); sociologists and economists have given particular attention to the impact of socio-economic status on educational and labour market success, extending analysis to language outcomes and practices as well as to issues of identity. Findings and theories from these different fields can be combined to achieve a greater understanding of the diverse linguistic and non-linguistic factors. However, these interpretations have not always been either consensual or compatible with each other. In the next sections, particular attention is given to the work in psycholinguistics, linguistics and sociolinguistics through assumptions which would later form the groundwork for current sociological research in language studies.

³³ See discussion on Giles & St Clair 1979; Markova 1978, though in large part founded by Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner and Fillenbaum 1960 study introducing the matched-guise technique (MGT), see overview in Giles and Couplan (1990) pp.21

1.3.1. The importance of socialization in language learning and preferences: the psycholinguistics of Wallace Lambert³⁴

Following the historical approaches discussed above, new methodological clarifications and context-sensitive approaches appeared more systematically starting in the early 1960s. Some of the most important work was done in psychology by researchers interested in stages of speech development and in the strategic significance of language in the development of personality. They investigated the significance of language for children, focusing on the socialization of the individual and its relationship with thought processes.³⁵ Individual attitudes toward a language community were introduced to account for variation in the effectiveness of language uses and language learning: they were hypothesized to affect the performance of bilinguals on intelligence tests.

In 1959, Wallace Lambert and his colleagues in Canada began an extensive series of investigations on this issue, comparing the levels of language competence of bilingual and monolingual children, controlling for social background and sex. Their findings revealed the flaws in previous arguments on the supposed intellectual inferiority of bilingual children in two main ways. On one hand, because early research failed to control for aspects of parental background such as social class—comparing children of poor immigrant families with children of middle-class English speaking families; on the other hand, early investigations also failed to distinguish between “fluent” bilinguals and “quasi” or “limited” bilinguals.³⁶ Thus, and contrary to earlier studies, Lambert and his colleagues demonstrated that the intelligence test results and grades of “balanced” bilingual children were actually higher than those of monolingual children (Peal and Lambert, 1962; Lambert, 1972), and that social background contributed to determining individuals’ bilingual potential. In addition, they found that individuals’ “language aptitude” and “language social motivation” are two relatively independent factors, both associated with individuals’ bilingualism and language “achievement.”³⁷

³⁴ Wallace Lambert, professor at McGill University since 1954, led a “long-range investigation of foreign-language immersion programs and “two-way” immersion programs, oriented more by an English-Plus than an English-only ideology”. In Paulston, C. B. and R. Tucker (2003), ppxi

³⁵ See discussion on Hertzler, 1965, in Paulston, and Tucker, 2003: 4-5

³⁶ see Cummins’ discussion in studies previous to the 1970s, in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), pp.20-55.

³⁷ Later critics assumed that their study were bias in favour of the bilinguals, because highly skilled in languages, but, as explained bellow, they were defined by balanced four different measures and the consequent bias considered to be of slight consequences, in Cummins, J. (2001), pp.34-37

Their general findings were as expected: individuals from minority language groups tended to seek to enter the majority group through acculturation. Over the course of time, this resulted in the loss of their parents' native language and a lower degree of identification with the related cultural background. However, this pattern was more frequent among individuals who experienced some cultural or social conflict between the contexts of the two languages. Thus, while studying individuals' attitudes and motivations, Lambert and his colleagues opened up the field for psycholinguistics on the relationship between group stereotypes, individuals' linguistic self-esteem and "communicative anxiety."³⁸ They argued that existing negative stereotypes may influence individuals' attitudes and motivations towards a language and the associated culture,³⁹ resulting in important interference in language learning processes and thus different outcomes: language assimilation, parents' native language loss, limited bilingualism, or perceptions of social "anomie."⁴⁰ Thus, linguistic self-esteem and "communicative anxiety" determined individuals' positive or negative attitudes in relation to specific cultures and languages—both members of language minorities and native speakers of the majority language. "Certain community-wide negative stereotypes towards speakers of a particular language may have a negative influence on a bilingual who uses that language. (...) this may constitute an intellectual interference in that language for him. This could have a detrimental effect for a bilingual when functioning in one of his languages if he had associations of inferiority or shame with that language. The fact that an individual becomes bilingual in a bicultural community may be attributable to a favourable disposition toward both the linguistic communities, whereas the monolingual may be retarded in his acquisition of a second language because of his unfavourable attitudes toward both the other culture and its language" (Peal and Lambert, 1962:122).

In addition, Lambert and his colleagues addressed different types of language interference, evoking Weinreich's hypothesis on the effects of different language learning contexts.⁴¹ They defined "compound bilingualism" as a learning model where languages meet directly,

³⁸ For instance, see discussion on Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner and Fillenbaum, 1960, and Anisfeld, Bogo and Lambert, 1961, in Giles and Couplan (1990) pp.57 (as later for MacIntyre and Gardner in 1989)

³⁹ "Some may be anxious to learn another language as a means of being accepted in another cultural group because of dissatisfactions experienced in their own culture while other individuals may be equally as interested in another culture as they are in their own." Also, further "advancing toward biculturality in this sense may be viewed as a broadening experience in some cases, or it can engender "anomie";," a feeling of not comfortably belonging in one social group or the other";," in pp.114 Lambert 1963b (pp. 114, in Gardner, pp.47) and in 11 - Lambert and Peal (1963) pp.179

⁴⁰ 11 - Lambert and Peal (1963) pp.179-186 Still, we can find parallels to earlier arguments made by Durkheim 1897, Srole 1951, Zimmel Kastoryano, Park and Stonequist mentioned it by the risks experienced by what they called The marginal man

⁴¹ Lambert recalled, then, Weinreich's (1953, or Ervin and Osgood, 1954) three main bilingual learning forms: *compound bilingualism* (two languages represent the same concept because learned in the same context), *coordinate bilingualism* (concepts from different languages are parallel and independent because learned in separated contexts) and *subordinate bilingualism* (one weaker language represented through the stronger language). In August and Hakuta (2005) pp. 233-245, about Weinreich (1953), distinctions showed to be hard to operationalise by Lambert et al. (1958)

arguing that it could more easily lead to inter-language confusions and conflicts (and create the risk of “semilingualism”); in contrast, they argued that “coordinate bilingualism”, wherein different languages are encountered and used in distinct contexts, would promote a learning process that is less dependent on cues stemming from the language context, creating a “built-in” distinctiveness of the two language systems that prevents them from directly interfering with each other during the learning process; however, the authors also pointed out that the management of the two languages in coordinate bilingualism could result in a temporal, functional and cultural segregation, creating a risk that the language with greater institutional utility and/or less social stigma would be promoted at the expense of the other, possibly leading to “subordinate bilingualism.”

Starting from these assumptions, Lambert and Gardner (1972) elaborated a typology on the relation between “attitudes” and “motivations” that target different language “achievements,” emphasizing that “correlation does not mean causation.” From these constellations resulted their two well-known types of “language orientation motives” (Giles and Couplan, 1990:45-50, and as previously mentioned for Fishman and Norton). “The orientation is ‘instrumental’ in form if the purposes of language study reflect the more utilitarian value of linguistic achievement, such as getting ahead in one’s occupation; it is ‘integrative’ if the student is oriented to the cultural community and desires to become potential member of the group.” (Lambert, 1963b:114; Gardner, 1990:47) They thus distinguished apparently similar language acculturation outcomes that involve different senses of language belonging. “The more proficient one becomes in a second language the more he may find his place in his original membership group is modified at the same time as the other linguistic-cultural group becomes something more than a reference group for him. Depending upon the compatibility of the two cultures, he may experience feelings of chagrin or regret as he loses ties in one group, mixed with the fearful anticipation of entering a relatively new group” (Lambert, 1963b, Gardner, 1990:47). In addition, Lambert and his colleagues proposed a classification of different combinations of language proficiencies, classified using four measures: a word association test, a word detection test, the Peabody picture vocabulary test⁴², and subjective self-rating on different proficiencies (speaking, reading, writing and understanding) in different languages. Each of the four were measured on a four-point scale and resulted in the classification of

⁴² An intelligence test that estimates verbal ability and scholastic aptitude through individuals’ receptive hearing vocabulary and images.

speakers as “monolinguals,” “bilinguals” or “ambiguous.”⁴³ In 1974, Lambert expanded this set of typologies, introducing a distinction between “additive bilingualism” and “subtractive bilingualism,”⁴⁴ based on individuals’ subjective assessment of different language contexts. (Peal and Lambert, 1962:126-127).

In a nutshell, the main contributions of psychological studies on language from the 1960s’ and 1970s’ to migration research can be summarized as a set of five general findings. The synthesis of these findings offers insights on why the combination of different languages has cognitive advantages, which processes complicate this picture of bilingual advantages, and what the main expected effects of bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ socialization experiences are.⁴⁵ First, bilingualism is assumed to be “an additive process, that affords the individual a dual perspective rather than a confined or incomplete intellectual and social development” Taylor, 1990:6). This means, furthermore, that bilingualism is expected to have a positive impact in individuals’ cognitive capacities and to be achievable by all individuals. Second, a more advantaged social background—and particularly parents with a higher level of education—is associated with a higher likelihood of emerging with bilingual skills, as for educational outcomes. Third, acquiring a new language implies some degree of acculturation to this language’s social and cultural contexts, through the adoption of norms, values and attitudes;⁴⁶ fourth, the frequency and quality of social and language contact is indeed determinant for individuals’ linguistic self-confidence. Finally, and departing from previous assumptions, the interplay between different language contexts is determinant of individuals’ attitudes and motivations toward either second language acquisition or first language maintenance, and consequently, of individuals’ general language proficiency and preferences.

In sum, the above-cited psycholinguistic studies argued that: social background + frequency and quality of language contact => individuals’ attitudes + motivations => uses +

⁴³ These classifications were later associated to attitudes, prejudices, identities – for both children (respondents) and parents. pp.126-127 in Peal and Lambert (1962).

⁴⁴ “Additive bilingualism” involved the acquisition of proficiency in the second language with no major loss in first language proficiency or allegiance to the original cultural group (an it tended to be applicable primarily to majority group members learning a minority language); “subtractive bilingualism” was viewed as more characteristic of minority group members acquiring the language of the majority . This conceptualization departed again from Weinreich’s concepts, in Giles and Couplan, (1990), pp.47-48. Others influenced by Lambert: Krashen’s (1982) “affective filter” which moderates language acquisition. Schumann’s (1978) acculturation model. Clément’s (1980) social context model. Giles and Byrne’s (1982) intergroup model

⁴⁵ *It would be expected that self-confidence would be an interactive function of the frequency and quality of contact: a high frequency of pleasant contacts will have a more pleasant outcome than a low frequency. Conversely, much unpleasant contact will have a more negative effect than a little contact* Giles and Couplan (1990). pp.57

⁴⁶ “one anticipates that if the learner is appropriately oriented, he may find that by learning another social group’s language he has made the crucial step in becoming an acculturated part of second linguistic-cultural community”,,” 11 - Lambert and Peal (1963), pp.179

learning => retention/assimilation/type of bilingualism.⁴⁷ Thus, these associations contribute to the stigmatization effect, behind utility and cognitive factors. Work by linguists in the 1980s contributed to revealing these advantages, as seen in the next section.

1.3.2. How linguistic and non-linguistic determinants turn bilingual experiences into potential cognitive growth: the linguistics of Jim Cummins⁴⁸

In the 1970s, some pedagogical schools suggested that bilingualism has a limited role “in the development of causal structures” for cognitive structures. They argued this differently from the previous research earlier in the 20th century, saying that this was because linguistic functioning depends to a great extent on non-linguistic functioning.⁴⁹ From his approach within linguistics, Cummins agreed that language depends on non-linguistic functioning, but contested this conclusion of a “non-causal role” for bilingualism. Following Ferguson, who said that “the bilingual is exposed to a wider range of experiences due to his experiences in two cultures,” he argued that the habit of switching codes that results from such experiences promotes the use of different perspectives and greater cognitive flexibility. In this sense, Cummins did recognize that one “*causal* element is the switching of perspective rather than any specifically linguistic factor.” But to this he added that further “linguistic explanations” also play a role in bilinguals’ cognitive development—such as the overlap in vocabulary that “accounts for the bilingual’s greater verbal ability,” and “transfer across and comparison of languages.” He thus argued that it is the combination of four considerations (code-switching; wider range of experiences; overlap of vocabulary; transference across and comparing languages) that together improve individuals’ reasoning and concept formation, with a significant impact in their capacity to separate between sound, meaning and object.⁵⁰ In this context, he laid out a theoretical analysis of the relationship between bilingualism and thought, on the basis of which he developed some of the groundwork of hypotheses and concepts that are now used in language studies in different domains.

⁴⁷ *If attitudes and motivation are important in determining the acquisition of second language material and skill, it seems equally likely to argue that they would influence language retention*, in Giles and Couplan (1990), pp.55

⁴⁸ Jim Cummins teaches in the University of Toronto, and his research “has focused on the nature of language proficiency and second language acquisition with a particular emphasis on the social and educational barriers that limit academic success for culturally diverse students”, In Paulston, C. B. and R. Tucker (2003), pp ix

⁴⁹ see J.Cummins, J. overview on existent studies until 1970s on the relationship between bilingualism and cognitive development, discussing Piagetian school (on developmental psychology and cognitive development applied to pedagogical sciences), Macnamara’s (1970, from psychology in McGill University) arguments and Furth’s (1966, developmental psychologist who worked in Jean piaget) studies on the cognitive effects of deafness and linguistic factors, in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), citation pp.23, discussion pp.20-55.

⁵⁰ As earlier suggested by Leopold 1949, Peal and Lambert (1962), Lambert and Tucker (1972) among others, see discussion in Cummins, J. (1970s), “A theoretical perspective on the relationship between bilingualism and thought”, in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), all citations from pp.23

In this work, Cummins observed the positive cognitive consequences for bilinguals of overcoming difficulties in coping with two languages, as well as adverse effects on their cognitive processes.⁵¹ One of his main contributions to this field was the concept of “language threshold levels, which cannot be defined in absolute terms because they are determined by more fundamental social, attitudinal, educational and cognitive factors” (Baker and Hornberger, 2001:41-42). The concept of language threshold levels relies, instead, on two theoretical assumptions—the “language interdependence hypothesis” (LIH) and “common underlying proficiency” (CUP) (Baker and Hornberger, 2001:118-119, 122). The interdependence between two languages (LIH) derives from learning experiences as described in terms of two conceptual dimensions: linguistic skills and linguistic knowledge. First, only when a certain level of competence is attained in the two languages will positive effects of bilingualism on individual cognitive functioning occur. Second, not all types of language skills show the same potential of transferability and interdependency, which is where the common underlying proficiency (CUP) hypothesis enters the picture. Cummins suggested two general types of language skills: literacy skills, or “cognitive/academic language proficiency” (CALP), and the more social language skills, or “basic interpersonal communicative skills” (BICS).⁵² For a balanced bilingual proficiency to be developed, first and second languages must share some common underlying proficiency (CUP) that defines their potential interdependency, particularly in relation to cognitive/academic language proficiency (CALP).⁵³ Cummins suggested that the need for a CUP is less in the domain of social skills and uses, i.e., in terms of basic interpersonal communicative skills (BICS), due to the fact that linguistic difficulties are said to have a greater effect on children’s intelligence at the formal operational stage (CALPS) than at the concrete operational stage (BICS)—for instance, the difference between classroom and neighbourhood.

Following his arguments on the relevance of CALPS, he further argued that the more time is spent with the second language, the higher the level of proficiency individuals need to obtain

⁵¹ “Because linguistic experience facilitate the development of cognition, difficulties in coping with two languages are likely to adversely affect a bilingual child’s expression of his intelligence through language, and consequently, his interaction with an increasingly symbolic environment”, in Cummins, J. (1970s), pp.28, 45-46

⁵² Basic Interpersonal Communicative Skills (BICS) refers to the skills which largely unrelated to academic progress, i.e., regardless of IQ or academic aptitude, cognitive and literacy skills, and. BICS refers instead to the cognitive undemanding manifestations or everyday aspects of communicative skills and language proficiency in interpersonal situations. Cognitive/Academic Language Proficiency (CALP) are the dimension of language proficiency related to literary skills and academic progress in Cummins, J. (1980s), “The entry and exit fallacy in bilingual education”, in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), pp.113-115.

⁵³ A further correlational hypothesis underlies here for CUP: more similar languages are more correlated in relation to their CALP, when compared to more dissimilar languages, in Cummins (1979b).

in this language to avoid cognitive underachievement (Cummins, 1970s: 41). Moreover, intensive exposure to a school language is also likely to impede the continued development of one's home language (i.e., parents' native language). However, the correlation between proficiency in these two languages starts in the early stages of life, even before school (as previously mentioned by Weinreich and Lambert). Furthermore, if a child's mother tongue/home language is less developed before entering into contact with a school language, this will exert a limiting effect on the development of the latter (Baker and Hornberger, 2001:75).

This is because the process of learning a school language depends strongly on the exposure to a correct form of the first language during the early stages of life. Otherwise, specific pedagogical support is needed. Inversely, when the first language is already well structured, interdependency between the languages is better assured at the CALP level. Cummins further considers that instruction in any of these languages will promote literacy skills in school.⁵⁴

These assumptions necessarily lead us back to linguistic studies on the “critical period hypothesis” (CPH): on the relation between age and concomitant cognitive skills of the (second-) language learner. Although there is a wide consensus that language attainment is negatively correlated with age of learning, there is widespread disagreement on the critical age point for learning a second language (between four and five years, later or before).⁵⁵ Cummins added that age expectations depend on the way language interdependency is put to work. Together with Collier (1987),⁵⁶ he argued that older second-language learners whose first-language CALP is better developed will acquire cognitive/academic skills (CALP) in a second-language more rapidly than younger learners whose first-language structure is less advanced. They presented two main arguments: first, that acquisition of a second language is faster for older learners because their cognitive skills are already more solid; second, second language

⁵⁴However, there may be some aspects of proficiency in each language that are not interdependent (ex aspects not related to cognitive processes, as spelling patterns, syntactic rules), being possible to hypothesize a model of bilingualism based on the Separated Underlying proficiency (SUP) (where first and second languages proficiency develop separately. Even though, Cummins suggested that first-language CALP is a major determinant for language learning and bilingual proficiency, thus, arguing for rejection of SUP in favour of CUP, as there is no evidence in research that it is true.

in Cummins, J. (1980s), in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), pp.130-131.

⁵⁵Referring to Johnson and Newport 1989, 1998, Penfield and Roberts 1959, Newport and Johnson 1989, Newport 2002, Birdsong and Molis 2001, Mayberry and Lock 2003, Hakuta, Bialystock and Wiley 2003, see discussion in Casey, Teresa and Christian Dustmann (2005), also in August and Hakuta (2005). pp.235.

⁵⁶Collier 1987, Cummins 1979; others disagree Rossell and Baker 1996 INED - P 1084 1/2000 ; Porter 1990, see discussion in August and Hakuta (2005).

acquisition is also faster and easier if there is continued development in the first language, i.e., if there is continuing support for the mastery of basic grammar in the native language. In sum, bilinguals need to overcome language threshold levels for two languages in order for their bilingualism to accelerate cognitive growth rather than hindering it. Moreover, what determines the extent of transference through language interdependence is the common underlying proficiency (CUP) (Baker, and Hornberger, 2001:118-119, 122), but the impact of this interdependence depends on threshold levels in both languages.

In sum, Cummins' threshold hypothesis and language interdependence hypothesis (LIH) attempt to integrate data showing that both linguistic and non-linguistic factors are important in understanding the dynamics of bilingual children's interaction with their educational environment, and how it works more as a cognitive advantage than as a restricting factor. Cummins suggested focusing on individuals' first-language CALP input, likely more important than "home-school language switch," "linguistic mismatch" or the "critical age" hypothesis.⁵⁷ The question Cummins mainly focused his research on was not "what effects does bilingualism *per se* have on cognitive processes, rather, which conditions under which bilingual learning experiences are likely to retard or, alternatively, accelerate aspects of cognitive growth."⁵⁸ In the following section, we will observed how Fishman transposes the considerations from the work of Lambert and Cummins discussed above into the sociolinguistic domain, where social identity gains more attention.

1.3.3. Language as a two-level resource: social integration and identification, in Joshua Fishman's sociolinguistics and sociology of language⁵⁹

A contemporary of Lambert and Cummins, Fishman was trained as a social psychologist, and became one of the founders of sociology of language and sociolinguistics. He focused on the social distinction role of language in existing social structures, from an angle that combined examination of language, culture, ethnicity, power and cultural change, being one of the first researchers approaching languages as a two-level resource: for societal integration and social

⁵⁷ "Home-school language switch" or "linguistic mismatch" hypothesis reflect a situation of inevitable academic difficulties since children cannot learn through a language they do not understand, because is neither their home and mother tongue.

⁵⁸ See discussion in Cummins, J. (1970s), "The influence of bilingualism on cognitive growth. A synthesis of research findings and explanatory hypothesis", in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (eds.) (2001), *An introductory reader to the writings of Jim Cummins*, Bilingual education and bilingualism 29, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon, , pp.33

⁵⁹ Joshua Fishman, professor at Yeshiva University since 1960, as well as in other universities, have shown major research interests in language and ethnicity, language planning, and reversing language shift. In Paulston, C. B. and R. Tucker (2003), pp ix

identification.⁶⁰ His main contributions can be summarized in five considerations that reveal his interdisciplinary focus. First, he conceptualized identity as a socio-psychological variable of which minorities are more conscious than majorities. Second, contrary to Anderson (1983), he considered identity to be imagined but not imaginary (Fishman 1996a). Closer to his anthropological contemporaries, he also viewed the relationship between language and culture as both symbolic and constructed, and individuals' and groups' social identity in relation to both insiders and outsiders. Sometimes language is included as primor-indicator, other times as marginal or even optional (Garcia; Ofelia; Rakhmiel; Schiffman and Fishman, 2006:31-33). However—and this is the third of the five points—the the impact of language on individuals' social identity is such that self-concept is “invariably different when the historically associated language is present than when it is absent.” (Fishman, 1991:17) Thus, most of the culture is in the language because it is expressed in the language—meaning that when we are talking about language most of what we are talking about is culture. (Fishman, 2007:71-81)

Fourth, despite these last considerations, he rejected the intimate “language-in-culture”, arguing that culture and ethnic identities outlast native language maintenance. “When language dies, people do not stop talking. (...) They go on in the other language; they work a new relationship between language and culture. The relationship is detachable, it is dislocated” (Fishman, 2007: 76; Fishman, 1985:120-121). Consequently, Fishman developed a dynamic approach to language and language shift, which is not about language “per se” but about its most important effects—cultural change: “every language grows as every culture changes” (Fishman, 2007:76; Fishman, 1985:120-121). Fifth, in this dynamic change, he argued that it is language that gives communities and individuals the ability to maximize the “self-regulation of culture change” and regulate cultural contact and conflicts. This is why, for him, minority language policies reveal important conflicts of interest, and mother tongue loss or general language assimilation is more a product of unbalanced social powers than it is determined by cognitive or linguistic factors. On this basis, he defended the view that minority and immigrant languages need to be safeguarded to ensure a democratic climate of expression,⁶¹ while espousing a cultural pluralism without cultural separatism.

⁶⁰ Fishman defined both disciplines as “centrally concerned not only with societally patterned behaviour through language but with societally patterned behaviour toward language, whether positive or negative”. By societally patterned behaviour through language he meant societal formation, societal interaction, societal change and dislocation; by societally patterned behaviour toward language he meant instead attitudes, movements, planning. in Garcia, Ofelia, and Harold Schiffman (2006), pp.3-7; also in Fishman (1991), pp.7

⁶¹ “Language-shift is a by-product of unequal rates of social change and of growth in econotechnical power and, therefore, self-regulation.” in Fishman (1991), pp.5-6; However, Fishman was not completely optimist for his own purposes, as “unfortunately, democratic regimes can be just as blind to cultural pluralism and to the needs of minorities for cultural recognition and support, as are autocratic regimes.” in Fishman (1991) pp.3. Indeed, already in 1968 Fishman used a global sample of countries, divided into linguistic homogenous and heterogeneous groups. To this, Pool added in 1972 the GDP, resulting in the Fishman-Pool hypothesis. – from this, both authors observed

Thus, and in contrast to some psychologists, linguists and sociologists in the 1960s, Fishman showed less interest in second language acquisition. But in connection with his interest in bilingualism, early in his career he defined two other important fields of inquiry: language maintenance and language shift.⁶² He investigated these two phenomena, analyzing changes in and the stability of different language uses. His findings led him to propose a “graded intergenerational disruption scale” (GIDS) in the context of his “reversing language shift” (RLS) model.⁶³ Through this model, he looked at how and to what extent groups can assess the threatened state of their languages and mobilize resources on behalf of maintenance of their mother tongue. The higher the score, the lower were the group’s prospects for language maintenance. Thus, in the first four stages of GIDS, individuals of minority language groups transcend diglossic status and are in search of power sharing; in the later four stages, individuals instead experience some kind of diglossia, experiencing a risk that neither intergenerational mother tongue transmission nor language maintenance will happen. Thus, taking a pluralist approach, Fishman conceptualized societal bilingualism not as a defining and required ability only for those from a minority language background, but as a result of individuals’ interaction and collective norms, serving as an important tool to define (or redefine) group boundaries (as for Barth, 1969).⁶⁴ And although he argued that bilingual education has positive effects not only on the first/mother tongue but also on the second language (like Cummins and Lambert), he added that this is of particular social relevance for children from communities with low literacy levels (Fishman, 2007:76; Fishman, 1985:120-121).

Here, he recalls previous assumptions, such as Weinreich’s language interference concerns, Lambert’s argument for the need to create a separate social space for each language, and Ferguson’s (1959) distinction between high varieties of languages (in religion, education,

more social equality for more linguistic homogeneous countries. In these investigations, Fishman concluded, though, that linguistic homogeneity characterizes states in which primordial ties are more under control, where more cultural-religious homogeneity and enlightenment are observed, together with more modern and plural forms of civic participation and social equality; to this Pool added his results, that while the homogenous countries could be poor, the heterogeneous countries could hardly be wealthy countries. CITATION

⁶² For instance, Fishman (1964), in Garcia, Ofelia, Rakhmiel Peltz, Harold Schiffman and Gella Fishman (2006) pp.23

⁶³ Stage 1 – language X used in higher educational, occupational, governmental and media efforts; Stage 2 - X used in lower governmental services and mass media, but not higher levels; Stage 3 – X used in lower work sphere, outside of the community, and involving interaction between both speech communities; Stage 4 – X used in lower education that meets requirements of compulsory education laws; Stage 5 – X used for literacy in home, school and community, but such literacy is not reinforced extra-communally; **Stage 6** – X is normal language of informal spoken interaction between and within all three generations of family, with Y reserved for greater formality and technicality than those common of daily family life; Stage 7 – X is spoken by people who are socially integrated and ethnolinguistically active, but behind child-bearing age; Stage 8 – X is spoken by socially isolated old folks. in Garcia, Ofelia, Rakhmiel Peltz, Harold Schiffman and Gella Fishman (2006.), pp.25-26

⁶⁴ “Bilingualism is acquired by exposure to, and interaction with, a community that lives in accord with the norms of usage and that is involved in the normal process of change to which most communities and most norms are exposed.(...) essentially a characterization of individual linguistic versatility.” Cited from Fishman 1972a, pp.145, in Garcia, Ofelia, Rakhmiel Peltz, Harold Schiffman and Gella Fishman (2006) pp.12-13, pp.20

politics and other domains) and low varieties of languages (at home and lower-qualified working spheres). This because, for Fishman, to understand bilingualism implied to interpret the nature and practical purpose of language uses, particularly for the native language of immigrant parents. “What are you going to do with the “mother tongue” *before* school, *in* school, *out* of school, and *after* school?—Because that determines its fate, whether it is going to become self-renewing.” (Fishman, 2007:80, my italics). Thus, he primarily emphasized the need for different social spaces for the two languages (mother tongue vs. school language or second language). Schools in particular, he argued, cannot be expected to promote efficient bilingual skills alone, because it is not their role to assure the transmission or acquisition of immigrant parents' native language.⁶⁵ Instead, parents' native language transmission and maintenance are only possible within the family and linguistic community (Fishman, 1991). “Nothing can substitute for face-to-face interaction with real family imbedded in real community. (...) *Gemeinschaft*⁶⁶ is the real secret weapon of RLS” (Fishman, 1991; Garcia; Schiffman and Fishman, 2006:19). He suggested further that “higher levels” of language (e.g. in the educational system) are also necessary for the maintenance of immigrant languages, but for the purpose of higher status recognition in society and not for its particular uses—corresponding, here, to Ferguson's high varieties or Tonnies' *Gesellschaft*/more impersonal society. In brief, through Fishman's RLS model it is possible to understand that the cultural autonomy of minority language groups also depends on language's being secured in a ‘home-family-neighbourhood-community’ environment nexus – assuming its role as a “language of solidarity”; inversely, if a language is widely used in the public domain and has language-institutional support (media, education, business, government), it assumes a different and complementary role as a “language of status” (Fishman, 2007:789). In the next section, focus is given to the current sociological and economic approaches that built the conceptual structure of the present research.

⁶⁵ “Schools are not inter-generational language transmission agencies(...) (it is) a crucial agency for particular aspects of language use, like literacy, versatility, or formality. But that is neither acquisition of the mother tongue nor transmission of the mother tongue.” (...) “The funny thing about literacy, even in languages of great literacy, is that every generation starts off with zero literacy. (...) That is not the way mother tongue works. Mother tongues are self-sustaining and a new generation does not wait until it goes to school to get its mother tongue (...) – the one shaping the identity of the child.” In Fishman, Joshua (2007), pp.76-78

⁶⁶ Tonnies' sociological category that defines the intimate community whose members are related to one another via bonds of kinship, affection and communality of interest and purpose

1.4. Factors influencing language processes: Constellations of linguistic and socio-cultural factors, language shift typologies, and intergenerational language acculturation

From the previous discussions, we have seen that language processes (transmission, acquisition, learning, retention, maintenance or shift) are not mainly a matter of individual disaggregation, but instead result from collective and interactive processes. Often examined from the angle of the linguistic consequences of immigration phenomena, they represent processes of societal change (Fishman, 1991; Beans and Stevens, 2003). However, this societal change is commonly interpreted as a shift mainly for minority language groups, based on two widespread assumptions: the significant risk of loss of non-national language(s) over the generations, independently of family strategies and skills acquired by children in early childhood; and the results of the low utility and social prestige of immigrant minority languages in the wider context, as opposed to uses within the family environment. In order to measure these changes, various models of language processes have emerged since the early work developed by Lambert and Fishman (beginning in the 1960s), followed by Cummins and Bourhis (beginning the 1970s), and more recently Portes and Rumbaut (beginning in the 1990s). Each model highlights the fact that language processes result not from arbitrary circumstances but from the operation of specific mechanisms whose combination reveals correlations or even causality relations, what Esser (2006) called “special constellations.”⁶⁷

For instance, Rumbaut, Massey and Bean (2006) applied a life Table method to develop linguistic life expectancies using questions on language use, proficiency and preferences to derive “linguistic survival curves” across generations and yielding “mortality rates.”⁶⁸ Following a rather liberal definition of “linguistic life” for immigrant languages, they conclude that “like taxes and biological death, linguistic death seems to be a sure thing in the USA, even for Mexicans living in Los Angeles, a city with one of the largest Spanish-speaking urban populations in the world” (Rumbaut, Massey and Bean, 2006:459).

Focusing on language shift in one generation for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Europe, Brizić proposed three gradual types of language shifts. In *minority language shift*,

⁶⁷ Term used in Esser 2006, pag 48, Figure 4.1

⁶⁸ They used surveys conducted in southern California (IMMLA and CLIS surveys footnote with link), region adjacent to Mexican border, the USA largest net of immigrants during 1970-2005 and the one which contains the most Spanish-speakers and persons of Mexican origins, and displayed a rising level of Hispanic residential segregation, in Rumbaut, Massey and Bean (2006), pp.447-460.

children of immigrants show a high level of competence in their parents' native language; in *partial language shift*, the children of immigrants show a moderate level of competence in their parents' native language; and in *total language shift*, the children of immigrants show little or no knowledge of their parents' native language. Moreover, aiming to specifically assess parents' linguistic transmission behaviour and its effects on children's language outcomes, Brizić (2006, 2008) further suggested the need to distinguish three levels of analysis. First, a *micro-level*, referring to children's linguistic starting point in their country of birth, such as childhood language contact. Second was a *meso-level*: parents' linguistic capital and intergenerational transmission indicators. By parents' "linguistic capital" the author meant their mastery of their native language(s), as well as language experiences related to level of education and occupational skills (SES), knowledge of the national language, and general linguistic self-esteem. "Intergenerational transmission indicators" refers to childhood language(s) and uses, and to parents' attitudes and aspirations in relation to language learning, school and the labour market. Finally, Brizić identified a *macro-level*: the macro-conditions for language acquisition in both the children's country of birth and residence and in the parents' country of origin, such as the language's (or languages') prestige, status (official language(s) or not), language instruction at the school attended, the proportion of immigrants who are from the same minority language background, and determinants in the immigration context (using Portes' modes of incorporation).

Beyond child-parents relation, Beans and Stevens (2003) approached language shifts as collective processes of change for minority language groups, combining micro-level units (individuals) with three meso-level units: the family, the minority language group, and the generation or birth cohort. On this basis, they identified both *intragenerational* language shifts, intertwined with processes of structural assimilation within a single generation, and *intergenerational* language shifts, assessed in two ways: first, through direct comparison of children's and parents language repertoires (rates of language shift defined in a way more similar to that of Brizić); and second, through the observation of shift at the communal level—i.e., the observation of the gradual replacement of the language of immigrant groups' country of origin with the national language (over an extended period of time and within a ethno-linguistic community).

The aims of the different models differ, but all pursue the understanding that language processes involve a range of determinant factors,⁶⁹ usually described on four levels of analysis: individuals, families, and other contextual factors such as minority language groups, societal and institutional frames (see Figure 1, which summarizes the main levels of analysis, concepts and authors). In general, the interpretation of these inter-relations always demands a multidisciplinary approach, “bridging the gap between socio-cultural factors and the actual process of cognitive development” (Baker and. Hornberger, 2001:39,127-129). Chiswick and Miller (2001) suggest that an economic analytical framework is of particular utility in interpreting these links between linguistic and non-linguistic factors. From both acculturation and agency perspectives, they approached language processes as investments, suggesting that the relation between linguistic and non-linguistic factors reveals conditions that can be described in terms of *exposure*, *efficiency* and *incentives*.⁷⁰ “Exposure” refers to the existence of opportunities to hear, study and use a language, which depend on the language skills and usages of the people with whom an individual interacts (e.g. partners, colleagues, neighbours, friends) as well as institutional opportunities (in school, work, and other institutional settings). “Efficiency” refers to the degree to which individuals’ language proficiency improves given a certain amount of exposure, which depends on the previous human capital of the actors involved. Finally, incentives, taken as the basis for the strategies of both individuals and groups, are aspects of both institutional and more informal settings that help to define the return on investments in gaining proficiency in different languages (part of human capital): expected gains, for instance, in economic position and social status.

⁶⁹ While Esser (2006) refers to these factors in a direct relation with acquisition of the national language as a second language, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) speak of assimilation processes in their segmented assimilation theory, a rational further applied to processes of language acquisition and assimilation. Portes and Rumbaut (2001), Bourhis (1970s and 1980s) proposal of *ethnolinguistic vitality*, a taxonomy of the structural variables can determine the course that relations may take when language groups are in contact. It provides a conceptual tool to analyze the socio-structural variables affecting the strength of language communities within multilingual settings, from Giles, Bourhis and Taylor (1977) and Bourhis, Giles and Rosenthal (1981), see discussion in Bourhis, Richard y. (2002), pp.653-662; see also In Bourhis, R.Y. and R. Landry (2008), pp.185-211

⁷⁰ Three main factors as previously presented by Chiswick and Miller (2001) equivalent to Esser (2006), four main factors: access, skills, motivation and costs), pp.2 and 97.

Table 1 - Main concepts

Level of analysis	Concepts	By
Societal level *social and institutional dimensions	* Incentive factors * Contextual interference * Language (of) status	*Chiswick & Miller *Lambert; Cummins; Brizic *Fishman; Bourdieu
Agency level * Individuals * Family * community language	* Exposure factors * Linguistic habitus /socialization experience * Acculturation strategies	*Chiswick & Miller * Bourdieu; Brizic *Fishman; Norton; Portes & Rumbaut
Outcome level	* Efficiency factors * Bilingual outcomes * Linguistic self-esteem / Linguistic identity * Language shift	*Chiswick & Miller *Lambert; Cummins; Fishman; P & R. *Brizic; Norton *Fishman; Brizic; Norton; P & R

Pluridisciplinary contributions: psycholinguistics; psychology; linguistics; sociolinguistics; sociology; educational studies; economy

As shown in the overviews above of the research of three researchers (a psycholinguist, a linguist, and a sociolinguist), linguistic factors are: individual intelligence levels, age when learning languages (or age at migration for parents); learning environment determinants (learning two languages separately, in immersion or simultaneously); linguistic similarities or dissimilarities between the parents' native language and national language; and interdependence between and common underlying proficiency for different languages. Thus, age is correlated with language processes in efficiency terms:⁷¹ for immigrants, age at migration is expected to be positively correlated with native language retention and negatively correlated with national language acquisition, with indirect effects on their children's language acquisition (Chiswick; Lee and Miller, 2002, Esser, 2006:22-23), and for the children of immigrants, age is negatively associated with contact with both languages, but not in a straightforward manner, as language interdependence and

⁷¹ In Jasso and Rosenweig 1990, ppp 313, 320. Further, both cognitivist and sociologic assumptions were confirmed in Beans and Stevens 2003, p.162 on census 2002 USA, although the authors consider that age effect may be overstated – immigrants migrating later may, through self-reporting, be more severe with their language skills due to their accent that is unavoidable more difficult for them to loose.

threshold levels are also efficiency factors (as seen above in the overview of the work of Cummins).

As found through extensive investigation in economic and sociological studies, non-linguistic factors (or so-called social-structural factors, Bourhis, 2002:653-662) are also determinants of linguistic socialization experiences: what Bourdieu defined as linguistic habitus. Linguistic socialization experiences both *determine* and *are determined by* individuals' human capital (particularly that which is acquired in the family, in the educational system, and in the labour market), they are also expected to work as efficiency and incentive factors. Linguistic socialization experiences work as efficiency factors because additional or higher-level skills and abilities (such as educational or professional diplomas and experiences, as well as positive contacts with any language) promote further language acquisition, (McManus and Welch, 1983; Portes and Schauffler, 1996; Dustmann, 1997; Esser, 2006) but they also work as incentive factors, because individuals expect specific gains when combining more language abilities with more education, labour market experience, or previous language skills. Of particular importance is language social status (Baker and Hornberger, 2001:26, 32), an incentive factor to learn and maintain a language, an index of the value and usability of a given language. This is reflected, for instance, in existing language supports at both formal and informal levels, such as in government services, politics, the educational system, the military, the mass media, the cultural domain, religious structures, and sports, and also at the international level. Moreover, demographic assessments of the structure of the population from a given immigrant or language background reveal further opportunities to practice and use languages, which can work both as exposure and incentive factors. For instance, the absolute numbers of a minority language group at national and local levels, their geographical distribution, fertility and mortality rates, marriage patterns, patterns of migration (such as age at migration, length of stay, reasons for migration, immigrant replenishment: Fishman, 1964, 1991; Gans, 1979; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990; Portes and Rumbaut, 1991; Waters, 1990; Alba and Nee 1997; Waters and Jiménez, 2005). In addition, stereotypes and/or discrimination in group relations, intra-ethnic contacts, gender, race, culture, and religion all play an additional role as incentive factors influencing individuals' and groups' attitudes and motivations to learn, acquire and practice languages.

For instance, the research findings of Giles, Bourhis and Taylor (1977) (Bourhis, 2002:653-662) corroborated the view that when native language status is high, linguistic assimilation is less likely, and significant ethnolinguistic vitality is likely to be promoted instead. On the contrary, when native language status is low, there is a higher risk of linguistic assimilation; and even when the demographics of a language group are weaker, strong institutional support and status as users of a prestige international language can compensate and produce positive effects on their ethnolinguistic vitality (with the contrary also being true). (Bourhis, 2002:653-662).

Chiswick et al.'s (2005) economic study on Australian longitudinal data applied to immigrants of different origins who arrived through various procedures looked at intergenerational effects on children's linguistic outcomes. They used immigrant parents' self-reporting of language proficiency and uses, and focused on the effects of education level and labour market participation on language skills and transmission within the family. They found effects of gender, age, migrant generation, density of immigrant communities, as well as family structure. While their results confirmed a positive correlation between the language skills of immigrant spouses, they also revealed that female immigrant spouses tended to report lower English proficiency (apparently because they were more likely not to be working). This gender difference was pointed out as an important determinant of language transmission within the family, as children were assumed to spend more time with their mothers, who were not working. Further, although it was observed that parents could learn the national language from their children, women's national language proficiency did not necessarily improve with the arrival of children within the family because decreasing female labour supply, thus, reducing their language contacts in professional settings. In addition, if children were used as interpreters, additional negative effect on their mother's, but not their father's, national language skills were observed. In sum, parental they found that language transmission varies with parental birthplace, age at migration, educational attainment, procedures of migration, length of stay in the host country (particularly whether or not this included children's earliest years), and the density of individuals with the same origin and kinship. In addition, the main predictors of the highest levels of self-reported English proficiency were related to participation in the labour market, higher-skilled occupations, and higher education. This meant further that, everything being equal, gender differences between parents decreased.

Van Tubergen and Kalmijn (2005)⁷² carried out an international comparison of a set of origin groups in several destination countries, looking at the effects of both group and institutional dimensions. Taking a macro-perspective, they compared various contextual factors, such as country of immigration (named the “destination effect”); country of origin (“origin effect”) and the combination of both (“setting” or “community” effect). In doing so they applied Chiswick and Miller’s (2001) economic concepts (exposure, efficiency and incentives), defining two hypotheses on “destination effects”: one holding that left-wing parties could (unintentionally) reduce immigrants’ exposure and incentives to national language; a second one holding that higher anti-immigrant prejudice would lead to lower exposure of immigrants to the national language due to inter-contact limitations, decreasing their chances of achieving better language skills (both hypotheses were confirmed, although the authors recognized that prejudice and proficiency could in fact stand in a two-way causal relation). Moreover, they defined four hypotheses on origin effects. The first relating positively the level of globalization of the country of origin to the social status of its language; the second relating positively the level of modernity of the country of origin to the degree of incentives to learn the language of the destination country. The first was confirmed, while the second was not: instead there was a direct relation between a high level of modernization in the country of origin, high levels of education and a higher likelihood of learning other languages. Moreover, the social and political conditions under which the immigrants migrate were also considered as a factor with a potentially determinant effect on efficiency in learning a new language. Indeed, the learning efficiency of refugees was lower than that of labour migrants. Finally, they set out other hypotheses on setting effects and additional linguistic factors. One was on the proportion of the immigrant population from the same origin, which was expected to hinder efficiency in host language acquisition, which was confirmed. The general conclusion of this international and interethnic comparative study was that family immigration biography and everyday environment tend to have a rather weak influence, while micro-level everyday circumstances, such as ethnic concentration and the quality of the immediate

⁷² They collected and standardized 19 existing immigrant surveys for nine Western countries during 1980s and 1990s, in which language proficiency was assessed for 182 groups of origin. These surveys were combined into one cross-national data set, *The International File of Immigration Surveys* (IFIS, van Tubergen 2004), and their analyses in the presented work refers to immigrants as those born outside the country of residence, above 18 years old and including both genders. In van Tubergen, Frank and Matthijs Kalmijn (2005), pp. 1412-57

living environment (like pre-school attendance) prevailed. Macro contexts such as general migration and integration policy appear to be less, if at all significant.

The main point here human capital and individual agency—any language proficiency is more highly valued when combined with higher educational attainment and/or greater occupational experience (Davila and Mora, 2004; Stolzenberg and Tienda, 2002). However, it is also true that high levels of human capital (e.g., long educational careers, experience in higher-qualified professions) may not be transferable (in Bourdieu's sense) in terms of positive effects when acquiring or acculturating to new languages if there is a lack of previous proficiency in the national language of the immigration country and/or relevant cultural and functional knowledge. Human capital refers to the need for (competent) plurilingual proficiency or general acculturation in the parents' generation, which increases the potential transferability of their human capital and consequently leads to higher returns for all generations. In the opposite case, the absence of reading and writing skills in one's native language (i.e., no education) is expected to have an additional and independent negative effect on individuals' linguistic socialization experience in the host country. Thus, voluntary migration (usually economic migration) and length of stay work act as incentive factors, with positive effects on parents' second-language acquisition, while the contrary holds for family migration, flight as a refugee, or temporary migration. Last but not least, all of these factors determining parents' socialization experiences are expected to influence their linguistic habitus, and consequently their language transmission behaviour with their children, ultimately influencing language shifts over the course of generations (Davila and Mora, 2004; Stolzenberg and Tienda, 2002). This is the focus of the next two sections, linking the importance of human capital considerations to the approaches of Fishman, Cummins and Bourdieu. The main point is that to understand language shifts, we need to understand what is involved in language transmission and acculturation, particularly in intergenerational terms.

1.4.1. Linguistic socialization experiences

“When you plan a journey from your mind into mine, remember to allow for the time difference.”⁷³

Immigrant parents’ transmission of their native language to their children is mainly a question of cultural legacy. Lahire (2005) highlights a number of specificities in the transmission of cultural heritage, such as language, as opposed to material legacies. One is that the transmission of cultural capital enriches the receiver without impoverishing the transmitter, because the economics of successful cultural transmission knows no impoverishment, no loss and no misappropriation. Second, cultural transmission is extended in time, involving repetition and the progressive installation of a *corps d’habitudes*, requiring long periods of engagement. Consequently, language transmission consists in the incorporation not only of a language (such as codes or linguistic structure) but also of schemes of verbal interaction, verbal exchange, and modes of using the language (Lahire, 2005; Fishman 1964, 1985, Bourdieu, 1991; Brizić, 2006). For this reason, anxiety, complexes, inhibitions and lower or higher self-esteem are also transmitted through language. Fourth, cultural transmission happens within socially organized situations that, unlike school learning systems, do not involve formal and explicit transmission of knowledge (Lahire, 2005, Fishman, 1991). This means that it depends heavily on family resources and strategies, and follows learning patterns different than those that apply in learning foreign languages. Fifth, because cultures change over the course of generations, to transmit and to incorporate a culture and a language is to change it. The extent of change depends on the conditions of transmission and the social relations between the transmitter and the receiver, i.e., it varies with the incorporated habits of each of the actors involved. These habits are drawn from current social contexts as well as from previous experiences and from the desire to (re)construct habits. The main focus of the present section is on the four last points: the dependency of children’s learning their immigrant parents’ native language(s) on the parents’ resources and strategies, the language shift implicit in any language transmission, language transmission as a channel for linguistic self-esteem transmission, and the role of the school within sociolinguistic dynamics.

⁷³ in Ashleigh’s cartoon from 1986, cited in Giles and Coupland (1990), pp.34.

1.4.2. Language transmission and background influence

Lambert and Fishman (1970s) confirmed that (competent) bilingualism is a question of socio-economic background, i.e., of sufficient resources. Indeed, the function and efficiency of family language transmission relies on the value of both language capital and cultural legacies, neither of which can be isolated from the specific socio-historical context that constructs children's linguistic habitus. Nevertheless, there has long been a wide consensus on the effects of parents' human capital on children's national language skills, as on their educational outcomes; but with regard to the retention, transmission and loss of languages of immigration, opinion has varied more widely. For instance, Alba, Logan, Lutz and Stults (2002) and Portes and Schauffler (1996) argued that parents' educational attainment has no influence of any kind on children's acquisition of their parents' native language retention. Further, they argued that language uses with the parents have little impact on their children's language outcomes over time, because outside the family environment children encounter few or no opportunities to use, learn or socially value their parents' native language (a similar point was made by Rumbaut, Massey and Bean, 2006). Similarly, many have highlighted that over the course of generations language becomes an experience of family intimacy, a tool for maintaining a remembered family past (Waters, 1990; Fillmore, 2005).

Similarly, Casey and Dustmann (2005) investigated the effect of parental endowment on language capital transmitted to the next generation, focusing on its consequences mainly on German proficiency and economic performance among children of immigrants born in Germany.⁷⁴ They used self-reporting by the descendants of immigrants on their language proficiency as well as on that of their parents; parents' native language was neither taken as a subject. The authors studied the relations between, on one hand, educational attainment and labour market participation in the two generations, and on the other, family structure and migration background characteristics such as living in the parental home, the existence of other siblings, and the parents' length of stay in Germany (when children were ten years old, an age that allowed to measure the effect of parental socialization in Germany while learning a language), controlling for migrant generation and gender. They applied linguistic considerations to children's formative years, they hypothesize that a native monolingual family environment (here: in the parents' native language) may hinder children's attainment of fluency in German.

⁷⁴Casey and Dustmann (2005) using German socio-economic panel (GSOEP, from 1984 – 2002).

Generational differences showed that the descendants of immigrants born in Germany showed far more fluency in German compared not only to their parents but also to their siblings born outside Germany. Further, parents' proficiency in German had an impact on their children's language proficiency and labour market performance, but this intergenerational effect decreased after a large set of family and parental background factors (such as education and labour market participation and job qualification) was controlled for. Children who had more contact with the mother in the household (particularly lower educated mothers with a lower level of German skills who did not participate in the labour market) had a lower level of proficiency in German, and themselves participated less in the labour market as well as being more likely to work in low qualified occupations. This reinforced the hypothesis that German proficiency reduced the probability of unemployment. The authors also concluded that a disadvantaged position for women is reproduced through the generations within the same family, and explained this in terms of two factors: because females had more contact with the mothers in the household of origin than males did, and were subjected to tighter control, resulting first in a low level of German language skills, and later in increased risks on the labour market, because female descendants required a higher level of German proficiency on the labour market than male descendants (because their main professional outcomes were in services, which involve more language skills than the industry jobs typical for males).

From a more sociological perspective, Portes and Schauffler (1996) took a contrasting interest in the determinants of bilingualism, and particularly of parental native language retention. They investigated the self-reported language uses and proficiency of descendants of migrants (some born in USA, others not).⁷⁵ As in the previous studies, parents' educational attainment, profession, and social context were expected to play a role. The social context was measured through governmental or societal forces that potentially devalued the parental language, but also in relation to the size and economic diversity of the co-ethnic community.⁷⁶ They hypothesized that in contexts where the community was large enough, economic incentives would promote proficiency in the parental language, thus leading to widespread bilingualism. In addition, language assimilation was expected to vary directly with the demographic dispersion of the immigrant group and with the length of US residency. Another hypothesis was that parental socio-economic status would have a positive effect on language assimilation

⁷⁵ They used longitudinal data from the CLIS study on teenagers descendants of post-1965 immigrants of different origins in USA (1993-2001), analysing, like in the previous studies, descendants self-reported language variables, on both English and parents' native languages proficiency and preferences (reliable and valid as mentioned by Fishman and Terry 1969), Portes and Schauffler (1996)

⁷⁶ See discussion on Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Massey, Goldring and Durand, 1994; in Portes and Schauffler, 1996:12

but none on parental language retention. For instance, they considered that higher educated and wealthier parents could wish either to transmit their language or to focus on language assimilation. Their results confirmed that specific socio-economic and demographic background characteristics of the family and the community (such as age, national origin and length of stay in the US), combined with different degrees of “welcomingness” towards each migration origin were important predictors. This confirmed their hypothesis on parental social status, co-national networks and contextual enhancements and obstacles. Finally, girls were more likely than boys to retain their parents’ language and become fully bilingual, revealing, like the previous study, gendered language socialization strategies within families.

Taking a more demographic approach, Filhon (2009) studied the transmission of languages within families of migrant origin from North Africa, using survey data on family history in France. The author hypothesized that language transmission in the family would not only depend on the place given to native languages within the family, but also on existing opportunities to learn and use non-national native languages outside the home, and, further, on the children’s future trajectories and practices (for instance, educational careers or partner choices). Further, she investigated the effect that knowledge of the parental native language may have in distancing children from their parents’ cultural universe, and on the role of language as a tool for the negotiation of identity. Filhon (2009) showed that parents with higher occupational qualifications had higher proficiency in French and invested more in the transmission of French but also in bilingualism. In contrast, parents with less qualified occupations or lesser participation in the labour market tended more to transmitted their native language exclusively. Moreover, and as previously observed, gender differences were mainly related to mothers’ labour market participation. Where mothers worked, both parents showed similar behaviour in terms of languages uses and transmission, depending further specific professional qualifications. Finally, Filhon (2009) observed specific variations in the language transmission behaviours of language minority groups within national immigrant origin groups, such as Berber speakers among North African immigrants: less qualified parents were more likely to transmit both Berber and Arabic, while more qualified parents preferred to transmit mainly Berber or Berber together with French language. (Filhon, 2009:128)

Taking a linguistics-based approach, Brizić (2006) investigated the linguistic success of the children of Turkish immigrants in Western European societies. Brizić gave particular attention to low linguistic self-esteem, which is associated with language and educational

underachievement, proposing a Linguistic Capital Model to account for background differences in language proficiency among the children of immigrants. (Brizić, 2006:344). To explain the observed unsuccessful linguistic outcomes, Brizić drew on Sasse's concept of "incomplete language acquisition," referring to situations where parents' comprehensive academic proficiency in any language is limited.⁷⁷ These situation could occur when the home language was in contrast to the official school language, the latter serving the political purpose of becoming individuals' "new first language." Further, when individuals are not exposed to all repertoires of the official language, due to the lack of education or short school careers, and additionally experienced the imposition of this language under strong discriminatory circumstances in relation to their own language background, risking to loose their native language in favour of a dominant one, but with incomplete language acquisition. This can happen in the country of origin or in the country of immigration if parents migrate at very early age. Brizić emphasized that situations of this kind exert a strong negative effect on individuals' language proficiency and self-esteem, both in academic and everyday conversational contexts. Further, it is expected to have a strong intergenerational impact, as documented in research on language shift. When parents opt to transmit language(s) that they do not completely master, either linguistically or emotionally, the effects are reflected in the efficiency of family communication, and in children's language uses and outcomes. Thus, what matters when trying to understand language shifts and intergenerational acculturation is not only parents' language *proficiency*, but also their linguistic *self-confidence* and *identity* (Brizić 2006).

Thus, the language changes that occur over the course of the generations that follow a migratory movement are not a straightforward story. Understanding them is the goal of the research presented here. First, we know from Fishman's "graded intergenerational disruption scale" (GIDS) that language transmission and maintenance through the generations after migration depends mainly on the family, and sometimes, for transmission and uses, on language community dynamics, because the efficiency of minority language transmission depends on its role as a language of solidarity (Fishman) in "low varieties" of language (Ferguson) or *Gemeinschaft* (Tonnie). The learning of a minority language through institutional arrangements, like school, media or other institutions, follows a correspondingly institutional language learning format. For the minority language group, this is not so much related to concrete language uses, but rather for purposes of recognition of language of status

⁷⁷ See discussion where Brizic recovers Sasse's concept of „incomplete language acquisition,” in Brizic (2006), pp.349.

(Fishman) in “high varieties” of language (Ferguson) or *Gesellschaft* (Tonnies) (Fishman, 1991, 2001) – although it influences individuals’ preferences. This separation of purposes recalls and reinforces the previously discussed need for differentiated social space for each language, to understand the dynamics of minority language loss or maintenance.

Second, we also know that intentions and strategies differ among families. Parents’ transmission of their native language may reflect the intention to transmit a cultural legacy or, inversely, to induce a quick shift towards acculturation inside the family. In both cases, research indicates that the most influential element is parents’ socialization experiences in different languages, both in their country of origin and in their country of immigration (as shown by Brizić). These experiences go beyond human capital indicators taken generically (such as level of education and professional experience), because they refer to specific experiences in particular languages (Brizić, 2001; Norton, 2000). Nevertheless, each choice with regard to language transmission can reflect specific purposes with regard to social mobility.

For instance, lower educated parents may focus on native language transmission for purposes of social control due to their limited resources, leaving children’s national language assimilation for socialization outside the home (particularly through the school system); higher educated parents, who supposedly have more facilities for native language transmission, may aim to transmit their native language to increase their children’s linguistic capital and trigger particular gains for their children in social mobility terms. In contrast, other parents are instead motivated by acculturation strategies, not aiming to pass on advantages based on their previous language capital because it is perceived low-status, along, potentially, with reasons that can be economic, political or even both. They thus concentrate their resources instead on transmitting the dominant language(s). Their motivations can rely on the will to quickly immerse their children in the language of the system, to compensate for their own experiences, such as low schooling, low qualified jobs, and limited social networks; or when parents are more educated or hold higher professional qualifications, the choice of an acculturation strategy in language transmission may be due to their experience of the untransferability of their own human capital in the immigration country, and/or experiences of discrimination due to their origins or language background. In sum, parents’ choices about language transmission are not always just a question of

“language utility” in the host country, but also reflect subjective experiences on the basis of which individuals evaluate their own capital, and, further, are sometimes associated to previous experiences in their native country. (Brizić, 2006:349) In other words, as Brizić (2006),⁷⁸ summarized, the socio-political assessment and treatment of a specific minority language group (and not simply affiliation to such a group in general) is expected to exert the strongest influence on individuals’ linguistic proficiency and behaviour, as well as on the collective experience of group identity.

In sum, when investigating language patterns for immigrant families over the course of generations, we need to consider the specificities of their social and cultural contexts in order to understand the relevance of their specific socio-economic background. The extent of expected changes in a given language depends, on one side, on its societal utility, and, on the other, on the conditions of transmission and the social relations between the transmitter and the receiver, as well as on their desire to (re)construct habits (Lahire, 2005). “When we talk of intergenerational communication we are talking of intercultural relations: different cultural groups (internally differentiated) who possess different values and beliefs about talk, different social and existential agendas, and different language codes.” (Giles and Coupland, 1990:33-34) Thus, it is also important to recall that immigrant parents’ linguistic socialization diverges from those of their children because it is differently affected by contextual determinants, which have different meanings for each generation. To understand these meanings is to understand the impact of native language transmission and language shift for each generation. This is the subject of the next section.

1.4.3. Language patterns in the family as indicators of intergenerational acculturation and intergenerational communication

“When we talk of intergenerational communication we are talking of intercultural relations.”
(Giles and Coupland, 1990:33-34)

To understand intergenerational communication between immigrants and their descendants, it is first necessary to distinguish between language uses (with parents, siblings, partner, children) and language proficiency for each family member. Previous research suggests

⁷⁸ See discussion, where the author recalls Sasse, 1992b; Fishman, 1999 and Bourdieu, 1983; Brizic, 2006

that in the large majority of the cases, the language preferred for use with parents is the parents' own native language. This is observed even when this language (or these languages) do not correspond to children's language uses with siblings, partners and friends, and is certainly independent from the children's own proficiency. In other words, while the combination of exposure and incentive factors hinders or accelerates the pace of national language acculturation and parents' native language loss (as mentioned above), they have a lesser impact on language exposure at home with the parents.

Thus, some children are indeed bilinguals, others are mainly competent in their parents' native language (more rare), others show assimilated language proficiency with little knowledge of their parents' native language, others have limited knowledge in any language (rare). Peal, Lambert and Cummins classified different language combinations and their context-dependence. They classified individuals as "balanced bilinguals" (with a similar level of competence in both languages, specifying that "*balance* does not imply complete equilinguality"⁷⁹), "unbalanced bilinguals" (whose difficulties in coping with two languages were not successfully managed), and "unilinguals" (who demonstrating proficiency in just one language). Lambert (1975) later distinguished between "additive" bilingualism and two kinds of "subtractive" bilingualism: a gradual loss of proficiency in the parents' native language that leads to "dominant bilingualism"; or limited proficiency in both languages (a kind of "semilingualism").⁸⁰ Further, their research findings did show that the explanation of underdeveloped bilingualism is not so much attributable to linguistic factors (such as language learning forms and cognitive abilities) as to a "history of assets" (such as SES background). This recalls Fishman's "elitist/folk" bilingualism (August and Hakuta, 2005:233-245) —"elite" bilingualism, presented as a matter of choice, "characterised the educated and upper classes of many societies throughout the centuries. (...) has never been an educational problem"; while "folk" bilingualism, presented not a matter of choice but of social struggle, "the result of ethnic groups in contact and competition (...) for the most part, associated with negative cognitive and academic consequences, and there are many sociolinguistic factors which can be evoked to account, at least partially, for such findings"

⁷⁹ Classifications from Cummins (1975) study on grade six children from English speaking home backgrounds who were attending a French-English bilingual program in Canada. Results indicated that those "balanced bilinguals" and "unilinguals" did not diverge much in verbal and fluency scales, and were both substantially higher compared to "unbalanced bilinguals"; this was different in the verbal originality, where "unilingual" scored at a similar level to the "non-balanced" group and substantially lower than the "balanced group". See literature overview in Cummins, J. (1970s), in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), pp.31-36

⁸⁰ Types of bilingualism: additive bilingualism (high levels in both languages) has positive cognitive effects; dominant bilingualism (one of the languages is like a native-like level) has neither positive nor negative cognitive effects; semilingualism (low level in both languages may be balanced or dominant) has negative cognitive effects. in Cummins, J. (1970s), in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), pp.72. Also, like Macnamara 1966 "balance effect" hypothesis (decreasing L1 competence while acquiring L2), or "semilingualism" of Hansengard 1968, skutnabb-Kangas 1975 in Scandinavian. see discussion in Cummins, J. (1970s), in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001) pp.39-40

(Paulston, 1975; Fishman, 1967; Baker, and Hornberger, 2001:38). Thus, each of these combinations necessarily reflects diverse language acculturation patterns in the family: in some family environments communication is more structured and effective, while in others it is more problematic. In cases where there is a significant degree of dissonant communication, the intergenerational transmission of symbolic and material resources is interrupted, and there is a risk of family disruption as well. In addition, the unequal distribution of language proficiencies among members of the same family may have significant effects on the distribution of roles (for instance, husband vs. wife, older and younger adult generations, or parents vs. children).

Portes and Rumbaut (2001) studied the impact of the children of immigrants losing their parents' native language on both children and their families. They analyzed key empirical indicators of *generational consonance/dissonance* and psychological well-being. Their results indicated that, with few exceptions, the children spoke better English language than their parents did, and spoke English better than their parents' native language. Even Spanish, the most common foreign language, trailed English by a wide margin. Correlations between children's knowledge of foreign languages and of English were negative, confirming the connection between the propensity to lose the former and the acquisition of the latter. The exception was in bilingual outcomes, wherein both languages were retained. Again, although almost all respondents said that they spoke their parents' native language when speaking with their parents, with time these language uses at home dropped to half. Thus, and as expected, knowledge, use of and preference for English increased consistently over time and throughout the generations.

Moreover, only a minority of surveyed teenagers were bilinguals, while the majority were English language monolinguals, while a considerable number of respondents showed *limited* bilingualism (meaning, an inability to speak their parents' language while lacking full fluency in English, and often caught with a growing stigma about speaking a foreign language) (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001:130). Due to certain parents' failure to learn the national language, these results were widely interpreted to suggest dissonant acculturation within families of immigrant background. However, there were distinct patterns of family linguistic acculturation, which varied more with social background than with parents' specific origins. For example, children of Cuban

background, largely born in the United States and from highly social diverse backgrounds, were deliberately integrated into co-ethnic institutions, attending bilingual private schools and protected from outside discrimination. They also showed a confident shift into the mainstream culture, mainly preferring the English language. In contrast, children of Mexican background, mainly from working class families, who were integrated into mainstream institutions and inner-city public schools, were also more subjected to outside discrimination. They tended to prefer the use of Spanish, a fact that these authors explained as a reactive process whereby their parents' language and culture were adopted as symbols of pride against external threats.

In a logistic regression applied to "fluent" bilinguals, Portes and Rumbaut used a set of predictors limited to objective and subjective characteristics of the student, family and school. Parental characteristics (such as national background, socio-economic status, household values and norms) were shown to heavily influence language transmission options and children's language preferences. In addition, place of birth, concentration of co-nationals in school or a large general presence of the immigrant population, institutions and media (newspapers, radio, TV) made further important predictive contributions. Compared to these factors, the respondents' own educational level and their parents' place of birth (in the United States or abroad) carried less weight. Again, bilingualism was shown to be more common among females, reflecting differential patterns of socialization according to gender, which was explained as in the studies presented above, by the fact that girls were more sheltered.

Further, they described family patterns in terms of *consonant* or *dissonant* intergenerational language acculturation, based on Portes' and Zhou's segmented assimilation theory. (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001:44- 69) They used children's reports on their proficiency in their parents' native language, and on their parents' national language proficiency (see Table 2). In contrast to previous typologies on language shifts, that of Portes and Rumbaut characterizes intergenerational language shifts comparing directly children and parents in terms of intergenerational communication and acculturation in the family of origin. And although they measured language shift patterns in terms of acculturation, the authors excluded the parents' language background and children's proficiency in national language from their typology (taking the latter taken as given, and extensively using it later in the detailed explanation of

each profile.) Thus, the authors measured the effect of bilingual competences on family intergenerational communication and acculturation indirectly, while investigating the impact of gradual “native” language loss in the family more directly.

Their typology identified two types of consonant acculturation, two types of dissonant acculturation, and one type of selective acculturation. 1) *Consonant acculturation* was said to occur on the basis of parental guidance and mutual intergenerational support, in a joint family attempt to merge into the mainstream language of the society. Children showed limited or no knowledge of their parents’ native language, and also had little contact with individuals from a similar immigrant background. This also meant equality for all family members in both private and public spaces in terms of the national language, but less so in relation to extended family and to the parents’ native language community (Norton, 2000). The main expected outcome in terms of children’s language outcomes was *national dominant*. 2) *Partial consonant acculturation* is similar to the former, but in this case the parents knowledge of the national language as a second language is more limited, although the main language outcome expected for the children was still national dominant. Family communication was expected to be less effective than in the previous situation, and children’s ties with their parents’ native language community even thinner.

Two other types of intergenerational acculturation reflect a challenge to parental authority, either in a reversal of family roles or in “generational reversal” while placing children at risk. In some cases, the private sphere can be characterized as a “Tower of Babel” (Norton, 2000). One is 3) *dissonant acculturation*, wherein parents remain strongly attached to the immigrant community, but isolated from the larger society and having a low degree of proficiency in the national language. In this case children show a dissonant language pattern which reflects a rupture with the family language background and the immigrant community. The expected language outcome for the children can be either limited bilingualism (more rare) or national language dominance, both resulting in potential intergenerational communication problems. The other “dissonant” type is 4) *dissonant acculturation and role reversal*, meaning a loss of both parental language and authority over the course of one generation. As in the previous type, parents are isolated from the larger society and show limited or no proficiency in the national language, but differently, neither the parents nor the children maintain

significant contact with the immigrant community. Consequently, parents become more dependent on the children's language knowledge in relation to the surrounding environment. Further, the children's limited acquisition of their parents' native language and their limited contact with the related language community prematurely frees children from parental control—a situation that, according to these authors' argument, leads to a risk of role reversal in the family. The children's expected language outcome was, again, national language dominance, but within the context of more isolation. Finally, they identified situations of *selective acculturation*, wherein children invest in both their parents' native language and the national language (*fluent* or *competent bilingualism*), independently of their parents' national language skills. These situations promote, on one hand, the preservation of parental authority and intergenerational communication, and on the other, the increasing emancipation of the children and a role for them as language “brokers,” because they are able to communicate with everyone in the family, and are potentially the main bridge between the family and the outside environment (Norton, 2000).

Table 2 - Intergeneration language knowledge and types of acculturation

Intergenerational language knowledge and types of acculturation

		Children´s knowledge on parental language		
		None	Limited	Fluent
Parents´ knowledge of "national" language	None	Dissonant acculturation and	Partial dissonant acculturation	Selective acculturation
	Limited	Partial dissonant acculturation		
	Fluent	Consonant acculturation		

in Portes and Rumbaut (2001), chapt 6, Legacies

In sum, Portes and Rumbaut's (2001) typology of intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation highlighted the fact that language shift within the family can be detrimental to at least some parts of the population. As other researchers before them, such as Fishman, Fillmore and Jon Reyhner had, or more recently Norton (2000), had argued, the loss of immigrant parents' native language leads to two contradictory outcomes: on one hand, the expected "language assimilation," which apparently allows greater communication and the integration of minority groups into the larger society, and which is expected to result in positive effects for social mobility; on the other hand, the risk of cultural dissonance within the family, and because it isolates the two generations from one another, which can also endanger strategies for social mobility. (Bean and Stevens, 2003). Last but not least, individuals' strategies of emancipation through language can lead to extremely varied outcomes which cannot always be separated from family dynamics, due to the importance of social networks (Norton, 2000). The next section focuses on school as an important institutional factor.

1.4.4. Bilingual education and the role of school

To teach fish to swim?

Education is one of the factors most strongly associated to individuals' language outcomes and linguistic self-esteem, both directly and indirectly, in the form of influences whose effects extend over multiple generations. Acknowledging this relational strength, migration studies research has given particular attention to the association between educational underachievement and low national language proficiency among the children of immigrants, confirming the presence of significant interactions between social, cultural, linguistic and school factors (Baker, and Hornberger, 2001:63-95). However, less attention has been given to bilingual proficiency, which will be the main focus of this section.

As discussed above, sociologists and economists have, in general, agreed on a general human capital assumption with regard to school achievement: more language skills (in any language) promote more schooling and vice versa, as cognitive skills for language learning are also gained through more schooling. However, there has been more agreement on this positive relation between individuals' school performance and national language proficiency (McManus, Gould and Welch, 1983; Portes and

Schauffler, 1996; Dustmann 1997; Esser 2006; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990), and less on its relation to (competent) bilingualism, over and above the acquisition of the national language.⁸¹ Educational science schools suggested that bilingualism has a limited role “in the development of causal structures” for cognitive development, because linguistic functioning is said to depend to a great extent on non-linguistic functioning.⁸² However, since the 1970s, research has shown that bilingualism can accelerate the development of verbal and non-verbal abilities, as well as cognitive flexibility (Baker and Hornberger, 2001:26-55), with a consequent impact on individuals’ schooling.

More recently, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) and Hakuta and Diaz (1985)⁸³ concluded that bilingualism is indeed a significant predictor of subsequent academic performance, while the opposite causal relation was weaker. Others have presented extensive arguments along contrasting lines, suggesting instead that assimilative language acquisition constitutes the core of the relevant processes for the school and social integration of immigrants and their descendants. Esser’s (2006) literature overview focuses on this kind of approaches, which hold that bilingual skills do not (generally) pay off. He argued that the finding of many reliable studies leads instead only to the conclusion that if ethnic enclaves and markets are sufficiently large, disadvantages created by linguistic and ethnic stratification can be attenuated by bilingual skills; otherwise, he said, ethnic resources are not an effective counterweight to ethnic stratification arising from linguistic and other deficits. The author agreed that school context plays a role in terms of language integration, although he argued that it is mainly reliable when the proportion of children of low social class is high (influencing the quality of teachers, school equipment, teachers’ expectations, stereotyping (vulnerability), and the intellectual climate), promoting the image of a “common fate.” And though he agreed that discrimination effects occur, he argued that these do not suffice to explain the previously mentioned effects of social background and ethnic concentration. Esser (2006) further criticizes the language interdependence hypothesis, arguing that in socially disadvantageous school environments, everyday (and

⁸¹ See also discussion in Esser 2006, referring to research made in Zhou and Bankston 1994; Bankston and Zhou 1995; Rumbaut 1994; Portes and Hao 1998.

⁸² see J. Cummins, overview on existent studies until 1970s on the relationship between bilingualism and cognitive development, discussing Piagetian school (on developmental psychology and cognitive development applied to pedagogical sciences), Macnamara’s (1970, from psychology in McGill University) arguments and Furth’s (1966, developmental psychologist who worked in Jean piaget) studies on the cognitive effects of deafness and linguistic factors, in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), pp.20-55.

⁸³ Hakuta and Diaz (1985) samples on Spanish-speaking puerto-rican students immersed in bilingual education program in New Haven, although their final usable sample was small, all in Portes and Rumbaut (2001)

subjectively measured) language skills in parents' native language show no independent influence on national language reading performance, while everyday national language skills have a very strong independent effect on reading performance at school. Moreover, he argued, use of the parents' native language at home or with friends lead to increased negative effects on children's reading performance at school (as observed by Casey and Dustman, 2005).

However, important avenues of research have opened up in the examination of school approaches to minority language groups and individuals from different socio-economic background, enriching the debate with multidisciplinary views. For instance, Fillmore (2005) analysed the impact of recent education policies and practices in the United States on early second language learning, through monolingual preschool education that is intended to allow children to become English speakers by age of five. The author was particularly interested in examining the effect of national language acquisition on loss of the parents' native language among these children,⁸⁴ studying the phenomenon of "subtractive bilingualism" (Lambert 1975, 1977, 1981) interpreted not as a form of "bilingualism" but as the erosion of the children's primary language. Fillmore (2005) found that when children were exposed to a national language that was intended to dominate their practices before their parents' native language was fully established, the loss of the latter was accelerated, as well as perception that it had no or limited function or value. In addition, and as previously shown by Collier (1987) and Cummins (1980s), dropping the first language at a very early age increased the risk of failure to learn the second language correctly due to a lack of grammar and semantic structure in the first language. Thus, last but not least, when language acculturation resulted in the loss of the parental language(s), this was not necessarily in the interest of either the child or the society at large. According to Fillmore, the trend of "forced-march acculturation" (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001) and the resulting subtractive bilingual outcomes (Lambert, 1975) has reinforced the critical consequence of parental language stigmatization, an outcome that risked being contraproductive with respect to the aim of successful integration. (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001:130). For Fillmore, the crucial point here was

⁸⁴ The research sample consisted in interviews made with parents of different origins living in the United States, who were not bilingual for their large majority and showed little knowledge on English language, and whose children attended either English-only or bilingual preschool programs in the United States. The data was controlled by family structure variables (family size: number of children: 1-2; 3-4; 5 or more; age of children; both parents at home or not; head of household), migration background (length of residence: less than 5 years, 5 – 10, over 10), as well as language and educational variables related to the children (childhood language, age entering school, language uses with parents and siblings). Fillmore (2005). 289-307

that language loss not only diminishes the individual's linguistic skills, but also affects the social, emotional, cognitive and educational development of individuals and their families, with potentially disruptive effects on family relations and cohesion.

Taking a different perspective, August and Hakuta (2005) analyzed the linguistic outcomes of different types of educational programs. Their findings suggested that the attainment of bilingualism through different conditions of exposure does not lead to differences in its fundamental cognitive organization, because other social settings determine its potential continuation. While in some specific settings, the teaching of the national language at various levels of education (including tertiary education) can result in the maintenance of *fluent* bilingualism (meaning the opportunity to structure the parents' native language), in other social settings, similar teaching may lead to monolingualism (meaning loss of the parents' native language). Particularities of the settings may include social pressures outside the family and language community that lead the children to become aware of the use and value of their parents' native language (e.g. understanding that others are not going to learn their parents' native language). Thus, these authors argue that the answer is mainly based on the societal context in which children learn the national language. If linguistic or ethnic diversity is not socially valued, children may show similar motivations to stop using their parents' native language independently of whether or not they attend bilingual classes in school, and sometimes even long before they have mastered the national language.

Thus, and differently from Esser (2006), Cummins's linguistic arguments also suggest that the main issue for linguistic success is neither the possibility of a "home-school language switch" or "linguistic mismatch" problem,⁸⁵ nor the invariants of personality traits or cognitive abilities. As seen in the overview of his work above, the main issue with regard to linguistic success is, first, about input levels in terms of first-language cognitive/academic language proficiency (CALP) and its interdependence with the second language; Second, later, their effect on school success relies not on pure linguistic and cognitive traits but rather on socially constructed relational traits, which result from unequal power relations (as argued by August and Hakuta, 2005).⁸⁶ Thus, while Cummins agreed that neither literacy nor biliteracy are

⁸⁵ "Home-school language switch" or "linguistic mismatch" hypothesis argues that there is inevitable academic difficulties since children cannot learn through a language they do not understand, because is neither their home and mother tongue.

⁸⁶ For instance, in Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner and Fillenbaum, 1960, and Anisfeld, Bogo and Lambert, 1961, in Giles and Couplan, chapt 2 pp.57 (as later for MacIntyre and Gardner in 1989), or, here, Norton 2000.

sufficient for successful education, he argued for the need to acknowledge bilingualism as a valuable cultural and economic asset. Individuals' language and education abilities are social constructs that intersect with their social identity. Thus, second language acquisition studies need to address the inequitable power relations that are reflected in social structure opportunities for learners to practice languages inside and outside the classroom, so to assess the real effects of bilingualism on school success. In other words, neither learners' low linguistic self-esteem, nor any "communicative anxiety" or "affective filters," are pure linguistic or cognitive traits, because they are intrinsically associated to the value assigned to their parents' native language in national language learning contexts (as in August and Hakuta, 2005). And although language interdependence is more time-dependent and centred on writing skills in different languages (Cummins), each language's threshold level is necessarily related to linguistic self-esteem, and particularly to "communicative anxiety," where oral skills and interaction situations reflect the (lack of) acceptance of diversity (also Norton, 2000.)

Thus, Esser does not consider that the positive effects of language interdependence are concentrated mainly in reading and writing skills, and are expected to have an effect only after a long period of contact (the end of primary school, as argued by Cummins). Second, although he emphasizes the importance of socio-economic segregation in the school environment, he offers no further considerations on schools' approach to language and cultural diversity, thus not contradicting earlier conclusions on the effects of pupils' backgrounds being treated as having low value—the evidence that educational underachievement and illiteracy among minority language groups are caused by the systematic devaluation of minority groups' culture and denial of access to power and resources. For Bourdieu this was, indeed, a crucial characteristic of Western societies, where "language (de)legitimation" happens not only through interpersonal relations but mainly through institutions such as school and the labour market. (Bourdieu, 1991:24-25) Educational systems in particular, where formal credentials and qualifications involve a certain kind of objectivation of knowledge and language proficiency, are the main mechanisms for creating and sustaining existing language inequalities. (Bourdieu, 1991:24-25) This function of schools, which is inherent to the development of modern societies (as explained above), produces a cultural devaluation of minority backgrounds, through schools' focus on "functional literacy." (Baker and Hornberger, 2001:268-274) Finally, this means that the social and cultural distances between groups do not explain the entire story. When

lower social and cultural distances are not enough to for “(real) opportunities” to be provided by “exposure” (contact/interaction), it is because the importance of other contextual considerations (such as origins, language background, gender, age) is greater (Norton, 2000). Beyond “lack of skills and motivation,” when learning and retaining a language, individuals may face a lack of opportunity that is similar to socio-economic segregation. “What opportunities are available to ‘second-language learners’ to interact with ‘target-language speakers’?(...) If learners do not make progress in learning, teachers cannot assume that learners do not wish to learn the second language or that they are unmotivated or inflexible; perhaps the learners are struggling because they cannot speak under conditions of marginalization.”⁸⁷

The main point of disagreement between the presented approaches is that the former emphasize the need for linguistic assimilation to better integrate into society (here, in terms of school and national language success), while for the latter, the school’s focus on “functional literacy” assigns the role of “language of integration” exclusively to the national language and devalues the languages and socio-economic backgrounds of many of its pupils. This form of school functioning favours middle-class families, with high levels of “functional literacy” and academic achievement, while jeopardizing many minority languages. Consequently, both families and pupils often “assign their ‘linguistic products’ a limited value, and sometimes eliminate themselves from the educational system.”(Bourdieu, 1991:21; Paulston, 2003; Garcia and Schiffman, 2006; Baker and Hornberger, 2001:37-41) Like the legitimation of “symbolic violence” identified by Bourdieu:⁸⁸ “those least inclined and least able to accept and adopt the language of the school are also those exposed for the shortest time to this language and to educational monitoring, correction and sanction.” (Bourdieu, 1991:62) Fishman argued further: “our political and cultural foundations are weakened when large populations groups (sic) do not feel encouraged to express, safeguard, and to develop behaviour patterns that are traditionally meaningful to them. Our national creativity and personal purposefulness are rendered more shallow when constructive channels of self-expression are blocked and when alienation from ethnic-cultural roots becomes the necessary price of self-respect and social advancement, regardless of the merits of the cultural

⁸⁷ See Norton’s discussion around Freire 1970, 1985; Giroux 1988, 1992; Simon 1987, 1992, in Norton (2000), citation pp.16.

⁸⁸ See Bourdieu overview on the role of school within the homogeneization of the language in western societies – from the need to build the common consciousness of the nation (Whorf’s or Humboldt’s theories of language), applied to Durkheim concept of education as an instrument of intellectual and moral intégration; to the instrumentalization of school as the principal and only means of access to administrative positions, becoming the main institution that has the monopoly in the large scale production of producers / consumers, i.e., is where the reproduction of the market within which the social value of the linguistic competence (its capacity to function as linguistic capital) happens or ceases to exist, in Bourdieu, 1991 pp.21-25; 45-57. Lahire 2005, pp.203

components of these roots.”⁸⁹ Focusing on reversing the historical pattern of devaluating particular identities, Lambert (1975), Fishman (1976), and Cummins defended bilingual educational programs that promote biliteracy for both minority and majority children, a matter of empowerment through biliteracy (Baker and Hornberger, 2001:258-260). For this purpose, they added that to combat low educational achievement in minority language groups, formal education should focus not only on “functional literacy” but instead should also spread “cultural” and “critical” literacy—again, to members of both minority and majority groups.⁹⁰

1.5. Conclusion

To understand the processes whereby individuals of immigrant origins are incorporated into societies, we have to understand, as Lapeyronnie (1993) and Fishman argued, that societies have experienced profound evolutions. These have been marked by the differentiation of two social processes: the *participation level* of groups and individuals in economic terms, in terms of acquisition of goods and full and complete citizenship; and their *social integration level*, i.e., the degree of involvement of individuals in cultural and social conflict, as well as definition of the self and recognition of subjectivities. Both authors examine the participation of social actors and their levels of social integration, as well as the political management of these relations. In this sense, they unveil how societies hinder the potential bilingualism of individuals, while acculturation approaches that focus on participation levels give limited attention to individuals’ degree of involvement in the linguistic conflicts that emerge from migration phenomena. The latter have not given enough attention to the way societal institutions can embrace diversity in cultural heritage, neither by recognizing its provision of cognitive and social enrichment, nor in focusing sufficiently on the impact of monolingual pressures toward social change at the individual level—i.e., on individuals’ linguistic self-esteem and social identity.

The nineteenth century school led to great achievements in the spread of literacy, and knowledge and democratization of opportunities for social mobility, but it stratified society as much as it liberated it. Particularly those from backgrounds that are less associated to the

⁸⁹ citation from Fishman 1966, as cited in 1972a, pp.23, cited here in pp.35-36, in Garcia, Ofelia, Rakhmiel Peltz, Harold Schiffman and Gella Fishman (2006) pp.35-36

⁹⁰ Evoking Freire e Macedo (1987) and E D Hirsch (1987), here Cummins distinguishes “functional literacy” (ability to read and write adequately and accordingly to school system norms), from “cultural literacy” (ability to share experiences and points of reference within and interpretative community in order to adequately comprehend the context) and “critical” literacy” (ability to analyse the division of power and resources, ex to understand which social purposes are served through both “functional and cultural literacies”), in Cummins, J. (1990s), in Baker, C. and N. H. Hornberger (2001), pp.268-274

uniformized culture and social references proclaimed by this movement, have often experienced school culture as being “pushed” on them, while being less motivated to be “pulled” into school with their background references. The descendants of immigrants are, by definition, part of the latter. Their “linguistic integration” into society implies a conflict between different cultural and social/linguistic contexts, in continuous confrontation throughout their socialization. School and family, the main institutions for language transmission and learning, work as a durable set of social relations within this conflict. Both endow individuals with power, status and resources of various kinds, in connection with a recognized form of authority that does not stem from the words alone. (Bourdieu, 1991:106-111) The incorporation of a language, a code, a linguistic structure, is above all the incorporation of schemes of verbal interaction, verbal exchanges, and modes of using a language, wherein social class and origins are intrinsically related. Thus, these relations of transmitted power are expressed within a set of socio-historical conditions on the sides of both production and reception.

School, where language transmission mainly happens through the promotion of “functional literacy,” is usually rooted in a single “language of integration” that devalues pupils’ linguistic diversity. In general, this results in the loss of many “potential bilingual” individuals, and the most expected outcome is language assimilation and native language loss. In particular, children who find the school universe completely new and foreign with respect to their family background are those who depend most fully on the school to appropriate the elements of a “written school culture”. (Lahire, 2005:214) The children of parents without formal education who become achievers themselves in school become the most pure and assimilated product of the school system because they depending on it completely to succeed. (Lahire, 2005:215) In more conflictual situations, low levels of linguistic skills (or semilingualism) may also happen, combined with school underachievement. However, sometimes the devaluation of the parents’ native language begins at home, when the family privileges language acculturation strategies, incorporating a sense of their own native language’s low utility into its own practices, between “instrumental” or “integrative” motivations. However, the cost of this pattern is the loss of family symbolic, affective and material resources (as discussed above). Acknowledging these consequences, some families with similar starting conditions show bi-cultural “integrative” strategies, and still others focus instead on their cultural background while trying to promote more bilingual “instrumental” strategies.

The linguistic consequences of immigration phenomena are conflictual because they are processes of social change, which happen within a specific set of socio-historical conditions. To understand the linguistic outcomes of the descendants of immigrants' (in terms of proficiency, self-esteem, communicative anxiety, and school achievement) is, thus, to understand the way society (individuals, families, schools, labour market, politics, etc.) deal with these social changes. And while at the 19th century, and the beginning of the 20th century, the social change predominantly aimed for in the course of this conflict was homogenization, similar homogenization pressures today reflect a resistance against the increasing cultural plurality that resulted from the mass immigration that began the end of the 20th century. Thus, this response to diversity is not new (recalling times when individuals from socially disadvantaged backgrounds and regional minorities faced similar "linguistic integration conflicts"), and its main goal has remained the same: for individuals to achieve a level of competence in a "national language," they have to be socially and culturally assimilated and dominated. The context has changed, but the increasing diversity observed in Western European schools, and particularly in large urban areas, continues, as before, to be dealt with through a single "language of integration," irrespective of pupils' diversity of backgrounds. And even where bilingual programs have been put into place, they are either rare or not very systematic (see the next chapter), and school continues to hinder "bilingual potentiality" because it prefers to reproduce the model than to change it, i.e., to "teach fish to swim." (Bourdieu, 1991:119)

Moreover, according to some interpretations, linguistic outcomes other than national language monolingualism are an indicator of social disruption. Assimilationist approaches, in particular, tend to conclude that parents' native language practices are one of the main hindrances to national language acquisition. With regard to the descendants of immigrants this is often associated to significant social and cultural contrasts, frequent recourse to "foreign" language practices in the family of origin and in community networks, ethnic segregation and enclaves, and not rarely to risks of new types of semilingualism. Others, instead, argue that these phenomena are indicators of a need for social change, suggesting instead that such problematic underachievement results from the implementation of linguistic assimilationist policies in increasingly diverse societies. Indeed, societies are changing their approaches to integration at the same pace as mass immigration phenomena, as shown by increasing demographic, cultural, social and linguistic diversity, and individuals' claims for social equality are combined with demanding for rights for culture diversity recognition. However,

school, one of the main societal institutions charged with promoting productive learning for future economic and political integration, has been rather “diversity blind,” risking the twofold reproduction of a long-standing social problem. To “pull” individuals into social participation thus implies not “pushing” them with a homogeneous foreign culture, but allowing more balanced diversity of relations, such as in language. Thus, when attention is turned to processes of social change and cultural conflict around language, conservative monolingual models come to seem likely to be less effective than innovative “diversity-inclusive” ones. And, contrary to assimilative arguments sometimes presented in relation to the issue of social segregation, it is exactly where the individuals are the most socially and culturally segregated that this innovation is the most needed to ensure future opportunities. So to explain the condemnation of bilingualism, we need to understand, first, that it happens particularly where social segregation is greatest and not the inverse, and second, that societal institutions have to play their part in embracing cultural diversity—for the sake of both cognitive and social enrichment, which are reflected later in individuals’ linguistic self-esteem and social identity.

Chapter 2

Current language diversity and immigrant minority languages in France, Germany and the Netherlands

2.1. Introduction

The aims of this chapter are twofold: first, to discuss the management of linguistic diversity in France, Germany and the Netherlands; and second, to assess the status of different languages, and particularly Turkish, as immigrant minority languages. For this purpose, the chapter is divided into four main parts. In the first part I describe the existing variety of bilingual or plurilingual individuals within these three officially monolingual countries, focusing on the linguistic situation of immigrants and their descendants. In the second part I look at the recognition of language diversity from a top-down perspective, in the framework of international debates and official documents of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union. The third part examines national approaches to cultural diversity, focusing on the main differences and commonalities between the three countries. While setting in the context the different approaches for the relation between diversity and social equality, the particular focus in the second and third parts is on the linguistic consequences of the immigration phenomenon. The final part identifies further commonalities and differences between the three countries in terms of national language policies and immigrant minority language teaching, highlighting the place of Turkish and the enrolment of the descendants of Turkish immigrants.

2.2. Exclusion through language policy – between official and non-official language diversity

“Europe has a rich diversity of languages. This fact is usually illustrated by reference to the eleven official languages of the European Union. However, there are many more languages spoken by the inhabitants of Europe (...) referred to as ‘minority languages,’ even when in Europe as a whole there is not one majority language, because all languages are spoken by a numerical minority.”

(Extra and Gorter, 2001:1)

Officially, the mother tongue of the majority of citizens in each country of the EU is the national official language of their country, with exception of Belgium, Spain and some countries in the Baltic region (e.g. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania). In northern

western European countries about 93% of the citizens are said to have the national official language of the country as their mother tongue.⁹¹ The remaining citizens are divided between those raised either in other European languages or in non-European languages. Nevertheless, research has indicated that existing linguistic diversity is more significant than the aforementioned official picture suggests, and that the latter has made it difficult to get a clear view on the real state of language diversity in these countries.⁹²

Non-official languages are usually called minority languages, because they are expected to be spoken by a numerical minority. These languages are usually distinguished into larger groups, such as “regional minority languages,” “non-territorial languages” and “immigrant minority languages.” Commonly, this language diversity is managed within important hierarchical categorizations—with the national official languages (perceived as the language of the majority) certainly enjoying the highest status, followed by “indigenous or regional” minority languages, then “non-territorial” minority languages and, lastly, “immigrant minority languages.” (Broeder and Extra, 1999:109) Educational and political agendas have followed these hierarchical categorizations, albeit in accordance with differing political agendas.

In sociolinguistic terms, however, minority languages have more points in common than differences (Extra and Verhoeven, 1993; Extra and Gorter, 2001; Gogolin, 2002). They all follow similar trends in relation to their actual spread and the development of their domestic and public vitality; the relevant processes and determinants of language maintenance versus language shift are very similar; the relationship between language, ethnicity and identity show identical patterns; and their status as minority languages in schools, particular in the compulsory stages of primary and secondary education, have shown similar recognition. In addition, the study of all minority languages presents similar difficulties: scarce statistics rarely based on similar criteria and approaches, as well as substantial variety in legal recognition, protection and policies. Nevertheless, more information is available on the socio-demographic impact of regional and territorial languages than on that of immigrant minority languages, particularly when the latter originate from non-European countries.

⁹¹ In both EUROBAROMETER 2005 and 2006, European and Languages, Special Eurobarometer 237 and 243– Wave 63.4 and Wave 64.3– TNS Opinion & Social, European Commission.

⁹² “European nations consider themselves as monolingual or, at the most, bi-, tri- or quadri-lingual, if they are divided into territories with different main languages. This is the reason why hardly any reliable data on language diversity in Europe can be found in official statistics; the self-image of relatively homogenous populations makes the question of how many and which languages are actually used in a country, unnecessary.” in Gogolin (2002), pp.7. See also Extra and Gorter (2001)

Regional languages were demographically more dynamic until the end of the nineteenth century compared to their current situation. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, national educational programs have imposed language homogenization, sapping the vitality of regional languages both directly and indirectly, making their intergenerational transmission in the family less useful. Only in the aftermath of the Second World War, and more precisely since the 1970s, did minority languages return to the political agenda. This was particularly the case of regional and territorial languages, which experienced increasing support and legal protection at international levels. As a result, various countries implemented affirmative educational policies and programs, and although public sensibilities towards regional languages changed, the vitality of these languages continued to decrease, with few exceptions.

Statistics and estimations on the proportion of regional and territorial languages in international comparative terms vary. For instance, Grimes compiled a series of historical inventories of language landscapes around the world, identifying a high degree of linguistic diversity within most countries that officially claimed to have homogeneous linguistic systems. This was also true of the three countries that the present study focuses on: Grimes (1992) identified 23 different languages present in Germany (without counting most of the immigrant minority languages), 28 in France (counting some older immigrant minority languages but not including the Arab language), and 5 languages in the Netherlands (without counting immigrant minority languages, Grimes, 1992:455-457,458-460, 471). Still, although Grimes's work on linguistic diversity offers an impressively detailed historical overview, many languages were left out of her inventory.

Extra and Gorter (2001) gave a more accurate picture of the demographic impact of language diversity for regional and territorial minority languages in Europe. They proposed a typology that takes into account both these languages' legal status and their geographical dimension in relation to state boundaries.⁹³ The first type includes regional minority languages spoken in one part of only one European Union member state: in France these were Breton (300,000 individuals) and Corsican (160,000); in Germany, these were North-Frisian (8,000 individuals), Saterfrisian (2,000), and Sorbian (60,000); in the Netherlands, Frisian (450,000

⁹³ In the scope of the Project – *Which languages for Europe?* (enrolling non-governmental European Cultural Foundation (established in Amsterdam), Babylon (Tilburg University) and the Fryske Akademy), this book is an outcome of seminars that brought together policymakers and experts on regional and minority languages, in Oegstgeest, NL, 28-30 January 2000. The title of the book makes further reference to the well-known study of the Linguistic Minorities Project from the mid-eighties: *The Other Languages of England* (centred in all other languages ignored in public, official activities in England). In Extra and Gorter (2001), pp.11 – 13.

individuals). The second type is made up of regional minority languages that are spoken in more than one European Union member state: in France this includes Basque (70,000 individuals), Catalan (102,000) and Occitan (3 500,000); in Germany, Low-German (8-10 million); in the Netherlands, Low Saxon (1.8 million) and the Limburgian (1 million). The third type includes languages spoken in a given European Union member state that are the dominant official language in another, usually neighbouring state. In France these include German (975,000) and Dutch (80,000); in Germany mainly Danish (50,000). The fourth are official state languages that are not official working languages of the EU: in France, Luxemburgish (35,000). And, finally, the fifth type includes the non-territory minority languages, present in almost all member states, such as the Romi and Yiddish languages (Extra and Gorter offered no estimates of the numbers of speakers of these languages). Their work characterizes language diversity in Europe, intentionally excluding immigrant minority languages from outside Europe.

Immigrant minority languages, and particularly non-European immigrant minority languages, are also a part of language diversity in most European countries, but counting them is more difficult. Country backgrounds do not necessarily correspond to a single native language background, and immigrants' native languages have seldom been registered or identified. Although their presence in Western Europe is not new, it increased with the mass migration phenomenon from the second half of the 20th century, with the launch of guest worker programs with non-European countries, followed by family migration, students, refugees and asylum seekers from various parts of the world. With the settlement of an increasing number of foreigners since the 1970s have come social processes of immigration, urbanization and minorization, involving significant socio-demographic changes in Western European countries.

Many of the newcomers of this period were religiously, culturally and linguistically distinct from the previously settled population. In addition, they experienced different opportunities to incorporate into society, due to the evolution of technology that facilitated communication with and transportation to and from their countries of origin (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). The adaptation of these populations to the "hosting" societies has not always fit with previous expectations of assimilation—i.e., it has not always resulted in culturally undifferentiated individuals. Thus, Western European societies have experienced increasing cultural and linguistic diversity within their territory, particularly in urban settings. This has further

implied a change of perceptions of individuals of immigrant background — from “foreign language groups” to “community or immigrant minority languages,” more evident in northwestern Europe, where the largest absolute numbers are to be found in France, Germany and Great Britain.⁹⁴ Turkish and Arabic are the main examples of these so-called non-European immigrant languages, because they are spoken and learned by millions of the inhabitants of the European Union member states.

Thus, only recently has the socio-demographic weight of immigrant minority languages from non-European countries become significant. Similarly to regional languages, awareness that immigrant languages are core values for those with immigrant background rose during the 1970s, concomitant with the re-emergence of regional languages and identities. But in contrast to the former, these immigrant minority languages were approached as obstacles to integration, particularly by policymakers (see discussion in Extra and Gorter, 2001; Joppkes and Morawska, 2002). Indeed, for most liberal states, official claims for cultural diversity recognition have given less space for language pluralism, and particularly to immigrant languages. Indeed, language assimilation is perceived as more compatible with liberal normative values compared to assimilation of other cultural traits (namely religion, in Joppkes and Morawska, 2002). And where it exists, public support for “immigrant languages” refers to these languages as the heritage of “non-national residents” or “non-territorial,” “non-regional,” “non-indigenous” and even “non-European” individuals (Extra and Gorter, 2001:1). *Langues étrangères* in France, *fremde Sprachen* in Germany, *allochtonen* in the Netherlands, these programs include intercultural dialogue but approach the cultural background of each language as foreign to the culture and history of the immigration countries. In addition, these policies have generally been implemented within the framework of broader immigration and integration policies for individuals with immigrant background, and defined as provisional goals on the path to achieving the ultimate aim of linguistic assimilation.

In summary, the official recognition of immigrant languages occurs with their introduction into the existing public education system (among other institutional forms), and in parallel with other private initiatives. This public support has been offered within the framework of

⁹⁴ Current estimations point that about one third of the population under the age of 35 in urbanized Western Europe has an immigrant background from non-EU countries. And accordingly to Eurostat 1996, jan 1993, EU population was 368 million, 4,8% of whom were not national citizens, mainly due to non-EU flows, whose numbers rose from 9 to 12 million between 1985 and 1992 – the largest in France, Germany and Great Britain, in pp.3 in op cit, Broeder, Peter, Guus Extra (1999), see also In Extra, Guus, and Durk Gorter (2001), op cit., pp. 13

integration policies, but because approaching these languages as foreign, and defining a limited interest in measuring language outcomes, these integration policies contrast for their conceptual exclusion (Extra and Gorter, 2001:1, see discussion in section 2.5). The “otherness” attributed to immigrant languages derives from a restrictive interpretation of the notions of citizenship and nationality, relegating immigrant background to the condition of perpetual foreignness, an approach that is only partially applied to other minority languages. The roots of this approach lie notably in the historical role of language homogenization in nation-states, further shaped by constitutional *ius sanguinis* principles on citizenship deriving from parental origins, in contrast to *ius solis*, wherein nationality derives from the country of birth. Thus, it is no surprise that compared to regional or other territorial languages, mother tongue education in immigrant minority languages has been implemented by public policies within more restrictions, and offered considerably less legal protection. Consequently, these languages have been also considerably less present in the educational systems of European member states (Extra and Gorter, 2001; Joppke and Morawska, 2002).

In what follows I will offer a brief overview of the evolution of different minority language status in the three European countries under study here, aiming to show how the treatment of immigrant languages has been justified. For this purpose, I will first recall the role of international institutions, such as the UN and European institutions, through their covenants, resolutions and charters on the recognition of language diversity. Secondly, I will examine each country’s integration and immigrant policies, and then look at specific domestic policies in France, Germany and the Netherlands with regard to the teaching of national and immigrant languages, particularly Turkish.

2.3. Linguistic diversity at the international and European levels: Top-down approaches to language diversity

“Immigrants bring a wealth of human capital which, if nurtured carefully, can positively contribute to the economic well-being and cultural diversity of the host country.”⁹⁵

2.3.1. Between cultural recognition and political exclusion

During the aftermath of the Second World War, and concomitant to the beginning of guest worker recruitment in Western Europe in 1966, UN resolutions recognized language diversity through the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the covenant states.⁹⁶ This document presented language as one of the three prominent properties of “minorities” (along with ethnicity and religion), defending the rights of linguistic minorities to practice their languages as universal rights attributed to “persons” and not “nationals.” (Extra and Gorter, 2001:9) However, more affirmative action was taken thirty years later, in the UN Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (adopted by the General Assembly in 1992). This second document specifies the state’s obligations in relation to minorities, associating language learning with economic integration and progress. These are given in paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 4, which specifies that “states shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, to provide them with adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue and to enable them to participate fully in economic progress and development in their country” (Extra and Durk Gorter, 2001:19). One year later, the UN declaration at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 went further, explicitly recognizing cultural diversity as a prerequisite for social cohesion and not a threat, focusing again on the need for protection against discrimination. “Persons belonging to minorities [...] have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion and to use their own language in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination.” Extra, Guus, and Durk Gorter, 2001 op cit:19) However, each of these three UN documents left the definition of minorities to each covenant state.

⁹⁵ PISA 2006, about PISA 2003, pp.3

⁹⁶ 1966, part III - article 27 “In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language,” in Extra and Gorter (2001) pp. 19

At the European Union level, legislation on linguistic rights is traced back to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (known as the European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR, which came into force in 1953, Viaut, 2004:6). It developed further together with UN initiatives. Later, the Council assembly added a second protocol to the Convention of 1950, demanding the inclusion of an article on the protection of national minorities, and devoted to the theme of language contact within the hierarchical structure of Europe. This resulted in Recommendation 285 Regarding the Rights of National Minorities, voted in 1961 by the Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe (Viaut, 2004:6). Its formulation foresaw the right of people belonging to a national minority to make use of their own language, and for its teaching to be provided in schools. As observed for the previous UN documents, its article 14 mentions that language is a criterion of non-discrimination, together with sex, race, skin colour and religion, although, like related UN conventions, it does not refer explicitly to any specific national minority (Viaut, 2004:6).

Beginning in the 1970s, there was more international collaboration between politicians, educators, academics and researchers, forging a common educational culture in the forty-eight countries which had previously signed the European Cultural Convention of 1954 (Beacco, 2011). Two examples of this common work were the 1975 Declaration of Galway (Declarations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), the 1978 Declaration of Bordeaux, and Recommendation 928 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from 1981 on “educational and cultural problems of minority languages and dialects in Europe” (Viaut, 2004:7). Both expressed concern for linguistic diversity and multilingualism, with a view to building a democratic European citizenship that included language diversity in the educational program of schools (made implicitly for the Common European Framework of Reference for Modern Languages, Beacco, 2011). Moreover, the Council of Europe aimed to improve the status and reproduction of non-national languages, this time distinguishing minority languages in regional, minority or foreign languages. These documents would serve as the basis for a series of resolutions in the early 1980s.

Following this, the European Parliament passed a set of resolutions on language protection and promotion in 1981, 1987 and 1994, focusing mainly on regional minority languages. The first of these resolutions, in 1981, was the Arfé Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities (Viaut,

2004:7). It led to the founding of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages in 1982 (which took on the status of non-governmental organization at the European Council and United Nations levels) and the European MERCATOR Network (whose current aim is to promote research on the status and use of regional minority languages, Extra and Gorter, 2001: 19-26). However, acknowledging the persistent non-recognition of minority languages and discrimination against them after the Arfé resolution, the European Parliament voted the Kuijpers Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities in the European Community in 1987, and Resolution 192, on Regional or Minority Languages, taken by the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (later the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, or CLRAE), in 1988.⁹⁷ Through these resolutions, members of the European Parliament unanimously demanded that all EU countries recognize national sign languages as official state languages, while giving regional and minority languages an official status. All of these processes aimed to ensure the application of the Arfé resolution, and formed the basis for the two most symbolic conventions on language diversity of the 1990s (Viaut, 2004:8): the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 1992, and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995.

It should be remembered that, during the 1990s, the debate on the recognition of minorities was motivated by particular tensions and conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. At the European level, this led to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Vienna Declaration in 1993, signed in 1995, Viaut, 2004:8). The Framework dealt with minority languages insofar as it identified language as one of the main features of national minorities. However, it explicitly excluded immigrant minorities, neither focusing on their languages nor on what constitutes a “national minority.”⁹⁸ In contrast, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of 1992 presents a longer and more language-focused story. Elaborated between 1984 and 1988 under the aegis of the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (later the CLRAE), it was intended to become the first large international text fully devoted to the subject of linguistic rights and to the safeguarding of lesser-used languages (Viaut, 2004:8-11). Viaut (2004) characterized its main

⁹⁷ *Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe* (CLRAE) is a body depending on the Council of Europe, composed by independent experts and politicians from the Parliamentary Assembly, In op cit, Viaut, Alain (2004), pp.8

⁹⁸ Signed by Germany in 11/5/1995, ratified in 10/9/1997, into force 1/2/1998, signed by The Netherlands in 1/2/1995, ratified in 16/2/2005, into force in 1/6/2005. Not signed by France. In <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=157&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> (seen latest in October 2011). See also op cit, Viaut, Alain (2004), pp. 11

question as follows: “Do we wish in Europe to advocate a real functioning of the cultural heritage that regional or minority languages represent?” (Viaut, 2004:5). Its process reflected the European revival of regional and minority languages during the 1970s, which led to Recommendation 928 of 1978 and Resolution 192 of 1988, mentioned above.⁹⁹ The original proposal included two sensitive issues: the right to “historical reparation” and the official recognition of regional or minority languages (Viaut, 2004:10-11). Because these two points were not unanimously accepted, the discussions ended with two main changes. The main point was that regional or minority languages were recognized not as an “attribute of a community” but rather as an “expression of cultural wealth.” First, from the point of view of linguistic rights, this avoided conflicts with national policies and approaches: second, although connected to the issues of collective and individual rights, it ended up presenting interculturalism and multilingualism as values, without demanding their official recognition at a political level.

Only in 1992 did the members of the Council of Europe sign this Charter, which became the most symbolic European document on the recognition of language diversity (coming into force in 1998, Extra and Gorter, 2001:19-26). It was approved by a large majority of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, but with the abstention of France, Turkey, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom, the opposition of Greece, and the absence of Bulgaria. Like previous UN documents on a similar theme, it did not specify the languages in question (leaving this up to each country to decide), but specified their general nature. Thus, regional, minority and non-territorial languages were defined by their traditional uses in a given country by a minority group; for being in contrast to official languages; and corresponding to a territory (Viaut, 2004:24-25). In contrast, dialects and immigrant minority languages were explicitly excluded. In sum, “being the first international text devoted to minority languages in general, the Charter does not aim to revolutionise the [*sic*] conceptions and practices as regards the protection and the promotion of these languages” (Viaut, 2004:5). I will now discuss how the three different countries under study here have dealt with these international agreements.

⁹⁹ The *Recommendation 928 of 1978 (Declaration of Bordeaux on Educational and Cultural Problems of Minority Languages and Dialects in Europe)* adopted in 1981 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the *Resolution 192 of 1988 (on Regional or Minority Languages)*, taken by the *Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE)* in 1988, In op cit, Viaut, Alain (2004), pp.10-11

2.3.2 The relations of France, Germany and the Netherlands to international debates on the recognition of language diversity

Each of the three countries under study here has taken a distinct official approach when participating, recognizing and signing each of the documents referred to above. As briefly mentioned, France has stood as an exception to international agreements on language and the recognition and protection of minorities, due to its constitution and its model of integration. For several UN conventions (such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1981, and the UN Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities in 1992) French representatives signed with constitutional reservations. For the 1966 Covenant, French representatives did not ratify Article 27 (on minorities' right to a cultural life and the use of their own language); the same happened with article 30 of the 1981 convention (children's right to have their own cultural life and use their own language);¹⁰⁰ and for the 1992 UN Declaration, France did not rectify its article 4 (on the need for States to take measures in favour of offering minorities full equality before the law, allowing them to express their characteristics, develop their culture, have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue, and encouraging knowledge of their history, traditions, language and culture).

For similar reasons, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of 1992 and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995 were both signed by France but without being ratified (in the case of the Charter, along with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom).¹⁰¹ Only two axes of the European Charter were accepted: article 8 (teaching regional and minority languages, not considered contrary to the constitutional principle of equality), and Articles 11 and 12 (on the media and cultural life of these languages). The general inapplicability of the European Charter was based on its explicit demand for the official and public use of regional and other minority languages, which "violates the constitutional principles of indivisibility of the Republic, of equality before the law and uniqueness of the French people" (Viaut, 2004:7). Thus, from the constitutional preamble (paragraph 4) and Part II (section 7) of the Charter, it is "contrary to

¹⁰⁰ My translation, from the original : *Le Gouvernement de la République déclare, compte tenu de l'article 2 de la Constitution de la République française [avant l'introduction de la disposition relative à la langue française et donc au nom du principe d'égalité], que l'article 27/30 (n'ont) pas lieu de s'appliquer en ce qui concerne la République.*, in Décret n°81-76 du 29 janvier 1981 portant publication du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, ouvert à la signature à New-York le 19 décembre 1966, and Décret n°90-917 du 8 octobre 1990 portant publication de la Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant, signée à New-York le 26 janvier 1990, in Eysseric, Violaine (Avril 2005), *Le corpus juridique des langues de France*, Délégation Générale à la langue française et aux langues de France, (<http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/lgfrance/legislationLDF.pdf> latest view nov 2011), pp81-82

¹⁰¹ <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=157&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> (seen latest in October 2011); see also Viaut, Alain (2004), pp 6

Article 2 of the Constitution” to recognize a right to practice a language other than French not only in “private” but also in “public life,” a category in which the Charter includes the justice system, administrative authorities, and the provision of public services.”¹⁰² The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 promoted a debate on linguistic diversity at both European and national levels. In France, this led to a constitutional revision, reinforcing the constitutional law in 1992, art. 2 from the constitution of the V republic – “La langue de la République est le français.”¹⁰³ Later in 1996, the French State Council refused the previous Charter issues, like the French Constitutional Council in 1999;¹⁰⁴ both decisions reinforced the principle of linguistic uniformity as the cornerstone of the French integration model.

Contrary to France, German legislation is characterized above all by indifference toward language issues at the constitutional level—the constitution neither states a national language nor does it mention minority languages. In accordance with international conventions, it does guarantee freedom of language choice, implicitly through constitutional articles on free personal development (art 2) and freedom of communication (art 5), and explicitly in the article on non-discrimination (art 3). (Gogolin and Reich, 2001:193-214). A sharp distinction is made between indigenous and immigrant linguistic communities, irrespective of demographic, cultural and pedagogical arguments and in accordance with the principles of the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages and the prevailing position in constitutional law. Thus, Germany has been more cooperative with regard to the need to protect and official recognize minorities and language groups, though with a focus mainly on regional languages. Its representatives signed and ratified the 1966 UN Covenant in 1973, signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995 and ratified it in 1997, and ratified the European Charter in 1998. For the latter, Germany recognized several official languages, though depending on the individual Länder: Danish and North Frisian in Schleswig-Holstein; Upper Sorbian in the Free State of Saxony; Lower

¹⁰² *porte atteinte aux principes constitutionnels d'indivisibilité de la République, d'égalité devant la loi et d'unicité du peuple français* ». cette inconstitutionnalité provient du préambule (alinéa 4) et de la partie II (article 7) de la Charte (...) contraires à l'article 2 de la Constitution « en ce qu'elles tendent à reconnaître un droit à pratiquer une langue autre que le français non seulement dans la “vie privée” mais également dans la “vie publique,” à laquelle la Charte rattache la justice et les autorités administratives et services publics. In Conseil Constitutionnel, 15 juin 1999, décision n°99-412DC relative à la Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires, in op cit, Eysseric, Violaine (Avril 2005), pp86-88

¹⁰³ LOI constitutionnelle no 92-554 du 25 juin 1992 ajoutant à la Constitution Article 1er Après le premier alinéa de l'article 2 de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, il est inséré un alinéa ainsi rédigé : “La langue de la République est le français.” that only a recent revision of the French constitution creating official recognition of regional languages in 2008, Loi constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008 In op cit, Viaut, Alain (2004), pp 46-49; see also discussion on Caubet, Dominique (2001), pp.261-277; and Leclerc 2001, in Filhon 2009, pp. 93-98.

¹⁰⁴ Conseil d'Etat, section de l'intérieur, avis relatif à la Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires, 24 septembre 1996 (n°359 461); and Conseil Constitutionnel, 15 juin 1999, décision n°99-412DC relative à la Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires in op cit, Eysseric, Violaine (Avril 2005), pp86-88

Sorbian in Brandenburg; Saterland Frisian in Lower Saxony; Romani (throughout Germany); Low German in Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, in Brandenburg, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony-Anhalt.

As for the Netherlands, its representatives ratified the 1966 UN Covenant in 1978, and signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995, ratifying it in 2005. The European Charter, ratified in 1996, was perceived as quite important in Netherlands, and led the government to recognise West Frisian in Friesland, Limburgish dialect in Limburg; Low-Saxon language, Romani and Yiddish across the Netherlands. Frisian, the only regional language variety with a legally protected status in the Netherlands, is said to stand in an intermediate position, better than immigrant languages, but with a modest place in the educational system, within primary and secondary education only.

2.3.3. International recognition of immigrant minority languages

As previously seen, in the major official European documents immigrant languages have been left for integration policies for immigrants. Specifically in the aftermath of the end of guest worker recruitment programs, the Council of Europe issued guidelines on schooling for the children of “migrant workers,” through a Directive of the European Communities in 1977¹⁰⁵ (now EU directive 77/486, 25th July 1977). It was intended to promote the legitimization of immigrant minority language instruction in Europe, and eventually its legislation in some countries, but its ambitions remained limited (Extra and Gorter, 2001). For the three countries under study here, initiatives of this kind had already begun before the directive, though they took a more explicit form after its approval. In 1998, Recommendation 1383 on Linguistic Diversification¹⁰⁶ of the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly referred to a need for the learning of modern languages other than English, in parallel to official national and regional languages (article 5). It recalled specifically the need for more attention to the languages of both regional and non-native populations (article 8). However, its recommendations with respect to immigrant languages remained limited, including no further specifications.

In contrast to other kinds of minority languages, recognition of immigrant minority languages has come mainly through non-governmental organizations. One of the most significant

¹⁰⁵<http://eurlex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl&lang=fr&ihmlang=fr&lng1=fr,en&lng2=bg,cs,da,de,el,en,es,et,fi,fr,hu,it,lt,lv,mt,nl,pl,pt,ro,sk,sl,sv,&val=58572:cs&page=> (seen later October 2011)

¹⁰⁶<http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta98/EREC1383.HTM> (seen latest in October 2011)

examples was the Universal Declaration on Linguistic Rights in Barcelona in 1996, signed by UNESCO, branches of PEN, and other non-governmental organizations.¹⁰⁷ This document presented language as property of groups, and recognized its importance beyond official state definitions and recognitions. “This declaration considers as a language group any group of persons sharing the same language which is established in the territorial space of another language community but which does not possess historical antecedents equivalent to those of that community. Examples of such groups are immigrants, refugees, deported persons and members of diasporas.” Its article 5 declares that official language recognition has actually worked as an obstacle to respect for minority languages. “This declaration is based on the principle that the rights of all language communities are equal and independent of their legal status as official, regional or minority languages. Terms such as regional or minority languages are not used in this Declaration because, though in certain cases the recognition of regional or minority languages can facilitate the exercise of certain rights, these and other modifiers are frequently used to restrict the rights of language communities.” Similarly, the Declaration of Oegsteest in 2000 (*Moving away from a monolingual habitus*), approved at an international conference, referred explicitly to regional, minority and immigrant languages. Although it emerged from an event organized by the Council of Europe and the European Union, on the recognition of Europe as multicultural and integrated in the European Year of Languages, 2001, this declaration was mainly agreed by the non-governmental European Cultural Foundation (established in Amsterdam).

2.3.4. Different approaches but limited recognition of immigrant minority languages

There has been some improvement in the recognition of language diversity in Europe, particularly since the 1990s. Currently, a dozen European countries officially recognize the existence of regional or minority languages within their borders, including for legal or administrative purposes, but in general solely within certain geographical areas. Although the three countries under study here have used a single official national language, there were three exceptions, in Germany (the official status of Danish in Schleswig-Holstein and of Sorbian in Brandenburg and Saxony) and the Netherlands (of Frisian in Friesland, since 1980).¹⁰⁸ Only in France has no exception to the single official language been recognized, though several minority languages have been officially considered part of French culture heritage since 2008 (see chapter 2).

¹⁰⁷ PEN Clubs (worldwide association of writers). In Extra, Guus, and Durk Gorter (2001), op cit., pp. 19-26, <http://www.linguistic-declaration.org/versions/angles.pdf> (seen latest in October 2011)

¹⁰⁸ Eurydice 2006:2007 Figure B11 pp.51; Figure A1 In Eurydice network (2008), pp. 18

Fewer rights have been recognized with respect to immigrant languages. As Joppkes and Morawska (2002) mentioned, most liberal states favouring plural diversity claim that language assimilation has been compatible with liberal normative values with respect to any other cultural trait, particularly when referring to immigrant minority languages. Indeed, minority language groups in the three countries still enjoy scant linguistic rights, and immigrant minority language groups in particular virtually none. Thus, political recognition of immigrant minority languages has been left out of statements and agreements at the European and ministerial levels. This observation contrasts with their demographic weight and the fact that minority languages have, in theory, been continuously and officially recognized as a cultural rather than a political matter (Broeder and Extra, 1999:109-110; Extra and Gorter, 2001: 19-26). Indeed, the official protection of language diversity reflects political choices. “The non-official state languages undergo difficulties to be recognised and managed, perhaps more than other cultural characteristics which are common to a given population. It is true that language is eminently political insofar as, being used to communicate and to culturally identify a group, it participates in the organisation of life in society, in its conception and symbols” (Gogolin, 2002). To understand how this has worked in France, Germany and the Netherlands, I will now focus on each country’s integration model.

2.4. Integration policies and cultural diversity: Three different models

During the years that followed the halt of recruitment (1973-74) there was little sign of integration policies of any kind in France, Germany and the Netherlands. None of these nations regarded itself as a country of immigration, and all saw the halt of recruitment and the return of foreign workers to their countries of origin as an inevitable sequence. This changed at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of 1980s, when the fact that many immigrants would stay permanently became evident, and policies reflected stepwise measures to strengthen their legal status—more quickly in France and in the Netherlands, and considerably later in Germany (in the 1990s). During this period, pluralist approaches influenced policy changes in this domain, but did so differently from country to country.

Kymlicka (2010) argued that the generalized openness to pluralist approaches characterizing Western countries between the 1970s to the 1990s was due to the heritage of the history of the

first half of the twentieth century. Early racist perspectives explicitly pronounced the superiority of some peoples and cultures over others, and their rights to rule over them, approaches that underpinned countries' domestic laws (e.g. racially biased immigration and citizenship policies) and foreign policies (e.g. in relation to overseas colonies). After WWII, when Europe had experienced the worst consequences of such ideologies, there was a generalized questioning of undifferentiated models of citizenship that had previously been taken for granted, as well as on the old-style of cultural assimilation as the only way to engage social incorporation. New assumptions on human equality emerged, followed by the explosion of "lifestyle enclaves" and "individualization." Claims for group-differentiated ethno-policies emerged, rejecting earlier ideas of a unitary and homogeneous population in any given Western State (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). These changes resulted in and were promoted by three main macro-phenomena: (Kymlicka, 2010:35) 1) the decolonization of 1947-1965; 2) the struggle against racial segregation and discrimination, such as the African-American civil rights movements, in 1955-65; 3) the struggle for multiculturalism and minority rights, from the late 1960s onward. Each of these processes contributed to a democratic "citizenization," (Kymlicka, 2010:35) with two meanings: first, not to suppress differential claims but to filter and frame them in the language of human rights, civil liberties and democratic accountability; second, to turn hierarchical relations into relationships of liberal-democratic citizenship. In sum, multiculturalism rose in Europe as part of a larger "human rights revolution" in relation to ethnic and racial diversity and in contrast to the pre-WWII context, when ethno-cultural and religious diversity in the West were characterized by a range of illiberal and undemocratic relations (Kymlicka, 2010).

In the 1970s and 1980s, as Western countries were experiencing post-war liberalism and emergent human rights philosophy, the issue of "integrating" postcolonial, labour and new settler migrants and their offspring also arose (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, there was an increasing recognition and accommodation of immigrants' diversity, leaving space for multiculturalism policies and minority rights at both domestic and international levels. In general terms, integration policies were expected to guarantee equal rights through the incorporation of immigrants into the welfare state, with two different aims: on one side, striving to absorb immigrants on the basis of the values and norms of the receiving society, and on the other, trying to respect the distinctive cultural character of each immigrant group. In practice, national policies did not turn out to be completely inclusionary, and each country defined different approaches and practices on the basis of distinct national

approaches and historical events. Importantly, legislation on nationality and citizenship occupied, then as today, a prominent place as the relationships between equal rights and the incorporation of individuals were defined. Significant distinctions were made between EU citizens, those from former colonies, guest workers, family immigration, students, refugees, resettlers and asylum seekers. Each category offered different access to rights to long-term residency and naturalization, and the evolution of individuals' legal status depended on each country's political approach to immigration.

A number of studies have pointed to distinct ideological conceptions of national policies, with a wide range of policy practices that globally characterized each regime—determining policies that were pluralist or multicultural, assimilationist, differentialist, and more. For instance, Castles and Miller (1993), Alexander (2007) and Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010) referred to different classical ideal-type models that reflect each state's response to increasing ethnic-cultural diversity. For instance, a “multicultural” or “pluralistic model” is one where the main attitude in the host society is that “migrants are permanent, their otherness will and should remain” (Alexander, 2006). This model was observed for the Netherlands until the turn of the twentieth century, though Alexander (2007) in some cases would call it in some points “intercultural model.” In sum, these approaches are characterized by policymaking based on tolerance and active support for cultural diversity, implying both the incorporation and the participation of immigrants, ethnic minorities and their cultural specificities. All of these factors have been perceived in the Netherlands as important axes for both social integration and individual emancipation, through ethnic- target measures (Alexander 2007; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). In contrast, in the “republican” or “assimilationist model,” the main attitude in the host society is that “migrants are permanent but their otherness is temporary” (Alexander, 2006). It supposedly defines the French approach, based on civic and cultural assimilation, which is perceived as universal because it is not based on ethnicity. Policy measures are centred on socio-economic-spatial criteria, while undifferentiating individuals in terms of cultural specificities. Finally, there is the “exclusion” or “differential exclusion model,” or indeed the “guest worker policy” model—where the main attitude in the host society is to view “migrants as temporary *guestworkers*” (Alexander, 2006). This model is identified for Germany until the turn of the twentieth century, where integration policy focus was given to socio-economic criteria while standing aloof from cultural policy. However, in contrast to the previous civic model, there has been support for cultural activities

of immigrant groups. On one hand to make communities partners for sharing responsibilities, in the other side, to control foreign communities with an eye to their eventual return.

There is one term common to these three different models, whose use in each case distinguishes them from each other: *integration*. Based on the way this concept is applied, it is possible to assess what is expected for each country when managing a ‘plural’ society, while determining who is the target population for which integration measures. For instance, in the Netherlands and Germany, policy measures have established that immigrants or foreigners have specific problems that are in contrast to those of the majority population, while no such recognition has been seen in France, with its more universalist approach. Furthermore, in the Netherlands, integration policies have targeted specific ethnic minorities, while in the other two countries the use of terminologies such as “ethnic” or “cultural” minorities has been traditionally avoided. For instance, in France, integration policies are applied to all citizens independently of immigrant or non-immigrant background, while in Germany the focus has been on foreigners, with an ethnic conceptualization that distinguished foreigners of German ethnic background from others. In addition, each integration policy has assigned different roles to local, regional and national actors. In France, the central state and its institutions have played the major role in defining integration policy and the resources available for its application, though some decentralization occurred from the 1980s and again the 1990s; in both Germany and the Netherlands, local authorities, community organizations and even religious organizations have played a major role in defining and promoting integration policies through with specific population-targets, although these have often been financed by the national states (Joopkes and Morawska, 2002). In Germany a distinction must also be made between state and federal policies: there has been significant policy diversity within the country, with some regions closer to the French model and others to the Dutch. In the next section, I will briefly describe each country.

2.4.1. France: A colour-blind model of social cohesion with increasing concerns about racial discrimination

It was not until the 1981 election of François Mitterand’s socialist government that the French state officially abandoned the idea of that immigrants’ stay would be temporary. The main step taken was the use of naturalization as a means of integration for those with immigrant background, meaning that the guarantee of “equal rights” implied rights and duties that

combined both welfare and political domains. Political participation in France becomes possible only through access to French citizenship. This universal access to citizenship, and furthermore to education (in accordance with the French constitution) follows the tradition of the “French melting pot,” disregarding cultural distinctions in order to achieve civic assimilation, which can be traced back to the revolution and the assimilationist Jacobin tradition (Silberman and Fournier, 2007:222).

In France, then, cultural issues have been officially left to the private sphere and separated from other dimensions that are explicitly targeted by public integration policies (housing, employment, education, health, political participation). This has meant that integration “difficulties” have been defined on socio-economic urban segregation criteria, for both nationals and foreigners, aimed at equal access to all services, and not supplemented by measures targeted at ethnic or foreign groups. For instance, criteria may be youth from difficult neighbourhoods, general vocational training for those with difficulties, equal access to social housing, gentrification policy. For instance, educational policies have focused on Priority Education Zones (the ZEP programme, introduced in 1982), aiming at urban revitalization but without reference to immigrant ghettos as in the Netherlands. However, in many of these urban areas do include large proportion of schoolchildren with immigrant backgrounds and, since 1998, have been targeted by programs focusing on the need to consolidate French language.

French policies underwent significant change between the end of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, a period that saw the emergence of objections to the assimilationist tradition and demands for *le droit à la différence*. There was much debate on local policies and practices, and diversity of origin was indeed taken into account. Within this context, immigrant mother tongue teaching started at the end of the 1970s (though the latter were mainly organized by representatives of the country of origin and not by the French state). More concrete measures and events demanding for more plurality occurred during the short period of multiculturalism in France during the 1980s, after the election of the socialist government in 1981. Amongst the most significant were the legalization of immigrants’ associations’ and their access to state funding for socio-cultural activities; the recognition of France as a society of immigration, where economic disadvantages strongly matched immigrant origins (mainly in the labour market and housing); and policy makers work with immigrant associations to regularize immigrants (Alexander, 2006); and two symbolic marches by youth from migrant

backgrounds demanding equality of recognition—the March for Equality, or “March of the Beurs,” in 1983, and “Convergence 84” (Simon and Sala Pala, 2010).

Some argued that this multicultural turn remained mainly symbolic (Schnapper 1992), and indeed, as early as the end of the 1980s, the rhetoric of “failure to integrate” quickly re-emerged. The debate was refocused on the need to re-define the “French model of integration,” with the “principle of equality” at its heart. To reinforce this, in 1989 the High Council for Integration (Haut conseil à l’intégration, HCI) was established to inform and advise the authorities on the integration situation of immigrants, while defining the main axes for French integration policies (Simon and Sala Pala, 2010): 1) social integration approached as an individual process, not a communitarian one; 2) citizenship as the pivot of the integration process, ensuring the mixing of the population; 3) integration should mean equality in social life. In addition, the work of advisory councils with individuals of immigrant background has been done mainly on non-ethnic or immigrant associations (Alexander, 2006). Finally, the turn toward assimilationist approaches went even further with the sudden political expansion of the Front National, a far-right political party, who brought immigration more explicitly into political speech. They approached immigrants as exogenous to the national common life,¹⁰⁹ reinforcing the prejudice of an “irremediable inferiority” of immigrants and their descendants.

Fears of ‘balkanization’ and concerns about “communitarism” rose and have only risen in France since then, particularly since 2001 (Simon and Sala Pala, 2010). This context has involved strong opposition to physical manifestations of “otherness,” particularly when referring to religion. For instance, the French parliament passed a law banning all religious symbols in schools in February 2004, though aiming to ban the wearing of Islamic headscarves. In addition, in October and November 2005, a series of Parisian suburbs exploded in riots, followed by other communities throughout France. The rioters were characterized in the media as youth of immigrant background, and particularly Muslims, although in reality they also included youth with no immigrant background. There has been a growing concern on discrimination, resulting in some tensions between traditional frameworks focusing rather on socio-economic inequalities and emerging concerns about racial inequalities. These tensions have been illustrated by controversy over “ethnic statistics.” Since the end of the 19th century,

¹⁰⁹ Le Pen “*Droit à la différence ? Mais oui, bien sûr, chez vous.*” – emphasizing both immigrant exogeneity and the right to a real French identity, in Brubaker, Roger (2002)

the French census has never asked for information about ethnicity, race or religion, but a debate on this policy arose in the leadup to the 1999 census. The official conclusions ran against the introduction of ethnic categories either into official statistics or into any social statistics collected by researchers. Arguments against these statistics held that such categories contradict the French principle of undifferentiation and challenge the “French model of integration”; defenders of their implementation argued that existing discrimination phenomena needed to be measured more precisely (Simon and Sala Pala, 2010).

In the last ten years French policy makers have demonstrated increasing social sensitivity to issues of discrimination. From a more formal standpoint, France has had to transpose relevant EU directives on anti-racism and anti-discrimination into law (Alexander, 2006; Simon and Sala Pala, 2010).¹¹⁰ For instance, in the domain of access to higher education, positive discrimination measures based on socio-spatial criteria have been implemented more recently — the *Grandes écoles*’, with the ZEP agreements, which have offered special admission procedures to the *Grandes écoles* for students from high schools located in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (*Zones d’éducation prioritaire*). In 2005, the French state created an additional independent body to examine discrimination issues, the High Authority for the Struggle Against Discrimination and for Equality (*Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité*, or HALDE). In sum, current policies have demanded, on one hand, the uniformization of cultures and belongings, with the argument that to actively generate the invisibility of minorities results in social cohesion. However, on the other hand, they have sought also to apply anti-discrimination policy to promote diversity, relying, albeit indirectly, on the recognition and identification of groups and minorities in disadvantaged socio-economic positions (Simon and Sala Pala, 2010).

2.4.2. Germany: Standing aloof from a never-existent multicultural dream

Germany is known for forty years experience of “an immigration situation without an immigration country” (Chancellor Kohl, in Klaus Bader, 1994). Its official policy applied to foreigners was clear: “there are no immigrants (*Einwanderer*) but foreigners (*Ausländer*) or foreign fellow-citizens (*ausländer Mitbürger*) who are not members (of German nation).” (Senders, 1996:147) Three specific principles ruled over immigration policy in Germany: the “integration“ of those with the right to live in Germany; the continuation of the 1973 ban on

¹¹⁰ In 2001, these were anti-discrimination act; in 2002, the social modernisation act; in 2008, the adaptation to European Law act.

the recruitment of new migrant workers; and financial incentives for immigrants to return to their country of origin (Faas 2010, pp 34). In the aftermath of the oil crisis in 1973, the German Social Democratic coalition government and chancellor Willy Brandt decreed a halt to the recruitment of foreigners, perceived as temporary foreigners. In 1979, the First Federal Commissioner for Aliens, Heinz Kühn, rejected biculturalism and compulsory Germanization in the “State of Affairs and Further Development of the Integration of Foreign workers and their families in the Federal Republic of Germany,” opening the way against multicultural policies. And in 1983 came the introduction of the Remigration Stimulation Act, intended to encourage immigrants to return to their countries of origin, recalling the principle according to which immigrants were viewed as temporary and should be kept to a minimum number.¹¹¹

Although the use of terminologies speaking of “ethnic” or “cultural” minorities has traditionally been avoided, German policy was designed on the basis of the understanding that foreigners have specific integration problems, with a further distinction between foreigners of German ancestry and those of non-German ancestry. This distinction promoted institutional discrimination both between different groups of foreigners and between foreigners and national citizens. Four post-war immigrant groups formally challenged German equality politics (Faas, 2010): on one hand, refugees and resettlers (*Aussiedler*);¹¹² on the other, migrant workers (*Gastarbeiter*) and asylum seekers. The first two groups enjoyed positive discrimination in terms of citizenship rights, with both access to German citizenship and dual citizenship for a longer period, while the latter were offered a chance at naturalization only from 1993 onward, though with more restrictions for asylum seekers, and even then only subject to the fulfillment of a series of more restrictive conditions.¹¹³ they had to have spent 15 years or more in Germany, to give up their former citizenship (no right to dual citizenship). (Faas, 2010:36,45)

Otherwise, policies in Germany have been based mainly on socio-economic criteria. Some assimilation measures have been encouraged, such as the state measures in both Berlin and Frankfurt on spatial dispersion policy during the 1970s, focusing on school and housing

¹¹¹ Every migrant who wished to voluntarily left German would receive an incentive of 5 400 euros, but only about 250,000 migrants, and mainly Turkish, responded, in Faas 2010, pp.34, see also Schönwälder, 2010.

¹¹² Refugees were ethnic German immigrants from the second world war deported from former German territories from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Russia; the resettlers were people of German origin from the former Eastern bloc countries of the Soviet Union, Romania and Poland, many descendants – together, they made a large immigrant group of 8,3 million between 1945-1950, in Faas 2010, pp.31

¹¹³ This occurred only after some violent racist attacks during the aftermath of the German unification. Naturalization rights occurred only after the memorandum *Outlines for Aliens Legislation* of the Christian-Liberal coalition parties (CDU, CSU and FDP) in 1989, and some cautious changes in 1990 and 1993, resulting in the 1991 new Aliens Act (Vermeulen, 1997; Senders, 1996; Schönwälder, 2010).

(Alexander, 2006). However, cultural features of foreigners have been treated by integration policies as foreigner characteristics to be conserved with minimal public control and support, and for some cases even through some cooperation with migrant associations (such as religious and language training in public schools). This has also meant that local politics and community organizations, including religious communities, have played a major role in promoting policies by means targeting specific populations to each activity, albeit often with financial support from the national government. This resulted in wide regional variations in German policy in both theory and practice, as the *Länder* hold extensive powers at the local level (over matters such as inclusion in social welfare and educational policies), while policies on immigration, regulation and citizenship are a federal responsibility (Gogolin and Reich, 2001; Broeder and Extra 1999).

In brief, until the 1990s the aim of German integration philosophy was to guarantee “equal rights,” conceived as confined to “equal social rights,” while being strongly differentialist, and particularly on three different points (Brubaker, 2002; Alexander 2006): 1) Formal division of responsibilities (between federal, state and municipal governments, employers and NGOs); 2) A German system of social service provision specific to those with immigrant background, and framed by the state and three major non-state organizations – the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Church and the union-linked Workers’ Welfare Association (while reagruping individuals by origin, these policies perpetuated foreign/immigrant condition by national origin);¹¹⁴ 3) and until 2000, access to citizenship in minimal terms and integration implying only short-term solutions (such as social, civic and economic rights without political ones). It was further grounded in three main principles of integration: 1) the demand that foreigners living legally in Germany to show a minimal cultural and linguistical integration, and commit to the values of the constitution (as in most liberal states); 2) defending the restriction of further immigration from non-European Union countries (again, as in most liberal states); 3) encouraging foreign workers to return to their native countries (Senders, 1996; Joppke and Morawska, 2002). In sum, “assimilation” remained the normative horizon for immigrant integration in Germany, like in most liberal states, along with the political exclusion of most foreigners (Joppke and Morawska, 2002).

¹¹⁴ In Vermeulen (1997): the trade union-linked Workers Welfare Association (*Arbeiterwohlfahrt*) for Turkish origin immigrants; the Protestant Diakonisches Werk (with Greeks), and the Roman Catholic Caritas (with Italians)

In spite of an official policy that has traditionally been hostile to immigration and that remains hostile to institutionalized plurality, some elements of multicultural policy do exist in Germany (Schönwälder, 2010). Beginning in the 1980s, a debate on multiculturalism developed between academics and politicians. Some emphasized the potential of multiculturalism in the age of globalization, referring to its pluralist recognition as a more achieved form of democracy, while others (centre-right and radical right wing parties) viewed multiculturalism as a threat. (Faas, 2010:36) Thus, concepts such as multiculturalism and interculturalism began to be referred to regularly in debates around education in Germany, at four levels: cultural identity, mother-tongue teaching, bilingual education, and the inclusion of multicultural and anti-racist values in curricula. (Faas, 2010:36) On the conservative side, for example, the Christian Democratic Chancellor Kohl (in office from 1982 to 1998), perceived the national and multicultural agendas as incompatible, still maintaining that “Germany is not a country of immigration.” Thus, while the SPD presents naturalization as a pre-condition for successful integration, the CDU’s position is the other way around: the party takes integration as a precondition for naturalization (Faas, 2010:36).

Nevertheless, at the national level, the German unification in 1990 was followed by an increased openness to multiculturalism, which has increased in the last ten years. And while youth unemployment grew with German unification, resulting in fears of competition from “outsiders,” the problem of integration for the children of guest workers moved to the fore. (Faas, 2010:36) Thus, the deficits of post-unity Germany became obvious with the violent outburst against foreigners, which did not distinguish between asylum-seekers and native-born Turks (Joppke and Morawska, 2002, Faas, 2010).¹¹⁵ And while there was also an increasing association between immigration and crime in public debate, there was also concern about access to citizenship, that should allow immigrants and their descendants to enjoy protection from expulsion.

Within this context, the “red-green” coalition government of Social Democrats and The Greens voted amendments to the 1990 Aliens Act (*Ausländergesetz*) in 1999 (which came into force in 2000), while arguing for a need to attract high-skilled foreign workers. The new

¹¹⁵ With the fall of Berlin wall and the iron curtain, several racial and religious discrimination events demonstrated the raise of “anti-foreigner” and “anti-Muslim” violence in Germany. For instance, the murder of three Turkish women in 1992 in Molln, the setting fire of the house of a Turkish family by young neo-nazi German men in 1993 in Solingen, and again in Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen. From this followed violent protests of Turkish Muslims in several German cities, as well as millions of people in peaceful mass demonstrations. More recently, a pregnant women of egyptian origin was stabbed to death by a German man who she was suing for insulting her for wearing a headscarf, while here husband was seriously wounded while trying to save his wife by a policeman, in Faas, 2010, pp.35, 42, 50.

Aliens Act introduced *jus solis* citizenship for the children of immigrants born and raised in Germany, automatically for grandchildren of immigrants; for children of immigrants aged between 16 and 23 years old, having eight years of residence in Germany and six years of schooling in German school (further conditions including having no criminal record and being willing to give up their original citizenship). Adults who had legally resided in Germany for 15 years could also apply for naturalization if they had no criminal record, were willing to give up their former citizenship, and could economically support themselves and their family (Faas, 2010, pp.36). This new law represented a radical departure from Germany's traditional model of ethno-cultural nationhood (Ludvig, 2000; Joppke and Morawska, 2002; Faas, 2010). A report issued in 2000 by the federal commissioner for foreign affairs of the same government, on the situation of foreigners in Germany, included no reference to *deutsche Einheitskultur* (German unified culture) in the section on "integration," but instead to a German society consisting of a "multiplicity of coexisting lifestyles" (Joppke and Morawska 2002). In addition, in 2005, under Rita Sussmuth's commission on immigration, Germany passed an explicit immigration act for the first time, which stipulated, for instance, that new immigrants and repatriates should attend (free) language and integration courses.

Later, after conservatives won the 2005 federal elections (led by Angela Merkel and her Christian Democratic Union, or CDU), considerable further steps were taken toward the symbolic recognition of plurality (Schönwälder, 2010). For instance, Merkel "hosted three (...) integration summits (*Integrationsgipfel*) (the first in 2006, the second in 2007), with political and societal representatives to discuss issues of German language learning, education and job opportunities"(Schönwälder, 2010)—culminating in the 2007 National Integration Plan. Additionally, there were several official conferences on Islam, "addressing religious topics, German law and values and employment policies" (Faas, 2010:44). In the same year, the Minister of Integration Maria Böhmer pointed out that Germany had 14 million inhabitants with an immigrant background; and, recognizing that one third of school children had a migrant background, starting in 2006 both Interior Minister Schäuble and Minister of Integration Maria Böhmer began referring to a change in paradigm from immigration to integration, in both socio-economic and cultural terms. These references focused on *Ausländer* (both foreign and naturalized citizens) and *Spätaussiedler* ("repatriated" ethnically German immigrants) which made up a total of 15.3 million people in the most recent census (Schönwälder, 2010).

At the federal level, the first movements toward pluralism began earlier. For instance, mother tongue teaching has existed in Germany since 1960s, no longer under the pretext of aiming for children's "return" to their parents' country of origin from the 1980s onwards. Pluralist approaches were also taken at the state level in Berlin and Frankfurt, where there were multicultural projects "celebrating diversity" (Alexander, 2006). For instance, the state government in Berlin has sought to facilitate access to naturalization, or home-language classes (Alexander, 2006); the state Senate's Commissioner for Integration and Migration has publicly insisted that multiculturalism is a useful concept to describe the diversity of German society, and Berlin government's approach to integration promotes diversity (2005, 2006, Schönwälder, 2010). In addition, alternatively to the foreigners' advisory council, they formed a body of ethnically based representatives from immigrant communities in 2003 (Alexander, 2006; Schönwälder, 2010). This also implied some delegation of services to associations, as agents of integration. Similarly, Frankfurt, with about six hundred thousand of inhabitants, has the highest share of foreigners in Germany (25%). In 1989 the state government created an Office for Multicultural Affairs (AmkA), following the "Frankfurt model" created in 1982, to coordinate the work of the state's administrative bodies that deal with those of immigrant background, and to develop an anti-discrimination agenda for local government, notably including specific ethnically targeted services. And since 1983, immigrant minority language teaching has been compulsory for children of immigrants in this state.

Nevertheless, criticisms of multicultural policies in Germany were early and numerous. As individuals of immigrant origin have continued to lag behind the population with non-immigrant origins for socio-economic indicators, critics began in the 1990s to refer to *Parallelgesellschaften* (parallel societies: a term from the sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer). Blame for failed integration was placed on immigrants themselves, for weak inter-ethnic contact, weak German language skills, educational underachievement, and failure to adopt German constitutional values. Consequently, multiculturalist approaches have also been criticized as a kind of retreat, promoting social and cultural segregation. For instance, in 2004, Heinz Buschkowsky, the Mayor of Neukölln, a borough of Berlin, claimed that multiculturalism has led "to a 'ticking time-bomb' of ethnic separatism and disaffected youth"; in 2006, the senior CDU politician Volker Kauder claimed in the *Bild* newspaper that "the time of looking away and blindness resulting from a false multi-culti ideology is over";

in the same year, the historian Arnulf Baring claimed, again in the *Bild*, that *Ausländer* (foreigners) had been unwilling to accept the German culture during the “decades of a multicultural dream”; in 2008, Stefan Lust, in the *Tagesspiegel* and in his book *Abschied von Multikulti* (Farewell to Multiculti), argued that the privileging of identities-of-origin over a common host-culture “must lead to disaster.” Furthermore, Eurobarometer surveys have indicated relatively high levels of resistance to multiculturalism within German society (Schönwälder, 2010). More recent pressures have been promoted by politically unfavourable climate and budgetary restrictions, leading to significant criticism to pluralist policies, particularly mother tongue education, with the diversion of resources toward German language education and the elimination of immigrant language teaching where before it had been compulsory (Gogolin and Reich, 2001; Schönwälder, 2010).

In sum, the evolution of German context promoted politicians to distance themselves from the “multicultural dream,” presented as a negative image of the past and a synonym of the ills and illusions of a liberal left. However, some researchers have argued that, in reality, Germany has been highly differentialist and has never abandoned an official policy or paradigm of multiculturalism, because there had never been such a policy, at least at the federal level (Schönwälder, 2010).

2.4.3. The Netherlands: From pluralism to the embrace of assimilationism

While Dutch government’s Memorandum on Foreign workers from 1970 had stated clearly that the Netherlands was not a country of immigration (Scholten, 2011), in the late 1970s, the country went through a paradigm shift. While the retention of identity was initially seen as a pre-condition for successful return, at this point, the settlement of immigrants came to be seen as an opportunity for enriching the country’s cultural diversity in Dutch society (Entzinger, 2002). “From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, there was a strongly institutionalised research-policy nexus,” promoted by a think tank close to the Prime Minister (Penninx, Garcés-Masareñas and Scholten, 2005). Reports published in 1979 by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) (entitled *Ethnic minorities*) and the Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (ACOM¹¹⁶) (“Minorities Research Advice”) assumed that immigrants were permanent, and argued that their incorporation into Dutch society should be encouraged

¹¹⁶ ACOM was installed by the Culture Department in 1976 in order to coordinate and integrate research on ethnic or cultural minorities (Penninx, Garcés-Masareñas and Scholten, 2005)

through specific minorities policies (Entzinger, 2002; Penninx, Garcés-Mascreñas and Scholten, 2005; Scholten, 2011). The government responded with a reply memorandum in 1980 and a minorities memorandum in 1983 (Vermeulen, 1997; Entzinger, 2002; Scholten, 2011). From then onwards, individual immigrants were approached as “ethnic minorities” (*etnische minderheden*), defined in terms of group membership and with the aim of “integration with retention of identity,” laid down in the *Minderhedennota* and accepted by the Parliament in 1983 (Entzinger, 2002)—marking the beginning of the Dutch official “plural model of integration.”

These integration policies officially aimed a pluriform or multicultural society, through minority policies for specific target groups—not applied to all individuals of immigrant background but mainly to those from former colonies and guest workers (from the 1960s and 1970s), as well as to other groups toward whom Dutch history left the country with particular responsibility (such as Indonesians and Moluccans: Entzinger, 2002). There was an extensive reference to “ethnic” and “cultural” minorities in the formulation and defense of specific policies, defining eight main groups that included Turks.¹¹⁷ The main argument was that immigrant minorities live in specific disadvantaged situations, because “did not participate on an equal basis in Dutch society.” (Joppke and Morawska, 2002:14; Extra and Verhoeven, 1993:46) This was reinforced in 1987 with the report by the Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (ACOM, “A fair chance”) in favour of U.S.-style affirmative action. Since then, “minority” measures have been the basis for policy against deprivation in employment, education, housing and health (for instance, vocational training or policy aiming to develop entrepreneurship). (Vermeulen, 1997:44; Alexander, 2006). Cultural issues were assumed to be included in demands for social inclusion beginning in 1981. For instance, intercultural education was laid down in law, although the meaning of cultural identity was not clearly specified. (Vermeulen, 1997:44; Alexander, 2006)

In brief, the main aim was equality before the law for all rights, except in the armed forces and the police. It involved the access of foreigners into the welfare state, easier access to Dutch citizenship, and, after 1992, the possibility of dual citizenship.¹¹⁸ Since 1985, immigrants have also been able to participate politically at the local level: in that year

¹¹⁷ In Extra and Verhoeven (1993), pp.4-8 Later on, Chinese, Pakistanis and Palestinians were not designated for both financial and substantive reasons, Italians, Greeks, Spanish and Portuguese did not showed to suffer enough deprivation, and EU nationals are now excluded from new integration policy for newcomers. In Vermeulen (1997), pp.44-48.

¹¹⁸ This politics increased dramatically the naturalisation rates, particular among the Turks, but this possibility was several reduced in 1997, in Vermeulen, 1997; Entzinger, 2002; Prins and Saharso, 2010).

foreigners with at least 5 years of legal residence acquired the right to vote in Dutch municipal elections and to stand for office in local councils (Entzinger, 2002). Last but not least, in 1994 protection from discrimination by foreign nationality was extended under the Equal Treatment Act (along with gender, sexual orientation, and race),¹¹⁹ as well as support for regularization for those in irregular situation (Alexander, 2006).

Regulation and citizenship laws have been the responsibility of the national government as in France and Germany. Since 1982 integration policies in all ministries, such as Education, Employment, Social Welfare, Justice, Housing, as well as the financing of local policies, have been coordinated by the Minorities Policy Coordination Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Entzinger, 2002). Here, more like in Germany, local politics and community organizations always played a major role in promoting integration policies targeting specific populations, a differentiation that was reinforced when “minorities” gained the right to participate in public decision-making through advisory board councils,¹²⁰ and again in the 1990s, when local authorities and municipal executives became charged with local policy on minorities. In sum, this first period was also characterized by a return to the pillarization (*verzuiling*) system,¹²¹ recalling the 19th century and the later Dutch constitution recognition in 1917 of the right to organize with public funding to maintain and protect one’s religion. In line with the pillarization tradition financed by the state, the key notion here was emancipation. This meant not only support for physical manifestations of “otherness,” but also the treatment of migrant associations and religious institutions as agents of empowerment and the ethnic targeting of institutions and services (through community-organizations and participatory boards). (Vermeulen, 1997:44; Alexander, 2006) This period of pillarization ran from 1982 to 1994 under the policy motto “integration with preservation of identity,” whose formulation referred not to individuals but to (ethnic minority) groups (Prins and Saharso, 2010).

¹¹⁹ Earlier proposed in 1984 by the Working Party and included in 1983 Minority-Minor Rights report on the demand of the Dutch Centre for Immigrants, In Vermeulen (1997), pp.44; see also Prins and Saharso (2010).

¹²⁰ Who report to the minister of Home Affairs, and many local authorities have also public participation procedures In Vermeulen (1997), pp.44; see also Alexander (2007).

¹²¹ The Dutch tradition of institutionalized pillarization (*verzuiling*) from the late 19th century was inspired by the image of a Greek temple with its roof supported by a number of separated pillars. It was based on four religious-ideological pillars: Calvinism, Catholicism, Socialism and Liberalism, then applied schools, housing corporations, hospitals, trade unions, newspaper, the major religious and ideological communities – where schooling was an important element for emancipation. With the 1960s secularization of the constitution, and individualization trends in society, the pillarization system to lose much of its significance, though only one third of Dutch public schools are currently public. Following this, during 1980s the first steps were made to establish schools for immigrants, such as Muslims and Hindus, currently about 30 in the Netherlands. Entzinger, Han (2002); see also Prins and Saharso (2010).

As in France and Germany, there have always been criticisms of multicultural policies in the Netherlands. As early as 1989 attempts were made to shift the paradigm, when the Scientific Council on Governmental Policy produced report entitled “Ethnic Minority Policy,” (the WRR report), centred more on education and employment and less on minority background references, referring specifically to the need to improve the Dutch language proficiency of minorities and less on first-language instruction (here understood as immigrant parents’ native language), as well as the need to ensure their adoption of the liberal values of their host society (Extra and Verhoeven, 1993; Vermeulen, 1997; Joppke and Morawska, 2002; Alexander, 2006). However, this report suggested also the use of the term *allochtonen*,¹²² a term that has been extensively used in minority-targeted policies, and that was to be applied to individuals with an immigrant background down to the grandchildren of immigrants. Only in 1994 was this official term officially refused, though it has continued to be in used widely in debates both in the public sphere and in research.¹²³

Between 1994 and 2002, Dutch policies focused on equal opportunity in four main areas: employment, housing, school and health. Over this period, policies emphasized the lack of socio-economic integration among individuals of immigrant background (Entzinger, 2002; Prins and Saharso, 2010). And though an aim in this period was to minimize ethnically based measures, it was when the definition of ‘black schools’ (meaning more than half of students with *allochtonen* immigrant background), and Muslim schools emerged, implying the provision of extra support by the national state to schools with a high proportion of “ethnic” pupils and the appeal for cultural mediators when necessary (Alexander, 2006). In this period the view that the teaching of Dutch language, culture and history was more explicitly declared as necessary for the basic social cohesion of Dutch society, with an eye to combat the recognized potential for the perpetuation of ethnic enclaves, which had come to be viewed as less temporary than previously thought (Alexander, 2006).

In brief, until 2002, integration policies in the Netherlands, in practice, approached cultural differentiation as temporary and equated more as a deficit and less as enrichment (Extra and Verhoeven, 1993). Critics also highlighted that the pillarization system did not work because it financed small elites of ethnic activists and not ordinary immigrants—even, according to

¹²² *Allochthone*, coined by sociologist Hilda Verwey-Jonker, refers to residents of who either one of their parents or themselves are not born in the Netherlands, applying further the categories of western and non-western – categories contested in the public debate but still used by researchers doing statistics and policymakers.

¹²³ Such term did not gain acceptance from some provincial and local authorities (for its perceptions of an inferior position), and soon after, since 1994, the *countours memorandum* confirmed the its official rejection from the part of national authorities In Vermeulen (1997), pp.44.

some arguments, because even pillarism in its original form rested on collaboration between elites, which led to exclusion and segregation (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). These conclusions motivated local policies to minimize support for religious institutions, instead emphasizing support for intercultural activities (Alexander, 2006). As mentioned above, the main criticisms of Dutch pluralist policies were centred on the defense for Dutch secularism.

Already in 1991, Frits Bolkestein, leader of the Conservative Liberals (VVD), argued that Western liberalism should not bargain its principles, lecturing against the “world of Islam.” He opened the way to a “new realism” in Dutch politics.¹²⁴ But it was ten years later that this Dutch new realism turned into a more direct political criticism of pluralist policies, particularly after 2000, when the journalist Paul Scheffer published an article on “The Multicultural Drama” (Prins and Saharso, 2010). In keeping with the “new realism,” his article criticized multicultural policy for its supposed blindness to social indicators showing the overrepresentation of immigrants in statistics on unemployment, poverty, criminal activity and school drop-outs (Vertovec and Weseendorf, 2010). Soon afterward, Scheffer’s criticisms were followed by more radical claims. First, after September 2001, came the entry of Pim Fortuyn, an outspoken Dutch politician, onto the Dutch political scene, launching the “Fortuyn revolt.” Fortuyn turned the rhetoric of the “new realism” into a more radical hyperrealism by openly criticizing the welfare state, the policy of toleration, left-wing churches, and immigrants, castigating Muslims for their inherent unassimilability and condemning European unification. However, when in 2002 he was shot to death by a radical ecologist, his murder shocked the defenders of multiculturalism and opened the political field for the continuation of this “new realism” (particularly between 2002 – 2006: Prins and Saharso, 2010). The coalition of Christian Democrats, Liberals and Centre Democrats that followed in 2004 implemented compulsory integration exams for immigrants, and obliged immigrants to take “integration courses” (Prins and Saharso, 2010). The filmmaker Theo Van Gogh and the asylum seeker Ayaan Hirsi Ali (a Somali woman of Muslim background), were in the same line of critics as Fortuyn and gathered support from Islamaphobes and Dutch nationalists. They made a controversial film that put Muslim women into the spotlight with the message that they should emancipate themselves through western secularized ideals, which was also intended to criticize leftists for their supposed indifference to the fate of

¹²⁴Frits Bolkestein “new realism” was based on four principles 1) daring to speak frankly about truths; 2) ordinary people are the spokesperson; 3) Dutch national identity = being frank, straightforward and realistic; 4) resistance to the left, as racism and intolerance, considered to be too relativistic approaches; 5) highly gendered discourse – Muslim women are depicted as victims of their own culture, while men are the privileged ones, in Prins and Saharso (2010).

Muslim women. However, their story also came to an abrupt and dramatic end. Van Gogh was brutally murdered by a Dutch Moroccan Muslim extremist in 2004, and Hirsi Ali, who was under protection by Dutch security forces, was found to have lied on her asylum application: rejected by Dutch conservatives, she decided to migrate to the United States in 2007. Following the shock of these two political murders, intellectuals in the Netherlands highlighted the need for a Dutch *Leitkultur* (dominant culture), and the values of cultural diversity and the loyalty of Muslim population were widely questioned (Prins and Saharso, 2010).

In 2007, Dutch policy entered a period of civic integration (Prins and Saharso, 2010). Since then, the parliamentary coalition of Christian democrats, Labour Party and Christian Union, have avoided words such as *autochtone*, *allotochtone*, *ethnic minority* and *Islam*, giving preference to the term *citizens* (Prins and Saharso, 2010). Although they softened asylum and integration policies, promoted integration courses for immigrants, educational projects for the children of immigrants, and improvements as poor neighbourhoods, they also maintained many strict measures introduced by the earlier government, such as the need to prove basic Dutch proficiency before migration through an exam in the home country (at a cost of 350 euros), higher fees for visas (833 euros to visit relatives, 433 euros for students or job-holders), and the need to prove a relatively high income if marrying a foreign citizen leaving abroad. Thus, since 2002 immigrants and their children have been expected to follow an assimilatory trajectory after migration – not just in terms of economic and social participation (Prins and Saharso, 2010).

2.4.4. Swinging between *the return of assimilation* (Brubaker) and the *backlash against multiculturalism* (Vertovec)

Although many in academic circles have described various contrasts between national or local integration models (e.g., group vs. individual; accommodationist vs. laissez-faire), others have argued that these distinctions are more legal than sociological, because they refer to differences that, in practice, are smaller than they are believed to be (Vermeulen, 1997). Indeed, recent European approaches indicated a widespread perception that policies toward immigrants/foreigners have provoked significant cultural and social backlash. Thus, over the last ten years, assimilationist perspectives have come to the fore in what may be identified as convergent integration and regulation immigration policies in the EU. The three countries

under study here have been no exception. And since 2005, France, Germany and the Netherlands, all have experienced swings to the right in their national governments, often with an anti-immigration and anti-Muslim focus (Faas, 2010).

Evolution in regulation policies has seen a set of common trends. Starting in the Netherlands, the 1996 Memorandum Outlines for the Newcomers' Integration Bill stipulated that newcomers should be helped to quickly find their place in Dutch society by means of an 'integration programme' consisting of Dutch language courses as well as vocational orientation, career planning, implemented through the law of 9th April 1998 (*WIN – Wet inburgering nieuwkomers law*), measures that would be applied by the local authorities, (Vermeulen, 1997). Refusal to participate was to be punishable by fines, with exceptions for migrants who had arrived before the law had come into effect and for nationals of other EU member states. In 2004, further obligations were imposed on those wishing to migrate to the Netherlands: basic Dutch language skills became a criterion for obtaining an entry visa, even as immigrant language instruction lost its public funding.

In France, since 2003 the French parliament has positioned knowledge of French culture and proficiency in the French language at the heart of the process of *insertion* for immigrants. For instance, the law of May 2004 on French language was the first determinant step for professional training of those with immigrant background to succeed (Extramiana, 2011 :7), or the *Comité interministeriel à l'integration* launched on the 10th of April 2003, which defined a "hosting and integration contract" applied since in 2006 (with an experimental phase beginning in 2003, and which became compulsory starting in 2007), explicitly requiring a minimum level of French proficiency;¹²⁵ as well as Law n. 2005-32, from the 18th of January 2005, which made access to a residency permit contingent upon language training;¹²⁶ and the creation of the *Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration* (OFII, in 2009), supposedly supporting foreigners during their first 5 years, with the aim of creating a direct and individual relationship between the state and the citizen, in opposition to a communitarian conception. (Extramiana, 2011:7)

¹²⁵ Organised and paid by the Fonds d'Action et de soutien pour l'integration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD), in Op cit, Sénat (2005). See also Extramiana (2011) pp.7

¹²⁶ applied by the ANAEM – Agence nationales de l'accueil des étrangers et des migrations, that substitutes OMI, in Op cit, Sénat (2005).

In Germany, the Residence Act of the 30th of July 2004, which came into force on the 1st of January 2005, established a right for immigrants to a free course of instruction in the German language and civic integration, which would be compulsory for foreigners showing found to have German language skills. Beginning in 2007 this began also to be applied to those already living in Germany. Immigrants judged to lack language skills who failed to participate would be prevented from renewing their residency permit, find their access to naturalization limited, obliged to pay German language training costs and be penalized with a 10% reduction in general social benefits.¹²⁷ In addition, new institutional discrimination by immigrants' background came once again to be applied to family reunification policies. Spouses from non-EU countries needed to be at least 18 years old, to have a visa and, for those from Turkey, the Middle East and Africa, prove sufficient linguistic knowledge, a criterion not applied to those coming from South Korea, Japan, Australia and United States (Faas, 2010). Last but not least, integration tests were applied to adult immigrants aiming to naturalize since amendments on citizenship law from 2007. However, in practice, these tests have been more a challenge on the compatibility of Muslim and German constitutional values.

Common trends can also be seen in recent changes in the integration policies of these three countries. Both pluralist or assimilationist approaches (or policies) can be identified for any national model, even when using different terminologies. Nevertheless, there is no evidence in the practices and adjustments of immigrants and their children in any country that assimilation is not occurring (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). However, in each of these countries, immigrants' maintenance of "transnational linkages" with their society origin reveal a different face of assimilation, because moving from more restrictive to more liberalizing thrusts (Joppke and Morawska, 2002). When more liberalized forms of cultural incorporation occur, or, at least, pluralist policies are applied, this has been met with significant criticisms, notwithstanding the fact that some national policies have embraced pluralism more officially than others (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010).

Since the mid-1990s, there has been an apparent backlash against and retreat from multicultural approaches, in a kind of re-assertion of nation-building for common values and identity, unitary citizenship, and a "return to assimilation" (Kymlicka, 2010). With the turn of the millennium, Europe experienced what Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010) called a "seismic

¹²⁷ Organised by BAMF – Federal office for migration and refugees, in Op cit, Sénat (2005), Faas, 2010, pp.46.

shift,” with the rise of a widespread and more or less unified set of condemnations of multiculturalism. These were raised not only in countries that had implemented openly pluralistic approaches, such as the Netherlands, but in most Western European countries in general. Those of diverse political affinities focused on different criticisms in relation to the accommodation of immigrants: those on the right claimed that diversity had ‘gone too far’ and begun to threaten natives’ ways of life; on the left, attention was focused on the supposed socio-exclusion consequences of pluralist policies; social democrats focused on the preservation of national identity and the struggle against racism and discrimination. For the latter, the term “diversity” has appeared alongside or as an alternative to “multiculturalism,” and put in contrast to with more individualised forms of inclusion (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010). In sum, there has been that (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010): a) multiculturalism fosters the accentuation or preservation of cultural differences; b) such differences lead to communal separateness; c) separateness deepens inequalities in socio-economic standing, leads to the breakdown of social relations, and provides an incubator for extremism and possible terrorism—all of these arguments accompanied by the blaming of immigrants themselves and/or pluralist policies. In the following section, I will demonstrate how this affected the integration of immigrant minority languages into each country’s policies, and how was it related with national language trainings.

Table 3- National integration policy approaches for immigrants and their descendants 1

	Models of integration		
	France	Germany	The Netherlands
General Integration model	* Nationhood conception: civic approach * Assimilationist and universal model: share of same norms, culture, language and rights	* Nationhood conception: Ethnic-German approach * Communitarian model - culturalist and differentialist	* Nationhood conception: pluralist approach * Recent assimilationist trend (since 2000)
Citizenship policy	* Access to nationality by <i>ius soli</i> since 1889, and reinforced in 1998 * Dual citizenship allowed ever since	* Until 1993 - foreigners are not members * Denizenship à <i>ius soli</i> only for 3rd generation since 2000 * Restrict Dual citizenship allowed since 1993	* Access to nationality by <i>ius soli</i> since 1985 * Dual citizenship allowed since 1992, restricted since 1997
Target of integration policies	* General policy target based on individuals' socio-economic-spatial criteria * Some positive discrimination since 1982, and again from 2000	* 1979 - First Aliens Commissioner, rejecting biculturalism and compulsory Germanization * Policy target specific for foreigners * Institutional discrimination: foreigners of German-ethnicity (<i>aussiedler</i>) vs. foreigners of non-German ethnicity (<i>auslander</i>)	* Since 1980s - separated integration policy for minorities * Target policies on national origins combined with social disadvantages * Pillarization system to current Secularization (1980-1994) - public support for non-dominant cultures * Current uniformization of target social policy since 1996, and again from 2004

Table 4 – National integration approaches for immigrants and their descendants 2

		Models of integration		
		France	Germany	The Netherlands
Policy for foreigners	Since 1980: * Immigrant associations allowed * Regularization of foreigners together with immigrant associations * Foreigners access to welfare system * Foreigners enjoy no political rights * French language learning programs more organized from 1990s	* Until 1993 - <i>foreigners are not members</i> * Foreigners limited to specific equal social right * Cultural policies together with local partners - delegation of responsibilities * German language learning from 1974 * More restrictive measures for German language and culture since 2004	* 1985 - foreigner rights to vote and stand for office at local level * 1994 - Equal Treatment Act * Since 1996, and again since 2002 - more restrictions for Dutch language and culture basic skills and proficiency	
Policy for minority groups	* State ≠ religion (1905), exception: Alsace region * No funding for communitarian/religious organisations * Latest recognition of communities' organisations (1980s) * Advisory boards exclude ethnic or immigrants' associations * Immigrants' language instruction modestly included in educational policies	Since 1949 Basic Law - Public funds for religious communities officially recognized not for muslim confessions Since 1964 - Immigrant language integrated in educational policies as religious educational, part of national government policies in some states Since 1978 - Promotion of foreign or ethnic-community organizations on local advisory boards Since 2005 - integration and religious national summits to decide <i>National Integration Plans</i>	* Constitutional Secularization 1960s * Integration promoted by religious, political and community organisations, starting with Pillarization system * Advisory boards for minorities since 1990s * Since 1974 - immigrant languages included in educational policies, abolished in 2004 * 1990s - quotas for public servants at 5% * Since 1993 decentralization towards municipalities on educational policies * Since 1994 - ethnic-public rations for school extra-fundings * 2000s - less public funds for religious communities	
% of Turks in total immigrants	5-6%	29%	28%	

2.5. Dealing with linguistic diversity through mother tongue instruction: An enrichment of human capital or a handicap to be managed?

*“As a consequence of processes of migration and minorization, the trend in many European countries is towards increasing cultural and linguistic diversification.”*¹²⁸

Recent international data from the Eurydice network (2008) on school-aged youth in OECD countries indicated a change in the demographic and linguistic landscape since the middle of twentieth century.¹²⁹ According to these data 7% of students aged 15 spoke a language at home that was different than the language of instruction at school: 3% spoke a regional or minority language and 4% a foreign language. These proportions were significantly higher in some countries, reaching 9% in Germany (regional, minority and foreign languages combined), versus 6% in The Netherlands and 7% in France (in the latter case, 2% regional and 5% foreign language).¹³⁰ PISA data, other recent OECD data, (2005/2006), indicated even higher proportions of 15-year-old pupils speaking a different language at home than at school. From a total average of 12% of pupils declaring a home language in contrast to the school language in the EU27, 8% were immigrant pupils and 4% had non-immigrant origin,¹³¹ with higher percentages in Germany (14% pupils of immigrant origin plus 9% of non-immigrant origin), France (13% and 5%, respectively) and the Netherlands (11% and 6%, respectively). This linguistic change has transformed transformation of European schools, particularly in the last ten years, into spaces of language socialization, particular in urban areas, independently of official policies on language diversity. (Gogolin, 2002:8-9)

Extra and Broeder, focusing on the mismatch in Europe between the evolving demographic and linguistic reality and policy development, confirmed that in most European countries there has been in the last ten years an increase in the number of immigrant minority pupils who speak a language at home other than (or in addition to) the dominant school language. In addition, they observed that schools have responded to this home-school language mismatch

¹²⁸ In pp. vii Broeder, Peter, Guus Extra (1999), *Language, ethnicity and Education ; Case studies on immigration minority groups and immigrant minority languages*, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon)

¹²⁹ In Eurydice network (2008). Its is Eurostat's statistical data taken from New Cronos database related to 2005/2006, providing information on language learning participation rates of pupils and students in primary and secondary education. The Eurodyce and Eurostat data relate solely to general education and to private sector and to granted-aided private schools. They cover 31 countries, namely all those involved in the Eurocyde network activities in EU Action Programme in the field of Life Long Learning. Some indicators have been devised using the contextual questionnaire database for the PISA 2006 (OECD).

¹³⁰ Figure A2 pp. 20 . PISA Dataset 2005/2006 (although some countries this data did not included minority language pupils who received instruction in their mother tongue), in Eurydice network (2008),

¹³¹ Pupils of immigrant origin were considered to be those born abroad or at the survey country of both parents born abroad. Figure A3 pp.22 PISA Dataset 2005/2006, in Eurydice network (2008)

by developing a curriculum that pays more attention to the school language as a second language. And while there is a general consensus about the necessity of investing in education in the school language as a second language for pupils of immigrant background, no similar support exists for immigrant minority language instruction as mother language.¹³² Extra and Broeder's extensive research also showed that comparative cross-national research on Immigrant Minority Language Instruction (IMLI) in the various EU states is rare and focuses mainly on particular language groups, (Broeder and Extra, 1999:109) offering little information on the subject as a whole.

The importance of immigrant language policies in the European context has been debated since the 1970s, and extensively studied since the 1980s, albeit in relation to a limited set of aims. As mentioned above, the first European document on the need for immigrant language teaching—the Directive of the European Communities (now the EU)—which remains the principal reference on the subject, dates to the aftermath of the end of guest worker recruitment, in 1977. This directive, intended to be a guideline of the Council of Europe on the schooling of the children of “migrant workers” (directive 77/486, 25th July 1977),¹³³ became the basis on which it was demanded that member states introduce the language and culture of children of immigrants into each national education system.¹³⁴ However, most European countries had already developed specific measures in this direction in their compulsory education systems before this directive was issued, particularly in primary education, with the aim of supporting family return. The 1977 Directive arrived when there was a change of this approach, when, at the end of 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, European countries were confronted with the demographic evolution of their immigrant-origin populations. New approaches turned IMLI into an important instrument for combating socio-economic disadvantages, offering the prospect of a more pluralistic society that would aim to bridge the gap between home and school environments while encouraging school achievement in ‘regular’ subjects. In the service of this societal project, it was extended to secondary education and, in some countries, to kindergarten as well.

¹³² Broeder, Peter, Guus Extra (1999), pp. 73 and Extra and Goorter, 2001, see Table 1, pp. 34, appendix. Both books examine the policies of a number of European Union countries regarding immigrant minority language instruction in primary and secondary educations. Several terminology are at use: *home language instruction*; *instruction in the native language and culture*; *instruction in immigrant languages*; *instruction in ethnic minority languages*. Most common acronym is IMLI immigrant Minority Language Instruction – which a matter of multilingual and not bilingual matters; not easy to fit in the rest of the curriculum. On difference of status between primary and secondary education IMLI, and status of different languages in secondary education, see Table 5 pp. 31, Table 6 pp. 36 in appendix.

¹³³ <http://eurlex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl&lang=fr&ihmlang=fr&lng1=fr,en&lng2=bg,cs,da,de,el,en,es,et,fi,fr,hu,it,lt,lv,mt,nl,pl,pt,ro,s k,sl,sv.&val=58572:cs&page=> (seen later October 2011)

¹³⁴ pp. 39 Nejla Küçüksahin, *Rapports entre la connaissance de la langue maternelle et la maîtrise du français chez les élèves d'origine turque scolarisés en Belgique* (pp.39-48) in Crutzen et Manço (2003)

Indeed, and over the decades, ‘the extent to which immigrant minority language instruction (IMLI) has been a topic in government policy with European dimensions is related to estimates of the number of “foreign resident groups” in the countries of the European Union presented by the Statistical Office of the EU (Eurostat) in Luxembourg (based on nationality) (Broeder and Extra, 1999:73). Most countries showed similar development over time in their argumentation for the role of immigrant minority languages and their teaching (IMLI) (Broeder and Extra, 1999:73). In 2006/2007, specific regional, minority and foreign languages were taught as second languages at various levels in primary or general secondary education, at the education levels corresponding to ISCED 1+2+3 in Germany, France and the Netherlands.

However, IMLI has been organized in various ways. In the first stage of the development of IMLI in Europe, funding, teacher selection and content came mainly from consulates or embassies of the country of origin (this is still the case in France and in some German states such as Berlin). In its second stage, it became the responsibility of the host government, in keeping with intercultural educational policies (such as in the Netherlands until 2004, and in some German states, such as Frankfurt-Hessen until 1999). The third stage has represented a return to the model applied in the first. In response, countries of origin emphasized the intrinsic importance of knowledge of immigrant minority languages from a cultural, legal and economic perspective. Thus, culturally it should contribute to maintaining and advancing a pluralist society; legally, to the international recognition of the right to language development and language maintenance, in keeping with the fact that many immigrant minority groups consider their own language as a key to the value in their cultural identity; economically, to collective knowledge in societies that are increasingly internationally oriented. In brief, it should improve the social status of these languages.

However, in all three countries, the purposes of those conceiving IMLI programmes have been far from their main aims. Broeder and Extra (1999) main conclusions has been “that cultural-political arguments for IMLI have not led to an educational policy in which the status of immigrant minority languages has been substantially advanced in any of the countries involved in this study. (still today) The target groups of IMLI are considered disadvantaged groups in virtually all the countries.” (Broeder and Extra, 1999:106). Being of immigrant minority background has been considered a source of problems and deficiencies, and rarely as a source of knowledge and enrichment. Thus, not surprisingly, disagreements on the

legitimacy of these programs reflect top-down and bottom-up differences in all countries with, on one side, policymakers, headmasters and regular schoolteachers, and on the other, parents, IMLI teachers and immigrant organizations. “Instruction in the immigrant minority languages stands out in stark contrast to this (investment in school-language), as it is much more susceptible to an ideological debate about its legitimacy. (...) These differences in top-down and bottom-up attitudes emerge in all countries focused in this study.” (Broeder and Extra, 1999:105) I will now take a more detail look for all three countries.

2.5.1. France: *Plurilinguisme à langue dominante unique*

The French government policy of *plurilinguisme à langue dominante unique* has meant that opportunities to use other languages than French have been quite restricted (Calvet, 1999; Adami, 2008). The principle that “*La république française est une et indivisible*,” defined since the French Revolution and identified with the universal use of the French language – the only official common denominator for conscription, legal system, rail and road links, and the compulsory school system. Thus, the far-reaching centralism of the school system was a major element in the creation of the nation between the 19th and 20th centuries. And the arrêté ministériel of the 7th of June 1880, stipulating that French would be the only language used in school, launched the official tradition of monolingualism, bringing with it a status devaluation of other languages, denigrated as mere *patois*. (Vermeulen, 1997:30,68)

Not surprisingly, then, the renewal of the question of multilingualism in French society is a recent development. Recent demographic studies have highlighted the reality of linguistic diversity (Heran, Filhon, et Deprez (2002, 2005); Feraud et al., 2002; Clanché, 2002; Simon, 1997), revealing transgenerational processes that lead to a progressive abandonment of foreign languages among the children and grandchildren of immigrants. However, the pace of linguistic assimilation was found to vary with background and geographic location in France. In EHF (1999), about eleven million individuals in France had regular contact with a language other than French in their family environment, and around one quarter of the total population was bilingual. Among the latter, 60% were bilingual in French and a foreign language (this group lived mainly in urban areas), while 40% were bilingual in French and a regional language (and typically lived in rural areas). And while the trend in the transmission of regional languages was decreasing, for foreign languages the inverse

was seen, due to increasing number of those of immigrant origins (Clanché, 2003) particularly in certain urban areas such as Île-de-France (centred on Paris, Filhon, Deprez and Heran, Filhon, et Deprez, 2002; Filhon, 2009). The most commonly transmitted languages among individuals of immigrant background were Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian, followed by German, Polish and Turkish (Clanché, 2003). The latter is said to be the eighth-most widely spoken language in France. Survey data from the school environment confirm the presence of significant linguistic diversity among schoolchildren (Bertucci, 2005:4).

The immigrant generation, and the slow pace for language learning

The linguistic diversity of immigrants has enjoyed little recognition, and special support for French language skills was limited and smoothly implemented since the guest worker programs. For instance, in the 1960s, out of 1.5 million adults and young adults who were in need of French training, only 40,000 to 50,000 received French instruction—at the time called ‘alphabétisation.’ However, the Fonds d’Action Sociale (FAS), created in 1958 to work with guest workers mainly from Algeria as Muslim French), began to offer training to all immigrants from 1964 onward, but no legislation or specific regulation made it a requirement that linguistic instruction be offered to immigrants (Leclerc, 2011). NGOs played the largest role in this capacity, among which one specifically focused on French language instruction: *L’Amicale pour l’enseignement aux étrangers* (AEE). They worked together with the *Association de formation professionnelle des adultes* (AFPA), which organized the training, and the national education system, which offered mainly logistic and pedagogical support to the AEE (Leclerc, 2011).

With the law of 1971 on continuing professional training, some improvements occurred in immigrants’ access to training programs; later, in 1975, in the context of economic and industrial crises, two memoranda renewed the training for immigrants while focusing on *Formation à Dominante Linguistique* (FDL) and on socio-educational actions for immigrant women. A number of criticisms of this programs emerged, and when the AEE folded in 1978, a number of criticisms of its programs emerged: they were described by some as paternalistic or racist, and said to have lacked consideration for the specific linguistic needs of individuals. New NGO appeared, such as the *Comité de liaison pour l’alphabétisation et la promotion* (CLAP), the *Association pour l’alphabétisation et l’enseignement du français aux travailleurs immigrés* (AEFTI) – both were founded in 1972 and brought together researchers, unions and professional trainers, as did the *Centre de Documentation pour la*

formation des travailleurs migrants, created in 1973. (Leclerc, 2011) Thus, the 1970s saw the emergence of a network of non-governmental institutions focused explicitly on French-language training for immigrants, which, importantly, included paid and trained teachers.

During the short multicultural period in France in the 1980s, it was recognized that the large majority of immigrants were lower qualified and had limited proficiency in French, two conditions that made them one of the most vulnerable social categories with respect to industrial restructuring and unemployment (in 1985 the unemployment rate among immigrants was 18.4%, versus 10% for the population as a whole); another factor that was widely recognized was the educational underachievement of working-class children, a category that included a highly disproportionate number of children of immigrants. (Adami, 2011:39) In this period the invisibility of immigrants and their languages in France came to an end, and specific demands for cultural recognition claimed that, for immigrant parents' generation, the right to speak had been taken away. (Adami, 2011:39) In terms of linguistic policies, the main issue was to change the *Formation à dominante linguistique* (FDL). (Leclerc, 2011) More didactic proposals arrived only during the 1990s, and particularly in 1995, when the FAS made the evaluation of French language training compulsory, increasing the number of teachers with post-secondary qualifications, and creating different types of French language training: *Français Langue Etrangère* (FLE) and *la lutte contre l'illettrisme, formation linguistique des migrants*. (Leclerc, 2011)

In the 2000s, the question of linguistic diversity included the right to one's language, referring also to immigrant minority language. And while the division of linguistic policies of the European Council issued several reports on immigrants and European integration, in France the *Délégation générale à la langue française et aux langues de France* (DGLFLF) organized seminars on linguistic integration policies in France and Europe (2004, 2005). (Leclerc, 2011) There were further institutional changes—FAS changed to *Fonds d'action et de soutien pour l'intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations* (FASILD) in 2001, and again in 2006 to the *Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances* (ACSE)—working together with *Agence nationale de l'accueil des étrangers et des migrations* (ANAEM) and the *Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration* (OFII) in 2009. (Leclerc, 2011) FLE was divided by French educational direction into *Français langue seconde* (FLS), *Français langue professionnelle* (FLP) and *Français sur objectifs spécifiques* (FOS). However, there is little indication that French language support for immigrants from

non-francophone countries has had an impact on these populations. Instead, these recent institutional changes reflect an assimilationist approach to the re-emergence of a *droit à la langue*, both as a labour right (FAS 2000-2002; Law of 2004), but also as a matter of integration and immigration policies (Law, 2006), via its inclusion in hosting contracts for new arrived immigrants, for example.

Children of immigrants in France: a stepwise recognition of linguistic diversity

In contrast to existing language support for immigrants, linguistic policies targeting the children of immigrants and minorities have been more numerous. The main period for the recognition of language diversity in schools was in the aftermath of the Second World War: the recognition of the need to preserve and study regional and minority languages in the Dexionne law of 1951,¹³⁵ and the recognition of regional languages in the Haby law of 1975;¹³⁶ the recognition by the *Délégation générale de la langue française et des langues de France*, or DGLFLF (Ministry of culture since 1996) that regional and minority languages as part of French culture, including dialectal Arab and Berber (though no official status for any of these languages); and the most recent revisions to the constitution, which included the official recognition that “Regional languages belong to the patrimony of France” (article 75-1 of the constitutional law of 2008).¹³⁷

Since the 1980s, linguistic diversity has been tolerated in the educational system (Viaut; 2004:11;49). This has involved a light pluralist approach, mainly centred on regional languages, which has in fact been provided for since 1951 (by the Dexionne law, reinforced in 1975 by the Haby law). This pluralist approach has been more dynamically applied in Alsace, where enrolment in German language primary education programmes has maintained a relatively high status, while other regional languages have been rarely taught in primary schools (such as Basque, Breton, Catalan, Corsican and Occitan, Broeder and Extra, 1999:77 – 81). In secondary schools, regional minority languages have occasionally offered as options for study as second or third modern languages, but enrolment in these programs has also been low.

¹³⁵ In 1951, the Dexionne law recognizes minority and regional languages, within two aims: to preserve the French language, to recognize the existence of regional languages and reinforce their study, in Filhon 2004, pp.109

¹³⁶ Within a monolingual political approach, the Haby law that reforms education in France by the introduction of the college unique, though including an article mentioning that regional minorities could be demanded to public French schools, in Filhon 2004, pp.109

¹³⁷ a revision of the French constitution, [Loi constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008](#), Article 75-1: (a new article): "Les langues régionales appartiennent au patrimoine de la France" ("Regional languages belong to the patrimony of France").

If regional languages have been marginalized in the educational system, this is even more the case of immigrant languages (Broeder and Extra, 1999). However, the integration of pupils of foreign origin is an longstanding issue in France. Beginning with the Jules Ferry laws at the end of the 19th century¹³⁸ and since the 1960s, French and foreign students had the right to the same education in public schools.¹³⁹ Starting in 1925, foreign students were offered extra foreign language courses, including the history and geography of their country of origin in their original language. These were provided by foreign instructors outside school time; however, this measure that came into force only later in 1939 (Bouysse, 2011). With the increasing number of foreign population from the late 1960s came a new phase in the relationship between children of foreign background and the French school system. First, the Ministry of Education implemented a non compulsory school policy, through bilateral agreements signed between France and eight partner countries (Bouysse, 2011). These measures were created within the framework of a broader policy trend aimed at regularizing migratory flows, return programs and the integration of newcomers.¹⁴⁰ Children of immigrants arriving in France were offered intensive training in the French language through temporary programmes organized by the state (*classes d'accueil CLA*).¹⁴¹ But it was not until 1970 that specific arrangements were made for the children of migrant workers subjected to compulsory schooling (aged 7-13) to attend¹⁴² experimental “initiation” classes for foreign children (preparatory courses: *CP* or *CLIN*) in primary schools.¹⁴³ Starting in 1973, “reception classes” for children of immigrants (introductory classes: *CLA*)¹⁴⁴ were further offered in secondary education to francophone foreign students (between the ages of 12 and 16 years). This last program was created through an official circular that, for the first time in such an official context, explicitly mentioned the “children of foreign migrants.”¹⁴⁵ Both CLIN and CLA aimed to contribute to improved learning of the school language as a second

¹³⁸In 1881, Jules Ferry implemented a French school free of charge (“gratuite, laïque et obligatoire”), turning the Jacobin monolingual ideal and reinforcing the collective conscious in all French territory. In 1882, public primary education compulsory and secular. In certain public places it became forbidden to ‘cracher par terre e de parler patois,’ in Filhon 2004, pp.109

¹³⁹In Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.16

¹⁴⁰In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp. 16

¹⁴¹Although few attended under the justification of their previous knowledge in this language, see discussion on Boyzon-Fradet 1992 and 1982, all in Penn and Lambert (2009), page 57-59

¹⁴²In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010 in pp.16

¹⁴³Circular no. IX-70-37, January 13, 1970, In Vigner, Gérard (2008), *La scolarisation des enfants nouvellement arrivés en France*, Inspecteur d'académie Inspecteur pédagogique régional de Lettres, in *Langues et cité. Plurilinguisme et migrations*, *Bulletin de l'observatoire des pratiques linguistiques*, Nov 2008, N° 13, DGLF, (http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/Langues_et_cite/langues-cite13.pdf latest visit nov 2011), in pp.5. Currently, students who arrived in France before the age of 16, with little or no schooling, are enrolled in CLA-NSA (*reception classes* of students without previously school enrollment), while pupils original from immigrant families, their enrollment in primary education is made through regular classes according to their age and grouped by CLINs (*introductory class*) In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.17

¹⁴⁴Students who arrived in France after the age of 16 (not in age of compulsory education), may benefit from the general tasks for insertion (*missions générales d'insertion* - MGI). In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.17

¹⁴⁵Circulaire n°73-383, 25 septembre 1973, in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, pp.16; In op cit, Vigner, Gérard (2008) in pp.5

language, but without doing much to take into account either the structure of the pupils' various mother tongues or their plurilingual competences.¹⁴⁶

Mother tongue courses return to active policies only later, at the end of the "Trente Glorieuses" (in 1975)—in the form of the *Enseignement des langues et cultures d'origine* (ELCO, IMLI in English) program. ELCO was promoted by the French government on the strength of bilateral agreements:¹⁴⁷ first with Portugal in 1973, followed by Italy in 1974, Spain and Morocco in 1975, Yugoslavia in 1977, Turkey in 1978,¹⁴⁸ Algeria in 1981. The courses were first offered in elementary schools, and later in secondary education as well. Similar to the end of 1930s, their original aim was to offer foreign children the opportunity to maintain knowledge on their language and culture of origin, but unlike those of the 1930s, it was implemented with an eye for their return (Lanier, 2010:5). In sum, the introduction and development of all three of these programs—CLIN (primary education reception classes), CLA (secondary education reception classes), and ELCO—were implemented in the public education system at primary, *collège* and vocational *lycée* levels, initially with the intention of supporting family reunification and return policies.¹⁴⁹

The framework gradually developed on the basis of European Communities Directives (in 1977, as previously explained). Thus, in 1978, the education of immigrants' children became the subject of a more explicit public policy that called for dialogue with foreign parents.¹⁵⁰ The focus of the ELCO program changed toward conveying knowledge of immigrant parents' cultural background through intercultural activities.¹⁵¹ With the resolution of 1981¹⁵² and again the circular in the end of the 1980s,¹⁵³ all students were allowed to enroll in ELCO training. Two aims, presented as complementary, were defined: first, the mastery of the mother tongue as a prerequisite for the successful learning of a second language (here, French); secondly, valuing the culture of origin, enabling the personal development of young

¹⁴⁶ In op cit, Vigner (2008), in pp.5 ; in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.24

¹⁴⁷ In op cit, Penn and Lambert (2009), page 57-59 ; also In Petek (2004), pp. 45-55 ; in op cit, ministère d'éducation nationale, jeunesse et vie associative, édcuscol 2011; in Lanier (2010), in pp.5

¹⁴⁸ Turkey signed the agreement in 1978 for the primary education, and in 1979 for secondary education, in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.24

¹⁴⁹ Circulaire n°75-148 du 9 avril 1975, in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.23; in relation to BOEN, n°15, 17 avril 1975, in op cit, Lanier (2010). in pp.5

¹⁵⁰ Circulaire n°78-238 du 25 juillet 1978, in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.16

¹⁵¹ in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.26

¹⁵² In op cit, Bouysse (2011)

¹⁵³ The circular n°86-119 of 13th March 1986, and the circulae n°86-120 concerning the hosting and integration of foreign pupils in *écoles, collèges et lycées*, extend its scope of intervention to all students and families of foreign nationality, in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, pp.17 and pp.25

people from other cultures.¹⁵⁴ There was an increasing consciousness that working-class children, including the children of immigrants, showed massive educational underachievement. (Adami, 2011:39) Although in the 1990s studies showed that underachievement rates among the children of migrants were comparable to others from a similar social background,¹⁵⁵ cultural explanations started to take on an important place in the public sphere.

Nevertheless, linguistic homogeneity has always been perceived as the main norm for French public schools. Already in 1972, the French President Pompidou claimed that “Il n’y a pas de place pour les langues et cultures régionales dans une France qui doit marquer l’Europe de son sceau.” And twenty years later, in the context of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the French deputy Pandraud argued similar to Pompidou, highlighting the role of different social agents. “Je rends hommage à l’école laïque et républicaine qui a souvent imposé le français avec beaucoup d’autorité – il fallait le faire (...) Je suis également heureux que la télévision ait été un facteur d’unification linguistique. (...) S’il faut apprendre une autre langue à nos enfants, ne leur faisons pas perdre du temps avec les dialectes qu’ils ne parleront jamais que dans leur village : enseignons-leur le plus tôt possible une langue internationale!” (Filhon, 2004:109) Following this rationale, call for the recognition of linguistic diversity in schools have been interpreted as a call to introduce ethnicity into French educational institutions, considered to be in contradiction with the French integration model. In practice, students’ language diversity has not in fact been taken into account by teaching professionals (Bertucci, 2008:4), for whom linguistic homogeneity is the norm, and French language has been systematically taken both as pupils’ mother tongue and as the language of teaching.

ELCO in France

The French national education system’s approach to language diversity has influenced the form in which ELCO programs have been implemented. Parents suggest to the consulate of their country of origin that ELCO courses be offered, and the latter is responsible for the recruitment and payment of the teachers (who must originate from the parents’ country of origin), as well as organizing the curriculum and textbooks (Broeder and Extra, 1999:77 – 81; Vermeulen, 1997:69-73; Bouysse, 2011; Lanier, 2010:6). The teachers are then seconded to

¹⁵⁴ In ministère d’éducation nationale, jeunesse et vie associative, *Enseignements de Langue et de Culture d’Origine (ELCO)*, édcuscol – le site des professionnels de l’éducation, (<http://eduscol.education.fr/cid52131/enseignements-de-langue-et-de-culture-d-origine.html>) latest visit nov 2011)

¹⁵⁵ Such as discussion on Vallet et Caille (1995), in Adami (2011) pp.39

schools, and the entire arrangement must be approved by the French Ministry of Education. Following this approval, the Mayor must provide space and equipment for teaching.¹⁵⁶ Class scheduling and coordination is balanced with other subjects, for a duration of one hour and a half up 3 hours per week,¹⁵⁷ with a required minimum of fifteen students. The language courses can be provided either during school time (*intégré*, or integrative, teaching) or outside school hours (on Wednesday or Saturday – *différé*, or “deferred,” teaching, which is the most common arrangement).¹⁵⁸ As ELCO depends on the representations of foreign countries, the languages offered are those whose consulates fund this type of education.

In primary education, ELCO enrolment is available beginning in the first year of schooling, with no admission criteria. The large majority (about 70%) take place outside school hours.¹⁵⁹ It generally runs throughout the entire period of primary schooling; although marks are given, evaluation of immigrant language proficiency is said to be lacking (Broeder and Extra, 1999:77–81). Besides ELCO, languages other than French—mainly European foreign languages (English, Spanish, Italian, German and Portuguese, in ISCED 1)—are also taught as second languages in primary education. (Eurydice, 2006:2007:103)

In secondary education, enrolment in ELCO has been lower than in primary education. Some mother language teaching (as a second or third foreign language) has been integrated into modern language programs from the French Ministry of Education (*langues vivantes* - LV1 or LV2). This format is available at various levels, such as *collège* (junior high school), *lycée professionnel* (vocational secondary school), with the general and technological baccalaureate; the Turkish language is currently among the languages offered in this context. A minimum enrolment of five to eight students is required (depending on the type of secondary school), and the three to four hours of teaching per week are integrated into the general curriculum, with the possibility of classes outside regular school hours if students come from different educational sectors (Broeder and Extra, 1999: 77–81; Vermeulen, 1997: 69-73). The LV has more restrictive rules compared to ELCO in primary education—both the curriculum and teachers are under the responsibility of the French Ministry of Education (only French nationals recruited through public selection procedures, Broeder and Extra, 1999: 77 – 81; Vermeulen, 1997: 69-73); accordingly to the Common European Framework

¹⁵⁶ In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp 23 ;

¹⁵⁷ In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp. 23

¹⁵⁸ In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, pp.23 ; in op cit, LANIER, Valérie (2010 ?), in pp.6

¹⁵⁹ In Broeder, Peter, Guus Extra (1999), pp. 77 – 81; also in op cit, Petek, Gaye(2004) pp. 45-55 ; also In Vermeulen, Hans (ed) (1997 (pag 69-73)

of Reference for Languages (CEFR).¹⁶⁰ LV languages may be subjected to exams, some compulsory and others not, and count for extra school credits.¹⁶¹ The main languages taught as LV at secondary education level are European (such as English, Spanish, Italian, German and Portuguese), along with Ancient Greek. Immigrant languages, though they are available for the baccalaureate exams, are much less present in formal education teaching (more common/frequent for Arabic and Chinese than Turkish). (Vigner, 2008:5) This is said to be due to the fact that school managements are often opposed to it, either on budgetary grounds or because they do not wish to attract too many pupils from immigrant backgrounds (Broeder and Extra, 1999:77–81).

In sum, French IMLI has been more restricted compared to immigrant mother tongue teaching in the other two countries. This is due to French constitutional specificities and far-reaching central policy, both of which have significant implications for the country's integration policies, and its educational and language policies in particular (in Broeder and Extra, 1999). The proportion of pupils enrolled in ELCO in France has been decreasing since the 1990s (Lanier, 2010:5). The highest level of enrolment is found in primary education, while it is much lower at the secondary level (though less data is available on the latter, Broeder and Extra, 1999:77–81). Enrolment was far higher during the 1980s (around 140,000 annually), decreased in the 1990s (between 100,000 and less than 140,000 annually), and substantially less during the 2000s (less than 100,000 annually).¹⁶² The most recent data (from 2002-3 to 2008-9)¹⁶³ indicate the largest decrease in primary school pupils' participation in ELCO programs (to about 91,000 in 2008-9). ELCO enrolment has been highest among pupils of Moroccan origin, followed by those of Turkish origin, and then pupils of Portuguese and Algerian origin.¹⁶⁴ In contrast with the general trend, Turkish

¹⁶⁰ In op cit, ministère d'éducation nationale, jeunesse et vie associative 2011, édcuscol

¹⁶¹ in Réglementation générale des épreuves de langues vivantes des baccalauréats général et technologique, ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche ministère d'éducation nationale, jeunesse et vie associative, édcuscol – le site des professionnels de l'éducation. Références : note de service n° 2003-115 modifiée du 17 juillet 2003 (Bulletin officiel n° 30 du 24 juillet 2003), rectificatif du 23 septembre 2003 (BO n° 36 du 2 octobre 2003) et note de service n° 2009-191 du 21 décembre 2009 (BO n° 2 du 14 janvier 2010). (<http://eduscol.education.fr/cid46511/textes-de-referance-epreuves-de-langues-vivantes.html> latest visit nov 2011)

¹⁶² In addition, in 2003-04, pupils' enrolment in ELCO was concentrated, more than 86%, only in the first grade in Petek (2004) pp. 45-55; see also Haut Commissariat à l'Intégration, *Liens culturels et intégration*, Rapport au Premier Ministre, Paris, La documentation française, 1995, p.78; and Bouysse, 2004, p.92; Lanier (2010), in pp.5. However, if in 1984/85 about 15% of total students were enrolled in ELCO in primary education, in 1989/90 these proportion increased up to 23%, decreasing again to 14% in 1990/91, in Vermeulen (1997 (pag 69-73) ; In Caubet, Dominique, 2001 pp.261-277, Sources: Masthoff 1988 and DEP, Direction de l'Evaluation et de la Prospective:

¹⁶³ Source: Annexe 2 - Evolution des effectifs d'élèves et d'enseignants d'ELCO depuis 2002 par langues, In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.137 –138

¹⁶⁴ The most important ELCO enrolment has been for pupils of Moroccan origins (25000 students including 3000 in college and high school), followed by the Turkish ELCO (with about 13,000 students), then Portuguese and Algerian ELCO, in Bouysse, 2004., p.92, Lanier (2010) in pp.5

language enrolment has been consistently dynamic, slightly increasing in primary education and presenting stable and continuous enrolment in secondary education.¹⁶⁵

Some scholars have argued that eligible children have rarely attended IMLI primary education classes in France, and even less at the secondary level, due to a combination of several factors that demonstrated a lack of interest in these programs (Broeder and Extra, 1999:77 – 81; Penn and Lambert, 2009:57-59). For instance, although in principle ELCO teachers should be subjected to inspection by both the French national educational authorities and representatives of the system in their country of origin, this is said to be rarely the case.¹⁶⁶ Still, although bilateral agreements have stipulated that ELCO teachers must speak French, this is not always the case, resulting in further difficulties with regard to the organization of their teaching in the school and their relations to other teachers.¹⁶⁷ In secondary education, where enrolment has been particularly low because children have shown a preference for German and English languages and their parents' have not wished to set their children apart in different classes (in Oakes 2001 and Boyzon-Fradet 1992), ELCO has targeted pupils who encounter academic difficulties with the normal curriculum.

In addition, institutional reports, such as those of the *Haut Conseil à l'intégration* (HCI, 1991-2010), have drawn similar critical conclusions as the ones just mentioned. They argued against ELCO's communitarian references, said to be contrary to the norms of the republic, and even evoked the fear of a form of "Islamic catechism." Moreover, they argued that the common practice of ELCO teaching outside regular school hours has contributed to the stigmatization of these pupils' cultural background.¹⁶⁸ Both criticisms were repeated again in the report of the *Commission de réflexion sur l'application du principe de laïcité dans la République* (or Stasi commission) in 2004 and that of the General Inspectorate of Education (*l'Inspection Générale de l'Education Nationale*) in 2006. In sum, all have called for the elimination of this program as an immigrant and its integration into mainstream education as modern languages, enhancing the main advantage for the redefinition of its programs and schedules.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Source Ministère de l'éducation nationale (survey of languages) in pp. 77 – 81, Broeder, Peter, Guus Extra (1999); Vermeulen (1997 (pag 69-73) ; In op cit Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp.26 , Source: Annexe 2 - Evolution des effectifs d'élèves et d'enseignants d'ELCO depuis 2002 par langues, pp.137 –138

¹⁶⁶ In op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, in pp 23 ; in Lanier (2010), in pp6

¹⁶⁷ In Bouysse (2011), see also in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, pp28

¹⁶⁸ in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, pp28

¹⁶⁹ in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l'année 2010, pp28-29 ; In op cit, Petek, Gaye (2004), pp. 45-55

Some ELCO courses have not been validated by the French Ministry of Education, because they considered to lack of suitable material (for instance, because using the same used for as Turkish children in Turkey, Lanier, 2010:14). Instead, preference is for integration in LV modalities. “L’évolution des ELCO vers un enseignement de langues vivantes permettant aux jeunes de tirer parti de leur héritage familial et à la nation d’enrichir son patrimoine linguistique (...) d’un enseignement d’histoire des civilisations, incluant les références aux faits religieux, assuré par les enseignants de la République, doit permettre en outre d’apporter aux jeunes issus de l’immigration, les outils nécessaires à la connaissance de leur culture dans ses aspects contemporains et dans son universalité.”¹⁷⁰ Following this, Turkish government representatives have been working together with the *Direction générale de l’enseignement scolaire* (DGESCO) for the teaching of Turkish in junior high school and high school as a modern foreign language by the Ministry of Education. In sum, ELCO instruction in France has resulted in a very vague definition of its aims, particularly in primary education, while in secondary education IMLI programmes have ended up being incorporated into modern foreign language classes.

2.5.2. Germany: Between linguistic indifference and a variety of national models

Germany has about 10 million inhabitants of non-German origin who are currently multi- or bi-lingual in everyday life (Gogolin and Reich, 2001). However, there is no reliable data either on the ethnocultural composition of Germany’s population or on the sociolinguistic status quo in Germany, because there has been little survey research in Germany. This is partly due to its official self-conception as a linguistically homogeneous nation-state, like France (in Gogolin and Reich, 2001).

Indeed, until recently, Germany was not officially considered a country of immigration despite its evidence, which, in the same vein, meant that the country saw itself as monolingual (Gogolin and Reich, 2001). However, contrary to France, at the constitutional level Germany is characterized by indifference towards language: the constitution neither states a national language nor takes any position toward minority languages. This is related to the German post-war context: the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), approved on the 8th of May 1949, defines a strong inclination to invest in supranational

¹⁷⁰ Les parcours d’intégration : rapport du Haut Conseil à l’intégration - HCI au premier ministre, la documentation française mars 2003. citation In op cit Petek, Gaye, 2004, pp. 46 ; in op cit, Rapport au Premier ministre pour l’année 2010, pp28

institutions like EU and in the so-called “Europeanized German identity” (a phrase from the conservative Chancellor Adenauer: Faas, 2010). In accordance with the European Charter principles on regional and minority languages and the prevailing position in constitutional law, a sharp distinction has been made between indigenous and immigrant language communities, irrespective of demographic, cultural and pedagogical arguments. This also means the only legal framework for the defense of immigrant groups’ linguistic activities relies exclusively on individual human rights.

Regional minority languages, such as Danish and Sorbian, are available at all levels of basic education (for ISCED 1+2+3), while foreign language options include only modern European languages along with Latin and Ancient Greek. The Sorb language in Saxony (Lusatian region) and Brandenburg, which has had its own school since 1844, is the only one to have enjoyed such a status. The Sorb Pedagogical Institute was founded in 1949, under the influence of the positive discrimination policy enshrined in GDR legislation in 1949, as the first case of full participation of non-German language schooling in the national educational system, from nursery school to university level (Hall, 1998). Similarly, only the Constitution of Saxony includes an article on minority rights for foreign languages, indicating that the State respects the interests of “foreign” minorities whose members legally live in the country (Gogolin and Reich, 2001). Otherwise, recognition of foreign languages has been limited.

The teaching of the German language

The recruitment of non-German workers for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was not intended to lead to migrant workers staying in Germany; only in 1974 did the German Language Association for Foreign Workers begin offering German language teaching for these workers (from the Labour Ministry, Vermeulen, 1997). However, the arrival of immigrants’ children raised the new issue of compulsory education for “guest-worker children,” and already in 1964 the *Kultusministerkonferenz* (KMK)¹⁷¹ had adopted a two-pronged educational policy to harmonize the policies of different Länder with respect to immigrant children. They stated that the children of immigrants should receive the same educational opportunities as German children and be required to attend state schools (except pre-school) (Gogolin and Reich, 2001; Penn and Lambert, 2009). Subsequently, in 1965 the

¹⁷¹ *Kultusministerkonferenz* (KMK) in the German Federal Republic (GFR) have often given the root of legal measures at state level, though it has no statutory force because education policy is, in general, of state domain (in Broeder and Extra (1999), in pp. 82 – 87, Gogolin and Reich (2001), pp.193-214).

conservative coalition government passed a “foreigner law” granting immigrant workers the right to send their children to school, but no naturalization rights.¹⁷² This was done in stepwise fashion—first with additional classes in German as a second language, and other basic subjects offered as “preparatory classes” (*vorbereitungsklassen*) and “transition classes” (*übergangsklassen*) for a period of between one and at most two years prior to regular instruction (Vermeulen, 1997; Broeder and Extra, 1999; Penn and Lambert, 2009; Faas, 2010). In this period, classes for the children of foreign workers had two purposes: to prepare children for an eventual return to the school system of their home country, and to correct their assumed “lack of German language skills and their inability to follow the German educational system” (Faas, 2010).

A second policy measure for the children of immigrants referred to the need to preserve their linguistic and cultural identity—*Muttersprachlicher Ergänzungsunterricht*, IMLI in English, with a more explicit emphasis on the need to prepare them for reintegration into the educational system in their parents’ country of origin. This policy was less consensual over time and across states, defended more by the official representatives of the countries of origin and researchers in the social sciences. This instruction was driven by supporters of more pluralistic integration policies and their arguments for the introduction of an intercultural citizenship curriculum in German schools (Gogolin and Reich, 2001). As early as 1964, supplementary lessons in immigrant languages were provided to the children of guest-workers in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). As for preparatory and transition classes in German, this supplementary mother tongue instruction which, was provided in separate classes, went on for a maximum of four years (Vermeulen, 1997; Gogolin and Reich, 2001). This mother tongue instruction was temporarily abandoned in 1971 (Broeder and Extra, 1999), but returned in 1979 when the Kultusministerkonferenz recalled its dual recommendations of 1964. Following the 1977 directive of the Council of Europe, new opportunities for IMLI training in Germany emerged, departing from the overriding argument on supporting the pupils’ own identity as an important task for state schools (Broeder and Extra, 1999; Vermeulen, 1997). In a first instance, and as previewed in the 1977 European Directive, IMLI was limited in most states to children of families from the recruitment countries (*Entsendestaaten*: Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia, though some states added Morocco and Tunisia). In secondary school children were able to choose their mother tongue as a subject in lieu of the obligatory first or second foreign language.

¹⁷² This law of 1965 did not change until 1990, in Faas 2010, pp.32.

However, there was a lack of consensus between the German states in relation to the aims of IMLI, and only after German unification was the issue given a place on the national agenda.¹⁷³ The legislation changed in the 1990s, enabling other immigrant minority children to qualify for IMLI training, and shifting the focus from return policy to the importance of multilingualism in a European context (Broeder and Extra, 1999; Vermeulen, 1997). In 1992, and again in 1994, the “Standing conference of the Ministers of Education” (*Kultusministerkonferenz*, KMK) published a review of progress, agreeing further on national educational standards that identify the need for foreign language instruction as part of vocational training, as well as for political and cultural education (Faas, 2010). Consequently, in 1996, the KMK published a guideline for “Intercultural Education at School,” arguing for further specific measures, such as the inclusion of intercultural education in schools, the use of images that all students can identify with, the recruitment of non-German teachers, and intensified collaboration with teachers of mother tongue teaching. Several states followed these recommendations (Faas, 2010).

Nevertheless, educational policies are mainly defined at the national level, showing divergent approaches to policies with regard to *Aussiedler* and particularly to educational policies on instruction in non-German “native” languages (Broeder and Extra, 1999). This divergence has promoted a generalized lack of recognition of immigrant languages in the educational system. For instance, although the possibility for the children of immigrants to validate the study of their mother tongue as a foreign language existed for the *Abitur* high school diploma, students were obliged also to show a high level of qualification in another specific foreign language out of a set that does not include the large majority of immigrant languages (such as Turkish and Arabic, Gogolin and Reich, 2001). This constraint lowered the value of these languages and made it more difficult for the children of immigrants’ to choose to validate their mother tongue skills for their high school diploma. In addition, OECD international data on school children (PISA) between 2001 and 2006 highlighted particularly poor student performance in Germany, particularly among those of Turkish and Italian background, as well as a lower probability among these groups of completing some degree of higher education. These international data led to more criticisms of IMLI instruction, but with limited effects. In sum, the teaching of immigrant languages in regular German school system has not been stable

¹⁷³ Previously non-existent in GDR, since unification in East Germany only Saxony consulates have been allowed to offer IMLI since 1992 while in the others there has been no IMLI measures comparable to Westerner Länders. In Vermeulen, (1997), “pp.65. Also in Broeder and Extra (1999), pp. 82 – 87.

(Gogolin and Reich, 2001), depending heavily on the resources of particular immigrant groups and of the education ministries of their countries of origin (Gogolin and Reich, 2001).

IMLI organisation

Currently, school management assesses the need for IMLI in consultation with parents, and the total need is then determined by district (Vermeulen, 1997; Broeder and Extra, 1999). Like in France, no admission criteria are applied to pupils who wish to enrol in IMLI training, and a large proportion of the pupils in primary and secondary education who qualify for IMLI have participated (60-80%, according to Luchtenberg, 1995). In terms of availability and participation, the language that has seen the most progress as an optional subject in secondary education is Turkish.¹⁷⁴ High levels of enrolment in Turkish language instruction motivated Essen University to establish a teacher training program for Turkish in the 1990s (Broeder and Extra, 1999).

In primary education, IMLI has been offered during the school day, like for religious instruction, for a maximum of five hours per week; an extra two hours can be offered only if religious instruction is also included (particularly in Islam and Greek Orthodoxy, Broeder and Extra, 1999; Gogolin and Reich, 2001). Progress in language proficiency is expressed in a separate mark on school report cards but, as in France, with limited status and effects. In secondary schools in some states, immigrant minority languages are offered as an optional subject that can be taken in lieu of the obligatory first or second European foreign language; and like in France, sometimes no lessons are given but exams are offered. Only in Hesse, pupils' enrolment became obligatory in 1983, and its report determinant, though it has remained easy to obtain an exemption (Broeder and Extra, 1999; Vermeulen, 1997).

The distribution of responsibility for IMLI programmes has differed from state to state. The former West German federal states presented three main models (Broeder and Extra, 1999). In one model, the educational department of the State is responsible for the recruitment of teachers, who are appointed by the Ministry of Education and Arts and enjoy the same status as other teachers. The same is applied to the development of teaching materials and the organization of teacher training, with additional funds employed for instruction for German as a second language (Vermeulen, 1997). Five states followed this model: Bavaria, Lower

¹⁷⁴ For instance, in 1994, 9% of total pupils in school attended IMLI, summing about 1 million who were, for their large majority, of immigrant minority origin, and about 42% (472 226) of Turkish background (in Vermeulen (1997), pp. 63-67, Broeder and Extra (1999), pp. 82 – 87).

Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Hesse (in the last of these, IMLI has been compulsory since 1983). The other model is, like in France, run by the consulate, including content, organization, funding and teacher recruitment. Teachers do not enjoy the same status as other teachers, have to give lectures in different schools, and are appointed to Germany by their country of origin for a maximum of five years (Vermeulen, 1997). Since the 1990s support for this format has been decreasing for two reasons, though this was a cheaper model that provided classes free of charge. First, on the grounds that it is more difficult to integrate into the regular school programme; and second, due to the resulting influence of the consulate, which is seen as a serious drawback. This model has been implemented in six states, namely Berlin, Baden-Wurttemberg, Bremen, Hamburg, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein (Vermeulen, 1997, p. 65). A final model is that of European schools, mainly in secondary education, partially bilingual and devoted to European languages (English, French and Russian). An exception is Berlin, the only state where primary schools of this type also exist, and offer Turkish language instruction (Broeder and Extra, 1999; Vermeulen, 1997)

Recent developments and the paradigmatic case of Hesse state

Hesse became a paradigmatic case of the recent evolution of IMLI and German monolingual resentment in both politics and public opinion. The medium of instruction in primary and secondary education in Hesse is German, and the main foreign language taught is English. Since 1983, the state has offered “mother tongue teaching” to children of immigrants, in primary education on a compulsory basis, and, since 1996, as an option in secondary schools. Though theoretically compulsory, parents could request and exemption, and the total number of exemptions granted was relatively high (in general, higher than 50%).¹⁷⁵ Although compulsory, the lessons were given outside regular school hours (two lessons per week in grade one, three lessons per week in grade two and five lessons per week in grade three). A large majority of these mother tongue teachers were educated in the country of origin but paid by Hesse government; additionally, a centre of “heritage” languages” in Frankfurt was responsible for the material, in-service training and counselling. However, when the conservative party won state elections in 1999 and took over from the former SPD Green party coalition after a campaign against double nationality, one of their first initiatives in the Hessian Parliament was an amendment to the School Act to “secure quality in Hessian schools,” which abolished immigrant language teaching. “The results of devoted work in

¹⁷⁵ 54% in 1980; 68% in 1985; 62% in 1996, Gogolin and Reich (2001).

educational policy, referred as a model for other States of the Federal Republic, was destroyed in a few months time (...) Three decades of intercultural pedagogy – school practice, work of educationalists, official decrees and recommendations – were not enough to convince the political elite and the [*sic*] public opinion. As a result, a monolingual ethnocentric mind-set prevails” (Gogolin and Reich, 2001).

2.5.3. The Netherlands: Multiculturalist paradox ?

In the Netherlands For those of non-immigrant background, this mainly includes Frisian (officially recognized) and Lower Saxon, Dutch dialects, and standard Dutch. For those of immigrant background, the main examples were Turkish and Arabic (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998). Although speakers of Frisian make up less than 4% of the Netherlands’ total population, it is the language with the longest institutional history—the Fryske Academy was founded in 1938 for purposes of research on Frisian language, history and society,¹⁷⁶ and in 1980 Frisian became obligatory in primary education in Friesland, both as a subject and a medium of instruction in every grade. In 1991, it became compulsory for the first three years of secondary education as well, and for higher education level mainly outside Friesland (Vermeulen, 1997; Gorter, Riemersma and Ytsma, 2001). The arguments presented in favour of Frisian language instruction in primary school show significant parallels with those currently used for the teaching of immigrant minority languages. Defenders of Frisian teaching have historically been motivated by the need to combat deficits in school achievement, with a recent shift toward cultural-political arguments as the school success of Frisian-speaking children became similar to that of native speakers of Dutch. In the wake of this improvement, no supplementary financing has provided for Frisian language programs since 1993 (Vermeulen, 1997).

For about 35 years, two types of bilingual education programs have been offered to ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (Driessen, 2005). The first were bilingual reception models, applied mainly in the 1980s in the lower grades in a small number of primary schools. These were further subdivided into transitional and simultaneous models, involving only a limited number of children (the languages involved were Turkish and Arabic). Another form was the IMLI model, known as mother tongue instruction (MTI; Driessen, 2005) or home language

¹⁷⁶ In Gorter, Riemersma and Ytsma (2001) pp.103-118: In Friesland, 55% speaks Frisian at home, 94% can understand it, 65% can read it but only 17% can write it. 60% said to have greater fluency in Frisian than Dutch.

instruction (HLI, Extra and Verhoeven, 1993). First introduced in 1967, and contrary to the previous models, all children of guest-workers were eligible (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998, 2001; Driessen, 2005). Though it was quite widespread, taking as much as 10% of time spent at school and targeting pupils lagging behind in school achievement, government support for IMLI was abolished in 2004, and since then these programs have been supported by local organizations. Some authors, evaluating the implementation and effects of IMLI policy, have concluded that it was not successful (Driessen, 2005). In this section, I will present the main arguments and relevant facts.

IMLI: Stepwise implementation

From the literature on educational policies relating to Immigrant Minority Language Instruction IMLI programs, about six different phases can be identified (Boeschoten, Dorleijn and Leezenberg, 1993; Extra and Verhoeven, 1993; Vermeulen, 1997; Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998; Broeder and Extra, 1999; van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra, 2001; Driessen, 2005). The first stage was the introduction of IMLI in Netherlands in 1967, initially organized and financed by immigrant parents with the support of their countries of origin representatives. This changed in 1974, when IMLI came under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, both as a subject and as a medium of instruction for large groups of pupils in primary education: in Dutch, *Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur* (OECT, or Own language and culture teaching, later changed to OALT; van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra, 2001). Like in France and Germany, this initial stage aimed to facilitate the integration of the children of immigrants upon migration to their parents' country of origin. The main targets were children with low-SES background in primary schools, of at least one parent who either had Moluccan or Mediterranean origins or were refugee, based on bilateral agreements. Children received bilingual instruction in the official language of their parents' country of origin (assumed to be their home language) and in Dutch as second language (Vermeulen, 1997; Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998; Broeder and Extra, 1999; Driessen, 2005). It included two and half hours of teaching in the official language and the culture of the home country, and the optional use of ethnic minority languages as auxiliary languages of instruction in general education (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998). Schools received funding for additional teaching personnel (van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra, 2001). As teachers were recruited on the basis of Turkish qualifications, they generally showed a poor command of the Dutch language and the Dutch educational system. Scholars have argued that the 1974 measures were implemented without previous preparation, teacher guidance, supervision or curriculum development, even lacking

a legal basis and possibility for bilingual education (Extra and Verhoeven, 1993; Vermeulen, 1997; Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998; Broeder and Extra, 1999; van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra, 2001). For these reasons, OETC remained a marginal subject, and was never truly integrated into regular school programs (Boeschoten, Dorleijn and Leezenberg, 1993).

A second stage started around 1980, when policymakers abandoned the assumption of immigrant/guest-worker return. A policy plan published by the Ministry of Education in 1981 proposed a new pair of aims: education should enable members of minority groups to fully function and participate in Dutch society while offering them the possibility both of learning Dutch culture and language and that of their parents' home country (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998). After 1983 the role of home language instruction was transferred to so-called inter-cultural education, which aimed to close the gap between school and home environments, but which focused less on home language/mother tongue proficiency (Driessen, 2005). In 1984, educational policies were divided: on one hand, the Social Priority Policy program was created for the children of working-class Dutch natives, while on the other, schools with immigrant children were given additional resources and IMLI acquired a more explicit legal basis (Driessen, 2005).

In the 1970s and 1980s, as the number of children of immigrants from low-SES families significantly increased, the Ministry of Education focused on the struggle against the deficits of low-SES families in all elementary Dutch schools (Extra and Verhoeven, 1993; Broeder and Extra, 1999; van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra, 2001; Driessen, 2005). In 1986, additional funds were allocated to schools with a large number of pupils from disadvantaged families. Thus, in a third phase, IMLI was integrated into the Educational Priority Policy (EPP) (Vermeulen, 1997), set out by the Primary Education Act (*Wet op het Basisonderwijs*), for low-SES/disadvantaged groups (Boeschoten, Dorleijn and Leezenberg, 1993), excluding those of higher SES status or those from countries with historical ties to the Netherlands. As before, the promotion of children's specific cultural background was understood to promote their social emancipation as well.¹⁷⁷ However, in practice, IMLI was designed as a temporary measure within a wider program aiming at full proficiency in Dutch and at most limited proficiency in the mother tongue (Driessen, 2005). It was taught in the official language of

¹⁷⁷ Specific groups of origin, as those from China, were excluded because considered to have no SES comparable to those of individuals coming from Mediterranean countries (Ministry of Interior 1983). In van der Avoird, Broeder et Extra (2001), 215-242

immigrant parents' country of origin for a maximum of two and half hours a week during school hours and a further two and half hours outside of school hours (Driessen, 2005).

The fourth stage reflected an important turning point, when in 1992 the Committee for Immigrant Minority Pupils in Education (CALO) presented an advisory report to the Dutch Ministry of Education entitled "Cedars in the garden" (*Ceders in de tuin*). This committee approached immigrant minority languages explicitly not as sources of problems and deficiencies but instead as sources of knowledge, skills and enrichment. This meant a shift of paradigm, in discarding SES and generational criteria in favour of multicultural ones (Vermeulen, 1997; Broeder and Extra, 1999; van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra, 2001; Driessen, 2005). First language teaching was expected to contribute positively to the development of Dutch language skills, as well as to promote well-balanced bilingualism and its positive effects on cognitive development (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998). Within this perspective, IMLI was intended—as in the late 1970s and early 1980s—to contribute to bridging the gap between the home and school environments, while promoting—as in the later 1980s—school success in Dutch and other subjects (Vermeulen, 1997; Broeder and Extra, 1999). However, access to the home culture was to be provided in Dutch from the fourth grade on, and integrated into the normal school curriculum (Driessen, 2005).

During the second half of the 1990s, there was a general perception that the children of immigrants continued to lag far behind native Dutch children, and a questioning of the usefulness of bilingual education. In addition, IMLI was perceived to reduce educational opportunities and promote segregation (Driessen, 2005). Nevertheless, the Dutch government opted in this period to adopt a new Educational Disadvantage Policy (EDP), increasing autonomy for the municipalities with respect to national education policies (Broeder and Extra, 1999; Driessen, 2005). State secretary Netelenbos issued two memoranda in 1995, one on Local Education Policy and other on Education in Immigrant Minority Languages (changing from OECT to *Onderwijs in Allochtone Levende Talen*, OALT). Governmental responsibility for the provision and quality of IMLI (for inspectorate control and funding) was recognized, but this policy now called for a greater degree of cooperation between different local actors. In this fifth stage, local authorities assumed the responsibility for public information, management and inter-school cooperation on IMLI; schools took responsibility for teacher recruitment and the quality of instruction; and immigrant minority groups were to be both actors in these programs and their target population. Eligibility was defined anew by

home language rather than by socio-economic status or generational criteria (as in the earlier 1980s: Broeder and Extra, 1999). The 1996 Primary Education Act that followed aimed to implement this policy, with parliamentary support gathered in 1998 (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998). Two types of IMLI were offered: one compromising cultural perspectives as deficit and where the home language functioned as a support for Dutch language acquisition, through extra-curricular hours, from grades one to four; another where the home language would function as a medium for cultural education, through extra-curricular hours, from grades five to eight (van der Avoird, Broeder et Extra, 2001; Driessen, 2005).

However, Dutch policies changed dramatically after a sequence of events that followed the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York, USA—the election of the Populist right wing Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and his assassination, and the coalition government of Christian Democrats, Liberals and Centre Democrats that followed in 2004, adopting many of Fortuyn’s ideas on immigration, calling for more assimilationist policies and the abolishment of some minority policies. This included the decision in 2004 to abolish IMLI and give higher priority to Dutch language learning. In addition, they began to require newcomers to have basic skills in the Dutch language before obtaining an entry visa, increased the prices for visas, integration courses and citizenship applications (Driessen, 2005).

IMLI before its official abolishment

In the Netherlands, schools have the possibility of choosing three different types of languages of instruction: Dutch, foreign languages, and minority/regional languages. Like in France, we find two models of minority/immigrant language teaching: either direct integration of language support during the school hours or special programs in separate (extracurricular) classes (Eurydice, 2006:2007:103). In primary education it is possible to learn foreign/minority languages including Frisian, English, French or German (ISCED 1), while all other languages were subjected to the Ministry’ permission; in secondary school (ISCED 2+3), schools have greater autonomy of choice in the teaching of languages, although the administration of official language exams requires Ministry permission. Foreign/minority languages taught at secondary school include Frisian, English, French, German, Turkish and Arabic (for ISCED 2+3),

and Latin and Ancient Greek at higher levels of (compulsory) secondary education (ISCED 3).¹⁷⁸

In primary education, the formal status of IMLI was laid down in Article 10 of the Primary Education Act (*WBO Wet op het Basisonderwijs*) of 1985. Whether IMLI would actually be offered in a given school was determined by the interplay of forces between school management, teachers and parents, although excluding children with EU background.¹⁷⁹ It stipulated two and half hours per week of IMLI within regular school hours and two and half hours per week outside regular school time, for a minimum of eight pupils per language, and the possibility of bringing together pupils from different schools (Boeschoten, Dorleijn and Leezenberg, 1993; Broeder and Extra, 1999). The government would support IMLI in primary education for the specified target groups, although in some cases pupils' home language was in contrast to the official language of parents' country of origin (such as Aramaic-speaking Syrian-Orthodox children from Turkey, or Moluccan children Moluccan-Malay; Vermeulen, 1997). As mentioned above, the effect of primary school IMLI on first language skills was seldom evaluated,¹⁸⁰ while considerably more attention was focused on the effects of IMLI on second-language acquisition (Dutch) and general school achievement.

In secondary education, article 12 of the Secondary Education Act (*WVO*) designated IMLI as an optional subject, in addition to or instead of other optional subjects. With two hours per week, for a minimum of four pupils and, like in primary education, the provision for additional staff, and since 1987, Turkish and Arabic became the main IMLI languages offered as optional subjects in secondary schools (Vermeulen, 1997; Broeder and Extra, 1999). In general, the form in which IMLI has been offered in the Netherlands in secondary education has been more similar to the form it has take in the other two countries compared to primary education (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998). Since 1991, and again in 1993, language proficiency requirement was made available for VBO (technical and vocational education), MAVO (lower general education), HAVO (higher general education) and VWO (pre-university education). Final certificates for these two languages have been offered at the

¹⁷⁸ Eurydice, 2006:2007: Figure B11.51. Figure B10, 48.

¹⁷⁹ However, pupils' eligibility for IMLI was not specified in legislation but in school letters (in Broeder and Extra (1999), pp.93-99, Vermeulen (1997), pp.80-81).

¹⁸⁰ In pp.93-99, Broeder, Peter, Guus Extra (1999). The latter found that Turkish language instruction had positive effects on the Turkish proficiency of primary school pupils of Turkish origin, less evident for the Arabic teaching for pupils of Moroccan origins (Ex Aarts; de Ruiter and Verhoeven (1993); Aarts 1994). Although rare, National Institute for Educational Measurement (CITO) tests were developed by Aarts and De Ruiter (1995), allowing to assess language proficiency in mother tongue at the end of primary school, further developed bilingual tests (by Verhoeven et al 1995) at the beginning of primary school.

HAVO level since 1995, and at the VWO level since 1996 (van der Avoird, Broeder et Extra, 2001).

IMLI: Problems and prospects

The main problems with IMLI pointed out by critics related, first and foremost, to its goals. Its primary aim was to contribute to bridging the gap between home and school environment, promoting second language learning and school success, and rarely to promote first language proficiency as such (as proposed by Meestringa 1990 for elementary school). Thus, Dutch became dominant in a quick swift in school training (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998) and home language acquisition was rarely treated as a form of school success. This situation made this type of training into a tool for an assimilationist/submersion model, although its purported intentions were described in the opposite way (Vermeulen, 1997). A more autonomous status was seen in secondary schools, where the home language is taught as a foreign language and evaluation of skills is a key aspect (Extra and Verhoeven, 1993; van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra, 2001). Secondly, minority language instruction should have been treated as a form of cultural enrichment and not as a way to compensate for deficits (Kroon and Ton Vallen, 1998), and some authors have argued that bilingual or multilingual models in primary and secondary education were mainly adopted for transitional purposes and based on the low socio-economic status of the children's background, target within ethnic minority policies (Driessen, 2005).

However, this “deficit – enrichment” approach has also depended on individuals' position in negotiating IMLI programmes. The acquisition of Dutch as a second language has been the main priority of national and local educational authorities, school boards and principals, and Dutch language teachers, all of whom have shown resistance to first language maintenance, as in the other two countries (Extra and Verhoeven, 1993; Broeder and Extra, 1999). On the other hand, individuals of immigrant origins, associations, parents, and first language teachers, to whom first language learning and maintenance is a key goal in itself, intrinsically related to second language (Dutch) improvement and school achievement. Students' enrolment has depended on the relationship between these two approaches. For instance, IMLI enrolment has been highest among pupils of Turkish and Moroccan origins,¹⁸¹ due to a combination of factors: parents' and pupils' attitude towards IMLI, the geographical

¹⁸¹ For instance, in 1995, from the 67,000 children enrolled in IMLI, 61000 were Turkish and Moroccan origins (representing 73% of the total of pupils of Turkish and Moroccan origins in primary school, decreasing to 67% in 1998 and to 57% in 2000) In Driessen (2005), pp.78

distribution of immigrant minority groups, and the degree of institutional support from headmasters and school governing bodies (Vermeulen, 1997:81). Facing higher levels of demand for Turkish and Arabic, the Ministry of Education developed teacher training programmes specifically for these languages, which have been offered at colleges in Rotterdam and Amsterdam since 1984 (Boeschoten, Dorleijn and Leezenberg, 1993; van der Avoird, Broeder and Extra, 2001). Nevertheless, as in France and some German states, Turkish and Arabic teachers have not enjoyed the same status as the teachers of other modern languages (as English, French or German) or classical languages (such as Latin and Ancient Greek).

2.6. Conclusion

In sum, *minority languages* in general are officially recognised as cultural values but not as political matters, although official perceptions reflect rather political options and less sociolinguistic ones (Gogolin, 2002). As discussed in this chapter, immigrant languages in particular, though representing significant proportions of settled populations, have been left out from *political recognition at both the European level and ministerial statements*. And within this limited recognition, immigrant language instruction has been part of integration policies in different countries—as foreign languages provided for those with immigrant background, and with two general aims: social integration and intercultural dialogue. And knowing that language status derives from the combination of both demographic and sociolinguistic status, and the latter including the educational status of languages, analysing language diversity approaches through the public instruction of the existing languages is of all pertinence.

Moreover, the educational status of a language goes behind the demographic weight and geographical distribution of a minority language group. This is so as it results also from the combination of these two factors with several other factors, such as the attitudes of parents, pupils, school headmasters and teachers in relation to these languages and its instruction needs, as well as on the existing national and local policies and official approaches. The interplay of these different forces will further influence pupils' enrolment in these programs, as well as on their motivation and attachment towards their own language background. France, Germany and the Netherlands have shown different official approaches and policies on immigrant language instruction through school. A quick comparison indicated that IMLI enrolment has been much more widespread in the Netherlands, followed by Germany and the

least in France. Nevertheless, these three countries have shown important common points in terms of the official legitimacy of immigrant language recognition, as well as on the general conclusion of its limited success in public schools.

We can say that the limited success of immigrant minority language is due to different types of reasons, the large majority common to all the three countries. For instance, disagreements on the legitimacy of immigrant languages instruction tend to reflect some bottom-up and top-down different views, susceptible to ideological debates that could be more complementary and less contradictory. In the one hand, parents, IMLI teachers and immigrant organisations, focusing on the enrichment of society through bilingual or plurilingual competences, as well as on the consequent link with parents' cultural background; On the other hand, policy makers, school headmasters and regular school teachers, who have focused mainly on school language and other school subjects achievements (Broeder and Extra, 1999). Another important reason is the limited number of evaluation impact of its aims, i.e., in terms of immigrant language achievement and bicultural competences, turning the matter harder to grasp. Inversely, we have observed instead the prevailing linguistic assimilation approach of these programs. Particularly in primary education, these languages are not taken as part of the 'regular' or 'national' curriculum, becoming instead a negotiable entity in a complex and often opaque interplay of forces by several actors (Broeder and Extra, 1999). Only in a later stage of education, i.e., in secondary education, immigrant languages gained higher status if included in educational programs and evaluated as foreign languages subjects. Nevertheless, their introduction as foreign/modern languages in secondary education has shown a limited status when compared to other languages (such as English, French, Spanish or German languages), and likely on their lower weight as additional credits.

Referring specifically to national and local policies, it has been previously discussed that the public support for immigrant languages has been framed within integration policies that contrast with the conceptual exclusion of these languages. For all countries, the "otherness" applied to immigrant languages pushes immigrant background to the condition of a foreign background, which is not applied to other minority languages. Although this was observed in the three countries under study here, it has shown to have occurred for different reasons.

In Germany, the conceptual exclusion of immigrant language derives from its cultural and political restrictive interpretation of "citizenship" and "nationality," where *ius sanguinis*

tradition has been more strictly and longer applied. Moreover, this has occurred independently from Germany's constitutional principles, characterised by the absence of official monolingualism. Here, immigrant language instruction has been generally supported as a human right and for social control aims, but assuming also that the cultural and political priority is given to German language assimilation rather than plurilingualism results. When more recent pressures for assimilation policies increased, where these programs had become governmental responsibility (ex Hessen), they were also the first to be abolished (compared to Berlin consulate-supervised model).

In contrast, in France both traditions of *ius solis* access to nationality and the official monolingualism have been imposed and defended for a long time, and through the constitution. The role of the central state in the recognition of language diversity has been in the heart of French integration debates and policy practices. And although the country has demonstrated more openness for recognition of cultural diversity of its population since the 1980s, to demand public measures for actively recognize and protect any minority languages, and particularly immigrant languages, is seen as a transgression of the role of the state into a forbidden area of citizens' private sphere. This separation turns its politics blind to the relationship between mother language structure, competent bilingualism and individuals' cognitive development, particularly for its population with more disadvantageous SES conditions, who possess few resources to acquire formally these languages. Thus, here immigrant language instruction has been tolerated in public schools, but under the responsibility of foreign representatives and under hard criticism. Only for the level where there is some evaluation on other languages than French (secondary education), the French national education has included in its programs the main immigrant languages as modern foreign languages, but leaving behind its inclusion in primary education programs.

In the Netherlands, there has been a general openness to cultural diversity at constitutional, political and cultural levels. This was further reflected on pupils' highest enrolment in IMLI programs in the course of time. However, the Dutch multicultural paradox is equally mirrored in its language policy aims. From the beginning, immigrant language teaching has not been conceived for the efficiency of a bilingual education, which would aim to achieve plurilingual or bilingual individuals. On the contrary, the integration of language diversity in national educational policies has been conceived as a temporary measure (like for regional languages as Frisian), with the main aim to combat social and school disadvantages, and focusing

instead on its impact on Dutch language proficiency and other school subjects. Thus, with the recent context of significant pressures for assimilationist policies, the end of public funding for immigrant languages was one of the first measures to be applied (since 2004), returning its responsibilities to the tertiary sector.

In sum, recent trends in all three countries indicate that the Berlin and the French models for IMLI, who maintained sort of less the frame from the late 1960s - 1970s (consulates-supervised)—meaning cheaper costs, lesser control but the most criticised – are, however, also those currently resisting more to assimilationist policies. In contrast, where immigrant languages were integrated in national educational policies (Hessen and the Netherlands), meaning higher governmental engagement, control and funding, there was a radical withdraw of public funding in the last ten years. As mentioned by Joppkes (2002), most liberal states favouring plural diversity recognition (such as France, Germany and the Netherlands), keep on arguing that language assimilation is compatible to liberal normative values, particularly when referring to immigrant minority languages. Thus, when more liberalized forms of cultural incorporation happened, and the application of more explicit plural policies took place, this occurred under the presence of significant criticism, and assimilation perspectives gained more place in a kind of re-assertion of common values and identity, and ‘return to assimilation’ (Kymlicka, 2010; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Faas, 2010). IMLI, as a bilingual program, achieved, instead, linguistic assimilation and less bilingual or plurilingual competences. Nevertheless, these programs have experienced significant criticism not because failing to achieve efficiently its plurality aims, but mainly as a multicultural policy, resulting in a reinforcement of these languages lower status.

Table 5 - Language diversity approach, by country

Language diversity approach		
France	Germany	The Netherlands

National approach on language diversity recognition			
* At international level	* Highest resistance to language diversity	* Acceptance of language diversity (human rights´ approach)	* Acceptance of language diversity
* At national level	* Constitutional monolingualism, but cultural valorization of linguistic plurality	* No constitutional language limitation, but cultural valorization of monolingualism	* No constitutional limitation, cultural and political valorization of linguistic plurality

	Public education offer in Turkish as foreign language		
Official language of parents´ country of origin as modern/ foreign language	Turkish at ISCED 2 and 3 (lower and upper secondary) of compulsory education	Turkish non-existent	Turkish at ISCED 2 and 3 (lower and upper secondary) of compulsory education

Table 6 - Language diversity and Immigrant Minority Language Instruction 1 (IMLI), by country

Language diversity approach			
France		Germany	The Netherlands
IMLI - Immigrant Minority Language Instruction			
Beginning	Aim: prepare to return		
	Organisation: bilateral agreements		
	* 1925 until WWII - extra foreign courses * Since 1973 - ELCO* (Turkish language - 1978) * Content: language, geography and history	* Since 1963 * Aim: to assist in learning German language	* Since 1967 - OETC/ OALT***** * Content: language, geography and history
Organisation	In general, immigrant language is the official language of parents' country of origin		
	* Demanded by parents, organized and paid by the consulates * Primary education: 1h30 to 3h/week; 70% after school hour; Consulate teachers * Secondary education: 3h to 4h/week; additional credits; Recent - public servant teachers	* Berlin: optional; teacher and organisation by the consulates * Frankfurt: compulsory since 1983; teacher federal public servant, abolished in 1999 * Primary education: mainly for guestworkers' children Max 5h/week BUT usually 2h30 (+2h with religious education), during school hours or parallel * Secondary education: 3h to 4h/week; additional credits, but lower status choice	* Demanded by parents, organized and paid by the consulates * Primary education: no specific planning and organisation Max 2h30/week, within or outside school hours * Secondary education: evaluation
Pupils of Turkish background in IMLI	Descendants of Turkish - one of the largest group; more than 20% of the total	Descendants of Turkish - the largest group; more than 40% of the total	Descendants of Turkish - the largest group; more than 40% of the total; particularly high in Amsterdam and Rotterdam
* ELCO - Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d'Origine, France			
***** OETC/ OALT - Mother Tongue Instruction, The Netherlands			

Table 7 - Language diversity and Immigrant Minority Language Instruction 2 (IMLI), by country

Language diversity approach			
	France	Germany	The Netherlands
	IMLI - Immigrant Minority Language Instruction		
1970s	(see previous box)	* (interrupted 1971-1976) * 1976 - aim: to maintain pupils own identity * 1979 - applied to secondary schools as first or second language	Since 1974: * Financed by Dutch government, part of regular education * On demand of parents, teachers and school managers * Eligibility: combining immigrant and SES disadvantaged background
1980s	ELCO new focus: * Intercultural activities * Improve French language acquisition * Secondary education: additional credits	* 1983 - Compulsory in Hesse state	* 1983-84 - aim: cultural emancipation - promote equal chances through intercultural education * Demand little knowledge on immigrant languages, improve Dutch language acquisition
1990s	* 1995 - INALCO** exams for Turkish language; 5,1% INALCO exams were of Turkish language * Secondary education: Turkish integrated in French National Education - <i>Langues Vivantes</i>	* KMK reports (1992, 1994, 1996): foreign languages and intercultural dialogue in all * 1990s - Aim: multilingualism European context and not pupils return * 1994 - 60 - 80% eligible pupils attended * 1996 - Aim: integrated in intercultural education * 1999 - abolished in Hesse state	* 1991 - Aim: more support Dutch language learning * 1992 - immigrant language as source of knowledge and bridging home and school language * Middle 1990s - children of immigrant background lacking behind Dutch skills and intercultural dialogue * 1996 - focus shift to Dutch language learning
2000s - End	* HCI (1991, 2010); Stasi (2004)**** reports: demanding ELCO suppression because too communitarian	* Pressure to abolish IMLI, though still ongoing in Berlin	* 2002 - more assimilative policy claims * 2004 - abolish of OECT; focus on Dutch learning * offer outside public education

** INALCO - National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations (state) ,France

*** HCI - Haut conseil à l'integration / STASI - Commission de reflexion sur laicité dans la republique, France

Table 8 - Status differences between IMLI from primary and secondary education

**Broeder and Extra (1999) Status differences between IMLI
in primary and secondary education**

IMLI	Primary Education	Secondary Education
Target groups	<i>de iure</i> : mostly immigrant minority pupils from specific source countries <i>de facto</i> : mostly subset (subconjunto) of these pupils	<i>de iure</i> : mostly all pupils <i>de facto</i> : mostly subset immigrant minority pupils
Arguments	Mostly of a struggle against deficits: . Bridging home/school gap . Promoting school success in other 'regular' subjects rarely cultural policy: . Promoting cultural pluralism . Promoting knowledge of languages in a multicultural and globalizing society	Mostly cultural policy: . Promoting cultural pluralism . Promoting knowledge of languages
Goals	Rarely specified	Commonly specification of oral and written skills to be reached
Evaluation	Rarely judgement/report figure for IMLI: 'language' in school report = national standard language	Examination and report for IMLI, explicitly and separately evaluated from national standard language
Minimal enrolment	Relatively high number of pupils: per class, school and municipality	Relatively low number of pupils: per class, school and municipality
Time-table status	Not perceived as 'regular' education: instead of other subjects or extra -curricular	Regular optional subject in regular free time table space
Funding	. National, regional or local authorities . Consulates/embassies of source countries	. National, regional or local authorities
Educational appliances	Rarely originating from country of settlement, often abroad source country	commonly originating from country of residence

Source: Broeder, Peter, Guus Extra (1999), Language, ethnicity and Education ; Case studies on immigration minority groups and immigrant minority languages, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon, table 3.9, pp.107

Note: study comparing The Netherlands, Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden and Great Britain.

Chapter 3

Turkish immigration in France, Germany and the Netherlands, parents' different migration stories

3.1. Introduction

This chapter has two manifold aims: to make an overview on the immigrant context for the parents of the Turkish descendants, while disentangling respondents social and migration family background. Departing from the understanding of parents' country of origin, that led to their emigration to Western European countries, I further analyse their trajectory as immigrants, mainly in relation to the labour market. Although emigration circumstances and individuals' profiles sometimes diverged, their professional insertion in different European labour markets had more points in common than differences. From this, I raise the hypothesis that transferability of previous acquired human capital was less achieved in France and Germany than the Netherlands. The importance of such focus relies on its impact on family transmissions and acculturation strategies, in which the parents' labour market integration becomes one of the main issues.

3.2. History of modern migration movements from Turkey to France, Germany and the Netherlands

The modern migration of Turkish workers to Europe dates officially from the Turkish constitution in 1961, which gave its citizens the right to move through the Turkish emigration office. Turkish administration was then particularly active in recruiting emigrants through government-to-government agreements, to “(...) stimulate the integration of the country into the European political and economic community, and encourage the industries of the receiving countries to invest in Turkey (...)”.¹⁸² Domestic issues had led to important push factors since the 1950s,¹⁸³ and among the most important ones is the Turkish industrialisation. It promoted new forms of production and labour strategies, but led as well to internal mass migration (both circular and permanent) because reinforcing regional inequalities and important pauperization of some ranges of its population. Especially the regions with dynamic population growth and more traditional ways of life, such as some

¹⁸² The new constitution of 1961, resulting from the coup d'état 27 May 1960, allowed new international policies for labour migration through the Agence Nationale Turque pour l'Emploi – ANTPE/IIBK. The Turkish administration was, by then, particularly interested to monopolize the migration chains, giving better facilities for emigrants: “(...)made going abroad through the IIBK much cheaper, easier, and officially secure as compared to going abroad outside the IIBK.(...) (while ensuring) that the receiving countries would convey their official demand for Turkish labour only to the IIBK.” in Akgündüz, 2008. See also Hüküm, 2003; Kastoryano, 1986; Levallois, 1992; Lucassen, 2005.

¹⁸³ “(...)the main causes(...)that made large numbers of people in Turkey eager to take up work in west(...)in the 1960s and 1970s(...) (firstly) three economic factors: the economic and industrial growth rates, and national income distribution; unemployment; and a capitalist transformation process in the socio-economic structure.(...)(secondly)population growth(...)Thirdly'(...)cultural-ideological stimulating effects(...)particularly in large cities.the attitude of the Turkish state to labour migration; and the role of social networks.” in Akgündüz, 2008

provinces in Eastern and Central Anatoly, experienced enduring mass unemployment and significant circular internal migration waves, in chorus with long internal political conflicts.¹⁸⁴ The population from these regions has been one of the main actors within Turkish migration flows, first at the national level — accelerating Turkey's urbanisation process, and since the 1960s at the international level, especially from 1965 on.

In parallel, the North Western European economies started to recover from World War II, experiencing almost full employment, remarkably low unemployment rates and dramatic increase of labour shortages. The need for unskilled workers in the industrial sector was the most evident case, motivating new policy opportunities for international population movements. The first response was the absorption of the available labour force to Western Europe and through the application of the Treaty of Rome of 1957, though giving unsatisfactory results.¹⁸⁵ The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the country with more important labour shortages, was prevented from Eastern Europe inflow with the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961 without having significant experience of colonial labour inflows. Under these circumstances, the FGR turned to be particularly engaged in guest workers recruitment, finding its most successful response with Turkey. While the volume of Turkish immigrants increased in Germany, other European countries followed: Germany in 1961,¹⁸⁶ followed in 1964 by Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium, later in 1965 by France and in 1967 by Sweden.¹⁸⁷ Turkish authorities favoured a rotation system for labourers going to the West, wishing that as many Turkish workers as possible to get an experience abroad (Akgündüz 2008). Most of these Turkish workers had no previous contact with Western Europe and were of rural origins, although some had previous experienced internal migration..

¹⁸⁴ Since the implementation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, these conflicts have been motivated from the project of Turkey as a Nation: firstly, the abolition of the Cha'ria in the Turkish constitution, and the alphabetisation process abolishing the arab in favour of latin alphabet; secondly, the creation of a Minister of Religious so the state could control the religious confessions and brotherhoods, and the application of a religious criteria while negotiating population movements with the neighbouring countries; thirdly, the non recognition of any non-Turkish ethnic and religious minorities (previously recognised by the ottoman system). These changes led to important and sometimes violent internal struggles, with current deep impacts in today's Turkey, specially in the regions where there's a combination of large presence of minorities and lowest education attainments. On the time of State official engagement in emigration waves to Europe, these regions were considered priority for the guest worker recruitment to Europe, although recruitment was made, in practice, in larger urban units (in DIE - l'Institut d'État de Statistiques, 1996 in Elmas, 1998; Akgündüz, 2008).

¹⁸⁵ « (...) by applying the terms of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which gave nationals of the European Economic Community the right to take up employment in other member state. (...)initially turned to the labour reservoirs of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece . ». Also, "(...)the volume of spontaneously available migrant labourers was not sufficient to match the demands (...) in Western Europe.(...)even those European countries (e.g. France and The Netherlands) that experienced self-initiated colonial migrant inflows from their (former) colonies were engaged in deliberate recruitment efforts abroad, and pursued open door policies towards foreign labour(...)"In Op.Cit., Akgündüz, 2008.

¹⁸⁶ For 1961, "Turkey's agreement with Germany was the toughest one in the sense that it did not mention any rights of workers relating to work and residence." Thus, it was later revised in 1964 to negotiate better rights for the Turkish workers and extended their possibilities for staying, in Akgündüz, 2008.

¹⁸⁷ In Tiryakioğlu, Bilgin (2006), *Multicitizenship and its consequences in Turkish law*, Ankara law review, vol3,n.1. However, many Western European countries (especially Germany and France, but also Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands), had already received Turkish workers before signing the agreement, and while Germany had started through private bureau, the latter countries had used the IIBK channel. However, these previous flows were much smaller than the later ones that followed the government-to-government agreements (in Akgündüz, 2008).

We can identify two main periods for the Turkish modern migration flows. The first, before 1965, characterised by more anonymous immigration, and the second from 1965 on, a more intensive and massive migration through nominative forms.¹⁸⁸ Following this, there were specific social networks chains of workers, which determined the nature of the flows, its potential expansion, selectivity of origin and specific destinations.¹⁸⁹ Altogether, the number of individuals of Turkish origin moving to Western in Europe never ceased to increase, up to more than 2 million registered in the IIBK Turkish administration (Agence Nationale Turque pour l'Emploi – ANTPE/IIBK), whom more than 60% departing after 1970. Their increasing numbers happened in spite of four main factors that aimed to stop these flows: the initial temporary status of the migration recruitment programs, the suspension of state-organised labour migration in the 1970s,¹⁹⁰ the official incentives for migrants to return¹⁹¹ and the continuously restrictive trend on international migration policies. While the massive labour migration arrived between 1961 and 1974 (skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled workers, mainly male workers), family related and asylum seekers arrived after the 1970s' oil crisis and the 1980s Turkish coup d'état.¹⁹² Refugees took their turn mainly after 1980 and until 1988, and again after the restrictions for asylum in the 1990s.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ The first period was characterised by immigration mainly to Germany, arriving through anonymat procedures and originally from urban and industrialised regions, due to lack of responsiveness from the population from the more rural and poor regions. In 1965, the Turkish authorities inserted a priority regulation for underdevelopment and developing provinces, to counterbalance the high share of emigration rates from the developed provinces and urban areas and high internal migration pressures. The number of those going abroad increased dramatically when different possibilities for migration channels emerged: many using official recruitment through nominative procedures, others through their own networks (sometimes through village development co-operatives that emerged in 1965 and flourished in the 1970s), or still others through touristic procedures. New possibilities diminished the coverage of the official exit through the IIBK, particularly outflows of skilled workers (Penninx & Van Renselaar 1978 - in Akgündüz, 2008).

¹⁸⁹ For this matter, available evidence is, though, generally referring to migrants that came from the rural areas of Central and Eastern Anatolia and least to those coming from urban areas, in Akgündüz, 2008.

¹⁹⁰ For the French case, the new law of immigration— circulaire 5 July 1974, stopped immigration of non-EU countries and restricted family reunion rights under the Government of Valéry Giscard D'Estaing. Consequently, only about 804 Turkish migrants entries were registered between 1975 and 1991 concerning the five main European countries for the guest worker program (Germany, France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, in Elmas, 1998). See also n Tebbakh, 2007. In Germany the recruitment ended in November 1973, by a decree of the German Labour Ministry, implying that migrants entering after Nov 1974 ceased to be eligible for work permits, in Erdem and Mattes (2002);


¹⁹¹ In France, these were implemented between 1977 and 1981 (Estabiet, 1997);

¹⁹² The 1973 oil crisis affected the already fragile Turkish economy. The FMI had given warning to the Turkish banks in 1977, the inflation rates increased up to 90 to 100% between 1978 and 1979, leading to a dramatic decreasing for the real salaries and 3,5 million unemployed in 1978 (OCDE data). With the impact of the oil crisis in Europe, the drop of remittances from its emigrants decreases from 1,4 milliard dollars in 1974 to 982 millions dollars in 1976, 1977 and 1978, creating a deficit in the balance de payments of 2,3 milliards. The important social and economic instability that resulted from this did not help the political violence that Turkey experienced during the 1970s, opposing left and right wing movements in both urban and non urban centres. This sum of factors created conditions for the military coup d'état of 12 September 1980, demotivating emigrants to return, while pushing factors for new outflows, mainly family reunion and refugees from left wing movements. They went first in direction to the neighbouring countries, as Syria and Liban, later to Europe for safety reasons: mainly Greece, Germany and France (Chevallier 2009; Icduguygu, 2005).

¹⁹³ Since 1952 there were two institutions for refugees issues and hosting in France: L'Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA, under the Ministry of Foreigner Affairs and granting the refugees status) and Commission des Recours des Réfugiés (CRR). In 1954 the country recognizes the Geneva Convention for refugees, and later, in 1967, the New York protocol. Later, in the 1980s, while in Germany there was a clear trend of discouragement to demand for asylum in its territory, reflected also in restricting economic rights (in 1980), limiting social supports (in 1981 and 1982) and a high refusal rate for refugee status (about 81% of refusals in 1982, against the average of 42% in the rest Europe). In France, there was instead a period of openness since the socialist government in 1981, with a recognition rate for refugees strongly contrasting with Germany: 73% in 1982. The numbers of political refugees from Turkey in France increased during all the 1980s: from 1 316 political refugees from Turkey in 1981, to 5000 in 1984 and a total of 17 335 asylum seekers in 1989. Although France had become more attractive to Turkish refugees than Germany, the weight of the large Turkish community in this latter country was still enough to attract more refugees there: in Germany there were

Current estimations suggest there are between 3,2 to 4 million citizens of Turkish origin in all European Union countries, one of the largest group among foreign workers in Western Europe.¹⁹⁴ Data from 2000, pointed to about 2,637 million individuals of Turkish origin living in Germany, 370 thousands in France and 271 875 in the Netherlands - the three main countries of settlement for this population at the international level.¹⁹⁵ Considering only those who are currently foreign citizens, more recently data (2008) points to a total of 2, 275 million Turkish foreigners in the current European Union countries, from which the large majority will be living in Germany (72%), followed far behind by France (9%), Austria (5%) and the Netherlands (4%) (see Figure 2).¹⁹⁶ Turkish citizens represented about 9% of the total of the 26 million foreigners living in Europe Union in 2006 (Eurostat, 2006, see Figure 1).

Figure 1¹⁹⁷ - Proportion of Turkish foreigners in EU countries



about 137 000 refugees from Turkey from 1978 and 1988, becoming the second more representative group for asylum seekers, while in France they will sum up around 54 000 between the end of 1980 and beginning of the 1990s (in Elmas 1998). After the general restrictive trends in the 1990s in Europe (Dublin agreements in 1990 - in France 1992, Germany 1993), the refusal rates spread out, but still about 350 thousand requests for asylum from Turkish citizens were registered in all Europe between 1985 and 1995 (Eurostat 1996, in Elmas 1998; Chevallier 2009).


¹⁹⁴The proportion of emigrants has been increasing significantly in Turkey since the 1970s: in 1973 it represented 2,3% of its population, increasing to 4,5% in the 1980s, to nearly 5% in the 1990s and 6% in the early 2000's (Icduguygu, 2005). In 1970, 13% of its population between 20 and 35 years old had migrated (accordingly to 1970 census data DIE 1977, in Akgündüz, 2008). For the European hosting countries: 600 000 in 1972, to about 715 000 in 1974, 1,8 million in the early 1980s, 2,9 million in the mid-1990s, and to over 3,5 million in the early 2000's (de Tapia, 1992; Elmas, 1998).

¹⁹⁵In TAM, 2001 and Eurostat 2000, In Hukum, 2003; see also Irtis-Dabbagh, 2003; Icduguygu, 2005; data from Turkish Ministry of Labour and Social Security from 2002 in Icduguygu, 2005; Akgündüz, 2008

¹⁹⁶Both Figures 1 and 2 include data related to foreigner individuals, in order to allow international comparison for all EU countries. If we include those born in Europe having an European citizenship, the population of Turkish origin living currently in the Netherlands increases to comparable proportions to France, and significantly more than in Austria.

¹⁹⁷in Eurostat, 2006, data available data for 20 European Union countries and refers only to Turkish citizens with non European nationality. The total number includes also Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain and United Kingdom, though few cases. In the Netherlands, if including those with Dutch citizenship, the numbers increase to one-fifth.

Figure 2 – Proportion of total Turkish foreigners within each country



3.2.1. Between official and non official channels of emigration

When emigration of Turkish workers came into the agenda in Turkey, various forms of internal migration were already happening, some for long terms and many in circular terms — the urban-to-rural kind being the forefront. Internal migration was made mainly in direction to Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, or other provinces in Western Turkey — the largest and most developed economies in the country (Akgündüz, 2008). By contrast, Eastern Anatolian region was, by then, the least developed and where many departures happened. International recruitment to Western Europe was made firstly through official channels (IIBK), in the main Turkish cities in (more anonymous forms), and secondly through less official channels, through migrants' social networks and direct contact with enterprises (more nominal forms).

When the guest worker program was put into practice through IIBK (beginning of the 1960s), the Turkish policy to send workers abroad had two manifold aims: to improve or provide Turkish workers professional skills, while helping to develop more underdevelopment areas in Turkey (characterized by high rates of population growth, unemployment and circular migration). To attain both aims, the recruitment towards western European countries was planned under a rotation system (limited staying and return within two years), and centered in more underdevelopment provinces of Turkey. However, none of the aims was achieved successfully, as most of the IIBK recruitment was made in the developed or in developing

provinces (particularly in Western Turkey), and many workers ended settling in their immigration countries. For instance, “the German Government had no intention of employing migrant workers permanently but, because the need for workers beyond the initially agreed-upon date, many of these young men stayed (in Germany) long behind their initial two-years contracts, and were joined by their families in subsequent decades”. (Faas, 2010:32). In addition, most of the outflows happened after the halt of recruitment period and outside the Turkish official channels, and this time, indeed the recruitment was made mainly in underdevelopment provinces.

Accordingly to the official bureaus in Turkey, during the first stage (1961-65) most of the official recruitments (through IIBK) were made in the three largest cities (46% from Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) or other provinces from Western Turkey (mainly Marmara and Aegean seas, almost one fifth).¹⁹⁸ Only very few Turkish workers were then recruited from Black Sea, Central Anatolia, Eastern Anatolia or even Mediterranean coast (13%, 10%, 9% and 3%, respectively). In a second stage (1966-1973), when the Dutch and French official recruitment started from IIBK Ankara branch, there were more Turkish workers leaving from Central and Eastern Anatolia (17% and 13%, respectively), but still far behind compared to those leaving from the three main Turkish cities or other West Turkey provinces (31% and 20%, respectively.) Neither the Black or Mediterranean coast official recruitment changed much during this second stage (12% and 6%, respectively).¹⁹⁹ Both periods recruited mainly male workers and, depending on their provinces of departure, disposing of diverse levels of educational attainment and academic qualifications.

Indeed, it was through unofficial recruitment (i.e., social network outside the official channels) that more significant outflows reinforced the still ongoing outflows from Central and Eastern Anatolia. During the main migration periods a vast majority of the Turkish population lived in rural areas, and less than two-fifths in urban areas. In contrast, the majority of migrants from the 1960s, but especially from the 1970s, had lived in urban areas before going abroad due to prior internal migration, although born and socialized in rural areas. (Akgündüz, 2008:167). In addition because the German official recruitment was made mainly in Istanbul (Marmara region “Istanbul und Thrazien”), more urbanized and skilled workers were recruited for German labour market compared to the Dutch and French ones.

¹⁹⁸ Akgündüz, 2008: Table VI.1:163

¹⁹⁹ Akgündüz, 2008: Table VI.1: 163

(Akgündüz, 2008:170-171) And although in the beginning (1963-64) immigrants came to Europe from all regions except Kurdish Eastern Anatolia, since the Dutch and French recruitment bureau location in Ankara, Central Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia turned into important sources of immigration to these countries. However, mass migration from these regions would mainly occur after the recruitment halt, and under the form of family reunification, undocumented labour migration, marriage migration and asylum migration from Kurdish areas (Akgündüz, 2008:166-167). By then, “those recruited as labour migrants from the underdeveloped provinces turned out to be the initial cohort of a long-lasting migration movement.” (Akgündüz, 2008:167)

3.2.2. Starting with Germany

After Second World War, Germany was one of the Western countries with more important labour shortages, facing high competition with other Western European countries for labour force recruitment. With no experience with colonial labour inflows, Germany recruited first Southern European workforce, and refugees and resettlers from Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany – who contributed to the German “economic miracle”. However, with the construction of the Berlin wall in 1961, FRG was prevented from the ongoing recruitment of the available workforce from Eastern Eastern countries²⁰⁰ and, consequently, turned to be particularly active in applying guest workers agreements, starting with Turkey in 1961.²⁰¹ The 31st October 1961 bilateral agreement between Germany and Turkey turned to be one the most successful response in fulfilling the labour shortages for the first, becoming was well one of the most influential moments in the history between the two countries (Faas, 2010).

Those coming to Germany from Turkey arrived mainly during the third phase of postwar of immigration to Germany, more precisely between 1961 and 1973 when the active recruitment of foreign labour by the FRG led to a rapid growth of foreign population. The share of women was relatively low: 13% in 1964, 24% in 1973, from which more than 90% recruited for semi-

²⁰⁰“In the case of Germany (...)by 1950, 7.9 million (German refugees and resettlers from Eastern Europe, called by German authorities *Aussiedler*) came from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet Union, and some 3.8 million from the German Democratic Republic before the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.(...) Central and Eastern European countries, which had been an important source of labour supply to the USA and, since the last two decades of the XIX century, to Germany, France and Switzerland, effectively disappeared from the international migration scene. The only exception was a small trickle of refugees, particularly after the suppression of the 1956 uprising in Hungary, and the 1968 Prague Spring. Likewise, except for Yugoslavia, the socialist countries of the Balkans and what was the Soviet Union were certainly out of the world capitalist labour market .China, which had been another major supply country for international labour migration from the mid-XIX century onwards, also ceased releasing labour as a result of its 1949 revolution.” See discussion on Münz & Ulrich 1998; Fassmann & Münz 1994; Hoeder 1985 and 1996; Potts 1990; Bade 1997; Zolberg 1997, in Akgündüz, 2008).

²⁰¹ To re-build German’s traditional economy, bilateral agreements were signed with Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia and Morocco in 1965, Yugoslavia in 1968; To a less extent, there were some recruitments from Asian, North African and South American countries, such as, for instance, in 1974 with South Korea to recruit nurses. However, recruitment of Turkish citizens to Germany had already happened before 1961, but in much lower scale and not through government-to-government agreements. *Op.Cit.*, Akgündüz, 2008, Faas, 2010, pp.32.

skilled or unskilled works. (Erdem; Mattes, 2002) Turkish immigrants continued to come in a later phase (1973-1988/89), after the recruitment stopped in 1973, attempting to reduce the number of foreigners. German economy had moved to service jobs from 1970s to 1980s, and 1990s, and more formal professional qualifications were required while immigrant workers were more quickly led to unemployment. (Erdem; Mattes, 2002) Nevertheless, there was, a growth of foreign population due to family reunification (spouses and children, though there is no precise information on its numbers),²⁰² increasing the number of individuals in age to work (particularly women), who were however, allowed to enter the country but had no permission to enter the labour market.

In 1977, the economic recovery promoted a change in the work permit policies, and those who had entered before 1977 become eligible, but with the second oil shock in 1979 immigrants' employment declined again (Erdem and Mattes, 2002). Restrictive policies remained the most important reason for immigrants' economic inactivity in the 1980s and 1990s, in a labour market opened to qualified workers but closed to unskilled workers, particularly for immigrant women coming for family reasons who ended up withdrawing from the labour market (Erdem and Mattes, 2002). In spite of the labour and staying rights restrictions after the halt recruitment in 1973, and the important number of unemployed foreigners during the recession phases of 1974-75 and 1981-84, many immigrants stayed in FGR,²⁰³ especially those from Turkey or ex-Yugoslavia who could not re-enter due to home country circumstances. Moreover, the proportion of Turkish population in Germany has been relatively stable since 1971, representing about 26% of total foreign population in 2006.²⁰⁴ In Germany, more than 60% of foreigners live in big cities or other densely populated regions, particularly in cities like Frankfurt and Berlin, in contrast to 41% of German nationals.²⁰⁵ This was the result of the country's economic structure and political history – the large urban agglomerations in West Germany had a large proportion of industries of iron and steel, automobile, chemical, and highly specialized services (like in Berlin).²⁰⁶

²⁰² See Table 2, in Munz and Ralph Ulrich (1998), pp.27, 42

²⁰³ see Figure 5, in Munz and Ulrich (1998), pp.35

²⁰⁴ Recent data from Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2006, in Kristen and Granato (2007); see also Figure 9 for 1971 and 1994, in Munz and Ulrich (1998), pp.45

²⁰⁵ referring to data of Federal Institute of Regional Studies and Planning, in Munz and Ulrich (1998), pp.45

²⁰⁶ see also Table 4 in Munz and Ulrich (1998), pp.45-46

3.2.3. The Netherlands follows Germany

The Netherlands has a long history of immigration. Already between 1590 and 1800, the estimated foreign-born population was never less than 5%, and only from the XIX century to the end of Second World War foreign-population declined, due to lower entries and significant emigration to the new world (USA, Canada and Australia) or to other colonial territories (such as South Africa and Indonesia.)²⁰⁷ Post-War migration was firstly characterized by immigrants from Dutch (former) colonies already in 1945 (Dutch-Indonesian),²⁰⁸ while the guest worker recruitment followed at the end of the 1950s, when post-war reconstruction of Dutch industry was finished and the domestic labour supply was insufficient.²⁰⁹ These industries attracted first semi-skilled and skilled workers from Italy (agreement signed in 1960) and Spain (1961), mainly skilled workers for metal industry, coalmines and shipyards (Akgündüz 2008). With unsatisfactory results, this was followed by a second wave of guest workers in the middle of the 1960s, mainly unskilled and lower educated workers who occupied semi-skilled and unskilled industrial jobs. During this second wave, workers were recruited from Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), Morocco (1969), Yugoslavia (1970), and Tunisia (1970, Akgündüz 2008).

Turkish bilateral agreement with the Netherlands was signed in 1964 (same year when the German agreement was revised), although Turkish workers have been admitted already before through the IIBK channel. Through these official channels they were mainly men, and arrived in small numbers (not even twenty five thousand).²¹⁰ Official nominative demands were later agreed, substituting anonymous forms, a practice that reinforced specific social networks. From the 1970s, the Dutch industry passed its post-war peak levels of expansion, but coped with a shortage of unskilled work. And while the service sector attracted Dutch qualified individuals, low-level industrial jobs were left for the immigrants.

Thus, Turkish immigrants arrived mainly from the 1970s, but rapidly overcame the first waves when, since 1971 labour migration was transformed into family-based migration. After Dutch colonies independency in the 1970s, new waves of population arrived to the Netherlands, mainly West-Indian colonies, as Suriname, Antillean Islands.²¹¹ However, by

²⁰⁷ Source CBS, in Focus Migration, country profile no 11 2007

²⁰⁸ About 250 000 to 300 000 of repatriates from Indonesia between 1956 and 1962, and 12 500 Mollucans in 1951, in Akgündüz 2008. See also Tesser and Jaap Dronkers (2007), pp.359-401

²⁰⁹ in Tesser and Dronkers (2007) , pp.359-401

²¹⁰ in Table IV.5 pp111, in Akgündüz 2008.

²¹¹ in Tesser and Dronkers (2007), pp.359-401

then Dutch economy was deteriorating, unemployment numbers starting to exceed vacancies, leading to the halt of guest worker recruitment and immigration in general in 1973.

Nevertheless, and unlike Germany, the country continued to recruit foreign labour between 1973 and 1974, when domestic supply did not meet the demand (Akgündüz, 2008). Only from 1975 no more labour demand was officially received in Turkey from the Netherlands (Akgündüz, 2008). Immigration numbers restarted to rise with the economic recovering in the 1980s, and family reunification peaked around 1980,²¹² increasing tenfold the proportion of those original from Turkey and Morocco.²¹³ Currently, Turkish citizens tend to live in urban areas, particularly concentrated in the four largest cities (about two-fifths in The Hague and Utrecht up to almost of the population in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, compared to 13% of Dutch origin population), and since 2007, represent about one fifth total of foreigners.²¹⁴

3.2.4. The last guest workers to arrive in France

In France, recruitments of foreigner working force started already before 1945, “(...)unlike the other Western European states, (France) explicitly recognised immigration as vital to secure economic recovery at the end of the war.”²¹⁵ After WWII, French government created the National Immigration Office (ONI), hosting various foreigner workforces during the *Trente Glorieuses*, from 1945 to 1973.²¹⁶ Similarly to Germany and the Netherlands, the first recruitments of Southern European workforce were not sufficient, but more rapidly “laissez-faire” principles were implemented in the 1960s (meaning less direct state involvement). By then, recruitments were mainly from North Africa, with citizens enjoying unrestricted entries to France until the end of the 1960s.²¹⁷ With the Algerian war (from 1954 to 1962) and its independence in 1962, there was an important impact on the French public opinion that led to the need for “new recruitment agreements” (Akgündüz, 2008). The

²¹² in Tesser and Dronkers (2007), pp.359-401

²¹³ Source CBS, in Focus Migration, country profile no 11 2007

²¹⁴ Source CBS, in Focus Migration, country profile no 11 2007

²¹⁵ France became a country of emigration already in the XIX century, with immigration from neighbouring countries and overseas ex-colonies. After the WWI, the “Société générale d’immigration”, created in 1924, was a public organisation directed by employers from the industrial and agricultural sectors, constituting the first stage of the public management of immigration in France. This was interrupted by the repressive trends of the quotas policies in 1932 and the later German occupation. After WWII, the « publication d’ordonnance » in 1945 estimated a need of about 5 million foreigner workers to France, which led to the creation of the ONI, and later the L’Agence Nationale d’Accueil des étrangers et Migrations (ANAEM, see discussion on Noriel, 1998, in Koç, 2008; Tebbakh, 2007; Akgündüz, 2008).

²¹⁶ Kivisto 2002, Kaya and Ferhat, 2005; Tebbakh, 2007.

²¹⁷ Mainly from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, but also some from West African ex-colonies, especially from the Sahel area - Mali, Mauritania and Senegal “In 1945, Sub-Saharan Africans were excluded from the application of the law concerning the conditions of French nationality acquisition. However, according to the Constitution of 1946, members of this population were considered to be subjects and not as citizens of the French Union (French Republic and overseas), and were allowed to travel all around the French territory. In Ordonnance no. 45-2441 19 October 1945, Nationality Code”, later modified with the crisis in the 1970s, in Tebbakh, 2007; see also Akgündüz, 2008.

Portuguese immigration recruitment was signed in 1962, though its peak would arrived between 1967-68 (Tribalat, Simon and Riandey, 1996), and new guest workers recruitments followed, such as the one signed with the IIBK branch in Ankara, Turkey, in 1965.²¹⁸ In contrast with the other two emigration countries, Turkish workers in France were the last group applying for the guest-worker program, remaining also considerable less in numbers compared to the Southern European and North African migrants in France. “(...)in practice France started to recruit Turkish labourers only in 1970 (...)and)received a total of 55 710 workers through the IIBK (until the recruitment halt taken on 3 July 1974)” (Akgündüz, 2008).

In detail, Turkish modern waves to France can be divided in four main stages. The first takes place in the early 1950s, through short-term training provided by the International Labour Organisation and in small numbers. A second small flow through the IIBK in Turkey, recruiting Turkish workers through anonymous forms and in two moments, between 1963-1964 and after the government-to-government agreement in 1965 (Kaya and Ferhat, 2005). A third migration phase, between 1970-74, was called the “nominal migration,” meaning direct calls from the French private sector and using “self-feeding” character from the workers’ social networks. Compared to the previous flows, the latter led to an intensive and inter-personal chain migration from specific ethnic and rural communities in Turkey, and was characterised by individuals with lower educational attainments (Kaya and Ferhat, 2005; Selimanovski, 1992; Estabiet, 1997; Akgündüz, 2008). During these three first phases, very few were females or individuals coming under the auspices of the guest worker program but leaving Turkey for political or religious reasons. (Hüküm, 1998; Irtis-Dabbagh, 2003) However, the first massive Turkish immigration to France happened only after 1974, through a sudden family reunion after the guest-worker recruitment halt. This was reinforced by refugee flows in the 1980s and 1990s, turning currently to more diverse and less intense immigrant inflows.²¹⁹ Particularly before the 1980s, the large majority of Turkish immigrants had little knowledge on the French context before migrating and had never been in France before.

²¹⁸First official agreement was signed in April 1965, between Hassan Isik (Turkish Minister of Foreigner Affaris) and Bernard Hardion (French Ambassador in Ankara) (in Tebbakh, 2007), later revised in 1969 (in Hüküm, 2003; Irtis-Dabbagh, 2003). However, Turkish migration to France had already started around 1962-1965, as previously explained (see note 13) (Kastoryano, 1986, Irtis-Dabbagh, 2003; Lucassen, 2005; Akgündüz, 2008).

²¹⁹Mainly after the Coup d’état in 1980 in Turkey, first from left wing movements until 1984, but also Armenian and Assyrian-Chaldean minorities, and since 1984 mainly Kurdish, with the increasing of violence in the struggles between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish government (in Elmas 1998; Chevalier 2009).

Currently, Turkish citizens represent the seventh largest population of immigrant origin in France (INSEE data 2006), a young adult population (65% are between 15 and 44 years old) with no significant gender differences (INSEE 2006, Irtis-Dabbagh, 2003; Lucassen, 2005; Kaya and Ferhat, 2005; de Tapia, 2007). The first two waves of Turkish migrants settled in the Île-de-France, Alsace-Lorraine and Rhin-Alps, dispersing in the country since the desindustrialization, although still to be found mainly in the first regions of settlement (INSEE 2006, Irtis-Dabbagh, 2003, Petek-Salom, 1998, Koç, 2008). As other population of migrant origin, they also showed a concentration in urban unities (more than 90%), especially in Paris, followed by Strasbourg and Lyon.²²⁰ Within the urban unities, they have shown some concentration on cheap and social housing in disadvantaged parts of the city cities.²²¹ Alsace, the third region in France with highest numbers of individuals with a Turkish background, is where this population represents the biggest proportion of individuals with a foreign origin since 1986 (about 16% of the total of the immigrants, INSEE 2006), the second city in France with more individuals of Turkish origin (10%, after 63% in Paris, INSEE, 1999; Levallois, 1992; Jund, 1992).

3.3. Parents' migration history in the three countries: more similarities than differences

The previous described departure and arrival contexts were mirrored in the experiences of Turkish parents in the TIES survey (see Table 9). Country differences reflect the historic evolution of the guest worker recruitment, its halt and the family reunification that followed, clearly dictated by gender differences. Turkish parents arrived earlier in Germany compared to France and The Netherlands but, in general, men left earlier and for working reasons, women later and for family reasons. Only few parents in TIES survey came for asylum reasons (less than 8% and mainly in Germany). Turkish parents' were, in general, adults when migrating to the survey country (at least 80%, see Table 10). With some diversity in Germany — 20% of the mothers and 14% of father were not adult migrants: 6% were born in Germany and 14% of mother or fathers arrived at younger age.) In the Netherlands, only few parents emigrated at earlier age (8% of the fathers and 10% of the mothers), while in France almost all parents arrived during adulthood (at least 94% for the mothers and 97% for the fathers). Most of Turkish fathers arrived during the guest-workers recruitment, though the large majority during the second stage of the official recruitment (from 1965 onwards, see Table 9).

²²⁰ INSEE, 2006, The lack of studies on Turkish refugees does not allow to determine where these individual have preferred to settle in France, but existing research points to a significant concentration in the Parisian region (Chevallier 2009).

²²¹ From the 1970s, the HLM (Habitations à loyer modéré) became increasingly occupied by the population with an immigrant origin, as many arrived in France during an important development of this kind of housing. This is the case for about 40% of the population of Turkish origin (Housing survey , INSEE, 1996, in Tebbakh, 2007).

And as expected, while in Germany they arrived during the official recruitment (56% between 1965 and 1970, 16% before 1974), in France fathers arrived during the recruitment period but mainly at the end (30% before 1970, 42% between 1970-74); in the Netherlands, Turkish fathers arrived in different periods (32% before 1970, 22% between 1971-1974, 31% between 1975-1979). In addition, reasons for migration differ between countries – while in Germany and France the large majority of fathers migrated to Western Europe for working reasons, this was also the case in the Netherlands but almost one third of fathers there came for also family reasons. This is not a surprise because, as previously seen, from 1971 there was already an important family-migration flow to the Netherlands following labour workers. In contrast, mothers came later and for family reasons, but while in Germany and France mothers' arrived to join the partner or to marry, in the Netherlands at least half of the mothers came for general family reunification reasons. Moreover, many mothers in Germany migrated still during the recruitment period (56% before 1974), which was not at all the case for mothers migrating to France and the Netherlands. The latter started to migrate from 1971 on, and mainly from 1975 onwards (since the halt recruitment, 60% arrived after 1974).²²² Only Turkish fathers in France or in the Netherlands had some working experience before migrating (at least 67%), otherwise, the large majority of Turkish fathers in Germany and Turkish mothers in all countries had no work experience before migrating (at least 83%).

Finally, the large majority of these parents are still living in their emigration country (at least 93%, see Table 9). In addition, parents of all groups of origins (Turkish and non-Turkish parents, see Tables 10 and 11) showed a wide diversity of ages (between 34 and 82 years old). In general, mothers are younger than fathers, and Turkish parents are younger than non-Turkish parents. And while in Germany, Turkish and non-Turkish parents showed closer mean ages, the youngest are Turkish parents in France, and particular Turkish mothers (who came also the latest).

²²² Not shown here, only in France we observe city differences – while the large majority of the mothers in Paris arriving later (and 43% between 1980 and 1995), in Strasbourg most mothers migrated still during the recruitment period (35% between 1971 and 1974).

Table 9 - Turkish parents migration experiences, % column

	Fathers			Mothers		
	France	Germany	Netherlands	France	Germany	Netherlands
Year of migration						
1944 - 1964	3,7	12,8	8,1	1,9	3,9	1,5
1965 - 1970	26,2	43,3	23,7	13,2	27,9	11,4
1971 - 1974	42,0	15,5	22,0	25,1	24,5	21,1
1975 - 1979	18,0	12,5	30,6	31,7	24,0	40,9
1980 - 1995	10,1	16,0	15,6	28,1	19,8	25,1
N	149	400	346	137	359	342
Main reason to migrate						
Marriage/reunification with partner	1,0	3,6	10,2	62,2	61,3	41,2
Reunification with family	4,0	14,1	16,8	34,2	25,7	49,8
Work	88,9	70,0	64,5	1,9	3,8	3,6
Asylum/refugees	1,3	7,2	1,9		4,6	1,4
Other	4,8	5,1	6,6	1,8	4,6	4,0
N	150	390	422	136	346	420
Worked before migrating?						
Yes, worked	74,5	17,0	66,8	15,9	7,8	13,4
No	25,5	83,0	33,2	84,1	92,2	86,6
N	142	312	358	129	295	381
Country of current residence						
Survey country	99,2	97,1	93,1	99,2	97,4	96,0
Another country	0,8	2,9	6,9	0,8	2,6	4,0
N	477	484	394	489	495	404

Table 10 - Turkish parents' age and migrant generation, % column

	France		Germany		The Netherlands	
Age	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
34-44 years old	11,8	36,9	5,6	12,6	9,7	18,5
45-54 years old	47,0	41,2	30,9	48,6	38,3	48,5
55-64 years old	34,7	19,9	47,3	36,6	32,3	26,7
65 or more years old	6,4	2,0	16,2	2,3	19,7	6,3
N	498	493	482	484	371	363
mean age	52,93	48,28	56,54	51,96	55,44	51,56

Generation in relation to migration

Born in survey country		2,8	1,2	6,4	1,1	3,2
Migrate before 15 years old	2,6	3,0	13,5	13,9	8,4	10,3
Adult migration	97,2	94,1	85,3	79,7	90,4	86,6
N	498	495	497	503	434	439

Source: TIES, INED 2010

Table 11– Non-Turkish parents' age, , % column

Age	France		Germany		The Netherlands	
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
34-44 years old	1,0	2,5	7,1	12,7	0,4	1,5
45-54 years old	34,3	41,9	35,3	47,4	23,7	34,7
55-64 years old	50,3	46,5	47,1	35,7	59,9	55,1
65 or more years old	14,5	9,2	10,5	4,2	16,0	8,7
N	272	263	493	498	469	472
<i>mean age</i>	<i>57,70</i>	<i>55,52</i>	<i>55,34</i>	<i>52,70</i>	<i>59,06</i>	<i>56,87</i>

Si

3.3.1. Regions, provinces and urban origins

Turkish parents in TIES survey came from very different regions and provinces in Turkey (see Figures 3 and 4). TIES data confirms indeed some concentration from Anatolia regions for Turkish parents in all countries, particularly Central Anatolia in Strasbourg, or Central and Eastern Anatolia in Paris, Berlin and Frankfurt, while, different, some from Black Sea in the Netherlands. About one-quarter of parents in France were original from Western Turkey, particularly the Aegean Sea and some specific provinces (Izmir, but also from Afyon and Denizli, or still for Aydin for mothers, see Figures 3 and 4). Still, almost one fifth of parents living in Paris were from Tunceli in Eastern Anatolia (see Figures 3 and 4, particularly for the mothers), while in Strasbourg 45% were from Central Anatolia (and mainly from three provinces, Kayseri, Konya or Sivas), and almost one fifth came from Black sea (with no particular provinces of origin). Turkish parents in Germany showed even lower concentration in terms of provinces of origin, though many came from the different Anatolian regions (at least 60% in Berlin, 45% in Frankfurt, see Figure 3) — and especially from Central and Eastern Anatolia for those in Berlin. As expected, considerable number of parents came from more urbanized provinces, such as Ankara in Central Anatolia (>25%) and Istanbul in Western Turkey (>55%, see Figure 4). In the Netherlands, the Black sea was the region for more than one third of Turkish parents (from three main provinces, Samsun and Kastamonu, and from Giresun for the fathers, see Figure 4). Otherwise, more than one third were from different Anatolian regions (mainly from Hakkari for >40% of those from Eastern Anatolia), and around one-quarter from Western Turkey (Aegean and Marmara seas, three-quarters from Istanbul, see Figure 3).

And accordingly to the Turkish *Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü* (DIE) on regional development index from 1973, and IIBK classification of provinces in 1974,²²³ the main provinces of Turkish parents in the TIES survey showed no homogenous development trends by regions of origin. In detail, the main provinces of origin of Turkish parents in France confirmed the evolution of this immigration phenomenon. Many in France were from Turkish provinces in developing stage (ex. Aegean sea — Afyon, Denizli Aydın; Central Anatolia — Kayseri, Konya); while no negligible number of Turkish parents in France were original from the most *developed* provinces (particularly İzmir), or, inversely, from the most *underdeveloped* provinces of Eastern Anatolia (Tunceli) or Central Anatolia (Sivas). Similarly, in the Netherlands, Turkish parents were either from *developing* provinces in the Black Sea (Samsun and Kastamonu) or *underdevelopment* provinces in Black sea and Eastern Anatolia (Giresun or Hakkari), while only those from Western Marmara were original from the most *developed* areas (İstanbul). In Germany, the concentration of provinces of origin shows the indications of previous literatures – Turkish parents were mainly original from more *developed* or *in developing* areas in Turkey (such as Ankara, confirming that the most significant recruitment occurred outside IIBK offices).

²²³ DIE index includes 12 indicators, see appendix IV, pp.219 and 221, in Akgündüz 2008.

Figure 3 - Turkish parents' regions of origin





Figure 4 – Turkish parents' provinces of origin (% in relation to total in the region)



Finally, as observed in Figure 5, Turkish parents were mainly of rural origins ($\Rightarrow$ 70% from villages or middle size towns), while less than 30% of Turkish parents were from large cities. Inversely, parents of non-Turkish origins were mainly from urban areas, and particularly from those where their children are currently living (for more than 50% in Berlin and Rotterdam; between 40% and 50% in Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam; and less than 40% in Strasbourg, see Figure 6). Otherwise, non-Turkish parents came from middle size urban settlements, and only in Strasbourg and Amsterdam about 30% of parents' were of rural origins.

Figure 5 – Turkish parents' urban origins





Figure 6 – Non-Turkish parents' urban origins



3.3.2. Citizenship regimes: Turkey, France, Germany and the Netherlands

The large majority of Turkish parents were currently living in the immigration country at the time of the survey (more than 93%, see Table 1), with a length of residence that varied between 12 years to a maximum of 63 years. This meant that all parents had achieved residential periods long enough to fulfill the current conditions for naturalization accordingly to each country citizenship regime. However, the evolution of the different citizenship regimes influenced Turkish immigrants' propensity to naturalize, and within it the access to dual citizenship has also played a major role. In addition, very recently new legislation restrictions have tightened naturalization rights, particular in the Netherlands and Germany, but also in France (see chapter 2). Nevertheless, in a quick view, the naturalization rate of individuals of Turkish origins born abroad (in exclusive or dual terms) has been much more widespread in the Netherlands compared to France, while in Germany their naturalization

rates turned to be quite important only since 2000, including dual citizenship. To understand this, a brief overview on the evolution of the three citizenship regimes, complemented with the Turkish regime, is necessary to understand current indicators and TIES data. Turkish nationality law played its major role influencing Turkish immigrants' resistance to naturalization. Under the Turkish law, children born abroad Turkey from at least one Turkish parent have always been automatically granted Turkish citizenship, previewed through *jus sanguinis* principle, in the condition that the child is declared in the Turkish consulate before turning 18 years old. However, dual citizenship was not tolerated by Turkish law until 1981.²²⁴ But with the Ankara agreement in 1963 and the waiting process of Turkish entry from the UE,²²⁵ Turkish administration opted for dual citizenship openness, so to allow its citizens living in European Union to circulate freely in the Schengen Space (de Tapia, 2007). However, only from the 1990s, immigrants of Turkish origin living in Europe started to acquire the host countries nationality, due to immigration country previous restrictions.

In Germany, the right to naturalization and nationality has, before 2000, been rarely given, even for those born in Germany of foreign parents and grandparents. With the new act from 2000,²²⁶ foreign-born are entitled to discretionary naturalization after fifteen years of residence; children who grown up in Germany need a minimum of eight years of residence (or six years attendance at German schools); in addition, there is (the need to prove no criminal record, to guarantee income) and there were high administrative fees until the mid-1980s, (about five thousand DM). Only exceptionally dual citizenship has been allowed. All these conditions contrast with the facilities for immigrants of German ethnic origins (see chapter 2). Thus, it is with no surprise that Germany has presented one of the lowest rate of naturalizations among foreigners, although more common among younger individuals, while older Turkish migrants, and those coming to Germany long before, have shown little intention to naturalise. Numbers indicate that around 1% naturalized between 1974 and beginning of the 1990s.²²⁷ Still in 1994, only one in two Turks was interested in acquiring German

²²⁴ From the Turkish Nationality Act (TVK), in force between 1964-1980, dual or multiple citizenship status was not possible, but since the 1981 Amendment dual citizenship has been encouraged (Tiryakioglu, 2006).

²²⁵ Ankara agreement refers to the Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Community signed in 1963. Within time, EU denied Turkey's application to the EU in 1987, and did not include Turkey among the followed accession candidates in December 1997, rather later in Helsinki in 1999 (in Faist, Thomas (2004), *Op. Cit.*).

²²⁶ In January 2000, a reformed citizenship law introduced by the coalition of Social Democrats and Greens took effect in Germany, allowing children of immigrants living in Germany to be granted by birth both German and citizenship and that of their parents' country of birth until the age of 23, when they had to choose between one or other. Other children's entitlement to citizenship depends, though, on parents' minimal staying of 8 years and possession of unlimited permission of stay; Immigrants themselves need to wait for 8 years of living in Germany, but cannot be welfare recipients. The majority of labour migrants are entitled to German citizenship, in Diehl and Blohm (2003), pp141-142

²²⁷ Fees diminished to 100 DM in 1993, see Table 6, in Munz and Ulrich (1998), pp.48-49

citizenship (like for other foreigners), registering about 20% of naturalization processes.²²⁸ This trend was confirmed in GSOEP data (1998, Diehl and Blohm, 2003: 133-161), showing that the large majority of those eligible for naturalisation showed no intention to do so, and only more recently the naturalisation rates for those of Turkish origins increased, or had intentions to do so. However, multiple citizenship, perceived as an exception in Germany has been more common than expected in 1983 this was the case for 68% of Turkish population with a German citizenship, although still reflection low naturalisation rates (Munz and Ulrich, 1998:50). And although the new law in 2000 did not motivate higher naturalization rates, due to its restrictions the population of Turkish origin displayed the highest rate of naturalization by then.²²⁹ Otherwise, foreigners in Germany cannot vote or be elected at any level, do not access to some public official professions, or can't even travel for more than six months without losing their rights in Germany, unless they are retired.

In contrast to Germany, in the Netherlands the conditions for naturalization were gradually eased during the 1980s, particularly for children of immigrants born in the Netherlands. In 1985, older citizenship law from 1892 was substituted (Ersalini, 2007), so to facilitate the access to descendants of immigrants born in the Netherlands — able to opt for Dutch citizenship between 18 and 25 years old; for those born in the Netherlands of parents born in the Netherlands but foreigners (the so-called third generation), access to Dutch citizenship became automatic; for foreign-born Dutch citizenship became possible after five years of residence, or three if married to a Dutch citizen. In general, further criteria imply no conviction and minimal Dutch language skills. Otherwise, since 1985 foreigners can be civil servants (except army and police) and vote or be elected in local elections. A second key change occurred in 1992, when the government introduced the possibility of dual citizenship. Naturalization rates increased particularly Turkish population naturalization between 1993 until 1996. However, when the renouncement of prior citizenship was reinstated in 1997, these rates suffered an important decline (Entzinger, 2002:59-86). And when citizenship law became more strict again in 2003 (with the introduction of integration tests with more rigid criteria on Dutch culture and language), there were further decline in the naturalization rates. Nevertheless, dual citizenship has been often granted, and already in 2006, one million Dutch citizens had dual citizenship (Ersalini, 2007). Among those of Turkish background, 72,5% had double citizenship, while 27% were foreigners.

²²⁸ According to MARPLAN survey, in Munz and Ulrich (1998), pp49-50.

²²⁹ See Figure I in Diehl and Blohm (2003), pp135, 141-142

In France, citizenship has been historically defined in political rather than ethno-cultural terms since its revolution. The Decree of 26th August of 1792 expressly invited foreigners and "*friends of liberty*" to join the French state, in a combination of *jus sanguinis* with *jus solis* principles. Since 1851 French citizenship was granted to grandchildren of immigrants, and almost 40 years later, in 1889, became automatic for children of immigrants (de Tapia, 2007). France became officially a country of immigration, (Weil, 1999) where children of migrants would not be foreigners (Weil, 1999). About one century later, between 1993 and 1998, there was one interruption of this integration philosophy (Law Méhaignerie/Pasqua n°93-933), when children of immigrants could only obtain French citizenship by declaration (meaning to choose a nationality through a clear expression of will, between the ages of 16 and 21, and requiring five years of residence and non-convictions registers). (Ribert, 1998) This was soon reversed in 1998, when a new amendment re-established that individuals born in France of non French parents can automatically acquire the French citizenship at the age of 18 unless they refuse, and even earlier if their parents naturalise, or through a declaration of will between 13 and 16 years old.²³⁰ For all procedures, the legislation always allowed dual citizenship (except if there are special bilateral agreements), not making any further distinction between binational and other French citizens. Consequently, since the 1950s the large majority of immigrants and their families arriving in France become French either by naturalization, marriage or birth (Borrel and Simon, 2005), and children born in France from foreigner parents have been automatically granted citizenship when they turn 18, with a refusal rate of 7 to 8 % (Simon, 2003).

However, relatively small numbers of Turkish immigrants have applied for French citizenship, (Tapia, 2007) being those who least obtain the French nationality, together with the Algerian and followed by the Portuguese (ex between 1990 and 1995, only 10 thousands applied for French citizenship).²³¹ Previous MGIS national survey (1996) confirmed lower naturalization rates among the Turkish immigrants, with very residual dual citizenship (<3%), though


²³⁰Children born in France of foreigner parents will acquire the French citizenship in two ways: 1) Automatic acquisition - *jus solis* after birth: for those children born in France from foreigner parents, they become automatically French at the majority age if they have lived / are living in France since their 11 years old and for at least 5 years (continuously or not). These children can refuse their French citizenship 6 months before it is automatically granted, or 12 months after. 2) Acquisition by declaration - *jus solis* after birth for those children born in France that have lived / are living in France since their 11 years old and for at least 5 years (continuously or not), that aim to anticipate their French citizenship acquisition before majority age, can do it by their own will when completing 16 years old, or through the parents' requirement and the children personal consent when completing 13 years old (article 21-11, code civil). Main laws documents: Articles 17 to 33-2 in the civil code and by the decree n° 93-1362 of 30th December 1993 (J.O. of 31-12-1993, Law n°93-933 (loi Méhaignerie), modified by the article R.321-30-1 in the *code de l'organisation judiciaire* (JO of 17-03-1998, Law 9/98 (loi Gigou) and JO of 27-11-2003) and by the law n° 2006-311 of 24th July 2006.

²³¹ SOPEMI, 1996; OCDE, 1997, in Elmas, 1998.

naturalization increased to 15% for those arrived single after age 15. The EHF national survey (1999) confirmed some intergenerational change: while 89% immigrants of Turkish origin were foreigners, this proportion dropped to 79,1% for children arriving in France, decreasing radically to not more than 16% for those born in France. Similarly, for the 1999 Census, only 15% of Turkish immigrants had French citizenship, compared to more than the double for the total immigrants. More recently INSEE data from 2006, the numbers for Turkish immigrants with French citizenship increased to 27%, but still lower compared to the general average of 40% (Selimanovski, 1992; Simon, 2003; NSEE, 2006; de Tapia, 2007). Recent national survey (TeO, Simon, 2010) indicated that for those of Turkish origins, naturalization was about 30-32% (for both women and men), while dual citizenship among those who acquired the French citizenship almost 60%. In general, there have been no significant gender differences, independently from migrant generation.

TIES data confirmed expected trends for Turkish parents' citizenship status (see Figure 7). Indeed, those who least naturalized were Turkish parents in France, who in fact arrived later and were younger, but, on the other hand, immigrated to the country where naturalisation has been more open for a longer time, including for dual citizenship possibilities, and where foreigners have limited rights. Nevertheless, this confirms previous findings on low naturalisation rates among Turkish immigrants in France, and common dual citizenship status for those who naturalise. Inversely, the Netherlands, being the country where foreigners have had more rights, was, however, where Turkish parents naturalised the most, and many through dual citizenship, as indicated by previous findings. In Germany, where there have been more restrictions in access to naturalization, there has been also more motivation to naturalise knowing the limited rights that foreigners dispose in Germany. Indeed, the naturalization rates of Turkish parents in Germany fell between France and the Netherlands, while showing the lowest proportion of dual citizenship. Thus, among those naturalised, dual citizenship was considerably more important in France, followed by the Netherlands and the least in Germany (due to the latter restrictions to multiple citizenship).

Figure 7 – Turkish parents' citizenship status



3.4. Parental socio-economic position in migration country: gender and origin differences

3.4.1. Parents' highest educational attainment

In Western European countries, individuals of immigrant background have shown systematic disadvantaged socio-economic positions in relation to those of non-immigrant background. This is often observed in their occupational skills (higher proportions of manual workers, skilled, semi-skilled or even unskilled), or in their employment status (higher proportions of unemployed or non-working individuals). These disadvantages labour market situations are partially due to processes prior to entry into the labour market (school attainment or previous working experiences in the country of origin, and recruitment forms) but also to the labour market restructuration experiences in Europe from the middle 1970s.

The large majority of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe, who arrived between the 1960s and 1970s had maximum primary education or were just literate (varying between 64% up to 87%).²³² The proportion of those with higher secondary or more varied between 2% and 22% (mostly with upper secondary vocational diploma, while less than 1% had tertiary education), though the illiteracy rate was inferior to 10% (much smaller than the one in Turkey by the same period — 44% in 1970 Turkish census). Thus, Turkish immigrants arriving as guest workers through official channels had, on average, low educational attainments (basic schooling) in relation to their emigration context, but an average over the mean in relation to Turkey society. With the diversification of the immigration flows, their educational level differed even more accordingly to the age, reasons for migrating, place of birth or region of origin (ex: refugees vs. guest-workers, migration at an early age vs. during adulthood, born in migration country vs. in Turkey), with more significant analphabetism among immigrant women, for those of rural origins or arriving after 15 years old.

In Germany, the large majority of Turkish immigrant males showed primary or none education (at least 60%), followed by those with lower secondary education (33%), while for Turkish immigrant women the lowest educational level was even more evident (81% with primary education or less, 16% with lower secondary education).²³³ In the Netherlands, data from the 1980s and 1990s showed that Turkish immigrants persisted amongst the lowest educated groups, particularly for Turkish immigrant women. Compared to Dutch native males, Turkish immigrant males were more than the double having only primary education (23% compared to 67%). In contrast, Dutch native males were considerably more disposing of lower or upper secondary education (one-quarter and one third), while for Turkish immigrants males this was considerably less (<one fifth attained lower secondary, 12% for higher secondary). Finally, Dutch natives were almost nine times more among those with tertiary education compared to Turkish immigrants. When comparing Turkish women to Dutch native females, the first were almost four times more with primary education attainment or less (25% and 81%), while fewer Turkish immigrant women showed tertiary education level (<one-tenth).²³⁴ In France, Turkish immigrants' low educational attainment was also confirmed

²³² Akgündüz 2008, Table VI.7:181

²³³ in Table 7:2A and Table 7.2.B German Mikrocensuses (MZ), from 1993 and 1996 pooled datasets, in Kalter and a Granato (2007), 271-31. see also in DJI youth survey 1997, in Nauck (2007), pp.46

²³⁴ In analysis comparing SPVA data from 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, in Tesser and Dronkers (2007), pp.359-401

through different studies,²³⁵ and also more recently (TeO, 2010). Again, particularly Turkish immigrant women were three times more present among those without diploma or with lower secondary compared to French citizens with no immigrant background (between 21% and 36%, compared to 8 to 10%, respectively). Inversely, they were three times less present among those with tertiary education (10% compared to at least 32%), while at upper secondary levels, only Turkish immigrant females were twice less present (12%, compared to around one fifth for the others).

In the TIES survey, parents' educational attainment was one of the main indicators for country and family background differences (see Figures 8 and 9, significantly correlated for all countries and cities).²³⁶ As expected, Turkish parents' most common educational attainment was primary education or less, but within an important variation (40-75%, even more evident for the mothers — 50-80%). Gender gaps were, at all levels of education, more evident in Germany and the least in France. For instance, in Germany Turkish mothers were twice more with no schooling than fathers (50% and 24%, respectively), while fathers were almost twice more in having primary education (between 20-30% for mothers, 40-50% for fathers). It was in Paris and Rotterdam where Turkish fathers were the most educated (around 30% with higher secondary or more), followed by those in Amsterdam and Strasbourg (around 20%), while the least in both German cities (15%). Similarly, Turkish mothers were more educated in Paris (25%) compared to Turkish mothers in all the other cities ($\leq 10\%$). Moreover, with no surprise, Turkish parents migrating during adulthood showed lower educational attainment (no schooling or primary school, 85-95%) than those arriving at younger ages or born in the survey countries (around 10%, see Figure 10, mainly in Germany).

The picture changes radically for non-Turkish parents – 40-85% had higher secondary or more (see Figure 9). Non-Turkish parents showed higher educational levels in France (80-90% had higher secondary attainment or more, 60-80% for the others), more common in Strasbourg than in Paris (90% compared to 80%). Gender gaps between non-Turkish parents were mainly important in Germany and the Netherlands, where mothers were significantly

²³⁵ Kastoryano, 1986; GERIM, 1989, in Levallois, 1992; Tribalat, Simon and Riandey (1996), using MGIS national survey (1996.); Simon, 2003; Irtis-Dabbagh, 2003; Tebbakh, 2007, using 1999 INSEE data.

²³⁶ For Turkish parents, Rho de Spearman, for chi-square of 0,01), but while these relations have a significant strength particularly in Rotterdam (0.59), Paris (0.58), Strasbourg (0.47) and Frankfurt (0.44), they are clearly less significant in Amsterdam (0.37) and Berlin (0.34). For non-Turkish parents, Rho de Spearman, for chi-square of 0,01), particularly in Paris (0.67), Rotterdam (0.55), Strasbourg and Amsterdam (0.47), while clearly less significant in Germany, in Frankfurt (0.37) and Berlin (0.28).

less educated than fathers (mothers were more than twice showing lower secondary attainment compared to father: 57% and 25%, respectively). Finally, and for all countries and cities, Turkish parents coming from more urban origins in Turkey had higher educational attainment, and likely for non-Turkish parents in France. Inversely, in Germany and the Netherlands, the less urbanized the parents' origins are, the higher the proportion of parents who are higher educated.

Figure 8– Turkish parents' educational attainment




Figure 9– Non-Turkish parents’ educational attainment





Figure 10 - Turkish parents' educational attainment by migrant generation



3.4.2. Situation in the labour market and professional– past and present

Among Turkish workers sent by IIBK (around eight hundred thousand), almost one third were skilled workers, which was considerably higher than the Turkish population by then.²³⁷ For those arriving in Germany, the proportion of skilled manual workers varied between 22% and 44%, though reaching about 76% in 1975. In France, skilled workers represented 50% in 1969, decreasing immediately to 16% in 1970, and increasing again to 30% or more between 1973 and 1974. In the Netherlands there were even more important variations, from 14% in 1963; increasing immediately to 23% in 1964, varying enormously until 1974, between 36% and 92%. In addition, outside formal channels, unskilled workers were more present in the any of the countries.

²³⁷ Akgündüz, 2008, Table V.8:184.

Independently from these variations registered in the official bureaus in Turkey, the arrival of Turkish migrants in the European labour market, as well as of immigrants in general, happened in chorus with the industrial restructuration that started in the 1970s. And as the economic restructuration affected mainly guest workers who had, in general, low qualified jobs and lower educational levels, compared to the native population, they were, thus, less prepared for professional renewal, experiencing a mass foreign unemployment from the early 1980s on. Particularly male immigrant unemployment became very significant compared with the native population, while immigrant women started to enter in the labour market with their arrival. There was a subsequent growing gap between the socio-economic condition of the general population and those of migrant origins, which became structural. (Simon, 2003; Alexander, 2006; Meurs et al, 2006)

Indeed, from 1964 onwards, more than half of the foreign workers were recruited to the two most important sectors: iron and metal production and processing. Since 1965 onwards, more than 60% of Turkish workers were employed in these sectors as skilled jobs, representing more than one-quarter of the sector hand labour representing from more than one third in the 1970s (Akgündüz 2008.) The share of women was relatively low: 13% in 1964, 24% in 1973, from which more than 90% recruited for semi-skilled or unskilled works, concentrated in manufacturing but not requiring a formal qualification (74% of Turkish women, compared to 34% for German women, Erdem; Mattes, 2002).

With the halt of immigration in 1973, and German economy moving to service jobs requiring more formal professional qualifications (from 1970s to 1980s, and 1990s), the labour market refrained the demands for unskilled work. (Erdem; Mattes, 2002) Consequently, foreigners' integration in the labour market changed significantly. If in the early 1970s, two thirds of all foreigners worked in manufacturing and construction, over the period 1974-94 they were no more than half, as their workplaces have disproportionally disappeared or been moving to low-wages countries, thus, foreigners in Germany switched to services or were more quickly led to unemployment (Munz and Ulrich, 1998:47). For instance, Turkish women employment rate decreased by 20% within two years - from 62% in 1973 to 42% in 1975, Erdem and Mattes, 2002). And although continuing to decline during the 1980s, since 1988, the majority of Turkish women were employed at service jobs (65%), more similar to German women (78%, Erdem and Mattes, 2002). However, high inactivity rates among Turkish women were further explained by legal constraints that resulted from the immigration halt. Though they

were allowed to enter Germany, many could not obtain working permits, which promoted their economic inactivity in the 1980s and the 1990s.²³⁸

Consequently, foreigners continued to show significant differences compared to Germans: if about half of foreign workers were in unskilled or semi-skilled positions in 1992, they were only 16% for their German counterparts (Munz and Ulrich, 1998:47). During the 1990s, Turkish immigrant men unemployed were 19% (22% for women), while for those working, more than half were in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs (58%, 64% for women), while significantly less were skilled manual worker (17%, 4% for women), petty bourgeoisie (4%, 3% for women), routine non manual (1%, 4% for women) or salariat (3% for both genders).²³⁹

In The Netherlands, and according to Dutch statistics, Turkish workers have shown also a concentration in “factories and workshops”. Indeed, Dutch recruitment bureau in Ankara indicated that about 40% were recruited to the metal industry, about 15% for textile, between 11% and 12% for food and catering, or leather, rubber and paper, or still, construction (Akgündüz 2008). However, as in most other western countries, in the second-half of the XX century the Dutch economy was transformed from an industrial to a post-industrial economy (Tesser and Dronkers, 2007), although service sector was, in 1965, nearly large as the industrial one. The economic crisis that followed in the 1980s meant the end of labour intensive forms for industrial production, giving, as in Germany, space for the service dominated economy. Lower educated immigrants, employed at low-level industrial jobs, changed their labour market position drastically. Lacking the qualifications demanded in the rapidly expanding service sectors, only a small part of the new sectors (such as cleaning services) absorbed this handlabour, resulting in a three-fold increase of unemployed rates among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants (Tesser and Dronkers, 2007). For 2006 data from CBS, they showed lower market participation (less than 45%, compare to more than 65% for autochtoon Dutch) as well as high unemployment numbers (15% for Turks in 2006, 4,3% for autochtoon Dutch, Ersalini, 2007).

²³⁸ However, during the midst of the economic recovery period, and work permit policy changed for those who had entered before 1977 become eligible for working permits. In 1979, at the height of the boom, the policy was replaced with a three year waiting period for newly arrived migrants, recovering employment rate that declined again with the second oil shock in 1979. Nevertheless, in 1985 about 43% of Turkish women were unemployed, from whom 60% had more than 5 years of previous working experience. In Erdem and Mattes (2002)

²³⁹ in Table 7:3A and Table 7.3.B, 7.4.a. and 7.4.b. German Mikrocensuses (MZ), from 1993 and 1996 pooled datasets, in Kalter and Granato (2007)

In addition, in the Netherlands female inactivity has been more important than male inactivity, independently from their migrant or non-migrant origins. However, it has been even higher for immigrant women, particularly for Turkish women (69%), compared to native Dutch women (45%) or still to Turkish immigrant males (22%) or native Dutch autochtoon males (16%).²⁴⁰ For all those active in the labour market, unemployment is clear more common for Turkish immigrants (32% Turkish immigrant males, and 24% for females), more than the double compared to autochtoon Dutch (males 8%, females 15%). Likely, Turkish immigrants have been more present among unskilled or semi-skilled workers (41% for men, 47% for women, compared to less than 20% for autochtoon Dutch), while being considerably less present among highly qualified professionals (5% both females and first immigrant males, compared to more than 30% for autochtoon Dutch), or even white-collar workers (4% immigrant males and 11% first immigrant females, compared to 16% for autochtoon Dutch males and about 40% for autochtoon Dutch females).²⁴¹

In France, male immigrant unemployment increased significantly since the industrial restructuration: from 1975 to 1982, if 6,9% of French citizens lost their jobs at the textile and construction industries, numbers increased to up 24,3% for foreigners. (Merckling, 1998) Since then, Turkish immigrants had experience significant unemployment rates, and particularly women have shown more over-exposure to high unemployment and inactivity rates. In 1999 census, around 23% of Turkish immigrant males were unemployed (similar to the Maghrebian and Sub-Saharan African migrants), almost 60% of women arriving as adults (though dropping to 44% for those arriving before age 16).²⁴² More recently, de Tapia (2009, using data from the “Pôle d’Emploi” 2003-2005 on Turkish citizens), indicated that this population showed three times more unemployed than the average population in France, with important gender differences: the male activity rate was 81%, while was 22,8% for the women; male employment rate was 62,5%, while 13,9% for women; male unemployment rate was 22,9% and 49,8% for women. We can further confirm both gender differences in French Census (1999): for those working, their main economic sectors for the men was the construction, commerce and intermediate goods industry, while women were more concentrated in the commerce, followed by the services for business, services for individuals and industries of goods consumers. The large majority of Turkish immigrant men were blue collars workers,

²⁴⁰ SPVA data from 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, in Tesser and Dronkers (2007), pp.359-401

²⁴¹ Dutch data (SPVA data from 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998) in Tesser and Dronkers (2007)

²⁴² in the Census and Labour survey, INSEE, also in Simon, 2003; Meurs et al., 2006.

while women were blue-collars and employee, and about 9% of entrepreneurship of the total (mainly men).²⁴³ Recent national survey (TeO, 2010) indicated that 30% of Turkish immigrant workers were semi- or skilled manual workers, 33% skilled manual workers, 2% were white collars, while 4% were executives of professionals, compared to 15%, 28%, 11% and 25% for the majority population.

Regional particularities on the economic settlement of this population in France indicated an interplay between urban areas and economic landscape. For instance, while male activity rate is slightly higher in other regions of France than Île-de-France (with a maximum difference of 7%), this is the opposite for the female migrants, for whom the activity rate in the latter region can be 13% higher compared to the other regions (Census 1999). For instance, in Paris, Turkish migrants have been more concentrated in the textile and clothing industry, construction, restaurants, and car industry, often combined with the recruitment through the kinship or region of origin networks (in the car industries in the suburbs) or just national origins (in the cloth industry in centre of Paris). (Kastoryano, 1986; Tapia, 2007; Chevallier, 2009) For the Alsatian region, different research showed that the settlement of this population follows the spatial distribution of the local industries, with high employment rate for low skilled labour during the 1970s.²⁴⁴ These were mainly construction and industry sectors (as materials for construction, metallurgy, automobile, textile, wood), sometimes combined with jobs in the seasonal agricultural sector. (Selimanovski, 1992; Levallois, 1992). Especially small industries practiced direct recruitment of Turkish workers from rural areas, resulting in significant direct chains from certain regions of origin, more like in Parisian suburbs. Since the industrial restructuring, Turkish immigrants in have shown a decreasing activity rate, (Brabant, 1992) where age and the duration of settlement has not been a surplus. In Strasbourg has played the role of the French metropolis inserted in the Rhin axe of job opportunities (together with Zurich, Basel, Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Frankfurt, Cologne and Amsterdam, Selimanovski, 1992) though its unemployment rate among Turkish immigrants has been higher than elsewhere else in Alsace during the 1990s (30%), as the city hosts Turkish migrants unemployed from the spread Alsatian industries (Brabant, 1992).

²⁴³ Census and Labour survey 1999, see also Simon, 2003, confirmed also by Mikol and Tavan (2006, based on 2006 INSEE) who indicated slightly more cases of self-employed individuals (about 12%) in Tebbakh, 2007.

²⁴⁴ GERIM research (1989) shows that 83% were blue collars (from which 40% unskilled and 45% skilled), and their first job in France was construction for 42%, 3,5% in agricultural, 15% in services (Brabant, 1992).

When the respondents were 15 years old and at the time of the TIES survey, parents' insertion in the labour market indicated important gender gaps for all countries, clearly more pronounced for Turkish parents. Differences between groups were significant and of origin slightly decrease with a general increase of the unemployment.

In the past — parents' employment status when respondents were 15 years old

When the respondents were 15 years old, the large majority of fathers of Turkish and non-Turkish origins were active in the labour market (>90%, see Figures 11 and 12). Only in the Netherlands one fifth of Turkish fathers were retired, while very few for all other fathers in all cities and countries. The proportion of mothers working was smaller compared to fathers' (from all origins and in all countries), but gender gaps were more important for the Turkish parents. Between 60% - 70% of mothers of non-Turkish origins were working (showing a gender difference of less than one third for all countries), while the picture changes significantly when referring to the mothers of Turkish origin — 43% were working in France, 27% in the Netherlands and 22% in Germany. Thus, Turkish fathers were twice more working than Turkish mothers in France, three times more in the Netherlands and four times more in Germany. Only in France and Germany we find some city difference — mothers in Paris and Frankfurt were more working, while in Strasbourg and Berlin were more non-working. Not more than 10% of fathers were unemployed, with three times more unemployment for those of Turkish origin, but no cases in France. Non active mothers were mainly staying at home: at least 54% for those of Turkish origins (and almost 80% if living in Germany), decreasing significantly to 27% for those of survey country origins (though less in France). Very few mothers were unemployed: less than 7% for those of Turkish origin and less than 2% for those of survey country origins (fewer mothers were retired).

At the time of the survey — parents' employment status

More recent parents' employment status (in the moment of the survey, see Figures 13 and 14) indicated a decreasing participation rate for all fathers in all countries (of at least one fifth). Being mainly for retirement reasons, there were though an increasing proportion of unemployment situations, more pronounced for the Turkish fathers. This was, though, less important in Germany (about one fifth, even lower for German fathers), more important in France (about one third for both fathers), and clearly evident in The Netherlands (two-fifths for Turkish fathers, or about one fifth for Dutch fathers). Thus, the proportion of working fathers was higher in Germany (69% Turkish fathers, 75% German fathers), followed by

France (66% and 69%, respectively,) and the lowest in the Netherlands (43% for Turkish fathers, but still 67% for Dutch fathers). The proportion of retired fathers was, again, more similar in France and Germany (23% and 26%, respectively), while increasing significantly to 50% in the Netherlands. Unemployed Figures showed a reverse scenario in relation to the past: numbers soar in France (up to 14% of unemployment rate for Turkish fathers, 2% of French fathers), to more than the double in the Netherlands (up to 16% or 3%, respectively), while slightly decreasing in Germany for the Turkish fathers (down to 7%) but increasing for German fathers (up to 6%).

Mothers' more recent employment status revealed lower levels of labour market participation, always lower for Turkish mothers. The proportion of Turkish mothers working in Germany did not change much (25%), and even decreased substantially in the Netherlands and in France (to 19% in the Netherlands, and 27% in France). Similarly, the proportion of non-Turkish mothers working also decreased, of about one fifth for all countries. Thus, there was an important increasing of unemployment and retirement situations. Unemployment remained the most significant for the Turkish mothers, — 28% for the Turkish mothers in France, 23% in Germany, 33% in the Netherlands; less for French mothers (12%), for German mothers (11%) or Dutch mothers (7%). Retired mothers were significant for the non-Turkish mothers. Inversely, the proportion of non-working mothers also decreased in relation to the past, in France to 55%, in the Netherlands to 51% and in Germany to 59%. Inversely, the proportion of non-working non-Turkish mothers maintained similar proportions for the German mothers (24%), while decreasing in the Netherlands (down to 25%) and significantly in France (down to 10%).

In sum, parents' more recent employment status showed a decreasing number of individuals working, due to retirement or unemployment. These changes are transversal to all origins, although Turkish parents maintained a more unfavorable situation. Secondly, employment status evolution in time was more problematic in France and the Netherlands, but not in Germany: while Turkish parents in France and in the Netherlands saw their unemployment rate gotten worse more recently, this was not the case for Turkish fathers in Germany. Thirdly, although both gender and origins gaps decreased, Turkish mothers remained considerably more fragile in terms of unemployment and number of individuals withdrawing themselves from the labour market during active age

Figure 11 Fathers' situation in the labour market when respondents were 15 years old




Figure 12 – Fathers' current situation in the labour market




Figure 13 - Mothers' situation in the labour market when respondents were 15 years





Figure 14 – Mothers' current situation in the labour market



Parents' employment status by educational attainment

As we can observe below (see Figures 15 to 22), that the highest educated Turkish parents were those more active in the labour market, in the past or at the time of the survey. Similarly, non-working mothers were the lowest educated ones. Different the association between activity rates and higher education is less evident for non-Turkish fathers in France. Inversely retirement and unemployment proportions show different associations with education levels, depending on parents' origins. While unemployment numbers are clearly associated to lower education level if they are non-Turkish parents, it is more transversal in terms of education levels for Turkish parents' in all countries. Not shown here, but for Turkish fathers in Germany who were children of immigrants the level of education decreases for the proportion of those currently working, while increasing the proportion of those unemployed or retired. This is different for the mothers who were children of immigrants: they were higher educated, more active in labour market and less non-working compared to those who arrived in Germany as adults, though no significant differences for unemployed or retired situations.

Otherwise, parents arriving adults, in general disposing mainly of primary education or no schooling, their past and current situation in labour market does not change much with their level of education.

Figure 15 - Employment status when respondents were 15 years old and educational attainment - Turkish fathers




Figure 16 – Current employment status and educational attainment - Turkish fathers




Figure 17 Employment status when respondents were 15 years old and educational attainment – non-Turkish fathers




Figure 18 – Current employment status and educational attainment – non-Turkish fathers




Figure 19– Employment status when respondents were 15 years old and educational attainment - Turkish mothers




Figure 20 – Current employment status and educational attainment - Turkish mothers




Figure 21 – Employment status when respondents were 15 years old and educational attainment – non-Turkish mothers





Figure 22 – Current employment status and educational attainment – non-Turkish mothers



Parents' professional skills in the past

As observed in Figures 23 and 24, the large majority of Turkish fathers worked on skilled manual professions (73% in France, 67% in Germany and 64% in the Netherlands). The second more common professional category was unskilled manual occupations, with similar proportions for each country (around 17% and 18%). Country differences were more related to the more qualified professions (executive, professionals and lower white collars): they were less present in France (10%) than in the other countries (15% in Germany and 18% in the Netherlands). Like school level, the scenario changes for non-Turkish father — their levels of professional qualifications are much higher, particularly in France and the Netherlands and less in Germany. About 60% of non-Turkish fathers in France and the Netherlands were executive, professionals or white collars, while slightly more than one third were skilled manual workers and less than 6% semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers. Only exception was Germany, where the large majority of non-Turkish fathers were, like for Turkish fathers,

skilled manual workers (60%), more than one third performed the most qualified professional occupations (37%), with very few cases of semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers (4%).

Turkish mothers in France, who were the most educated and active in the labour market among the Turkish mothers, showed professional occupations similar to Turkish mothers in Germany, the lowest educated ones and less active in the labour market. This way, about one third of the Turkish mothers worked in semi-skilled or unskilled occupations — 33% in Germany and 37% in France, and up to 45% in the Netherlands; at least half in skilled manual occupations — 61% for Germany and 52% in France, down to one third in the Netherlands; very few in high qualified occupations — not more than one-tenth in France and Germany, though almost one-fourth in the Netherlands. Thus, it is among the few mothers working in the Netherlands where we find the more professional qualified Turkish mothers. In addition, differences between mothers of different origins are more pronounced than gender differences within groups. Thus, the French and Dutch mothers occupied more qualified professions (about 53%), compared to German mothers (one third) who, like German fathers, showed more significant proportions of skilled manual workers (almost 60%, while about 40% for the other mothers). Less than 9% had semi-skilled or unskilled manual occupations, particularly low in France (not even 4%). Thus, compared to non-Turkish mothers, those Turkish origin are four times more working in the lowest qualified professions in Germany, five times more in the Netherlands, increasing to ten times more in France.

Figure 23 – Fathers’ professional occupation when respondents were 15 years old





Figure 24 – Mothers’ professional occupation when respondents were 15 years old



Parents' professional occupation by educational level

For parents in general, the most qualified jobs were performed by the higher educated individuals. But when comparing Turkish parents by countries of residence the proportion of semi-skilled or unskilled jobs was not always similar to the proportion of lower educated parents. More linear association between education level and professional occupation was observed for the Turkish parents in the Netherlands and both French and Dutch parents, while less evident for Turkish parents in France and all parents in Germany. Indeed, in the following Figures 25 and 28, we can see that the majority of Turkish parents were skilled manual workers independently from their educational attainment, while for non-Turkish parents with higher secondary or more, the large majority (>60%) were executive, professionals and white collars, which is not the case for non-Turkish parents with lower educational attainments. Nevertheless, also for Turkish parents, the proportion of more qualified occupations increased with level of education but significantly less than for non-Turkish parents, and even less for Turkish parents in France. Though the latter were the most educated among Turkish parents (and mothers the most active in the labour market) among the most educated parents those in France were the least working in more qualified occupations – only 20%, compared to 25% and 35% for other Turkish fathers, and 40% to 80% for non-Turkish fathers. This means that the transferability of previously acquired competences once on the immigration country seemed to have occurred for some Turkish parents, about slightly less for those in France. Thus Turkish parents' participation in the labour market was associated to their education level, but less reflected in their professional occupation.

Figure 25 - Turkish fathers' occupation by educational attainment




Figure 26 – Non-Turkish fathers' occupation by educational attainment




Figure 27– Turkish mothers' occupation by educational attainment





Figure 28 – Non-Turkish mothers' occupation by educational attainment



3.5. Conclusion: main commonalities and differences between Turkish parents in France, Germany and the Netherlands

Turkish parents in the TIES survey migrated mainly during the last phase of guest workers recruitment (1970 onwards), or after the halt recruitments, and later for the mothers. Accordingly to literature, this was the period of more nominal migration recruitment, i.e., when social networks from certain regions in Turkey were gaining field in Turkish immigration inflows to Europe. Many of these social networks were composed by lower educated individuals from specific rural provinces in Turkey, particularly from less developed provinces (such as those in Anatolian regions), although with the course of time these networks expanded with internal migration in direction to more developed provinces and large cities in Turkey. Thus, in contrast to the official recruitments which brought more skilled Turkish workers to Germany and semi and unskilled workers to France and the Netherlands, the later recruitments (nominal and unofficial basis) brought, instead, more diverse profiles of workers.

The TIES data confirmed that parents were of rural origins, from developing or underdeveloped provinces from Central and Eastern Anatolia, Black sea and Western Turkey, while only some from developed provinces (more in Germany). In addition, there was an expected association of Turkish parents' rural or urban origins and their level of education – those coming from more rural origins tended to show lower educational achievements than those coming from more urban areas. Moreover, Turkish parents in Germany arrived the earliest, were the oldest and the lowest educated in the TIES survey, and had no previous working experiences before migrating. Inversely, Turkish parents in France arrived later, were younger, slightly more educated than those in the Netherlands and significantly more than those in Germany, and had previous professional experiences before migrating. Turkish fathers in the Netherlands felled in between, with more close profiles to those in France.

These differences in terms of destination country were also observed for the mothers. Firstly, Turkish mothers showed similar background as fathers in terms of regions, provinces and rural origins. Secondly, as expected by previous literature, in general mothers migrated later than fathers, mainly for family reasons, had no previous working experiences and were considerably lower educated. Thirdly, while Turkish mothers in Germany arrived the earliest, were the oldest and the least educated, those in France were those arriving latest, were the youngest and the most educated, while those in the Netherlands felled, again, in between.

Thus, it is with no surprise that Turkish mothers' in France showed the highest participation in the labour market compared to the others. However, here one should remember the German restrictions in conceding working permits, which prevented immigrant women's participation in the labour market, or the structural gender differences in the Dutch labour market, where women activity rate was in general considerably lower compared to men. Nevertheless, there was an exception to these different country profiles — Turkish parents who were children of immigrants. These were mainly present in Germany — 20% of Turkish mothers and 14% of Turkish fathers (see Table 10) — who were considerably more educated, although not revealing particularly high activity rates, and more educated than those arriving as adults in Germany, as well as compared to Turkish parents in France and the Netherlands.

However, and in general, the higher the parents' educational level, the more number of cases active in the labour market and in qualified professional occupations. But among the most educated ones, Turkish fathers in France were the least working in qualified occupations. Similarly for the Turkish mothers — the higher educated were more active in the labour market, but for those in France, their educational level was also less reflected in qualified professions compared to the other Turkish mothers. In addition, it is among Turkish parents in France, including those with higher educational attainment, to whom unemployment increased more significantly over the course of time. And when comparing Turkish and non-Turkish parents within countries, Turkish parents' disadvantaged situation in labour market in France becomes more evident. On one hand, Turkish parents in France showed lower gaps for educational attainment and participation in labour market, as well as in terms of gender differences for both indicators, while the Turkish parents in the other countries showed more significant differences when compared to non-Turkish parents. On the other hand, and inversely, in terms of professional qualifications, or more recent unemployment numbers for fathers, Turkish parents in France were not only performing less well in relation to other Turkish parents, but were also showing more significant distance from non-Turkish parents within countries.

To this we should add that, however, that Turkish fathers in France were also those showing the lowest naturalization rate, which had probably some consequences in terms of the professional occupation to some of them. Moreover, their low competences in immigrant country language played also an additional role, as we will confirm later in chapter 5. In sum, compared to Turkish parents in Germany and the Netherlands, those in France brought more

advantageous educational capital from Turkey. And although the transferability of these previously acquired capital led to a significant participation in the labour market (particularly for the mothers), it brought few advantages in terms of professional opportunities when compared to other Turkish parents in Germany and the Netherlands.

Chapter 4

Turkish descendants and transition to adulthood

4.1. Introduction

Youth transition to adulthood is traced by trajectories that cross various domains, such as leaving parental home, family formation, transition between school and labour market, and labour market careers. Corner stones of dynamics of transition to adulthood (de Valk, 2006), these domains need to be understood in terms of social mobility dynamics, and are neither immune to the evolution of context particularities nor family and individuals' characteristics (such as social class origins, ethnicity, immigrant origins and gender). For instance, the increasing age when completing education or the complexity of educational careers at several stages in life, the changes in the labour market structure, or the values and norms in relation to gender roles, marriage, sexuality and childcare — all contribute to the complexity of choices, changing patterns of family formation promoting the delay of first union, or increasing the numbers of those leaving the parental home before living in a couple (references, TIES international).

Of particular interest here is the understanding that contemporaneous societies are, on the one hand, characterized by general trends for social equality policies — namely through the extension and expansion of educational systems. On the other hand, we have also observed additional significant changes on labour market that have, instead, contributed to hinder the upward moving in the previous existent social ladders (such as the loss of jobs typically held by school leavers, more insecure jobs hold in longer periods, or the existence of stigmatization mechanisms when acceding to occupations that lead to social mobility). In terms of structural insertion, this has meant that individuals' trajectories have traced higher complexity paths on their transitions between school and labour market, or within the labour market, sometimes experiencing yo-yo independence/dependence cycles regarding their family of origin resources. Within these processes, some authors have argued that, social inter-generational inheritance was strengthened over the last decades rather than to be reduced. This raises the hypothesis of important social closure processes that generate patterns of simultaneously social and ethnic/immigrant background stratification (Heath and Cheung, 2007). Within this analytic framework, youth with labour immigrant background are believed to be particular disadvantaged.

When referring to Turkish immigrants and their descendants, previous studies showed social practices that have reinforced traditional communitarian networks, especially kinship and *hemserilik* networks,²⁴⁵ and few contacts with others. And as these kinship networks rely on a "debt principle" they have shown larger impact on migratory projects, matrimonial practices, and access to job, housing and investments. Existing literature has given particular focus to traditional and arranged marriages, believed to be key moments to understand each family history and the impact of such networks.²⁴⁶ Nevertheless, this phenomena is neither a "Turkish particularity" nor associated to particular religious affiliations, but more to the relevance of kinship networks themselves, i.e., to indicators of *social homogamy*,²⁴⁷ and different social networks are based on diverse social homogamy criteria. In general, they play an important role in individuals' pathways of transition to adulthood, like for partner choice and the timing of union formation, influencing, further, its interplay with different "social" schedules – such as the completion of school, labour market participation and access to the first stable job. Nevertheless, when studying descendants of immigrants born and raised in Western European societies, the impact of these social networks necessarily lead to the understanding of their interplay with the existing norms and values of society in general, which exert additional influence in individuals' choices and constraints.

Within this framework, the main point of the present chapter is to focus on structural and social integration indicators for descendants of Turkish immigrants in the TIES survey, namely on citizenship access, leaving parental home and partner choices, educational careers and first indicators on labour market. The main indicators are compared to control group outcomes and their parents' generation whenever this was possible, so to understand if there are specificities for descendants of Turkish immigrants.

²⁴⁵The *Hemserilik* networks, that « (...) can be described as networks of solidarity, social and symbolic ties based on communal or regional affinities. » In Faist, Thomas (2004), *Op. Cit.*

²⁴⁶History has shown that this traditional practice has led to important internal and international migration movements among young males in age to marry, tracing back to the Turkish Altaic traditions. It was previously regulated by the law before the abolishment of the *Chari'a* in the Turkish Constitution of 1924 (Kastoryano, 1986; Gökalp, 1996). See also Autant-Dorier, 1998; Fliche, 2006 ; de Tapia, 2007; Akgönül, 2009

²⁴⁷ See discussion in Heran; Bozon in Akgönül, 2009

4.2. Demographics – between gender, birth-cohort and migrant background

4.2.1. Gender and age

For the TIES survey, gender distribution was equilibrated, though varying between 40% and 60% (see Figure 29). In Paris and Berlin there were slightly more men among descendants of Turkish immigrants, in Strasbourg and Frankfurt more women for both groups. These small differences were due to some fieldwork constraints. In contrast, respondents' age distribution indicated different patterns by country of birth and group of origin (see Figures 30 to 32). The most significant age differences were between groups, and particularly between men of different groups of origin in Paris (mean age difference was six years). Inversely, in Germany respondents showed the lowest age difference between groups. In general, descendants of Turkish immigrants were younger (mean age between 21 and 26 years old) compared to control group respondents (mean ages between 25 and 28). This meant that many descendants of Turkish immigrants were at the beginning of their transition to adulthood, which corresponds to a life stage soon enough to conclude if they would be very in contrast to the mainstream population, particularly in France. These age differences between groups were mainly due to Turkish mothers' arrival date in the immigration country and younger ages — the majority of Turkish mothers were younger and arrived after 1975, though arriving earlier and being older in Germany, while arriving later and being younger in France. Thus, respondents in France were the youngest within each group of origin (mean age lower than 24), especially descendants of Turkish immigrants and men living in Paris (mean age was 21, and more than 80% of these respondents were ≤ 24 years old). The oldest were control group respondents, in Germany and in the Netherlands (mean age between 27 and 28), followed by descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany (mean age 26). And only in France women were older than men, though almost non gender differences for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Strasbourg.

Figure 29 – Respondents’ gender, by group of origin and city




Figure 30 – Respondents’ age, by gender, city and origin background




Figure 31 – Respondents' age, by gender, city and origin background





Figure 32 – Respondents' age, by gender, city and origin background



4.2.2. Citizenship – between legislation and family reproduction

Control group respondents were citizens of the survey country, selected for their parents' non-immigrant origins, their own country of birth and citizenship status. Descendants of Turkish immigrants were selected by country of birth and country of residence, varying for their citizenship status accordingly to the combination between their parents' country of origin citizenship legislation (for citizens living abroad), the evolution of their own country of birth legislation, and individuals' practices. As previously seen, neither citizenship legislation or individuals' practices were the same in France, the Netherlands and Germany (chapter 3). When referring to descendants of immigrants, the first countries difference refers to *jus solis* citizenship principles. There has been some back-and-forward in France during the 1990s, more recent changes also in the Netherlands, while recent openness in Germany in the last 12 years compared to its previous forty years of highly restrictive nationality access (see chapter 3). However and even though different *jus solis* approaches, the majority of descendants of immigrants born in these countries are expected to hold each country nationality.

For the access to exclusive or multiple citizenship status we find also significant country differences. In Germany, access to double citizenship status has been particular difficult to obtain accordingly to its legislation, but not rarely granted; different, the legislation in France has been quite open to dual citizenship status, allowed since nineteenth century, and in the Netherlands since 1992, though new restrictions applied since 1997. However, naturalisation rates have been particular low for Turkish immigrants in France, although dual citizenship status is common among those who naturalised, similarly in the Netherlands but with higher naturalisation rates, while lower rates in Germany.

The TIES data indicated the aforementioned country differences, for both the parents' and respondents' generations (see chapter 3 for parents, here Figure 33 below for descendants). In general, the number of those with exclusive survey country citizenship exploded within one generation, particularly in France (at least ten times more compared to parents), but also in Germany (for the double), while slightly less for the Netherlands – Turkish descendants holding survey country nationality were 60 - 75% in France, 45 - 60% in Germany, and around 40-45% in the Netherlands. Inversely, the numbers of those with exclusive Turkish citizenship was considerably reduced over the course of one generation, remaining slightly more important in Germany (10- 20% for the first, < 5% for the others). Those with double citizenship represented about half number of cases with survey country citizenship — quite

common for respondents in the Netherlands (52 - 56%); like for their parents' generation), also important in Germany and France (20- 45%). Still, it is in Frankfurt where respondents showed the highest diversity in terms of citizenship status – descendants of Turkish immigrants here showed the highest proportion of cases holding exclusively Turkish citizenship (20%), the lowest number of respondents holding exclusive survey country citizenship (45%), and about 30% holding dual citizenship. Finally, there were no gender differences, and few age differences (not shown here) — the youngest Turkish descendants in Berlin were more holding exclusively German citizenship in all German sample, and similar for the youngest respondents in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, while no age differences in France.

The Figure 34 analysed respondents' citizenship status in relation to fathers' status (not shown for the mother, but with similar results). In Germany, where legislation evolution and access to nationality has been more difficult, citizenship status reproduction over the course of one generation was the most important. Almost half of descendants of Turkish immigrants holding exclusive German citizenship had a father with similar citizenship status, while for those holding instead a dual status or Turkish citizenship almost none had a father with a German citizenship. Instead, and again, half of respondents with a dual status had a father with similar citizenship, and almost all respondents holding exclusive Turkish citizenship had also a father with the same status. In the Netherlands similar trends could be observed, but differences were less significant, while in France, where legislation has been the most open, citizenship status over the course of generation changed drastically.

Figure 33 – Turkish descendants' citizenship status, by city





Figure 34 – Citizenship mobility – parents' vs. respondents



4.2.3. Family structure – origin and current

This section deals with the size of family of origin, current household composition, partner background and beginning of family formation. So to understand respondents' family patterns, whose leaving parental home and whose leaving in a couple, the TIES data allows to grasp age, gender and origin differences, through a first assessment on social homogamy degree behind those already in union formation (social homogamy here in terms of the educational level and individuals' immigrant origins).

Size of family of origin

To determine the size of families of origin I used the number of siblings, a major factor for socio-economic outcomes of children (Chiswick, 1988, see Figure 35 and 36). Families of origin were larger for Turkish descendant respondents compared to control group – while at least 50% of the first had no less than three siblings, control group respondents were only one fifth with similar number of siblings. Inversely, those with only one sibling were clearly more present among control group respondents (25 - 53%, especially in the Netherlands), while between 5-20% for Turkish descendants. And similarly for those with no siblings — between 32% and 44% for control group respondents, particularly in Germany, while between 1-15% for Turkish descendants and almost non-existent for France and the Netherlands.

Figure 35 – Family of origin – number of siblings – Turkish descendants





Figure 36 – Family of origin – number of siblings – control group



Current household situation

The majority of respondents had left the parental home at the time of the survey (Figures 37 and 38), with the exception of Turkish descendants in France and further variation was observed in relation to individual's age, gender, country of birth and group of origin. A first evidence was that leaving parental home was more common for control group (>70%, higher in the Netherlands — 90%), less for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands (>60%), and particularly few in France (25%). This particularity of Turkish descendants in France was partially explained by their youngest age. Indeed, for all groups and countries, the majority of respondents in the same age range as most Turkish descendants in France (between 18 and 24 years old) were still living with one or two parents – at least 70%, although less for control group in Germany (50%). Likewise, for all groups and countries, the oldest respondents (30 years old or more) showed also similar trends — more than 80% were already living by themselves, even for Turkish descendants in France. Differences between groups and countries were more pronounced for those aged between 25 and 29 years old - while at least half of the Turkish descendants in France and the Netherlands were still living with both parents or one parent, they were less than 30% for Turkish descendants in Germany or even fewer for control group respondents in all three countries (<20%). Finally, there were gender differences (not shown here) for some descendants of

Turkish immigrants –compared to men, women left parental home earlier, would be more living with a partner, while men were either still living with their parents (mainly in France) or in their own household without a partner (more in Germany). Gender and city differences combined (not shown here) were mainly observed in France and for descendants of Turkish immigrants – compared to men and those living in Paris, women in Strasbourg showed significant number of cases living in their own household (50%), mostly with a partner.

Figure 37 – Co-habitation with parents or by oneself – Turkish descendants





Figure 38 – Co-habitation with parents or by oneself – control group



Whose living with a partner and whose not?

Partner is choices in social homogamy dynamics has been the focus of many studies. However, there is a limited knowledge for descendants of immigrants in Europe, as studies usually do not allow distinguishing between first generation and their children (Hamel, Huscheck, Milewski and de Valk, 2012). Union formation was here analysed as the formation of a joint household, without differentiating between conjugal households and non-marital cohabitations (see Figures 39 and 40). For the TIES data, control group respondents were those mostly living with a partner, higher in the Netherlands (64%), while almost half in France and both groups of origin in Germany, or Turkish descendants in the Netherlands. In contrast, and as expected, they were significantly less among Turkish descendants in France (one fifth). And although older respondents were more living with a partner than younger respondents, age differences were more significant in the Netherlands for all groups or for Turkish descendants in France. Once again, gender and city differences were particularly observed for Turkish descendants in France — women were more living with a partner than men, and particularly in Strasbourg compared to Paris.

Figure 39 Proportion of households with partner, by gender, age and city – Turkish descendants





Figure 40 – Proportion of household with partners, by gender, age and city – control group



Social homogamy: whose the partner of whom?

TIES data allows to assess some degree of social homogamy, expected to play an important role in partners' choice. Here, it is determined in terms of individuals' education level and specific migrant origins. Background origins were determined by partners' place of birth, both parents' origins and partner's age entering survey country (before or after 12 years old, see Figures 41 and 42). Partners of mixed origins were very residual for all respondents, meaning that social homogamy in terms of origins was evident for all groups. For the control group respondents, the large majority of partners were original from survey country (90% in France, 80% in the Netherlands, 70% in Germany), while for descendants of Turkish immigrants, partners were mainly of Turkish origins (95% in the Netherlands, 85% in France and 80% in Germany). In addition, in Germany half of descendants of Turkish immigrants who were living with a partner showed additional homogamy indicators with the partner in terms of both sociological and demographic experiences — their partners were, as themselves, children of immigrants, and those born outside Germany had migrated at younger ages (one-quarter immigrated before 12 years old). In contrast, in France and the Netherlands the majority of partners were first generation immigrants (64% and 71%, respectively), and only about one fifth were descendants of immigrants. For control group respondents, when partners were of immigrant background (mainly in Germany, about 30%), half had been immigrant children and another half descendants of immigrants born in Germany (in general from Eastern Europe and mainly of Serbia or ex-Yugoslavian origins).²⁴⁸ In the Netherlands and France, very few partners were of different origins (<15%), and in general not of Turkey origins. For this indicator, there were no significant gender, age and city differences.

²⁴⁸ This does not confirm Nauck (2007) data, indicating that in Germany, while German females marrying foreign males, the first nationality was Turkish, but confirms more German males trend, marrying firstly Polish women, and 5th place Turkish women. In Statistisches Bundesamt 2005, in Nauck, Bernhard (2007), pp.38.

Figure 41 – Partners’ immigrant background – Turkish descendants




Figure 42 – Parents' immigrant background – control group



Assessing social homogamy in terms of educational level implies, firstly, to check where partners obtained their highest diploma (see Figure 43, only for descendants of Turkish immigrants); and secondly, to determine if partners' educational level was similar or divergent from the respondents (see Figure 16, for both groups). Not surprisingly, the majority of Turkish descendants in Germany had partners who obtained their highest school attainment in Germany (for almost 70%), and even for those who were immigrants themselves, because the majority had been immigrant children. In contrast, almost 90% of Turkish immigrant partners in France obtained their higher educational level in Turkey, which is not a surprise as their large majority arrived during adulthood. This question was not made neither to Turkish descendants in the Netherlands nor for control group in the three samples.

For partners' educational level (see Figure 44), a first general observation shows that at least half of the respondents had a partner with the same level of education as themselves, in proportions that defined more country patterns and not related to group of origin differences. Specially descendants of Turkish immigrants and control group in Germany, who showed the lowest educational levels (see section 4.2.3.3, pp.33, in this chapter), the large majority of their partners showed either the same educational levels (between 50% for Turkish descendants and 57% for control group) or were more educated (45% and 30%, respectively), and very few had a lower educated partner (4% and 13%, respectively). In France, where partners were mainly Turkish immigrants patterns of educational homogamy were also observed. Even knowing that respondents in France were the most educated ones (see section 4.2.3.3) many partners had the same educational level as respondents (between 45% for Turkish descendants and 64% for control group) or were even more educated (37% and 23%, respectively), while few were lower educated (19% and 13%, respectively). In the Netherlands, where education level was more average (see section 4.2.3.3) significant number of partners had also the same educational level as respondents (40% and 50% respectively), but more partners' had lower educational level (55% for control group, two-fifths for those of Turkish origins), while very few had more educated partners (less than one-tenth). Thus, in terms of demographic, sociological and school socialization, descendants of Turkish descendants in Germany showed the highest social homogamy for their partner's choices (Turkish origins, migrant generation and educational level), while in France this was more in terms of educational level and Turkish origins and less for migrant generation, and in the Netherlands only in terms of Turkish background.

Figure 43 - Country school where partner obtained the highest educational level – Turkish descendants





Figure 44 – Partners' educational level in relation to respondents'



Family formation: having or not children

In terms of family formation, the majority of respondents showed to have not achieved this stage yet, as most of them had no children (see Figures 45 and 46). However, although descendants of Turkish immigrants were the youngest respondents, and the least in having left parental home and been living with a partner, they were more in having at least one child (almost three times more). For instance, in Germany and the Netherlands, about 30% of Turkish descendants had at least one child, about 23% and 24% for both groups in France, while the least for control group in Germany (16%) and particularly lower for the control group in the Netherlands (9%). Thus, origin differences were the smallest in France and the most important in the Netherlands. Age differences showed the expected outcomes – the oldest were clearly more in having at least one child, a difference that was, like for living parental home, more important in France (more than the double), while the least for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany. Nevertheless, combining gender and city differences we observed, once again, that in France women were more in having at least one child than men, particularly for those of Turkish origins, as well as for those in Strasbourg compared to their counterparts males or those in Paris.

Figure 45 – Have at least one child – Turkish descendants





Figure 46 – Have at least one child – control group



4.2.4. Demographics reveal stronger link to Turkey in the Netherlands and in France while less in Germany

Compared to control group respondents, Turkish descendants were younger, had larger families of origin and were more living with their parents. However, among all respondents who had already left parental home, Turkish descendants were considerably more living with a partner and having already at least one child compared to control group. Group differences were more evident for the oldest respondents, particularly in France and the Netherlands, while gender differences were mainly observed in France and for Turkish descendants living in Strasbourg in relation to Paris. Nevertheless, all respondents living with a partner showed significant social homogamy patterns in terms of partners' background origins.

In general, social contrasts between control group and Turkish descendants were more observed in France, followed by the Netherlands and the least in Germany. For instance, Turkish descendants in France were, in relation to control group in this country, younger, more in living with their parents and original from larger families had immigrant partners, but were closer to control group for their citizenship status, educational level of their partners and in having already children. Turkish descendants in the Netherlands contrast with Dutch origin respondents for their citizenship status (dual citizenship) larger families of origin, having an immigrant partner and already a child, but they were closer for the proportion of those leaving the parental home and educational level of partners. Different, Turkish descendants in Germany contrast less with German origin respondents mainly their different citizenship status (some only Turkish, more dual citizens) and because having already children, otherwise, they showed similar trends referring to their age, size of family of origin, leaving parental home and living with a partner, as well as for social homogamy of partners.

Finally for all Turkish descendants there was a chance that Turkish social networks played a role for their partner choices (and probably for family formation), though not similar for each country. Observed differences between descendants of Turkish immigrants in different countries raised the hypotheses of three different patterns: descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany showed the highest social homogamy patterns – in terms of background origins, immigration cohort, school socialization and educational level, while this was more partially for those in France (not for migrant generation neither school socialization, but for educational level and Turkish origins), and clearly lower for those in the Netherlands. (more centred on Turkish origins, and less commonalities of generation and educational levels). Thus, in Germany, where Turkish descendants naturalisation rates were slightly lower compared to the other countries, but families of origin smaller, respondents' partner choices were more contextualised in Germany, i.e., with partners who shared similar socialisation experiences at different levels. If these were influenced by specific Turkish social networks, they must be inserted in the German context.

In contrast, in France and the Netherlands, where naturalisation rates were almost total and families of origin larger, partners' choices revealed probably more influence of Turkish social networks from parents' country of origin. The large majority of partners were Turkish immigrants (65-70%, compared to 25% in Germany). However, when comparing parents'

educational attainment with children's and children's partners the picture differed between France and the Netherlands. Turkish descendants in France seemed to be changing the types of social networks linking them to Turkish immigrant partners, because younger generations (descendants and partners from Turkey) had higher educational level compared to parents, the older generation (see chapter 3 for parents, and section 4.2.3.3. of this chapter for descendants). In contrast, descendants of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands showed, with their partners' choice, a more smooth change in terms of the educational levels of Turkish immigrant partners (at least 40% of partners were lower educated than respondents). This contrast of descendants in the Netherlands with those in France and Germany raises the question of existing traditional networks from Turkey (Hamel, Huscheck, Milewski and de Valk, 2012).

4.3. School trajectory and experiences

Educational outcomes are "the result of a continuous process of developing and accumulating school-relevant skills that stretches from birth onwards throughout the different stages of the pre-school and school career" (Kristen and Granato, 2007:346). Within this process, parents' human capital play a role determining their knowledge on the school system, as well as on their reaction more or less in time in order to follow their children school career (Kristen and Granato, 2007). Thus, social class background is expected to influence children's results, and existing studies on educational attainment of children of immigrants show that their underachievement is due to socio-economic background disadvantages. Some have argued further that also ethnic backgrounds shape these children educational process and influence parents' decisions at different transition points in their educational careers (as earlier mentioned in Boudon 1974). Altogether, labour immigrant parents with disadvantaged socio-economic positions dispose of a double effect of social class and migrant background, hindering the social mobility chances of their children. Immigrant parents' disadvantaged position are, thus, related to their knowledge on the school system, their limited knowledge on school language and possession of other resources necessary to understand and negotiate the educational system requirements (such as social networks, Kristen and Granato, 2007). Indeed, this can be observed for lower or higher educated immigrant parents who find their

previous acquired knowledge to be of little use in the school system of the new country.²⁴⁹ Nevertheless, parents social capital alone does not explain the full story.

Immigrant pupils' disadvantages in school is also determined by teachers' perceptions and expectations on minorities, reflected in discrimination practices in school, and affecting either educational transitions or the development of students' competences. Most important, the institutional arrangements shape the degree in which educational and class background disadvantages are transmitted over the course of individuals' school career. Moreover, institutional determinants of countries school systems have different impact in relation to both social classes and immigrant background of its pupils. The timing and form to which the first educational transition is organised has significant consequences in terms of social disadvantages reproduction in school, as well as on creating additional difficulties for children of immigrants. Background disadvantages are expected to be more determinant within early tracking systems compared to later tracking. If first educational transition happens at an early age, the institutional evaluation of children will reflect more the children's social background and less children's accumulated experiences and competences in school (reference). Particularly children of immigrant families, who often experience an home-school in relation to both language and social background — meaning that parents are less familiar with the school system, need more time to catch-up and, for this reason, will rather benefit from a later selective mechanism, expected to turn social background of less relevance in their school performance (Cummins and others).

This section follows both considerations – the influence of social background and that of school institutional arrangements in the educational trajectories and attainments of respondents, comparing those with Turkish immigrant background in the three countries with those with non-immigrant background. Such analysis has two aims — to assess both school integration and school democratisation of different country's school systems. School integration has here a double meaning: either as a channel to enter the society – for instance, through the acquisition of the necessary credentials to enter the labour market; or as a channel for transmission of cultural and social values, sometimes experienced by minorities as a conflict process within family transmissions (Lapeyronnie, 1993). This confrontation is of most interest for this study. School democratisation can be read as the access of working class

²⁴⁹ “Restricted transferability of origin-specific educational resources may affect immigrant families' ability to make educational investments”. in Kristen and Granato (2007), pp. 348.

children to the general and more academic tracks, such as their representation in tertiary education,²⁵⁰ measured through intergenerational educational mobility. The following section is a description of each country educational system.

4.3.1. The school systems

For all three countries, the school systems are structured into primary, secondary and tertiary education. Each educational transition implies a growing array of choices, and where early compulsory educational levels offer more options, more consequences are later found for individuals' professional outcomes (in Germany and the Netherlands). Primary school is compulsory for all three countries, with the general task of performing a minimal degree of cultural knowledge and homogenization, with different length between countries. It is through compulsory secondary education (in general until lower secondary level) that school systems secure the basic skills and needed credentials to enter the labour market. Later, the degree of required specialization increases from upper secondary education onwards, as secondary and tertiary levels play the role of sorting machines for the labour market, divided into different tracking structures, of more selective nature in some countries than others.

Starting age of compulsory schooling ranges from five years old (in the Netherlands and Berlin) to six (in France and Frankfurt), and ends at age sixteen in Germany and France or seventeen in the Netherlands. Thus, the length required for compulsory education varies between ten and twelve years of schooling. However, minimal age for entering school usually refers to pre-school attendance and not to the minimal compulsory age. In France, pre-school attendance (maternal school) is almost universal at age three;²⁵¹ in the Netherlands, the average age at entering school is four years, although children are integrated in the same basic education institutions as primary education (and only one year prior to minimal compulsory age, age five);²⁵² in Germany, the pre-school offer (kindergarten) is less common, turning school entering more coinciding with compulsory minimal school age (which varies with the Lander federal states (Bundesländer)).

The first phase of compulsory education is, for all countries, primary school. In France, primary education is compulsory, and currently for children aged from six to eleven or twelve

²⁵⁰ From SOEP 2002, in Tucci (2008), pp.158

²⁵¹ Since law in 1989, pre-school is optional and free for nationals and foreigners, and in general indicates about 100% attendance

²⁵² Since the catering of nursery and primary school structures led to a common entering at age four in 1985.

years old. It lasts four years and implies six hours day and four to five days a week. In Germany, primary school implies four years of comprehensive and part-time education, starts at age five in Berlin, otherwise at age six for the remaining federal states. In the Netherlands, primary education is on average of 5,5 hours/day, for children from five to twelve years – eight years of primary education. Grade repetition in primary education is possible in all countries, though less common in the Netherlands (ties international reference). Due to the different length of primary education between countries, secondary education starts also at different ages. The first stage, lower secondary education, is in general the second stage of compulsory education, divided into different tracks of professional, technological or academic orientations. Vocational and grades selection differ significantly from country to country, with further impact either on the rate of early school-leavers or in the positions and financial returns expected in the labour market (reference). The latter transition point occur on upper secondary level, implying a wider range of possibilities that reflects more competitiveness and dependence on the quality information and social networks of individuals, necessary to navigate successfully through its structure (TIES International, forthcoming). The last educational stage is the tertiary sector, starting at a minimal age between eighteen or nineteen, and including a huge array of degrees and programs. Some are more professional, others more academic, and since the Bologna agreement there are all divided into three years of under graduation, two master years, and at least three years of doctoral studies.

In France, transition from primary to lower secondary level is automatic, although the preceding phase has to be completed. Teachers give education orientations to pupils, but the decision can be appealed by the parents (Eurydice, 2009). Lower secondary starts from age eleven to age fourteen/fifteen, within one unique system for all students (“college unique”).²⁵³ Compulsory education includes also the first year of the lycee and ends at sixteen years old. Students can access a diploma (brevet), or continue to upper secondary education, during the two last years of tracked lycées (between fifteen and eighteen years old), corresponding to the first educational transition and selection into different types of baccalaureate since 1985 — the general (or academic), technological, vocational baccalaureates or vocational CAP (shorter).

²⁵³ Haby law, that resulted from the school democratisation which came into force in the 1980s, when French politics aimed to achieved 80% of a generation to the Bac (French ministry of education, Jean-Pierre Chevènement), in Tucci (2008).

In the Netherlands and Germany, transition between primary and lower secondary implies that the preceding level has to be completed with additional education advices are given by teachers or a school official, who designate the specific kind of school students attend next. In Germany, the transition to lower secondary education occurs earlier (at age ten), with the exception of Berlin, where the first selection happens at age twelve, like in the Netherlands. This transition in Germany implies an immediate choice between three different tracks — two of each being the preparation for apprenticeship: the lowest secondary diploma or Hauptschule (general elementary, grades five to nine, some schools appealing for those with insufficient German skills because offering German language training); the Realschule (medium-level, grades five to ten, offering no German language training and allowing access to Gymnasium); and Gymnasium (grades five to thirteen, acceding to the Abitur (maturity certificate), offering no German language training and being the more direct access to tertiary education). Once in upper secondary level, there is an academically oriented track and four separate paths of Vocational Education and Training (VET), with diverse content and credentials which are highly specialized. In sum, the progression between different educational levels in the German system is not automatic and instead tied to subject-specific evaluation. It is also characterized by little permeability between different paths, as early as from the transition between primary education to lower secondary. In addition, if students demonstrate unsatisfactory results already during the first transition moment, they can choose either to repeat the grade or, when having completed the required years of schooling, to leave the educational system without a valid school certificate beyond primary school (TIES, forthcoming).

In the Netherlands, transition to lower secondary education corresponds to the first education transition, taking place after eight years of primary school and at age twelve. It follows qualification requirements dictated by institutional orientations, from which pupils are tracked into one of the three types of secondary education: the basic qualification is pre-vocational secondary education VMBO (*voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs*, which replaced prevocational education (VBO, *voorbereidend beroepsonderwijs*) and junior general secondary education (MAVO, *middelbaar algemeen voortgezet onderwijs*) in 1999/2000, though again in 2001, four years length and allowing to go further to HAVO); HAVO, the senior general secondary education (*hoger algemeen voortgezet onderwijs*, five years length — the first three years are lower secondary and the last two upper secondary, giving access to higher education, especially higher professional education or HBO *hogeschool*); the pre-

university education VWO (*voorbereidend wetenschappelijk onderwijs*, six years length — the first three years are lower secondary and the last three upper secondary, mainly preparing to tertiary education). For both lower and upper secondary education, there is some degree of permeability, allowing those who were earlier selected to lower qualified tracks to retrieve for higher educational degrees, although through a longer educational route (reference).

4.3.2. Early conclusions on countries comparison

The three countries under study present not only different school systems as well as different educational outcomes for their population. In general, research indicates that immigrant families adjust to the institutional structure and behaviour prevalent in their emigration country, including in relation to their children's school participation, although educational inequalities between pupils of immigrant or non-immigrant families have been continuously observed for all countries. For instance, contrasting school outcomes, such as those without diploma and those with tertiary education, are generally more common in France (TeO (2010), Tucci, 200 :151-152); in Germany, professional training of short term has been more common, and independently from immigrant origins (references);²⁵⁴ in the Netherlands, individuals show more diverse educational attainments, with fewer cases of individuals without diploma or in tertiary education in relation to France, but more tracks and diplomas diversity in secondary education in relation to both France and Germany (Tesser and Dronkers, 2007).

TeO survey (2010) on national French data showed that educational inequalities between young adults aged between 18 and 35 years old depended on their origins. Compared to youngster of non immigrant origins, those born in France of Turkish origins were three times more with no diploma (27% compared to 8%) and less than half attaining tertiary education (14% compared to more than one third) – both trends showing no gender differences. In the Netherlands, SPVA data from 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998 (Tesser and Dronkers, 2007) showed that Turkish descendants differences were even more significant. They were the double having primary education (between 41% for males and 50% for females, compared to 23% and 25% for their Dutch counterparts), while five times less in tertiary education (5%, compared to 21% and 26%, respectively), with fewer differences for all other levels of

²⁵⁴ Although since the beginning of the 2000s there has been characterised by devalorisation of skilled industrial and artisanal occupations, revealing a gap between the demand and the offer of apprenticeship training at the working place. From SOEP 2002, in Tucci (2008), pp.151-152

education attainment. Recent data on descendants of Turkish immigrants showed significant improvement in comparison to their parents' generation and increasing in the last ten years, but still behind compared to autochtoon Dutch children.²⁵⁵ For instance, enrollment in tertiary education was still two times more important for Dutch natives (50%) compared to those of Turkish origins (25%).²⁵⁶

In Germany, since Lapeyronnie (1993) literature refers to descendants of immigrants disadvantage positions and overrepresentation in Hauptschule level.²⁵⁷ Mikrocensus data in the 1990s²⁵⁸ arrived to similar conclusions, showing higher contrast compared to France and the Netherlands. For instance, both males and females descendants of Turkish origins were four times more represented among the lowest educated individuals than those of German origins (42% for men, 52% for women, compared to 9% and 18% of German origin); inversely, they were considerably less attaining tertiary education (1% for those of Turkish origins, 16% for German men, 9% for German women). However, in relation to apprenticeship for both lower secondary or higher secondary — two of the most important educational attainment in Germany — those of Turkish origins were closer to those of German origins, particularly at higher secondary levels. For instance, they were between 41% and 48% for Turkish descendants females and males attaining lower secondary, 7% and 9% for higher secondary; this was the case for 62% and 64% for those of German origin males and female attaining lower secondary; 11% if higher secondary. More recently, Tucci (2008) referring to individuals aged between 18 and 40 years old in SOEP 2002 data showed low improvements. While those of German origins were four times more in tertiary education compared to those of Turkish origins (16% compared to 4%), the inverse was observed for the lowest education diploma (hauptschule/realschule: between 7% and 14% for those of German origins, compared to 30% and 39% for Turkish descendants; no diploma: 1% compared to 5%, respectively). Once again, groups diverged less for middle tracks and more professional tracks (for German origin individuals: technical professional long 8%, short 52%, BAC 9%; for those of Turkish origins: technical professional long 2%, short 46%, BAC 4%).²⁵⁹

PISA studies (see Tables 2 and 3 bellow) have shown that school expansion experienced in many OCDE countries allowed to overcome gender, regional and religious differences, but

²⁵⁵ Source CBS, in Focus Migration, country profile no 11 2007

²⁵⁶ Source CBS, in Focus Migration, country profile no 11 2007

²⁵⁷ see Table 7 on DJI 1988 data, in Lapeyronnie, 1993, pp.33

²⁵⁸ in Table 7:2A and Table 7.2.B German Mikrocensuses (MZ), from 1993 and 1996 pooled datasets, in Kalter and Granato (2007).

²⁵⁹ From SOEP 2002, in Tucci (2008), pp.151

less for migrant background differences. Findings indicated that although pupils of immigrant families are motivated learners and have positive attitudes towards school, they often perform at significantly lower levels than their native peers in key school subjects, such as mathematics, reading and science, and general problem-solving skills.²⁶⁰ Parents' occupational position and education level explain the main differences between children of different origins, as well as relatively high proportions of school composition in terms of pupils who combined immigrant origin and social background disadvantages. In addition, country of birth also mattered as descendants of immigrants born in European countries performed better than those born abroad. Nevertheless, inequalities due to origin remained important also for those born in the school country, and immigrant background effect was observed not only for educational attainment, but as well as for earlier school leavers or students' aspirations to tertiary education.²⁶¹ Moreover, the gaps between those of immigrant and no immigrant origins remained more important in some countries than others, the most important in Germany where immigration background was shown to matter more than country of birth, particularly for children of Turkish labour migrant parents.²⁶² More recently, Tucci (2008) study comparing France and Germany confirmed also that the probability of leaving school with the lowest diploma was, in general, higher for descendants of immigrants, though when controlling for individual's social background differences decreased more significantly in France than in Germany. Similar trends were observed on tertiary education attainment or for early school leavers. Additional gender differences showed significant disadvantages for women of Turkish origins, which were, however, less common in France.

A general conclusion has been that migrant origin differences seem to be particularly difficult to overcome in early selective school systems as in Germany,²⁶³ and educational mobility chances to be higher within the French and Dutch systems. Thus, these two countries, of semi-selective and comprehensive school systems, turn pupils' outcomes to depend less from social background compared to Germany. Indeed, Germany's early education hurdle and stratified system substantially shapes children educational performance from early age,

²⁶⁰ PISA 2006, about PISA 2003, pp.3

²⁶¹ In PISA studies, students aspirations to tertiary education are more important in France (around one third) compared to Germany (less than one fifth), again, with more important differences for descendants of immigrants (if born in Germany 12%, if born abroad 15%) and almost none in France. See also discussion in Tucci (2008), pp.166

²⁶² PISA 2006, about PISA 2003, pp.9

²⁶³ See distinctions made by Kerckhoff (2001) applied to individuals with migrant and no migrant background, referring that more open education systems in countries (like in France) are better suited to include descendants of immigrants in higher education compared to more stratified school systems in Germany, while The Dutch more mixed systems is in between, in Crul, Schnell, Herzog-Punzenberger, Wilmes, Slietman and Gomez, 2012

turning pupils' chances for tertiary education, or shorter vocational school careers (and further positions in the labour market) highly predictable in relation to their social background.²⁶⁴

This is partially explained by three important disadvantages in processes of human capital acquisition and accumulation for those with immigrant origins in German's educational system: 1) the latter entrance in the educational system; 2) the earlier selection (after only four years of part-time primary education) into a lower permeable tracking system. In contrast, the French educational system is more comprehensive, characterised by early school entering, lower secondary education within a "college unique", and a track selection occurring much later, at the end of compulsory education and age sixteen. Regrouping children of different social classes in longer school careers, seems to end up promoting a later social selectivity, although before this first track some selectivity occurs on schools social status (particularly in moments of first school selections — centre ville vs banlieue or province; or highly prestige university schools, Tucci, (2008 :163-164). In the Netherlands, the school system is a semi-selective one, where social mobility occurs through longer educational careers due to earlier tracking system (at age twelve). Thus, pupils tracked to apprenticeship in lower secondary but aspiring tertiary education, can achieve higher education if they find conditions to continue a longer school career. In one way or another, social and immigrant background counts for all countries in terms of social selectivity, some differentiating from lower secondary education with very little permeability between tracks (Germany), others as well but with more permeability (the Netherlands), while others valorising differently types of upper secondary levels and school prestige (France). Their type of selectivity has further impact in labour market integration.

²⁶⁴ See discussion on Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Muller et al 1998, in Kristen and Granato (2007), , pp.343-366. This is so also because German labour market, segmented along occupational lines, is strongly depending on educational trajectory and social background.

Table 12 - Country's educational system

	On educational systems		
	France	Germany	The Netherlands
Educational policies	Educational policy depends on the national government	Educational policy depends on the Länder	Educational policy depends on the national government but managed local authorities
Educational model	Educational comprehensive system Compulsory educational age: 6 to 16 years old Pre-school enrolment 3-4 years old	Educational selective system Compulsory educational age: 6 to 16 years old in Frankfurt; 5 to 16 years old in Berlin Pre-school enrolment between 3-5 years old	Educational semi-selective system Compulsory educational age: 5 to 17 years old Pre-school enrolment at 4 years old
Primary education	6 to 12 years old Grade repetition possible Compulsory completion but no compulsory advice	5 to 12 years old in Berlin; 6 to 10 years old in Frankfurt; Grade repetition possible Compulsory completion and advice	5 to 12 years old Grade repetition possible Compulsory completion and advice
Lower secondary	College unique - first transition with no selection 11 to 15 years old	First transition with first selection into three tracks 10 to 14 years old / 10 - 15 / 10 - 18 years old	First transition with first selection into three tracks 12 to 15 years old / 12 - 16 years old
Upper secondary	Second transition with first selection into three tracks 16 to 18 years old	Second transition with second selection into five tracks	Second transition with second selection into several tracks 15 to 17 years old / 15-18 years old
Tertiary education	Third transition with second selection into more than three tracks	Third transition with third selection into more than three tracks	Third transition with third selection into more than three tracks
Persistent social inequalities	Easier access to upper secondary, stratified tertiary education: academic vs vocational; spatial segregation	Social selectivity from lower secondary: academic vs vocational	Social selectivity from lower secondary: academic vs vocational; longer tracks vs shorter tracks

Table 13 – Educational level of school population (PISA 2003)

	Education level of the population, native and foreign-born					
	<i>aged 15 years or older (circa 2000)</i>					
	Bellow upper-secondary		Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary		Tertiary education	
	ISCED 0-1-2		ISCED 3-4		ISCED 5A-5B-6	
	native-born	foreign-born	native-born	foreign-born	native-born	foreign-born
France	45.8	54.8	37.4	27.2	16.9	18.1
Germany	23.6	43.4	57.0	41.0	19.4	15.7
The Netherlands	40.7	53.0	39.8	29.4	19.5	17.6
source: InTable 1.3. pp 177 PISA 2006 about PISA 2003, data from OCDE 2005, <i>Trends in international migration</i> , SOPEMI 2004						

Table 14 – Gaps between Turkish-origin vs. Non-immigrant pupils (PISA 2003)

	France	Germany	The Netherlands
	PISA 2003 results - 15 years old pupils		
*ratio reading skills between pupils of immigrant and non-immigrant origins	0,91	0,81	0,92
*effect of national language support programs	Gaps diminish but practice is relatively uncommon		
* population of Turkish origin	Descendants of Turkish immigrants born in France show lower school achievement	Descendants of Turkish immigrants in general do worse in both school achievement and German proficiency.	Descendants of Turkish immigrants in general do worse in both school achievement and Dutch proficiency
	Descendants of Turkish immigrants born in France do better than those born in Turkey.	Descendants of Turkish immigrants born in Germany do worse than those born in Turkey.	Descendants of Turkish immigrants born in The Netherlands do better than those born in Turkey.

Departing from the described contexts and arguments, TIES studies allows reconstructing the educational trajectory of the respondents, starting with pre-school attendance and age entering school, followed by grade repetition and final school attainment. A further section was dedicated to an intergenerational education mobility overview and to assess individual's subjective school experiences, such as perceptions on attended schools in terms of pupils' immigrant background, welcoming to migration diversity and reported experiences of discrimination. Finally, an explanatory analysis was made by country, indicating the variables that most contribute to the lowest and highest educational attainment of the respondents.

4.3.3. Age entering school

Minimal compulsory age and age entering school do not necessarily match in countries where pre-school attendance is generalized. Indeed, the large majority of respondents entered school before compulsory age (see Figures 47 to 48): the earliest in France (80% at age three), followed by those in the Netherlands ($\Rightarrow$ 70% at age four, or before), entering at the different ages in Germany (between 34% and 47% at age three, 30% to 40 at age four, while between 17% and 30% at age five or later). There were no significant differences in terms of gender, origin background and city of residence, meaning that immigrant families adapted to the institutional practices of each country for age entering school. Only in Berlin, men of the control group were those entering the earliest in school (61% at age three, compared $< 47\%$ for the others), while men descendants of Turkish immigrants entered the latest (39% entered at age five or later, compared to $< 30\%$ for all others).

Figure 47 – Age when entering school – men





Figure 48 – Age when entering school - women



4.3.4. Grade repetition in primary and secondary school

In general, TIES data indicated that grade repetition were more important for men than women and in secondary school than in primary school, particularly high for men descendants of Turkish immigrants in France (see Figures 49 and 50). However, group and country differences were more significant in primary school than in secondary education, due to a general growth of grade repetition during secondary school.

Grade repetitions in primary school were higher for descendants of Turkish immigrants in France and the Netherlands, particularly in Strasbourg (almost half repeated primary school at least once, slightly higher for women). Their counterparts in Paris and Amsterdam showed the second highest rate of primary school repetition (>one-quarter), followed by those in Frankfurt and Rotterdam (about one fifth). In contrast, control group respondents showed lower repetition grades in primary education (5-20%), particularly women. Finally, the lowest repetition grades in primary education was observed for respondents in Berlin, for both groups and gender — about 10% for descendants of Turkish immigrants, 5-10% for women of Turkish descendants, <10% for both men and women of the control group).

There was a general increase of grade repetitions during secondary education (except where repetition grades were already high in primary education — in Strasbourg), with group and gender differences becoming more significant in Berlin and Frankfurt while disappearing for all other cities. This growth of grade repetition was more evident for male respondents in Berlin from both groups of origin — 35% of men descendants of Turkish immigrants, 20% for men of the control group. A similar trend was observed in all other cities, for both groups and gender, with grade repetition for descendants of Turkish immigrants always higher for all countries and cities.

Figure 49 – Grade repetition during primary school

Grade repetition during primary school - once or more





Figure 50 – Grade repetition during secondary school



4.3.5. Educational attainments



Respondents' highest educational attainment is showed in Figures 51 and 52, by group of origin, gender and city. The main group difference relied on the comparison between those with the lowest and the highest attainment. Control group and women were in general higher educated than men and descendants of Turkish immigrants, while the latter more present among the lowest education level. And while group differences were the most significant at the highest education level in France and the Netherlands (particular in Strasbourg), in Germany they were slightly more important at the lower educational levels.

As expected, it is in Germany where respondents from both groups most attained the apprenticeship level (>60% in Frankfurt to almost half in Berlin), while they were less than one third in France, or less than 13% in the Netherlands. Very few respondents attended tertiary education in Germany (particularly few in Berlin). Upper secondary education was more present among respondents in both Dutch cities (about one third, slightly higher for

Turkish descendant and women), and the least for those in both German cities. City differences were mainly significant for descendants of Turkish immigrants in France and for both women and men alike — those living in Paris attained higher educational level compared to those in Strasbourg, while the contrary was observed for men of the control group, who attained lower educational level in Paris in relation to Strasbourg.

In sum, the most educated respondents were women or those of the control group in France and the Netherlands (58-75% attained tertiary education, particularly high for women in Amsterdam and Strasbourg). The second highest educated respondents were descendants of Turkish immigrants in Paris, whom at least 56% females and 49% males attained tertiary education, followed by descendants of Turkish immigrants in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Strasbourg (21-35%, in Strasbourg women were more educated). It was in Germany where respondents least achieved tertiary education, particularly for those of Turkish ancestry (17-23% for control group, < 9% for descendants of Turkish immigrants). On the opposite pole, for the lowest educational attainment (lower secondary or less), there were fewer gender differences, few cases in France and clearly more in Germany and the Netherlands. Descendants of Turkish immigrants were those who most attained the lowest diploma (25-35%, in Germany and the Netherlands), followed by their counterparts in France and control group in Germany (10- 20%, higher in Berlin and Strasbourg). Control group respondents in France and the Netherlands showed very few cases (= < one-tenth)



Figure 51 and Figure 52– Highest educational attainment of women/men, by origin background and city



However, the previous assessment of respondents' educational position included the highest-level diploma for those who already left school and the present educational level for those who were still in school. Many respondents were still attending school, with important country and group differences though – few in Germany (<13%), considerably more in France and the Netherlands (>30%), particularly in Paris and for those of Turkish origins (42%). Indeed, differences increased when distinguishing between those still in school or those who had left school). For those still studying it is expected a more significant educational mobility and, indeed, particularly for descendants of Turkish immigrants there were considerably more respondents still studying and attending tertiary education compared to those who had already left school. For instance, in Germany, descendants of Turkish immigrants still in school were almost ten times more attending tertiary education compared to those who had left school, while in France and the Netherlands differences were still very significant but reduced (more than the double). Inversely, the proportion of those with lower secondary attainment was clearly more important among those who had left school, while fewer differences for control group respondents (see Figures 53 and 54).

Last but not least, being or not in school added further gender differences in France and the Netherlands, but none in Germany. For instance, for Turkish descendants in France still studying, men were three times more in apprenticeship than females (22% and 7%, respectively), while less in upper secondary (19% and 34%), showing no differences for tertiary educational attainment. Moreover, gender differences were even more contrasting for those of Turkish origin — women were more than the double in having attained tertiary education (56% and 25%, respectively), and less than half in having attained apprenticeship level (13% and 34%, respectively) or in lower secondary or less (16% and 25%). Differently, Turkish descendants still studying in the Netherlands indicated a male advantage – men were more represented in tertiary education than women (59% and 44%, respectively), while less represented, once again, in upper secondary (27% and 37%). Otherwise, there were no differences for those who had left school in the Netherlands.

Figure 53 and Figure 54 – Highest educational attainment, still in school vs. left school



4.3.6. Intergenerational educational mobility

To assess school democratisation in different country's school system implies also to understand if children of working class and immigrant background were achieving academic tracks like, for example, tertiary education. In this section, I measured intergenerational educational mobility, associating parents' highest educational level with respondents' highest educational attainment.

As previously observed in chapter 3, Turkish parents had the lowest educational attainment, but over the course of one generation the majority of the respondents surpassed their parents' education level (see Table 15 and 16). However, educational mobility was more significant for those whose parents had primary education or more, while less when parents had no schooling. This meant that intergenerational educational mobility was lower in Germany and for Turkish descendants, as many had no schooling. Descendants of Turkish immigrants living in France were those who most surpassed their parents' educational level, particularly when compared to their counterparts in Germany. Indeed, for descendants of Turkish immigrants in France and the Netherlands, higher educational attainment, and tertiary education in particular, was generalized and less dependent from parents' lowest or highest education level – meaning some degree of school democratisation for these cases. The same was observed for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany but only in relation to apprenticeship level attainment and not for higher educational levels. Otherwise, the majority of the remaining respondents showed that their educational achievement was, indeed, significantly associated to their parents' education level — higher education level of their parents the highest educational attainment of the respondents, and vice-versa. This intergenerational educational reproduction was more important for control group respondents, and to some extent also to descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany.

Table 15 – Educational mobility – parents’ vs. Respondents of Turkish origins

Descendants of Turkish immigrants
Family background highest educational level by respondents' highest educational attainment

<i>(% columns)</i> Respondents' highest educational attainment		Family background highest educational level				<i>Total</i>
		no schooling or koran school	primary school	lower secondary	higher secondary or more	
France	Lower secondary or less		16,9%	15,1%	8,4%	14,4%
	Apprenticeship		25,8%	26,6%	26,9%	26,3%
	Upper secondary		19,5%	18,0%	16,8%	18,4%
	Tertiary education		37,7%	40,3%	47,9%	40,9%
	Total		236	139	119	494
Germany	Lower secondary or less	32,6%	33,7%	18,3%	22,1%	29,7%
	Apprenticeship	50,7%	59,9%	46,7%	47,1%	53,6%
	Upper secondary	11,6%	5,0%	20,0%	13,2%	10,0%
	Tertiary education	5,1%	1,5%	15,0%	17,6%	6,6%
	Total	138	202	60	68	468
Netherlands	Lower secondary or less		30,8%	17,0%	23,9%	26,0%
	Apprenticeship		7,9%	14,9%	8,0%	9,6%
	Upper secondary		34,1%	34,0%	29,5%	33,1%
	Tertiary education		27,1%	34,0%	38,6%	31,3%
	Total		214	94	88	396

Table 16 – Educational mobility – parents’ vs. Respondents of non-Turkish origins

Control group
Family background highest educational level by respondents' highest educational attainment

<i>(% columns)</i> Respondents' highest educational attainment		Family background highest educational level			<i>Total</i>
		lower secondary or less	higher secondary	post secondary and tertiary	
France	Lower secondary or less	3,8%	5,0%	,0%	2,5%
	Apprenticeship	30,8%	12,4%	4,2%	11,7%
	Upper secondary	23,1%	18,2%	7,0%	14,0%
	Tertiary education	42,3%	64,5%	88,7%	71,7%
	Total	52	121	142	315
Germany	Lower secondary or less	27,8%	11,2%	2,7%	13,7%
	Apprenticeship	54,1%	64,1%	40,5%	56,2%
	Upper secondary	12,0%	10,4%	12,6%	11,3%
	Tertiary education	6,0%	14,3%	44,1%	18,8%
	Total	133	251	111	495
Netherlands	Lower secondary or less	16,0%	4,5%	1,6%	7,3%
	Apprenticeship	11,5%	3,6%	1,6%	5,5%
	Upper secondary	27,6%	23,2%	14,7%	21,2%
	Tertiary education	44,9%	68,8%	82,1%	65,9%
	Total	156	112	184	452

To put in a nutshell, those in Germany, compared to respondents in the other two countries, entered later, repeated less school grades, left school earlier, showed the lowest school attainment of the TIES sample and reflected lower intergenerational education mobility. This profile was even more evident for respondents with Turkish background, except for repetition in secondary school or for the minority still in school. In contrast, in France respondents entered the earliest, repeated more their school grades, left later the school and showed the highest school attainment in the TIES sample (particularly women). However, group differences indicated that while Turkish descendants showed higher educational mobility in relation to their parents, control group respondents showed, instead, an important reproduction. Nevertheless, like in Germany, Turkish descendants in France who had already left school were considerably lower educated, particularly those in Strasbourg. In the Netherlands, all respondents entered, as in France, earlier, but those of Turkish origin repeated more the school grades and had a shorter school career than control group, although the former showed more important intergenerational educational mobility compared to the latter. In addition, a gender difference indicated an additional Turkish male advantaged for those still studying, but not, again, for those who had already left school. Thus, in the Netherlands descendants of Turkish immigrants showed a longer school career and higher education attainment compared to their counterparts in Germany, but shorter than those in France. In the next section, I analysed individuals' perception on school composition and institutional welcome.

4.3.7. Subjective perceptions on school experiences

TIES survey allowed assessing the school experiences in relation to subjective perceptions on the proportion of children of immigrant origin in primary and secondary schools, perceptions of hostility or welcome towards descendants of immigrants in secondary school, equality of chances for all individuals in school, as well as on self-reported personal experiences of discrimination.

Respondents' perceptions on the migrant composition of the school population were different between the groups (see Figures 55 and 56). For both primary and secondary schools descendants of Turkish immigrants were more in reporting to have attended schools with higher proportion of pupils of immigrant origins compared to control group respondents (as for PISA data). The latter were less than one-tenth attending primary and secondary schools

where at least three-quarters of pupils had a migrant background, with no significant difference from primary to secondary schools, while the majority attended schools with less than one-quarter of pupils with migrant background. Inversely, Turkish descendants reported to have attended schools with higher proportion of individuals with a migrant background, a proportion that increased with the transition to the secondary school, particularly in Strasbourg and Amsterdam, but also for Paris and Frankfurt, while not changing much in Rotterdam and slightly decreasing for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Berlin. The migrant composition of schools in Paris and Berlin were perceived to be more heterogeneous compared to schools in Strasbourg and Frankfurt (like for control group respondents), although in Strasbourg and Frankfurt men descendants of Turkish immigrants reported more to have attended schools with higher proportion of pupils with immigrant background compared to their women counterparts).

Figure 55 – Perceptions on proportion of immigrant children in primary school






Figure 56 – Perception on proportion of immigrant children in secondary school




Respondents reported further if their secondary school was more or less welcoming for pupils of immigrant origins, and their answers diverged, again, by group of origin and school country (see Figure 57). Between one third and a half of descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany perceived secondary schools to have been less welcoming for those of immigrant background, and particularly for men in Frankfurt. In Strasbourg, they were also almost one third to have the same negative opinion on school welcoming to immigrant pupils, followed by those in Rotterdam (almost one-quarter of Turkish descendants males). For all the other respondents, including descendants of Turkish immigrants in Paris and Amsterdam, more than 80% considered school to be at least as welcoming to immigrant pupils as to the others.

Figure 57 – Students of immigrant origin were less welcome in secondary school



Respondents reported also on their perception on the school system as fair system for all pupils (see Figure 58). Less optimistic opinions were to be found in France, while in Germany respondents were more divided between neutral and optimistic opinions, and more optimistic ones in the Netherlands. The least optimistic were men in Strasbourg (around 60% disagreed that school was a fair system, and were also lower educated compared to those in Paris), the second least optimistic were women of both groups in France (between 40% and 60%), followed by descendants of Turkish immigrants in Paris and in both German cities (between one-quarter and one third). The most optimistic were the respondents of both origins in the Dutch cities (between 55% and 65% considered school to be a fair system) followed by control group in both German cities (between 40% and 50%). Finally, in Frankfurt and Paris respondents were more positive with the educational system than those in Strasbourg and Berlin, except control group in Paris, who were even less faithful with the educational system than respondents of Turkish origins


Figure 58 – The school system offer equal opportunities to all pupils



Respondents reported also on their personal discrimination experiences during secondary school (see Figure 59). These experiences were reported to be more common among descendants of Turkish immigrants and for men, particularly in Berlin, Frankfurt and Strasbourg (in general, lower educated), while least reported by control group and women, in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Paris. Repeated discriminatory experiences were not very common, though, and again, more reported by Turkish descendants and in Germany. This way, control group were those who most reported none discriminatory experiences in secondary school, particularly in Amsterdam and Rotterdam ($\geq 81\%$), but also in Paris and Strasbourg (64-74%), and Berlin and Frankfurt (55-66%). For the control group respondents, among those who had experienced hostility in secondary school due to their immigrant origins, not even one-tenth had experienced this repeatedly, with no particular gender or city differences. Inversely, descendants of Turkish immigrants reported more experiences of discrimination in secondary school, though within significant variations between countries,

cities and gender (between 30% and 80%). Those in Frankfurt, Berlin and Strasbourg were the most reporting discrimination experiences, particular among males (between 70% and 80%, less for females in Strasbourg — 50%). The reporting of discrimination experiences was also important for those in Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam (between 30% and less than 50%, always less for women). Like for control group respondents, the frequency of these discriminatory experiences was not very high, except, again, for about one fifth to one-quarter of men descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany.

Figure 59 – Experiences hostility or unfair treatment in secondary school because of origin



In sum, descendants of Turkish immigrants, and particular men, were those reporting to have attended schools with higher diversity of immigrant pupils in both primary but particularly during secondary schools. They were also reporting less inclusive perceptions on school for

pupils of immigrant background, as well as reporting more personal discrimination experiences during secondary school. Control group respondents were, in general, on the opposite pole of such opinions. However, group different opinions were less important in the Netherlands, where respondents were, in general, the most positive for both groups (although perceptions on school diversity composition were the most diverse). In France, different origins did diverge on the perceived immigrant diversity of schools attended and, as well as on personal experiences of discrimination and school welcoming — always less positive for those of Turkish origins, particularly if living in Strasbourg. But differently from the Netherlands, respondents in France of different groups differed less in the perception of school as a fair system, due to the fact that both groups were, in general, not positive on educational equality of French schools. Finally, it is in Germany where the contrast of school composition in terms of immigration background was lower, between groups but, Turkish descendants' opinions on the equality of the school system, on the welcoming to immigrant pupils and on the personal experiences of discrimination were the most divergent compared to control group and Turkish descendants in the other country. While descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany were the most negative in describing school welcoming to migrant diversity and reporting more personal discrimination experiences, German ancestry respondents were either positive or neutral.

4.3.8. Explaining the highest and the lowest educational attainment within each country

The main group differences in respondents' school experiences were related to school attainment at the extremities of the educational ladder – lower secondary or less and tertiary education attainments. Knowing that group differences resulted from the interaction between school systems specificities, background characteristics (mainly, parents' education levels and professional occupation, and size of family of origin) and individual demographic characteristics, to unravel some of this complexity I made an explanatory analysis, so to interpret respondents' probability in attaining the lowest and the highest educational attainments, through a binary logistic regression divided into four models (see Tables 17 to 19).²⁶⁵

²⁶⁵ Respondents' probabilities to attain each educational level are firstly controlled by group of origin, secondly by individual variables (city of residence, gender and age), thirdly by socio-background variable (father's highest education attainment and professional occupation when respondents were between 12 and 15 years old) and, finally, by different school variables (either on institutional characteristics or on personal perceptions about on the school system, in relation to equality of chances and diversity issues.) For socio-background variables, it was used fathers' information, and when this information was missing, missing values were substitute for the same information for the mothers, when available. This concerned 28 cases for fathers' education level in France, 60 in the Netherlands and 60 in Germany; and 17 cases for fathers' occupation in France, 147 in the Netherlands and 92 in Germany.

For all countries, descendants of Turkish immigrants showed higher probability to attain lower secondary education or less compared to control group respondents – five times more in France, almost three times more in the Netherlands and Germany. Inversely, descendants of Turkish immigrants showed lower probability to attain tertiary education – four times lower in the Netherlands, three times less in France and Germany. However, Turkish origin effect decreased or disappeared with social background and school variables, remaining significant only for tertiary educational attainment probability in Germany (about 2,4 times less).

City differences increased when adding school variables. For instance, there was two times more probabilities to attain tertiary education in Paris compared to Strasbourg, 1,5 times more in Amsterdam compared to Rotterdam; inversely, probability increased to two times more to attain lower secondary or less in Berlin in relation to Frankfurt, as well as in Rotterdam compared to Amsterdam. Gender differences were only significant in France and referred to the probabilities of attaining lower secondary or less (men showed almost twice the risk – gender differences disappeared for tertiary education risks once introducing the school variables). Finally, age differences revealed that older respondents showed higher probabilities to attain tertiary education and less to attain lower secondary or less (except in France). This was particularly evident in Germany and the Netherlands, where the youngest showed almost twice probabilities to attain lower secondary, or three times less to achieve tertiary education; or only in the Netherlands where older respondents showed at least twice more probabilities to attain tertiary education than younger respondents. Only in France, age effect disappeared once controlling for school variables.

Not surprisingly, social background in terms of parents' educational attainment, professional occupations and family size (measured here by number of siblings) showed expected probabilities on respondents' educational attainment. This occurred mainly when comparing the lowest with the highest educated parents, while for professional qualifications included different positions. Those whose parents were more educated or professionally qualified showed higher probability to attain tertiary education, while vice-versa was true for higher probabilities to attain lower secondary or less. The size of family of origin was mainly significant for educational attainment probabilities in Germany, partially in the Netherlands and not at all in France. Those who had smaller families of origin (one or two siblings)

showed twice more risks of tertiary educational attainment comparing those with the smallest origin families (no siblings), but no differences in relation to largest families of origin.

The last model included schools variables, showing significant effects on respondents' probability for the lowest or highest educational attainments, and no effects only for age entering school or pre-school attendance (not shown here). Otherwise, in Germany, where school variables had a more significant prediction effect, they did not, though, overcome Turkish immigrant prediction for tertiary educational attainment risks, or age and father's educational prediction effect for both educational level probabilities. In France, there were also a significant number of school variables determining individuals' probability to attain either the lowest or the highest education level. And similar to Germany, school variables in France did not overcome social background prediction effect in tertiary education (namely father education and professional qualification). In the Netherlands, only few school variables showed a prediction effect on respondents' education attainment, but when observed they overcame the prediction of Turkish origins.

In sum, the probability of attaining the lowest or the highest educational level in France seemed more dictated by school experiences, social background and city differences, and less for Turkish immigrant background, gender and age indicators. The probability to attain lower secondary level was primarily determined by individuals' neutral perception on the school system as a fair system, followed by primary school repetition (almost five times more), perceptions of high numbers of immigrant pupils in primary school (between almost three to almost four times more) and, finally, being a men (almost two times more). The risk to attain tertiary education was more related to not having repeated primary (almost five times more) or during secondary school (almost three times more), as well as father higher education (almost two times more) and higher qualified occupation (around three times more) and, still, on perceptions of lower immigrant pupils presence in secondary school (three times more), and living in Paris (almost twice more).

In Germany educational background was one of the main indicators that most explained respondents' educational attainment, followed by subjective perceptions on school, grade repetition, age, city and Turkish origins, while not for gender and father' professional occupation. In detail, the probability of individuals to attain at most lower secondary or less was mainly determined by fathers' lowest educational attainment (3,5 times more) and

perceptions of high presence of immigrant pupils presence in primary school (three times more), followed by individuals' negative opinion on the school as a fair system (2,5 times more), grade repetition during both primary and secondary school, perceiving secondary school as less welcome for immigrant pupils, experiencing discrimination, be younger and living in Berlin (all twice more). Within a similar rationale, the risk of attaining tertiary education was determined by fathers' higher education level (almost eight times more) and personal perceptions of welcome feeling for immigrant pupils in secondary school (almost five times more), followed by grade repetition in secondary school and being older (both around three times more). This was further followed by Turkish origins, having one or two siblings' maximum and perceiving school as a fair system and low presence of immigrant pupils in secondary school (all around twice more).

In the Netherlands, social background variables remained the most significant predictors, and showed explanatory significance equivalent to the school variables and age. Thus, respondents' chances to attain lower secondary at most increased for those whose fathers were the lowest educated (about twice more) or lowest professional qualified (about 2,5 more), had experienced primary grade repetition and perceived high presence of immigrant pupils in school (both about twice more), or, still, living in Rotterdam (1,5 more). Similarly, the chances to attain tertiary education increased with no grade repetition during primary education (almost four times more), followed by older respondents, fathers' highest education attainment, professional occupations and having had maximum two siblings compared to having had none, as well as on perceptions of low immigrant composition in secondary school(all about twice more). To a less extent, also to be living in Amsterdam (1,4 more).

Table 17 - Relative risks to obtained as highest educational attainment - lower secondary or less / tertiary education – France

Likelihood for highest education attainment																	
France		Lower secondary or less						Tertiary education									
		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Origin background																	
Turkish ancestry		1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1	
French ancestry		,191 ***		,194 ***		,428 n.s.		,631 n.s.		3,017 ***		3,384 ***		1,377 n.s.		,833 n.s.	
City of residence																	
Paris				1		1		1				1		1		1	
Strasbourg				1,733 *		1,356 n.s.		1,623 n.s.				,592 ***		,603 *		,509 ***	
Gender																	
Men				1		1		1				1		1		1	
Women				,665 n.s.		,643 n.s.		,570 *				1,427 *		1,395 *		1,342 n.s.	
Age																	
18-24				1		1		1				1		1		1	
25-29				,472 *		,370 *		,434 n.s.				1,271 n.s.		1,617 *		1,158 n.s.	
30 or more				1,120 n.s.		,921 n.s.		1,319 n.s.				,633 *		,820 n.s.		,697 n.s.	
Social background - highest education attainment																	
Primary education or less						1		1						1		1	
Lower secondary						,737 n.s.		,648 n.s.						1,178 n.s.		1,167 n.s.	
Upper secondary or more						,459 *		,645 n.s.						1,764 *		1,767 *	
Social background - occupation when respondents aged between 12 and 15 years old														1		1	
Executive, professionals, white collars						1								,297 ***		,328 ***	
Skilled manual workers						1,084 n.s.		1,226 n.s.						,271 ***		,296 **	
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers						2,299 n.s.		2,712 n.s.						,395 *		,458 *	
Not working						1,642 n.s.		1,228 n.s.									
Nr siblings														1		1	
No sibling						1		1						1,908 *		1,937 n.s.	
1 sibling						,438 n.s.		,470 n.s.						1,073 n.s.		1,217 n.s.	
2 siblings						,979 n.s.		1,186 n.s.						,859 n.s.		1,143 n.s.	
3 or + siblings						1,115 n.s.		1,399 n.s.									
Did no repeat primary education								1								1	
Repeated primary at least once								4,942 ***								,207 ***	
Did no repeat secondary education								1								1	
Repeated secondary at least once								,819 n.s.								,374 ***	
Less than 25% pupils of migrant origin in primary/secondary school								1								1	
at least 50%								2,815 *								,680 n.s.	
at least 75%								3,750 **								,319 ***	
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school								1								1	
less welcome than others								1,054 n.s.								,924 n.s.	
School system is perceived as a fair system								1								1	
Negative opinion on school system								,860 n.s.								1,449 n.s.	
Neutral opinion on school system								,058 **								1,363 n.s.	
Did not experienced discrimination in secondary school								1								1	
Experienced discrimination								,617 n.s.								,865 n.s.	
N		851		851		830		768		851		851		830		785	
* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001																	

Table 18 – Relative risks to obtain as highest educational attainment: lower secondary or less / tertiary education - Germany

Likelihood for highest education attainment																
Germany	Lower secondary or less								Tertiary education							
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Origin background																
Turkish ancestry	1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1	
German ancestry	,363	***	,368	***	1,188	n.s.	1,252	n.s.	3,254	***	3,107	***	,718	n.s.	,409	*
City of residence																
Berlin			1		1		1				1		1		1	
Frankfurt			,663	*	,648	*	,556	*			,794	n.s.	,664	*	,679	n.s.
Gender																
Men			1		1		1				1		1		1	
Women			,927	n.s.	,979	n.s.	1,130	n.s.			,963	n.s.	,959	n.s.	,882	n.s.
Age																
18-24			1		1		1				1		1		1	
25-29			,667	*	,531	*	,536	*			2,151	*	2,571	*	2,731	*
30 or more			,707	n.s.	,505	**	,494	*			2,228	**	2,717	***	3,044	***
Social background - highest education attainment																
No school or koran school					1		1						1		1	
Primary education					1,013	n.s.	,977	n.s.					,243	*	,251	n.s.
Lower secondary					,742	n.s.	,586	n.s.					2,290	n.s.	2,530	n.s.
Upper secondary or more					,275	***	,289	**					6,740	***	7,741	***
Social background - occupation when respondents aged between 12 and 15 years old																
Executive, professionals, white collars					1		1						1		1	
Skilled manual workers					,910	n.s.	,930	n.s.					,785	n.s.	,883	n.s.
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers					,656	n.s.	,696	n.s.					,966	n.s.	1,109	n.s.
Not working					,956	n.s.	1,041	n.s.					,850	n.s.	1,282	n.s.
Nr siblings																
No sibling					1		1						1		1	
1 sibling					1,140	n.s.	,946	n.s.					1,764	*	2,042	*
2 siblings					1,628	n.s.	1,277	n.s.					1,895	*	2,142	*
3 or + siblings					2,710	***	1,461	n.s.					1,254	n.s.	1,872	n.s.
Did no repeat primary education							1								1	
Repeated primary at least once							2,362	*							,860	n.s.
Did no repeat secondary education							1								1	
Repeated secondary at least once							2,069	**							,382	*
Less than 25 % pupils of migrant origin in primary/secondary school							1								1	
at least 50%							1,277	n.s.							,514	*
at least 75%							2,131	*							,000	n.s.
Did not remember							3,160	***							1,295	n.s.
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1								1	
less welcome than others							2,126	*							,205	*
School system is perceived as a fair system							1								1	
Negative opinion on school system							1,354	n.s.							,536	*
Neutral opinion on school system							2,522	**							1,767	n.s.
Did not experienced discrimination in secondary school							1								1	
Experienced discrimination							,578	*							,709	n.s.
N	1.006		1.006		930		930		1.006		1006		930		930	
* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001																

Table 19 – Relative risks to obtain as highest educational attainment: lower secondary or less / tertiary education – the Netherlands

Likelihood for highest education attainment																
The Netherlands																
	Lower secondary or less								Tertiary education							
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
Origin background																
Turkish ancestry	1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1	
Dutch ancestry	,263	***	,256	***	,561	*	,626	n.s.	4,160	***	4,072	***	2,206	***	1,457	n.s.
City of residence																
Amsterdam			1		1		1				1		1		1	
Rotterdam			1,430	*	1,374	n.s.	1,508	*			,722	*	,791	n.s.	,700	*
Gender																
Men			1		1		1				1		1		1	
Women			,874	n.s.	,785	n.s.	,850	n.s.			,971	n.s.	1,062	n.s.	,993	n.s.
Age																
18-24			1		1		1				1		1		1	
25-29			1,500	n.s.	1,433	n.s.	1,384	n.s.			2,711	**	2,684	*	2,508	*
30 or more			1,583	n.s.	1,361	n.s.	1,623	n.s.			2,539	**	2,782	**	2,258	*
Social background - highest education attainment																
Primary education					1		1						1		1	
Lower secondary					,684	n.s.	,743	n.s.					1,139	n.s.	1,091	n.s.
Upper secondary or more					,368	***	,453	*					2,642	***	2,178	**
Missing values					2,050	*	1,596	n.s.					,490	n.s.	,574	n.s.
Social background - occupation when respondents aged between 12 and 15 years old																
Executive, professionals, white collars					1		1						1		1	
Skilled manual workers					1,837	n.s.	1,695	n.s.					,498	**	,555	*
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers					2,578	*	2,532	*					,477	*	,537	n.s.
Not working					2,174	*	1,850	n.s.					,738	n.s.	,866	n.s.
Not alive/ does not know					2,751	*	2,326	*					,456	*	,525	*
Nr siblings																
No sibling					1		1						1			
1 sibling					,675	n.s.	,571	n.s.					1,370	n.s.	1,673	n.s.
2 siblings					,674	n.s.	,617	n.s.					1,779	n.s.	2,103	*
3 or + siblings					1,009	n.s.	,841	n.s.					,995	n.s.	1,182	n.s.
Did no repeat primary education							1								1	
Repeated primary at least once							2,254	***							,267	***
Did no repeat secondary education							1								1	
Repeated secondary at least once							,966	n.s.							1,156	n.s.
Less than 25 % pupils of migrant origin in primary/secondary school							1								1	
at least 50%							1,845	*							,517	*
at least 75%							1,196	n.s.							,465	**
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1								1	
less welcome than others							,577	n.s.							1,361	n.s.
School system is perceived as a fair system							1								1	
Negative opinion on school system							1,266	n.s.							,721	n.s.
Neutral opinion on school system							,787	n.s.							1,209	n.s.
Did not experienced discrimination in secondary school							1								1	
Experienced discrimination							1,158	n.s.							,698	n.s.
N	923		923		923		895		923		923		923		892	
* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001																

4.3.9. Turkish descendants showed different education upward mobility between countries

To put in a nutshell, upward mobility education over the course of one generation was more observed for descendants of Turkish immigrants compared to control group respondents, but depending on the country. Educational mobility occurred towards intermediary educational levels in Germany while towards higher educational levels in France and The Netherlands, although, for all countries it was more important for those who were still in school compared to those who had left in school. Nevertheless, school subjective perceptions were considerably less positive for those of Turkish origins in France and Germany, and particularly men and those living in Strasbourg (in general, lower educated), but contrasting more with the control group perceptions in Germany. Inversely, group differences were least significant in the Netherlands, where respondents were, in general, the most positive on school environment.

In addition, for all countries, the probability of attaining the lowest or highest educational attainment were, as expected, mainly determined by social background variables (particularly fathers' education) and school experiences (particularly for grade repetition), together with subjective perceptions of immigrant pupils presence and welcoming to diversity in schools. Moreover, school variables revealed more significant prediction effects in Germany, some in France while less in the Netherlands. In addition, social background, and particularly Turkish origins, remained significant only for probability to attain tertiary education in Germany. Thus, although school contrasts between different origins were smaller in Germany compared to France and the Netherlands, subjective experiences in school were more contrasting in Germany, and, similarly, prediction effects for school attainment pointed to a more important weight for social backgrounds, origins and school variables in Germany, while less in the other countries.

4.4. Labour force participation

In this section focus is given to the labour market integration, comparing Turkish descendants with control group respondents and their parents' generation. Previous research had shown that descendants of Turkish immigrants improved their situation in relation to their parents' generation, but maintained a considerable disadvantage position compared to other descendants of immigrants, and particularly to those with no immigrant background. These

disadvantaged positions are sometimes combined with gender differences (women were more white collar professions, but also “stay-at-home” or studying, while men were more active and more skilled manual workers). The most disadvantage positions in the labour market have been, however, present for both men and women descendants of Turkish immigrants, as semi- or unskilled manual workers or unemployed. And only in France and the Netherlands previous studies have shown more problematic data for women while, inversely, for Turkish descendant men in Germany.

For instance, in France, recent national data, TeO (2010) focusing on individuals between 18 and 50 years old showed that the combination between origins and gender resulted in a disadvantaged situation for immigrant descendants, particularly for women descendants of Turkish immigrants. In general, activity rate was higher for men compared to women (average of 81% compared to 72%), though lower for descendants of Turkish immigrants men (67%) and even lower for their women counterparts (35%). For those working, descendants of Turkish immigrants were clearly more present among semi- or unskilled manual workers (one fifth for both genders), while considerably less for both male and female of the majority population (less than 10%). Inversely, the majority population was considerably more present for the most qualified professions (more than 37% for both gender, while 20% for male descendants and 11% for female). Skilled manual workers were, in general, most common for men, and particularly for descendants of Turkish origins (43%, compared to 25% for those of the majority population, while significantly less for women of both origins (4% and 11%, respectively). Finally, women were considerably more present among the white collar workers, 57% if of Turkish descent, 49% of the majority population, while 14% or less for men of all origins.

Unemployment rates were, inversely, more important for descendants of Turkish immigrants (around 22% for men, more important for women 34%) compared to not more than 10% for those of French origins of both genders. In addition, among non-working individuals, descendants of Turkish immigrants were still studying, particularly, women (13% for men descendants of Turkish immigrants and 20% for their female counterparts, about 8% for majority population and both genders). The remaining were not-working, 10% of women from the majority population while 27% for those descendants of Turkish immigrants and less than 3% for men of both origins.

German microcensus²⁶⁶ showed that activity and inactivity rates were not very different between Germans and descendants of Turkish immigrants, but indicated significant gender differences.²⁶⁷ Thus, male activity rate was higher (80%, for both origins), while female activity rate was around 60%. Like in France, descendants of Turkish immigrants were more studying (around 15%, while less than 6% for those of German origins). In France, skilled manual workers showed lower group and gender differences (between 30-40%) while for the most and the least qualified professions group differences emerged. For *petit bourgeoisie* occupations, all groups and gender represented always less than 8%. Descendants of Turkish immigrants were significantly less occupying the highest qualified occupations (<5% in salaried positions, for both genders, while >24% for those of German origins, for both genders). Instead, Turkish descendants were more present among semi- or unskilled manual workers or those unemployed (between 35% and 39%, and around 16% to 18% unemployed for those of Turkish origins, compared to 30% for German women and 16% for German men semi- or unskilled or less than 7% of both genders unemployed).

Dutch data (SPVA data from 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, Tesser and Dronkers, 2007) indicated some different trends compared to France and Germany: few activity rates, similar gender differences. This way, while almost all Dutch native men (84%) were active in the labour market, they were only slightly less for descendants of Turkish migrants (about 71%) or first migration from Turkey (78%). Women showed a significantly lower activity rate, particularly for first immigrants (31%), while more similar between female descendants of Turkish immigrants (52%) or Dutch native women (55%). For their professional occupations, group and gender combination dictated that women of Turkish origin occupied, as for France, the most disadvantaged positions in the labour market. Dutch natives showed higher number of the most qualified professions (salaried — 38% if Dutch men, 31% for Dutch women, while three times less for those of Turkish origins — 10% for both men and women). Inversely, those of Turkish origins were more represented for the lowest qualified professions or among the unemployed individuals — 30% of men were semi- or unskilled manual worker, while half for women (16%), 22% were unemployed men and 32% for women. They were clearly less for those of Dutch native origins: for unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers — 17% for men or 9% for women; for unemployed — 8% for men but 15% for women. For *petit*

²⁶⁶ in Table 7:3A and Table 7.3.B, Table 7.4.a. and 7.4.b German Mikrocensuses (MZ), from 1993 and 1996 pooled datasets, in Kalter and Granato (2007).

²⁶⁷ in Table 7:3A and Table 7.3.B, Table 7.4.a. and 7.4.b German Mikrocensuses (MZ), from 1993 and 1996 pooled datasets, in Kalter and Granato (2007).

bourgeois occupation there were fewer group and gender differences (between 3% and 6% for all), while for other intermediary professional positions, there were more gender than group differences, as for routine non-manual (between 16% and 23% for men, and 37% to 39% for women) or skilled manual workers (between 11% and 14% for men, and less than 9% for women). Finally, the improvement over the course of one generation was significant for individuals of Turkish origin, except for the proportion of skilled manual workers, which remained quite similar over one generation, and the same for the growth of unemployment numbers for females descendants (from 24% for first immigrant women, to 32% for descendants females).


For the TIES data, the majority of respondents was working or working and studying at the time of the survey (see Figure 60 and 61). These were between 60% and 70% for control group respondents, while varying more significantly for descendants of Turkish immigrants – from half respondents in France, 60% in Germany to the large majority in the Netherlands (>80%). Women descendants of Turkish descendants were, as expected, less active in the labour market, 20% less compared to their males counterparts in Germany and the Netherlands but more in France (53% compared to 71% in Germany, 54% compared to 71%, in the Netherlands, 48% compared to 59% in France). Age differences were more important for control group respondents compared to descendants of Turkish immigrants, while more similar between groups for Germany. Younger respondents of Turkish descent were less working in France than older ones (44% and 73%, respectively) or even more less for control group respondents (27% and 87%, respectively), while no age differences for Turkish descendants working in the Netherlands but some for control group (75% and 91%, respectively) or all respondents in Germany (54% and at least 64% for Turkish descendants; 63% and 77% for control group). Unemployment at the time of the survey was more common among descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and particularly in Berlin (20%, the double than Frankfurt), otherwise less than 14% in France and the Netherlands, but few gender differences. Younger were more unemployed, than older respondents in France (14% and 4%) and in Germany (21% and at least 14%, respectively), but no age differences for the Netherlands.

The number of those exclusively studying was particularly low in Germany, while in France represented the double or more compared to respondents in the other countries. This was particularly evident for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Paris (one third), but also for

their counterparts in Strasbourg or control group respondents in both French cities (between one fifth and one-quarter). In addition, only in France, women descendants of Turkish were more studying than men (33% and 23%, respectively). Not surprisingly, younger respondents were more still studying, particularly for control group respondents and in France and the Netherlands, but also Germany and for Turkish descendants. Finally, very few respondents were not active in the labour market — usually less than 6%, or varying between 12% and 19% for Turkish descendants in Frankfurt or control group in Amsterdam. However, and as expected, women descendants of Turkish immigrants were considerably more “stay-at-home” than men, and gender differences here were more important in Germany and the least in France. This way, in Germany women descendants of Turkish immigrants were ten times more “stay-at-home” than their male counterparts (29% and 2%, respectively), seven times more in the Netherlands (23% and 3%, respectively) and three times more in France (9% and 2%, respectively). For control group, women were also more “stay-at-home” than men, particularly in Germany (13% and 1%, respectively) while less in France and the Netherlands (5% and 1%, respectively). Only in France, older descendants of Turkish immigrants were at least four times more “stay-at-home” than younger respondents (22% and 5%, respectively); similarly, older control group respondents in Germany were the double more “stay-at-home” (10% and 5%, respectively).


Figure 60 – Situation in the labour market at the time of the survey – Turkish descendants

Situation in the labour market at the time of the survey, by city, gender and age



* Note: too small number of cases

Figure 61 – Situation in the labour market at the time of the survey – control group



* Note: too small number of cases

4.4.1. Activity, inactivity and unemployment

The respondents' activity rates were very high for all countries and groups (see Figure 62 and 63) — around 70% to 90% for the control group respondents and for descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany and in the Netherlands, lower for Turkish descendants in France, and in Paris (62%). Gender and age differences were further confirmed for respondents' activity rates. Turkish' descendants women indicated an activity rate 25% smaller than men in Germany, 17% smaller in France and the Netherlands, while less than 10% gender differences for control group respondents, and almost none if the latter were living in the Netherlands. Younger were also less active compared to older ones, around one-quarter less for younger

descendants of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and France, or younger control group in the Netherlands, but no differences for younger Turkish descendants in Germany or control group in Germany and France. Unemployment rates varied between 3% and 20%, always higher for descendants of Turkish immigrants and especially in the Netherlands. Compared to control group respondents, unemployed Turkish descendants were seven times higher in Amsterdam, four times more in Rotterdam and Paris, less the double in Berlin, while smaller group differences in both Strasbourg and Frankfurt. Unemployment rate were higher for younger descendants of Turkish immigrants in France and Germany, or younger control group in Germany.

Figure 62 – Activity and unemployment rates – Turkish descendants





Figure 63- Activity and unemployment rates – control group

Activity and unemployment rates, by city, gender and age



4.4.2. Employment

Respondents professional qualification varied accordingly to group of origin and country of birth (see Figures 64 and 65). Descendants of Turkish immigrants in France were either working in the most or the least qualified professions (executive, professionals and white collars, or the semi- or unskilled manual workers, about 78% all together), while their counterparts in Germany were mainly skilled manual workers (72%), and those in the Netherlands showed more diverse professional skills, either skilled manual workers (48%) or executive, professionals or white collars (two-fifths altogether). The picture diverges more for control group respondents in France but less for their counterparts in Germany and the

Netherlands. Those in France were mainly performing the highest qualified professions (about half of respondents) or white collars (more than one-quarter). More professional diversity was, again, observed for the Netherlands-although many were working as executive and professionals (> two-fifths), a significant number of respondents worked as skilled manual workers (about one third). Control group respondents in Germany were, like descendants of Turkish immigrants, concentrated in skilled manual professions (50%), while the remaining worked as executive and professionals (two-fifths). Country patterns hide city differences only for descendants of Turkish immigrants — they were more professionally qualified in Paris comparing to Strasbourg, slightly more qualified in Frankfurt comparing to Berlin, but no particularly city differences in the Netherlands. Gender differences indicate no significant patterns in relation to the highest qualified jobs, although, as expected, women were more employed as white collar professionals, while men as skilled manual workers.

Figure 64 – Current professional occupation – Turkish descendants





Figure 65 – Current professional occupation – control group



4.4.4. Type of contract

The majority of the respondents working had a permanent position, particularly if they were not of Turkish ancestry (see Figure 66 and 67). And while in Germany permanent position were more common among descendants of Turkish immigrants, inversely, in the Netherlands Turkish descendants showed the lowest proportion of permanent positions (about 43%) and the highest proportion of temporary positions (> one third, compared to < than one third for all the others). Only for Turkish descendants in France, and those in Strasbourg, showed significant proportions of temporary contracts (two-fifths), while their counterparts in Paris important variation of situations. Otherwise, there were few or almost none gender differences.

Figure 66 – Working job status – Turkish descendants





Figure 67 - Working job status – control group



4.4.5. Occupational mobility over the course of one generation

To assess of professional mobility over the course of one generation, the final Table associates father's professional qualification when respondents were between 12 and 15 years old and respondents' current professional occupation at the time of the survey (see Tables 20 and 21). For control group respondents whose fathers were more professional qualified (executives, professionals and white collars), respondents performed similar professional qualifications in France and the Netherlands (> 60% in France and the Netherlands). The remaining 40% of respondents were either skilled manual workers (mainly in the Netherlands) or still studying (in both countries, not shown here). In Germany, this professional reproduction was less common (one third), while the remaining respondents

entered the labour market either as skilled manual workers (more than two-fifths and one fifth were non-active).

The reproduction of similar professional skills over the course of one generation was more common for those fathers who were skilled manual workers – in Germany they were at least two-fifths of respondents who were themselves skilled manual workers, likely in the Netherlands, though much less for Turkish descendants (one fifth, compared to two-fifths for control group. The remaining were staying-at-home or showed instead some upward professional mobility in relation to their fathers, but this mainly for control group respondents – 30% in Germany, 40% in the Netherlands, while for Turkish descendants they were 11% in Germany and 29% in the Netherlands. In France, respondents whose fathers were skilled manual workers, showed more cases of professional upward social mobility, but again more evident for control group (51%) than to descendants of Turkish immigrants (28%). Thus, very few showed to reproduced their parents' skill manual professions (<8% for both groups), while the large majority was either studying (60%) or unemployed (one-quarter for Turkish descendants). Finally, the social reproduction of those whose fathers occupied the lowest qualified professions was the most important for descendants of Turkish immigrants, particularly in France (one fifth), while significantly less in Germany (five times less — 4%), and not possible to be measured for all other cases due to few number of cases. For the remaining respondents of lower skilled fathers, in France respondents showed upward professional mobility (almost 35%), or to be unemployed or still studying (42%), while in Germany they were either working as skilled labour migrants (almost 40%), or were also non active or still studying (44%).

Table 20 – Professional mobility: parents' vs. Respondents of Turkish origins

Turkish descendants

Respondents' current occupation <i>(% in column)</i>		Family background - professional qualifications of father				Total
		Executive, professionals and white collars	Skilled manual workers	Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	Not working	
France	Executives and other professionals	20,9%	14,5%	14,3%	3,1%	14,3%
	White collar workers	4,7%	13,9%	18,2%	28,1%	14,7%
	Skilled blue collar workers	4,7%	5,0%	5,2%	3,1%	4,9%
	Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	4,7%	17,8%	20,8%	21,9%	17,3%
	Not working	65,1%	48,8%	41,6%	43,8%	48,8%
	Total	43	338	77	32	490
	Executives and other professionals	6,9%	3,1%	4,0%	2,1%	3,5%
	White collar workers	5,2%	7,8%	9,3%	7,3%	7,6%
	Skilled blue collar workers	34,5%	47,7%	38,7%	32,3%	41,7%
	Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	8,6%	5,4%	4,0%	6,3%	5,7%
	Not working	44,8%	36,0%	44,0%	52,1%	41,5%
	Total	58	258	75	96	487
Netherlands	Executives and other professionals	13,3%	14,2%	4,8%	12,4%	12,3%
	White collar workers	13,3%	14,9%	7,1%	10,6%	12,1%
	Skilled blue collar workers	37,8%	21,3%	35,7%	27,1%	27,1%
	Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	6,7%	3,5%	7,1%	8,8%	6,5%
	Not working	28,9%	46,1%	45,2%	41,2%	42,0%
	Total	45	141	42	170	398

Source: TIES, INED 2011

Table 21 – Professional mobility: parents' vs. Respondents of non-Turkish origins

Control group

		Family background - professional qualifications of father				Total
Respondents' current occupation		Executive, professionals and white collars	Skilled manual workers	Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	Not working	
France	Executives and other professionals	42,9%	30,0%	6,3%	29,3%	35,5%
	White collar workers	17,0%	20,9%	31,3%	12,2%	18,3%
	Skilled blue collar workers	2,2%	8,2%	,0%	12,2%	5,2%
	Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	2,7%	10,0%	25,0%	7,3%	6,6%
	Not working	35,2%	30,9%	37,5%	39,0%	34,4%
	Total	182	110	16	41	349
Germany	Executives and other professionals	19,3%	12,5%	10,5%	9,4%	14,6%
	White collar workers	13,3%	16,3%	15,8%	15,6%	15,2%
	Skilled blue collar workers	41,6%	40,7%	26,3%	21,9%	39,2%
	Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	4,2%	3,0%	,0%	12,5%	4,0%
	Not working	21,7%	27,4%	47,4%	40,6%	27,1%
	Total	166	263	19	32	480
Netherlands	Executives and other professionals	46,1%	22,5%	17,6%	33,0%	35,3%
	White collar workers	17,2%	19,4%	17,6%	15,5%	17,4%
	Skilled blue collar workers	18,6%	39,5%	23,5%	22,7%	25,7%
	Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	1,0%	,8%	11,8%	3,1%	1,8%
	Not working	17,2%	17,8%	29,4%	25,8%	19,7%
	Total	204	129	17	97	447

4.4.6. Subjective labour market experiences

Subjective perceptions on labour market experiences allow also assessing individuals' perspective on their labour market situation. For more than half of the respondents working, their job qualification was perceived as corresponding to their educational level (see Figures 68 and 69), particularly for control group respondents (at least 73%). Nevertheless, it was in the Netherlands and France, where respondents were the most educated, that respondents reported their current job qualifications to be below their educational skills, particularly for descendants of Turkish immigrants and women in France – between one fifth and one-quarter for control group respondents, increasing to more than one third for Turkish descendants.

Figure 68 – Current job correspondents to educational level – Turkish descendants





Figure 69 – Current job correspondent to educational level – control group



TIES survey inquired further on respondents' perception on labour market in terms of equality of chances, on their perceptions of existing discrimination towards descendants of Turkish immigrants, when looking for a job and at the workplace (see Figures 70 to 73). Independently from respondents' origins, the large majority perceived that, compared to those with no immigrant background, descendants of Turkish immigrants were more discriminated when looking for a job and at the workplace (> 90%). In addition, women descendants of Turkish immigrants in France and Germany were more perceiving unequal treatment for those of Turkish origins looking for a job, but no gender differences for discrimination perceptions at the workplace.

Thus, respondents' opinions diverged mainly on the frequency of this perceived discrimination, but always higher when looking for a job, while less once at the workplace. It was perceived to be more common in the Netherlands (>60% for all respondents when

looking for a job; considerably higher for descendants of Turkish immigrants when referring to workplace situations (>60%) compared to control group respondents (about one third)). Respondents in the Netherlands were followed by those France (about two-fifths perceived significant discrimination against Turkish descendants when looking for a job; decreasing to between 12% and one fifth at the workplace); finally, perceptions of frequency were the lowest in Germany (about one third when looking for a job, decreasing, again, to between one fifth and one-quarter at the workplace). However, country patterns did not always reflect city differences – Turkish descendants in Strasbourg and Berlin, and control group respondents in Strasbourg, perceived that Turkish descendants suffered more regularly from discrimination when looking for a job and workplace compared to their counterparts in Paris and Frankfurt (almost twice more when looking for a job; almost four times higher at the workplace).

Figure 70 – Perception of discrimination when looking for a job – Turkish descendants




Figure 71 – Perceptions of discrimination when looking for a job – control group




Figure 72 – Perceptions of discrimination at workplace – Turkish descendants





Figure 73 – Perceptions of discrimination at workplace - control group



However, labour market subjective perceptions changed when respondents report on their own personal experiences of discrimination (see Figures 74 and 75). Although the large majority of respondents perceived that descendants of Turkish immigrants were discriminated in accessing to labour market and at workplace, they were considerably less in having experienced themselves these discriminations, although numbers were still significantly high. Moreover, the general perceptions indicated that Turkish respondents in Germany reported less frequency of perceived discrimination, but inversely, they reported more personal experiences. In addition, gender differences were also mainly observed in Germany – men descendants of Turkish immigrants were reporting more cases of discrimination when looking for a job and at workplace, as well as on the intensity of this hostility treatment. Thus, in Germany, about 60% of Turkish descendants reported personal discrimination when looking for a job, while in France and the Netherlands these were half of the respondents. For those with working experiences, they were less than half reporting personal discrimination at workplace in the Netherlands and Germany, or even less in France (around one third).

Nevertheless, the frequency of these discrimination experiences was rare (<one-tenth reported to be frequently), which can be due also to their short experience in the labour market. Finally, and again, they were more in reporting personal discrimination experiences when looking for a job and at workplace if they were living in Strasbourg and Rotterdam, compared to Paris and Amsterdam; similarly, the intensity of such experience was more important in Strasbourg in relation to Paris (about three times more cases who said frequently).

Figure 74 – Ever experienced discrimination when looking for a job





Figure 75 – Ever experiences discrimination at workplace



In sum, the majority of the respondents were working, though slightly less in France. Unemployed was in general low, though more common among younger respondents and descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany (and particularly in Berlin). Group and gender differences in relation to unemployment rates were, however, more evident in the Netherlands, where women descendants of Turkish immigrants showed higher unemployment rates. For those working, descendants of Turkish immigrants were less qualified and, as previous research showed, women were more working as white collars, while men as skilled manual workers, otherwise, gender differences were less significant. More contrasting professional qualifications were observed in France — more qualified in Paris and for control group respondents, less qualified in Strasbourg and for descendants of Turkish immigrants. In Germany there was a clear concentration of manual occupations (more skilled in Frankfurt, less in Berlin), with fewer group differences, while more diverse professional qualifications in the Netherlands for both groups also.

The economic sector where many respondents worked was mainly tertiary sector. Otherwise, many were integrating the quaternary sector (particularly women), and only some concentration in secondary sector for Turkish descendants in France. Permanent positions were more common among control group, but group differences remained more significant in Netherlands and Strasbourg and, again, the least in Germany. In addition, the reproduction of professional occupation over the course of one generation was the most important for control group respondents, particularly at highest levels of professional qualifications in France and the Netherlands, or at lower levels of professional qualifications as skilled manual workers for both groups in Germany, or, still, for descendants of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. Upward professional mobility was, thus, observed for descendants of Turkish immigrants in France and Germany whose fathers were semi- or unskilled manual workers, or, to a less extent, also for those whose fathers had been skilled manual workers. Nevertheless, for Turkish descendants in France it was too early to assess any trend, as many were still studying, although tracing upward mobility paths because achieving tertiary education.

Finally, respondents' perceptions on the matching between their level of professional qualifications and their own educational attainment was less satisfying for those who were more educated, i.e., in the Netherlands and France, particularly higher for women descendants of Turkish descendants in France. Again, fewer group differences in Germany. In addition, perceptions on labour market discrimination against Turkish descendants were shared by all respondents. However, and although its frequency was perceived to be higher in the Netherlands and lower in Germany, inversely, personal experiences of discrimination were more reported by Turkish descendants and males in Germany, and particularly in Berlin.

4.5. Conclusions

Experiences of transition to adulthood were traced by many different life trajectories within various domains: education, labour market, leaving parental home and family formation. These are corner stones of adulthood transition dynamics, which are, by definition, not immune to the evolution of contextual particularities, and need to be understood in terms of social mobility dynamics. For a long time now research has extensively focus also on the role of family and individuals' characteristics, such as social class origins, ethnicity or immigrant origins and gender — shown to be determinants for social mobility patterns (reference.) In this chapter focus was given to the structural integration factors, namely citizenship access,

leaving parental home and partner choices, educational careers and first labour market indicators, comparing descendants of Turkish immigrants with control group respondents and parents' generation.

Our data showed that, compared to control group respondents, Turkish descendants were younger, had larger families of origin and were more living with their parents, although for those living with a partner they were also more in having already at least one child. In addition, group differences were more evident for the oldest respondents, particularly for women of Turkish origins and for those living in Strasbourg, while less for Turkish descendants in Germany. Moreover, in relation to partners' choice, descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany showed the highest social homogamy patterns, and centred in the German context – in terms of migrant generation and Turkish origins, school socialization and educational level. This occurred more partially and centred in the Turkish context for those in France and in the Netherlands, showing, again, more significant group differences.

In terms of school achievement, group differences increased when distinguishing those who had left school, while less for the minority still in school, the latter showing similar educational attainment between groups. Nevertheless, upward education mobility over the course of one generation was generally more observed for descendants of Turkish immigrants. But while in Germany it occurred towards more intermediary educational levels and for both groups of origin, in France and the Netherlands Turkish descendants showed more upward educational mobility, towards higher levels of education, while control group respondents showed a more important reproduction of parents' educational levels.

In a quick snapshot for education indicators, respondents in Germany entered later, repeated less school grades and left school earlier – particularly for descendants of Turkish immigrants. In France, respondents entered the earliest, repeated more their school grades, but left later, showing, in general, the highest school attainment. In the Netherlands, descendants of Turkish immigrants showed a longer school career and higher education attainment compared to their counterparts in Germany, but shorter than those in France. Moreover, shorter school careers occurred where subjective perceptions on school system were less positive. In addition, the probability of attaining the lowest or the highest educational attainment were mainly determined for social background variables (particularly fathers' education), but well as by school variables. And after controlling for both groups of factors,

Turkish origins prediction did disappear, except for tertiary education attainment in Germany. This latter result reinforced the conclusion of more limited upward mobility for Turkish descendants in Germany comparing to the other two countries, although showing lower group contrasts with control groups in the same country.

In terms of labour market indicators, descendants of Turkish immigrants were again considerably behind control group respondents – but group differences were, again, smaller in Germany. Indeed, perceptions that labour market discrimination exists against children of Turkish immigrants were shared by all respondents. However, and although its frequency was perceived to be higher in the Netherlands and lower in Germany, inversely, personal experiences of such discrimination were, like for school discrimination experiences, more reported by Turkish descendants and males in Germany, and, once again, more in Strasbourg and Berlin. Moreover, intergenerational upward mobility showed similar patterns as educational mobility: it occurred mainly towards skilled manual professions in Germany, while in France and the Netherlands went further to more qualified professions. However, in terms of group comparison within countries, Turkish descendants in Germany showed more similarity with control group, while Turkish descendants in the Netherlands showed, inversely, significant origin disadvantages. Nevertheless in France, descendants of Turkish immigrants showed always better positions in all comparison levels, though country patterns hide significant city patterns. In Paris Turkish descendants did significantly better compared to those in Strasbourg; but were also too young to conclude on their labour market integration.

In sum, Turkish descendants in Germany showed to be lacking behind in terms of school attainment and occupational skills when compared to their counterparts in France and the Netherlands. However, this is related to the German context particularities, as they showed also the lowest social contrast when compared to control group respondents within each country. Inversely, in France and the Netherlands, where Turkish descendants seemed to be doing better in school and labour market, they contrasted more within their country compared to control group within each country, particularly in France. However, when referring to subjective experiences of welcoming to different origins in both labour market and school, and particularly for personal experiences of hostility treatment, Turkish descendants in Germany showed the highest contrast compared to all respondents. Either in relation to Turkish descendants in the other countries or to control group in Germany, their subjective

perceptions and personal experiences reflected their general lower achievement in school and labour market – they were those reporting more negative perceptions on society equal opportunities for those with Turkish origins, as well as those most reporting personal experiences resulting from that perceived hostility.

Chapter 5

The linguistic socialization experiences of Turkish families and their descendants in France, Germany and the Netherlands

5.1. Introduction

Western European cities have recently experienced increasing cultural diversity due to families of immigrant origin. Individuals' language patterns have been the centre of much debate, in relation to social integration and the significance of language diversity within official monolingual contexts. In this chapter I explore language transmission by parents during childhood as well as language uses and self-perceived proficiency in early adulthood. The latter is used as an indicator of linguistic self-esteem from a sociological perspective (Bourdieu, 1991; Fishman 1991; Brizić, 2006; Norton, 2006). Approaching language outcomes as a consequence of collective processes, the present chapter has two main aims: first, to understand how language has shifted between generations among individuals of Turkish origin in the three countries, and, second, how the observed language shifts can be understood in terms of family language opportunities and contact.

5.2. Overview on linguistic issues for individuals with Turkish background in France, Germany and the Netherlands

Turkish immigrant parents came to Western Europe through the guest worker recruitment (between the end of the 1950s until the beginning of the 1970s) and the family reunification and refugee flows that followed (from the 1960s to the 1980s). They brought with them a wealth of linguistic diversity, previously framed within a hierarchical structure at both political and social levels (Yagmur, 2001; Brizić, 2006). Often this framing was not in favour immigrants' native language: many spoke Turkish dialects or Kurdish languages. Once settled in Western Europe, Turkish immigrants have been said to demonstrate particular resistance to learning the languages of their countries of immigration, in a kind of refusal to assimilate linguistically at both the individual and family levels (reference here). However, it is no less true that studies on the language acculturation outcomes of people of Turkish migrant origin in Western Europe have rarely taken into account their experiences of linguistic socialization (in both their country of origin and of immigration).

France and the Netherlands began to implement integration policies for guest workers and labour migrants only in the early 1980s, while in Germany from the mid-1990s (see chapter 2). The teaching of the national language to immigrants and their descendants in these countries started mainly in the 1970s, but more intensive programs for foreigner adults were put in place only in the 1990s, in the context of stricter immigration and integration policies (e.g. with regard to entrance, regularization or naturalization). Due to the lack of national language learning resources for guest workers, from the beginning of their staying, many learned these languages in their workplace and neighbourhood environments. In Germany, for instance, foreign workers of various nationalities and languages developed Foreign Workers' German (FWG),²⁶⁸ a rudimentary form of German for communication in everyday settings, which functioned as a way of learning German without systematic guidance.

In contrast to adult immigrants, national language (French, German or Dutch) support for the children of immigrants has been provided in Germany and the Netherlands since the 1960s and since the 1970s in France. This has typically been provided in a sequence beginning with transitional and separated classes followed by integration into regular instruction. Over time, much investment and technical support development has been put into teaching each national language as a second language, although these programs' effectiveness has been often contested. In addition, minority language instruction for children of immigrants was launched in Germany in 1962, becoming more dynamic after 1979 and focusing in intercultural dialogue (meaning a more pluralist approach on different cultures) beginning in the 1990s. It became compulsory in Frankfurt in 1983, but was abolished in 1999, while in Berlin has always been optional and still existing. In the Netherlands it has existed since the 1960s, becoming part of national policy in the end of 1970s, before being converted to municipal policy at the end of the 1990s, and finally being abolished in 2004. In France it has existed since the 1970s, with a focus on intercultural knowledge since 1978, and an enlargement to inclusion among the modern language options starting in lower secondary school recently. In all three countries these programs have been offered in public schools, though taught in separate schedules and classes and not integrated into the pupils' general evaluation. In Paris, Strasbourg and Berlin the programs have been organized by consulates, embassies and associations from the parents' country of origin and still existing as for the majority of those

²⁶⁸ In Blackshire-Belay, Carol (1991) *Foreign Workers' German: A Concise Glossary of Verbal Phrases* University Press of America, London. This research included 78 foreign workers who were interviewed, and whose spontaneous speech was recorded and analyzed..or still in Becker-Cantarino, Barbara (1996) *Berlin in Focus: Cultural Transformations in Germany* Greenwood Publishing Group

with immigrant ancestry, while in Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Netherlands they were part of the national educational policies, albeit with separate curriculum and teachers, until they were abolished in the turn of the century (and returning to more informal teaching. Enrolment in such programs has been higher in primary school than at the lower secondary level, but while they have not been integrated into national educational policies at the primary level, at the secondary level they have been gradually integrated into the general curriculum, although considered as a lower-status option compared to other foreign languages. Turkish language enrolment has been one of the most stable and dynamic for all the three countries: 20% of the total of pupils engaging in immigrant minority language teaching in France, 40% in Germany and the Netherlands (for more details, see chapter 2).

In sum, instruction in immigrant minority language has been implemented in two different contexts. First, as part of a policy aimed at preparing the return of guest workers to their countries of origin. During this period, the teaching of a second language (e.g. Turkish for children of Turks) in schools was done in order to prepare pupils for their return to Turkey, while recruitment policies were based on the rotation principle for their parents. Thus, the aim was not to train children of immigrants to stay but instead to leave. Second, from the 1980s onwards, perceiving that immigrant children would settle, immigrant language teaching was thought as an instrument to combat the social disadvantages systematically observed for children of immigrant. Thus, it aimed to bridge the linguistic gap between home and school, at the same time that the national standard language was introduced as a second language, and target as the main priority in relation to immigrant language.

Despite the aforementioned policy similarities, existing norms and discourses have proved to influence linguistic outcomes among the children of Turkish immigrants differently in each of these countries. The general trend among descendants of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe, as for the majority of those with immigrant ancestry in general, is that language uses at home are more independent than self-reported proficiency. For instance, Turkish descendants linguistic social practices within the family are said to be less assimilated, in some cases reflecting insufficient proficiency.²⁶⁹ In Germany there has been a widespread public debate on lower general language skills among children of Turkish descendants, continuously demonstrated in empirical studies. In the Netherlands, where integration policies

²⁶⁹ Kastoryano, 1986; Tribalat, 1995; Irtis-Dabbagh, 2003; de Tapia, 2007; Ersalini, 2009. Data from Kitty database (1987) and Diehl and Schnell (2004, 2006) on SOEP data across the survey waves from 1983 to 2001, in the discussion in Esser (2006), pag 38 and page 41

have focused more on mother language teaching than in the other two survey countries, its aims have nonetheless centred mainly on improving Dutch language skills, with no clear evaluation of its impact on proficiency in the minority languages used (see chapter 2). Facing massive criticism for its failure to resolve school, labour and linguistic inequalities, it was abolished in 2004, during a period where policies aiming at assimilation were favoured. In France, debates on insufficient language proficiency have been, in general, applied more to the Turkish parents' generation than their children, although widespread maintenance of the use of Turkish has often been referred to. Perceived as a linguistic issue, Turkish language retention has been rather feared as a communitarian segregation risk. (see chapter 2).

Indeed, where Turkish descendants represent a significant proportion of school pupils (such as in Germany and the Netherlands) both international comparative research and national case studies have indicated that their school achievement and language skills are weaker compared both to pupils of non-immigrant origin and to those of other immigrant origins (OCDE, 2006; PISA, 2003, 2009). Some studies have shown that the more problematic cases among Turkish descendants not only lack academic language proficiency in the school language, but both conversational and academic proficiency in their first language as well (even though the latter has rarely been systematically tested.²⁷⁰ These findings have led to the identification of a cross-national "Turkish trend" across Europe. However, more recent international comparisons between France, Germany and the Netherlands including both Turkish immigrants and their children, although they did not focus primarily on linguistic outcomes, indicated a variety of differences between countries in this domain. And while the results of Ersalini (2009) showed that individuals of Turkish origin in France were the most linguistically assimilated, Kaya and Kentel's (2005) comparison between Turkish immigrants and their children in France and Germany concluded that those in France were more worried about their national language skills and less open to learning additional languages than those in Germany.

In order to identify any specific "Turkish trend" in the countries under study here, it should be highlighted that, as Brizić (2006) previously mentioned, that it is not just affiliation to any immigrant or linguistic group, but also the socio-political assessment and treatment of a particular group that exerts an important influence on linguistic proficiency and behaviour

²⁷⁰ See discussion referring to Fase 1994, Cummins 2000, Olechowski et al. 2002, Crul and Doornik 2003 and Esser 2006, in Brizić (2006).

and on the collective experience of group identity. In other words, each settlement country and country of origin includes contextual particularities that determine whether and in what way language becomes a major issue. Having briefly described the immigration context (see Chapter 2 for more details) the next section will focus on the importance of parents' country of origin on linguistic outcomes.

5.3. A brief overview of Turkey's linguistic landscape, from the implementation of the Republic to the guest worker programs

The Turkish language, part of the Turkic language group (which includes at least thirteen languages), has had a relatively short life in Turkey in its present form, concomitant to the birth of the modern Turkish Republic from the beginning of the XX century (Yagmur 2001, Brizić 2006). Previously, beginning in the Seljuki period (1071-1299) when the spread of Islam led to a heavy influence of Arabic and Persian cultures on both Turkish and Kurdish languages as Kurmanji, Turkish co-existed with various other languages. Arabic was used for religious education, Persian for literature, and Turkish for daily communication. In addition, a synthetic language – Osmanlica/Ottoman Turkish, with grammatical rules derived from Arabic and Persian as well as Turkish became a high-status language for religion, culture and administration. Considered unintelligible to the common people, it distanced them from the ruling classes.

The picture changed significantly between the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, when increasing nationalism and the growing influence of the press motivated official reforms on national language homogenization in other European countries with highly linguistic diverse populations (Akündüz, 1998). A movement demanding language reform and the elimination of borrowings from Arabic and Persian emerged from Turkish intellectuals.²⁷¹ In the 20th century, major international conflicts accelerated this process, while radically altering the geopolitics of the Ottoman territory. When the empire sided with Germany and lost the First World War, England, France, Greece and Italy invaded its territory, and the war of

²⁷¹ Ziya Gökalp, sociologist, writer, poet, and political activist of Kurdish origin, was one of the main characters advocating for the Turkification of the Ottoman Empire, and the imposition of the Turkish language and culture. He was later influential in shaping the reforms led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, thus, believed to be behind the Turkish language reform, in Yagmur (2001).

independence led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ended with the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Inspired by the European nationalism of his time, Atatürk emphasized a Turkish-ness in contrast to the Ottoman period, and Turkish society underwent a cultural and ideological transformation focused on its modernization. This movement called for Turkish-ness to be refounded, moving away from the religious and Arab-inspired conservatism and toward Western-oriented modernism and secularism, with language emerging as a basic pillar of the new identity. Three of the most important reforms in this period were the abolition of Sharia, structural education reform, and linguistic homogenization. School became compulsory for both women and men; religious and Arabic instructions were banned in schools, both as a subject and as a medium; and the Latin alphabet was introduced to reframe the vocabulary based on the previously existent Turkish language during the Ottoman Empire. After this point, no languages other than Turkish could be taught at schools or any cultural centres, and all language showing a high degree of influence of Persian and Arabic borrowings was highly stigmatized. However, this ambitious linguistic reform was characterized by special social conditions.

The first of these was the combination of an extremely low literacy rate and high linguistic diversity. The mainly rural population included numerous non-Turkish native speakers, who were of lower social status (this was particularly true of native speakers of Turkish dialects and Kurdish languages). These differed from those settled in the largest urban centres, such as Istanbul or Izmir, where the many minority language groups included some with little or no schooling and others with high levels of educational capital, such as the Armenian and Greek minorities. Secondly, the founding of the Turkish Republic was marked by the protection of specific minorities based on religious but not linguistic criteria. This protection resulted from the Lausanne Treaty, and after the forced population movements that began in 1923 and were promoted by the Turkish Constitution and the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations.²⁷² These massive and sudden population movements between the new Turkish Republic and some neighbouring countries that had been part of the Ottoman Empire were based on religious affiliations and longstanding ethnic groupings. Turkish-

²⁷² The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was an agreement between the Greek and Turkish governments signed in Lausanne on January 30, 1923, in the aftermath of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922. The agreement provided the expulsion of Christians from Turkey to Greece and of Muslims the other way around. It was ratified after the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, and registered in *League of Nations Treaty Series* on January 27, 1925. In addition, the Turkish Constitution (Chapter 3, section 2, article -42), and the Lausanne Treaty signed between the Republic of Turkey and the allied forces (British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and the Serb-Croatian-Slovene State-), on 24th July 1924, allowed also the population exchange on religious criteria only. This treaty provided the independence of the Republic of Turkey as well as the protection of the Greek Orthodox Christian minority in Turkey and the Muslim minority in Greece — although most had been deported under the earlier Convention. From both agreements, about 900 000 Greek Orthodox Christians were exchanged against 400 000 Muslims from Greece. In Yagmur, (2001) pp.423.

speaking individuals of non-Muslim confessions departed en masse, resulting in the large-scale disappearance of entire social and professional categories, and consequently in significant shortages of various professional occupations in the new republic. In exchange, the country experienced a massive influx of non-Turkish native speakers, who were not familiar with the country's social structure or the Turkish language. Within a few years, Turkey experienced massive and abrupt exchanges of ethnic, linguistic and even professional populations, changing the linguistic landscape in both urban and rural areas, and leading to additional economic costs in the country's reconstruction and development. With the application of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkish education policies were obliged to include exceptions for the Armenian, Greek and Hebrew language communities remaining on the country's territory.²⁷³ Instruction in other foreign languages, such as English, French and German, was also accepted in schools: they were viewed as contributing to the country's modernization and westernization. The linguistic reform expanded in its territory during the last 70 years, and implied continuous linguistic change at the point that today's Turkish speakers can hardly understand Turkish language documents dating from the installation of the republic.

Currently, the Turkish language is officially spoken by 90% of the population, a linguistic homogeneity that is more apparent than factual, as it is difficult for language minorities to achieve official recognition, and their real proportions in the population are a matter of controversy. The 1927 census registered the first and second languages spoken at home, as well as religion, a question that was posed again in 1935 and renewed every five years, but since the 1985 census these questions have been completely excluded. It is assumed that language diversity has decreased due to compulsory schooling in Turkish, although this is less evident in rural areas where a high proportion of members of the less educated population are from other linguistic backgrounds²⁷⁴ (such as Turkish regional dialects and Kurdish languages

²⁷³ Particular status was given to immigrant languages from the Balkans and Caucasus, the largest group were the Circassians (about one million) and the Armenians and the Greeks, for their large majority Christians — all groups that ended up in establishing their own schools and enjoy special rights. Turkish constitution on protection of minorities: articles 38-44. (cited in pp.423): *No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training and education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved.* In Yagmur (2001) pp.423

²⁷⁴ out of 35 languages., Grimes 1992, For instance, Kurdish language groups, whose Kurmanji (Northern Kurdish language) is the main one spoken in Turkey, is a branch of Iranian languages with extensive Arabic and Turkish loans, are estimated to be about 6,5 million, but mostly based in religion affiliation. (Grimes 1996). Present four linguistic variations, Not many are very bilingual in Turkish, and the Roman script is used in Turkey, The language is outlawed in Turkey, 28% of literacy rate. Traditionally pastoralists, now agriculturalists. Muslims Sunni and Alevi, some Yezidi, secular (Grimes, 1992, pp.756) Another important minority language group is the Zaza, also an Iranian language but whose group identification is first based on language and then on religion. They are estimated about 2 million individuals in east and southeast Anatolia. East central, Sunni Muslims. Arabic, one of the largest linguistic minority, is mostly present in southeast Turkey, in Yagmur, (2001). Originally brought in a laborers, bilingual in Turkish and do not read in Arab, agriculturalists, small shops and business. Muslims (Grimes, 1992, pp.754) Also in Yagmur, (2001) and from Grimes (1996); Boeschoten (1997); Andrews (1989); Robins (2000), see discussion on these all in Brizic (2006). Armenian, from 70 000 estimates from 1980, 40 000 use it as first language. Many in Istanbul, a few

in south-eastern rural towns: Grimes 1996). However, the endogamic patterns of both minority language groups (with various religious affiliations) and the large majority of Turkish speakers (mainly Sunni) are based more on religious than linguistic criteria, promoting further language loss for minorities. In sum, ‘Turkish society is characterised by a striking linguistic divide even between the Turkish-speaking “rural majority” and the Turkish-speaking educated “urban elite,” due to rapid and extensive reforms aimed at westernising the country. Among these changes, the reform of the Turkish language may be regarded as the most radical. In spite of great efforts to make this beneficial to the rural population, the vast majority did not have the opportunity either to participate in this ambitious linguistic reform or to acquire the new forms. Thus, there is still a large distance between modern Turkish and the regional dialects; it therefore takes rural children a relatively long time to cope with the written form of the modern language.’ (Brizić, 2006:348).

The aim of the next section is to understand the influence that these different contextual dynamics (in both the parents’ country of origin and their immigration country) exert on the linguistic proficiency and behaviour of individuals, not least in terms of collective experiences of group identity. The linguistic outcomes of various individual linguistic socialization experiences are disentangled from one another.

5.4. Assessing the main concepts: *linguistic socialization experience, language transmission behaviour, linguistic self-esteem*

Anthropological studies on linguistic diversity from the early 20th century showed, firstly, that each language is embedded in specific social and cultural contexts and, secondly, that the interaction of different language contexts often reflects social, and sometimes political conflicts (see chapter 1). More importantly, these conflicts are expected to influence individuals’ language acquisition, outcomes and preference.

Following this, Brizić (2006) gave particular attention to the study of immigrants’ linguistic transmission behaviour and its effect on children’s linguistic success, highlighting children’s linguistic starting conditions. Her work has led to the consistent observation of significantly

in eastern Turkey. 96% bilingual in Turkish, present four linguistic variations, the majority are Christian (Grimes, 1992, pp.754) Greek, estimated between 5 000 and 8 000 in Turkey in 1981, Istanbul city, many have emigrated from Turkey (Grimes, 1992, pp.754) Kirmanjki (five variations) many in Germany, France and the Netherlands, Alevi Muslims, pastoralists, peasant agriculturalists (Grimes, 1992, pp.755-756) Turkish Anatolian – 90% of the population in 1987, mainly Muslims, known by nine dialects – Danubian a western dialect, the others are eastern: Eskisehir, Razgrad, Dinler, Rumelian, Karamanli, Edirne, Gaziantep, Urfa (Grimes, 1992, pp.757) Grimes (1992).

lower linguistic self-esteem among the descendants of Turkish immigrants in some European countries, such as Austria. For this reason, Brizić made use of the concept of “incomplete language acquisition,” i.e., when individuals show significant limitations in academic proficiency in any of the languages they speak.²⁷⁵ Referring to these as “exceptional linguistic situations,” she described two common scenarios: 1) Individuals who acquire lower linguistic capital because of short or nonexistent school careers (a general sense of insufficient language acquisition related to proficiency); 2) when individuals undergo an important language shift, abandoning their first language and adopting a new first language (a strict sense because due to language insufficiencies that result from incomplete language shift). In sum, if individuals were not exposed to the full repertoire of the “official language” due to the absence of education or short school careers, and experience language imposition in the context of strong discrimination related to their background, such situation entails the loss of the native language in favour of a dominant language. This can happen in the country of origin or in the immigration country if the parents migrate at very early age, and it exerts strong negative effects on individuals’ language proficiency, academic self-esteem, and everyday conversational practices. Thus, Brizić focused on *origin-specific differences*, referring to both parents’ country of origin and their country of immigration. Her main argument was that “parents’ linguistic capital and transmission behaviour are decisive factors for the immigrant children’s linguistic success” (Brizić, 2006:344-345), a view that is also confirmed by the results of many previous studies.

In addition, and as documented in language shift studies, “exceptional linguistic situations” hinder the acquisition of other forms of human capital (such as further education or the acquisition of other languages), increasing also the probability that individuals transmit lower linguistic self-esteem. For instance, when parents opt to transmit language(s) that they do not completely master, either linguistically or emotionally, the effects are reflected in family communication and in children’s language uses and outcomes. It is important here to understand that it is not only parents’ language proficiency that matters but also their linguistic self-confidence and identity under such conditions: all of these are components of an individual’s linguistic capital. Thus, *linguistic socialization experiences* can be expected, first, to determine parents’ linguistic capital; second, to influence their language transmission behaviour; and, thirdly, to predict both generations’ linguistic self-esteem and linguistic success.

²⁷⁵ See discussion where Brizic recovers Sasse’s concept of „incomplete language acquisition“, in Brizic (2006), pp.349.

As previously mentioned, the focus in this chapter corresponds to the micro and meso levels of analysis in Brizić's Linguistic Capital Model—i.e., analyzing children's linguistic starting point in their country of birth and their parents' linguistic capital. Both are particularly useful in assessing the above-mentioned "Turkish trend," because they are intended to identify potential "exceptional linguistic situations." In this model, the linguistic socialization experiences of the descendants of Turkish immigrants are also determined by other linguistic and non-linguistic factors, more centred on the specific context in which they have lived. In this connection, Weinreich (1940s, 1950s), and later Lambert (1963) have devoted particular attention to forms in which different languages can be combined during the learning process, highlighting two general forms: *compound bilingualism*, where the two languages interact directly during the learning process, and *coordinate bilingualism*, when two language systems do not directly interact during the learning process because they are used and learned in separated contexts. The two situations have been shown to result in different types of language interference, and depending on the combination of learning at home and in school, on differential linguistic success. While compound bilingualism was expected to lead more easily to inter-language confusions and conflicts, due to the direct and continuous confrontation between languages that it involves, in coordinate bilingualism languages have a "built-in" distinctiveness and learning processes are less dependent on the form taken by the confrontation between the different language contexts. Coordinate bilingualism, however, was thought to promote language segregation at cultural, temporal or even functional levels (because of the promotion of the language(s) with greater institutional utility and/or social prestige, thus resulting in *subtractive bilingualism* or *assimilated* outcomes).

To understand how Brizić's determinants of linguistic socialization can be related to Weinreich and Lambert's forms of dual-language acquisition, further linguistic considerations need to be included. For instance, the *critical period hypothesis*,²⁷⁶ which leads us to draw on Cummins approach to *language interdependence* (LIH, 1980s, see chapter 1). Cummins observed that both the general development of an individual's cognitive skills and the learning of a second language depend strongly on exposure to the correct form of a first language in the early stages of life. This is due to the fact that the process of acquiring new languages or competences in general relies strongly on the transferability of

²⁷⁶See discussion referring to Johnson and Newport 1989, 1998, Penfield and Roberts 1959, Newport and Johnson 1989, Newport 2002, Birdsong and Molis 2001, Mayberry and Lock 2003, Hakuta, Bialystock and Wiley 2003, all in Casey and Dustmann (2005), and also in August and Hakuta (2005), pp.235.

concepts between different languages. In his research he found that older children with more structured mother-tongue proficiency learned more easily a second language even when their mother tongue (or home language) was in contrast to the school language. Younger children with very limited mother-language structure performed less well, even when their home language was also the one used at school. Finally as in Bourdieu and Lahire's sociological approaches (chapter 1), Cummins' hypothesis reinforced the view that language acquisition is a slow process of incorporation, within a period that is less dependent on minimal age or mono-, bi- or pluri-lingual starting conditions (e.g., in the childhood environment) than on the management of language structures and interferences, under the influence of both linguistic and non-linguistic determinants.

In sum, findings from linguistics on language interference, language interdependence and critical periods show that (first-language proficiency) the structure of the home language environment have significant and direct effects on the development of individuals' cognitive structure and on their learning of a second language. In this context, linguistic and non-linguistic factors matter both in how the learning of different languages interacts as well as in opportunities to acquire and valued proficiency in each language. Thus, Brizić concept of linguistic socialization experiences emphasizes the importance of individuals' linguistic starting conditions and the whole range of experience in the course of their life trajectory. Linguistic socialization experiences are expected to predict individuals' cognitive capacities in language development terms, and consequently on opportunities for human capital accumulation (Casey and Dustmann, 2005), and its transmission in the family. Nevertheless, the efficient transmission of parent's native language has been the focus of much disagreement. And here, sociolinguistic factors enter into the analysis. Since Lambert (1972), linguists, psycholinguists and sociolinguists have shown that the maintenance of a minority language over the course of multiple generations depends on the presence of socio-economic background resources that allow an efficient and useful intergenerational transmission (see: chapter 1). More recent assimilationist approaches have argued, differently, that the educational attainment of parents has no influence on their children's minority language retention, even for writing skills, but that it does influence their language assimilation (Alba, Logan, Lutz and Stults, 2002). These theorists have highlighted the most expected outcomes for immigrants' native language—independently of bilingual competence acquired in early childhood, the loss

of minority language(s) over the course of multiple generations is a well-known risk, highly correlated with the utility and social prestige of this (or these) language(s) in the broader context (Fillmore, 2005; Waters 1990, Lapeyronnie 1993).

Fishman added to this that for minority language groups, language shifts depend not on language per se or its indexical function but on its importance in collective processes of cultural change. This is so as language is a crucial tool that communities, families and individuals can use to maximize self-regulation of cultural change. Thus, the learning and use of the host country language can function as a tool for emancipation through some degree of necessary acculturation into the society where individuals live, while the retention of their native language (for the immigrant parents) or acquisition of their parents' native language (for children of immigrants) can enable individuals' for a more active participation in change in the society and for higher social recognition of more bilingual or plurilingual abilities. Thus, although language loss many happen beyond parent-child language uses, it is determined by each individual linguistic socialization experiences and depends on their level of participation/engagement in processes of societal change (parents and children, Beans and Stevens 2003; Brizić 2006; Kymlicka, 2010).

For the TIES data, the linguistic socialization experiences of Turkish descendants were here defined, first, by starting conditions, such as parental linguistic capital, language transmission in the family, and societal approaches to language diversity. "Parents' linguistic capital" is interpreted as the combination between parents' language background, educational attainment, labour market experiences, and proficiency in the national language of their immigration country. "Intergenerational transmission indicators" include the language transmitted to the children during childhood, thus revealing the combination of different languages in the family. Age at school entry was also taken into account, to determine the moment of contact with more formal and functional literacy of survey country language. The second phase of the examination of linguistic socialization experiences was an exploration of the relation between second-language acquisition and first-language maintenance, which is highly dependent on the utility and social status of each language, both inside and outside the home.

A final assessment looks at language shifts over the course of a single generation, focusing on the evolution between childhood language and current language proficiencies in both parents'


native and national languages, comparing the current uses and proficiencies of the parents' and the children's generations. The thrust of the argument of the present study is that children's linguistic self-esteem depends less on contact before some critical age or on "school-home language matching" and more, at an early stage, on the accordance between parents' linguistic capital and their language transmission strategies, and later, on how both the family and the society manage the relevant form of language diversity (in terms of the social uses and status of languages). The following section focused on parents' linguistic capital, interpreted here as the outcome of a broader linguistic socialization experience, i.e., the result of a combination of parents' language background, educational attainment, labour market experiences, and, finally, proficiency in the national language of their immigration country.

5.5. The linguistic socialization experiences of Turkish migrant parents

In the TIES data, the large majority of Turkish parents were adult migrants raised in the Turkish language (see: Figure 76, on parents' childhood language).²⁷⁷ Only in Germany there were significant city differences. First, because in Frankfurt there were more parents with monolingual Turkish language background compared to those in Berlin, where there were more cases of a small minority from Kurdish language minority groups (22% in Berlin, 9% in Frankfurt). Parents of Kurdish language background migrated during adulthood and had also a minimal degree of schooling, thus were native speakers of both Kurdish language and Turkish (few in France also). A minority of Turkish parents were also raised in the national language of the survey country along with Turkish language: this population was again mainly present in Germany, children of immigrants arriving at early age or born in the survey country, but no city differences (see chapter 3 for more details on parents' migration generation).

²⁷⁷ Mother's and father's childhood language are significantly correlated. Rho de Spearman: Berlin 0.75 ; Frankfurt 0.58; in Paris and Dutch cities around 0.5, Strasbourg 0.33.

Figure 76 - In which language(s) was your father/mother raised?




Once in their immigration country, Turkish parents acquired new language skills to varying degrees of success. As already mentioned, the literature has highlighted Turkish immigrants' lower progress in learning the languages of their countries of emigration in comparison to other immigrants. Human capital characteristics, such as rural origins, lower educational levels and less qualified professions have been the main explanations behind this apparent "Turkish immigrant trend". Previous studies have demonstrated that when immigrants lack reading and writing skills in their "native" language (i.e., no education or basic reading and writing skills, which includes a considerable number of cases among some guest worker groups), this limitation in their human capital is expected to have an additional and independent negative effect on their linguistic socialization experience in the host country. Inversely, when individuals' proficiency in different languages is associated with higher educational attainment and/or greater occupational experience is more socially valued (Davila and Mora, 2004; Stolzenberg and Tienda, 1997). Nevertheless,

it is also more difficult to attain proficiency in the language of the host country when lack of cultural knowledge or limitations on recognition of credentials makes it difficult to transfer or make use of previous human capital (in education, professional experience, and native-language proficiency). Thus, attention must be given to parents' previous acquired capital but also to the opportunities to "transfer" their accumulated human capital after arriving in the immigration country (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990, McManus, Gould and Welch 1983; Davila and Mora 2004, Stolzenberg and Tienda 1997, Esser 2006). This "transferability" is mainly determined by the utility of parents' educational capital in the new countries.

In the TIES survey, parents' educational capital was generally acquired in the home country: for more than 90% of Turkish parents in France and the Netherlands, and about 75% in Germany had schooling in Turkey (see chapter 3). Its assessment in terms of linguistic socialization experiences involved a combination of their labour market experience in the immigration country and their survey country language proficiency. Firstly, and looking at potential explanatory factors, TIES data, showed that Turkish parents disposed of low educational attainment, particularly for mothers (see chapter 3). In addition, Turkish parents' educational attainment was associated to their rural/urban origins, meaning that those from a rural background typically had limited academic skills, while the academic skills of those from more urbanized origins were more diverse, and, again, particularly for mothers. However, some "untransferability" of higher educational capital (such as higher secondary or more) was more observed in the French labour market—those parents with different levels of educational attainment ended up in occupations at a similar level of qualification as lower educated parents in Germany with primary education or less. Thus, as different educational qualifications resulted in similar low qualified professions in the emigration country, we expected different utilities and linguistic esteem evaluations for survey country language, reported in parents' survey country language proficiency. Respondents reported on their parents' oral, reading and writing proficiency in the survey country language (see Figures 77 and 78), and differences between countries in relation to proficiency were more significant for reading and writing skills than for oral skills. Although for all countries mothers' (who were lower educated than fathers) showed lower survey country language proficiency in relation to fathers, Turkish parents in France showed in general, lower proficiency in survey country language, particularly in Strasbourg and for reading and writing skills. Inversely, parents'


proficiency in the survey country language were higher reports in Germany, and particularly in Frankfurt.

Figure 77²⁷⁸ *How well would you say your father/mother speaks or spoke the survey country language?*



²⁷⁸ Only in France, chi2 valid for fathers of $p < 0.01$.

Figure 78²⁷⁹ *Can/could your father/mother read or write in the survey country language?*



Reported survey country national language proficiency for the parents was associated to migration generation, age, educational attainment and labour market experience (see Table 22 and 23).²⁸⁰ For instance, younger parents showed better proficiency in reading and writing in the survey country language than older ones. However, what most distinguished individuals' proficiency in terms of parents' indicators were parents' educational attainments, (participation in the labour market and degree of qualification of the job held) and findings revealed patterns of results that were consistently more evident for mothers than for fathers (as expected from previously reported findings, such as those of Casey and Dustmann

²⁷⁹ Only in France, chi2 valid for fathers of $p < 0.001$ and for mothers for $p < 0.05$.

²⁸⁰ We do not show here the numbers by parents' childhood specific language, due to its apparent low diversity in France and The Netherlands, and because childhood language diversity is more related, as previously mentioned, to other social variables. Moreover, we indicate here mainly parents' "reading and writing" skills because they represent the competences were contrasts between countries, and mothers in relation to fathers, are more significant.

2005, Chiswick and Miller 2001, 2005). Thus, parents with high levels of education showed high proficiency in survey country national language, varying further and directly in relation to employment status and occupation. In the past, fathers who were unemployed or in unskilled or semi-skilled professions were at least twice more frequently to have very low proficiency in the survey country language, particularly compared to those in more qualified professions. Employed fathers were more able to read and write in survey country language compared to unemployed and retired parents (differences of 15% to 30%). For the mothers, employment status was even more significant in distinguishing their survey language proficiency, as employed mothers were twice as likely to be able to read and write in survey country language compared to retired, staying at home or unemployed mothers.

Country differences were partially explained by parents who were children of immigrants in Germany (see Tables 22 and 23). Those who migrated at earlier ages or were born in Germany were younger, more educated, more likely to be employed, and worked in more qualified professions. Parents who arrived in Germany as adults (> 75% of the total Turkish parents for the German sample) were older, less educated, and although more likely to be employed, tended to work in less qualified professions (see chapter 3). Not surprisingly, compared to the 25% who had migrated at earlier ages or who were born in Germany: the fathers were one fifth less likely to be able to read and write in German if arriving as adults (78% compared to 99%); and significantly more likely to be able only to read (16% compared to 2%); the mothers were less than half as likely to be able to read and write in German if arriving as adults (42% compared to 94%), or significantly more likely to be able only to read (25%, compared to 6%). Finally, almost one third of mothers migrating as adults could neither read nor write in German (while none for the others who had been children of immigrants).

Despite this generational difference among Turkish parents in Germany, the lowest reported proficiency in a survey country language was for Turkish parents in France, although this group was in general, higher educated compared to Turkish parents in both Germany and the Netherlands. Turkish fathers in France were three times more likely than those in Germany to be unable to read or write in the survey country language (19% in France, 6% in Germany), and 20% less likely to be able to do both (56% in France, 78% for Germany). Differences for Turkish mothers in France were similar but smaller, which is not surprising given that Turkish mothers in Germany had particularly low levels of education (50% had no schooling, while

less than 18% for the other countries), and low proficiency in national language (one quarter could neither read or write in German language, although this proportion raised up to 33% in the Netherlands and 44% in France). Nevertheless and as previously mentioned, the professional status of Turkish parents in France revealed some downward mobility when comparing their educational level and professional occupation in the immigration country to the educational level and professional outcomes of parents in Germany and the Netherlands. This hint to some “untransferability” from Turkish schooling to the French labour market, which should be expected to have some impact on their linguistic self-esteem in French. Indeed, TIES data confirmed that their proficiency in French was low—the higher educated Turkish fathers in France were almost 20% less likely to be able to read and write in the survey country language than those in Germany (80% compared to 98% where some were children of immigrants), and 13% less compared to those in the Netherlands (adult migrants, as in France, and 93% could read and write in Dutch). Differences in survey language proficiency between higher educated mothers (i.e., higher secondary education or more) in different countries were more significant compared to fathers’ (64% in France, compared to 97% in Germany and 95% in the Netherlands). Similar comparative trends were also observed for both parents professional status.

However, considering that Turkish parents in Germany had lower educational attainment and did not occupy particularly qualified positions, their children’s positive evaluations of their German language proficiency should be taken with caution and set against the context of their specific trajectories. This is true for all Turkish parents, independently of their country of settlement, given the general lack of language learning support provided in their immigration countries and their type of labour market insertion. Nevertheless, low levels of previous educational capital were more evident in Germany. Thus, to set against the context parents’ language proficiency in relation to their specific trajectories is a reminder of the relativity of this indicator and the importance of individuals’ linguistic self-esteem and identity. And here, for similar levels of qualifications we observed a linguistic-esteem reported by their children as higher for Turkish parents in Germany and in the Netherlands, while lower for those in France. As the latter were higher educated than the former but performed low qualified professional qualifications, their reported French skills may denote a lower linguistic self-esteem due to their experience of also lower utility, of their previous acquired educational capital. The next section focuses on the linguistic starting conditions of descendants of Turkish immigrants, beginning with their childhood language and its determinants.

Table 22 Mothers' socio-demographic characteristics

	Mother's reading and writing skills in "national" languages											
	France				Germany				The Netherlands			
	read+write French	read French	neither read nor write	% column	read+write German	read German	neither read nor write	% column	read+write Dutch	read Dutch	neither read nor write	% column
% row												
<i>Generation in relation to migration</i>												
Born in survey country of native parents	100,0			2,8	100,0			6,4	100,0			3,2
Born in survey country or migrating before 15 years old	33,3		66,7	3,0	94,3	5,7		13,9	77,8	11,1	11,1	10,3
Born in Turkey and coming at adult age	34,3	21,3	44,4	94,1	42,4	24,9	32,7	79,7	51,7	13,1	35,2	86,6
<i>Age</i>												
34-44 years old	44,8	22,7	32,5	36,9	65,6	18,0	16,4	12,6	65,7	20,9	13,4	18,5
45-54 years old	32,7	23,3	44,1	41,2	54,5	19,1	26,4	48,6	60,6	12,0	27,4	48,5
55-64 years old	28,1	14,6	57,3	19,9	50,8	22,6	26,6	36,6	38,9	13,7	47,4	26,7
65 or more years old	18,2		81,8	2,0	54,5	18,2	27,3	2,3	13,0	8,7	78,3	6,3
<i>Highest educational attainment</i>												
no schooling or koran school	6,2	6,2	87,7	13,6	38,7	19,4	41,9	50,3	19,7	10,6	69,7	17,3
primary school	25,3	30,0	44,7	46,5	41,1	36,4	22,4	24,3	52,0	13,6	34,3	52,1
lower sec	54,5	16,8	28,7	22,4	93,8	4,9	1,2	18,4	76,8	15,9	7,2	19,1
higher sec or more	64,4	17,8	17,8	17,4	96,8	3,2		7,0	94,9	2,6	2,6	11,6
<i>Occupation when respondents were 15 years old</i>												
Executive, professionals and white collars	28,6	71,4		11,0	100,0			6,4	94,4		5,6	23,0
Skilled manual workers	42,9	29,6	27,6	51,8	89,5	3,5	7,0	60,6	75,0	3,6	21,4	32,2
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	32,8	23,9	43,3	37,2	71,0	19,4	9,7	33,0	45,9	16,2	37,8	44,8
Not working	31,3	16,0	52,7	59,6	45,2	23,3	31,5	80,5	50,2	14,5	35,3	77,3
<i>Current employment status</i>												
Working	50,4	27,8	21,7	26,9	91,2	5,6	3,2	25,3	80,3	7,9	11,8	19,1
Unemployed	21,6	21,6	56,9	10,6	45,9	32,4	21,6	7,5	60,0	11,4	28,6	9,3
Retired or disabled	36,1	5,6	58,3	7,3	43,9	26,8	29,3	8,3	58,0	14,8	27,2	20,6
Domestic	29,6	21,0	49,4	55,1	40,2	25,1	34,7	58,9	43,7	14,6	41,7	51,0
Total	35,4	21,1	43,6	495	53,3	20,7	26,0	503	54,5	12,9	32,6	420

Table 23- Fathers' socio-demographic characteristics

	Father's reading and writing skills in "national" languages											
	France				Germany				The Netherlands			
<i>% row</i>	read+write French	read French	neither read nor write	% column	read+write German	read German	neither read nor write	% column	read+write Dutch	read Dutch	neither read nor write	% column
<i>Generation in relation to migration</i>												
Born in survey country of native parents					100,0			1,2				1,1
Born in survey country or migrating before 15 years old	92,3		7,7	2,6	98,5	1,5		13,5	91,9	2,7	5,4	8,4
Born in Turkey and coming at adult age	56,2	25,1	18,7	97,2	78,3	16,1	5,6	85,3	64,7	13,9	16,9	90,4
<i>Age</i>												
34-44 years old	86,4	11,9	1,7	11,8	88,9	11,1		5,6	94,3	2,9	2,9	9,7
45-54 years old	57,1	27,3	15,6	47,0	81,2	14,8	4,0	30,9	75,4	12,3	12,3	38,3
55-64 years old	53,5	23,3	23,3	34,7	83,3	11,8	4,8	47,3	60,0	16,5	23,5	32,3
65 or more years old	24,2	33,3	42,4	6,4	71,8	19,2	9,0	16,2	60,6	18,3	21,1	19,7
<i>Highest educational attainment</i>												
no schooling or koran school					60,5	24,4	15,1	28,5	20,7	10,3	69,0	8,1
primary school	44,1	28,6	27,3	47,7	82,8	15,1	2,2	44,5	60,1	21,4	18,5	45,1
lower sec	63,0	27,4	9,6	28,0	95,9	4,1		11,7	84,3	7,9	7,9	24,2
higher sec or more	80,2	13,8	6,0	24,3	98,4	1,6		15,3	92,9	3,6	3,6	22,7
<i>Occupation when respondents were 15 years old</i>												
Executive, professionals and white collars	83,3	11,9	4,8	9,6	84,5	12,1	3,4	15,1	85,0	10,0	5,0	18,3
Skilled manual workers	60,0	20,9	19,1	73,4	82,7	14,5	2,7	66,6	73,1	15,7	11,2	63,8
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	35,1	44,2	20,8	17,0	77,1	15,7	7,1	18,3	69,4	16,7	13,9	17,9
Not working	33,3	40,7	25,9	5,6	78,6	12,5	8,9	12,8	73,6	9,2	17,2	31,2
<i>Current employment status</i>												
Working	60,7	25,3	14,0	66,3	87,7	9,6	2,7	68,8	84,2	10,1	5,7	42,7
Unemployed	60,8	21,6	17,6	10,9	61,5	26,9	11,5	5,4	72,4	10,3	17,2	7,8
Retired or disabled	42,9	26,7	30,5	22,7	73,6	17,6	8,8	25,8	56,8	17,3	25,9	49,5
Total	57,2	24,3	18,5	499	81,3	13,9	4,8	503	70,0	13,5	16,6	439

5.6. Turkish descendants' linguistic socialization experience


In this section, we assess the childhood language environments and exposure opportunities of the descendants of Turkish immigrants, both within and outside the family. The analysis focuses first on the Turkish descendants' childhood languages and their determinants, and secondly on their current language proficiency and its relation to their opportunities for language exposure.

5.6.1. Turkish descendants' childhood language: mono versus plurilinguism

As displayed in Figure 79, on respondents' childhood language, most Turkish parents transmitted their native language (at least 80%), but in different modalities: some providing childhood bilingualism to their children (both the parents' native language and the survey country language) others childhood monolingualism (only the parents' native language). Childhood monolingualism in the survey country language was rare in all three countries (less than 7%), and in Germany, the only group to have experienced a monolingual childhood was the minority who were raised only in German. Language loss through a lack of family transmission was very uncommon and observed only for a minority of bilingual parents of Kurdish language background—about one fifth of these parents raised their children not in their native language, but in Turkish and the survey country language.

There were significant differences between the three countries, and within-country city differences only in France. The highest number of Turkish descendants initially raised as Turkish monolinguals was observed in France, particularly in Strasbourg (up to 60%, versus 48% in Paris). This proportion was considerably smaller in the Netherlands (between one-fourth in Rotterdam and one-sixth in Amsterdam) and almost non-existent in Germany. In contrast, the large majority of respondents in Germany and the Netherlands were childhood bilinguals (85% in Frankfurt and 70% in Berlin, 77% in Amsterdam and 70% in Rotterdam), whereas this was true of less than two fifths of respondents in France (40% in Paris, 35% in Strasbourg). Some parents from a Kurdish-language background raised their children plurilingually (Turkish, Kurdish and German languages for 20% of total respondents in Berlin, 9% in Frankfurt), and fewer than 10% raised their children only in their native languages (Turkish-Kurdish childhood bilingualism).

Figure 79 - In which language(s) were you raised?



Childhood language: between parents' human capital and children's school experiences

Given that, in general, Turkish parents were low educated and had their school experience in Turkey, many Turkish descendants experienced more structured contact with the survey country language (particularly functional literacy) at school. In order to grasp the association between family and school experiences with childhood languages, we will first focus on the relation of Turkish descendants' childhood language to their parents' human capital, and second on the children's age at school entry and their highest educational attainment.

In France, language transmission strategies in the family were significantly associated to parents' linguistic capital—namely, the mother's French language proficiency, educational attainment, as well as the father's educational level and professional qualifications (see Tables

24 and 25).²⁸¹ For instance, a focus on transmitting only the parents' native language was more common among less educated mothers (=> 62% with primary school or less) compared to those with higher levels of education (=<47% with lower secondary or more) and when mothers either had no reading and writing skills or could read, but not write, in French (63%, compared to 44% when they could both read and write); bilingual transmission was more often observed for higher educated mothers (54% and 42%, compared to 35% for lower educated mothers) or with better French skills (48%, versus about 35% for those with lower proficiency). These differences were also observed for fathers' educational attainment, but differences by occupation were slightly smaller. For instance, although the majority of Turkish fathers who were skilled manual workers preferred to transmit only Turkish (58%, with 37% transmitting two languages), those in the least skilled occupational categories (semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers) opted more for bilingual transmission (63%, while 36% transmitted only one language).

Among the groups surveyed here, we have observed that Turkish parents in Germany showed the lowest level academic skills in their mother tongue (76% had primary school or less) — the majority being manual workers in the immigration country (58%), and variable proficiency in German. They raised their children bilingually or plurilingually within the family (79% of the total), regardless of their level of human capital in terms of educational attainment, professional background and German proficiency. Thus, there were significant chances that some of these parents lacked the academic proficiency to allow them to transmit high linguistic self-esteem to their children in the several languages that they transmitted. There were still the parents who transmitted three languages (Kurdish, Turkish and German languages: 14% of cases). Members of this group, who were themselves Kurdish-Turkish bilinguals, were in general less educated, less active in the labour market or held low professional qualifications, and showed more limited reading and writing skills in German. Thus, when transmitting various languages to their children, they were exposed to the same risks as discussed above. Inversely, parents who were children of immigrants themselves (less than one fifth) were more qualified, and transmitted diverse language(s), and only about one-tenth did not transmit Turkish.

²⁸¹ We found no significant association between Turkish descendants childhood language and fathers' educational attainment and mothers' professional occupation.

In the Netherlands, parents' language transmission was, as in Germany, less associated to parents' educational attainment, professional qualifications, and employment status. Nevertheless, language transmission in the family was correlated with the father's proficiency in the Dutch language—bilingual transmission was common among fathers reported to be proficient in reading and writing Dutch (80%) and less so with those with no reading and writing skills in Dutch (64%), while Turkish monolingual transmission was two times more frequent among parents with the lowest skills in Dutch (36% transmitted only Turkish if the father could neither read or write in Dutch, compared to only 14% if the father was able to read and write). Thus, there was some convergence between linguistic capital and language transmission in the family. Otherwise, the combination of language transmitted and parents' human capital proved to be unrelated to their academic skills, as for Turkish parents in Germany, risking the transmission of lower linguistic self-esteem to some of the children of less skilled parents.

In general, there were no significant gender differences in childhood language among the descendants of Turkish immigrants (see Table 26), and only some age differences in France and Germany—Turkish monolingual transmission was more common among older respondents, as in Germany for those who with Kurdish as childhood language. When referring to respondents' school experiences, there were no specific trends in relation to their childhood language. For instance, age at contact with the survey country language in terms of more functional literacy can be assessed by age entering school. We have observed (see chapter 4) that this contact happened earlier for Turkish descendants in France (around 90% entered at the age of three years or earlier), followed by those in the Netherlands (81% at 4 years old), while in Germany age at school entry was the most diverse and latest (for instance, between 30% to 40% entered at the age of six years or later). In addition, the way in which this language contact occurred can also be associated to the length of individuals' educational careers, here assessed by respondents' educational attainment. As previously observed (see chapter 4), respondents in France were the most educated, followed by those in the Netherlands, with those in Germany attaining the lowest level of education. However, the only significant relationship between language transmission and educational career was observed for age at school entry in France (see Table 26). Those who had experienced a Turkish monolingual upbringing had, on average, entered school earlier than those whose upbringing also included French (58% and 38%, respectively), while for those entering later, the reverse was also true, i.e., about 37% of those raised only in Turkish entered school after

the age of three years, whereas among those raised in both Turkish and French this proportion increased to 52%. Similarly, in Germany, later school entry was more likely among childhood plurilinguals (Turkish, Kurdish and German languages).

In sum and as discussed above, parents' linguistic socialization experiences determine their language transmission (Brizić 2006). In addition, childhood language transmitted in the family may reveal parents' strategies either for to pass on a cultural legacy or executing a quick turn towards acculturation inside the family. In both cases, significant associations between childhood language and parents' human capital may be observed. For instance, more educated parents may opt to transmit their native language so to give their children more diverse and competitive skills, while lower educated parents who feel that their resources are limited may prefer to focus on national language in the aim of preventing their children from facing labour market limitations similar to those they encountered themselves. Although these examples do not tell the full story, these associations reveal parents' intention to facilitate their children's social mobility (see different strategies as different backgrounds and motivations may lead to similar outcomes in chapter 1).

In France, significant links were found between the language transmitted to the children during childhood, on one hand, and the parents' educational attainment, labour market skills and French language proficiency, on the other. Parents who provided a monolingual childhood were either lower educated or had lesser proficiency in French, while those who had provided a bilingual environment were more educated and more likely to be able to read and write in French. In addition, children who had a monolingual childhood experienced earlier contact with the French language in school, but no differences in the length of their school careers. Thus, it seems that for Turkish parents in France there was a concern of transmitting a childhood language according to one's skills, leaving other skills to the school. In the Netherlands, the link between childhood language and parents' human capital was weaker, being mainly connected to the parents' Dutch language proficiency, while in Germany no particular association was found. Thus, in both countries, childhood language seemed to have been more a concern for language assimilation already in the heart of the family, and independently from parents' skills. And differently from France, in the other two countries, there was no further association between childhood language within the family and their age of contact with a functional form of the national language at school; but like in

France, it was also not found to be correlated with the length of their school careers. However, we know that the school careers of the descendants of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands were more diverse while in Germany they tended to enter school later and stay in formal education for a shorter period. Thus, the frequent combination of parents' lower educational and professional capital with bilingual childhood transmission in Germany suggests the possibilities both of a degree of risk for lower linguistic self-esteem in the national language and parents' native language loss, more than in the other two countries. In brief, Turkish descendants in France disposed of more advantageous linguistic starting conditions in the family than their counterparts in the other two countries, and especially compared to those in Germany.

Table 24 - Descendants of Turkish immigrants - Childhood bilingualism according to parents' human capital

% row	Turkish descendants' childhood language in relation to their father's human capital												
	France				Germany					The Netherlands			
	Monolingual family transmission		Plurilingual		Monolingual family transmission		Plurilingual family transmission			Monolingual family transmission		Plurilingual	
	Parents' native	French	French and		German	Turkish and	German,	German and	Parents' native	Dutch language	Dutch and		
language	language	language	N	language	Kurdish	Kurdish	Turkish	N	language	language	parents' native	N	
Father's highest educational attainment													
no schooling or Koranic school					5,9		16,0	78,2	119	32,3	6,5	61,3	31
primary school	61,6	1,7	36,7	229	7,5	0,5	14,0	78,0	186	20,6	2,9	76,5	171
lower sec	51,1	6,7	42,2	135	8,2		12,2	79,6	49	19,8	1,1	79,1	92
higher sec or more	50,9	9,5	39,7	117	9,4		6,3	84,4	64	17,4	7,0	75,6	87
Father occupation when respondents was 15 years old													
Executive, professional and white-collar	45,5	15,9	38,6	44	3,4		10,3	86,2	58	7,7	7,7	84,6	39
Skilled manual workers	58,3	4,8	36,9	336	7,8	0,8	13,7	77,6	255	19,7	4,4	75,9	137
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	35,9	1,3	62,8	78	4,3	1,4	20,0	74,3	70	18,9	0,0	81,1	38
Not working	81,5	7,4	11,1	27	16,1		1,8	82,1	56	27,7	3,4	68,9	121
Father's employment status													
Working	51,8	6,1	42,1	309	5,7	0,3	12,6	81,4	333	16,8	3,7	79,5	163
Unemployed	58,8		41,2	51	3,8		7,7	88,5	26	17,9	7,1	75,0	28
Retired or disabled	65,4	3,8	30,8	104	12,0		19,2	68,8	125	25,1	3,2	71,7	189
Father's native language													
Turkish	56,1	5,1	38,8	467	7,2	0,6	2,5	89,7	320	22,1	3,9	74,0	388
Turkish and Kurdish	54,5		45,5	22	1,3	1,3	80,0	17,3	75				
National and Turkish	30,0	20,0	50,0	10	8,5		0,9	90,6	106	7,3	4,9	87,8	41
Father's reading and writing skills in survey country language													
read+write	53,7	6,0	40,3	285	8,6	0,2	13,7	77,5	409	14,4	5,6	80,0	287
read	54,2	5,0	40,8	120		2,9	12,9	84,3	70	30,4	0,0	69,6	56
neither read nor write	63,7	1,1	35,2	91			16,7	83,3	24	35,8	0,0	64,2	68
Total	55,6	5,2	39,2	500	7,0	0,6	13,7	78,7	503	20,5	3,9	74,9	434

Table 25 - Descendants of Turkish immigrants - Childhood bilingualism according to parents' human capital

Turkish descendants' childhood language in relation to their mother's human capital

% row	France				Germany				The Netherlands				
	Monolingual family transmission		Plurilingual	N	Monolingual family transmission	Plurilingual family transmission			N	Monolingual family transmission		Plurilingual	N
	transmission									transmission			
	Parents' native language	French language	French and parents' native language		German language	Turkish and Kurdish	German, Turkish and Kurdish	German and Turkish		Parents' native language	Dutch language	Dutch and parents' native language	
	language	language	language	N	language	Kurdish	Kurdish	Turkish	N	language		language	N
<i>Mother's highest educational attainment</i>													
no schooling or Koranic school	64,6		35,4	66	4,5	0,5	15,8	79,3	222	28,8	4,5	66,7	67
primary school	62,2	2,7	35,1	222	8,4		20,6	71,0	107	21,1	1,0	77,9	199
lower sec	38,9	7,4	53,7	108	9,9		4,9	85,2	81	18,1	5,6	76,4	74
higher sec or more	47,0	10,8	42,2	84	16,1	3,2	6,5	74,2	31	13,3	13,3	73,3	45
<i>Mother occupation when respondents was 15 years old</i>													
Executive, professional and white-collar	50,0	18,2	31,8	22	16,7			83,3	6	5,0		95,0	20
Skilled manual workers	54,5	4,0	41,6	101	19,3		7,0	73,7	57	11,1	3,7	85,2	28
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	48,6	1,4	50,0	72			29,0	71,0	31	17,9		82,1	39
Not working	55,6	6,0	38,4	284	6,0	0,8	14,0	79,2	385	22,5	5,2	72,3	291
<i>Mother's employment status</i>													
Working	53,4	7,6	38,9	131	9,6		9,6	80,8	125	14,5	1,3	84,2	78
Unemployed	60,8		39,2	51			13,5	86,5	37	21,1	7,9	71,1	37
Retired or disabled	61,1	16,7	22,2	37	7,3	2,4	9,8	80,5	41	19,0	4,8	76,2	84
Domestic	54,2	2,7	43,2	265	6,5	0,7	15,8	77,0	291	23,3	4,5	72,3	205
<i>Mother's native language</i>													
Turkish	58,6	2,9	38,5	444	5,4	0,3	0,7	93,6	298	22,3	2,4	75,3	384
Turkish and Kurdish	59,1		40,9	22		1,3	82,1	16,7	78				
National and Turkish	10,7	35,7	53,6	28	13,6	0,8	2,4	83,2	125	8,3	2,8	88,9	36
<i>Mother's reading and writing skills in survey country language</i>													
read+write	44,3	7,8	47,9	167	12,3	0,4	10,1	77,2	268	18,8	3,6	77,7	226
read	63,6	1,0	35,4	99	1,9	1,0	21,2	76,0	104	14,8	3,7	81,5	54
neither read nor write	62,8	3,4	33,8	207		0,8	15,3	84,0	131	27,6		72,4	135
Total	55,5	5,0	39,5	500	7,0	0,6	13,7	78,7	503	20,5	3,9	74,9	434

Table 26 - Descendants of Turkish immigrants - Childhood bilingualism by demographic and educational variables

Turkish descendants childhood language													
	France				Germany					Netherlands			
	Monolingual family transmission		Plurilingual		Monolingual	Plurilingual family transmission				Monolingual family transmission		Plurilingual	
			transmission		family							transmission	
	Parents' native	French language	French and parents'		transmission	German language	Turkish and	German, Turkish and		German and	Parents' native	Dutch language	
% row	language		native language	% column		Kurdish	Kurdish	Turkish	% column	language		native language	% column
Gender													
Men	53,8	5,5	40,7	50,5	5,8	0,8	12,4	81,0	48,1	19,8	5,4	74,8	46,5
Women	57,3	4,8	37,9	49,5	8,0	0,4	14,9	76,6	51,9	21,4	2,6	76,0	53,5
Age													
18 - 24	54,2	4,5	41,2	66,0	7,8		8,3	83,9	38,2	14,6		85,4	11,1
25 - 29	50,0	5,4	44,6	18,4	4,5		18,8	76,6	30,6	21,6	6,3	72,2	40,8
30 or +	67,9	7,7	24,4	15,6	8,3	1,9	15,3	74,5	31,2	21,3	2,9	75,8	48,2
Age at school entry													
between 2 and 3 years	57,7	4,3	38,0	89,6	11,2		7,1	81,7	40,4	11,9	11,9	76,2	9,7
4 years	36,5	11,5	51,9	10,4	4,9	0,7	14,8	79,6	29,1	20,7	3,2	76,1	80,9
between 5 and 7 years old					4,0	1,3	22,8	71,8	30,5	29,3	2,4	70,7	9,4
Educational attainment													
Primary school and special education	15,4	7,7	76,9	5,2				100,0	3,0	33,3		66,7	6,9
Lower secondary	52,2	4,3	43,5	9,2	1,4	0,7	12,9	85,0	27,8	22,2	3,3	74,4	21,2
Apprenticeship	68,7	5,2	26,1	26,8	8,3	0,8	15,8	75,1	52,7	28,6		71,4	9,7
Upper secondary + apprenticeship	49,5	1,1	49,5	18,2	16,3		10,2	73,5	9,7	19,3	3,6	77,1	32,5
Tertiary education	55,7	6,4	37,9	40,6	8,8		11,8	79,4	6,8	15,5	7,0	77,5	29,7
% total	55,6	5,0	39,4	500	7,0	0,6	13,7	78,7	503	20,5	3,9	74,9	434

5.6.2. Transition to adulthood turns the picture around: Self-reported language proficiency

Turkish descendants' proficiency in both their parents' native language(s) and the survey country language was assessed through self-reporting on *speaking*, *reading* and *writing* skills (see Figures 80 to 82). In general, their self-reported proficiency in both languages was very high, and proficiency in the two or three languages was positively correlated.²⁸² Due to their more structured contact with the survey country national language through the educational system, as well as its greater range of uses and greater societal prestige, it was not a surprise that their proficiency in the national language was, in general, greater than in their parents' native language. Not surprisingly, differences in proficiency between languages were more pronounced for reading and writing skills, and less for speaking skills. Last but not least, very low language proficiency was rare in both languages (around 10%), and only in Berlin was self-evaluated proficiency in the two languages very similar.

It is interesting to observe that although contact with the survey country national language within the family and during childhood was the least common in France, Turkish descendants in this country were the most positive in their self-reported proficiency in the survey country national language (the proportion reporting at least “very good” proficiency on each of the three skills was at least 77%), closely followed by those in the Netherlands (70% or higher, for childhood bilinguals in Dutch). In contrast, Turkish descendants in Germany, childhood bilinguals in German, reported more moderate language skills in this language (= <46% reporting *very good* or *excellent* writing skills in German, compared to at least 54% who reported *moderate* or *good* writing skills in German). Thus, those reporting moderate proficiency in the survey country national language made up a substantial part of the sample in Germany (around 45%) and the Netherlands (around 30%); while the number of cases in France was smaller (<15%).

As expected, moderate proficiency in different skills for parents' native language were more commonly reported compared to the reported moderate skills in national language. This was particularly common in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Frankfurt (40-45%), followed by Paris and Berlin (30-40%) and the least in Strasbourg (25-30%). In contrast, high skills in parents' native language showed the inverse order – more important in Strasbourg, Paris and Berlin,

²⁸² Rho de Spearman in France is always significant for $p < 0.01$, coefficient is, though, higher when relating different skills in the same language (between 0,69 and 0,91), while lower when relating different skills between different languages (between 0,19 up to 0,36).

less in Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. And similar to reported proficiency in survey country national languages, respondents only reported poor or no proficiency in their parents' native language(s) in a very small proportion of cases in all three countries (<15%), except for writing skills among Turkish descendants in Germany (almost 30% in Frankfurt and 20% in Berlin).

Finally, in a comparison of reported proficiency in parents' native and national languages, Turkish descendants were significantly less confident in their parents' native language compared to survey country national languages, particularly in Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam (the percentage of respondents reporting very good or excellent proficiency was of less 25% to 35% for parents' native language in these cities), followed by Frankfurt (15% less). The smallest differences in self-reported proficiency were seen in Strasbourg and Berlin, but while the proportion of respondents who were highly confident in their Turkish language skills was highest in Strasbourg, in Berlin the similarity in reported proficiency levels was due to their generally lower evaluation of their German language skills.

Figure 80 – Self-reported speaking skills




Figure 81 – Self-reported reading skills





Figure 82 – Self-reported writing skills



5.6.3. Language shifts from an intergenerational perspective

The present section focuses on intergenerational language shifts, following Brizić (2006, 2007). Brizić proposed three general types of gradual language shifts in relation to parents' native language: *minority language shift*, wherein children are highly competent in parents' native language; *partial language shift*, wherein the children's competence in their parents' native language is more limited; and *total language shift*, wherein children possess little or no knowledge of their parents' native language. These gradual language shifts were measured in three ways: First, most crudely, using respondents' self-reported proficiency, and then in more relative terms: first by comparing self-reported proficiency in parents' native language to their childhood language (Brizić, 2006) and second by comparing language uses with members of older and younger generations in the family—i.e., comparing language uses with parents and language uses with siblings.

Language shifts through self-reported proficiency


Two general language proficiency indices were created, one for each language, by taking the average of the three different individual proficiencies (see Figure 83). Total parents' native language loss, meaning individuals reporting little or no proficiency in their parents' native language, was rare (<10%), and particularly rare in France. Partial language shift, meaning moderate self-reported proficiency in the parents' native language, was the most common—seen in the majority of Turkish descendants in Frankfurt (almost 60%), followed by those in Rotterdam and Amsterdam (almost half), with smaller numbers in Berlin and Paris (almost two fifths) and particularly few in Strasbourg (around one quarter). Minority language shift, meaning high self-reported proficiency in the parents' native language, was mainly found in France and Berlin—being particularly high in Strasbourg (almost 70%) followed by Paris and Berlin (around 50%), Amsterdam and Rotterdam (<45%), and the lowest in Frankfurt (30%).

Comparing the two language indices (survey country national language and parents' native language), it can be observed that in Berlin, and Strasbourg self-reported proficiency was very similar for the two languages; but while in Strasbourg respondents' linguistic self-esteem was quite high, in Berlin reported linguistic self-esteem was lower for both German and parents' native languages, suggesting the combination of partial loss of the parents' native language with insufficient acquisition of the national language. In contrast, Turkish descendants in Frankfurt reported still lower linguistic self-esteem than those in Berlin for their parents' native language — the highest degree of (partial) parents' native language loss in the TIES

data on linguistic self-esteem. In Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam there were as many cases of parents' native language minority shift as of partial loss, combined with higher proficiency in survey country language — showing a general trend of self-reported linguistic assimilation in these three cities.

In sum, although Turkish parents' language transmission in different countries resulted in diverse outcomes in terms of linguistic self-esteem, context also played a role in influencing respondents' linguistic socialization experiences. For instance, potential bilingual outcomes were more common among the descendants of Turkish immigrants in France, considerably more so in Strasbourg than Paris. In the latter city, Turkish descendants were closer to their counterparts in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in terms of potential parents' native language loss. In Germany, where linguistic self-esteem was generally lower compared to the other two countries, patterns in the two cities were different. In Frankfurt, the loss of the parents' native language was more common than limited acquisition of the German language, whereas in Berlin lower linguistic self-esteem was found for both languages.

Figure 83 – Index on self-reported language proficiency



Language shifts in time: between childhood language and current proficiency

When relating the previous indices for the two languages with respondents' childhood language in the family (see Figures 84 and 85), a pattern was observed for all cities: Turkish descendants raised in monolingual childhood reported higher linguistic self-esteem than that of those raised in childhood bilingualism. Moreover, differences between the two languages proficiency were also higher for respondents who had had a bilingual childhood, while significantly decreasing for those who had experienced a monolingual childhood (even disappearing in Strasbourg and Rotterdam). Some Figures should be read with caution due to small case numbers, nevertheless, in order provide a complete picture, I decided to display all the outcomes.

Moreover, three main points here: first, not surprising, differences for childhood language were more significant for current self-esteem in the parents' native language compared to differences in survey country language; second, showed to be a particular case— although the number of respondents reporting high linguistic self-esteem for both languages was largest among Turkish descendants in Strasbourg who had been raised monolingually than those raised bilingually, differences between the two languages were still lower for those raised bilingually in Strasbourg than for respondents in the other cities raised also as bilinguals; third, Turkish descendants in Frankfurt and Berlin, who had almost all been raised bi or plurilingually, reported the lowest linguistic self-esteem for all languages compared to all other respondents.

Three further conclusions can be drawn regarding the transition between Turkish descendants' childhood language and current linguistic self-esteem based on the TIES data. Firstly, in light of parents' linguistic socialization experiences with respect to their general limited written language skills, bilingual language transmission in the family may promote the transmission of lower linguistic self-esteem (a tendency that was particularly evident in Germany, but that was also observed elsewhere). Secondly, given the greater range of opportunities to learn the survey country national language outside the home, the impact of potential lower self-esteem transmission could be expected to be greater for parents' native languages. For instance, generational expectations for parents' native language shift had indeed a greater impact in Frankfurt, where bilingual childhood and loss of the parents' native language in terms of self-reported proficiency were the greatest in the TIES sample. However, childhood bilingualism in Berlin affected German language self-esteem more negatively

while, inversely, parents' native language loss was one of the lowest, comparable only to Strasbourg. Indeed, loss of the parents' native language (by self-reported proficiency) was even lower in Berlin than among Turkish descendants in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Paris who, like the bulk of respondents in Berlin, had been raised bilingually. Thus, and thirdly, generally lower linguistic self-esteem among Turkish descendants in Germany is associated to their childhood bilingualism with their parents' lesser educational capital, particularly evident in this country, but the understanding of city differences for proficiency in parents' native language needs additional variables more related to opportunities for language contact.

Figure 84 – Index on self reported national language proficiency by childhood language





Figure 85 – Index on self-reported parents' native language proficiency by childhood language




Language shifts through language uses in the family

This section looks at a comparison of language uses with older and younger generations in the family, i.e., with parents and siblings. The aim was to understand which language uses were preferred independently of self-reported proficiency, and the distinction between uses with different generations within the same family is important to understand the complexity and vitality of acculturation patterns that may exist within these families.

Respondents in the three countries most commonly used their parents' native language with their parents, and even parents who transmitted more than one language to their children during childhood ended up privileging their own native language in oral use

(at least 70, see Figure 86). This is not surprising, as the language used with parents generally reflects neither the children's proficiency nor their uses with others, but the parents' own language proficiency and strategies for language transmission. In addition, differences between countries varied between cities— and uses of parents' native language being greater in Strasbourg than in Paris, in Berlin than in Frankfurt, or in Rotterdam than in Amsterdam, and, in general, more significant for parents' native language uses with the mother than with the father. In seem, Turkish descendants most commonly used their parents' native language with their parents in Strasbourg (90%) and the least in Frankfurt (70%), which is coherent to parents' proficiency in survey country language (higher in Frankfurt, lower in Strasbourg). Finally, some partial language shift for uses with parents was observed mainly for Turkish descendants in Germany (i.e., preferring survey country national language, about one-quarter in Berlin, 30% in Frankfurt).


Figure 86 - Which languages do you use when talking to your father/mother?



Language use with siblings showed the largest degree of parents' native language shift, as expected for immigrant families because referring to individuals with similar socialization experiences as respondents. However, this shift was clearly greater among Turkish descendants in France and lesser in Germany and the least in Netherlands, where respondents reported more partial language shifts (with almost no city differences: see Figure 87). Some Figures should be read with caution due to small case numbers, nevertheless, in order provide a complete picture, I decided to display all the outcomes. The main language used with siblings was the survey country national language (>50% for the three countries), a Figure that was higher in France (80%) where at least half of respondents used mostly the French language to communicate with their siblings and about one third mainly used French but mixed with Turkish. In Germany and the Netherlands the shift was more partial—the majority of Turkish descendants mixed their parents' native and the survey country language when speaking with their siblings (=>65%), of whom almost half used their parents' native language more than the survey country language.

Gender and age differences in relation to language uses with sibling were only observed in France—women were more likely to use mostly French with their siblings (almost 60%, compared to 40% for men), while men were more likely to mix languages (almost 60% compared to 40% for women). Similarly, older respondents also tended to use the French language more (at least 60% used French more, compared to slightly more than 40% of youngest respondents), while younger respondents were more likely to mix languages (almost 60% compared to less than 20% for the older respondents). Still, those who came from smaller families in the Netherlands (one sibling only), used Dutch more than those with two or more siblings (almost 50% if having one sibling compared to less than 30% if having two or more siblings), but this trend was not observed for the other countries. Finally, language shifts with siblings were greater where respondents' self-reported proficiency in their parents' native language was higher (in France), meaning that current uses in the family did not necessarily correspond to reported linguistic self-esteem.

Figure 87 - Which languages do you use when talking to your siblings?




5.6.4. Comparing self-reported proficiency and uses within the family

The present section compares reported proficiency and uses with different generations in the family (see Figures 88 to 90). To begin with, I will compare the proportion of Turkish descendants reporting high proficiency in both parents' native and national languages with the proportion of mothers and fathers with high reported proficiency in the survey country national language.²⁸³ Then, I turn to the comparison of parents' native language uses (including both exclusively and mixed with survey country national languages), and comparing language uses between different generations in the family (with mother, father and siblings). This was done to understand the differences just presented above in terms of language shift, at two levels – reported proficiency and current language uses, both younger and older members of the family of origin.

As above-mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, in France self-reported proficiency suggested successful language transmission combined with a high degree of linguistic assimilation. More respondents reported high proficiency in French compared to Turkish (see Figure 88: note though that there were almost no differences between languages in Strasbourg). Among Turkish parents, high proficiency in French was considerably more common among fathers (about 50%) than mothers (30%), with no city differences. A comparison of the two generations' reported proficiencies suggests that parents' reported French language acculturation remained weaker than their children's Turkish language acquisition. This was particularly evident in the comparison of children and mothers' proficiency, as well as in Strasbourg, whereas in Paris the levels of children's parents' native language acquisition and their fathers' French language acculturation were more similar. The main tool for communication between generations (particularly in Strasbourg) was thus the Turkish language (80-90%), with few differences between cities or between mothers and fathers. Nevertheless, language uses with younger different family members reflected different language preferences: for both cities we observed more uses of Turkish with the parents and, more French with the siblings, (who were also born, raised and educated in France as respondents).

²⁸³ Proficiencies of both generations used were indices resulting from previous indicators.

Figure 88 – Language over the course of generations – between proficiency and uses - France




In Germany, there were significant differences between the two cities. On one hand, language shifts were greater for self-reported proficiency in Frankfurt, and accompanied by a general trend of language acculturation in the family (parents and children), (see Figure 89). On the other hand, in Berlin, there was a relatively successful parents' native language transmission in terms of self-reported proficiency, accompanied by a degree of linguistic assimilation

(almost no differences in the proportion of respondents with higher proficiency in both languages), while also some language acculturation for the parents. However, for both cities many parents were reported as being highly proficient in German and fathers (80%, no city differences) considerably more so than mothers (around 50%, though higher in Frankfurt compared to Berlin). Thus, fathers' language acculturation was apparently more advanced compared to both mothers' acculturation and children's Turkish language acquisition, particularly in Frankfurt but also in Berlin.

Similar observations could also be indicated for children's self-reported proficiency in German language. Descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany reported significantly low linguistic self-esteem in the national language not only in relation to their counterparts in the other two countries, but also in comparison to their fathers. However, it should be kept in mind that immigrant parents' linguistic socialization reflects a different reality of proficiency and socialization from those of their children, because affected differently by contextual determinants. Thus, and proficiency evaluation after parents' and for children's have different meanings. Understanding this means to understand that the impact of language shift in the family has different implications for each generation. And for the large majority of TIES respondents the generational impact of these different socialization experiences showed the most an expected result: children showed higher national language acculturation than parents. However, this was less observed in Germany or less evident. And although children's evaluation on parents' proficiency does not follow similar criteria as for their self-reported linguistic self-esteem this particular contrast, not observed for the majority of respondents in the other two countries, may rely on these respondents' linguistic socialization experiences: very low educated parents transmitting several languages in the family, individuals' short school trajectories, and German society's approach to language diversity, particularly in relation to Turkish language. Moreover, communication between parents and children took place mainly in Turkish, live in France, and further language choices for current uses in the family varied depending on the family member, i.e., more Turkish with the parents and less with the siblings, although this generational variation was smaller than in France. Thus, although the relevant linguistic self-esteem was lower, and parent's language acculturation higher, the parents' native language saw more practical use among Turkish descendants in Germany than in France. With their siblings, three times more respondents used Turkish language.


Figure 89 – Language over the course of generations – between proficiency and uses - Germany



For the Netherlands, similarly to France, successful parents’ native language transmission in terms of self-reported proficiency was accompanied by a substantial degree of linguistic assimilation. Thus, more respondents reported the highest level proficiency in Dutch than in Turkish (see Figure 90). In addition, the reported proficiency of parents in Dutch was moderate, once again being considerably higher for fathers (>55%) than mothers (>35%), with no city differences. But in a comparison between the two generations, Turkish descendants in the Netherlands were more similar to those in Germany than those in France—

the average reported Dutch language acculturation of fathers was higher than both mothers' acculturation and children's Turkish language proficiency. Thus, communication between generations could have taken place in either language, but as in France and Germany, took place mainly in Turkish (with no city differences). As in the other two countries, the shift of language uses was more evident within the family of origin (with the siblings), but the degree of language shift was the smallest compared to the average of Turkish descendants in both France and Germany, particularly compared to France – they used three to four times more parents' native language in The Netherlands.

Figure 90 – Language over the course of generations – between proficiency and uses – the Netherlands



In sum, the TIES data reinforced the argument that language uses with parents depend little on individuals' proficiency (either children's acquisition of parents' native language or parents' language acculturation). They were instead related to the more complex issue of parents' overall linguistic capital and language transmission intentions—and both in terms of school attainment and reported language acculturation to their children. In contrast, language uses with younger generations in the family (here) indicated that assimilation-type language uses with younger members in the family were more frequent where self-reported proficiency in any language was higher, as well as where school careers were longer. Thus, language uses with siblings were more closely associated to socialization experiences in the survey country than were language uses with the parents. In addition, while these variations offered some illumination of the observed differences between France and Germany, they seem to be of less value in understanding those observed between France and the Netherlands – where school careers were more similar. Other non-linguistic factors, such as opportunities for language use, must be added to the analysis, including other language contact opportunities and the origins of the members of social networks—and, for instance, data indicated considerably higher proportion of Turkish origin peers in Germany, fairly high in the Netherlands and somewhat lower in France (see chapter 6).

5.6.5. Self-reported bilingual outcomes

Two general language proficiency indices were created, one for the survey country national language proficiency and one for the parents' native language proficiency, by taking the average of the three different individual self-reported proficiencies (see Figures above). These two indices were then used to assess different types of self-reported bilingual outcomes, as defined in previous typologies (Lambert 1975, Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Esser 2006, see typologies in chapter 1). From this resulted five categories (see Figures 91 to 93): *competent bilinguals* (high proficiency in both languages), *subtractive bilinguals – national dominant* (high proficiency in national language, lower for the parents' native language), *subtractive bilinguals – parents' native dominant* (high proficiency in parents' native language, lower for the national language), *limited bilinguals* (moderate proficiency in both languages), and *limited national unilingual* (moderate proficiency in the national language, none proficiency in parents' native language—a category that was found only in Germany and for very few cases). Some Figures should be read with caution due to small case numbers, nevertheless, in order provide a complete picture, I decided to display all the outcomes.

The most commonly reported result in the existing literature has been the acquisition of the national language combined with partial or total loss of the parents' native language(s). The TIES results, however, were more diverse, and more accordingly to previous national samples from Europe. In France there were more competent bilinguals (54%) than national-dominant subtractive bilinguals (30%), and very few of the others. In the Netherlands there were almost as many competent bilinguals (39%) as national-dominant subtractive bilinguals (38%), while still significant numbers of limited bilinguals (18%). Turkish descendants in Germany showed the most diverse bilingual profiles: a lower proportion of competent bilinguals (27%) and national-dominant subtractive bilinguals (23%), while significantly more, and the highest proportion of limited bilinguals (34%), and of parents' native-dominant subtractive bilinguals (13%), and a small number of cases of limited national unilingualism (3%).

While there were no gender differences, country patterns hid further differences based on city, age and citizenship. City differences were significant only in France and Germany but not in the Netherlands. National-dominant subtractive bilinguals (language assimilation) were twice as common in Paris (40%) than in Strasbourg (19%), and more common in Frankfurt (29%) than in Berlin (17%); likewise, there were slightly more competent bilinguals in Strasbourg (59%) than in Paris (50%), and in Berlin (34%) than in Frankfurt (21%). Similar city differences were observed for parents' native-dominant subtractive bilinguals, but only in Germany (more in Berlin than in Frankfurt). Citizenship was included here to so understand if there was an association with self-reported bilingual proficiency and their citizenship status, as self-reported proficiency is not only a measure of language skills but mainly social identity and perceptions of belonging. The only country with a significant relationship between citizenship status and respondents' bilingual outcomes was Germany: those holding dual citizenship were most likely to show bilingual competence and least likely to be parents' native-dominant subtractive bilinguals, while those holding exclusively Turkish citizenship were most likely to be limited bilinguals. This latter observation reflected the fact that among Turkish descendants in Germany who were foreign citizens (16% of the total), about 60% reported having the lowest level of linguistic self-esteem in both languages—putting them into a doubly fragile situation in relation to the country where they were born and had lived most of their lives.

Finally, self-reported language outcomes differed in each national context depending on age. In France, young respondents (18-24 years old) were considerably more likely to be

competent bilinguals (58%) than to be linguistically assimilated (26%); in comparison, for older respondents the trend were similar but the differences were smaller (more were competent bilinguals (48% and 45%) than linguistically assimilated (37%)). Inversely, in the Netherlands young respondents (18-24) were more likely to self-report as linguistically assimilated (54%) than as competent bilinguals (31%) or limited bilinguals (10%). In comparison, among older respondents (24-29, 30 or more) there was a smaller difference between the proportion of competent bilinguals (38% and 42%) and of linguistically assimilated individuals (35% and 37%), while those aged between 25 and 29 years were more likely to be limited bilinguals (24%, compared to <15% for the other age groups). In Germany the situation is different: we observed higher proportion of younger respondents who were limited bilinguals (39%) compared to all other bilingual profiles (21% and 22%). In comparison, older respondents (25-29, 30 or more) reported less but also significant number of limited bilinguals (25-29: 33%, 30 or more: 27%), and although these numbers were closer to competent bilinguals than for younger respondents (31% and 33%), there were again more numerous than parents' national-dominant subtractive bilinguals (23%). These observations suggest that in Germany lower linguistic self-esteem could be enduring or increasing over the course of generations; in contrast, in the Netherlands there was a loss of parents' native language throughout birth-cohorts; and, finally, in France, there were fewer problematic language outcomes, as well as more bilingual and fewer assimilated profiles. Younger also used more Turkish with siblings — reafirming thus idea of competent bilinguals more present among younger respondents and less for older one.

Figure 91 – Bilingual outcomes - France

Bilingual outcomes in France, by city, gender, age and citizenship status




Figure 92 – Bilingual outcomes - Germany

Bilingual outcomes in Germany, by city, gender, age and citizenship status





Figure 93 – Bilingual outcomes – the Netherlands



Bilingual outcomes by social background and other socialization experiences

Various authors (Lambert, 1963; Fillmore; Brizić, 2006; Norton, 2000) have argued that potential bilingualism is determined by children's linguistic starting conditions. The Turkish descendants in the TIES sample highlighted the fact that learning two languages in the same context (here, family of origin) implies a direct confrontation of languages, which results in a greater likelihood of language and further consequences for individuals' linguistic self-esteem, particularly if the same conflicts also exist in society, outside the home. We have seen that the survey country national language became more dominant in general (reported language proficiency was higher for national language compared to parents' native language, see previous Figures), but proficiency in any language was lower where parents provided a bilingual upbringing (Germany, the Netherlands), whereas it was higher where contact with different languages was separated into different contexts (France). In addition, respondents' self-reported proficiency was also higher where the combination between parents' linguistic capital (in terms of academic skills in native language and reported survey country language

proficiency) and the language(s) they provided during their children's childhood was more consistent (France, followed by the Netherlands and less in Germany). Later on, respondents' school careers, earlier and longer or later and shorter, also showed significant associations. In this section, descriptive analysis is centred on these main indicators, first center in relation to parents' linguistic capital, and second to the respondents' trajectory, focusing mainly on school variables.

Firstly, the relationship between parents' linguistic capital and children's language outcomes was as expected by previously explained sociological considerations on language studies (see Tables 24 to 38). Any language proficiency is more socially valued when this language capital is combined with higher educational attainment and/or greater occupational experience than if it is associated with lower educational attainment and/or low qualified occupations—effects that may be intergenerationally transferable (Davila; Mora, 2004; Stolzenberg; Tienda; 2002). Thus, not surprisingly, in all countries limited bilinguals and parents' native-dominant subtractive bilinguals had the most disadvantaged social backgrounds, while national-dominant subtractive bilinguals had the most advantageous ones—thus revealing that their linguistic starting conditions provided different language contact opportunities from the beginning. In contrast, competent bilinguals seemed to lie somewhere in between in terms of parents' social background, or in the case of France, showed no differences compared to national-dominant subtractive bilinguals. For instance, mother's current employment status was clearly associated with respondents' bilingual outcomes (except in France): national-dominant subtractive bilinguals were more likely to have working mothers and, to a lesser extent, this was also true of competent bilinguals, while limited bilinguals and parents' native-dominant subtractive bilinguals were more likely to have stay-at-home mothers. However, and only in France, competent bilingual had as many working as unskilled manual mothers and as skilled manual mother (42% each) while national-dominant subtractive bilinguals had mainly skilled manual mothers (69%).

In addition, there was more diversity in mother's migration generation among national-dominant subtractive bilinguals, but only in Germany—almost two fifths had mothers who were children of immigrants (<6% in the other two countries). Finally, parents' reported skills in the survey country national language revealed the expected trends: those whose parents were more fluent in the survey country national language were more likely to report being national-dominant subtractive bilinguals and competent bilinguals, and less likely to be

limited bilinguals and or parents' native-dominant subtractive bilinguals. Moreover, while these differences were more evident for fathers in France, they were more evident for mothers in both Germany and the Netherlands. Once again, competent bilinguals and linguistically assimilated respondents showed no particular difference in terms of their social background.

Moreover, Turkish descendants' self-reported language outcomes were also associated to their own trajectory, such as childhood language and school and labour market indicators (see Table 33 to 38 below). For instance, childhood bilingualism was more likely to be associated to national-dominant subtractive bilingualism, and childhood monolingualism to competent bilingualism (a pattern that was most evident in France but that was also seen in the Netherlands). However, and only for the Netherlands, language childhood of limited bilinguals' was similar to that of competent bilinguals. Other aspects of individuals' trajectories were also associated with their self-reported language outcomes. Firstly, age at school entry indicated that more problematic language outcomes were more common for those entering later in France and in Germany, particularly for limited bilinguals, but no trends were found in the Netherlands. Secondly, one of the few indicators which produced significant results for all countries was Turkish descendants' educational attainment: Turkish descendants who were national-dominant subtractive bilinguals or competent bilinguals tended to be more highly educated than those who were limited bilinguals or parents' native-dominant subtractive bilinguals. And while in France and in the Netherlands these significant differences were found between the highest educated from the lowest educated groups (i.e., tertiary education from lower secondary or less), in Germany the effect applied between groups with a smaller difference in the length of their school careers—those with upper secondary and apprenticeship levels compared to those with lower secondary or less (a difference that should not come as a surprise given the lower educational attainment of TIES respondents in Germany). Finally, while in Germany language assimilation profiles were more common among those with a higher level of education, notably compared to competent bilingualism, in contrast, in France and the Netherlands, competent bilingualism and linguistic assimilation were again equally associated to longer school careers.

Labour market experiences, a part of individuals' human capital, have long been a part of investigations on language (reference). Likely for educational attainment, different employment status showed expected associations with bilingual outcomes, and particularly in Germany. As observed before, the majority of Turkish descendants were working, or working

and studying, while fewer were full-time students (more in France), unemployed or even staying-at-home (very few in France: see chapter 4). Moreover, many were skilled blue collar workers in Germany; while occupational diversity was greater in the Netherlands (namely, executives and other professionals, skilled manual workers, and white-collar workers); and higher qualified workers in France (mainly executives and other professionals and white-collar workers). Despite these country occupational differences, their association to respondents' bilingual outcomes showed similar trends for all countries, which reinforced the presence of some profiles in some countries over others. Specifically, among parents' native-dominant subtractive bilinguals and, to a lesser extent, limited bilinguals, there were more unemployed or non-working respondents. However, these differences were particularly large in Germany, smaller in France and still smaller in the Netherlands. In addition, Turkish descendants' current occupations were also associated to their language profile. For instance, in Germany and the Netherlands, there were higher qualified workers among competent bilinguals and national-dominant subtractive bilinguals: white collar workers in both countries, and executive and other professionals in the Netherlands only. Limited bilinguals were more likely to be blue-collar workers at any level of qualification in the Netherlands (skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled), while in Germany they were mainly unskilled or semi-skilled blue-collar workers. Again, few differences between linguistically assimilated and competent bilinguals, even in Germany.

In sum, families that combined parents' linguistic capital with childhood language, increased the chances of achieving higher linguistic self-esteem for their children. In addition, individuals' school careers, and particularly longer school careers, were also associated to higher linguistic self-esteem. Turkish descendants in France combined several of these advantageous factors, those in the Netherlands slightly less (where fathers' Dutch proficiency and longer school careers were positively associated to linguistic self-esteem), and those in Germany significantly less. In addition, the negative impact of less advantageous factors seems to have been greater for the younger respondents in Germany, among whom there were more cases of limited bilinguals, even though their parents were reported to be more proficient in German (see chapter 4). Finally, individuals' school trajectory, meaning kindergarten attendance and highest educational attainment, seemed to have compensate less the social disadvantages of family language environment in Germany while associating more significantly low linguistic self-esteem with shorter educational careers, slightly less in the Netherlands and clearly less in France.

Table 27 - Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by social origins – mothers in France

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	% total column	Total
France	54,3	29,8	7,2	8,7	100,0	497
Mother migration generation						
French mother	0,4	8,1		2,3	2,8	14
Children of immigrants (1)	4,8	0,7	2,7	2,3	3,2	16
Adult migration	94,8	91,3	97,3	95,3	94,0	469
Mothers' highest educational attainment						
No schooling or koran school	11,4	12,4	30,6	19,0	13,8	66
Primary school	49,6	40,9	41,7	47,6	46,3	222
Lower secondary	20,1	29,2	22,2	14,3	22,3	107
Higher secondary or more	18,9	17,5	5,6	19,0	17,5	84
Mother's current situation in labour market						
Working	30,0	26,7	2,9	30,8	27,1	130
Unemployed	10,8	10,3		17,9	10,4	50
Retired or disabled	7,7	9,6		5,1	7,5	36
Domestic	51,5	53,4	97,1	46,2	55,0	264
Mother's professional occupation when respondent was 15 (3)						
Executive, professionals and white collars	15,7	6,8		6,3	11,3	22
Skilled manual workers	42,2	68,5	33,3	43,8	52,1	101
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	42,2	24,7	66,7	50,0	36,6	71
Mother read and write French?						
Can read and write French	35,7	38,0	16,7	40,0	35,3	167
Can only read French	23,1	21,8	2,8	20,0	20,9	99
Can neither read nor write French	41,2	40,1	80,6	40,0	43,8	207

Note (1) Children of immigrants born in France or immigrating at younger age (before 15 years old)

Note (3) ISCO codes

Table 28- Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by social origins – fathers in France

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	% total column	Total
France	54,3	29,8	7,2	8,7	100,0	497
Father migration generation						
Children of immigrants (2)	4,1	0,7	2,8		2,6	13
Adult migration	95,9	99,3	97,2	100,0	97,4	484
Fathers' highest educational attainment						
Primary school	45,9	44,9	55,6	61,0	47,6	229
Lower secondary	27,4	30,4	38,9	17,1	28,3	136
Higher secondary or more	26,7	24,6	5,6	22,0	24,1	116
Father's current situation in labour market						
Working	70,3	64,5	63,9	50,0	66,3	307
Unemployed	9,2	12,3	13,9	12,5	10,8	50
Retired or disabled	20,5	23,2	22,2	37,5	22,9	106
Father's professional occupation when respondent was 15 (3)						
Executive, professionals and white collars	7,8	11,0	13,3	13,2	9,6	44
Skilled manual workers	76,3	74,0	53,3	65,8	73,2	336
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	15,9	15,1	33,3	21,1	17,2	79
Father read and write French?						
Can read and write French	61,0	56,5	35,1	55,8	57,3	284
Can only read French	22,3	25,2	45,9	16,3	24,4	121
Can neither read nor write French	16,7	18,4	18,9	27,9	18,3	91

Note (1) Children of immigrants born in France or immigrating at younger age (before 15 years old)

Note (2) Children of immigrants immigrating at younger age (before 15 years old)

Note (3) ISCO codes

Table 29 – Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by social origins – mothers in Germany

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	Limited national dominant	% total column	Total
Germany	27,4	22,9	13,1	33,6	3,0	100,0	503
Mother migration generation							
German mother	2,2	16,5		5,9	0,0	6,4	32
Children of immigrants (1)	13,0	20,9	15,2	10,1	6,7	13,9	70
Adult migration	84,8	62,6	84,8	84,0	93,3	79,7	401
Mothers' highest educational attainment							
No schooling or koran school	45,4	40,4	66,1	55,7	40,0	50,3	222
Primary school	27,7	14,1	22,0	26,2	53,3	24,3	107
Lower secondary	16,8	33,3	8,5	14,8	6,7	18,4	81
Higher secondary or more	10,1	12,1	3,4	3,4		7,0	31
Mother's current situation in labour market							
Working	30,4	34,2	24,2	16,5	13,3	25,3	125
Unemployed or unpaid work	3,0	11,4	10,6	7,9		7,5	37
Retired or disable	7,4	10,5	3,0	10,4		8,3	41
Domestic	59,3	43,9	62,1	65,2	86,7	58,9	291
Mother's professional occupation when respondent was 15 ⁽³⁾							
Executive, professionals and white collars	11,1	7,7				6,4	6
Skilled manual workers	50,0	61,5	72,7	68,4	100,0	60,6	57
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	38,9	30,8	27,3	31,6		33,0	31
Mother read and write German?							
Can read and write German	66,7	69,6	31,8	35,5	100,0	53,3	268
Can only read German	19,6	19,1	16,7	26,0		20,7	104
Can neither read nor write German	13,8	11,3	51,5	38,5		26,0	131

Note (1) Children of immigrants born in France or immigrating at younger age (before 15 years old)

Note (3) ISCO codes

Table 30 – Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by social origins – fathers in Germany

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	Limited national dominant	% total column	Total
Germany	27,4	22,9	13,1	33,6	3,0	100,0	503
Father migration generation							
Children of immigrants (1)	10,9	20,2	12,1	13,0	6,7	13,7	68
Adult migration	89,1	79,8	87,9	87,0	93,3	86,3	429
Fathers' highest educational attainment							
No schooling or koran school	28,3	26,7	44,1	24,8	14,3	28,5	119
Primary school	49,1	27,8	40,7	50,3	71,4	44,5	186
Lower secondary	5,7	21,1	11,9	10,7	7,1	11,7	49
Higher secondary or more	17,0	24,4	3,4	14,1	7,1	15,3	64
Father's current situation in labour market							
Working	74,4	75,2	62,5	64,4	46,7	68,8	333
Unemployed	1,6	4,4	7,8	8,6		5,4	26
Retired or disable	24,0	20,4	29,7	27,0	53,3	25,8	125
Father's professional occupation when respondent was 15 (3)							
Executive, professionals and white collars	11,2	14,1	20,8	17,7	0,0	15,1	58
Skilled manual workers	72,9	64,1	60,4	64,5	85,7	66,6	255
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	15,9	21,7	18,9	17,7	14,3	18,3	70
Father read and write German?							
Can read and write German	88,4	88,7	63,6	75,7	100,0	81,3	409
Can only read German	9,4	11,3	25,8	16,0		13,9	70
Can neither read nor write German	2,2		10,6	8,3		4,8	24

Note (1) Children of immigrants born in France or immigrating at younger age (before 15 years old)

Note (3) ISCO codes

Table 31 – Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by social origins - mothers in the Netherlands

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	% total column	Total
The Netherlands	38,8	38,3	4,6	18,2	100,0	433
Mother migration generation						
Dutch mother	1,2	4,8		5,1	3,2	14
Children of immigrants (2)	9,5	13,3	10,0	6,3	10,4	45
Adult migration	89,3	81,9	90,0	88,6	86,4	374
Mothers' highest educational attainment						
No schooling or koran school	15,0	16,9	22,2	23,1	17,4	67
Primary school	53,6	43,9	66,7	61,5	51,8	199
Lower secondary	19,0	23,6	5,6	12,3	19,0	73
Higher secondary or more	12,4	15,5	5,6	3,1	11,7	45
Mother's current situation in labour market						
Working	14,9	27,4	10,0	13,9	19,4	78
Unemployed	8,4	8,9	10,0	11,1	9,2	37
Retired or disable	23,4	22,9	15,0	12,5	20,8	84
Domestic	53,2	40,8	65,0	62,5	50,6	204
Mother's professional occupation when respondent was 15 ⁽³⁾						
Executive, professionals and white collars	28,6	20,5	100,0	8,3	23,0	20
Skilled manual workers	34,3	30,8		33,3	32,2	28
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	37,1	48,7		58,3	44,8	39
Mother read and write Dutch?						
Can read and write Dutch	57,7	60,8	30,0	39,7	54,3	225
Can only read Dutch	11,7	13,9	25,0	11,0	13,0	54
Can neither read nor write Dutch	30,7	25,3	45,0	49,3	32,6	135

Note (2) Children of immigrants immigrating at younger age (before 15 years old)

Note (3) ISCO codes

Table 32– Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by social origins – fathers in the Netherlands

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	% total column	Total
The Netherlands	38,8	38,3	4,6	18,2	100,0	433
Father migration generation						
Dutch father	1,8	0,6		1,3	1,2	5
Children of immigrants (2)	8,3	9,6	5,0	7,6	8,5	37
Adult migration	89,9	89,8	95,0	91,1	90,3	391
Fathers' highest educational attainment						
No schooling or koran school	5,2	8,3		17,2	8,2	31
Primary school	46,5	39,6	58,8	50,0	45,0	171
Lower secondary	25,8	27,8	23,5	12,5	24,2	92
Higher secondary or more	22,6	24,3	17,6	20,3	22,6	86
Father's current situation in labour market						
Working	39,3	45,2	44,4	44,6	42,7	162
Unemployed	8,0	4,8	11,1	10,8	7,4	28
Retired or disable	52,7	50,0	44,4	44,6	49,9	189
Father's professional occupation when respondent was 15 ⁽³⁾						
Executive, professionals and white collars	14,9	22,2	20,0	17,1	18,3	39
Skilled manual workers	69,0	56,8	70,0	65,7	63,8	136
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	16,1	21,0	10,0	17,1	17,8	38
Father read and write Dutch?						
Can read and write Dutch	73,9	71,3	45,0	63,8	69,8	286
Can only read Dutch	11,8	14,4	30,0	11,6	13,7	56
Can neither read nor write Dutch	14,3	14,4	25,0	24,6	16,6	68

Note (2) Children of immigrants immigrating at younger age (before 15 years old)

Note (3) ISCO codes

Table 33 - Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by socio-demographic variables 1 – France

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	% total column	Total
France	54,3	29,8	7,2	8,7	100,0	497
City of residence						
Paris	48,1	68,9	27,8	37,2	<i>51,9</i>	258
Strasbourg	51,9	31,1	72,2	62,8	<i>48,1</i>	239
Gender						
Men	46,3	53,7	66,7	52,3	<i>50,5</i>	252
Women	53,7	46,3	33,3	47,7	<i>49,5</i>	247
Age						
18 - 24	70,7	57,4	69,4	62,8	<i>66,0</i>	328
25 -29	16,3	23,0	11,1	20,9	<i>18,3</i>	91
30 or +	13,0	19,6	19,4	16,3	<i>15,7</i>	78
Childhood language						
French language	0,7	12,1	10,8	2,3	<i>5,0</i>	25
Turkish language	68,0	34,9	62,2	44,2	<i>55,6</i>	277
French and Turkish languages	31,2	53,0	27,0	53,5	<i>39,4</i>	196

Table 34 - Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by socio-demographic variables 2 – France

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	% total column	Total
France	54,3	29,8	7,2	8,7	100,0	497
Age entering school						
at least 3 years old	91,9	89,9	67,6	88,6	<i>89,3</i>	444
between 4 and 7 years old	8,1	10,1	32,4	11,4	<i>10,7</i>	53
Highest educational attainment						
Low secondary or less	9,3	14,2	30,6	30,2	<i>14,3</i>	71
Apprenticeship	27,0	23,6	38,9	27,9	<i>27,1</i>	135
Upper secondary	19,6	15,5	25,0	14,0	<i>18,3</i>	91
Tertiary education	44,1	46,6	5,6	27,9	<i>40,4</i>	201
Current situation in the labour market						
Working, Working and stuc	52,8	57,0	43,2	53,5	<i>53,1</i>	265
Unemployed	10,3	10,1	37,8	16,3	<i>13,0</i>	65
Full time student	31,4	26,2	8,1	27,9	<i>27,9</i>	139
Not active, Domestic	5,5	6,7	10,8	2,3	<i>6,0</i>	30
Current occupation						
Executives, professionals	27,5	30,5	6,7	21,7	<i>26,7</i>	69
White collar workers	26,1	23,2	66,7	30,4	<i>27,9</i>	72
Skilled blue collar workers	10,9	17,1		13,0	<i>12,4</i>	32
Unskilled blue collar worker	35,5	29,3	26,7	34,8	<i>32,9</i>	85

Table 35 – Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by socio-demographic variables 1 – Germany

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	Limited national dominant	% total column	Total
Germany	27,4	22,9	13,1	33,6	3,0	100,0	503
City of residence							
Berlin	62,3	37,4	63,6	42,0	73,3	50,3	253
Frankfurt	37,7	62,6	36,4	58,0	26,7	49,7	250
Gender							
Men	50,7	40,0	45,5	50,9	66,7	48,1	242
Women	49,3	60,0	54,5	49,1	33,3	51,9	261
Age							
18 - 24	29,0	37,4	40,9	44,4	46,7	38,2	192
25 -29	34,1	31,3	22,7	30,2	33,3	30,6	154
30 or +	37,0	31,3	36,4	25,4	20,0	31,2	157
Childhood language							
German language		17,4			100,0	7,0	35
German and Turkish languages	78,1	69,6	86,4	91,0		79,2	396
German, Turkish and Kurdish languages	21,9	13,0	13,6	9,0		13,8	69

Table 36 – Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by socio-demographic variables 2 – German

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	Limited national dominant	% total column	Total
Germany	27,4	22,9	13,1	33,6	3,0	100,0	503
Age entering school							
between 2 and 3 years	47,3	38,9	46,0	30,1	80,0	40,4	197
between 4 and 5 years old	38,9	39,8	44,4	39,2	13,3	39,1	191
between 6 or 7 years old	13,7	21,2	9,5	30,7	6,7	20,5	100
Highest educational attainment							
Low secondary or less	15,9	11,3	50,0	50,9	6,7	30,8	155
Apprenticeship	71,0	53,9	30,3	43,2	80,0	52,7	265
Upper secondary	5,8	16,5	18,2	4,7	13,3	9,7	49
Tertiary education	7,2	18,3	1,5	1,2		6,8	34
Current situation in the labour market							
Working and studying	70,3	74,8	40,9	49,7	93,3	61,2	308
Unemployed	13,0	4,3	21,2	24,3		15,5	78
Full time student	5,1	13,9	13,6	3,0		7,4	37
Not active, domestic	11,6	7,0	24,2	23,1	6,7	15,9	80
Current occupation							
Executives, professionals	5,4	10,8	8,0	1,2	7,7	6,1	18
White collar workers	20,4	13,3	8,0	6,2	7,7	12,9	38
Skilled blue collar workers	68,8	72,3	72,0	75,3	61,5	71,5	211
Unskilled blue collar workers	5,4	3,6	12,0	17,3	23,1	9,5	28
Not classifiable	32,6	27,8	62,1	52,1	13,3	41,4	208

Table 37 – Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by socio-demographic variables 1 – The Netherlands

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	% total column	Total
The Netherlands	38,8	38,3	4,6	18,2	100,0	433
City of residence						
Amsterdam	47,6	51,2	30,0	43,0	47,3	205
Rotterdam	52,4	48,8	70,0	57,0	52,7	228
Gender						
Men	44,6	51,2	30,0	45,6	46,7	202
Women	55,4	48,8	70,0	54,4	53,3	231
Age						
18 - 24	8,9	15,7	10,0	6,3	11,1	48
25 -29	39,3	37,3	30,0	53,2	40,6	176
30 or +	51,8	47,0	60,0	40,5	48,3	209
Childhood language						
Dutch language	0,6	8,2		3,9	4,0	17
Turkish language	24,7	11,3	50,0	26,0	21,1	92
Dutch and Turkish languages	74,7	80,5	50,0	70,1	74,9	325

Table 38 – Descendants of Turkish immigrants – Bilingual outcomes by socio-demographic variables 2 – The Netherlands

	Competent bilinguals	Subtractive bilinguals - "national" dominant	Subtractive bilinguals - "native" dominant	Limited bilinguals	% total column	Total
The Netherlands	38,8	38,3	4,6	18,2	100,0	433
Age entering school						
between 2 and 3 years	11,3	9,6		8,9	9,7	42
4 years old	78,0	81,3	100,0	82,3	81,1	351
between 5 and 7 years old	10,7	9,0		8,9	9,2	40
Highest educational attainment						
Low secondary or less	26,2	19,9	40,0	46,8	28,2	122
Apprenticeship	12,5	6,0	20,0	8,9	9,7	42
Upper secondary	29,8	36,1	35,0	29,1	32,3	140
Tertiary education	31,5	38,0	5,0	15,2	29,8	129
Current situation in the labour market						
Working and studying	61,3	65,1	40,0	62,0	61,9	268
Unemployed	14,9	10,2	10,0	11,4	12,2	53
Full time student	11,9	14,5	15,0	10,1	12,7	55
Not active, domestic	11,9	10,2	35,0	16,5	13,2	57
Current occupation						
Executives, professionals	27,4	17,2	12,5	9,5	19,7	48
White collar workers	23,2	24,2	12,5	9,5	20,9	51
Skilled blue collar workers	41,1	49,5	62,5	57,1	48,0	117
Unskilled blue collar workers	8,4	9,1	12,5	23,8	11,5	28

5.7. Conclusions - the importance of combining parental linguistic capital and school experiences in respondents' linguistic socialisation experiences

This chapter looked in detail at the management of language diversity of Turkish immigrant families in France, Germany and the Netherlands. I did so investigating parents' linguistic capital, childhood language in the family, children's self-reported linguistic self-esteem and current language uses. My findings suggest that language diversity among descendants of Turkish immigrants was clearly a major issue in Germany and the Netherlands, while least in France, corroborating early studies on individuals' of Turkish origins in the three countries.

In terms of parents' language acculturation, our findings pointed to some language acculturation in Germany, particularly in Frankfurt, and in relation to reported language proficiency, bilingual childhood provided to respondents and language uses between parents and children. Turkish descendants' parents' in France showed, inversely, the least language acculturation patterns, particularly in Strasbourg, while those in the Netherlands laid in-between. Moreover, these language acculturation patterns showed to have occurred in Germany independently from parents' linguistic socialization experiences, only partially in the Netherlands, while in France showed to depend on parents' educational level and professional occupation in the immigration country. In France, parents' lower acculturation indicators are probably explained by experiences of some lack of recognition of their educational attainment in the French labour market, compared to the other Turkish parents with similar or lower levels of education — and previous literature has shown that such situations can have negative impact on individuals' language acculturation. Inversely, Turkish parents in Germany adopted more actively a language shift within the family, although disposing, for their large majority, of limited skills to transmit several languages (primary education or no schooling). Thus, in this country the lowest educated parents adopted as vehicle of communication in the family several languages that they dispose of limited proficiency. For this reason they've promoted, as Brizić argued, a situation of „incomplete language acquisition” for themselves and consequently, risking to transmit low linguistic self-esteem for their communication in the family. In the Netherlands, there wasn't neither a significant association between parents' educational levels, professional occupations and language acculturation patterns in the family, but Turkish parents in the Netherlands were, in average, higher educated and more professionally qualified than those in Germany. Thus, the risk of promoting language shifts in the family within limited language mastering was expected to be smaller in the Netherlands compared to Germany.

In detail, respondents' childhood language in the family reinforced country differences on parents' language acculturation. Monolingual childhood was considerably more present in France, particularly high in Strasbourg, while less in the Netherlands and particularly absent in Germany, (inexistent in Frankfurt). Inversely, bilingual or plurilingual childhood was the majority of cases in both Germany, Netherlands and, while less in France. And previous explain, in France respondent's childhood language varied more accordingly to Turkish parents' linguistic socialization experiences, while bilingual childhood in the Netherlands was partially associated to parents' linguistic capital, and shown Germany to be independent. These low matching between parents' linguistic socialization and childhood transmission in Germany raised, again, the possibility of risks for low linguistic self-esteem transmission to their children, particularly for low educated and low professional qualified parents. And given the observed country patterns' such risk was, less expected in the Netherlands, and considerably less in France.

Thus, it was also with no surprise that, where childhood was monolingual in the family, respondents' linguistic self-esteem was higher and differences between different languages' proficiency smaller, compared to those bilinguals both had bilingual childhood. In other words, monolingual childhood was more associated to competent bilingual respondents and less to linguistic assimilation – and was more common in France and particularly in Strasbourg, while considerably less in the Netherlands and none in Germany. Comparatively, bilingual childhood in the family was associated either to lower linguistic self-esteem or to more significant differences between different languages proficiency, thus, resulting in more cases of linguistic assimilation or limited bilingualism (more common in the Netherlands and Germany, and less in France). Thus, in the Netherlands and Germany families providing mainly childhood bilingualism provided also a lower utility for parents' native' language because the latter were competing directly with national language in the heart of the family compared to families who focused mainly in parents' native language.

In addition to this, parents' linguistic capital and individuals' own socialisation trajectories outside home (such as educational variables — age at school entry and educational attainment, and two work-related variables (employment status and occupation). First, where parents' linguistic capital (namely, educational attainment in the country of origin, labour market experiences in the immigration country, and reported proficiency in the survey country language) and respondents' childhood language were associated, respondents reported high

proficiency in both languages, compared to when parents were lower educated and parents' linguistic socialization experiences were less associated to respondents' childhood language. These results support Lambert, Norton and Brizić's previous assumptions: for potential bilingual individuals, different parental resources, and different acculturation behaviours, were associated to different types of language outcomes (Lambert) and linguistic self-esteem (Brizić). Thus, TIES results reinforce the argument in favour of a monolingual family environment when parents have a low level of linguistic capital provided by their different linguistic socialization experiences, and a bilingual environment only in other cases.

Secondly, respondents' own socialization experiences dictated further differences. More than age at school entry, educational attainment was substantially associated to respondents' language outcomes. The longer the respondents' school career, the higher the proportion of individuals reporting competent bilingualism or language assimilation, and fewer reporting limited bilingualism or parents' native-dominant subtractive bilingualism. This was so as those who had experienced a shorter period of contact with the survey country language in a more efficient structure (i.e., in the educational system) reported lower proficiency in this language, and many also in their parents' native language, compared to those with longer school careers. Thus, reporting fewer cases of competent bilingualism and language assimilation, while more cases of limited bilingualism, or native-dominant subtractive bilinguals. This way, linguistically assimilated and competent bilingual respondents disposed of the most advantageous social background and current educational levels, compared to limited bilinguals or parents' native language dominants. In other words, competent bilinguals showed to benefit from similar social background as linguistically assimilated respondents, while performing similarly well in school. However, this was less true in Germany, where competent bilinguals disposed of slightly less advantaged social background in terms of parents' education only, and performed slightly less well in school when compared to respondents reporting linguistic assimilation.

Still, we have seen that reported linguistic self-esteem and language uses have different meanings for the Turkish descendants in the TIES data. This was so as these variables are determined by different order of factors. We have just mentioned what was associated to respondents' linguistic self-esteem, while for language uses with parents we expected some association with parents' proficiency in the different languages and language transmission, i.e., to language acculturation in the family in terms of social practices. Language uses with

parents showed a general preference for parents' native language, though some acculturation in Germany and particularly in Frankfurt. In contrast, language uses with the siblings revealed to be independent from individuals' reported proficiency, showing an inverse pattern because preferring mostly national language uses. Siblings were, as respondents, born in survey country and attending survey country schools, disposing of language practices that depended, like for respondents, significantly more from school socialization, peers networks and further indicators related to their socialization experiences in the survey country. There was a general preference for national language uses with the siblings, but within an inversed language acculturation country patterns, compared to previous observations for reported self-esteem. Thus, language uses with siblings were showing more acculturation patterns in France compared not only to Germany but particularly to the Netherlands — where parents' language acculturation was less significant and respondents reported more cases of bilingual proficiency (in France), acculturation for language uses with the siblings was the most important, with no significant city differences. Inversely, where parents' language acculturation was more significant and respondents' bilingual proficiency less present, language uses with siblings were the least acculturated (in Germany and the Netherlands).

Those different outcomes for language uses with parents and siblings were expected, but the different paces observed in each country demands further explanation. Reminding Weinreich, Lambert and Fillmore, the co-existence of different languages in the same learning context leads to direct confrontation and conflict between these languages, which are already competing outside the learning context, where one usually dominates the others. Inversely, monolingual childhood in parents' native language, increased not only the chances to acquire this language, as well as to diminish the gap between different languages' self-esteem. However, its implicit functional segregation was said to hardly escape language dominance.

In France, parents' high education but low professional qualifications were associated to parents' limited language acculturation and respondents' childhood language, and from these combinations resulted different bilingual competences or language acculturation. There were further city differences revealing diverse linguistic starting points. Compared to Strasbourg, parents in Paris were higher educated, showed more language acculturation, and provided more a bilingual childhood. Respondents in Paris showed higher educational attainment, were more linguistically assimilated and less bilingual, but showed no differences for language uses with siblings compared to those in Strasbourg. Thus, city differences in relation to linguistic

starting points resulted in diverse educational attainments and bilingual outcomes but similar for current language uses. Compared to their counterparts in the other two countries, although Turkish descendants in France were more proficient in Turkish, in relative terms they used it less with their siblings. Were their bilingual self-reported proficiency of little use, leading to the risk of their rapid disappearance, and within a generation? Did their school trajectories determine their linguistic socialization experiences to the point of leading to higher potential for parents' native language utility loss? What role, if any, did the French society's approach to linguistic diversity play in this lesser use of bilingual skills for younger members in Turkish immigrant families?

In Germany, there were general and significant language acculturation patterns, for parents' reported proficiency, language transmission in the family, as well as respondents' current language uses with younger family members (though more evident in Frankfurt than Berlin). Thus, it was not a surprise that Turkish descendants in Germany knew the Turkish language relatively less well. In sum, parents' significant language acculturation was combined with children's language acculturation, resulting not only on few competent bilingual cases, and significantly more linguistically assimilated, but also more cases of limited bilinguals or parents' native dominant. This meant that respondents' lower linguistic self-esteem was also observed for the German language and this could be due to parents' low education and low professional qualifications, not associated to respondents' childhood language environment, or respondents' shorter period of linguistic socialization at school. Still, city differences revealed that, compared to Berlin, in Frankfurt parents were slightly more educated and professionally qualified, showing also more language acculturation for reported proficiency and language uses with children. Nevertheless, there were no city differences for the proportion of bilingual childhood, different educational attainments or language uses with siblings. Instead, differences revealed that in Frankfurt there were slightly lower linguistic self-esteem, resulting either in more cases of linguistically assimilated or limited bilingual respondents. Thus, city differences in terms of linguistic starting points were reflected in individuals' current linguistic self-esteem while less in their educational outcomes and language uses. How did the different city approaches on language diversity influenced respondents linguistic self-esteem? Do Turkish descendants in Germany need to experience one further generation (grandchildren of immigrants) to overcome the disadvantages of their social background and to achieve linguistic levels similar to those of the descendants of immigrants in the other two countries? How did German society's approach to immigrant

minority languages influence both the shorter school careers and the lower linguistic self-esteem of its largest group of immigrant descendants?

For descendants of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, parents' diverse educational and professional qualifications were less associated with childhood language compared to France, while more compared to Germany. Final results showed also differences in relation to the other two countries: some parents' language acculturation, combined with children's linguistic assimilation or competent bilinguals, and still a considerable number of limited bilinguals (or parents' native dominant). Thus, many of these respondents reported the highest language assimilation trends in terms of respondents' linguistic self-esteem, suggesting the possibility of a high degree of language shift. Instead, respondents showed the lowest degree of language assimilation in terms of language uses with the siblings, particularly in Rotterdam. Turkish descendants in the Netherlands reported lower linguistic self-esteem in Turkish language compared to their counterparts in France, but use it more outside parents-children' relation. City differences in terms of linguistic starting points indicated that, compared to Amsterdam, in Rotterdam there were slightly more educated and professional qualified fathers, but less linguistically acculturated parents who provided more monolingual childhood. But currently there were no differences for respondents' linguistic self-esteem, reported bilingualism or educational outcomes, but there were more uses of parents' native language with the mother and siblings in Rotterdam compared to Amsterdam. Do the observed city differences rely in their social networks for each city? Were their reported lower linguistic self-esteem in their parents' native language due to perceptions of Turkish language low social prestige the in the Netherlands—in a context of increasing pressure for (language) acculturation and assimilation, but where immigrant minority languages remain useful?

In the next chapter 1 will try to answer these questions, looking to main predictor factors for individuals' bilingual outcomes, while distinguishing language contact opportunities, school and city context, social background and patterns of intergenerational language acculturation in the family.

Chapter 6

Language acculturation among Turkish descendants: Between family and country determinants

6.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we observed that there is no homogeneous trend in the bilingual profiles of descendants of Turkish immigrants, reflecting varied sociolinguistic dynamics in the family and the emergence of some country-specific patterns. Where bilingual childhood is the most common (as in Germany and the Netherlands) there were fewer cases of Turkish descendants reporting competent bilingualism and more cases of language assimilation or limited bilingualism compared to a country where monolingual childhood is more common (France). In addition, parents' linguistic socialization experiences are also associated to children's current linguistic self-esteem—when low educated parents provided a bilingual childhood environment despite their own survey country language proficiency, more of their children reported low linguistic-self esteem in both parents' native language(s) and the survey country language than when low educated parents provided a monolingual childhood. These results confirm the main arguments of Weinreich, Lambert, Cummins and Fillmore: 1) the co-existence of two languages in the family of origin during childhood increases the importance of the national language (which is already dominant outside the home) in the family, while diminishing the children's opportunities to learn their parents' native language; 2) a monolingual family environment should be favoured when parents have limited linguistic capital, and a bilingual environment only otherwise.

In this chapter, I focus on the different opportunities that Turkish descendants have had to acquire and maintain their parents' native language and the survey country national language, within and outside the family. Aiming to assess further determinants of each bilingual profile, and the country differences seen in the latter, I first focus on patterns of intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family. The aim of this first analysis is to assess the language acculturation environment in Turkish descendants' family of origin, and its consequences for respondents' autonomy, resources and vulnerability, in relation to both the environment of their family of origin and the surrounding society. In a second step, I focus on the comparison between different exposure factors, which reflect different opportunities for contact with parents' native and national languages. The importance of each exposure factor depends on the language skills and usages of those with whom individuals interact (e.g., parents,

partners, neighbours, school peers, and friends). These were identified directly or indirectly whenever the relevant information was available.

6.2. Intergenerational language knowledge transmission and types of acculturation/communication

Parents vs. children

In this first section, I take an approach to intergenerational language acculturation in the family based on the segmented assimilation theory of Portes, Rumbaut and Zhou (see chapter 1). But in contrast to their typology, I look at respondents' bilingual outcomes and not only their proficiency in their parents' native language. To this I associated father's reported proficiency in the survey country national language, because fathers' proficiency was typically higher). Seven categories of intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family emerged from this analysis (see chapter 1, and in this chapter, Table 38), namely:

1. *Selective acculturation;*
2. *Consonant acculturation;*
3. *Consonant resistance to acculturation;*
4. *Dissonant acculturation 1 - role reversal;*
5. *Dissonant communication but consonant resistance to acculturation;*
6. *Dissonant acculturation 2 - risk of intergenerational reversal A;*
7. *Dissonant acculturation 2 - risk of intergenerational reversal B.*

I will first refer to four categories (*selective acculturation; consonant acculturation; consonant resistance to acculturation; and dissonant acculturation – risk of intergenerational reversal A*), which are characterized by consonant communication in the family, i.e., between children and parents, with differences between the profiles relating to the linguistic capital of different family members. Comparison of the four showed that family communication per se is not sufficient to ensure individuals' linguistic success and prevent language integration risks. The other three categories (*dissonant acculturation 1 (role reversal); dissonant communication but consonant resistance to acculturation; dissonant acculturation 2 - risk of intergenerational reversal B*) are characterized by dissonant communication in the family, thus creating diverse types of risks for family cohesion or vulnerability in society. These risks are mainly due to the dissonant communication in the family, and also in some cases to

Turkish descendants' limited linguistic capital. In what follows I explain in detail the characteristics of each category of intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family, and the number of Turkish descendants found for each case (see Figure 39).

Selective acculturation occurs where the descendants of Turkish immigrants reported competent bilingualism and fathers had low or high proficiency in the national language. The advantage of this situation lies in the younger generation's combination of acquisition of family symbolic resources (namely their parents' native language(s)) with language acculturation. On one hand, this offers children the ability to negotiate the importance of different language resources available within and outside the family, equipping them with skills that allow them to mediate between environments inside and outside the home. In other words, it provides children with the ability to play the role of "language brokers" in the family, where parents do not possess the necessary skills (Norton, 2000), or to become an additional family resource. On the other hand, it prevents communication problems between different generations and preserves parental authority. Thus, in such cases children's bilingualism is the key to more successful communication within the family, by means of which children acquire potential for emancipation in relation to their family of origin, while remaining able to make greater use of their parents' resources outside their family of origin. Given the previously observed trends in the TIES data, it is not a surprise that selective acculturation is the most observed pattern in France, and in particular in Strasbourg (59%, 50% in Paris), followed by the Netherlands (about 40% for both cities), and that it is significantly less common in Germany, with a particularly low proportion in Frankfurt (21%, 34% in Berlin).

Another situation that was relatively common among TIES respondents is consonant acculturation, i.e., when communication in the family is consonant due to children's national-dominant subtractive bilingualism and fathers' very high level of proficiency in the survey country national language. Thus, in these cases there is a joint family quest for integration into society through language acculturation, but at the cost of the loss of the parents' native language over the course of a single generation. In relation to the previous type, these situations may lead to greater equality between the roles of parents and children as bridges between the family environment and the surrounding society (Norton, 2000). However, they involve a potential communication gap between children and older family members (such as

grandparents), family in the parents' country of origin and other community members who are speakers of the parents' native language. In sum, and in contrast with the previous situation, here the lack of acquisition/ transmission of family symbolic resources (namely parents' native language(s)) prevents children from negotiating the importance of the symbolic resources available both within and outside the family, a role held instead by their father or parents. According to the TIES data, such cases, in contrast to selective acculturation, are more present in Germany, particularly in Frankfurt (27%), but are also fairly common in Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam (about one fifth), and are least common in Strasbourg (9%).

The third category, a completely different situation—consonant resistance to acculturation—indicated a more problematic context, despite the fact that, as in the two previous cases, family communication was assured. This third type of intergenerational language knowledge transmissiontransmission and acculturation occurred when children reported native-dominant subtractive bilingualism and fathers' possessed very low proficiency in survey country national language. On one hand, the transmission of family symbolic resources (namely parents' native language(s)) was achieved and communication within the family assured. On the other hand, both generations possessed limited linguistic resources in relation to the environment outside the home. Thus, children were, as in the previous situation, prevented from negotiating the importance of the different symbolic resources available within and outside the family, and fathers' has also limited resources. Thus, both generations were in a fragile situation in their daily lives. Only a small minority of TIES respondents were in this situation ($\leq 6\%$) in all cities.

The remaining categories of cases, in contrast to the first three, reflected dissonant communication within the family. For instance, consonant resistance to acculturation but dissonant communication represented one of the most problematic situations in this typology. Here, in these cases children's limited bilingualism was combined with fathers' low proficiency in the survey country national language. Thus, in contrast to the previous cases, transmission of family symbolic resources (namely parents' native language(s)) did not effectively take place and, in addition, the two generations' proficiency in the survey country national language is limited. Thus, as in consonant resistance to acculturation, both generations are isolated in the public sphere, and children further isolated in relation to the family environment and other members of the parents' native language community.

Communication in the family is less effective than in the previous situations, potentially turning the private family sphere into an unstructured tower of Babel, due to the children's generalized low linguistic self-esteem (Norton), which represents a significant risk of family disruption. For Turkish descendants in the TIES data, this problematic situation was, in general, relatively uncommon ($\leq 11\%$), though more common than consonant resistance to acculturation, the previous type of intergenerational acculturation. Not surprisingly, it is more common in Berlin, Frankfurt and Rotterdam (8-11%), and less so in Paris, Amsterdam and Strasbourg (3%-6%).

The two last situations include both dissonant communication and dissonant acculturation within the family. The next two types also vary according to the linguistic capital of different family members. For instance, dissonant acculturation 1 (role reversal) is when children reported national-dominant subtractive bilingualism and fathers possessed limited proficiency in their children's main language (namely the national language). In such cases there was thus loss of the parents' native language over the course of one generation, preventing effective communication within the family. Consequently, the private sphere here again is a "tower of Babel" (Norton, 2000), but slightly more structured here than in the previous case, because all family members supposedly possess sufficient language proficiency, but in different languages—children in the national language, parents in their own native language. Furthermore, children's failure to attain proficiency in their parents' native language precluded their negotiation of the importance of the different symbolic resources available within and outside the family. For instance, the children may have encountered significant isolation in the public sphere, because their use of their parents' resources may have been constrained by the limitations on access to those resources resulting from limitations on communication within the family. In addition, this leads to a potential loss of parental authority at home, combined an enhancement of children's role as language brokers in the family due to children's greater autonomy outside the home compared to their parents (Norton)—different here from the pattern in selective acculturation, because of the potential for role reversal between generations (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). In the TIES data, this situation was observed for a significant number of cases, although fewer than selective acculturation type. Furthermore, very significant country and city differences were found in the prevalence of this type intergenerational acculturation: from being almost non-existent in Germany (3% in Berlin, $<1\%$ in Frankfurt), to being considerably more common in France

and the Netherlands, some somewhat more in Rotterdam (14%) and in Strasbourg (10%) and highest in Paris and Amsterdam (almost one fifth).

The final type, dissonant acculturation 2 - risk of intergenerational reversal B, refers to a family environment characterized by dissonant acculturation, potentially defining one of the most problematic situations, particularly when combined with dissonant communication due to children's limited bilingualism. Here dissonant acculturation in the family here resulted from the opposite situation to the one just described—children reported native-dominant subtractive bilingualism or, in more extreme cases, limited bilingualism, and fathers, on the contrary, possessed very good proficiency in the survey country language. Thus, depending on children's reported linguistic self-esteem, these cases revealed two degrees of intergenerational reversal risk, depending on the potential for consonant communication in the family: higher when children report low linguistic self-esteem in any language, lower when children report at least sufficient linguistic self-esteem in their parents' native language. In contrast to the previous types, parents (or just fathers) were the main providers of second language or national language resources at home, reinforcing their authority in the private sphere (through their role of bridging the family environment and the surrounding society). Inversely, children possess limited resources for emancipation and negotiation of the different symbolic resources available within and outside the family, a point that is particularly evident when children report limited bilingualism. A key point here is that children's failure to (successfully) acquire the school language (namely the national language) can more easily lead to intergenerational downward social mobility compared to the other types of language acculturation in the family. In the TIES data, there were significant country differences in the prevalence of these profiles. This type of intergenerational language acculturation in the family is considerably more present in Germany (about one third), particularly for the more problematic types (32% in Berlin and 36% in Frankfurt, including 20% of respondents in Berlin and 29% in Frankfurt reporting limited bilingualism). In France and the Netherlands both of these types of cases were considerably less common: about a tenth in Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and just 5 percent in Strasbourg.

Table 39 – Intergenerational language acculturation and communication

		Children's bilingual typology			
		Limited bilingual	Subtractive - native dominant	Subtractive - national dominant	Competent bilinguals
Parents' knowledge of national language	Very Limited	<i>Consonant resistance to acculturation but dissonant communication</i>	<i>Consonant resistance to acculturation</i>	<i>Dissonant acculturation 1 - risk of role reversal</i>	<i>Selective acculturation</i>
	Average	3,1% 6,3% 8,3% 10,0% 4,1% 11,3%	1,6% 6,3% 4,3% 3,2% 2,6% 4,5%	17,8% 10,1% 0,4% 3,2% 19,0% 14,4%	50,4% 58,8% 34,0% 20,8% 41,0% 39,6%
	Fluent	<i>Dissonant acculturation 2 - risk of intergenerational reversal</i>		<i>Consonant acculturation</i>	
		3,1% 5,0% 19,8% 29,2% 10,3% 7,2%	2,3% 4,6% 12,3% 6,4% 0,5% 1,8%	21,7% 8,8% 20,9% 27,2% 22,6% 21,2%	

% Paris	% Berlin	% Amsterdam
% Strasbourg	% Frankfurt	% Rotterdam

6.2.1. Comparing intergenerational language acculturation types: Vulnerabilities and resources

In sum, consonant communication in the family (summing together: selective acculturation; consonant acculturation; consonant resistance to acculturation; and dissonant acculturation – risk of intergenerational reversal A) is most common in Strasbourg (79%) and Paris (76%), followed by Berlin (71%), Amsterdam and Rotterdam (67%), while considerably less so in Frankfurt (58%). Inversely, types involving dissonant communication in the family (summing together: dissonant acculturation 1 (role reversal); dissonant communication but consonant resistance to acculturation; and dissonant acculturation 2 - risk of intergenerational reversal B) varied from 42 percent in Frankfurt to one third in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, 29 percent in Berlin, 24 percent in Paris and 21 percent in Strasbourg.

Some Turkish descendants faced potential risks for their integration in the survey country and their achievement of sufficient language proficiency, assessed here by their linguistic self-esteem. Situations of risk were more common when communication in the family was dissonant rather than consonant. Geographically, they were more common in Berlin and Frankfurt, considerably less in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and still fewer in Paris and Strasbourg. In detail, situations of risk (summing together: consonant resistance to acculturation; dissonant communication but consonant resistance to acculturation; dissonant acculturation – risk of intergenerational reversal A and B) were mainly present in Berlin (45%) and Frankfurt (43%), particularly when there was dissonant communication in the family (28% and 39%, respectively, and summing together: dissonant communication but consonant resistance to acculturation; dissonant acculturation – risk of intergenerational reversal B), while being significantly less common when there was consonant communication (17% and 10%, respectively summing together: consonant resistance to acculturation; dissonant acculturation – risk of intergenerational reversal A). These numbers were considerably lower for the other cities in the survey, particularly in France: 19% and 6% in Rotterdam (dissonant communication types and consonant communication types, respectively), 14% and 3% in Amsterdam, 11% and 10% in Strasbourg, 6% and 4% in Paris. Inversely, cases of more successful language acculturation in the family (summing together: selective acculturation, consonant acculturation, dissonant acculturation 1 - role reversal) were most commonly observed in France and the Netherlands (90% in Paris, 83% in Amsterdam, 78% in Strasbourg, 75 % in Rotterdam), and considerably less common in Germany (55% in Berlin; 51% in Frankfurt). These most successful cases of intergenerational

language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family were characterized by Turkish descendants' acquisition of language proficiency sufficient to minimize potential risks with regard to language integration in society. The country where the highest proportion of Turkish descendants achieved this level of national language proficiency while also learning their parents' native language (i.e., selective acculturation) was France (50-59%), followed by the Netherlands (two-fifths), whereas considerably fewer such cases were found in Germany, particularly in Frankfurt (21%; 34% in Berlin).

In sum, the previously presented assumptions on different linguistic starting points in the family led to different predictions on individuals' linguistic self-esteem, which were confirmed. Most importantly, these assumptions led to predictions on the integration trajectory of those Turkish descendants whose linguistic starting point was potentially less structured, which were also confirmed. Thus, as expected, problematic situations are most common in Germany (45%-49%), less so in the Netherlands (17%-25%), and considerably less common in France (10%-22%), while less problematic situations are most commonly found in France, followed by the Netherlands and less in Germany. After identifying the main patterns of intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family for Turkish descendants in the TIES data, and assessing both risky and more favourable situations, I will now associate respondents' reported bilingual outcomes to a broader range of language contact opportunities that they faced. The aims of this next analysis are threefold. First, to disentangle which language contact opportunities are more associated to reported bilingual profiles; second, to determine which social indicators are better predictors of each bilingual profile; and last but not least, to understand which are the main factors behind the identified potential risks for Turkish descendants in terms of their successful integration in society (here assessed by their reported linguistic self-esteem). In a first step I took a descriptive approach to this task, and in a second step an explanatory approach.

6.3. Self-reported bilingual outcomes and language contact opportunities

The confirmed predictions about associations and trends in family acculturation mentioned above do not tell the full story about language acculturation, language shifts and language risks at either the individual or the family level. And as Lambert (1962, 1963, 1972), Cummins (2001), Fillmore (2005) and Norton, 2000 added further, although family resources and transmission behaviour influence individuals' cognitive development, with similar consequences on school and language outcomes, further contextual specificities play an important role in this process. These are crucial for a deeper understanding of individuals' linguistic capital formation, language dominance, and general linguistic self-esteem.

Economic and sociological studies have demonstrated the dual nature of linguistic socialization experiences: they both *determine* and *are determined by* individuals' human capital (see chapter 1). An articulation of this perspective can be found, for instance, in Chiswick and Miller's (2001) approach to language learning processes as language investments.²⁸⁴ Here, linguistic socialization experiences are expected to work both as "efficiency" and "incentive" factors for language acquisition and retention: as efficiency factors because additional and higher levels of skills and abilities (such as educational or professional diplomas and different language skills) promote further language acquisition;²⁸⁵ and as incentive factors because individuals expect specific gains from the acquisition of language abilities and their combination with experiences related to both educational and labour market skills. This approach highlights the interrelation between linguistic and non-linguistic factors in individuals' linguistic socialization experiences, determining a number of efficiency and incentive, but also exposure factors. Social networks in the family, in school, the labour market, neighbourhoods, etc., reveal a combination of linguistic and non-linguistic factors that help us to deepen our understanding of how these processes occur.

For instance, the expected dominance of the national language over the parents' native language has been shown, for the TIES data, to vary with country of residence and to reflect different meanings for self-reported proficiency and current language uses. Behind country differences we find not only diverse linguistic starting points in the family, and other language dynamics within the family, but also differences in school experiences and other social

²⁸⁴ Three main factors as previously presented by Chiswick and Miller (2001) equivalent to Esser (2006), four main factors: access, skills, motivation and costs, pp.2 and 97, see this study—chapter I.

²⁸⁵ See McManus, Gould and Welch 1983; Portes and Schaufli 1996; Dustmann 1997 in Esser 2006

dynamics. One of the most crucial determinants beyond social background is individuals' educational attainment, notably the length of individuals' school experience and their school trajectory, while age at school entry and grade repetitions are less important.

The TIES data show that the longer a respondent's school career is, the more likely s/he is to report competent bilingualism or language assimilation, and with the reverse being the case for reporting of limited bilingualism or native-dominant subtractive bilingualism. However, higher linguistic self-esteem in several languages was associated with lower use of immigrant minority languages with siblings and greater preference for the use of the national language, particularly if the respondent also reported a long school career. Inversely, where educational attainment was more diverse (in the Netherlands) or lower (in Germany), respondents reported more cases of linguistic assimilation and limited bilingualism, associated to greater use of the parents' native language in the family of origin (sometimes mixed with the national language). Individuals' reported linguistic self-esteem and language uses with siblings have distinct meanings in terms of individual and family acculturation. Sometimes the two indicators go hand-in-hand, other times less so: such differences are among the main points discussed in this chapter. Further social network indicators, such as origin of main peers, also play a role as contextual specificities here.

Starting with a descriptive analysis, I will explore the main indicators of different language exposure opportunities available in the TIES data, and analysing whether or not bilingual profiles were significantly independent or not from the following indicators. First, I will focus on data relating to parents (namely language uses with the father and mother, and an index of parents' survey country language proficiency); second, on siblings (namely number of siblings, birth order position, proportion of siblings with educational qualifications, and uses of languages with siblings); third, on other indirect indicators of contact with the parents' native language (such as frequency of visits to significant relatives, numbers of visits to Turkey in the last five years, language most watched on television, and internet uses related to Turkey); and finally, on direct and indirect language contact exposure with peers (such as proportion of individuals of Turkish background in the current neighbourhood and in secondary school, the main origins of peers, and current language uses with friends).

6.3.1. Parents: the first language contact opportunities

The general pattern of results was as expected (see Figures 94 to 96): linguistically assimilated respondents in all countries are the ones who most use the national language with their parents, either mixing it with their parents' native language (in Berlin, Frankfurt and Rotterdam) or not mixing languages (in Paris, Strasbourg and Amsterdam). Competent bilinguals and limited bilinguals (in Germany and the Netherlands), in contrast, are those who most use their parents' native language to talk with their parents. Thus, for Turkish descendants reporting insufficient language proficiency in any language, their communication with their parents was still centred in their parents' native language, although mixing languages is more common in the Netherlands and less so in Germany. In general, the patterns in language uses with fathers and mothers are similar.

However, these patterns do not correspond to patterns in parents' proficiency in the national language. First, except for Frankfurt, individuals' reported bilingualism was less associated to mothers' than to fathers' national language proficiency. The higher parents' proficiency in the national language, the more likely their children were to be assimilated or competent bilinguals. Thus, although competent bilinguals are among those who mostly preferred to speak parents' native languages with their parents, their parents' reported proficiency in French/Dutch/German did not differ much from that of the parents of linguistically assimilated respondents. Third, limited bilinguals reported parents' native language proficiency similar to the other bilingual profiles in Berlin, Frankfurt and Amsterdam, or only for to father's proficiency in the Netherlands.

In sum, parents' language proficiency and their language uses with their children have distinct implications. Parents' native language proficiency, assessed here through their children's reports, was more associated to their own linguistic socialization experiences (notably in their country of origin for the majority raised and educated in Turkey, and later in the country of immigration), while associated to their children linguistic socialization only in terms of language transmission practices (childhood language and current uses). Inversely, children's linguistic self-esteem was one of the main factors influencing family communication.

Figure 94 –Bilingual outcomes by language contact with parents, France




Figure 95–Bilingual outcomes by language contact with parents, Germany





Figure 96–Bilingual outcomes by language contact with parents, the Netherlands



6.3.2. Siblings: Additional family resources for maintenance of the parents' native language?

Understanding the role of siblings within language processes requires the consideration of siblings as additional family resources in terms of educational and language capital. The TIES data included indicators on siblings. But as observed in Figures 97 to 99, there were no significant associations among the descendants of Turkish immigrants between individuals' self-reported bilingual outcomes and their number of siblings, being an older or younger sibling, or having siblings with or without some educational qualification (see Table 37 in appendix for detailed data on siblings' birth order position and educational qualifications). In

Berlin, Frankfurt and Amsterdam, competent bilinguals and limited bilinguals have a higher average number of siblings than linguistically assimilated respondents, but no further trend could be identified. The main significant differences between bilingual profiles instead concerned current language uses with siblings. In chapter 5, I noted the finding of a significant language shift between language uses with parents and with siblings, which is larger in France than in Germany and the Netherlands. Despite these country differences, the data presented in figures below (99-100) confirm that competent bilinguals and limited bilinguals use their parents' native language more when speaking with their siblings (either mixed with the national language or not) than linguistically assimilated individuals, whereas more of the respondents in the latter group mainly use the national language. Thus, as observed for language uses with parents, although limited bilinguals' language proficiency in all languages is weak, they prefer to communicate with siblings in their parents' native language. In contrast, in Frankfurt language uses with siblings were quite similar among different bilingual profiles. In sum, although language uses with siblings generally reflected a language shift (in some countries more than others), they were nevertheless related to individuals' language proficiency. Last but not least, as observed for indicators of language uses with parents, it is in language uses (rather than for parents' national language proficiency, that the various bilingual profiles most differ from each other.

Figure 97–Bilingual outcomes by language contact with siblings, France




Figure 98–Bilingual outcomes by language contact with siblings, Germany





Figure 99–Bilingual outcomes by language contact with siblings, the Netherlands



6.3.3. Other indicators of exposure to parents’ native language

Figures 100 to 102 show data on exposure factors that imply different opportunities to acquire and practice parents’ native languages. A first glance at this data reveals interesting contextual patterns: respondents in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Strasbourg reported the highest level of opportunities to practice their parents’ native language; levels were slightly lower in Paris, and the lowest in Berlin and Frankfurt. The only country where city differences were observed was France, where contact with parents’ native language is more common in Strasbourg than in Paris. A large proportion of the descendants of Turkish immigrants in all three countries visit their relatives quite regularly (several times per day or week). This is the

case for the majority of respondents in Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Strasbourg ($\geq 60\%$), but fewer in Paris, Frankfurt and Berlin ($\leq 40\%$). Similarly, respondents in France and the Netherlands were more likely to report frequent visits to Turkey during the last five years (three times a year or more), while the proportion in Germany was considerably lower. Inversely, the majority of those who had never visited Turkey during the five years preceding the survey lived in Germany (20%-40%), while this was true of very few respondents in the Netherlands and France ($\leq 10\%$). Similarly, the majority of Turkish descendants in France and the Netherlands prefer Turkish TV or both Turkish and survey country TV (40%-70%), versus a significantly lower proportion in Germany ($< 40\%$). Inversely, respondents in Germany are more likely to prefer survey country TV channels (50%-90%) compared to those in France ($< 50\%$), while the trends observed in the Netherlands differ between groups (20%-70%). Finally, trends in the use of the internet to obtain information on Turkey were similar: such uses are most common in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Strasbourg (40%-50%), slightly less so in Paris (20%-40%), and considerably less common in Germany ($< 20\%$).

Significant associations emerged between some of these indicators and respondents' self-reported bilingual profiles. First, contrasts between bilingual profiles were more significant in France than Germany or the Netherlands. Second, the main distinctions that emerged were between those reporting either competent bilingualism or limited bilingualism and those whose reports indicated linguistic assimilation. This was particularly the case of visits to Turkey and TV channel preferences, while the pattern was less marked with respect to internet uses on Turkey and frequency of visits to relatives. Thus, competent bilinguals and limited bilinguals were more likely to watch Turkish TV stations, and to a lesser extent use the internet to obtain information related to Turkey, than linguistically assimilated respondents (with the exception of Turkish descendants in Frankfurt). Thus, as observed for language uses with parents and siblings, although limited bilinguals reported insufficient linguistic self-esteem in any language, their responses to these questions revealed a preference for their parents' native language. However, with regard to visits to Turkey, the pattern was different—while bilinguals visit Turkey the most, in some cities limited bilinguals do so less than those who are linguistically assimilated.

Figure 100 –Bilingual outcomes by other language contacts, France




Figure 101–Bilingual outcomes by other language contacts, Germany





Figure 102–Bilingual outcomes by other language contacts, the Netherlands



6.3.4. Peers and classmates: Similar background but reporting significant language shifts

Here I will analyze language contact opportunities with peers and others in two ways: indirectly, by the background of the respondent's current best friends, number of current friends of survey country origin, and the proportion of individuals of Turkish background in the respondent's secondary school and current neighbourhood of residence; and directly, by current language uses with friends.

Figures 110 to 112 in the Appendix give data on the origins of the TIES respondents' friends, as well as the other variables included in this section. The majority of descendants of Turkish immigrants in the three countries have mainly friends with Turkish origins. This group is a majority in Berlin (67%), Strasbourg (61%), Rotterdam (60%), Amsterdam and Frankfurt

(54%); the proportion is substantially lower in Paris (33%). Inversely, the proportion of respondents who have mainly best friends of survey country origin went from 29 percent in Frankfurt, to 27 percent in Paris, 23 percent in Berlin, 15 percent in Strasbourg, and was lowest in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (8%). Thus, although the majority of respondents in all countries have mainly Turkish origin friends, the proportion of those with mainly survey country origin friends was higher in France and Germany. In addition, as Figures 110 to 112 show in appendix, the national language was the most used when speaking with friends, either alone or mixed with parents' native languages, meaning that peers were the group with which the rate of language shift indicated by the TIES data was highest. No significant effect of gender and age on language uses with peers was found, while, as expected, the effect of peer origins was significant. Moreover, respondents mix the national language with their parents' native language significantly less (20% in Paris and 30% in Strasbourg, and about one quarter in Berlin and Frankfurt) than respondents in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (about 60%, although more than half of these use Dutch more than Turkish). Thus, in the Netherlands, where the proportion of friends of Turkish origin is the highest and that of friends of Dutch origin the lowest, and where the trend in linguistic self-esteem data is toward language assimilation, respondents are the least likely to use the Dutch language with friends (as previously observed with siblings, around one third). In this country, the mixing of Dutch and parents' native languages is considerably more widespread (60%).

I also analyzed the relation between the aforementioned language contact opportunities and individuals' reported bilingual profile, as shown in Figures 103 to 105 below. The proportion of individuals of Turkish origin in the neighbourhood of current residence was not significantly associated to respondents' bilingual profile in any city. In contrast, the proportion of pupils of Turkish origin in the respondent's secondary school was associated with respondents' bilingual profile, but the conclusions licensed by the observed trends are limited. A trend was found for limited bilingual respondents in Berlin and Frankfurt and competent bilinguals in Paris, who attended secondary schools with a higher proportion of pupils with immigrant background compared to the others; no differences emerged for respondents in Strasbourg, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Again, there were no significant associations between the proportion of survey country origin friends and individuals' bilingual profiles for any city.

The picture with respect to the origin of respondents' main best friends and language uses with friends was slightly different. The proportion of Turkish best friends differed between countries, and where peer origins were more diverse the association between respondents' bilingual profiles and peer origins was stronger. Thus, while in France and Germany competent bilinguals and limited bilinguals reported a higher number of Turkish origin best friends than linguistically assimilated respondents, more of the latter reported mainly best friends of survey country or mixed origins. For mixed origin friends, there were no specific trends according to bilingual profile in Germany or the Netherlands. No significant associations were observed for respondents in the Netherlands, who mainly have peers of Turkish origin. Similarly, only limited variation in language uses with friends by bilingual profile emerged. Only in Strasbourg did language uses not vary with respondents' bilingual profile. Otherwise, linguistically assimilated and competent bilinguals prefer the national language when speaking with their friends limited bilinguals also prefer this, just not as much. Differences between competent bilinguals and linguistically assimilated respondents were manifested instead in language mixing. Mixing languages is more common among competent bilinguals in Paris, Berlin and Amsterdam, and among limited bilinguals in Frankfurt, being considerably less common among assimilated individuals. Preference for the parents' native language alone was most commonly reported by limited bilinguals in Germany, and competent and limited bilinguals in the Netherlands; this preference is very marginal in France. Two final conclusions here. First, as observed previously, limited bilinguals do have more friends of Turkish origin, and tend to prefer to use their parents' native language with their siblings. Second, language use indicators are the ones with the strongest associations to reported linguistic self-esteem compared to the other indicators.

Figure 103–Bilingual outcomes by language contacts with peers, France




Figure 104—Bilingual outcomes by language contacts with peers, Germany

Bilingual outcomes by language contact with peers





Figure 105–Bilingual outcomes by language contacts with peers, the Netherlands



6.4. Identifying the main predictors of reported bilingual profiles

For the final explanatory models, we used the main factors that reflected individual and family resources, behaviours and experiences, and which might be expected to have an impact on individuals' language learning environment and bilingual profiles. Due to the sociological nature of the present research, more focus was devoted to non-linguistic (or so-called social-structural²⁸⁶) factors, as efficiency and incentive factors in the use and practice of languages. The aims of this analysis were threefold: to determine which variables contribute most to explaining self-reported bilingual outcomes; to assess how school and social background are combined in this explanatory equation for each country; and to

²⁸⁶ In Bourhis, Richard y. (2002), pp.653-662 Demographic variables as marriages patterns could not be considered due to the rate of living with a partner below 50%.

determine how additional language contact opportunities influence the effect of the previous structural indicators. The analysis was performed separately for each self-reported bilingual profile: linguistic assimilation, competent bilingualism, and limited bilingualism. The latter analysis was performed only for Germany and the Netherlands, due to the very low number of cases in France.

Furthermore, the analysis was performed in a series of five steps, in order to measure the different explanatory effects in a stepwise fashion. First I assessed the prediction effect of individual characteristics, such as age, gender, and city of residence. Second came social background resources and indicators of linguistic structure in the family of origin (namely, the following characteristics of parents: employment status, educational attainment in the country of origin, and language uses with respondents).²⁸⁷ Third, variables describing specific language contact opportunities in the family of origin, such as respondents' childhood language, and whether or not siblings' have an educational qualification, were added. The fourth step included variables characterizing context outside the family environment, focusing on those with the greatest expected impact. These were, first, objective characteristics of the school trajectory, such as the length of the individual's school career (measured through highest educational attainment) and grade repetition; and second, subjective school experiences, which mirror school approaches to social and cultural diversity (namely reported feelings of welcome, importance of parents and teachers during schooling, and family-school contacts). In the final step, other language contacts outside the family of origin and school were added, namely the origins of the respondent's main peers and the frequency of visits to Turkey.

Other variables were excluded from the analysis for several reasons: either due to the absence of diversity in their value (e.g. for fathers' employment status, where almost all were employed), lack of significance level for all countries, or strong correlations with other variables already in use. In detail, the social background variables removed were father's employment status (when respondents were 15 years old or currently—almost all fathers worked: see chapter 3); mother's employment status when respondents were 15 years old (high correlation with mothers' current employment status and with a low level of significance), both parents' occupation (few cases of mothers working, while no effect of father's occupational status was found in any country); mothers' educational attainment

²⁸⁷ not for age when migrating for parents due to lack of comparative data between countries, 30% of rate of non-response

(never significant in any country); both parents' migration generation (not used because there was little diversity in the Netherlands and in France, while in Germany this variable was highly correlated with language uses with the mother²⁸⁸), and father's proficiency in the survey country language (no effects for any country). Other factors related to the demographic structure of the family of origin were also removed, namely the number of siblings (no significant associations), respondents' birth order position (highly correlated to the proportion of siblings with educational qualifications: respondents who were older siblings had fewer siblings without diplomas after attending secondary school, while respondents who were younger siblings were twice as likely to have siblings without a diploma—only in Berlin were there no differences; see Table 39 in Appendix). Moreover, childhood language was not used for Germany (almost all plurilingual), but was used for the other two countries (high level of significance in France).

School-related variables removed were those where no predictive effect was found: age at school entry, grade repetition during primary school, personal experiences of discrimination in secondary school, perceived proportion of pupils of immigrant background in primary school (too many missing values in France) and in secondary school. Among other variables on language contact opportunities, we removed the reported proportion of Turkish background neighbours in the respondent's current neighbourhood (many missing cases in Germany); proportion of friends of survey country origin, both during secondary school and currently (high correlation with origins of best friends, and here a choice was made in favour of the variable with higher level of significance and explanatory value: origins of current best friends). Finally, we did not include language uses with friends because the main language used was the survey country language) or either language use with partners or partners' origins (only 20% to 40% of respondents had a partner).

²⁸⁸ For 93 percent of respondents in Germany who use Turkish more, their mothers arrived as adult migrants, and 50 percent of the mothers of those using mainly German as adult migrants, while the other half of mothers were mainly children of migrants (born in Germany or abroad) or of German origins (fewer cases).

6.1.1. Linguistic assimilation: Between language contacts in the family and educational variables

In this section I analyze the predictive value of individuals' self-reported linguistic assimilation for each country separately. In France, as observed in Table 40, the likelihood that descendants of Turkish immigrants would report linguistic assimilation was neither predicted by specific school experiences (such as repetition of grades and educational attainment) nor by social background indicators or language uses with siblings. Instead, the likelihood of report language assimilation in France was significantly predicted by language acculturation uses with the mother and respondent's childhood language, as well as by mothers' involvement during school, siblings' educational resources, individual subjective experiences of welcome at school, and finally, mainly for those living in Paris, being older and visiting Turkey. Thus, respondents in France were almost four times more likely to report linguistic assimilation if raised bilingually rather than monolingually, five times (if aged 30 years old or more) or three times (if aged 25-29) more likely compared to the youngest respondents (aged 18-24), and twice as likely if living in Paris as opposed to Strasbourg. In addition, the likelihood of linguistic assimilation is greater among respondents who use French with their mothers—four times more frequent than among those who communicate with their mothers mainly in Turkish (but with no difference found between those who mainly use the national language and those who mix languages); also three times more likely if the mother played an important role in school; twice as likely if individuals had felt welcome in school with respect to their origins than if they had not; and twice as likely if their siblings possess educational qualifications. Moreover, respondents who visit Turkey regularly were twice likely to report language assimilation than those visiting Turkey more rarely.

In contrast to France, in Germany the likelihood of language assimilation was mostly predicted by gender and educational variables (individual's and father's high school attainment), the father's importance at school, mother's employment, and having German peers (see Table 41). Thus, contrary to France, neither language uses with the mother nor with siblings showed any predictive effect on individuals' likelihood of reporting language assimilation in Germany, nor did visits to Turkey or the experience of feeling welcome at school. Women were twice as likely to report linguistic assimilation as men; the likelihood was four times higher for respondents with an apprenticeship education, and nine times higher for those with upper secondary or more, compared to those with lower secondary education or less; four times higher for those with non-working mothers than among those with working

mothers; three times higher when fathers had a lower secondary-school education than among those with the lowest educated parents (primary school or less—although no differences were found between the highest and lowest educated fathers); and the likelihood of assimilation was cut in half for those whose father had little involvement in secondary school. Finally, having German friends also predicted language assimilation—among those with mainly German friends it was four times higher than among those with mainly Turkish or mixed origin friends.

For Turkish descendants in the Netherlands, the pattern of factors that were predictive of linguistic assimilation combined those observed for the other two countries (see Table 42). Here, respondents' language assimilation was predicted by school experiences (namely high educational attainment, grade repetition and subjective experience of welcome), use of the parents' native language with mother and siblings, fewer visits to Turkey, and mothers' employment. Contrary to Germany and similarly to France, fathers' educational attainment was not found to predict language assimilation; nor, this time in contrast to France, was individual's childhood language. Those using mainly Dutch with their siblings were almost seven times more likely to report language assimilation, and those using it with their mothers two and a half times more likely, compared to those using mainly Turkish (but no difference was found for those mixing languages). Similarly, those who visit Turkey less often (once or twice a year maximum) were twice as likely to report language assimilation compared to those who go more regularly (in contrast to the pattern in France). Furthermore, the likelihood was also more than three times higher if the respondent's mother was employed than if not; four times higher if the respondent had attained tertiary education, or three times more for upper secondary, compared to those who had attained lower secondary or less (like in Germany); and twice as likely among those who repeated a grade in secondary school, or who had felt more welcome in school in relation to their origins compared to those who felt less welcome (like in France); and likelihood was cut in half if they considered their teachers important compared to those whose teachers were less important.

Table 40 – Likelihood of reporting language assimilation, France

Likelihood for self-reporting a bilingual profile:

France

	National dominant subtractive bilingual									
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
City of residence										
Paris	1		1		1		1		1	
Strasbourg	,301	***	,351	***	,403	**	,435	*	,435	*
Gender										
Men	1		1		1		1		1	
Women	,814	n.s.	,721	n.s.	,733	n.s.	,832	n.s.	,723	n.s.
Age										
18-24	1		1		1		1		1	
25-29	2,212	*	2,437	*	2,800	*	3,029	*	2,765	*
30 or more	2,700	**	3,086	**	4,849	***	5,035	***	4,801	***
Social background - highest educational attainment										
Primary education or less			1		1		1		1	
Lower secondary			,986	n.s.	,938	n.s.	,921	n.s.	,967	n.s.
Higher secondary or more			,736	n.s.	,566	n.s.	,445	*	,503	n.s.
Mother currently working			1		1		1		1	
Mothers were currently unemployed			1,266	n.s.	1,546	n.s.	1,353	n.s.	1,224	n.s.
Mothers were currently domestic			1,064	n.s.	1,326	n.s.	1,108	n.s.	1,025	n.s.
Mothers were currently other			,766	n.s.	,982	n.s.	,831	n.s.	,962	n.s.
Language spoken with mother										
More French than Turkish			1		1		1		1	
More Turkish than French			,379	*	,501	n.s.	,574	n.s.	,559	n.s.
Mostly Turkish			,141	***	,223	**	,262	*	,228	*
Raised in Turkish language					1		1		1	
Raised in Turkish and French, or just French					3,326	***	4,036	***	3,686	***
Language spoken with siblings										
Mostly French					1		1		1	
More French than Turkish					,631	n.s.	,615	n.s.	,593	n.s.
More Turkish than French					,601	n.s.	,605	n.s.	,642	n.s.
Siblings without educational qualifications					1		1		1	
All siblings hold educational qualification					2,212	*	2,593	*	2,410	*
Respondent's highest educational attainment										
Lower secondary or less							1		1	
Apprenticeship							,716	n.s.	,746	n.s.
Upper secondary							,772	n.s.	,909	n.s.
Tertiary education							,825	n.s.	,906	n.s.
Did no repeat during secondary education							1		1	
Repeated secondary at least once							,886	n.s.	,810	n.s.
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1		1	
Less welcome than others							,382	*	,379	*
Teachers were important during secondary school							1		1	
Teachers SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							1,426	n.s.	1,449	n.s.
Teachers NOT important during secondary school							2,137	*	2,132	*
Mother important during secondary school							1		1	
Mother SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							,255	*	,279	*
Mother NOT important during secondary school							,562	n.s.	,580	n.s.
During secondary school parents met REGULARLY with teachers							1		1	
During secondary school parents met SOMETIMES with teachers							1,393	n.s.	1,422	n.s.
During secondary school parents met RARELY with teachers							1,217	n.s.	1,215	n.s.
Origin background of 3 current best friends										
Mainly French origin friends									1	
Mainly Turkish origin friends									1,218	n.s.
Friends with mixed origins									1,276	n.s.
Fewer visits to Turkey in the last 5 years - once or twice a year									1	
Three/four a year									1,905	*
Five or more a year									,692	n.s.
N	500		489		450		433		431	

* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001

Table 41– Likelihood of reporting language assimilation, Germany

Likelihood for self-reporting a bilingual profile:**Germany****National dominant subtractive bilingual**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
City of residence										
Berlin	1		1		1		1		1	
Frankfurt	1,887	*	1,436	n.s.	1,370	n.s.	1,252	n.s.	,980	n.s.
Gender										
Men	1		1		1		1		1	
Women	1,398	n.s.	1,495	n.s.	1,410	n.s.	1,430	n.s.	1,918	*
Age										
18-24	1		1		1		1		1	
25-29	1,073	n.s.	1,415	n.s.	1,300	n.s.	1,091	n.s.	,848	n.s.
30 or more	1,063	n.s.	1,083	n.s.	1,173	n.s.	1,097	n.s.	,760	n.s.
Social background - highest educational attainment										
No schooling or Koran school			1		1		1		1	
Primary education			,637	n.s.	,578	n.s.	,524	n.s.	,516	n.s.
Lower secondary			2,990	*	3,477	*	2,853	*	3,041	*
Higher secondary or more			1,899	n.s.	2,287	*	1,890	n.s.	1,664	n.s.
Mother currently working			1		1		1		1	
Mothers were currently domestic			1,328	n.s.	1,661	n.s.	2,180	n.s.	2,186	n.s.
Mothers were currently other			2,782	*	3,366	*	4,511	*	4,536	*
Language spoken with mother										
More German than parents' native language			1		1		1		1	
More parents' native language than German			,425	*	,417	*	,482	n.s.	,603	n.s.
Language spoken with siblings										
Mostly German					1		1		1	
More German parents' native language					,828	n.s.	,938	n.s.	,941	n.s.
More parents' native language than German					,467	n.s.	,653	n.s.	,789	n.s.
No siblings or no answer					,270	n.s.	,218	n.s.	,514	n.s.
Siblings without educational qualifications					1		1		1	
All siblings hold educational qualification					2,180	n.s.	2,294	n.s.	,539	n.s.
No siblings or no answer					1,185	n.s.	1,596	n.s.	,395	n.s.
Respondent's highest educational attainment										
Lower secondary or less							1		1	
Apprenticeship							3,964	*	4,660	**
Upper secondary or more							9,172	***	8,342	***
Did no repeat during secondary education							1		1	
Repeated secondary at least once							,715	n.s.	,761	n.s.
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1		1	
Less welcome than others							1,284	n.s.	1,479	n.s.
Teachers were important during secondary school							1		1	
Teachers SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							1,220	n.s.	1,198	n.s.
Teachers NOT important during secondary school							,618	n.s.	,533	n.s.
Father important during secondary school							1		1	
Father SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							2,411	*	2,258	*
Father NOT important during secondary school							,731	n.s.	,722	n.s.
During secondary school parents met SOMETIMES with teachers							1		1	
During secondary school parents met RARELY with teachers							,851	n.s.	1,065	n.s.
Origin background of 3 current best friends										
Mainly German origin friends									1	
Mainly Turkish origin friends									,206	***
Friends with mixed origins									,245	*
No visits to Turkey									1	
Once/twice a year									1,959	n.s.
Three/four a year									1,551	n.s.
Five or more often a year									1,364	n.s.
N	503		434		429		418		418	

* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001

Table 42– Likelihood of reporting language assimilation, the Netherlands

Likelihood for self-reporting a bilingual profile:**The Netherlands****National dominant subtractive bilingual**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
City of residence										
Amsterdam	1		1		1		1		1	
Rotterdam	,776	n.s.	1,040	n.s.	1,237	n.s.	1,345	n.s.	1,323	n.s.
Gender										
Men	1		1		1		1		1	
Women	,729	n.s.	,694	n.s.	,609	*	,613	n.s.	,628	n.s.
Age										
18-24	1		1		1		1		1	
25-29	,490	*	,427	*	,509	n.s.	,425	*	,436	n.s.
30 or more	,514	*	,537	n.s.	,620	n.s.	,610	n.s.	,581	n.s.
Social background - highest educational attainment										
Primary school or less			1		1		1		1	
Lower secondary			1,291	n.s.	1,440	n.s.	1,240	n.s.	1,408	n.s.
Higher secondary or more			,914	n.s.	,820	n.s.	,626	n.s.	,661	n.s.
Mother currently working			1		1		1		1	
Mothers were retired or disabled			,566	n.s.	,435	*	,483	n.s.	,535	n.s.
Mothers were currently domestic			,375	*	,321	**	,300	**	,291	**
Mothers were currently other			,600	n.s.	,479	n.s.	,452	n.s.	,493	n.s.
Language spoken with mother										
More Dutch than Turkish			1		1		1		1	
More Turkish than Dutch			,332	**	,429	*	,436	*	,443	n.s.
Mostly Turkish			,254	***	,434	*	,396	*	,394	*
Respondent raised in Turkish language					1		1		1	
Respondent raised in Turkish and Dutch language					1,620	n.s.	1,813	n.s.	1,870	n.s.
Language spoken with siblings										
Mostly Dutch					1		1		1	
More Dutch than Turkish					,593	n.s.	,679	n.s.	,652	n.s.
More Turkish than Dutch					,172	***	,155	***	,145	***
Siblings without educational qualifications					1		1		1	
All siblings hold educational qualification					,627	n.s.	,645	n.s.	,575	n.s.
Respondent's highest educational attainment										
Lower secondary or less							1		1	
Upper secondary							2,734	*	2,989	*
Tertiary education							3,003	*	3,960	***
Did no repeat during secondary education							1		1	
Repeated secondary at least once							1,714	*	1,753	*
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1		1	
Less welcome than others							,439	*	,442	*
Teachers were important during secondary school							1		1	
Teachers SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							1,875	*	1,967	*
Teachers NOT important during secondary school							1,650	n.s.	1,599	n.s.
Mother important during secondary school							1		1	
Mother SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							1,551	n.s.	1,481	n.s.
Mother NOT important during secondary school							1,309	n.s.	1,158	n.s.
During secondary school parents met REGULARLY with teachers							1		1	
During secondary school parents met SOMETIMES with teachers							,786	n.s.	,916	n.s.
During secondary school parents met RARELY with teachers							,972	n.s.	,719	n.s.
Origin background of 3 current best friends										
Mainly Turkish origin friends									1	
Friends with mixed origins									,584	n.s.
Fewer visits to Turkey in the last 5 years - once or twice a year									,767	
Three/four a year									,584	n.s.
Five or more often a year									,491	*
Visited, doesn't said how many									,325	*
N	439		389		372		359		359	

* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001

6.1.2. **Competent bilingualism: Between school experiences and language uses in the family**

In this section I analyze, for each country separately, the predictive value of various factors with respect to individuals' self-reported competent bilingualism. In France, Turkish descendants' likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism was, like for language assimilation, significantly predicted by childhood language and language uses with the mother, particularly monolingual childhood and use of the parents' native language with the mother (see Table 43). But in contrast to the previous bilingual profile, gender, school experiences—namely high educational attainment, grade repetition, and subjective perceptions of being unwelcome—as well as mothers' regular participation in school meetings, and peers' mixed origins, increased the likelihood that a respondent would report competent bilingualism. Again, neither social background indicators nor language uses with siblings predicted Turkish descendants' bilingual profiles in France. Neither city nor visits to Turkey had any effect on the likelihood of respondents in France reporting competent bilingualism.

This likelihood was twice as high for women as for men; three times higher for those raised in the parents' native language compared to those who had a bilingual childhood; between three and almost six times higher among respondents who reported mixing languages (both Turkish and French) or using only Turkish with their mothers, compared to those using mainly French. In addition, respondents were two times more likely to report competent bilingualism if their parents met regularly with teachers than if their parents did so more rarely; and three times more likely if their mothers' importance during their school experience was low than if was high (although this effect's significance level was not very high); three times more likely if they had attained tertiary education than if they had attained lower secondary or less; and twice as likely if they had repeated a grade in secondary school or experienced school as less welcoming for pupils with their immigrant background. Peers' origins also affected the likelihood of competent bilingualism, but mainly comparing those with mixed origins to those with mainly French origin friends.

For descendants of Turkish immigrants in Germany, the analysis confirmed once again the importance of individuals' high school attainment and their mothers' employment status (see Table 44). However, unlike language assimilation, competent bilingualism was also associated to other contextual determinants: namely language use in the family, visits to

Turkey, fathers' involvement in school, and living in Berlin. In this case, no effects of fathers' educational attainment were found. The likelihood of competent bilingualism was four times higher among those who had attained the apprenticeship level compared to those with the lowest levels of educational attainment (lower secondary or less; no differences were found between the lowest and highest educated respondents); and eight times higher for those with working mothers compared to those with non-working mothers (though there was no distinction between stay-at-home mothers and working mothers) or for those whose fathers did not play an important role during school compared to those whose father played a crucial role. For language uses in the family, chances of competent bilingualism were five times higher among those who use German more when speaking with their siblings than among those who use a mix of German and the parents' native language; inversely, the chances were three times higher for those who predominantly use the parents' native language with the mother than for those who use German more. Finally, and as expected, the likelihood was more than two times higher for those who visit Turkey, compared to those who do not.

For Turkish descendants in the Netherlands, the likelihood of competent bilingualism was determined by current uses of the parents' native language in the family, visits to Turkey, siblings' educational qualifications, the importance of teachers, but not the importance of fathers during school (see Table 45). In contrast to linguistic assimilation, language contact variables showed prediction effects (except, again, childhood language), while individuals' educational attainment and social background variables had none. Turkish descendants in the Netherlands were more than three times more likely to report competent bilingualism if they use Turkish more with their mothers compared to those who use mainly Dutch (like in France and Germany); the likelihood was also almost twice as high if they reported using the Turkish language more with their siblings than if they reported using mainly Dutch (in contrast to Germany). The likelihood was higher, as in Germany, among respondents who visit Turkey than among those who seldom go; among those whose siblings hold post-secondary diplomas after secondary school compared to those whose siblings had no diploma. It was two times greater if teachers had been important during their school trajectory than if teachers were less important, as well as if parents and teachers met rarely rather than regularly.

Table 43– Likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism, France

Likelihood for self-reporting a bilingual profile:**France**

	Competent bilingual									
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
City of residence										
Paris	1		1		1		1		1	
Strasbourg	1,533	*	1,312	n.s.	1,147	n.s.	,998	n.s.	,900	n.s.
Gender										
Men	1		1		1		1		1	
Women	1,554	*	1,649	*	1,593	*	1,595	n.s.	1,868	*
Age										
18-24	1		1		1		1		1	
25-29	,572	*	,599	*	,592	n.s.	,560	n.s.	,581	n.s.
30 or more	,445	*	,448	*	,426	*	,592	n.s.	,550	n.s.
Social background - highest educational attainment										
Primary education or less			1		1		1		1	
Lower secondary			1,111	n.s.	1,128	n.s.	1,194	n.s.	1,047	n.s.
Higher secondary or more			1,653	n.s.	1,909	*	1,909	*	1,767	n.s.
Mother currently working										
Mothers were currently unemployed			,785	n.s.	,652	n.s.	,601	n.s.	,674	n.s.
Mothers were currently domestic			,660	n.s.	,617	n.s.	,580	n.s.	,596	n.s.
Mothers were currently other			1,135	n.s.	,875	n.s.	1,032	n.s.	,998	n.s.
Language spoken with mother										
More French than Turkish			1		1		1		1	
More Turkish than French			3,904	**	3,219	*	2,877	*	3,376	*
Mostly Turkish			5,801	***	4,332	**	5,152	**	6,226	***
Raised in Turkish language										
Raised in Turkish and French, or just French					1		1		1	
					,323	***	,322	***	,345	***
Language spoken with siblings										
Mostly French					1		1		1	
More French than Turkish					1,340	n.s.	1,392	n.s.	1,623	n.s.
More Turkish than French					,811	n.s.	,920	n.s.	,903	n.s.
Siblings without educational qualifications					1		1		1	
All siblings hold educational qualification					,990	n.s.	,694	n.s.	,691	n.s.
Respondent's highest educational attainment										
Lower secondary or less							1		1	
Apprenticeship							1,899	n.s.	1,917	n.s.
Upper secondary							2,281	*	2,193	n.s.
Tertiary education							3,205	*	3,211	*
Did no repeat during secondary education							1		1	
Repeated secondary at least once							1,808	*	2,125	*
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1		1	
Less welcome than others							1,776	n.s.	2,008	*
Teachers were important during secondary school							1		1	
Teachers SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							,817	n.s.	,789	n.s.
Teachers NOT important during secondary school							,501	*	,520	*
Mother important during secondary school							1		1	
Mother SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							2,911	*	2,983	*
Mother NOT important during secondary school							2,368	*	2,113	*
During secondary school parents met REGULARLY with teachers							1		1	
During secondary school parents met SOMETIMES with teachers							,878	n.s.	,889	n.s.
During secondary school parents met RARELY with teachers							,389	**	,349	**
Origin background of 3 current best friends										
Mainly French origin friends									1	
Mainly Turkish origin friends									,732	n.s.
Friends with mixed origins									,357	*
Fewer visits to Turkey in the last 5 years - once or twice a year									1	
Three/four a year									,819	n.s.
Five or more a year									1,128	n.s.
N	500		489		450		433		431	

* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001

Table 44– Likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism, Germany

Likelihood for self-reporting a bilingual profile:**Germany**

	Competent bilingual									
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
City of residence										
Berlin	1		1		1		1		1	
Frankfurt	,523	*	,478	**	,570	*	,381	**	,403	*
Gender										
Men	1		1		1		1		1	
Women	,947	n.s.	,919	n.s.	,931	n.s.	,801	n.s.	,777	n.s.
Age										
18-24	1		1		1		1		1	
25-29	1,680	*	1,789	*	2,184	*	1,871	n.s.	1,850	n.s.
30 or more	1,750	*	1,933	*	2,110	*	1,825	n.s.	1,774	n.s.
Social background - highest educational attainment										
No schooling or Koran school			1		1		1		1	
Primary education			1,016	n.s.	1,146	n.s.	1,143	n.s.	1,123	n.s.
Lower secondary			,462	n.s.	,402	*	,442	n.s.	,522	n.s.
Higher secondary or more			,984	n.s.	,885	n.s.	,952	n.s.	1,046	n.s.
Mother currently working			1		1		1		1	
Mothers were currently domestic			,493	*	,461	*	,496	*	,533	n.s.
Mothers were currently other			,209	***	,154	***	,116	***	,119	***
Language spoken with mother										
More German than parents' native language			1		1		1		1	
More parents' native language than German			1,201	n.s.	2,460	*	3,506	**	3,384	*
Language spoken with siblings										
Mostly German					1		1		1	
More German than parents' native language					1,109	n.s.	1,128	n.s.	1,084	n.s.
More parents' native language than German					,224	***	,219	**	,209	**
No siblings or no answer					1,050	n.s.	,981	n.s.	1,776	n.s.
Siblings without educational qualifications					1		1		1	
All siblings hold educational qualification					,984	n.s.	,932	n.s.	1,056	n.s.
No siblings or no answer					5,659	*	4,410	n.s.	2,795	n.s.
Respondent's highest educational attainment										
Lower secondary or less							1		1	
Apprenticeship							3,465	***	3,635	***
Upper secondary or more							,923	n.s.	1,065	n.s.
Did no repeat during secondary education							1		1	
Repeated secondary at least once							,682	n.s.	,698	n.s.
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1		1	
Less welcome than others							,969	n.s.	,862	n.s.
Teachers were important during secondary school							1		1	
Teachers SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							1,065	n.s.	,933	n.s.
Teachers NOT important during secondary school							2,342	*	2,000	n.s.
Father important during secondary school							1		1	
Father SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							2,066	n.s.	1,988	n.s.
Father NOT important during secondary school							3,176	*	3,160	*
During secondary school parents met SOMETIMES with teachers							1		1	
During secondary school parents met RARELY with teachers							1,166	n.s.	1,101	n.s.
Origin background of 3 current best friends										
Mainly German origin friends									1	
Mainly Turkish origin friends									1,673	n.s.
Friends with mixed origins									,911	n.s.
No visits to Turkey									1	
Once/twice a year									1,278	n.s.
Three/four a year									2,665	*
Five or more often a year									1,626	n.s.
N	503		434		429		418		424	

* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001

Table 45– Likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism, the Netherlands

Likelihood for self-reporting a bilingual profile:**The Netherlands**

	Competent bilingual									
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
City of residence										
Amsterdam	1		1		1		1		1	
Rotterdam	,990	n.s.	,902	n.s.	,878	n.s.	,828	n.s.	,853	n.s.
Gender										
Men	1		1		1		1		1	
Women	1,107	n.s.	1,165	n.s.	1,328	n.s.	1,273	n.s.	1,263	n.s.
Age										
18-24	1		1		1		1		1	
25-29	1,338	n.s.	1,505	n.s.	1,478	n.s.	1,458	n.s.	1,424	n.s.
30 or more	1,560	n.s.	1,649	n.s.	1,801	n.s.	1,611	n.s.	1,650	n.s.
Social background - highest educational attainment										
Primary school or less			1		1		1		1	
Lower secondary			1,537	n.s.	1,494	n.s.	1,560	n.s.	1,461	n.s.
Higher secondary or more			1,595	n.s.	1,545	n.s.	1,679	n.s.	1,631	n.s.
Mother currently working			1		1		1		1	
Mothers were retired or disabled			1,880	n.s.	2,060	n.s.	2,313	*	2,122	n.s.
Mothers were currently domestic			1,554	n.s.	1,632	n.s.	1,769	n.s.	1,781	n.s.
Mothers were currently other			1,179	n.s.	1,231	n.s.	1,482	n.s.	1,340	n.s.
Language spoken with mother										
More Dutch than Turkish			1		1		1		1	
More Turkish than Dutch			1,852	n.s.	1,776	n.s.	1,839	n.s.	1,759	n.s.
Mostly Turkish			3,876	***	3,545	*	3,392	*	3,425	*
Respondent raised in Turkish language					1		1		1	
Respondent raised in Turkish and Dutch language					,801	n.s.	,716	n.s.	,714	n.s.
Language spoken with siblings										
Mostly Dutch					1		1		1	
More Dutch than Turkish					1,518	n.s.	1,462	n.s.	1,546	n.s.
More Turkish than Dutch					1,707	n.s.	1,863	n.s.	1,957	*
Siblings without educational qualifications					1		1		1	
All siblings hold educational qualification					1,708	*	1,610	n.s.	1,709	*
Respondent's highest educational attainment										
Lower secondary or less							1		1	
Upper secondary							,745	n.s.	,724	n.s.
Tertiary education							1,002	n.s.	,878	n.s.
Did no repeat during secondary education							1		1	
Repeated secondary at least once							,883	n.s.	,857	n.s.
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1		1	
Less welcome than others							1,526	n.s.	1,456	n.s.
Teachers were important during secondary school							1		1	
Teachers SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							,477	*	,477	*
Teachers NOT important during secondary school							,984	n.s.	1,034	n.s.
Mother important during secondary school							1		1	
Mother SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							,819	n.s.	,854	n.s.
Mother NOT important during secondary school							1,296	n.s.	1,417	n.s.
During secondary school parents met REGULARLY with teachers							1		1	
During secondary school parents met SOMETIMES with teachers							1,024	n.s.	1,323	n.s.
During secondary school parents met RARELY with teachers							,822	n.s.	1,315	*
Origin background of 3 current best friends										
Mainly Turkish origin friends									1	
Friends with mixed origins									1,232	n.s.
Fewer visits to Turkey in the last 5 years - once or twice a year									1	
Three/four a year									1,096	n.s.
Five or more often a year									1,414	n.s.
Visited, doesn't said how many									2,294	*
N	439		389		372		359		359	

* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001

6.1.3. **Limited bilingualism: Between school experiences and language contact in the family**

In this section I analyze, for each country separately, the predictive value of various factors with respect to individuals' self-reporting of limited bilingualism. Due to the small number of such cases in France, respondents from this country were not included in this analysis. In Germany, factors found to be significantly predictive of limited bilingualism included living in Frankfurt, siblings' lack of educational qualifications, peers' mixed origins, school experiences (namely low educational attainment, grade repetition, and the father's importance during studies) and few visits to Turkey (see Table 4). Thus, there were no prediction effects of either social background indicators or language contact variables, apart from visits to Turkey. The pattern of limited bilingualism in Germany reflected a combination of individuals' disadvantageous social characteristics with other country characteristics. Thus, this form of bilingualism was three times more likely to be found in those living in Frankfurt than in those living in Berlin; almost three times more likely among the lowest educated respondents (lower secondary or less) compared to those with apprenticeship level, and seven times more likely compared to those with upper secondary or more; it was three times higher among those who had repeated a grade in secondary school compared to those who had not; almost three times higher for those whose father played an important role during their education; considerably higher if siblings had not acquired educational qualifications compared to those with no siblings (no difference between those whose siblings do or do not hold qualifications); and almost three times higher if the respondent's peers were of mixed origins, compared to those whose peers were German, or for those who have not visited Turkey during the last five years compared to those who do so frequently.

In the Netherlands, the likelihood of limited bilingualism increased with certain social background conditions (father's low level of education, mothers' non-involvement in school), individuals' low educational attainment and the use of the parents' native language when speaking with siblings. Thus, a combination of socially disadvantageous factors, associated with contact with the parents' native language (but independent of language uses with the mother) influenced this likelihood. Those who use mainly Turkish with siblings are more than three times more likely to be limited bilinguals, but there is little distinction between mixed language uses and the use of mainly Dutch (see Table 47). Similarly, the likelihood is higher among respondents who attained only lower secondary education (as opposed to upper secondary or tertiary), or whose fathers completed primary school or less (rather than lower

secondary; no difference was found between the highest and lowest educated fathers); and four times more among those whose mothers' had been important during secondary school.

Table 46– Likelihood to report limited bilingualism, Germany

Likelihood for self-reporting a bilingual profile: Germany

	<u>Limited bilingual</u>									
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
City of residence										
Berlin	1		1		1		1		1	
Frankfurt	1,674	*	2,161	***	2,022	*	3,222	***	3,340	***
Gender										
Men	1		1		1		1		1	
Women	,240	n.s.	,740	n.s.	,682	n.s.	,808	n.s.	,720	n.s.
Age										
18-24	1		1		1		1		1	
25-29	,761	n.s.	,642	n.s.	,575	*	,561	n.s.	,570	n.s.
30 or more	,625	*	,541	*	,479	*	,478	*	,522	n.s.
Social background - highest educational attainment										
No schooling or Koran school			1		1		1		1	
Primary education			1,696	*	1,620	n.s.	1,438	n.s.	1,618	n.s.
Lower secondary			1,080	n.s.	1,214	n.s.	1,174	n.s.	1,049	n.s.
Higher secondary or more			1,392	n.s.	1,585	n.s.	1,571	n.s.	1,689	n.s.
Mother currently working			1		1		1		1	
Mothers were currently domestic			1,975	*	2,074	*	1,208	n.s.	1,115	n.s.
Mothers were currently other			2,497	*	2,833	*	2,341	*	2,176	n.s.
Language spoken with mother										
More German than parents' native language			1		1		1		1	
More parents' native language than German			1,485	n.s.	1,238	n.s.	,982	n.s.	1,156	n.s.
Language spoken with siblings										
Mostly German					1		1		1	
More German parents' native language					,716	n.s.	,539	n.s.	,524	n.s.
More parents' native language than German					1,217	n.s.	,871	n.s.	,830	n.s.
No siblings or no answer					2,473	n.s.	5,443	*	1,766	n.s.
Siblings without educational qualifications					1		1		1	
All siblings hold educational qualification					,812	n.s.	,696	n.s.	1,388	n.s.
No siblings or no answer					,037	**	,011	***	,028	*
Respondent's highest educational attainment										
Lower secondary or less							1		1	
Apprenticeship							,339	***	,337	***
Upper secondary or more							,160	***	,146	***
Did no repeat during secondary education							1		1	
Repeated secondary at least once							2,856	***	3,060	***
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1		1	
Less welcome than others							,553	*	,594	n.s.
Teachers were important during secondary school							1		1	
Teachers SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							,847	n.s.	,944	n.s.
Teachers NOT important during secondary school							,367	*	,475	n.s.
Father important during secondary school							1		1	
Father SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							,361	*	,376	*
Father NOT important during secondary school							,202	***	,231	**
During secondary school parents met SOMETIMES with teachers							1		1	
During secondary school parents met RARELY with teachers							,836	n.s.	,741	n.s.
Origin background of 3 current best friends										
Mainly German origin friends									1	
Mainly Turkish origin friends									1,368	n.s.
Friends with mixed origins									2,730	*
No visits to Turkey									1	
Once/twice a year									,466	*
Three/four a year									,150	***
Five or more often a year									,337	*
N	503		434		429		418		418	

* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001

Table 47 - Likelihood to report limited bilingualism, the Netherlands

Likelihood for self-reporting a bilingual profile:**The Netherlands**

	Limited bilingual									
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
City of residence										
Amsterdam	1		1		1		1		1	
Rotterdam	1,214	n.s.	,914	n.s.	,769	n.s.	,731	n.s.	,715	n.s.
Gender	1		1		1		1		1	
Men	1,009	n.s.	1,096	n.s.	,957	n.s.	1,077	n.s.	1,086	n.s.
Women										
Age										
18-24	1		1		1		1		1	
25-29	2,720	*	3,203	n.s.	2,665	n.s.	2,542	n.s.	2,420	n.s.
30 or more	1,556	n.s.	1,647	n.s.	1,188	n.s.	1,053	n.s.	,937	n.s.
Social background - highest educational attainment										
Primary school or less			1		1		1		1	
Lower secondary			,281	*	,219	*	,254	*	,258	*
Higher secondary or more			,608	n.s.	,679	n.s.	,754	n.s.	,768	n.s.
Mother currently working										
Mothers were retired or disabled			1		1		1		1	
Mothers were currently domestic			,718	n.s.	,753	n.s.	,670	n.s.	,745	n.s.
Mothers were currently other			1,994	n.s.	1,932	n.s.	1,636	n.s.	1,766	n.s.
Higher secondary or more			1,705	n.s.	2,008	n.s.	1,589	n.s.	1,737	n.s.
Language spoken with mother										
More Dutch than Turkish			1		1		1		1	
More Turkish than Dutch			1,845	n.s.	1,291	n.s.	1,311	n.s.	1,360	n.s.
Mostly Turkish			,852	n.s.	,439	n.s.	,591	n.s.	,583	n.s.
Respondent raised in Turkish language					1		1		1	
Respondent raised in Turkish and Dutch language					1,032	n.s.	,995	n.s.	1,024	n.s.
Language spoken with siblings										
Mostly Dutch					1		1		1	
More Dutch than Turkish					1,389	n.s.	1,244	n.s.	1,206	n.s.
More Turkish than Dutch					4,262	*	3,397	*	3,354	*
Siblings without educational qualifications					1		1		1	
All siblings hold educational qualification					,797	n.s.	,705	n.s.	,677	n.s.
Respondent's highest educational attainment										
Lower secondary or less							1		1	
Upper secondary							,448	*	,415	*
Tertiary education							,302	*	,296	*
Did no repeat during secondary education							1		1	
Repeated secondary at least once							,761	n.s.	,796	n.s.
Pupils of immigrant origin as welcome as others in secondary school							1		1	
Less welcome than others							1,080	n.s.	1,214	n.s.
Teachers were important during secondary school							1		1	
Teachers SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							1,584	n.s.	1,629	n.s.
Teachers NOT important during secondary school							,597	n.s.	,555	n.s.
Mother important during secondary school							1		1	
Mother SOMEWHAT important during secondary school							,685	n.s.	,638	n.s.
Mother NOT important during secondary school							,267	n.s.	,250	*
During secondary school parents met REGULARLY with teachers							1		1	
During secondary school parents met SOMETIMES with teachers							1,152	n.s.	,810	n.s.
During secondary school parents met RARELY with teachers							1,127	n.s.	1,004	n.s.
Origin background of 3 current best friends										
Mainly Turkish origin friends									1	
Friends with mixed origins									,856	n.s.
Fewer visits to Turkey in the last 5 years - once or twice a year									1	
Three/four a year									1,695	n.s.
Five or more often a year									1,063	n.s.
Visited, doesn't said how many									,589	n.s.
N	439		389		372		359		359	

* P<0,05; **P<0,001 ; ***p<0,0001

6.2. Conclusion

Here I will try to establish an understanding of these different results, discussing the predictive power of the main factors along the way. This final section is divided into three parts: the first deals with the importance of current language opportunities in the family of origin, the second with the role of indicators of social class, and the third with the place of the observed types of intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family.

As observed above, individual effects, such as age, city and, more rarely, gender, played a role in predicting the bilingual profiles of individuals. Age had opposing effects in France and Germany, while no significant effect of age was found for the Netherlands. In France, older participants and those living in Paris were more likely to report linguistic assimilation, while younger women were more likely to report competent bilingualism—revealing the more recent emergence of this second bilingual profile in France. In all cases, the level of significance of age effects was always lower than that of the effects of language dynamics within the family (namely, childhood language and language uses in the family, but not respondents' own educational level). In contrast, in Germany, no effects of age, gender or city on the likelihood of linguistic assimilation were found (the main factors that did have an influence related to social background and the respondents' educational attainment), but such effects were found for the likelihood of reporting competent or limited bilingualism. In Germany, in contrast to France, the levels of significance of age and city effects were always lower than those of individuals' educational attainment, though the latter disappeared when school experiences and other contextual indicators were taken into account. The likelihood of that an individual would report competent bilingualism was higher for older respondents and those living in Berlin, while younger respondents living in Frankfurt showed, were instead, more likely to report limited bilingualism, suggesting a concerning pattern for the future. Both trends revealed different from what was observed for France, particularly in Frankfurt. In Germany, competent bilingualism has been becoming less common with more recent birth cohorts, while limited bilingualism has been gaining ground at the same pace.

In addition, peers' origins were mainly observed to have an impact on bilingual profiles where respondents had the highest proportion of friend with non-immigrant background: most of all in Germany, less in France, and not at all in the Netherlands. More specifically, having current best friends of German origin made linguistic assimilation more likely compared to

having best friends with either Turkish origins or mixed origins. Inversely, reporting mainly mixed origin friends rather than mainly national origin friends increased the likelihood of reporting limited bilingualism, in Germany, or competent bilingualism, in France. In sum, having a majority of Turkish origin friends did not significantly predict either competent bilingual or limited bilingualism, and only predicted language assimilation in Germany. In the Netherlands there were no effects in relation to friends' origin background, which was not a surprise as no more than 10% of respondents had mainly Dutch origin friends.

Moreover, where visits to Turkey are more common (>50% of respondents in France go quite regularly: see Figure 102), the chances of linguistic assimilation increased with the frequency of visits, but this factor had no significant effect on the likelihood of competent bilingualism. In the other two countries, where fewer respondents frequently visit Turkey, this indicator had a more selective meaning in terms of opportunities for contact with the parents' native language. Thus, the likelihood of reporting language assimilation was lower among those who visit Turkey more often than among those who visit the country the least (in the Netherlands), while the same was observed for the likelihood of reporting limited bilingualism (in Germany). Inversely, the likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism increased with the frequency of visits to Turkey. In sum, visits to Turkey provide not only opportunities to acquire additional skills in Turkish, but also additional general linguistic self-esteem.

The importance of current language opportunities in the family of origin

The TIES data demonstrated the importance of language practices in the family of origin, and particularly of the use of the parents' native language with the mother. Indeed, for all countries, different language acculturation practices in the family had significant predictive effects on respondents' bilingual profiles. Because the survey country language is dominant outside the family of origin, use of native language within the family significantly predicted successful transmission of the parents' native language and its maintenance in younger generations, and its mixing with national languages, in language assimilation trends. However, respondents' speaking with their parents in their native language carried little costs in terms of the acquisition of the survey country language, promoting instead the acquisition of additional language skills and not limited bilingualism. Furthermore, the uses of exclusively parents' native language during childhood in the family showed the same prediction in France. Among these, having experienced a Turkish monolingual childhood

increased the likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism, whereas a bilingual childhood increased the likelihood of reporting language assimilation, and very few individuals reported limited bilingualism. And although no effect of childhood language on the likelihood of reporting any bilingual profile was found in the Netherlands, it also emerged that in France parents' linguistic capital was more consistently associated with their language transmission choices than in the Netherlands. Indeed, while in France childhood's language played a role and social background played none, in the Netherlands the opposite pattern was found.

Siblings provide additional opportunities for language contact and resources within the family of origin. But while in France these had no significant effect whatsoever on individuals' reported bilingual profile, in the Netherlands and Germany they led to significant variation. In some situations, these language uses were closely associated with individuals' achievement of language proficiency, others less. For instance, in the Netherlands, language uses with siblings had a more significant effect than language uses with mother on the chances of linguistic assimilation and limited bilingualism, but a less significant effect on competent bilingualism. Using parents' native language rather than the national language with siblings decreased the likelihood of reporting language assimilation (as with mothers), and increased the likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism or limited bilingualism. Although limited bilinguals in both Germany and the Netherlands generally preferred to use their parents' native language (see, for instance, Figures 97, 98, 100, 101, 106, and 107 in this chapter), only in the Netherlands (and not in Germany) was the use of the parents' native language with siblings associated to the risk of semi-linguism. However, respondents' use of their parents' native language with their siblings was associated to a high likelihood of reporting limited bilingualism among individuals and their parents who also have a low level of education, revealing a combination of several limitations on skills. Instead, in Germany, language uses with siblings contributed only to predicting competent bilingualism and not other bilingual profiles, presenting a higher explanatory value and significance level compared to language uses with the mother, but in an inverted pattern. Thus, those who speak more with their siblings in their parents' native language were less likely to report competent bilingualism than those who use mainly German with their siblings. As shown in Figure 100 of this chapter, in Frankfurt there was no relation between language uses with siblings and respondents' bilingual profiles, while in Berlin only 10% of competent bilinguals used mostly their parents' native language, with the large majority using German. In addition, more than language uses with siblings, or even with the mother, the likelihood of reporting competent

bilingualism was clearly more determined by either individuals' level of education (specifically, apprenticeship) or their mothers' employment status.

To put in a nutshell, Turkish descendants' likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism was significantly higher when attitudes in the family were bicultural rather than assimilation-oriented, i.e., from the combination of individuals' acquisition of the national language outside the home and the use of their parents' native language as the main tool for family communication. The use of both languages inside home increased instead acculturation patterns for different generations, i.e., the likelihood of language assimilation reporting for respondents. Beyond these language use patterns, significant country differences were found, and beyond this we find respondents' linguistic starting point of respondents. We know that parents' linguistic capital at least partly determines children's linguistic self-esteem and language outcomes. This is the case because parents' language transmission involves the transmission not only of lexical tools, but most importantly that of linguistic self-esteem (Brizić, 2006). The impact of having parents with lower linguistic self-esteem can be attenuated by a better combination of parents' linguistic capital, in terms of proficiency and linguistic self-esteem, with the language transmitted in the family; and, as observed in chapter 5, in Germany language transmission within the family was clearly not associated to parents' linguistic socialization experiences. Thus, it is no surprise that while for some parents in Germany, language uses are not always accordingly to parents' specific language proficiency; in others, like in France or the Netherlands, the two factors had consonant predictive effects. In Germany, the likelihood of reporting semi-linguism or language assimilation was less dependent on childhood language and current uses with the mother and siblings than on social background indicators and individuals' further educational attainment. In France, where parents' language transmission practices were clearly more associated to their own linguistic socialization experiences compared to what occurred in Germany, the predictive effects of childhood language and language uses with the mother were larger than those of social background factors, with higher prediction compared to respondents' highest educational attainment. In the Netherlands, where the combination between parents' language transmission and their language capital was only observed for proficiency in Dutch language and not for their educational attainment, predictions on bilingual reporting differ from France. In the former country, family language dynamics and social indicators showed more similar prediction effects on respondents' bilingual outcomes.

These observations reinforce three arguments extensively used in this study. First, parents should transmit only languages in which they are proficient, so as to reduce the likelihood of transmitting lower linguistic self-esteem. Second, providing the opportunity to practice parents' native language within the family does not reduce, but improves the chances of developing high linguistic self-esteem in any language. This is the case because more diverse language skills improve an individual's cognitive development, and thus any language proficiency. Third, individuals' language uses have an effect on their proficiency, which varies according to the interlocutor. For instance, the use of the parents' native language with siblings increased the likelihood of reporting either competent or limited bilingualism in the Netherlands, while decreasing the likelihood of competent bilingualism in Germany. However, while in case of competent bilingualism the predictions observed for language uses with siblings were associated to high educational attainment, for limited bilingualism in the Netherlands these predictions were also determined by individuals' and fathers' low educational attainment.

Self-reported bilingual profiles as a matter of social selectivity

Bilingual profiles were associated to language dynamics in the family in the extent of their further association to individuals' social background and other social indicators. The main social variables that had significant predictive effects were, as previously seen, respondents' educational attainment and fathers' highest educational attainment, while mothers' social background indicators and siblings' holding or not an educational qualification had little effect. For instance, as previously discussed, when the main tool for communication with the mother was the language already dominant outside the family, the chances of successful acquisition of this language were indeed higher (at least in terms of self-reported proficiency), at the cost of parents' native language loss. When these trends are considered against the background of further social indicators, they correspond to two different dynamics, which are reflected in different country profiles.

On one hand, for Germany and the Netherlands, the factors determining whether an individual was more likely to report linguistic assimilation or limited bilingualism reflected some social selectivity (including siblings' level of education). In Germany, individuals with fathers educated to a high level were more likely to report language assimilation than those whose parents had attained primary education or less (mother working or not working had a lesser effect); in the Netherlands, having a working mother was associated with higher chances of

language assimilation; in both Germany and the Netherlands, respondents with a higher level of education were also more likely to report language assimilation. Similarly, in Germany, the likelihood of reporting limited bilingualism was lower among more educated respondents and those whose siblings had no educational qualifications (compared to those with no siblings, showing limited effects here), but neither fathers' educational attainment nor mothers' employment status had an effect. In the Netherlands mothers' employment status did not have an effect on the likelihood of limited bilingualism, but the probability was higher when fathers' and respondents' educational attainment was low. In sum, lesser use of parents' native language may result in limited bilingualism among individuals with a less advantageous social position. Otherwise, among individuals with a more advantageous social position, it may instead result in linguistic assimilation.

Competent bilingualism was clearly subject to a lower degree of social selectivity in Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany there were no effects of fathers' education level, mothers' employment status or siblings' attainment of educational qualifications, but it was more likely among respondents educated to the apprenticeship level compared to the lowest educated (lower secondary or less). In the Netherlands, competent bilingualism was again not associated to fathers' educational attainment, mothers' employment status, or respondents' educational attainment, but here it was associated to siblings' attainment of educational qualifications: those whose siblings had achieved some educational qualification were more likely to report competent bilingualism. In both countries, the likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism was associated both to more use of the parents' native language with the mother as well as to contextual indicators related to survey country school experiences (through siblings' and respondents' subjective experiences), while less to social background.

In sum, these social dynamics confirmed what the argument in the previous sections. Indicators of social selectivity in Germany varied in their impact on Turkish descendants' bilingual profile—while respondents' educational attainment always had a predictive effect for any reported bilingual profile, social background variables were only found to have significant predictive effects on the chances of language assimilation. In the Netherlands, different social selectivity indicators had more consonant effects. Here, both social background indicators and respondents' educational attainment had significant prediction effects, showing inverse trends for the likelihood to report language assimilation or limited bilingualism, but none for competent bilingualism. Last but not least, in France social factors

were less associated to any bilingual outcomes (in terms of social no background or respondents' educational attainment, but in terms of siblings' diploma). More similar to the other two countries, only the likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism increased with high levels of education, but it was not found to be subject to any influence from social background variables. Thus, in France bilingual profiles were associated to individuals' linguistic starting conditions (childhood language in the family) and current language uses with the mother (but not with siblings), and for educational attainment only with reference to competent bilingualism (like in the Netherlands and Germany).

Still, other school experiences also influenced the likelihood of different bilingual profiles, but with no overall patterns. Turkish descendants who repeated a grade in secondary education were more likely to report linguistic assimilation in the Netherlands, limited bilingualism in Germany, and competent bilingualism in France. In addition, the level of significance of this variable was lower than that of respondents' educational attainment and social background in the Netherlands, and lower than that of respondents' educational attainment in Germany and France. Subjective school experiences had similar significant prediction effects for all countries, being more common in France, only for some cases in the Netherlands and related to parents' importance during secondary school in Germany. In France and the Netherlands, more positive perceptions of the school environment were related to a higher likelihood of reporting linguistic assimilation, while, only in France, the opposite was true for competent bilingualism (no effects in Germany). Inversely, teachers and parents' importance during secondary school also predicted bilingual profiles. In France and the Netherlands, if teachers had been less important for respondents, the likelihood of language assimilation increased compared to those whose teachers had been important, while the opposite was true for the likelihood of reporting competent bilingualism (no effects for Germany). And while in France parents' involvement in school increased likelihood of language assimilation and decreased that of competent bilingualism, meetings with teachers had an inverse effect on competent bilingualism, and none on language assimilation. Results in Germany showed that if fathers had been important during secondary school, the likelihood increased in reporting either language assimilation or competent bilingualism, and the contrary being true only for limited bilingual likelihood. No effects in the Netherlands this time.

The main message here is that competent bilingualism depends more on diverse contextual variables (e.g., school experiences, language practices in the family) and less on social background. Linguistic assimilation likelihood depends both on social background and on further contextual variables, although this is slightly less true in France. Two further complementary arguments must be added to complete this last point. On one hand, only where parents most combined their previous language capital with their language practices in the family (France), the chances of linguistic assimilation were not predicted by social background indicators, highlighting how language practices can modulate the impact of parents' low linguistic self-esteem. The difference between the chances of limited bilingualism and language assimilation depended on the influence of social background on family language dynamics. If family language dynamics were less accordingly to parents' educational attainment and national language proficiency, once we add other contextual variables (such as school experiences) to the model, social background prediction value decreases for low linguistic self-esteem reporting (i.e., for limited bilingualism in Germany), while this does not occur when family language dynamics were at least accordingly to parents' national language proficiency (for limited bilingualism in the Netherlands). Last but not least, the effect of these main predictions reinforced and helped us to understand the main patterns observed in the first section of this chapter, on intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family. Where the main social indicators (such as social background and school experiences) showed a more significant prediction effect compared to language dynamics in the family, respondents showed also more cases of problematic linguistic situations in terms of language acculturation, and this in relation not only to the general society but as well as to family communication.

Conclusion

This study looked in detail at the management of language diversity among the descendants of Turkish immigrants and their families of origin in France, Germany and the Netherlands. The data for the study were drawn from The Integration of European Second Generation (TIES) survey and focused on parents' linguistic capital (reported by respondents), childhood language in the family, self-reported linguistic self-esteem, and current language uses in the family. No homogeneous language patterns among the Turkish descendants surveyed in the three countries and six cities emerged from the analyses. Instead, the country and city differences were related to specific sociolinguistic dynamics, and as expected, individuals' current linguistic self-esteem depended on how their linguistic starting points interacted with language dynamics in the family, their social background, and the city context where they grew up and live, particularly in the form of school experiences. The findings suggest four interrelated main conclusions:

1. Diversity
of language outcomes was mainly present in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, with a greater tendency toward bilingualism in Strasbourg and Paris, and a greater concentration of problematic cases in Berlin and, first and foremost, Frankfurt. Otherwise, country differences clearly indicated that language diversity among descendants of Turkish immigrants has been a major issue in Germany and the Netherlands (while being less problematic in France), corroborating early studies on individuals of Turkish origin in the three countries.
2. The co-
existence of two or more languages in the family of origin (the national language and the parents' native language(s)), during childhood and at the time of the survey, did not increase individuals' likelihood of developing bilingual competency. Instead, it decreased Turkish descendants' opportunities to learn their parents' native language(s), consequently increasing the gap in reported linguistic self-esteem between these different languages;
3. Inversely, a
monolingual family environment had positive effects on Turkish descendants'

linguistic self-esteem. The experience of a context where the minority language is the main tool of communication increased the chances of acquiring this language while decreasing the gap between reported linguistic self-esteem in national and parents' native languages, i.e., increasing the likelihood of competent bilingualism;

4. A bi- or plurilingual family environment (including the national and parents' native language(s)) had positive effects on Turkish descendants' linguistic self-esteem only when these family language dynamics were combined with parents' possession of high levels of linguistic capital (national language proficiency and educational attainment). When this pre-condition was not met, a bi- or plurilingual family environment with parents instead tended to promote limited bilingualism, particularly among Turkish descendants from more disadvantageous social backgrounds. Thus, where parents' linguistic socialization experiences have provided them with limited linguistic capital, it is more advantageous for children's linguistic self-esteem if the language in which parents are the most confident is used exclusively the family language environment.

Policy approaches and linguistic self-esteem

As described above, the results presented here indicate that language diversity among the descendants of Turkish immigrants has been a major issue in Germany and the Netherlands (while being less problematic in France). This corroborates early studies on individuals of Turkish origins in the three countries. Indeed, top-down approaches to language diversity have pointed in the same direction—immigrant languages have been a major integration policies issue in the Netherlands and Germany and less so in France, at two levels: in internal debates on society's cultural diversity and the place of immigrant languages within this diversity, and the resulting successive phases of inclusion and then abolishment of immigrant languages in national educational policies in these countries.

For instance, although in France there has been substantial resistance to political recognition, at both the international and national levels, of language diversity, internally the country has seen less debate concerning immigrant languages, particularly with respect to Turkish languages. And although language diversity has recently been officially recognized as a source of cultural enrichment for French society, this recognition included few references to

immigrant minority languages. Thus, the French approach has been blind to immigrant languages in its official recognition of language diversity and related institutions, although support for immigrant language teaching has been offered in public schools (with funding from private and home-country sources) since the 1970s. Although not as widespread as in the Netherlands, Turkish has been among the immigrant language programs with the most dynamic and persistent enrolment among pupils of immigrant background.

In the post-World War II context in Germany, political recognition of diversity, including language diversity, was promoted. In these terms the country has been more open compared to France, although not to the same degree as the Netherlands. Despite this formal political openness, German society has continued to be culturally self-perceived mostly as a monolingual country, and particularly non-European immigrant languages have been approached as foreign in relation to German culture and history. Immigrant language support has existed in public schools since the early 1960s, funded by private and home-country sources as in France. In addition, the policy history of Frankfurt in terms of immigrant language differs from that of Berlin. In the late 1980s, the state of Hessen included immigrant language instruction in its educational policies, as in the Netherlands, although enrolment was significantly lower than in the latter case. But with the assimilationist turn in Hessen's governmental elections in the late 1990s, immigrant language instruction was abolished from the state's policies. Nevertheless, in both Berlin and Frankfurt, public support for immigrant language instruction was intended to serve a paradoxical pair of aims. On one hand, aiming to control and prevent more "radical" communitarianism from developing in these immigrant language trainings; on the other hand, to prevent excessive cultural assimilation of the children of immigrants, who were expected to "return" to their parents' country of origin (which was, for a long time, the main country of nationality of many of these children).

The Netherlands was the country in this group that most welcomed international agreements on the recognition of language diversity. This recognition of pluriculturalism certainly influenced the early inclusion of immigrant language instruction in national educational policies. From its beginnings, this inclusion was also subject to significant criticism, as in the other two countries, stimulating numerous debates that led to various changes in policy on immigrant language instruction over time. Also as in the other two countries, Turkish was one of the immigrant language programs with the highest enrolment; in the case of the Netherlands, probably the highest. Finally, with the national elections in the early 2000s that

resulted in an assimilationist turn in Dutch integration policies, immigrant language instruction was eliminated the national educational policy, leading to its return to provision mainly by private and home-country institutions for the first time since the late 1960s.

The TIES data included no information on language training attended by either parents or respondents in either the national language or the parents' native language. However, previous studies have presented two interesting conclusions on this question. 1) Turkish language enrolment by children of immigrants has been among the highest in each of the survey countries compared to other immigrant language programs: among them, enrolment has been highest in the Netherlands, followed by Germany, and lowest in France; 2) the language offered has been mainly the official Turkish language, with instruction in minority languages from Turkey (mainly Kurdish languages) only rarely offered.

At the beginning of Chapter 5, I discussed the fact that many Turkish immigrant families brought with them a linguistic legacy that differs from the official national language in Turkey, including a number of Turkish regional dialects as well as Kurdish. The TIES data did not distinguish speakers of the official Turkish language from speakers of Turkish regional dialects, although it did distinguish Kurdish and other minority languages. Although the former distinction was not explicitly covered, the information available in the TIES data on parents' regional and rural origins makes it a strong probability that at least some of those whose children reported Turkish as their parents' native language had to be native speakers of Turkish regional dialects. Given the impossibility of confirming this probability on the basis of the data from the TIES survey, the only conclusion that can be drawn here is that because the existing immigrant language training in each survey country was provided mainly in the official Turkish language, in many cases this training was probably provided in a language that differed from the one used in children's language environment at home with the parents.

Furthermore, Extra (1993, 2001) and Fishman (1964, 2007) presented findings showing that such immigrant language programs had a limited impact on the transmission and maintenance of the native languages of immigrant parents. For instance, Extra (1993, 2001) showed that in many European countries these programs were generally not organized as bilingual teaching. Less attention was given to immigrant language evaluation, with the focus instead being on improving proficiency in the national language and other school subjects. Although some of these languages have recently been recognized as school subjects, this has occurred mainly

for lower and upper secondary education, and these subjects have remained unattractive for pupils due to a lack of incentives (either because they carry less weight in overall marks for diplomas compared to other foreign languages, such as English or French, or are included in final exams but with no time allotted to classes in the school schedule). In addition, over the first years of school socialization (namely, kindergarten and primary education), instruction in immigrant languages is maintained in classes where pupils are separated from their classmates, often provided outside regular school hours, and not subjected to official evaluation as other subjects are.

Fishman (1964, 2007) argued that schools alone cannot be expected to make it possible for children from minority language backgrounds to develop bilingual skills. One of the main arguments in Fishman's studies has been that the role of schools is neither to provide for the transmission of immigrant parents' native language nor its maintenance, a role that depends considerably more on the development of language confidence and skills in a 'home-family-neighbourhood-community' environment nexus. Thus, for Fishman (1964, 2007) the transmission of immigrant parents' native languages depends on their role as "languages of solidarity", i.e., as a key tool in the cultural autonomy and emancipation of minority language groups. Inversely, when minority languages are widely used in the public domain, with language-institutional supports such as media, educational systems, business, governmental institutions, etc., they assume a different and complementary role as a "language of status" (Fishman, 1991; 2007:789) The latter usually occurs independently of the spread of its acquisition by potentially bi- or plurilingual individuals. In other words, for Fishman the first and main condition for parents' native language transmission and successful acquisition lies in the family, while further institutional support can offer additional incentives, mainly by promoting it into a role as a language of status. In this regard, using the TIES data it was possible to draw important conclusions on the family language patterns of Turkish descendants in the three countries under study.

Main trends found – by country and city

A large proportion of Turkish descendants in the TIES survey reported the expected dominance of the survey country national language over their parents' native language, as many indicated that they had failed to better develop fluency in the latter. In general, they were more likely to speak with their parents in their native language, often mixed with the

national language, but reported low linguistic self-esteem in this language and were unlikely to use it with their siblings.

For instance, in France, the majority of respondents reported competent bilingualism, particularly in Strasbourg (59%, 50% in Paris), while language assimilation was more common in Paris (40%) than in Strasbourg (19%—the lowest level in the TIES sample, together with Berlin). The remaining respondents reported limited bilingualism or subtractive bilingualism (parents' native language dominant), in the opposite pattern—only 10 percent of Turkish descendants in Paris (the lowest in the TIES data), twice as high in Strasbourg (20%). In contrast, almost no city differences were found in the use of the parents' native language with siblings, which was, again, higher in Strasbourg than in Paris (11% each in Strasbourg, 4%-6% in Paris).

In sum, Turkish descendants' acculturation in their parents' language was the lowest in France out of the three countries, but with a paradoxical pair of trends in respondents' reports: the highest degree of national language acculturation for language uses with siblings alongside the highest reported rate of competent bilingualism in terms of linguistic self-esteem. What result might be expected from the combination of "blind" policies toward immigrant language diversity and the language contact opportunities reported by respondents (by indirect indicators: see chapter 6)? Was their reported bilingual self-esteem of little use, risking the disappearance of their parents' language within a generation? Did the long school trajectories in both cities mean that their linguistic socialization experiences were dominated by the French language to the point of leading to potential loss of their parents' native language in terms of actual language practices? What role, if any, did the approach taken to language diversity in French policies play in this lesser use of reported bilingual skills within these Turkish immigrant families?

The TIES data for Germany revealed contrasting patterns of language acculturation among respondents and parents in the two cities, though the prevalence of problematic situations of low linguistic self-esteem in both German and immigrant parents' native language in Berlin and Frankfurt differed less than that of other patterns. Compared to the other two countries, national language acculturation was more common, particularly in Frankfurt, as reflected in parents' German language acculturation, respondents' childhood language in the family, current language uses with siblings and, to a lesser extent, current language uses with parents.

In terms of linguistic self-esteem, there were considerably fewer reported cases of competent bilingualism in Germany, particularly in Frankfurt (21%, 34% in Berlin), and of linguistic assimilation (17% in Berlin, 29% in Frankfurt). In contrast, significantly more individuals reported either limited bilingualism (29% in Berlin, and the highest proportion in Frankfurt, 39%) or parents' native-dominant subtractive bilingualism (17% in Berlin and around 10% in Frankfurt). Perhaps not surprisingly given trends toward national language acculturation in the family, Turkish descendants in Germany reported knowing their parents' native language relatively less well than their counterparts in the other countries. However, in a considerable number of cases, their low linguistic self-esteem also applied to the German language.

City differences were observed in Germany both in terms of the history of language policy and TIES results. In Frankfurt, immigrant language instruction was included in educational policies for sixteen years, but was abolished ten years ago due to the assimilationist turn in Hessen's integration policies. Here, language patterns indicated one of the strongest trends toward acculturation, albeit with a substantial proportion reporting limited bilingualism. In Berlin, the presence of Turkish immigrants was promoted for the development of the city's industry in the political context of its isolation after World War II, whereas language instruction has been less widespread compared to Frankfurt, though its provision within public schools by private institutions has continuously been accepted. Language patterns among Turkish descendants and their parents in Berlin are slightly more centered in the parents' native language, though not as observed in France. In practice, few city differences were seen in unsuccessful language acquisition. Taken together, respondents who reported parents' native language-dominant subtractive bilingualism and those reporting limited bilingualism made up 45 percent of Turkish descendants in Berlin and 42 percent in Frankfurt (the two highest cities in the TIES sample). In Frankfurt, almost all of these reported limited bilingualism. Do Turkish descendants in Germany need to experience one further generation (grandchildren of immigrants) to overcome the disadvantages of their social background and to achieve linguistic levels similar to those of the descendants of immigrants in the other two countries? How did German society's approach to immigrant minority languages influence both the shorter school careers and the lower linguistic self-esteem of its largest group of immigrant descendants?

The Netherlands proved to have the greatest diversity of bilingual profiles with fewer cases of unsuccessful language acquisition compared to Germany, and the least significant city

differences. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam the number Turkish descendants reporting competent bilingualism (39%) was almost the same as the number reporting language assimilation (42% in Amsterdam and 36% in Rotterdam), while the remaining respondents mainly reported limited bilingualism (17%-20%), and, in a very few cases, parents' native-dominant subtractive bilingualism (3%-6%). There were no city differences, in respondents' linguistic self-esteem or their lower degree of language assimilation as measured by language use with siblings compared to the other countries (use of the national language with siblings in the Netherlands was the lowest of the three countries); and no differences in unsuccessful language acquisition (between 18% in Amsterdam and 25% in Rotterdam, only comparable to Strasbourg).

Thus, the reports of respondents in the Netherlands indicated a significant rate of language assimilation, suggesting the possibility of significant language shift, but they also indicated the lowest degree of language assimilation in terms of uses with siblings. In terms of linguistic self-esteem, Turkish descendants in the Netherlands reported fewer cases of competent bilingualism and more of limited bilingualism compared to their counterparts in France, but used their parents' native language more outside of parent-child relations. Was the lower number of cases of competent bilingualism compared to France due to perceptions of immigrant minority languages as having low social prestige in the Netherlands during the last ten years—a period where Turkish language programs have been among the immigrant language programs with the highest enrolment? Are their patterns of lower linguistic self-esteem compared to their counterparts in France due to increasing pressure toward (language) acculturation and assimilation, but in a context where their parents' native language remains useful? Was their reported childhood language in the family also an outcome of the same paradoxical context?

In sum, we have seen that bilingual skills and successful language outcomes depend on a number of sociolinguistic dynamics. These dynamics show that linguistic self-esteem depends less on mismatch between home and school or age at school entry and considerably more on the combination of linguistic starting points in the family, ongoing language dynamics in the family, social background, and school opportunities. The next section focuses on the main conclusions related to respondents' linguistic starting points.

The importance of individuals' linguistic starting point

The language legacies that immigrant parents carry with them into their immigration countries have already been subjected to hierarchical structure in their country of origin—a context that may be particularly disadvantageous for those from rural areas and with low levels of formal education. Their responses to these linguistic socialization experiences expressed in choices about language use and transmission with their children determined the linguistic starting point of respondents.

Out of the three countries studied here, France was the one where Turkish monolingualism in the home during childhood was most common, with significantly fewer cases of bilingual childhood (i.e., combinations of Turkish and French). This could be explained by parents' own language acculturation. In comparison to the parents in the other countries, those in France are highly educated, with half of them having acquired proficiency in French, but they showed the weakest tendency toward acculturation in terms of the acquisition of national language reading and writing skills. Thus, the linguistic starting conditions of Turkish descendants in France were characterized by parents with literacy skills in their native language combined with limited proficiency in French, and more cases of providing a monolingual childhood to their children than a bilingual one—if parents' educational attainment and French proficiency were higher, bilingual childhood was more common, and vice-versa. Comparison of Paris and Strasbourg revealed further differences: parents in Paris were higher educated, had developed greater proficiency in French, were more likely to have raised their children bilingually, and use more French with their children (the respondents), while those in Strasbourg were lower educated, had a lesser mastery of French, were more likely to provide a monolingual childhood to their children, and have continued to make lesser use of French. This type of linguistic socialization in the family increased the probability of leaving their children with positive linguistic self-esteem, in both languages. Indeed, in terms of linguistic self-esteem, less than 30 percent of respondents indicated language assimilation, while the large majority of the remaining respondents reported competent bilingualism, and almost none reported low linguistic self-esteem for both languages.

The pattern observed in Germany was very different. First, almost all descendants of Turkish immigrants had a bi- or plurilingual childhood (the highest proportion in the TIES data). Second, differences in parents' reported linguistic socialization experiences reflected the fact that some parents had been adult immigrants and others immigrant children was further

reflected in the diversity of these parents' educational experiences and general language socialization. Those parents (one quarter) who were children of immigrants themselves—although most were born in Turkey—are the highest educated among Turkish parents in Germany (see Chapter 3), and are highly proficient in German. The other 75 percent had migrated during adulthood, were the group of parents in the TIES sample with the lowest level of education, but their reported to be German language proficient, and their reported national language writing and reading skills superior to those in France. In sum, the bulk of Turkish parents in Germany showed the strongest trend toward acculturation in the survey country language among the parents in the TIES data analysed in this study, despite their lower level of formal education. The linguistic starting point of Turkish descendants in Germany was thus characterized by a situation where a majority of parents possessed low literacy skills in any language, because of their highly limited or almost nonexistent academic skills in their own native language. This was combined with language acculturation practices within the family: namely, parents who are proficient in German, bi- or plurilingualism in the family for respondents, and, to a lesser extent, ongoing bi- or plurilingualism between parents and respondents. Thus, the lowest educated parents risked creating situations involving communication difficulties for themselves and the impact of transmitting to their children low linguistic self-esteem was expected to be (Brizić, 2006, see Chapter 1). Indeed, indicators of respondents' linguistic self-esteem revealed an unsuccessful outcome for almost half of the respondents (with fewer than a third reporting limited bilingualism, and fewer than a fifth reporting native-dominant subtractive bilingualism). The other half reported more successful language acquisition, either language assimilation (about one quarter of respondents) or bilingual skills (about 30%). Analyses of the data from the two cities revealed that overall, transmission of parents' native language was greater in Berlin, while language acculturation or simply native language loss was more common in Frankfurt.

In the Netherlands, the large majority of descendants of Turkish immigrants had a bilingual childhood (Turkish and Dutch), but some had a Turkish monolingual childhood (21%). Respondents' parents were slightly more educated than those in Germany, and half of them had acquired at least sufficient Dutch language proficiency. In comparative terms, the TIES data indicated a greater average tendency toward acculturation (as reflected in national language reading and writing skills) among Turkish parents in the Netherlands than in France. The linguistic starting point of Turkish descendants in the Netherlands was characterized, then, by parents with literacy skills in their native language, proficiency in Dutch, and a

bilingual childhood home language environment. And because bilingual childhood was only combined with fathers' having a high level of proficiency in the national language in a subset of cases but not in relation to their general literacy skills (assessed here by their educational attainment), the transmission of positive linguistic self-esteem was not always expected. Linguistic socialization experiences within the family in the Netherlands resulted in a high degree of loss of immigrant parents' native language in terms of linguistic self-esteem, particularly when compared to their counterparts in France: respondents were either linguistically assimilated (40%) or competent bilinguals (almost 40%), while more unsuccessful outcomes were reported for the remaining cases (more than one fifth reported limited bilingualism). In contrast, outside the home they used their parents' native language considerably more than their counterparts in other countries and cities.

Patterns of intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family

Intergenerational language acculturation in the family (approached in the light of the segmented assimilation theory of Portes and Zhou during the 1990s: see Chapter 1) implied, here, an association between respondents having a bilingual profile in terms of linguistic self-esteem, and their fathers' reported proficiency in the survey country national language being high. Here, seven types of intergenerational acculturation in the family were distinguished, with some Turkish descendants reporting potentially risky combinations of characteristics while the responses of others, on the contrary, suggested successful linguistic integration in both the survey country and the family. Not surprisingly, country differences confirmed the above expectations – with a greater proportion of problematic situations in Germany, fewer in the Netherlands, and fewer still in France.

Situations of risk were identified each time individuals reported limited linguistic self-esteem in the national language, i.e., in the language that represents the pre-requisite for integration in survey country. This situation is the most problematic where individuals report limited bilingualism and their parents are insufficiently acculturated in the national language. Both situations create the risk of a high degree of isolation in relation to the dominant language in society, together with the risk of family disruption due to the potential for dissonant communication in the family. Very few such cases were identified in the TIES data; their numbers were higher in Frankfurt, Berlin and Rotterdam and significantly lower in

Amsterdam, Paris and Strasbourg. A second situation occurred where individuals reported limited bilingualism and their fathers were linguistically acculturated. Here again there is a potential risk of dissonant communication within the family, representing a risk of family disruption, but respondents were more isolated than their parents from the dominant language in the wider society. Such cases present a risk of intergenerational reversal, a situation considerably more present in Germany, particularly in Frankfurt, and significantly less so in both Dutch and French cities. The other problematic type was where there was consonant communication in the family but the children reported higher linguistic self-esteem in their parents' native language than in the national language, and fathers were not linguistically acculturated. These situations were very uncommon in any country and city. In sum, as seen in Chapter 6, all classes of problematic situations were more common in Germany, considerably less common in the Netherlands, and least common in France. More specifically, situations of risk were mainly present in Berlin (45%) and Frankfurt (43%), particularly when there was dissonant communication in the family (28% and 39%, respectively), and less common when there was consonant communication with children and parents (17% and 10%, respectively). These numbers were considerably lower for the other cities: 19 and 6 percent in Rotterdam (for dissonant and consonant communication, respectively), 14 and 3 percent in Amsterdam, 11 and 10 percent in Strasbourg, 6 and 4 percent in Paris.

Inversely, more successful linguistic patterns occurred where Turkish descendants acquired sufficient language proficiency to minimize risks relating to both language integration in society and family communication. Such patterns made up the largest majority of cases observed in France and the Netherlands (90% in Paris, 83% in Amsterdam, 78% in Strasbourg, and 75% in Rotterdam), and a significantly smaller proportion, although still a majority, in Germany (55% in Berlin and 51% in Frankfurt). However, this general class included three different profiles. First, where Turkish descendants did not lose their parents' native language background, giving children the potential role of "language brokers" in communication between family of origin and surrounding society. These cases were most common in France (50-59%), followed by the Netherlands (two fifths), and considerably less common in Germany, particularly in Frankfurt (21; 34% in Berlin). A second, contrasting situation occurred when respondents lost their parents' native language (showing high proficiency only in the national language), and their parents were also linguistically acculturated. Here, communication in the family was consonant, linguistic integration in society possible, but individuals' access to their parents' native language legacy was limited.

As expected, such cases were most common in Frankfurt (27%), followed by Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam (around 22%), and considerably less frequent in Strasbourg (9%). Last but not least, when linguistic success meant high proficiency only in the national language, but parents were not acculturated in terms of national language proficiency. Here, children's linguistic integration in society was successfully achieved, but at the cost of potential disruption in family communication. This potentially dissonant communication in the family could have led to role reversal in the family of origin due to the children's greater degree of autonomy in society compared to their parents. These situations were more common in Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam (14%-19%), considerably less common in Strasbourg (10%), and almost entirely absent in Berlin and Frankfurt (0%-3%).

How are these patterns related to the respondents' social background and school experiences? The prediction effects observed at the end of chapter 6 helped us to understand the main patterns observed in intergenerational language knowledge transmission and acculturation in the family. Where the main social indicators (such as social background and school experiences) showed higher prediction effects compared to language dynamics within the family, more cases of problematic linguistic situations were also observed, not only in relation to the general society but in the family. This is the topic of the next section.

Bilingualism and social integration

Additional contextual factors remind us of the role of the educational system in the dynamics of social reproduction. For instance, ethnic segregation in schools, as is seen in German *Hauptschulen*, amplifies the negative consequences of pupils' disadvantageous social background (including home-school language mismatch). And indeed, out of these three countries, it is in Germany that social and immigrant background best predict individuals' highest educational attainment. Moreover, it was only in Germany that competent bilinguals performed slightly less well in school (and having a less advantageous social background) than linguistically assimilated respondents, with both groups doing better than limited bilinguals. However, the likelihood of both linguistic assimilation and competent bilingualism increased with respondents' higher educational attainment, while the likelihood of limited bilingualism increased with low educational attainment. In contrast, differences in social background were predictive of linguistic assimilation but not of other bilingual profiles

(competent or limited bilingualism). In sum, because reported bilingual profiles were predicted by individuals' educational attainment, and the latter by social background, social background did determine individuals' linguistic self-esteem in the end, albeit indirectly.

In France and the Netherlands, Turkish descendants entered earlier into school and were selected considerably later, and school tracking less common before upper secondary. In addition, inequalities in terms of social and immigrant background were less significant for individuals' highest educational attainment compared to Germany. And both indicators (social background and individuals' highest educational attainment) showed similar degrees of association to competent bilingualism and linguistic assimilation, while being inversely associated to limited bilingualism or parents' native language dominance. Moreover, predictions of social background in individuals' highest educational attainment also reflected differences between Turkish descendants in France and the Netherlands. Explanatory results showed that in the Netherlands, where tracking occurs slightly earlier in the school system and parents' linguistic capital was only moderately associated to individuals' childhood language, respondents' highest educational attainment and social background predicted both linguistic assimilation and limited bilingualism (in opposite directions), but did not predict competent bilingualism. In France, where tracking in the school system was latest and parents' linguistic capital was more closely associated with respondents' childhood language, there was no prediction effect of social background for any bilingual profile, and highest educational attainment predicted only the likelihood of competent bilingualism. Thus, here, social background matter the least.

In sum, educational systems, the place where formal credentials and qualifications involve a kind of objectivation of knowledge and language proficiency, are also one of the main mechanisms for creating and sustaining existing (language) inequalities (Bourdieu, 1991:24-25), because the emphasis on "functional literacy" in school produces a cultural devaluation of minority backgrounds (Cummins during the 1990s; Hornberger, 2001:268-274). Thus, just as for initially social disadvantaged individuals socio-economic segregation may lead to low school achievement, beyond the possible lack of individuals skills in any language individuals may be, in fact, a lack of *opportunity* due to their home language background. In other words, low linguistic self-esteem is not a pure linguistic or cognitive trait, but is instead intrinsically associated to the value assigned to their parents' native language or home language environment in other learning contexts, particularly schools (August and Hakuta,

2005). Moreover, a successful transition between different language environments relies on what Cummins summarizes in his language interdependence hypothesis: the expected positive effects of this transition are time-dependent and focused on writing skills, i.e., they only occur after a period of contact long enough for individuals to attain some degree of proficiency and self-esteem in each language in relation to both lexical and socio-cultural environments (usually five years, and thus after the end of primary school). This way, systems that select pupils earlier than this offer them fewer opportunities to catch up after an initial home-school language mismatch situation compared to systems that select pupils after the first crucial years of language socialization in school. Indeed, in the TIES data, bilingual outcomes proved to be more differentiated by social indicators where home-school language mismatch was a major issue in educational policies (described above), i.e., where individuals' chances of longer school careers were significantly more determined by social and immigrant background.

These results support the conclusion that social background determines educational attainment and reported linguistic self-esteem in very similar ways (directly and indirectly). Thus, the causal dynamics of educational attainment and linguistic success were similar, in this respect. However, these also relate to a long lasting debate on the nature of the relation between school and language outcomes: what is cause and what effect? Our understanding of this relation depends on our understanding of linguistic success itself, which can be understood as being embodied by two completely different profiles: linguistic assimilation and competent bilingualism.

We have seen that linguistic assimilation depends on resources embedded in individuals' social background. Given that existing language dominance in society leads to vulnerability for individuals of minority language background, many perceive language assimilation as the paradigm case of successful integration, in strategic terms, because it typifies what is considered the main point—mastery of the national language. From this standpoint, bilingualism is regarded as an additional skill that depends not so much on social background as on contextual opportunities, and that creates no significant advantages in integration terms.

Other authors, in contrast, interpret competent bilingualism as an indicator of more complete social integration. In these approaches, competent bilingualism is taken to reflect a more complete form of participation in society and in the dynamics of social change than language

assimilation. Such approaches recognize the importance of whether or not competent bilingualism is achieved in determining processes of language shift, language reversal or language maintenance, taking into consideration the perspective of individuals of minority language background and their families (Fishman, 1991). This type of view involves an understanding of language as an important tool for the emancipation and empowerment of linguistic minorities. It also implies a more attentive examination of efficiency and incentive factors that depend on the combination of social background resources and other contextual determinants.

Finally, let me conclude with the observation that individuals' linguistic success depends on more and less favourable sociolinguistic situations, with an impact on both educational and linguistic outcomes. The aim of providing individuals with opportunities to develop their capacities and thereby have more choices is best served by endowing them with a wider range of resources. Promoting the creation of bridges between the family language environment and the wider society is one way to provide such resources, whereas cutting these links leads to the loss of a legacy. Those whose native language is dominant in society seldom face the choice of whether or not to relinquish a family language legacy over the course of a single generation. The descendants of Turkish immigrants, however, inevitably do. Studies in linguistics and psycholinguistics show that the mastery of two or more languages enlarges an individual's cognitive capacities: it only becomes a disadvantage insofar as societies offer unequal opportunities to those with different social and immigrant backgrounds. Thus, where language difference was taken as a handicap instead of an asset, individuals and families showed a stronger trend toward acculturation. None of the countries studied here has been substantially more inclusive in terms of language diversity than the others, but while France has mainly been diversity-blind, in others language diversity has been a major issue. The difference between these two approaches seems to have been reflected by trends in the acculturation of individuals and families. In addition, where schools are socially selective at an early age, bilingual self-esteem turned out to be even more strongly determined by social indicators. Nevertheless, the general devaluation of minority languages in schools ended up influencing individuals' language practices, notably outside parents-children relation, and particularly where individuals had longer school careers and the system was less selective in its early stages.

Appendix

Chapter 3

Tables 38 –Turkish parents – educational attainment by labour market in emigration country, by country and father/mother

	Parents' highest education attainment														
	France					Germany					The Netherlands				
<i>% column</i>	no schooling or koran	primary school	lower sec	higher sec or more	Total	no schooling or koran	primary school	lower sec	higher sec or more	Total	no schooling or koran	primary school	lower sec	higher sec or more	Total
<i>Fathers' occupation when respondents was 15 years old (1) (fr*, de* and nl**)</i>															
Executive, professionals and white collars		6.4	5.3	22.0	9.9	11.8	17.6	12.5	25.0	16.6		16.1	10.0	36.0	18.9
Skilled manual workers		72.4	78.0	70.6	73.6	63.4	70.6	57.5	73.2	67.4	88.9	62.1	72.0	56.0	64.3
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers		21.2	16.7	7.3	16.4	24.7	11.8	30.0	1.8	16.0	11.1	21.8	18.0	8.0	16.8
Not working		7.7	1.5	6.0	5.5	13.1	19.0	2.4	1.8	12.9	64.0	38.3	30.6	29.6	36.6
<i>Fathers' current situation in labour market (de*, nl* and fr***)</i>															
Working		59.4	74.4	73.9	67.4	61.1	63.5	89.4	88.9	69.8	20.0	29.2	54.1	64.6	42.9
Unemployed		14.0	6.0	10.8	10.9	6.2	4.4	2.1	4.8	4.7	16.0	7.8	5.9	7.6	7.9
Retired or disabled		26.6	19.5	15.3	21.7	32.7	32.0	8.5	6.3	25.5	64.0	63.0	40.0	27.8	49.3
Total Fathers (% row)		47.7	28.1	24.2	482	28.5	44.5	11.7	15.3	404	8.1	45.1	24.2	22.7	343
<i>Mothers' occupation when respondents was 15 years old (1)(fr*and de*)</i>															
Executive, professionals and white collars		11.0		27.3	11.8	4.0			26.3	7.0	10.0	3.0	33.3	57.9	24.1
Skilled manual workers	54.5	48.4	58.5	50.0	51.3	48.0	27.3	77.4	68.4	60.5	20.0	36.4	33.3	36.8	33.7
Semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers	45.5	40.7	41.5	22.7	36.9	48.0	72.7	22.6	5.3	32.6	70.0	60.6	33.3	5.3	42.2
Not working	82.8	58.6	60.6	42.1	59.7	88.3	89.1	61.3	34.5	79.7	83.6	82.2	69.6	50.0	76.5
<i>Mothers' current situation in labour market (de* and fr** and nl**)</i>															
Working	10.9	25.5	25.5	40.0	25.8	17.1	13.7	57.9	66.7	27.5	8.1	16.0	29.0	42.5	20.2
Unemployed	7.8	11.8	10.4	13.3	11.2	1.4	1.1	3.9		1.7	12.9	5.5	8.7	10.0	8.0
Retired or disabled	18.8	5.0	7.5	5.3	7.5	9.0	9.5	5.3	6.7	8.3	19.4	24.9	21.7	15.0	22.2
Domestic	62.5	57.7	56.6	41.3	55.5	72.4	75.8	32.9	26.7	62.5	59.7	53.6	40.6	32.5	49.7
Total Mothers (% row)	13.7	46.4	22.5	17.4	480	50.3	24.3	18.4	7.0	423	17.3	52.1	19.1	11.6	353
Source: TIES, INED 2010															
(1) % column: % for each professional category is made in relation to total of those working.															
fr *, de* and nl* chi2 sign p<0.000; fr** and nl** chi2 sign p<0.001; fr*** chi2 sign p<0.01															

Figure 106 - Turkish fathers




Figure 107 – Non-Turkish fathers




Figure 108 – Turkish mothers





Figure 109 – Non-Turkish mothers



Chapter 6

Figure 110

Current language uses with friends, by city and friends' origins




Figure 111




Figure 112

Current language uses with friends, by city, age and friends' origins




Table 39

	Paris	Strasbourg	France	Berlin	Frankfurt	Germany	Amsterdam	Rotterdam	Netherlands
No siblings	5,4	3,1	8,5	12,4	9,3	21,7	1,2	1,9	3,1
Siblings who have left secondary school WITH									
Respondents is older sibling diploma or certificate	93,4	78,9	88,8	81,8	92,5	87,0	82,5	81,6	82,0
Siblings who have left secondary school									
WITHOUT diploma or certificate	6,6	21,1	11,2	18,2	7,5	13,0	17,5	18,4	18,0
subtotal	121	57	178	55	53	108	63	76	139
Siblings who have left secondary school WITH									
Respondent is not older sibling diploma or certificate	79,7	52,9	64,0	79,5	79,2	79,4	64,1	55,3	59,6
Siblings who have left secondary school									
WITHOUT diploma or certificate	20,3	47,1	36,0	20,5	20,8	20,6	35,9	44,7	40,4
subtotal	123	174	297	166	173	339	142	150	292
TOTAL	258	239	497	253	250	503	208	231	439

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